ARGUMENTS About the ALTERATION of
TRIENNIAL ELECTIONS
OF PARLIAMENT.
In a LETTER to a Friend in the Country.
SIR,
YOUR last Letter expresses your great Concerns and Fears about the Design now on foot for the Alteration of the
Act for the frequent Meeting and Calling of Parliaments
in one Particular, that is, the Changing the
Term
for
Elections
of
Parliament,
from
three
to
more
Years; and at the same time gives me an Account of the several
Objections,
which make the greatest Noise around you upon that Subject. The same
Fears,
and the same
Objections,
I find to be very common, and very warmly propagated in all Conversations here in Town.
For my self, I acknowledge that it is with
me,
in
this
Case, as it is in many others of Importance; the
first Surprize
gave me the like
Uneasiness
to what you express: But I am very well satisfied, that the most likely Way to cure that Uneasiness, is, to debate the Matter as Friends; and to examine, Whether that
Surprize
be the Force of
meer Prejudice,
or of good Judgment. And for this, I am very sure, I am in one Respect, at least, well qualified, That as to my own private Advantage, or Interest, it is not of the least Importance to me, Whether the
Parliament
may, with the Consent of the
King,
sit
three
Years, or
seven
Years, or
twenty
Years. I have no Designs, nor Views; no
Piques,
nor
Resentments;
to incline me one way or other: And therefore, if you will put your self into the same
Posture
of Mind, we will, if you please, enter upon this Subject.
In all
Debates
of this Nature, there are
Two
principal Points, which will comprehend under them all other Particulars. The
One
is, Whether the Thing proposed be
lawful,
with regard to the Nature of our Constitution? The
Other
is, Whether it be
expedient,
or
useful,
to the Good Ends which ought always to be in the View of those who make Laws?
The
Lawfulness
of the Thing can't be denied by any Persons, tho' never so great Enemies to the doing it. Nor do I find, amongst all the
Topicks
employed against it, that any thing of Moment is
against the Right or Authority of the
Legislature
to do it. It is no more
a Fundamental
of our
Constitution,
That a
New Parliament
must be summon'd every
three Years,
than at any other Interval. It is equally just, as far as
Right
and
Authority
are concern'd, for the
King, Lords
and
Commons,
to six it for
one
Term, as for
another:
And if it were not out of their
Right
to make that
Great Alteration,
which fix'd it for
three
Years, it certainly cannot be out of their
Right
to make a much less
Alteration,
by fixing it once more to another Term.
As to the Sense and Mind of the Electors, the Truth of the Matter is this: They are suppos'd to have no other View in their Choice of Persons, than to send such to Parliament as they think best qualified, by their Estates, Wisdom and Integrity, to do whatever is to be done in Parliament, without regard to the Time of their Sitting there. And there is no other End in the electing Representatives, but that they, from Time to Time, may make, and alter Laws, in such manner as best to consult and promote the Good of the whole Community: The very Election is, and must be supposed to impower the Elected Persons, faithfully, and impartially, to do every Thing that is necessary, or expedient, for the Preservation and Establishment of the Common Interest, whether it falls in with the Humours or Opinions of the Electors, or not. This brings us to the only Point to be consider'd, when any
Alteration
of a former
Changeable Law
is proposed; and that is, Whether, (all Things consider'd,) it be
Expedient
and
Useful?
And of this, as far as the Time past is concern'd,
Experience
is the best Judge. When a
Law
hath been long tried, and the
Consequences
and
Effects
of it in a Nation, have been many Years open and sensible, it requires but little Thought to judge, whether it be best to continue it in every Respect, as it is, or to model it anew. And now, if you please, we will consider the
Effect
the
Triennial Elections
have had amongst our selves at
Home;
and then it will be proper to think of the
Effect
they have had, and still must naturally have,
Abroad.
At
Home,
the least Evil is, that the
Tempers
and
Spirits
of Men are put into a
Fermen
,
and boil'd up into a
Rage,
which never is cooled, because the Returns, at which this
Rage
is useful to some Persons or other, are so
quick,
that it is not
Politick
in such Men to
let
it cease; nor perhaps possible for them to
make
it cease, even if they were willing to do so.
Riots, Tumults, Mutual Abuses, odious Nick-Names, Personal Affronts,
are kept alive and warm, from
Three
Year to
Three
Year, by Men of Design and Dexterity in the Management of other Men's
Passions;
improved and heighten'd by such
quick Returns:
These are what we see and feel of the
Effects
of it upon the Temper of a Nation, that if ever it is ruined, can be ruined by nothing but its divided Affections and Interests.
Besides this, there could not be contrived a Method more effectual to the Debauchery of the Subject's
Morals,
not only in
one,
but in
all,
Respects, than
this
hath proved.
Bribery,
known and open, (without a Remedy) which supposeth a Corruption of Mind, and naturally leads to an Insensibility to every thing Great and Honourable; and by Degrees, to a perfect Disregard to every thing Sacred and Useful. A Scene of Bestial Intemperance encouraged and paid for in many Places, for fear
Friendship
should cool, if it be not kept hot by such Methods.—And the Crimes that often accompany
this,
need not be mentioned. The least is a General Disposition in Men to leave the Thoughts of Diligence and Industry in their Business, for the more agreeable Entertainments of Idleness, and a luxurious Beggary.
I do not suppose or argue that this
Alteration
of the
Term
will put a full Stop to this Corruption of
Morals,
either as to
Bribery,
or to the other Instances named. But it is certain that the Returns being not so quick, the Tempers of Men must, in the Nature of Things, become much more easy to one another by Degrees; which is itself an Advantage greatly to be valued. It is certain, that the
Scent
of
Bribery
cannot be so strong, nor the Avowal of it so constant, when there is such an Intermission. And, as for that never-ceasing Current of
Debauchery,
requisite for so frequent Elections, it must be this way interrupted; and, in a good Degree, broken into. The Crimes often accompanying it must diminish: And the
Men,
brought up to laborious Callings, must exchange their
Idleness
for Industry; and become much more useful to their Families and the
Publick.
I mention not the Ruin both of the Estates and Morals of
Gentlemen,
so frequently
Candidates
at our Elections: They know best how well they can bear such Evils; and whether it tends to make themselves better
Patriots
to their Country, or better Fathers to their own Families, that they are to make their Way by so quick Returns of
Bribery
and
Corruption.
We have hitherto considered the ill Effect of these evil Consequences at home, supposing them to terminate in the Concerns of
Private
Men. But this Supposition is not to be continued. For you will see presently, that all these Things have a visible Influence upon the
Publick.
The General
Topick
amongst the Adversaries of this
Alteration,
as well
those
who
hate,
as those who
love, Liberty;
truly so called, is, the
seeming
Advantage of this Part of the
Act
to that great and lovely Good. I call it
seeming;
because, as it never was designed at first, by many of the most zealous Promoters of it, for any thing but to
cramp
the Endeavours of a
Good Prince,
for the settling our
Liberties:
So it hath never had any better lasting Effect that Way, than they design'd it should have; but, as I think, visibly tends, in its Consequences, to the Destruction of our legal Liberties. The Reason is short and plain. Nothing in the World can make Men more supinely negligent of the Publick Interest, or dispose them more to receive their Chains, than a State of
Bribery, Corruption, Debauchery
and
Idleness.
And this is the constant State of most of our
Electors,
meerly thro' the quick Returns, and the pleasing Prospect of
Elections.
The more lasting and uninterrupted this
State
is, the less sensible are they of the
Evils
it inclines them to. They are by degrees brought to think the
highest Bidder
to have the best Right to their
Votes.
And will act in Time agreeably to that Thought, whether the
Money
be offer'd them from Abroad, or at Home. The little Interruption to their Vices and their Expectations, is the Thing which makes the Danger so great: And this is owing to the frequent Returns of
Elections,
at so short, certain, Periods of Time.
Nor doth this Argument touch the
Electors
only, but the
Elected
also, to a very great degree. For as long as Humane Nature is capable of
Corruption;
as long as there is a
Probability,
or even a
Possibility,
of any Part of Mankind being induced to sell their Country and their Posterity, for a present Advantage to themselves; so long it is evident to a Demonstration, that
Gentlemen,
who have, by so frequent Returns of
Chargeable Elections,
exhausted their Estate, and impoverished their Families, will be much more likely to seek, or to embrace Opportunities of re-imbursing themselves, and preventing their own immediate Ruin, at the Expence of the publick
Liberty
and
Security;
much more likely I say, to act this Part, than if the
Term
were made longer; and if by that Means they might hope to be at rest from Expence for a much longer Time.
Add to this, that
Personal
and
Party-Revenge,
which is, of all others, the most strong
Principle
in the Bulk of
Men,
never fails to actuate both the
Candidates
and the
Electors.
If ever our Ruin be effected, it is too probable
this
will be the great Engine of it. And let every one judge, whether any thing could be devised more likely, either to raise, or actuate, or preserve that Spirit in its Keenness and Bitterness, than the
Triennial
Returns of
Elections,
and the Expectation of them: Or whether any thing can give us any
Respite
from that Spirit, and its fatal Consequences, but an
Alteration
of those
Returns
to a longer Distance.
There is another Consideration very well worth mentioning on this Subject, which is the Distribution of Justice in the Countries: It is manifest, that nothing hath diverted the Course of it from its proper
Current,
so much as the
Party-Views
of Men, kept up to such a Degree by the expected Returns of
frequent Elections;
and that nothing can recall it again, but some Rest from those Views which turn'd it aside. Men will not have the Temptation, and therefore not the Inclination, either to suspend Justice, or to act contrary to it, in many of those Instances, in which now their constant Hopes or Fears, actuated by the
Frequency
of
Elections,
are too apt to draw them aside. Besides that, when some Intermission is given to the Heats and Quarrels of Neighbours, the Occasions and Opportunities of Partiality or Injustice, must, in good measure, cease.
The
Effects
which I have now gone over are but too certain, as they are the natural Product of the Passions of Men, in a divided Nation; and they are
Evils,
which will be, by degrees, at least very much abated by the present Design.
We have hitherto consider'd our
Triennial Elections,
their Influence upon
Us
at
Home.
Now, let us consider what Effect They have had, and still naturally have,
Abroad.
And here it must be remembred, that We are a Nation, not separated in Interest (as We are in Situation) from the rest of
Europe.
We have Enemies at Home, acting in Concert with Enemies Abroad: And
Friends
Abroad, without regard to whose Interests and Alliances, We must sooner or later, become a Sacrifice to those Enemies. We have a
Pretender
to guard against; Many here are his profess'd Friends; and many more act either blindly or designedly with Those who are so; bearing a sensible part in their Interests, and ever encouraging, or at least, not discouraging, Them. That which keeps up the Views of those Abroad, who think it their Concern, to make us the Scene of
Civil War,
if not a
Province
to themselves, under that
Pretender; That,
I say, alone, which keeps up their Views, is, the knowing They have
Friends
here; and the finding that these Friends are never in despair, but always representing their Cause, as promising well. And that which keeps them in this Temper, is, the constant Expectation of
New Elections,
in which They hope for more, but are certain at least, of
this
Advantage, that our Heats, and Hatreds, and Desire of Revenge, are still perpetuated and improved. This is constantly represented abroad; and with such Success, that They who wish Evil to our Happy Establishment, seem really to believe it; and they who wish well to it, receive Impression enough from it, to look upon Us with Diffidence, as a
People,
always fluctuating and uncertain. It was this great disadvantage, arising from our Condition at home, that brought King
William
to make a
Peace,
even against his own good Judgment, and his own great Views; for which nothing could be urged, but that distress, to which our wretched and uneasy State here, had reduced his Affairs. And no wonder now if after that great Unhappiness, and what is still more dreadful, after a late Fatal Experience, the best Friends we have
Abroad,
cannot be so confident of us, as our Interest makes it requisite they should be. In a Word, Our
Enemies
both
Abroad,
and at
Home,
can't be reduc'd even one step towards a state of
Despair,
in the Methods We are in at present: Nor our best Friends be throughly assured of our secure Estate: The
Former
must look upon us still, with a good degree of Contempt; and the
Latter
with a great deal of Uneasiness and Diffidence, till We have some resting Time, to Settle, not only the
Tempers,
but the Affairs, and the Interests of this Nation: Which never will be done, as there is Reason to fear, as long as
Parliaments
continue limited to the present Term.
This puts me in mind of another very material Point, which tho' absolutely necessary to procure Us the Confidence of our Friends, and to command Respect from our Enemies; yet seems impossible to be Effected without a greater steddiness of Counsels, a more uninterrupted Application to publick Business, and a more Mature and Disinterested Deliberation, than the Experience we have had of frequent
Elections
gives room to hope for: This is the Paying off the
Debts
of the
Nation,
which must otherwise Eat out the very Vitals of the Publick, and expose Us to the greatest Danger from such foreign Powers, as are using the most violent Methods to be before hand with Us in this signal Advantage. To work out this inveterate Evil, there appears but one Method, consistent with the Faith of Parliamentary Securities (which ought to be preserved inviolable) and at the same time, free from the Odium of imposing new Taxes on the Country, and in which consequently the Landed, and the Monied Interest, would be likely to join, without eithers thinking themselves in the least aggrieved. This is to Raise and Support the Publick Credit to such a Height, as may enable the Government to Borrow, at a
lower
Interest, what may Pay off such Debts as carry a
greater;
which was attempted last Year, but hindred by the Rebellion. Now Experience shews, that publick Credit will be subject to perpetual Fluctuations and Inequalities, or even fall to an Ebb from whence it is next to impossible to make it re-ascend, while the Measures of one three Years are liable to be Unravell'd and Reversed by the Three next succeeding, and those again by the next; and whilst under the Shelter of frequent Elections, such Tumults, Commotions and Disorders, are Introduced, as, however opposite in themselves, conspire in shaking the Foundation of all Government, keep Mens Minds in suspence, and make them look on every Thing as precarious, that is any ways involved with the Publick.
After many
Enquiries,
I can meet with but one
Good Event,
in favour of the
Triennial Term
for
Elections,
which a long Experience hath furnish'd us with: And that is, that it is suppos'd to have been the occasion of throwing out the Destructive
Bill
of
Commerce;
some
Gentlemen
not daring to Vote for it out of fear, of their next
Elections.
But this you will see, cuts both ways. For, as
Gentlemen
may by accident, not do a
Bad
thing for fear of their
Next Election;
so it is as plain, that they may, as often, not do the most necessary
good
thing, if it happens to be
Unpopular,
for the same fear. So that this holds at least equally
against
that Bill, as
for
it. But then many, who knew those Times, will deny the
Fact,
and affirm, that a multitude of
little Piques,
and
great Passions,
concurr'd in that Affair; and that the
Awe
of
Electors,
happen'd at that time to have but little Share in it. Private History would be useful to us upon this occasion. But
this
We all saw in
publick,
that however that Fear might then be suppos'd to work so far, as to hinder those few
Gentlemen
from openly espousing that
fatal Bill;
it did not work so far, as to keep them immediately from entering into an
Address,
and Voting for such
Methods,
as must have been as
Fatal,
as that Bill it self, if Providence had not interposed. What would it have avail'd us, that the
Bill
had not pass'd
then,
if these Designs, at the same Time on Foot, had prevail'd? And what doth it avail to say, that the
Triennial Term
did Us that good, (supposing it so,) when it is plain, it had not the Power to preserve that Good; and that the same Persons, who seem'd to fear it, yet were induc'd to
undo
their own Work, and to enter into Measures, which must have ended in the same Evils, and indeed, in Universal Destruction? It signifies little, therefore, whether this was the great occasion of that
lucky Incident
or not; because it is plain it had not power enough to hinder the Ill Effects of that
Bill,
in another Method: Nor would have hindred them, had not something else intervened. But supposing it had; certainly
that
one particular, so purely accidental, cannot be set against a
Train
of Constant, and too certain, Evil Consequences, which we feel every Day we live. These
Evil Consequences,
are so many undeniable-Arguments for an
Alteration
of it; and weigh exceedingly and particularly at this Juncture, when all our Happiness depends upon the
Firm Establishment
of our
Excellent King,
upon this Throne; when all our Enemies at Home and Abroad, visibly place their Hopes in our Disturbances, owing to nothing so much as to the constant Expectation of
Triennial Elections;
when all our true Friends, both here and elsewhere, wait with Impatience to see our Security firmly and throughly Established: When the going on with proper Measures, for such Establishment, has been unavoidably put off, by the Attention given to the Rebellion, and so the longer Continuance of this Parliament is become particularly necessary; And when We all may observe, if We please, that, tho' the
Rebellion
be in great Measure quell'd, yet, the
Spirit
of it, is so far from being lay'd asleep, that it walks about still, even at Noon-day, in defiance of all
Authority;
and with a strubborness, never to be reduced to a settled Despair, without some such
Method,
as is now talk'd of.
These
Particulars,
I say, are so many undeniable Arguments, for an
Alteration
of the
Term
of
Years
fix'd in the
Act,
unless it shall appear that the
Objections
against doing it, are of more Weight and Importance. Those which I have been able to hear of, together with such as you tell me are most talk'd of in the Country, We will now just run over.
The most general Objection (and that which seems in reality to lye at the Bottom of all the rest) is, that this Step will be so unpopular among the Electors, and raise such a Clamour all over the Nation, as must for ever sink the Interest of those who have any Share in promoting it. To this I answer, that it will wholly depend on the Parliament it self, to render this proceeding Popular, or Unpopular, by the right or wrong Use they shall make of the Prolongation thereby accruing to themselves. If their After-behaviour should be such, as to shew they had no wiser, nor more generous View in making this Alteration, than merely to save themselves the hazard, trouble and expence of a New Election, they must, no doubt, be content to reap the Rewards of their Selfishness, by forfeiting all Title to the future good Will of their Electors. But if their Zeal and Industry for promoting the Ease and Safety of the Nation, shall appear to rise in proportion to the Time allowed them for accomplishing the great Work they have begun, the
End
will sufficiently commend the
Means;
and the Advantages arising to the whole Kingdom from this Change, will easily Reconcile it to all such, with whom a good Man ought ever to wish to Maintain the Character of Popularity. It will certainly be in the Power of those who most apprehend the Odium, and Unpopularity of this Action, to Secure it from all possible Mis-representations, by making Use of the Power it will bring with it, to just and wise Purposes; to ease the Debts, to perfect the Tranquility, and to perpetuate the Peace of the Nation. Raising Money by
Taxes
upon
Land,
Windows, Soap, or any thing else, is always
Unpopular,
and always raises
Clamours,
when it is first resolved upon. Every thing that hath been done for the Security of His present
Majesty;
the suspending the
Habeas Corpus Act,
without which We must have been destroyed; the granting Him a Power to Raise, and Hire, Forces for his own, and the Nation's Defence; the putting his
Friends
into any Possibility of consulting his Safety and Honour; Every particular of this sort hath been represented all over the Nation, in such Colours, that it hath been highly
unpopular,
and been attended with great
Clamours:
But Necessity and Expedience are the things to be consider'd in all such Points.
These
will always make things
pleasing
to the true Friends of the Nation. But in order to be
popular
with the
King's
Enemies, the first Step he must take, must be, to lay down his
Crown;
and if his
Ministers
be resolved to be moved by
Clamours,
they must resign their
Posts,
and yield up all Power to those who wish to destroy them. The only Consideration is, whether the Nation's Affairs require a thing to be done: When
that
is fix'd,
Popular
or
Unpopular, Clamours
or
no Clamours,
ought not to affect any farther, than about the
manner
of doing it. Every thing that touches particular Men's Purses, or retrenches from their Luxury, will generally be
Unpopular
with those Men: But a little Time makes such things easy, when the
Publick
finds it's Advantage in it, and Men's Passions have had Time to cool.
Another thing which I find generally shews it self, at first hearing of the
Design,
is, an
Uneasiness,
as if
this
were
Repealing the Act:
When, in truth, I will venture to affirm, that it is so far from
that,
that it is indeed Restoring it to its best Design; and making it effectual to all that Good which was originally purposed, and intended, by any of those
honest Patriots
who joined in the first framing of it. The Designs were, that a
King
of
England
should not be
without
a
Parliament;
and that
one
and the same
Parliament
should have a
Term
fixed, beyond which it should not be in the Power of the
Prince
to continue it. And in both these respects the
Act
will be left as it was. All the Difference is, that the
Parliament
then in being, thought
Three Years
the proper Term. Experience hath assured us of a Multitude of Evils proceeding from so quick a
Return
of
Elections.
And therefore, in that part of the
Act,
and in
that
only, is the
Alteration
intended, in order to remedy or abate those
Evils,
without bringing in greater.
Another
Reason against it, is taken from a Suspicion of some private and personal Views in the
King's Ministers;
as if the whole Aim were to establish themselves, for so much longer time, in their Power. But I observe, that the same Persons who make this
Objection,
generally contradict it, by affirming that the
Ministers
have nothing to fear, and that this present Design is wholly
unnecessary,
because a Court may be sure of another
House
of
Commons,
to their Mind. They must think the
Ministry
very weak, not to see this, which is so plain, that the Influence of a
Court
hath hardly ever fail'd in this Point, tho' at the same time, the Gentlemen who make this Objection, are apt to insinuate the necessity of some Measures for this purpose, which cannot be very agreeable to an honest and incorrupt Ministry. However, in the Opinion of such as allow this, it cannot be having a View to
Themselves,
but a general View to the
Nation
at
Home,
and to the Interest and Glory of it
Abroad,
which engageth the Ministers in this Design. They who know the Nature of such Affairs, judge the contrary, that
Ministers,
as to their own private Interest, might more probably find their Account in
New Parliaments,
than in
One continued.
Experience shews, that the most
Courtly Parliaments
have turn'd
Uncourtly
in their long sitting. And therefore, this Design can't be necessary for any private self-interested Views of their own, because it is allowed, that such Ends, (if they have any,) might be serv'd as well, at least, in the former Method, as in this. They, who find a
Biass
in their Minds, against every thing proposed by a
Court,
let it be what it will, should consider, in this Case, whether it be not probable that the present Views and Designs are of a
Publick Nature,
rather than of a
Private;
and should act accordingly, without prejudice, or affection, as they think it requisite, or not, for the Establishment of the
King,
and the
Nation;
and for the more effectual destroying all the Hopes of the Enemies of both.
The most powerful
Objection
of all, is, that the
Alteration
now design'd, may make it much more likely, that under a
Bad Prince,
sometime or other,
Arbitrary Power
may b
brought in. For the present, I am sure, we have nothing to fear. We have now a
King
upon the
Throne,
whose
S
is fashioned to
Right
and
Justice;
and whose great enquiry upon all Occasions is, what our Constitution and what our Laws require of
Him.
We have a
Prince,
in View, to succeed Him, whose
Native Honour
and
Integrity,
guard Him against all suspicion. But I grant, this may not always be our Happiness, either in
Possession,
or in
Prospect.
And therefore if this
All
eration
could be proved, I should be moved another way, than I am at present: There will be more
Time,
I acknowledge, in any one particular
Parliament,
for
Attempts
to be made that way. But, as I think, not at all more likely to succeed. On the contrary, there is more likelihood, that
Gentlem
should by degrees, become even ready to part with a Constitution, for which there must be such Contention by
Bribery,
and all the
Arts
of Iniquity, every
Three Years,
than if it were otherwise. And then again, supposing a
Parliament
chosen for
Three Years
only; a
Prince
resolutely bent upon doing it in a
Pa
liamentary
way, prepared with Treasures and Favours, might make such Attempts, before that
Term
be expired, that none could resist, who would not as certainly go on farther in their Integrity. One may venture to affirm, that a
Parliament
which keeps its Integrity for
Three Years,
will discourage the making any such Attempts for the remaining
Four.
And, to give an Instance, if I remember right, the
Parliament
which gave up the
Liberties
of
Sweden,
gave that Fatal stroke within the
Term
of
Three Years
▪ Whenever a
Cour
can be bad enough for such a Design, they will first take care, at the time of Election, to set up Persons capable of the same bad Design. And then, there is no difference between
Three
or
Seven Years.
Only, here remember, what I have before observ'd to you, that the quick Returns of
Trienn
al Elections.
tend much more, to that
Corruption, Bribery,
Dissoluteness of Manners, as well as
Party-Revenge,
which pave the way to the loss of
Liberty,
than the
longer Term,
now proposed, can do. One might appeal to any who know the World, whether it be not more probable (as I have urged already,) that the
Elected Gentlemen
themselves, impoverish'd by so frequent Returns of their great
Charges,
will be inclined to listen to the Offer made them, with so pernicious a View, than if the Returns were not so frequent; and besides this, whether the Influence that way, from the powerful motive of
Party-Revenge,
will not have vastly more weight, when it
roused and irritated, and set on Fire, by so quick
Returns
of
Contention,
than if it were otherwise. And, what is of great moment, in my opinion, since it is plain that every Instance of wickedness, and divi
ion, tending to destruction, is so heighten'd and infl
med by the quick
Returns
of
Elections;
there must be much greater Encouragement to a
Foreign Enemy,
to interpose with his Money, to purchase our Ruine, in a
Triennial Choice,
than in a
Septennial.
Especially now, before we are well settled upon that Bottom which is the only Foundation of our Happiness. It is well known how far the Neighbouring Powers intermeddle in the Elections of
Poland
and
Germany,
and with how much success they send their Agents and Factors to them; and what an abuse of Liberty this Corruption has introduced in those Countries, all the World can testify: Nor can we think the Election of a British Parliament, so very indifferent a thing to some neighbouring Powers, especially, at certain Junctures, that they should think One or Two Hundred Thousand Pounds misapplied, in purchasing Votes to their Mind. And I can say, that this is no whimsical Supposition, because I have my self seen an
Intercepted Letter,
written from hence into
France,
just before the last
Election,
by a Friend to the
Pretender,
who had taken the
Oaths
to King
George,
plainly hinting both that such a thing was then expected from the King of
France,
and that he did not doubt the
Success
of it. I think, this alone is enough to allarm any true Lover of his Country, in the present Situation of our Affairs, and of those of all
Europe.
There is one more
Objection,
I hear, is often urged, That
We
should have severely blamed such a Design in the late
Administration:
Nay, that great Horror was express'd, at the very supposition of the thing, at that time; I grant this, and that the Horror was just and reasonable. But upon what was this founded? Not upon the unlawfulness of the thing it self; not upon the Impossibility of it's ever being fit to be done; but upon a too wellgrounded Assurance, that they who were then in Power must have meant it, whenever they did it, for the same end, to which their other Acts tended, and that was, the utter Ruine of the
Grand-Alliance,
and of all the Hopes of our best
Friends
Abroad, and the inspiring full Vigour into the Cause of
France
and the
Pretender.
This was the Ground of all just dread upon that Head. Had it been so, that they had design'd it manifestly for the firmer Security of the
Protestant Succession
here, and the greater support of the
Grand Alliance
abroad, no true
Britain
could have had ground of Complaint, but must have acknowledg'd, if it tended, and was n
essary to so good ends, that it was not only lawfull, but highly praise-worthy. An Instance parallel to it may quite take off the Edg
of this
Objection.
What honest Mind would not have been filled with
Uneasiness
and
Terror,
supposing
They
had then attmpted to suspend the
Habeas Corpus Act,
by which they might have confined all Men of great Capacity and Influence, whom they knew to be averse to their Proceedings, in favour of
France?
But would this have been any Argument, why the Friends of King
George
should not have secured
Him
and
the Nation
by such a
Suspension,
when made necessary by the Treasonable Practices of his avowed Enemies? Or because we blame a thing, lawful in it self, when we see it design'd for our
; therefore, must we be averse to a
lawful
thing, design'd, and tending to our
Preservation?
This is the whole strength of that
Objection,
which yet, I believe, weighs with many, for want of considering it.
As for the
late Ministers,
I verily believe they design'd no such thing. And my reason for believing so, is, that they did not at all want it; nay, that it would have done them more Hurt than Good. Their Designs were such as were to be manag'd solely by Artifice. The great
Engines
they made use of for keeping up a Spirit, against all Truth and Right, were those very
Mobbs, Riots,
and
Tumults,
which alone could keep a Multitude in such a Ferment, as to make them admire, and press for their own Ruine. They thought it their Interest to govern by the
Passions
of the Crowd: And were very peculiarly dextrous in the Management of them. They were possess'd of the full Cry, and Noise of the Nation, and likely, in all probability, so to continue: This was a much surer Hold to
Them,
and to
their
Designs, than the Continuance of One and the same
Parliament:
And therefore, they never attempted it. But certainly, as that same Spirit, which was then raised for the Service of the
Pretender,
made it
unnecessary
for
them;
so, it being still alive, and full of evil Influences upon our Happiness, this makes it highly prudent in
Others,
to do
that
in order to suppress and extirpate it, which
They,
in their Wisdom, would not do, for fear of quieting what they expected Benefit from.
Their
security consisted in keeping up that vile Spirit to the Heighth. It is the security of the
King
and his Government, to have a stop put to it, and to remove every Opportunity that may give
Fuel
and
Encouragement
to it, as far as is consistent with the Constitution and Liberties of the Nation.
All these
Considerations
put together, have, I confess, wholly taken off my
First Surprize.
And the same Considerations make me hope, that all true Friends to the
King,
and to the
Publick Happiness,
(which now depends entirely upon the firm
Establishment
of the present Royal Family) will not let their
General Suspicion,
or their
Particular Biass,
have such Power over them, as to move them, to join with their own
Enemies,
in a
Point,
in which if they should, by any unforeseen Accident, have
Success,
I am confident, they would very heartily, as well as fruitlesly
repe
,
of their own Proceedings. When Persons who have always shewn themselves
Enemies
to Liberty, and Professors of the
Principles
of Slavery; who have ever express'd a Hatred of the
Revolution,
and of every thing built upon it; and have ever been the Supports of the
Popish
and
Jacobite
Interest in these Nations: When such, I say, put on a Zeal for
Liberty,
it is a Moral Demonstration that it is all a
M
ck-Shew;
and that they themselves think quite otherwise of what they oppose, than they would seem to think. If it were really their Opinion, that the
Alteration
now proposed, would either help the
Cause
which they have espoused, or be any Prejudice to a
Government
which they hate, I am very confident, they would not enter into the
Opposition
of it, with that
Warmth
and
Heat
which they now profess. But they foresee that their
Hopes
must in Proportion abate, with those
Heats
and
Disturbances
which alone keep them alive; and for this Reason it is, that they now take into their Mouths the
rds
and
Topicks
which they have ever hitherto ridiculed and exploded; in order to keep off the
T
ng
which they heartily hate,
the Settlement of the present Government in Peace and Quiet at Home, and in Honour and Glory Abroad.
And this is one very good Reason, why
All,
who truly wish well to that
Settlement,
should unite in the
Alteration
of that which is the
Chief,
if not the
Only,
thing left to keep up the Spirits and Designs of its Enemies. But if, when it is in our Power, to put some Stop to our present
Corruptions
and
Distractions,
and to establish the
Glory
of our
King,
and the Happiness of our Country, in a Method perfectly confident with all our Rights and Liberties, we are guided by the Insinuations of those who hate us, and refuse to do it, we must thank our selves for all that follows. It will lie at our Door to answer for all the Consequences of such a Neglect. From
these,
with whom we join in it, we have no Returns to expect, but Contempt, Reproaches, and Insults.
In fine, I can consider the
Triennial Return
of our
Elections,
no otherwise, than as what hath made us, and still continues us, the most Divided and most Corrupted of
Nations;
what was at first by many contrived, and still in its own Nature tends to oppose the Designs of the
Best Kings,
and to promote those of the
Worst;
leading to an universal Debauchery of the Manners and Tempers of the
Electors,
as well as to make the
Elected
themselves weary enough of such perpetual Contests and Charge, to incline some Time or other to
Thoughts
which would not otherwise find Admittance; influencing the
People
to think easily of becoming a Prey to the
Highest Bidder;
keeping up the
Spirits
of our
Common Enemies,
and creating Diffidence and Uneasiness in our
best Friends;
introducing and increasing all Excesses of Violence and Mutual Revenge; serving a
Multitude
of
bad
Purposes, which have a peculiar Malignity at this particular Juncture, without having
one
good Effect, fit to be named in Opposition to them: And all this occasioned by the
Shortness
of the
Interval
allowed, either to put an End to such Evils, or to cultivate any thing that is Good. To cure all these entirely, nothing can perhaps be thought of, but what would introduce greater. To apply something that may put an
End
to
some
of them, and abate and diminish the rest, is a Matter that deserves the Regard of every good
Briton.
And, I believe, at this Time nothing at all effectual can be thought of, without an
Alteration
of the
Triennial Elections.
I am,
&c.
LONDON:
Printed, and Sold by
S. Gray
in
Amen-Corner.
(Price Three Half-Pence.)