A VIEW Of the real Dangers of the SUCCESSION, FROM The Peace with
FRANCE:
BEING A sober Enquiry into the SECURITIES proposed in the Articles of PEACE, AND Whether they are such as the Nation ought to be satisfy'd with or no.
London:
Printed for
J. Baker,
at the
Black-Boy
in
Pater-Noster-Row,
1713. Price Six-Pence.
A VIEW Of the real Dangers of the SUCCESSION, FROM The Peace with
France,
&c.
T HE
Protestant
Succession is a Thing of that Consequence to this Nation, and upon which the Peace and Prosperity of the People does so entirely depend, as from its Nature and Consequences very much justifies the Anxieties of our Minds about it; this is the reason of most of that Uneasiness in the several publick Transactions, which many People express, for fear lest that Security for this Succession, which we have so much depended upon, should Suffer, be Lessen'd, Invaded, or any way made Precarious.
These Fears have been very much encreased among us, and the common People render'd very Jealous, by the publick Reports so frequent, and so warmly spread among us, of the Encrease of the
Pretender
's
Interest
; the Concert between the
Friends
of the
Pretender
at Home, and their
Confederates
Abroad; particularly the terrible Accounts of the
French
Power, which are now represented to us, not only as Formidable, but as also firmly Engaged to Assist and Reinstate the Interest, and Title, and Person, of the
Pretender.
Those have been the Reasons why many People have been so warm against the
Treaty of Peace with France:
And indeed, whatever may have been objected by the Friends of the Ministry against those Fears, and Uneasinesses of the People about the
Peace,
this must be own'd, that if all that has been said on the other Side be true, those Fears and Uneasinessess may be very rational. No one can reasonably blame People for dislikeing the
Peace,
if that
Peace
is calculated for bringing in the
Pretender,
and by Consequence for over-throwing our
Protestant Settlement,
on which our Religion, Properties, Liberties, Trade, and General Peace do entirely depend.
As the Discontents on one Hand have been fomented, or encreased, upon those Suppositions as abovesaid,
viz.
that the
Peace
was ill Made; that there was no Security in
it
for the
Protestant Succession
; that the
French
King was Strengthen'd by
it
to such a Degree, as to make him more Dangerous than ever; and, that he was not discouraged by
it
from the
Jacobite Interest
; so, on the other Hand, it was Confronted at first by little or nothing of Argument founded upon Fact. But in general assuring the People, that it was not so; that the
Succession
was confirm'd; the Power of
France
reduced; the
Pretender
banish'd; the
Succession
recognized, and the like: But nothing appearing on either Side, the People remain'd fluctuating between various Uncertainties. Influenc'd as to Hopes and Fears, as their Parties, their Instructers, or rather Deceivers, on both Sides, prevail'd; and as the Insinuations they offer'd work'd upon their Passions. In this unfix'd Posture of Mens Minds, it is no wonder if the Generallity of the People fall into the worst; for Fear of Evil is so easily capable to prevail above the Hope of Good, having natural Propensity always ready to fall into the Scale with it, that it is not to be wonder'd at, if the Reasoning part was over-come, and we began Universally to distrust, that the
Pretender
was hid in the Secret of the
Peace,
and that the Treaty was but a
French
Mask to deceive the People.
While the Treaty remain'd an Embrio, Imperfect, and Unfinish'd, it could not be expected that this Uncertainty on both Sides could be Master'd, or that Satisfactory Arguments could be given, either by one Party or other, to confirm what they had alledged before, and gain the People one Way or other.
That
Difficulty
is now over; the
Treaty
is finished; the
Peace
made; the
Ratifications
exchang'd; and the
Articles
made publick: It has been the receiv'd Opinion, that the End and Design of Publications in such Cases is allow'd to be in order to general Satisfaction; and we are thereby tacitly admitted to Reason upon, Debate, and Explain to one another the Substance and Meaning of the Treaty, that we may know what it is we have obtain'd by the
War
; what Confirm'd, Gain'd, and Established by the
Peace
; and upon what Foundation of Security our
Liberties, Religion,
and
Estates
stand for the time to come. To do this Calmly, and Impartially, is the Design of this Work; and the End is the more just, in that two Things of great Consequence are proposed to be included in the Design of doing it.
1. If any Difficulties should offer, as private By-standing Judgments may sometimes give hints to publick Transactions, which even the Persons acting, however Wise, might not foresee, it may not be too late to obtain such Provision against them, or against the Consequences of them, as may make up the Deficiencies,
if any such were,
in the first Part of the Conduct; that so the Evil may be anticipated, and the Dissatisfactions which attend such Things prevented.
2. That if there are no Difficulties, but that all Things are provided for, sufficiently establish'd, and the
Peace, Liberty,
and
Religion
of the Nation secured by all the needful and due Provision which was possible, being made for the Safety and Certainty of the
Protestant Succession,
People may be made duly Sensible of it; their Doubts, Fears, Jealousies, and Apprehensions be removed, and the real Securities of their State placed in such a true Light, that they may no more be capable of being made uneasy by Misrepresentations, and Suggestions of Persons wickedly disposed.
There are divers other good Ends and Purposes contain'd in a Design so useful as this, of Discusing the
Articles of Peace
; which, perhaps, may, in the following Work, be hinted at, particularly the Stating and Examining into the real Power and Capacity of the
French
King to impose upon
Europe,
after this
Peace
; the Validity of the
Renunciations
of the
Spanish
King, and the Probability which there is, or is not before us, that these Treaties shall be kept sacred by the
French,
as they are like to be by us. In brief, the great question of the Validity of a Treaty as such with the
French,
may be Examined as it respects not his Honour and Faith only, which some People, in Matters of
Peace
and
War,
have been very free with; but as it respects the Power and Influence the
British
Court may hereafter have in the World, to enforce the Treaty, and to do the Nation Justice on the Agressors in any Contraventions that may happen.
In doing this an entire Impartiallity is necessary, neither on the one Hand adhering too warmly to those Opinions, who give up the Securities of this Treaty as entirely Void, and Insignificant, with respect to the Faith and Honour of the Parties we have Treated with; and run down as Ridiculous and Absurd, the Notion of
Britain
's holding the Ballance, or being able to enforce the Performance in time to come: And on the other Hand, not altogether supposing that there is nothing of Danger, either in the Will or Abillity of the
French
Court to make unjust Improvements, and Advantages, in breach of the Treaty hereafter.
In order to come directly to the Case, it is necessary to give the Reader an Abstract of what Provisions are really made in the
Treaty
with
France,
for the Security of the
Protestant Succession
in
Great Britain
; for that many who may, perhaps, see this Tract, may not have seen the Treaty itself, or may not have the Articles by them to refer to.
I'll take no Advantage here of what, however, I do really believe,
viz.
That the Treaty is very surprizing to some People; who, having been made to believe that there was no Care taken in it for the
Protestant Succession,
did not expect to find two such Articles as the Fourth and Fifth to be incerted in it, and that they should be Worded in such a Manner. And therefore, before we proceed to Animadvert on that Opinion, or to Examine, whether that Surprize is just, or, whether the Objections others make against the Security of those Articles are sufficient to continue the general Dissatisfactions, it will be necessary to place the Articles themselves in View as follows:
IV. Furthermore for adding a greater Strength to the Peace which is restored, and to the faithful Friendship which is never to be violated, and for cutting off all Occasions of distrust, which might at any time arise from the established Right and Order of the Hereditary Succession to the Crown of
Great Britain,
and the Limitation thereof by the Laws of
Great Britain
(made and enacted in the Reigns of the late King
William
the Third, of glorious Memory, and of the present Queen) to the Issue of the abovesaid Queen, and in default thereof, to the most Serene Princess
Sophia,
Dowager of
Brunswick-Hanover,
and her Heirs in the Protestant Line of
Hanover.
That therefore the said Succession may remain safe and secure, the most Christian King sincerely and solemnly acknowledges the abovesaid Limitation of the Succession to the Kingdom of
Great Britain,
and on the Faith and Word of a King, on the Pledge of His own and His Successors Honour, He does declare and engage, That He accepts and approves the same, and that His Heirs and Successors do and shall accept and approve the same for ever. And under the same Obligation of the Word and Honour of a King, the most Christian King promises, That NO ONE besides the Queen Her Self, and Her Successors, according to the Series of the said Limitation, shall ever by Him, or by His Heirs or Successors, be acknowledged, or reputed to be King or Queen of
Great Britain.
And for adding more ample Credit to the said Acknowledgment and Promises, the most Christian King does engage, That whereas the Person who, in the Life-time of the late King
James
the Second, did take upon him the Title of Prince of
Wales,
and since his Decease, that of King of
Great Britain,
is lately gone, of his own accord, out of the Kingdom of
France,
to reside in some other place, He the aforesaid most Christian King, His Heirs and Successors, will take all possible Care, that he shall not at any time hereafter, or under any pretence whatsoever, return into the Kingdom of
France,
or any the Dominions thereof.
V. Moreover the most Christian King promises, as well in His own name, as in that of His Heirs and Successors, That they will at no time whatever Disturb, or give any Molestation to the Queen of
Great Britain,
Her Heirs and Successors, descended from the aforesaid Protestant Line, who possess the Crown of
Great Britain,
and the Dominions belonging thereunto. Neither will the aforesaid most Christian King, or any one of His Heirs, give at any time any Aid, Succour, Favour, or Council, directly or indirectly, by Land, or by Sea, in Money, Arms, Ammunition, Warlike Provision, Ships, Soldiers, Seamen, or any other way, to any Person or Persons, whosoever they be, who for any Cause, or under any Pretext whatsoever, should hereafter, endeavour
to oppose the said Succession, either by open War, or by fomenting Seditions, and forming Conspiracies against such Prince or Princes who are in Possession of the Throne of
Great Britain,
by Virtue of the Acts of Parliament aforementioned, or against that Prince or Princess, to whom the Succession to the Crown of
Great Britain
shall be open according to the said Acts of Parliament.
Immediately after these Two Articles follows the formal Renunciations of the King of
Spain,
which, as they are not within the Compass of our present Considerations, so it will be needless to repeat them here; neither will the narrow Compass of this Tract admit of it. But it may not, nevertheless, be amiss to set down a few Words of the Introduction to those Renunciations, as they seem to lay down the Foundation upon which the whole Treaty stands, and upon which much of the present Peace, and Security of
Europe
depends. The Words are these:
VI. Whereas the most destructive Flame of War, which is to be extinguished by this Peace, arose chiefly from thence, That the Security and Liberties of
Europe
could by no means bear the Union of the Kingdoms of
France
and
Spain
under one and the same King; And whereas it has at length been brought to pass by the Assistance of the Divine Power, upon the most earnest Instances of Her Sacred Royal Majesty of
Great Britain,
and with the Consent both of the most Christian, and of the Catholick King, that this Evil should in all times to come be obviated, by means of Renunciations drawn in the most effectual Form, and executed in the most solemn Manner.
But to begin with the
Protestant Succession,
as the main thing upon which our Eyes are fix'd in this Treaty, and without which the whole is of very little Consequence to us: And here it is necessary to lay down a short View of the Reasons, and Foundation of the War, which, without doubt, are to be also some part of the Reason and Foundation of the
Peace,
or else the
War
will be no more to be justify'd than the
Peace,
or the
Peace
to be thought adequate to the Necessity of the
War.
The Reasons and Foundation of the
War
are abundantly express'd in the several Declarations made as well by the Queen, and the late King
William,
as by the several Princes and States, their Confederates; in which, if the Safety of the
Protestant Interest
is laid down, as the Thing most at Heart among the Confederates, the same ought to be also the main Design, or at least most Regarded in the making a
Peace
; for no
Peace
can be supposed to be effectual, but such as answers the Ends of the
War
; such as are squared to the Purposes, which in the said Declarations of the
War,
are laid down to be the just Reason for the Breach at the Beginning.
In the Declaration of
War
against
France,
Published in
England
by King
William
and Queen
Mary, May
the 7th, 1689, among divers other Reasons for the same, it is express'd in these Words:
And,
lastly,
as the said King of
France
has, for divers Years past, endeavoured, by Insinuations, and Promises of Assistance, to Over-throw the Government of
England. And in the Preamble to the said Declaration it is thus express'd:
To the utmost to promote the Welfare of our People, by preventing the Miseries which threaten them from Abroad.
In the second Declaration of
War
against
France,
enter'd into by Her Present Majesty, and publish'd
May
the 4th 1702. The Reasons and Causes of the
War
are thus enumerated.
1. The Exorbitant Power of
France,
which must be reduced.
2. The Alliances which
Great-Britain
stands engaged in, particularly the Grand Alliance, and that those Allies ought to have reasonable satisfaction.
3. And especially the following Particulars,
The
French
King has not only proceeded to farther Violence, but has added thereunto a great Affront and Indignity to us and our Kingdoms, in taking upon him to declare the pretended Prince of
Wales
King of
England, Scotland,
and
Ireland,
and has also Influenced
Spain
to concur in the same Affront and Indignity, as well as in other Oppressions: Wherafore we find our selves oblig'd for maintaining the publick Faith, for Vindication of the Honour of our Crown, and to prevent the Mischiefs which all
Europe
is threatned with, to declare War,
&c. Vide the Declaration.
These being the proposed Reasons, and the just Occasions of the present War, there seems several Arguments to occur here, which I shall mention previous to the ensuing Discourse.
1. If the
French
King's owning and receiving the Prince of
Wales
as King of
England, &c.
was a just Ground of the
War
; the revoking that Acknowledgment; disowning him as such; recognizing Her Majesty's Rightful and Lawful Title to the Crown, and securing as much as could be required of him that Title, and Her Majesty's quiet Possession thereof, ought to be a Capital Consideration of the
Peace
; otherwise the End for which the
War
was begun was not sufficiently answer'd; the Repose of
Europe
not atall obtain'd by the Treaty; the Queen's Honour sufficiently repair'd, or the Affront given made amends for.
2. If the
French
King's bare Owning and Receiving the
Pretender
as King of
Great Britain,
was made a sufficient Foundation of the War; though he had then made no Effort for his Establishment, or had any way attempted to place him on the Throne; then the said
French
King retracting the said Owning and Recieving,
&c.
and promising, as by the Treaty of Peace, Article the 4th he does, on the Faith and Word of a King,
&c.
Never to Receive him again, or any way to Aid or Assist him,
&c.
in Disturbing Her Majesty, or Her Successors in the Line of
Hanover,
is as much Security as could be ask'd of the
French
King, and may be taken in full Satisfaction of that Particular, till
France
makes some visible Infraction of that Engagement.
For the first of these that the King of
France
Revoking,
&c.
the Acknowledgment he had made of the
Pretender,
and Recognizing,
&c.
the Queen and the Succession ought to be a Capital Consideration of the Peace; there seems to be no occasion to enter into any Debate about it; especially since the King of
France
has yielded to the Justice of it in Expressions so full, and to the utmost Extent of all that could be desired, as appears by the Fourth Article: But it is chiefly mention'd here as matter of Wonder, that any among us should object against the Measures taken at the Beginning, and indeed thro' the Progress of this Treaty, as if the most solemn Recognitions of Her Majesty's Title to the Crown, and of the Establish'd Succession in the Protestant Line of
Hanover
could be forgotten.
And first the Objection, as it was formerly made against the Six Proposals of
France,
called (however mistakenly)
Preliminaries, viz. That the
French
King did not sufficiently Acknowledge the Queen's Rightful and Lawful Title to the Crown.
This I think ought to be answer'd in the same manner that the
Germans
at this time reply to the Proposals of Peace made by
France
to the Emperor; where the
French
King offers it as an Article, that he will acknowledge the Emperor as such: I say, it ought to be answer'd in the same Manner,
viz.
with Contempt signifying, That the Imperial Crown having not the least dependence upon the Vote Suffrage, or Acknowledgment of the King of
France,
they can by no means make his Acknowledging, or not Acknowledging the Election of the Person of his Imperial Majesty to that Crown to be an Article of a Treaty; or accept of such his Acknowledgment as any Condition of Peace. But that his bare Treating of Peace with his Imperial Majesty, as it is necessarily attended with such Acknowledgment, so his Imperial Majesty cannot be Treated with, under any other Title, Figure, or Denomination: For Example; that it would be absur'd to treat with an Arch-Duke of
Austria
in the Affairs and Properties of the Imperial Crown, or with the Empire, in the Matter of the Rights and Succession of the House of
Austria.
Thus, in the Case of Her Majesty's Rightful Possession of the Regal Titles, and Sovereign Authority of
Great Britain,
there was no need to Capitulate with the
French
King to acknowledge Her Majesty in the usual Forms; for that the Crowns of
Great Britain
and
Ireland,
and the Succession of Her Majesty, having no manner of Dependence upon the
French
King, or the
French
Government, or upon any Vote Suffrage, or Recognition, on the part of
France
to be made. It would derogate from the Honour of the
British
Nation, from the Personal Right of Her Majesty, and the Authority of Parliament, to accept of any such Recognition of the Queen's Title from the King of
France,
as any Condition, Article, or Preliminary to an Article, in any Treaty whatsoever. But that, in the very Act of Treating, such Recognition is so effectually supply'd and contain'd, that nothing can be more compleat; since the
French
King cannot commence any Treaty, but in the Name of Her Majesty, and with Her Majesty in Person, as represented by Her Plenipotentiaries, Clothed with all the Royal Stile and Dignity, Titles, and Appellations which attend the Persons of the Kings and Queens of
Great Britain
; which Names, Stile, Titles, Appellations, and Dignities are of meer Course, and by the Usage and Custom of all Treaties, always express'd in the very first Powers produced by the Ministers and Ambassadors of each Prince, or Sovereign, so Treating; and accepted by the other; and after that, are again necessarily repeated in the very Title and Introduction to such Treaty, or Agreement, which shall afterward be made, and as is for Example in the several Treaties as well of Peace as of Commerce, now under Consideration; in these Words in Latin and in English.
Tractatus Pacis & Amicitiae inter Serenissimam ac Potentissimam, Principem
Annam,
Dei Gratiâ,
magnae Britanniae, Franciae,
&
Hiberniae,
Reginam.
In Inglish thus:
A Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the most Serene and most Potent Princess
Anne,
by the Grace of God, Queen of
Great Britain, France,
and
Ireland.
Mark, the King of
France
here owns Her Majesty to be Queen of
Great Britain,
&c. and that She is so by the GRACE OF GOD; not atall supposing Her Title depended upon his Recognition, or received any confirmation thereby.
Having then acknowledged Her Majesty to be Rightful and Lawful Queen of
Great Britain,
the
French
King could make no Scruple of coming into the rest,
viz.
to acknowledge the Succession of the House of
Hanover,
which is a Consequence of the Revolution; upon which, as the Occasion, Her present Majesty's Right of Possession is built, and which is settled upon the Basis of Parliamentary Limitation; which Parliamentary Authority is the Rightful and Lawful Power, among others, from which Her Majesty's Right of Claim immediately proceeds.
Having also acknowledg'd the
Protestant
Succession, recognized the Authority that Establish'd it, and own'd the
Protestant
Race of
Hanover
to be the only Rightful and Lawful Heir to the
British
Crown, the rest fell in as natural Consequences,
viz. First,
That he should Expunge, Disown, and Banish from his Dominions, the Person of the
Pretender,
engaging never to admit him to come again into his Kingdoms. And,
Secondly,
That he should, in the solemnest Manner possible, engage never to Aid or Assist him, or any one for him, directly, or indirectly, in making any Claim to the Crown of
Great Britain,
or in offering any Disturbance, either to Her Majesty's Possession, or to the
Hanover
Succession, as it is Established by the
British
Parliament.
Let us then enquire how this is done, and in what manner expressed, that the great Question may afterwards come to be clearly Discuss'd,
viz. What Security this is to the
Protestant
Succession?
The Words of the Article are as strongly express'd, and as full as can be devised: And I hear many People express themselves with an agreeable Surprize that it is so; for tho' all that is alledg'd of the Perfidy and Disingenuous Principles of the
French
King, were to be acknowledg'd; yet, since Verbal Assurances are sometimes to be taken; and, perhaps, no other can be obtain'd in some things, of which this is one; it is as satisfactory as the Nature of the Thing will allow, that those Verbal Assurances be full and compleat.
The Nature of Treaties is now such, and the Conduct of Princes Abroad is allow'd such a Latitude, that, in some respect, it may be said of all Treaties, nothing is to be Depended on but what either you have Power to Enforce, or the other gives sufficient Security to Perform.
Thus, where Security could be obtain'd in this Affair of the Treaty, Her Majesty made a demand of such Security that she might be in a Condition to Enforce the Execution: As for Example, The
French
King Offers, on a Peace, to Demolish
Dunkirk. How shall I be sure of that?
says Her Majesty.
Will you put it into my Hands immediately, that I may have Power to see that Promise put in Execution?
The
French
King Consents, so that now the Queen of
Great
Britain
demolishes
Dunkirk,
not the
French
King; that is, She holds it in Possession till it is done, and Her Forces are to Encamp in the Neighbourhood to see the Execution.
It is but too well known a Truth, that there are some People, besides the
Jacobites,
who are surpriz'd, and ill-pleased to see this Affair so remarkably settled by the Treaty, and that the
French
King has thereby stoop'd to such Declarations and Protestations against the Interest of the
Pretender:
And these are those who, for other Ends, had much rather have been furnish'd from the Articles themselves with sufficient Grounds of Complaint, that the
Protestant
Succession had been neglected; and the Interest of the
Pretender
had not been sufficiently Weakned, and Discourag'd. Such a Complaint being in its Nature very Essential to the Publick Good, and to the Establishment of Things in this Nation, would have been very Popular, and would have been capable of many ways of Improvement, to the Advantage of those who study to keep the People uneasie, and distemper'd, about the Publick Management of Affairs, and to whom nothing has contributed so much, as the Notion of the Danger of the
Pretender.
The Complaints of these People have been so loud, that no one could have thought but that they really knew what
France
was acting in this Affair; and that, even in the Articles themselves, there had appear'd more Foundation for their Dissatisfactions; it was no more question'd by those who supposed all those Complaints were well Grounded; I say, it was no more question'd, but that when the Articles came to be made Publick, it would appear, that the Succession of
Hanover
was very slightly taken Notice of, and that room was left for the Interest of the
Pretender
to be carry'd on; so that the
French
King might at any time, after the Queen was Deceased, concern himself in that Matter, without any dammage to his Honour and Faith; and any Branch of his Treaty with the Queen to the contrary, in anywise notwithstanding.
But I do not find, upon a serious Revising the Articles, but that these People, the first movers of those Complaints only excepted, are under very great Disappointments upon the Articles first appearing in Publick; nay, the most Angry have not yet been able to find the least Fault in the Recognitions and Provisions made, either on the Part of the
French,
or on Our Part, for the Security of the House of
Hanover
; or, to say what they could have demanded of the
French
King more than is Granted by the Treaty, with respect to that Particular. The Truth of the Case being this, that the
French
King was not able to do more; or was it Honourable for the
British
Plenipotentiaries to ask more of him in that Particular.
It might be thought some Testimonial to the Validity of these Articles, That the
Jacobites
in
Great Britain
are so universally Thunder-struck with them, that there is so profound a Silence thro' the whole Nation among them; nothing is heard from them of the usual Boasts they have, for some time, made of their Growing Interest, and of the great Assistance their Prince should receive, upon any Occasion, for the Establishing him on the Throne of
Great Britain.
Whereas now nothing is heard among them but very secret and private Reproaches, and Reflections upon the
French
King, for suffering himself to yield to such severe Conditions, and so effectually to bind himself against the Interest of their Prince, as they call him, as never to Assist him after the Queen's Death, and never to admit him to return into
France
again.
These Complaints, I say, are very secretly and softly express'd among them too; for they cannot, without manifest Ingratitude, complain of any one Step the
French
King has taken; they cannot deny, without the Reproaches of the whole World, but that the
French
King has gone a greater Length for the Propagation of the
Jacobite
Interest in
Great Britain,
than any Prince in the World could have done; and has done more for them than all the
Popish
Powers in the World would have done. The hazard of a Ruinous
War,
undertaken for the Restoring King
James
II. and carry'd with no other View, thro' innumerable Disasters to the
Peace
of
Ryswick
; the Undertaking this second
War
under that disadvantageous Step to
France,
of Acknowledging the present
Pretender
as King of
Great Britain,
which justly Enflam'd and Provok'd this Nation to such a Degree, as to make all the Parts of the Island Address the late King
William
to renew the
War,
which otherwise the Nation, at that time, were not much inclin'd to. These things, attempted by the King of
France,
for the
Jacobite
Interest, leave the Friends of the
Pretender
no room to Exclaim against him, as otherwise they would have done, as a Man abandoning his Friend.
On the contrary, to reckon the divers Attempts, Hazards, Losses, and Expence the
French
King has been at, in Behalf of the
Pretender,
and of King
James
II. would be to Write the greatest Panegyrick upon the Friendship, Constancy, and Generosity of the King of
France
that could possibly be Written: In which the Armies sent into
Ireland
to his Relief; the Loss of his Fleet at
La Hogue
; the Attempt upon
Scotland
; the constant Expence of Supporting the Court of St.
Germans,
and all its Hangers on, and Dependencies, for above Twenty Four Years, must come to be reckon'd up; all which being consider'd, it is but in silent Murmurs that the
Jacobites
can complain of the
French
King, for giving up the Cause of the
Pretender
as he has done.
On the other Hand, his own Circumstances tell them plainly, that he has espoused their Cause as long as he was able to support himself; and that his Affairs were reduc'd to that Extremity, that he could no longer carry on the
War
with safety; nor could he make any
Peace
without relinquishing, entirely, a Prince, and an Interest which he was not able to support.
These things stop their Mouths, I say as to Complaint, and therefore they testify their Surprize and Despair, by a profound Silence; which Silence also tacitly acknowledges, that they look upon the Acknowledgments and Recognitions made by the
French
King, of the
Hanover
Succession to be too effectual a Blow to their Interest in
Britain,
which, on the other Hand, is an Argument to us to look upon it as some Security to the said Succession.
With the Silence of the
Jacobites
Party, and as a Consequence thereof, the Fears and Apprehensions of Honest and Well-minded People abate also; I mean of such People who, being guided by no Party-Interest, kept their Eyes only upon the Publick Good, yet were made uneasie, and alarm'd by the continued Suggestions of others, that the Ministry, and even the Queen Herself, were in the Interest of the
Pretender.
It might take up some room here to Convince you that such People were made Uneasie, and by what Method, on what Account, by Whom, and for what Reason. But I am willing to forget those Things; the remembrance whereof serve only to promote that which will help to Divide us, and to make us yet Uneasie to one another.
That many good People were alarm'd with the Notion of the
Pretender
being at hand; and possess'd with a belief that the Ministry and the
French
King were in Concert for the Restoring him in these Kingdoms. This is what needs no Evidence; the very Insolence of the
Jacobites
as it was given for a Reason of their Apprehensions, so it was a Confirmation of the Arguments others had used for the raising those Jealousies and Apprehensions in the People.
They were told, that the Ministry encourag'd and employ'd none but
Jacobites
; that the profess'd Friends of the
Pretender
had distinguishing Marks of Favour show'd them; that even the Dialect spoken at Court was different from what used to be the Language in the Case of the Succession; that Addresses were presented, in which not only the House of
Hanover
was not mentioned, but in which the Interest of the
Pretender
was expresslly recommended; and, that yet such Addresses were equally accepted, and received equally Graciously with others; that the greatest Insolences of several Persons upon the Name of
Hanover,
and the
Protestant Succession,
were left Unpunished, and the like.
The Business of the
Hanover
Memorial was in the next Place mention'd, and the Resentments express'd by the Queen and Ministry at the Publication thereof, with several other Things which were call'd to mind, to confirm the Suspicions, and to perswade the People here, that the same Affection which promoted the Settlement of the Crown upon that House was not now to be found among us,
&c.
While the Treaty of Peace was in Agitation, these Suspitions encreased; and it was expected by some, that the Interest of the
Pretender
was in immediate agitation; that the
French
Influence having a Governing Power among us, would not fail to attempt that by Treaty which they had so often, and so long attempted in the Field by the Sword.
It was a happy surprize then to such People as these, to find the aforesaid Articles Incerted in the Treaty of
Peace,
where the most they could expect in favour of the Succession was, that nothing expresly, on the other Side, should be incerted; and that the
French
King should be prevail'd with to leave the
Pretender
to his own Fortunes, and to say nothing of him; nay, some People would have thought this a great deal, and would even have compounded with us for such a Thing as a Favour to the Succession of
Hanover,
which they had scarce reason to expect.
What then could such People say, when they found the utmost Care taken, and the strongest Engagements enter'd into with the
French
King, for the
Protestant Succession,
and the Recognizing, upon all Occasions, the House of
Hanover
as the Rightful and Lawful Successor to the Crown.
What could they say, but acknowledge themselves Surpriz'd, Satisfy'd, and Pleas'd; as also, that they had been impos'd upon before: When they found the
French
King brought to Compliment the Queen of
Great Britain,
with the solemn and declar'd Expulsion of the Person of the
Pretender
from, not the Succession of
Britain
only, but even from the Dominions of
France
; and engaging to make that Expulsion Perpetual, and that he shall never be admitted to set his Foot within the Kingdom of
France
again.
Would any Man have thought that the King of
France,
who had formerly acted so avowedly in the Interest of the
Pretender,
and had voluntarily brought down upon his Kingdom so heavy a War, by the meer declaring him by the Titles of
Britain
; who had made such Efforts for him, and had Promised never to forsake his Interest till he had established him on the Throne, would be brought so entirely to give him up, so effectually to relinquish his Interest and Concerns, as to engage never to Own him again by those Titles, which he himself had before acknowledged to him.
These Things having been so openly declar'd against before, by the
French
King, it was the more Rational to expect, that the Party here might have been prevail'd upon, and Influenced by the
French
to have Countenanced that Interest, or at least to have contented themselves with very moderate Provisions against him; and till the contrary appear'd, there was too much force in their Reasoning the other way, not to take with the People whose Minds were already prejudiced as abovesaid.
But when the Articles appear, these People seem'd surpriz'd; began to exclaim at the Injustice done the present Ministry, and to approve of what was done in behalf of the
Hanover
Succession; till they met with new Scruples and Suggestions, in order to keep up the Temper of Complaint, and to bring the Notions of the Danger of the
Pretender
into play again; and these were the ill Opinions which Common Fame had deeply Imprinted in the Minds of the People, of the
French
King being to the last Degree Perfidious; that he made no Scruple of breaking in upon the most sacred Engagement when ever his Ambition, Avarice, Superstition, of especially Thirst of Glory, prompted; that he made no farther Use of Treaties and Postulations, Articles and solemn Conventions, than to amuse and separate the Conjunction and Confederacies of his Enemies; and made it his constant avow'd Practice, or Maxim, to keep the most sacred Engagements of Treaties no longer than till he had the Opportunity to break them to his Advantage, and much more to this Purpose.
From these Things they ask us now, what signify all the Treaties and Engagements which the
French
King has made in the Affair of the
Protestant Succession
; and what Dependance can we, or ought we to have upon them?
Now it is a Mistake if any Reader expects to find this Tract attempting to take off any of the above Reproaches cast upon the Honour and Character of the
French
King, his regard to his Word, or holding sacred the Engagements he has enter'd into.—Not at all: This shall be no part of my Task; let it go; let it be taken all for granted, if they please; or not taken for granted, as you shall please. But the two Questions to be ask'd here, and which contains the whole of the Case, are these.
1. What more could be done by the
French
King to secure us against him, or give us Satisfaction in his future Conduct, with relation to the
Pretender
?
2. How, with safety to the Honour and Reputation of our Arms, could we aledge, that our Safety against the
Pretender
was not sufficiently secured by this?
1. What more could be done by the
French
King to secure us against him, or give us Satisfaction in his future Conduct, with relation to the
Pretender.
This Question has been ask'd before now, and so many abrupt and absurd Answers have been given to it, that even the Persons who have given those Answers, desire not to have the Question repeated; and are willing to hear as little of it as they can. Some have answer'd, the
French
King should have deliver'd him up to us: But this is liable to many Exceptions; and to speak in general only, the best Friends of the House of
Hanover
have declared, they did not desire to have that Method taken as a dangerous Experiment for many Reasons, some of them fitter to be guess'd at than express'd. Some have suggested, That the
French
King should have caused him to be made away privately, rather than to have suffered himself to be brought to so Dishonourable a Submission, as to Forsake, and Abandon a Person who had, from his Infancy, been shelter'd under his Protection. But this was too Barbarous and Unhospitable, for even the worst Enemies of the
Pretender,
if they were Christians, to approve of; and no one could maintain it without Horror, even at the same time that they were for entirely Expelling him from hence. Others suggested, That we should have procur'd him to be Confin'd in the
Pierre Encise
in
France,
where Prisoners for Life are generally sent, near
Lyons
; and that he should be suffer'd there to end his Days quietly: But this was liable to the same Objections of the
French
King's breaking his Word, that the present Articles are liable too; since he might cause the Gates to be Opened when ever he thought fit, and might let him out from thence with the same Ease that he may now Recall him into his Dominions.
What, then, can we propose that the King of
France
could have done, in respect to the Disposing the Person of the
Pretender,
more than first having caused him, or desired him (
call it as you please
) Voluntarily to withdraw out of his Dominions; to engage, in the solemnest manner, not to admit him to Return thither any more; and no more to own him for ever hereafter under the Titles of King of
England, Scotland,
and
Ireland,
King of
Great Britain,
or, in short, any of Her Majesty's Titles and Royal Stile, as he did before.
It is true, The
French
King may break his Word, may renounce the Faith and Honour of a King, pledg'd to Her Majesty, and the Faith and Honour of the very Throne of
France,
which he has engaged, as far as in him lies, in the Name of all his Successors; and there is no helping this: But I do not see what farther could be done; what more could have been asked of the King of
France
; or what more he could have granted, to have made us more safe.
Pledges of Towns, Possession of Frontiers, and Cautionary Garisons, could be of no signification here; neither did ever any one of the other Opinion say what Town or City they would accept as a sufficient Caution, or Pledge, for the Security of his Performance: Nor, indeed, could any thing the
French
King possesses have given us the least Security in such a Case. On the contrary, had any of the Possessions of the Kingdom of
France
been made over in a way of Security, or as a Preliminary for the performance of this Negative, and to assure us, That he never would Assist, or Entertain this
Pretender
again: This would, even itself, have been a most forcible Motive to the
French
King to have broke that very Engagement, and to have made the Attempt, that having set him up here, and obtain'd the Possession of the
English,
or
British
Crown for him, He,
the Pretender,
should clear him,
the
French
King,
of those Engagements, and restore to him those Pledges.
Nor in such a Case would there have lain so much of the Charge of a breach of Honour, or a Charge of Perfidiousness, since he that takes Security is supposed not to depend upon the Promise, or Engagement, but relinquishing the Honour of the Person takes the Equivalent,
viz.
the Pledge for his Satisfaction.
What then, any Ambassador, or Plenipotentiaries, could have ask'd more than the present Treaty has taken: Or, indeed, what could have been proposed farther to the
French
King to have done for our Security and Satisfaction in this Case, remains for any to set down that knows, for I do not pretend to it.
2. How, with safety to the Honour and Reputation of our Arms, could we aledge, that our Safety against the
Pretender
was not sufficiently secured by this?
The Safety of
Britain
must be esteem'd by us to be very weakly Defended, and our Establishment to be in a very precarious Condition, if we may suppose it to depend so entirely upon the
French
King's performance of his Engagements, as that without it we are given up, and lost to the
Pretender.
Those who are thus Flegmatick in the Case of the
Protestant Succession,
very much Dishonour their own Country, and the Confidence they have either in the Power or Unanimity of the People of
Great Britain
; that they should think we should be so much at the Mercy of the
French
King, that when ever he pleases to break his Engagements, we are to be subdued to the Interest of the
Pretender.
It is true, The Interest of the
Pretender,
back'd by the Power of the
French
King, is not to be dispised; nor the Danger of it to be made light of; and therefore, every thing that is reasonable and practicable ought to be done, to keep that Apprehension off: And the Treaty has made so much Provision, that whether it be sufficient or no, it seems to be all that the Nature of the Case would admit of; and all that was really practicable in the Thing: To be Flegmatick and Dismay'd now, would suggest to us, that our own Power is of no weight in this Case; that we must depend entirely upon the Conduct of the
French
King to preserve the
Succession
; and, that we are to be Happy or Miserable, just as he is, or is not pleased to be faithful to his Engagement.
This, I must acknowledge, I think is Complimenting the
French
King too much at our own Expence, and placing the
British
Strength at so low an Ebb, as no reason can be given for.
Britain,
or the People of
Britain,
no doubt, were we Hearty and Unanimous in the Interest of the Nation, are able to keep up the Resolutions already taken in the Affair of the
Succession,
and are able to Support our own Laws and Constitution against the whole World: And tho' it is highly reasonable that, on a Treaty, the
French
King should engage, as he has done, to relinquish the
Pretender,
and acknowledge the Successor, yet our Safety is very far from depending entirely on the Performance of that Engagement; and we ought to be in very little Concern, whether the
French
King will perform his Promises or not.
The Question, therefore, does not so much rest upon this Point, whether the
French
King will perform the Treaty he has made or no; but whether any thing farther could have been done for our Security or no in a Treaty, whether with the
French
King, or any-body else; what the
French
King could have granted farther, or what we could Honourably to our selves have demanded farther, that we may see if the People that mady the Treaty have been faithful or no.
I shall readily grant, that if our Security depends upon the
French
King's performance of his Promises and Engagements, the
Protestant Succession
may be a very precarious Thing. The Faith and Honour of the best Princes in the World being too weak a Basis to build a Thing of that Consequence upon, especially while, according to the present Practices, the Faith and Honour of Treaties are always Interpreted by Princes their own way, when they have any Pretensions to make, or find it for their Conveniency to break in upon their Word given.
And for this Reason those People who lay so great a stress upon our Treaty with
France,
and place so much weight there, as if the whole, and only Security of our
Protestant Settlement
depended upon this Treaty; not only Dishonour our own Nation, but really Weaken the
Succession
itself. Do such People know, or consider, that the
Protestant Succession
is our Fundamental Security for the
Peace, Prosperity, Liberty, Property, Religion, Posterity
of this Nation, and all that is, or can be dear to us, or them, now and for ever? What a Condition should we be all in, if these Things, of so much Consequence to us, depended for their Safety, upon the Veracity, Faith, and Honour of the
French
King; aye, or any King upon Earth? Such People have too mean an Opinion of our Constitution, and of our Power to maintain it. It is, no doubt, convenient and safe for us to tye up the Hands of those who are Enemies to the
Succession
as far as possible: And it seems to be as much done that way as it was possible could be done in the Treaty. But when all that is over, we hope the Security of our Establishment has better Foundations than any that could be furnished from Foreign Contracts, or provided in a Treaty with
France.
As far as Treaty could provide, as far as could either be offer'd by the
French
King, or proposed by us in a Treaty, seems to be Obtain'd and Settled by this Treaty; and it is yet unknown what those People who complain of the Insufficiency of this Treaty, do propose; either as what might have been done, or as what would have been sufficient if it had been done in the Treaty, I mean as it relates to the
Protestant Succession.
If then, nothing can be thought of farther for the Security of the
Protestant Succession,
which either was in the Power of the
French
King to grant, or which we ought to have accepted from him, or proposed to him, then the present Treaty is as sufficient a Security to the
Succession
as it was possible to make it be, or as a Treaty could admit.
The same Thing might be said in the Case of the
Spanish
Renunciations, which lay it down as a Foundation, that
France
and
Spain
ought to be joyn'd together in the same Person; since then the Possessor King
Philip
was not driven Out; and that yet it appear'd necessary to make a Treaty of Peace on all Sides. Nothing more effectual could be devised, or proposed than those Renunciations: And however Invalid Renunciations have been, in like Cases, thro' the Accidents that may have happen'd, yet upon a due Examination, it will appear that such Formal Proceedings are not esteem'd so very Insufficient as we now make them, or so appointed to be broken, as that they cannot be kept; and in the Prosecution of this Argument there shall be shewn in due time.
1. That the present Renunciations are of a different kind from all that ever were proposed in an Affair of the like Nature, as far as History can instruct us in the Case.
2. That there is something in the Nature of the Thing, that makes these Valid; and that tho' all the former Contracts of the like Nature in the World have, or had proved ineffectual, yet that these cannot do so.
3 That King
William
accepted of Renunciations, in Cases of like Nature, as the only Method to bind Princes, in Cases where other Obligations could not be taken or given.
But these Things are reserved to a Treatise of the Renunciations, which may be Published by itself.
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