TRACTS, CONCERNING THE ANCIENT AND ONLY TRUE LEGAL MEANS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE, BY A FREE MILITIA.
I. The ancient Common-Law Right of
associating with the Vicinage,
in every County, District, or Town, to support the civil Magistrate in maintaining the Peace.
II. A
general Militia,
acting by a well-regulated
Rotation,
is the only safe Means of defending a
free People.
III. Remarks concerning the trained Bands of the City of
London.
IV. Hints of some general Principles, which may be useful to military Associations.
LONDON: PRINTED IN THE YEAR M.DCC.LXXXI.
THE ANCIENT COMMON-LAW RIGHT OF ASSOCIATING WITH THE VICINAGE, In every County, District, or Town, to support the Civil Magistrate in maintaining the Peace.
THE Ancient Common-Law Right OF ASSOCIATING WITH THE VICINAGE, In every County, District, or Town, to support the Civil Magistrate, in maintaining the Peace.
MAN being, by
nature,
a social creature, it is
natural
for him to
associate
with his brethren and neighbours, for common defence against all
unjust violence;
and such
association
being
just
and
reasonable,
as well as
natural,
we have not only a
right
thus to associate, but are even
bound
to do it, by a branch of the
common-law,
which cannot
legally
be changed: for it is fixed upon
all
men, in their respective districts and countries, as an indispensable DUTY, by
THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS,
that we may become assisting
(says Cowel, tit. 2.)
both to our parents and country; and
REPELL FORCE AND INJURY:
and from hence it comes,
(says he,)
that whatsoever we do, for the defence of our own bodies, is adjudged legal.
For which he cites Bracton, l. i. c. 6.
This c. 6. seems to be an error of the press, instead of c. 5. num. 7. the proper reference to Bracton's declaration concerning the NATURAL RIGHT of all men
to
RESIST VIOLENCE AND INJURY.—
Hoc autem jus gentium soium hominibus commune est, veluti erga Deum religio, ut parentibus et patriae pareamus, ut
VIM
atque
INJURIAM PROPULSEMUS,
nam
DE JURE
hoc evenit, ut quod quis ob sui tutelam corporis fecerit,
JURE
fecisse existimetur. Item cûm inter homines cognationem quandam constituit natura, consequens est hominem homini insidiari nephas esse.
But this noble
constitution of nature,
whereby we ought to esteem
all mankind
as
brethren,
is utterly corrupted by the hardened iniquity of temporal governments! The laws of nature and sound Policy require every industrious citizen to be exercised and expert in
"Arms of Defence and Peace,"
for mutual protection; but these, alas! are too generally discouraged and neglected, whilst
arms of offence and robbery
are eagerly preparing in every port! The unprincipled and abandoned part of mankind, that lay aside all
discernment between right and wrong,
are prompted, by royal Proclamations, not merely to
"covet their neighbours goods,"
but to
lay wait for and take
them; whereby war is more notoriously declared, and is infinitely more active
against trade, and the honourable merchants of the world,
than against the standing armies and navies of our enemies! Thus the seas swarm with piratical banditti, carrying letters of
dispensation for dishonesty,
and
the earth is filled with violence!
Have we not cause to expect some tremendous vengeance to vindicate the
righteousness of
GOD; or that the Almighty will once more command the elements to sweep
corrupted man
from the face of the earth? We are secured indeed, by divine promise, from any future general destruction, by a deluge of
water;
but the elements of
tempest
and
fire
are still reserved to execute the wrath of GOD, and are frequently mentioned as the instruments of his vengeance. Isaiah xvii. 13. Psa. lxxxiii. 13-15. cxlviii. 8. Dan. ii. 35. 2 Thess. i. 8. 2 Pet. iii. 7.
num. 7. So the Author of Doctor and Student, in his second chapter, concerning the law of Nature and Nations, and the law of Reason, asserts, that,
by the law of reason, it is lawful to repell force with force; and that it is
THE RIGHT OF EVERY ONE
(fas est unicuique se tueri,
&c.
)
TO DEFEND HIMSELF AND HIS PROPERTY AGAINST UNJUST VIOLENCE.
Lex rationis permittat plurima fieri, ut scilicet quod licitum est vim vi repellere, et quod
fas est unicuique
se tueri, et rem suam defendere contra vim injustam. Doct. et Stud. c. ii. p. 8.
And again, in his fifth chapter, concerning the first foundation of English law,
Reason,
he again repeats the maxim, that
it is lawful to repell force with force for the defence of the body, due circumstances being observed.
—
Quod licitum est vim vi repellere pro tuitione corporis, debitis circumstantiis servatis.
C. 5. p. 14.
b.
Now, as the Laws of
reason
and
nature are immutable,
Et quod LEX RATIONIS in corde scribitur, ideo
deleri non
potest,
nec etiam recipit mutationem
ex loco nec tempore, sed ubique, et inter omnes homines,
servari debet.
Nam JURA NATURALIA IMMUTABILIA SUNT, ET RATIO IMMUTATIONIS EST, QUOD RECIPIUNT NATURAM REI PRO FUNDAMENTO,
quae semper eadem est,
et ubique,
&c.
— "Et contra eam" (legem rationis vel naturae)
non est praescriptio, vel ad appositum statutum sive consuetudo. Et, si aliqua fiat, non sunt statuta, sive consuetudines, sed corruptelae.
Doct. et Stud. c. ii. p. 5.
this
natural right
of
associating
for common defence and peace, and the
natural right
of every individual to
repel force with force,
in defence of himself and property, can never be annulled by
any act of parliament,
but must ever be esteemed as
immutable rights of the common law,
and must always remain in force, unless the government should unhappily
cease to be
LEGAL, by setting aside the first foundations of the LAW! Ancient statutes, however, though not the foundation of
these rights,
yet bear ample testimony to the exercise or usage of them: for, what is
the power of the countie,
so often mentioned in the ancient law and statutes, but
an armed association of the vicinage?
—an
association,
from which no layman, from 15 to 60 years of age, was exempt. See Lambard's Eirenarcha, third book, p. 316, title,
"Power of the Countie."
—
That the Justices of the peace, Sherife, or Under-sherife, ought to have the aide and attendance of
ALL
the
KNIGHTES, GENTLEMEN, YEOMEN, LABOURERS, SERVAUNTS, APPRENTICES,
and
VILLAINES:
and likewise of
WARDES:
and of other
YONG MEN
that be above the age of
xv.
years; for
ALL
of that age are bound to have harnesse
The word
Harnesse
was used to express all necessary
accoutrements
for war, according to the rank of the bearers, and comprehended not only belts and armour, but likewise
arms
and
weapons,
of
every sort,
that, for the time being, might be esteemed most useful; so that in the old Dictionary, by Minsheu, (printed in the time of king James I.) the word is explained by the Greek plural,
, which signifies
arms,
or instruments of war of all sorts in general; and this is the sense also of the word
Armure,
as used in the above-cited statute of Winchester, (13 king Edw. I.) which, in the old English version of it, is rendered
Harneis, viz.
And further, it is commanded, that
EVERY MAN
have in his house
HARNEIS,
(in the original statute, written in old French, the word is
"Armure,"
which,
by the context,
must necessarily be understood to comprehend
Arms
as well as
Armour,
)
for to keep the peace, after the ancient assise: that is to say;
(2) EVERY MAN,
between
15
years of age and
60
years, shall be assessed and sworn to
ARMOR,
according to the quantity of their lands and goods:
(3)
that is to wit; from £
15
lands and goods,
40
marks,
AN HAUBERKE, A BREAST-PLATE OF IRON,
("shapell de ferre,")
A SWORD, A KNIFE, AND AN HORSE:
And from £
10
lands and
20
marks goods,
AN HAUBERKE, A BREAST-PLATE OF IRON, A SWORD, AND A KNIFE: (5)
And from £
5
lands,
A DOUBLET, A BREAST-PLATE OF IRON, A SWORD, AND A KNIFE: (6)
And from
40
s. land and more, unto
100
s. of land,
A SWORD, A BOW AND ARROWS, AND A KNIFE: (7)
And he that ha
h less than
40
s. yearly shall be sworn to keep
GISARMS,
Gisarms, properly "GUISARME,"
(cu)
PERTUISANE,
arm
militaire
fait comme une
lance,
ou comme une longue bayonnette.
Dictionnaire du vieux Language François, par M. Lacombe.
KNIVES, AND OTHER LESS WEAPONS:
And all other that may shall have
BOWS AND ARROWS
out of the forest, and in the forest
BOWS AND BOULTS,
&c.
St. ii. c. 6. A. D. 1285.
by the statute of Winchester.
See also, in page 479 of the Eirenarcha, a farther testimony that the law requires all laymen not only to have
arms,
but also to be
well exercised therein.
See title,
"Archerie." "If any man, being the
QUEEN
's subject,
" (the author wrote in the reign of
queen
Elizabeth,)
and not have reasonable cause or impediment, and being within the age of
60
years,
(except spirituall men, justices of one bench or other, justices of assise, and barons of the exchequer,) have not A LONG BOW AND ARROWES READIE IN HIS HOUSE,
or have not
USED SHOOTING THEREIN;
(which is a clear command to be
exercised
in arms;)
or have not, for EVERY MAN-CHILD IN HIS HOUSE, (betweene 7 yeeres and 17 of age,) a bow and 2 shafts; and for every such, being above 17 yeeres, a bow and 4 shafts; or have not BROUGHT THEM UP IN SHOOTING,
&c.
he loses 6
s.
8
d.
for each month.
And, under the same head, he informs us, that, if any man, above the age of 24 years,
have shot at any marke under
eleven score yards,
(
viz.
one furlong, or 220 yards,)
with any prick-shaft or flight,
he shall "
loose
6
s.
8
d.
for every shot." Also,
if the inhabitants of any towne have not made and continued
their Buts as
they ought to do,
—
lose 20
s.
for every 3 moneths;
(Eirenarcha, 4 book, p. 478, 479;) for which he cites 33 Hen. VIII. c. 9. in which, indeed, the obligation for
every man
to have arms, and
be exercised
therein, is expressed still in stronger terms,
viz.
—
that butts be made, on this side the feast of St. Michael the Archangel next coming, in every city, town, and place, by the inhabitants of every such city, town, and place,
ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF ANCIENT TIMES USED,
and that the said inhabitants, and dwellers in every of them, be
COMPELLED TO MAKE AND CONTINUE SUCH BUTTS,
upon pain to forfeit, for every
3
months so lacking,
20
s. And that
THE SAID INHABITANTS SHALL EXERCISE THEMSELVES WITH LONG-BOWS IN SHOOTING AT THE SAME, and elsewhere, in holy days
and other times convenient.
And, to the intent that EVERY PERSON
may have bows of mean price,
be it enacted,
&c.
§ iv. and v. Thus the law not only
permits,
but absolutely
requires,
EVERY PERSON to
have arms,
and be EXERCISED in the use of them.
The exercise of the Long-bow was formerly esteemed the most effectual military discipline for the defence of the kingdom, and is so declared in another act of parliament of the same year, cap. 6.
—
Divers gentlemen, yeomen, and serving-men,
now of late have laid apart the
good and laudable exercise
of the
Long-bow,
which always heretofore hath been
the surety, safeguard, and continual defence, of this realm of England, and an inestimable aread and terror to the enemies of the same.
(Extract from the preamble to the act of 33 Hen. VIII. c. 6.)
Hence it is plain, that
gentlemen, yeomen, and serving men,
were required, by law, to be
exercised in the use of such arms
as were esteemed the best for the safeguard and defence of the realm.
and, therefore, as the law, at that time,
required
EVERY MAN
to be exercised
in the use of the
then
fashionable weapons, the reason of the law holds equally good, to
require the exercise of
ALL MEN in the use of the present fashionable weapons, the
musquet and bayonet.
But even at that time, the use of musquets, or guns, was allowed to the inhabitants of all cities, boroughs, and market-towns, and for the very fame reason, (the defence of the realm,) by a provisional clause of the last-mentioned act, § vi.
Provided alway, and be it enacted,
&c.
that it shall be lawful, from henceforth, to all gentlemen, yeomen, and serving-men of every lord, spiritual and temporal, and of all knights, esquires, and gentlemen, and to ALL THE INHABITANTS
of cities, boroughs,
and
market-towns,
of this realm of England, to shoot with any hand-gun, demihake, or hagbut, at any butt or bank of earth, only in
place convenient for the same,
(whereby it appears that proper places for exercise should be appointed in every town,)
so that every such hand-gun,
&c.
be of the several lengths aforesaid, and NOT UNDER. And that it shall be lawful, to every of the said lord and lords, knights, esquires, and gentlemen, and the INHABITANTS
of
EVERY CITY, BOROUGH, AND MARKET-TOWN,
to have and keep in every of their houses any such hand-gun or hand-guns,
of the length of one whole yard,
&c.
and NOT UNDER,
to the intent to use and shoot in the same, at a butt or bank of earth only, as is above said, whereby they and
EVERY OF THEM, BY THE EXERCISE THEREOF,
in form above said,
MAY THE BETTER AID AND ASSIST TO THE DEFENCE OF THIS REALM, WHEN NEED SHALL REQUIRE,
&c.
This statute is still in force.
Every
temporal person
was (formerly) liable to pecuniary penalties;
if he have not
(says Lambard)
and keep not in readinesse, such horses, geldings, weapon, armour, or other furniture for the wars, as, after the proportion of his abilitie, he ought to have and keepe.
(Eirenarcha, book iv. c. 4, p. 480.) Thus stood the law so late as the latter end of queen Elizabeth's reign, when the book last-cited was published; and the general tenor of the doctrine, respecting the
right of Englishmen to have arms,
hath since been confirmed, by
the Declaration of Rights in the Act of Settlement,
(1 Wm & Mary, st. 2, c. 2,) though it seems now to be limited to
Protestant subjects, viz.
That the subjects which are Protestants
MAY HAVE ARMS FOR THEIR DEFENCE,
suitable to their conditions, and as allowed by law.
—This latter expression,
"as allowed by law,"
respects the limitations in the above-mentioned act of 33 Hen. VIII. c. 6, which restrain the use of
some particular sorts of arms,
meaning only such arms as were liable to be concealed, or otherwise favour the designs of murderers, as
cross-bows, little short hand-guns, and little hagbuts,
and all guns UNDER CERTAIN LENGTHS, specified in the act; but
proper arms for defence
(provided they are
not shorter
than the act directs) are so far from being forbidden by this statute, that they are clearly authorised, and
"the exercise thereof"
expressly recommended by it, as I have already shewn. And indeed the laws of England always required the people to be armed, and not only to be
armed,
but to be
expert in arms;
which last was particularly recommended by the learned chancellor Fortescue:—
et revera, non minime erit regno accommodum, ut
incolae ejus in armis sint experti.
—
Indeed it will be of no small advantage to the kingdom, that the inhabitants be
EXPERT IN ARMS.
(De Laudibus Legum Angliae, c. xliv. p. 106.) And, in the notes and remarks on this book, by the learned Mr. Justice Aland, we find the following observations to the same purpose. 'In the Confessor's laws' (says he) 'it is,'
DEBENT
"All freeman
OUGHT" (
debent,
it is their duty)
TO HAVE ARMS, and to keep them always ready for
the defence of the kingdom,
&c.
UNIVERSI LIBERI HOMINES,
&c.
ARMA HABERE, ET ILLA SEMPER PROMPTA CONSERVARE AD TUITIONEM REGNI,
&c.
"See" (says he)
the laws of the Conqueror
TO THE SAME PURPOSE.
The custom of the nation
(continues this learned judge)
has been,
TO TRAIN UP THE FREEHOLDERS TO DISCIPLINE; v. 13 and 14. C. ii. c. iii. and ib. § 20. and title, WAR,
in the table to the statutes.
Among the ancient constitutions, or ordinances, of the kingdom, recorded in the Myrror of Justices, chap. i. § 3. we read that it was ordained,
that every one, of the age of 14 years and above,
should prepare him
(se apprestat)
to kill mortal offenders in their notorious crimes, or to follow them from town to town with hue and cry.
&c.
The true purpose and advantage of having
all the inhabitants
of this kingdom trained to arms is farther manifested in our old law books and statutes; as in the Westminster Primer, cap. xvii. on the case when any cattle are unlawfully taken and driven into any castle or strong hold,
&c.
—
Le Visc• . ou le Bailife prise ove luy
POYAR DE SON COUNTIE,
ou de sa Bail, et voile assaier de faire de ceo repl' des avers a celuy qui les aver prise,
&c.
That the sheriff or the bailiff shall take with him THE POWER OF HIS COUNTY, or of his bailiwick, and shall endeavour to make replevin
(or recovery)
of the cattle
from him that hath taken them,
&c.
And lord Coke remarks on this: —
Nota,
EVERY MAN
is bound by the Common-Law to assist not only the Sherife in his Office for the Execution of the King's Writs, (which are the Commandments of the King,)
ACCORDING TO LAW;
"Commandment of the King, according to Law."
Any commandment of the king, which falls not within this description, is
not binding
or
valid, in law;
for the king's commands ought only to proceed,
by due process of the law,
through the king's courts of justice, which are
the only
proper channels in which
the executive power
of this limited monarchy can legally flow and be exerted; because it is one of the first principles of our constitution,
that the king can do nothing on earth, as he is the minister and vicar of
God,
but that only which he may do by the law.
(
Nihil aliud potest rex in terris, cum sit Dei minister et vicarius, nisi id solum quod de jure potest.
Bract. lib. iii. c. 9.) And this teaches us how to understand the trite maxim, that
"the king can do no wrong;" i. e.
he has no legal
authority to do wrong;
—
Potestas sua juris est, et non injuriae.
Bract. lib. iii. c. 9.
He has not any peculiar prerogative,
either to
do wrong,
or to decline from
doing right
and
justice.
NON EST ULLA REGIS PREROGATIVA
quae ex justitia et equitate quicquam derogat.
Rot. Parl. 7 Hen. IV. num. 59. But, if any king of this
limited monarchy
should, nevertheless, wilfully
do wrong,
and presume to rule contrary to the laws and fundamental principles of the ancient constitution, he ceases to be
"the minister and vicar of God,"
and, in the eye of the law, immediately commences
Minister Diaboli.
—
Potestas enim juris solius est Dei, injuriae vero
DIABOLI;
et
CUJUS
opera fecerit,
EJUS ET MINISTER ERIT.
(Fleta, lib. i. cap. 17. p. 17.) See also in Bracton, (lib. iii. cap. 9. p. 107.) who, after reciting the same doctrine, concerning the effect of
good
or
bad
measures, adds,
"Igitur dum facit"
(rex)
JUSTITIAM,
vicarius est
REGIS AETERNI;
minister autem
DIABOLI,
dum declinet ad injuriam:
and the consequence must be fatal, even to the
temporal
state of such an one, because all legal authority of the sovereign ceases, in this realm, if the king presumes to rule by
"will and pleasure,"
instead of law!
for there is
NO KING,
where
WILL
governs and
NOT LAW.
Non est enim rex, ubi dominatur voluntas et non lex.
(Bract. lib. i. c. 8.) The advisers, therefore, of illegal measures (or any measures that require an
undue influence
in parliament to make them pass) are so far from deserving the title of the
"king's friends,"
that they are really his most dangerous enemies: they are
traitors,
whose
disloyal
councils lead to certain destruction, as nothing but
"righteousness can establish the throne."
but also his Baily, that hath the Sheriffe's Warrant in that Behalfe, hath the same Authority,
&c.
(2 Inst. p. 193.)
The attack of a castle or place of arms must require disciplined troops; and therefore it was certainly necessary that "EVERY MAN,"
so bound by the common-law to assist, should be trained to arms,
in order to fulfil his duty. And the learned Nathaniel Bacon, in his historical Discourse of the Uniformity of the Government of England, (1st part, p. 64.) remarks, that
the Strength consisted of the Freemen; and, though many were bound by Tenure to follow their Lords to the Wars, and many were Voluntiers, yet, it seems,
ALL WERE BOUND UPON CALL, UNDER PERIL OF FINE, AND WERE BOUND TO KEEP ARMS,
for the Preservation of the Kingdom, their Lords, and their own Persons; and these they might neither pawn nor sell,
but leave them to descend to their Heirs,
&c.
The common-law right of the people of England
to have arms
is also clearly expressed by the great and learned judge Bracton, one of the most ancient writers of our common-law, who is justly esteemed of unexceptionable authority.—
ei qui justè possidet, licitum erit cum armis contra pacem venientem ut expellat, cum armis repellere, ut per
ARMA TUITIONIS ET PACIS, quae sunt justitiae,
repellat injuriam et vim injustam, et arma injuriae,
&c.
(Bract. lib. iv. c. 4.)
i. e.
—
to him who justly possesses it SHALL BE LAWFUL
with arms
to repel him who cometh to expel, with arms against the peace, that, by ARMS OF DEFENCE AND PEACE,
which are of justice, he may repel injury and unjust violence, and arms of injustice,
&c.
The late unhappy tumults prove, that these principles of the English constitution are as
necessary
to be enforced
at present as ever they were;
for, had they not been fatally neglected and disused, the abandoned rioters would have been quelled and secured by the neighbouring inhabitants of Westminster,
&c.
in
their first attempts;
or, in case they had advanced towards the city, if
the proper barriers had been reserved,
the citizens would have had time to get under arms, to support their own magistrates in securing the peace of the city; for any attack upon the gates or posterns would have justified an immediate discharge of fire-arms, or other weapons, against the assailants, without waiting for the command of a peace-officer: and, as the inhabitants of each city and county are required to make good the damages sustained on such occasions by private individuals, it is plain that the
inhabitants themselves,
in their collective capacity, do form that proper POWER, from which the law requires the
prevention
of such damages, and the support and defence of the civil magistrates: for, otherwise, the law ought to have directed the damages to be deducted from the last preceding parliamentary grants to the
army.
If it be alledged that there can be no occasion, in these modern times, to arm and train the inhabitants of England, because there is an ample military force, or
standing army,
to preserve the peace; yet let it be remembered, that, the greater and more powerful
the standing army is,
so much more necessary is it that there
should be a proper balance to that power,
to prevent any ill effects from it: though there is one bad effect, which
the balance
(howsoever perfect and excellent) cannot prevent; and that is
the enormous and ruinous expence
of maintaining
a large number of men, without any civil employment for their support;
an expence, which neither the
land
nor
trade
of this realm can possibly bear much longer, without public failure!
No Englishman, therefore, can be truly LOYAL, who opposes these essential principles of the English LAW,
One of the articles against cardinal Wolsey, 21 Hen. VIII. was, for that he did endeavour to subvert antiquissimas leges hujus regni, universumque hoc regnum
Angliae
legibus
imperialibus
subjugare.
'Tis fit that those who attempt to subvert the laws should, according to the old writ, be carried
ad goalam de Newgate.
Merito beneficium legis amittit, qui
legem ipsam
subvertere intendit.
Mr. Justice Aland's Notes on Fortescue de Laudibus Legum Ang. p. 75.
whereby the people are required to have
arms of defence and peace,
for mutual as well as private defence; for
a standing army of regular soldiers is entirely repugnant to the constitution of England, and the genius of its inhabitants.
No English king before Charles II. had any other guards than his pensioners, and yeomen of the guard, (first appointed by that great oppressor of his people Henry VII,) save Richard II. who with the aid of 4000 profligate archers made himself absolute. The usurper,
(Cromwell,)
it is notorious, kept up an army in support of himself and his tyranny,
and Charles II. being connived at in keeping a few (additional) guards, he insensibly increased their number, till he left a body of men to his successor great enough to tell the parliament he would be no longer bound by the laws he had sworn to.
In the year 1697, immediately after the conclusion of the war with France, it is well known how far the soldiery, against king William's inclination and earnest endeavours, were reduced. On behalf of the court it was then declared that
the army was not designed to be made a part of our constitution, but to be kept only for a little time, till the circumstances of Europe would better permit us to be without them.
To which it was answered, and reasons given to prove, that
these conspirators against their country were satisfied that their continuance then was an establishment of them for ever.
'And it was farther obser|'ved, that
the very discontents they might create would be made an argument for the continuing of them: but if they should be kept from oppressing the people, in a little time they would grow habitual to us, and almost
become a part of our constitution,
and by degrees we should be brought to believe them not only
not dangerous,
but
necessary;
for every body saw, but few understood, and those few would never be able to persuade the multitude that there was any danger in those men they had lived quietly with for some years.
'And moreover that
without dear bought experience any body may know before hand what will be the natural consequences of
a standing army.
From the day you set them up you set up your masters; you put yourselves wholly into their hands, and are at their discretion. It is
the conquest
of the nation in the silentest, shortest, and surest way. They are able to dispose of your lives and estates at
will and pleasure;
and what can a foreign conqueror do more? If after this we live and possess any thing, it is because they let us; and how long that shall be neither
we
nor
they themselves know.
—
Continued Corruption, standing Armies, &c. considered,
1768, p. 15-17.
Standing armies were not unknown, indeed, to our ancestors in very early times, but they were happily opposed by them, and declared
illegal.
A remarkable instance of this is related by Sir Edward Coke, in his 7th rep. p. 443, (Calvin's case,) but with a very
erroneous
application of the doctrine, (as there are in many other instances of that particular report,) for which the chancellor or judges, probably, who spoke, and not the reporter, must one day be answerable.
It appeareth, by Bracton, lib. iii. tract 2. c. 15. fol. 134. that Canutus, the Danish king, having settled himself in this kingdom in peace,
kept
notwithstanding
(for the better continuance thereof) great armies within this realm.
[Yet Bracton was more wise and honourable than to conceive or hint that
great armies,
so kept by the king, were proper instruments
for the better continuance of peace;
for he says no such thing, this being only a
disloyal
conceit of some modern judge, concerned in the argument of Calvin's case: but to return to the words of the reporter.]
The peers and nobles of England distasting
THIS GOVERNMENT, BY ARMES AND ARMIES,
And every Englishman, that has not the same
distaste,
is surely
disaffected
to the true constitution and laws of his country, and may justly be charged with
disloyalty;
for none but
freemen
ought to be trusted with arms in a
free country,
and not men that are enslaved under martial law, in regular armies, to yield an implicit
active obedience
to the word of command, whatever it may be, without distinction of
good
or
evil!
(ODIMUS ACCIPITREM, QUIA SEMPER VIVIT IN ARMIS,)
wisely and politiquely persuaded the king, that they would provide for the safety of him and his people, and yet his armies, carrying with them many inconveniences, should be withdrawn,
&c.
(This would be a proper language and true policy for a free British parliament to adopt.)
"Hereupon"
(says the reporter)
Canutus presently withdrew his armies, and within a while after he lost his crown,
&c.
Here again the judge, whoever he was that spoke, betrayed a most
disloyal
prejudice in favour of
a government by arms and armies,
which led him into a notorious falsehood! for, though the former part of the sentence is true, that king Canute
"withdrew his armies,"
yet the latter part, that,
within a while after, he lost his crown,
is totally
false;
and the judge, by asserting that
groundless
circumstance, seemed inclined to insinuate, that
the withdrawing the armies
occasioned the (supposed)
loss of the crown,
which was far from being the case. The great and noble Canute reaped the benefit of his prudent and generous conformity to the free constitution of this
limited monarchy;
for he enjoyed a long and glorious reign,
after
he sent back his Danish soldiers; which, according to Matthew of Westminster, (p. 403,) was in the year 1018; and he held the crown with dignity and glory to the end of his life, in the year 1035, when he was buried at Winchester with
royal pomp
(
regio more,
ib. p. 409): and his two sons also, who separately succeeded him, died likewise,
kings of England;
for they lost not the kingdom but by natural deaths, and the want of heirs.
Happy would it have been for England, had all succeeding kings been as wise and truly politic as the great Canute, who feared not to commit the care of his own person, and those of his foreign friends that attended him, to the
free laws and limited constitution of this kingdom.
The old English maxim, however, against
a government by arms and armies,
ought never to be forgotten. —
Odimus accipitrem, quia semper vivit in armis.
(
June,
1780.)
A GENERAL MILITIA, ACTING BY A WELL-REGULATED ROTATION, IS THE ONLY SAFE MEANS OF Defending a free People.
A GENERAL MILITIA, ACTING BY A WELL-REGULATED ROTATION, IS THE ONLY SAFE MEANS OF Defending a free People.
THE establishment of standing armies is, perhaps, the most dangerous of all political expedients, and has been fatal to the liberty of every nation upon earth that has adopted it; and, therefore, though the doctrine of
necessity
is generally pleaded to excuse the measure, yet there seems rather a
necessity
of absolutely rejecting it; and of forming the national defence upon some other less dangerous plan.
The service of a
national militia
may be divided into equal proportions of attendance,
by rotation,
so as to inculcate and diffuse a sufficient knowledge of arms and military discipline throughout the whole body of a nation or people; and thereby supersede the baneful
necessity
of keeping
regular troops, or standing armies of mercenaries.
Whenever the public safety demands the assembling and continuance of a large body of troops in actual service, to watch and resist the motions of any powerful invader, a regular military
Roster of Service,
from the
whole national militia,
is the safest and best means of forming and continuing such an army in the field; because it would be, not only, the least burthensome to individuals, but also less dangerous to the community at large; for, if the regularity of
rotation
were duly observed, no man would be so long detained from his ordinary calling and occupation as to lose his
civil capacity
and way of livelihood at home, nor be thereby unwarily drawn into a
separate interest
from his fellow-citizens; which was unhappily the case of the Parliament's army in 1647; for, after having bravely defended the
national liberty
for some years, this very army became the instrument of a most hateful national
bondage,
under a military tyrant!
The nature of a Roster is well described by General Bland, in his Treatise of military Discipline, from p. 287 to 312. When a great army is formed by several nations in alliance, which send into the field, each of them, a different number of battalions, a
Roster
is esteemed the best expedient for regulating and dividing the general service into due proportions amongst them all: and General Bland has given, in p. 290 of the above-mentioned Treatise, the form of such
a Roster general for the detaching of battalions, according to that in Flanders, in
1708.
He has also given
Tables of Proportion for detaching private men,
that is, for detaching them from the several battalions in the field, that the danger and fatigue of the service (especially at sieges) may be equally divided among them. And, nearly on the same plan, tables might be formed, for detaching the
individuals of a national militia from the several parishes, or districts, to which they belong, in due proportion to the number of males enrolled in each of them;
whereby the hardship and inconveniences of military duty for the common safety would be equally divided among the whole nation; and, of course, the time of actual service would be most profitably diminished to each individual, whilst the knowledge of arms and discipline would be regularly
circulated
into all parts of the country; and with it also such a sensible perception, to each individual, of his fellowship, or incorporation, with the whole national community, as would plainly tend to prevent all partial and undue emulation of particular counties or districts against their neighbours: for, by such provincial jealousies, the ancient states of Greece were unhappily disunited, and their attention withdrawn from that true mutual interest and defence of each other, without which none of them could long subsist in freedom: whereas, if (on the contrary) they had been inured to the social duty of serving in one common army, drawn equally from each confederate state, by a proper
"Table of Proportion,"
and duly changed by
rotation,
(to prevent them from becoming
mere soldiers,
) there would have been no just cause to be jealous of each other's power (as between the Athenians and Lacedaemonians,
&c.
); for all successes, as well as losses, would have been equally divided among them; so that no particular state could have acquired, by victory, any enviable advantages, peculiar to itself, to incite the jealousy of the rest; but every individual, in every part, would, by these means, have been led to consider himself, not merely as a member of a single petty state or district, but (with a more enlarged idea of his own social character) as a member, rather, of the whole community of free citizens throughout all Greece: for the circulation
A
Rotation,
or general circulation of public duty, may be compared to those
"wheels within wheels,"
which give life, vigour, and activity, to a
whole community,
by enabling it (howsoever extensive and scattered, with respect to local
situation
) to move and exert itself as
one united living body,
actuated by
one spirit,
like as the hosts, or armies, of the commonwealth of Israel are typified by the Cherubim, or
four
living creatures, (as represented in the standards of the four principal tribes,) united in
one animated
system of action, moving altogether with wheels (or rotations) and wings,
full of eyes
within and without.
For, in a state that is perfectly free, (and in such only,) the eyes of the several individuals of which it is composed are permitted to look forward, with effect, to the true interests of the community at large; and may well be considered as the eyes, figuratively represented in the whole body of the Cherubim, and in all their parts; (their backs, and their hands, and their wings, and the wheels full of eyes round about;) every eye in that great united figurative body of the Cherubim helping to
enlighten
the
intention,
and thereby influence the motion or government of the whole.
of the
Roster
would have been a most effectual bond of union to secure the connexion and communication of the most distant branches of the confederacy; and, by preserving the general body of the people in their
civil capacity
and
ordinary occupations,
it would also have rendered them less liable to be drawn from the common interest of the state at large, partially to favour the arbitrary designs of any usurping commander in chief or petty tyrant: for no general-officer (had such a confederacy of national union been duly established) would have been able to assume more power and authority, than what was fairly delegated by the majority of suffrages, in one
great united general council
of chosen citizens from every part.
The general body of individuals, in such a case, indeed, submit themselves to serve, by rotation, the humble station of private soldiers; but the time of service being limited, and
equal
to all men in duration, it would be no great hardship, especially if each freeman that bears arms was allowed his
natural right
of suffrage in the state, his due share of legislative influence, to controul the commanders, and regulate the service.
In a nation consisting of six millions of souls, (which number England is commonly said to contain,) the number of males capable of bearing arms (and who, according to
natural right,
are justly entitled also to a share in the legislature) would be estimated at a fourth part of that number, according to the most general mode of estimation,
viz.
1,500,000 men; from which number a
Roster of actual service from home,
only for one month each man in the space of a whole year, would supply a constant army in the field of 125,000 men, if so many were necessary. A continual change
every month,
or every
fourteen days,
of half a battalion at a time out of each district, or still in smaller proportions,
viz.
a few companies at a time (or even by half-companies, from smaller divisions or parishes) would be most adviseable, that every part of the country might always retain nearly the proportion of eleven parts out of twelve of its own militia, as well for the purposes of guarding it, as to carry on the ordinary cultivation, and other necessary local occupations, without interruption. Persons above the common rank might serve in squadrons of horse, (if they preferred that kind of service,) as
equites,
or
esquires.
Those men whose time of service approached, as being next upon the established
Roster,
should be more carefully exercised
at home, after the hours of labour,
for one month at least before their time of marching. By these means they would be prepared for the service; and the very march, if properly conducted, would add to their discipline. The certainty of returning, when relieved by companies of their neighbours, in so short a time as
one month,
(if they lived so long,) or two months, allowing for the march out and home, would much reduce the anxiety of parting from their families and friends.
It will probably be objected, that a national militia, which has been exercised only in small bodies, is incapable of effectual service against an enemy: but for this a remedy may be found. Let the army be first formed in a separate encampment, at such convenient distance from the enemy, that they may not be liable to an immediate attack.
A central situation must, of course, be chosen for this camp of discipline, where the several companies from the whole nation may be regimented under proper general-officers, and be daily exercised, in
large bodies,
for a whole month (or six weeks, if necessary) before they are brought to face the enemy. And, for this reason, it would be expedient to require from each individual (I mean the first time he is entered on the
Roster
) one month or six weeks attendance,
more
than the generally established proportion of time on the
Roster,
(which would be only once in his whole life-time, and therefore no great hardship,) in order to be exercised with a large body of troops in some of the principal and most necessary movements and evolutions for the field; and, after the month or six weeks training in the camp of discipline, an army of 125,000 men might be marched to the camp or camps of actual service, to do duty for the time allotted to each upon the
Roster
against the common enemy; and the number might be continually kept up by monthly detachments of battalions from the first camp of discipline, in proportion as the time of service (allotted to each of the former companies upon the
Roster
) should expire. The country would also be guarded by the returning disciplined companies dispersed in every part; and the knowledge of arms and discipline, by the time a
single circulation
of the
Roster
was completed, (
viz.
in one year,) would be diffused throughout the
whole nation;
which would thereby be enabled afterwards to exert itself gloriously upon any sudden emergency; for it might afford to bear even the loss of six such capital armies of 125,000,
viz.
in all, 750,000, men, before it would be necessary to increase the time of service from one month to two months actual service, for each disciplined man, in a whole year. With so small a portion of time employed in military service, every man might preserve his ordinary occupation, either in trade or husbandry, and maintain his rank and situation in life with his family, as a
free citizen, in his own district,
at all other times, when the
Roster
of public service did not demand his personal attendance from home. But when, by a contrary method, a national militia is so long continued in actual service, without
rotation,
as to inure the individuals to a neglect and disuse of their ordinary employments, in their respective counties and districts, they gradually lose their
civil capacity,
and, from
free citizens,
are apt to become
mere sold-iers,
dependent on their military
Sold,
or stipend, and the favour of superiors; whereby they acquire such a slavish submission to COMMAND, be it
just
or
unjust,
that they readily undertake to execute those very measures and designs, which they themselves, perhaps, have previously condemned; alledging, that
a soldier has no right to judge for himself,
(thus indiscriminately applying, to the general propriety or impropriety of any military undertaking, a principle, which properly relates only to the necessary discipline and mode of conducting it in the field, after a man has absolutely consented and engaged to serve in it,)
and that a soldier must go
(say they)
wherever he is ordered, without any demur about the propriety or injustice of the service.
So that they establish not only a
passive,
but an
active, obedience
to the will of others, which makes the profession
dishonourable! — dishonourable,
I mean, in those who admit this doctrine of
unlimited obedience,
which is derogatory to their
natural dignity, as men;
for they give up an indispensible quality of
human nature,
the right of discerning between
good
and
evil,
(which is nothing less than a desertion, or apostatising, from the duty which
every man
owes to God and his eternal laws!) and thereby render themselves and their profession the bane of every state where they are established, and a disgrace to
human nature!
REMARKS CONCERNING THE Trained Bands OF LONDON.
REMARKS CONCERNING THE Trained Bands OF LONDON.
THE Militia, or Trained Bands, of London have never been known to misbehave in
actual service,
however despicable they may appear in their annual musters.
Citizens of London, from the most ancient times, were required to keep arms in their houses. The annual muster is rather a
muster of the arms
than of
the men,
who would probably go out to
actual
service, if there should be really occasion for them; but even the meanest of
the men,
as they now are generally sent out, (being for the most part substitutes,) if they were exercised for a few hours three times a week, only for one month, and restrained from the use of strong liquors during the time of exercise, would be found more serviceable (if there was any real occasion of public defence) than is generally conceived.
Of this real facts afford the best proof: the irregularity of the Trained Bands and want of discipline were as conspicuous and notorious, it seems, in the year 1642, as at present: for, when Capt. Skippon (afterwards Major-General) was directed by the parliament to attend them, as a guard, with two companies of the
Trained Bands
of London, Lord Clarendon's account of that matter is expressed in the folloWing contemptuous terms;
This man
(says he, meaning Skippon)
marched that day in the head of their
TUMULTUARY ARMY
to the parliament-house.
Bk iv. p. 380.
Yet Lord Clarendon himself makes ample reparation to the
Trained Bands
for this contempt, when he speaks of their
unexpected
behaviour at the battle of Newbery; for, though he allows their
inexperience both of danger and service,
he expressly attributes to the
steadiness
of the Trained Bands the preservation of the parliament's army. No troops in the kingdom had at that time been able to withstand the spirited charges of Prince Rupert's well-disciplined horse, till this
tumultuary army,
(which seems to be an exact description also of their present musters,) for the first time, compelled them to wheel about.
Rapin speaks of the brave defence of the
infantry
on that day in very high terms, but without mentioning what particular troops they were; so that no reader would suspect that he described the actions of the
"tumultuary army"
of the city.
After the Prince had routed
the cavalry
of the enemy,
(says Rapin, meaning the
parliament's cavalry,
)
he fell upon their
infantry,
which, though deprived of the help of the cavalry, received him with so much
intrepidity,
that he was
repulsed
several times, without being able ever to penetrate.
Après avoir mis en deroute
la Cavalerie
des ennemis, il alla tomber sur leur
Infanterie,
qui, bien que dénuée du secours de la Cavalerie, le reçut avec tant d'intrepidi
é, qu'il fut repoussé plusieurs fois, sans qu'il pût jamais la percer.
Rapin, tom. viii. p. 426.
But Lord Clarendon candidly attributes the glory of the day to those whom he before despised as a
tumultuary army.
"The London Trained Bands"
(says he)
and auxiliary regiments (of whose
INEXPERIENCE
of
DANGER,
or
ANY KIND OF SERVICE,
beyond the easy practice of their postures in the Artillery-garden, men had till then
TOO CHEAP AN ESTIMATION)
behaved themselves to wonder; and were, in truth, the preservation of that army that day. For they stood as a
BULWARK AND RAMPIRE TO DEFEND THE REST;
(whereby he attributes to them the chief resistance;)
and, when their wings of horse were scattered and dispersed, kept their ground
SO STEADILY,
that, though Prince Rupert himself led up
THE CHOICE HORSE
to charge them, and endured their storm of small shot, he could make no impression upon their stand of pikes,
BUT WAS FORCED TO WHEEL ABOUT:
of so sovereign benefit and use is that readiness, order, and dexterity, in the use of their arms, which hath been so much neglected.
Bk. VII. p. 347.
Thus the
City Pike-men
are commended as a standard pattern of military discipline, (viz. for their
readiness, order, and dexterity, in the use of arms,
) by the very same historian who had entitled them
a tumultuary army
a very short time before this occasion which extorted his commendation. A moderate and sufficient discipline, for real service, is more easily and sooner acquired than people generally conceive; and nothing is wanting to the present establishment of City Trained Bands but more frequent musters, for about an hour or an hour and a half at a time,
after the hours of labour:
for, if they were allowed this advantage, they would be nearly upon the same footing as the Militia of New England, Connecticut,
&c.
which lately conquered the well-disciplined army of General Burgoyne: they would be nearly upon the
same footing,
I say, except in one point; which is, that the
New England Militia
have always maintained the ancient constitutional right of choosing their own officers in the public
Folkmotes:
which the learned Judge Atkins, by the best authorities, has proved to be the original constitution of our national Militia. Polit. Tracts, p. 254.
The present establishment of the
county regiments of Militia
savours too much of a
standing army,
both in
discipline,
and
the effect
of the service upon the
common men;
who, by being absent too long a time from their families and ordinary occupations, are apt to become
mere soldiers,
despising their former trades and employments, and consequently
ceasing to be citizens.
Nothing, surely, can be more dangerous to a free state than such
an effect
as this; for the
professed soldier
generally gives up to superior COMMAND
Command
is properly
imperium,
the essence of
empire
for, the title of
imperator
(or
emperor
) originally signified nothing more than
the commander in chief of the army:
and, though this power of
command,
was generally delegated, at first, by the election and appointment of the people, or senate, and of course was esteemed subject to their controul, yet, by the usurpations of successful military chiefs, (when the forces under their command have been detained so long in actual service as to lose their
civil capacity
and become a
standing army
of mere
sold-iers
dependent on their
sold,
or military pay, instead of their former
civil
connections and useful occupations,) it has always been liable to be changed from a
limited command
to
"merum imperium,"
or
absolute dominion,
which Leopold Metastafius, a learned Roman Advocate, very properly stiles
"belluina potestas,"
a
beastly
power; a term which most aptly characterizes the
enormity,
and consequent
illegality,
of
unlimited monarchy!
And this use of the term,
belluina potestas,
is strictly
legal
and justifiable; because it is the
very mark
by which the prophets of God have branded all the arbitrary dominations of mankind, from the Babylonian head of the great and terrible image of Tyranny down to
its very toes,
the present divided kingdoms of the earth, which still exist in power, (and must so continue for some little time longer,) for the punishment and destruction of depraved man, until it shall please God, in his mercy, to break them in pieces by
his eternal kingdom,
which will then
become a mountain,
(or earthly establishment of government,)
and fill the whole earth,
(Dan. ii. 35. 44.) For all the said temporal empires and kingdoms are included in the prophetic representation of
four great and terrible beasts;
(see Dan. vii.) so that the
belluina potestas
is undeniably attributed to
all of them;
and, that we may more clearly demonstrate that the term denotes a power, unlimited by law and due popular controul, it is necessary to remark, that the characteristical property of each of these
beastly
empires is, "
to do according to his
WILL;" that is, without limitation of
law, right,
or other
just controul
in favour of the people: such
unlimited
WILL at is called
"absolute;"
i. e.
"loosed from"
all due restraint of the people, or other
obligation
whatsoever. This
bestial
mark of
absolute will
was the characteristical property of the
first beast,
the Babylonian head or
winged lion
of the Chaldees; "
whom he
WOULD" (NAY, the proper Chaldee word for WILL, both verb and noun)
he slew, and whom he
WOULD
(
)
he kept alive, and whom he
WOULD
(
again)
he set up, and whom he
WOULD
(
once more)
"he put down:"
(Dan. v. 19. So that the
will
of the monarch was manifestly the
only law
of that empire; and the unhappy effects of such
unlimited
power, even to the
monarch himsself,
is strongly marked in the very next verse;
But, when his heart was lifted up,
(the natural consequence of such undue exaltation
An excellent antidote against the evil of
royal will,
or
undue exaltation,
is prescribed in Deut. xvii. 18-20. viz. That the king shall
"write out for himself a copy"
(or rather a
duplicate,
)
"of this law"
[i. e. those written laws of God which had
twice
been solemnly
read,
not only in the presence, but
in the ears,
(or hearing,)
of
ALL
the people;
and had as often been solemnly confirmed, at each
public reading,
by the voluntary assent of
all the people,
saying, —
"all that the Lord hath said will we do."
Exodus xxiv. 3.7. Thus the divine laws became the regular
statutes
of that nation]:
And it"
(viz. the king's own written duplicate of the law)
shall be with him, and be shall read therein, all the day of his life: that be may learn to fear the Lord his God,
TO KEEP ALL THE WORDS OF THIS LAW, AND THESE STATUTES, TO DO THEM
(and the reason of thus
limiting
the ROYAL WILL, by laws and statutes, is assigned in the very next sentence);
that
HIS HEART BE NOT LIFTED UP ABOVE HIS BRETHREN,
and that he turn not aside from the commandment:
(to)
the right band or
(to)
the left:
(which is surely a strict
limitation
of the
regal power;
a measure highly important to the true interst even of the monarch himself: viz.)
to the end that he may prolong
(his)
days in his kingdom, he and his children, in the midst of Israel.
And in like manner the kings of all Christian nations should be
limited by the same statutes,
excepting only those statutes which were merely
ceremonial
or
temporary.
And they should be still farther
limited
by the more perfect
statutes
of the Christian revelation, without being allowed the least power of WILL, or prerogative, to
turn aside from the commandment to the right hand or to the left;
that the declared purposes of the Gospel in behalf of man (viz.
on earth
PEACE,
good will towards men
) may be
effectually established;
and that
the
WILL of our heavenly Father (which is always
righteousness
and
peace
) may
"be done on earth as it is in heaven;"
for that is the true effect of the approaching
kingdoms of God on earth,
which all Christians are taught to promote by their daily prayers. But the princes of the world (under the influence of our spiritual enemy, the
dragon,
which hath given his power to
the beast
) do openly oppose the
effectual
establishment of
God's kingdom on earth,
by impiously claiming to themselves a
royal prerogative
to
make
WAR
or peace
without the advice and assent of the people, or congregation; which is manifestly to
LIFT UP THEIR HEARTS ABOVE THEIR BRETHREN,
and of course
"the earth it"
(once more)
"filled with violence,"
(see p. 7.) whereby the
royal
promoters of it are rendered dreadfully obnoxious to the vengeance and retribution of the Almighty, when his approaching
kingdom
shall
come "to destroy the destroyers of the earth:"
—
. Rev. xi. 18. — But, if kings would be contented to govern with
legal
authority, (i. e. authority
duly limited
by the
uninfluenced
representation of each nation, or people,
freely
and
equally
elected for
every session
of each national council,) and would, after the example of king Canute, magnanimously rely (under God) on their national hosts of free armed citizens, (instead of
standing armies,
) for the security of their
crowns,
they would stand clear of the heavy judgements denounced against
the body of the beast,
and would have no cause to fear the approaching
kingdom of God,
nor the irresistible stroke by which it will
break in pieces
the whole image of tyranny, and
"cut off all the horns"
(or crowns)
"of the wicked"
(Psa. lxxv. 6, and lxxvi. 12): for
legal
kings are effectually secured by the scripture promises in favour of RIGHTEOUSNESS,—viz. that
"the horns"
(or rather
crowns
)
of
THE RIGHTEOUS
shall be exalted
(Psa. lxxv. 6): so that they may truly hope to
reign with the just,
when
the kingdom and dominion, and the greatness of the kingdom
UNDER THE WHOLE HEAVEN,
shall be given to the people of the saints of the Most High,
&c. Dan. vii. 27.
,)
and his mind hardened in
PRIDE,
he was deposed from his kingly throne, and they took his glory from him: and he was driven from the sons of men, and his heart was made like the
BEASTS,
(a notable instance of God's vengeance against the
belluina potestas
of royal
will
and
pleasure,
) "
and his dwelling was with the
WILD ASSES,"
&c.
(Dan. v. 19, 20,
&c.
) By this very
example
did the holy prophet reprove a wicked and
unbridled
descendant of the same monarch, just before the total dissolution of his empire, as he had also previously warned the royal ancestor himself, to
break off his sins by
RIGHTEOUSNESS,
&c.
which would have effectually restored
due limitations
to his government, and destroyed the baneful
"belluina potestas"
which occasioned the warning; but the counsel was neglected, and, of course, the monarch was humbled, and his empire ruined! for then were the
wings of the
BEAST of Babylon plucked,
and his dominion taken away.
(Dan. vii. 4.)
Absolute will
was also the essential property of the succeeding empire, or the
second beast; viz.
the Medo-Persian monarchy, described elsewhere under the figure of an impetuous
ram,
which pushed westward, and northward, and southward,
so that no
BEASTS
might stand before him, neither (was there any) that could deliver out of his hand, but
(the prophet now adds the principal
bestial,
or
brutal,
mark)
HE DID ACCORDING TO HIS WILL,
and became great.
(Dan. viii. 4.) For, after the Persian monarchs had once acquired the baneful
"belluina potestas,"
by the establishment of
standing armies
in every province, even the once-boasted
laws of the Medes and Persians
became as vague and uncertain as the
royal will and pleasure
to which they were, of course, subjected, howsoever
unchangeable
they might have been reputed in the commencement of that empire.
Neither was the
third beast
(the cruel
four-headed flying leopard
of the Grecian empire) without the same characteristical mark of
absolute will,
though it is not expresly annexed to Daniel's description of that compound of Tyranny in his seventh chapter; but, in the farther description of the Grecian empire, (chap. xi. v 3.) the same
wilful
or
unlimited
dominion is clearly foretold;
A mighty king shall stand up, that shall rule with great dominion,
(and then follows the mark of the beast,) "
and shall do according to his
WILL."
The king, mentioned in the 36th verse, that
shall do according to his
WILL,
and exalt himself, and magnify himself above every God,
is generally understood to denote the
fourth and last beast,
or
empire,
which
still exists;
being that most noxious and tremendous beast with
iron teeth,
(described in Dan. vii. 21.)
which devoured, brake in pieces, and stamped the residue under his feet;
i. e.
in the most violent and
beastlike
manner, which is plainly to "
do according to his
WILL!" We see then how aptly
unlimited command,
or
merum imperium,
is expressed by the term,
"belluina potestas."
The
unlimited will
of a king is so great an abomination in the eye of the
English Common-law,
that the exercise of it in this country is declared to be an effectual disqualification or abasement from the
regal
dignity,
for there is
NO KING,
where
WILL
governs, and not law.
—
Non est enim rex, ubi dominatur
VOLUNTAS,
et non lex.
(Bract lib. i. c. 8.)
A king of England
ceases to be king,
when
he ceases to be limited by the
LAW; for it is a rule of the common-law, that
"a king can do nothing" (i. e.
by virtue of his office)
on earth, while he is the minister and vicar of God, except that alone which
BY LAW
he may.
—
"Nihil enim potest rex in terris,"
&c.
nisi id solum quod de
JURE
potest,
&c. (See the note in pages 21 and 22.) And, therefore, when the law is
suspended,
or set aside, (which is the highest and most baneful
injustice,
) the king's power ceases to be
"ae jure,"
for, in the eye of the law, he is esteemed
Minister diaboli, dum declinet ad injuriam;
so that he and his ministers reduce themselves thereby to the common level of all other bad men; and whatsoever
power,
or
force,
in that case they may be able to exert, has no better foundation than the temporary power of banditti, which may be lawfully and conscientiously resisted by all men.
A king of England, therefore, though he is
supreme,
(or
sovereign,
) in personal dignity and rank, yet he is
not so
in will and power; because, in these, the law (to avoid the
belluina potestas
of
absolute monarchy
) requires that he should be duly
limited
by the people: a necessary distinction this, respecting
supremacy,
of which the unfortunate K. Cha. I. seems not to have been aware, or he would not, with his dying breath, have denied the people's right to a
share in the government;
saying,—
It is not for having share in government, sir; that is nothing pertaining to them; a subject and a
SOVEREIGN
are clear different things,
&c.
—and so they certainly are, with respect to
personal dignity,
or
rank,
when compared
as individuals;
and yet the
sovereignty,
or
supreme power,
belongs of right to the people, i. e. to the majority of them, or to the majority of their duly elected representatives.
"And therefore,"
(we may say with that learned casuist, Bp Taylor, in his Ductor Dubitantium, lib. iii. c. rule 1, p. 522.)
it is but a weak and useless distinction when we speak of kings and princes, (by them meaning the
SUPREME POWER,
) to say that some are
ABSOLUTE,
some are
LIMITED
in their power.
— That is, the distinction is weak and useless only when we mean to speak of the
supreme power:
this is clearly the bishop's meaning, as the following context will shew; for otherwise the distinction to be made between
absolute
and
limited "kings and princes"
is so far from being
weak
and
useless,
that it is the necessary and proper criterion between the
illegal
and
legal
dominion of kings; the
limited
alone being
legal
in this kingdom.
For
(the bishop adds)
it is true that some princes are so
(i. e.
are
LIMITED
in their power); "but then"
(says he)
they "are
NOT
the
SUPREME
power."
(This is directly to the point in question; and he adds a farther illustration of it:)
It is a contradiction
(says he)
to say that the
SUPREME POWER
is limited or restrained; for that which
RESTRAINS
it is
SUPERIOR
to it, and therefore the other is
NOT SUPREME.
That a king ought not to have the
supreme power
is clearly laid down by the best writers on the English
Common Law;
and particularly by Judge Bracton, one of the most ancient as well as the most respectable authorities.
Rex sub Deo et Lege. Rex habet
SUPERIOREM,
Deum,
(scilicet,)
item
LEGEM,
per quam factus est rex; item
CURIAM SUAM,
viz. comes, barones,
&c. Bract. lib. 2. c. xvi. p. 34.
"Lex fraenum est potentiae,"
&c.
That such a power of RESTRAINT is vested in the LAW, as well as in the LEGISLATORS of this
limited
monarchy, is clearly proved by Mr. Acherley in his book on free parliaments. He argues from the words of the
original writs of summons to parliament,
— that the
determining or decisive power,
demanded by the said writs, (
ad faciendum ea,
i. e. the insuperable and urgent businesses for which the parliament is called,) is
derived from the people,
and is
independent;
and his inference is good; and he gives a remarkable instance of this
independent power in the people;
which is their answer to the pope respecting the banishment of Adomar, Bp of Winchester, in 1258. Ann 43. Hen, 3. Viz.
Si dominus rex et regni majores hoc vellent, COMMUNITAS tamen ipsius (Adomar) ingressum in Angliam jam nullatenus sustineret.
That, if the king and lords would do this thing, (meaning, if they would revoke the banishment)
yet the commons
WOULD NOT SUFFER
or bear Adomar's
residence in England.
And the commons caused their speaker, Petrus de Montford,
'vice totius communitatis,'
to sign, and he did sign, this answer.
p. 9.
From this example, therefore, as well as from a great multitude of other instances of the power of the
English commons,
it is manifest that there is
no supreme power
in England without the concurrence and assent of
the people:
not a
general assent,
once for all, to throw
the supremacy
into other hands, but an
especial assent
for every new circumstance that may be liable to affect their interest. For which cause, also, parliaments ought (indispensably) to be newly elected
every session,
according to ancient usage, i. e.
every year once, and more often if need be
; and that in as
equal
a proportion of
representation
as possible; because, the more
equitable
in this point it is made, the more conducive it will surely be to the happiness and true permanent interest both of king and people.
But if, on the contrary, by the modern
innovations
of
triennial
and
septennial
elections, reduction of the right of voting, venality of almost depopulated boroughs,
&c.
the
supreme power
should be gradually corrupted, it must become a
supreme
evil to the destruction of
good government
and
peace!
for, in such a corrupted state, nothing can thrive under it but
standing armies,
and that which always regularly attends their establishment throughout all the branches of the fourth, or Roman, tyranny, I mean the
belluina potestas
of imperial
will
and
command,
against which the vengeance of the Almighty is clearly denounced; so that those persons, who yield themselves instruments to promote either the one or the other, are guilty of the grossest impiety! A free militia, therefore, is the only just and legal means of internal national defence.
that indispensible human right of judging between
good
and
evil,
which alone constitutes the distinction between
men
and
brutes;
and, through a false notion of military honour, the soldier is apt to think that his duty requires an
implicit active obedience
on all occasions; whereby
the standing armies
of all nations are constantly and regularly the tools of despotism, and the bane of all good and limited government.
A
national militia,
therefore, ought to be constituted upon principles as opposite to those of
standing armies
as possible; and no rules or arrangements whatever, that may tend to detach men from their ordinary callings and employments, as
free citizens,
ought, on any account, to be admitted.
The City-Militia, even upon its present establishment, was always respectable, when
real service
was wanted.
HINTS OF SOME GENERAL PRINCIPLES, WHICH MAY BE USEFUL TO Military Associations.
HINTS OF SOME GENERAL PRINCIPLES, WHICH MAY BE USEFUL TO Military Associations.
AS the sole purpose of
Military Associations
is to support the
Civil Magistrate,
and to join
the power of the countie,
when legally summoned by sheriffs,
&c. for common defence,
it is necessary that each associated company be formed, upon principles as opposite to those of
standing armies
(valour and good discipline excepted) as can possibly be devised.
The
freedom
and
equal
natural rights of individuals, and the preservation of their
civil capacity,
must therefore be considered as objects of the utmost importance and consideration; in order to which
the freedom of election
in the appointment of
officers,
and a
frequent renewal of choice
therein, are absolutely necessary to be maintained.
Let the whole corps of Associators in every neighbourhood, or
vicinage,
divide themselves into small bodies, of ten persons each, in their respective districts; and let each ten, or decennary, choose from among themselves a
tithing-man,
or serjeant, to superintend the discipline of the ten, and to receive and communicate to them all summonses from the Civil Magistrate, or orders from the
Committee of Association,
and to transact such other business as the nature of the
Association
may require: the power of the serjeants, nevertheless, to be subject to the controul of a majority of the ten, who choose them respectively; and no other
military
officers should be appointed, except officers of
Platoons
for a single day; viz. when the corps is divided into Platoons for exercise (agreeable to the mode recommended by General Bland, p. 66): at which time each platoon ought to choose its own leader, whose power should cease with that day's exercise. An experienced person must, however, be chosen at a previous general meeting, to instruct and direct the corps in the general manoeuvres and evolutions of the field, who should, from time to time, be appointed
Commanding-officer of the day.
In times of actual service, the Lord-Mayor, or either of the sheriffs that are present, must be considered as the legal commander of the association.
As three decennaries, or serjeants guards, will be the proper complement for a
platoon,
so two platoons, or six decennaries, (being sixty men,) will be a convenient number for a
company,
and ten such companies a sufficient number for a
battalion,
or ward division; as it will be equal to two townships or two county hundreds.
There should be,
within
each ward, several places appointed for drilling, or teaching
the common exercise
to
small parties;
and also one place, more spacious, for those that are become expert in handling their arms, to be taught
the platoon exercise,
to form themselves into companies, to march, wheel,
&c.
But, if a place cannot be found
within the ward,
sufficiently spacious for such a
general exercise
of the whole body, it is probable that two or three places may be found therein sufficient for the exercise of
single companies,
or at least of
single platoons,
which should be appropriated accordingly; and none of these places of exercise should be open to the inspection of strangers, as it must be irksome to gentlemen to be overlooked, before they have acquired some tolerable knowledge of the military discipline. One place of
general rendezvous
should likewise be appointed
within each ward,
for the neighbours to assemble in case of any sudden alarm.
To prevent the individuals of the Association from being injured in their
civil
capacity, care must be taken, that the times of
drilling and private exercise
be appointed both before and after the usual hours of labour; and that an option be given to the learners of attending either at the
morning
or
evening exercise,
as shall be most convenient to themselves, that no man may be induced to neglect or injure his ordinary calling or
occupation,
by which his
civil capacity
is maintained: and, for the same reason, the times of
public exercise in larger bodies
should not be
more frequent
than is absolutely necessary for acquiring
a moderate and useful discipline,
rather than a critical nicety in the military manoeuvres; which latter would take up more time than
men of business
can usually spare; and which must finally have the bad effect of tiring out many of the most useful members of society: and, therefore, it is not only necessary to restrain the
too great frequency
of such meetings, but also the
duration
of each meeting, that as little time may be lost to the individuals as possible; and that those who attend may not incur the necessity of
taking any refreshment whatsoever
while they are out
on exercise,
or in
going
or
returning,
which would otherwise occasion many inconveniences too obvious to be mentioned, besides an
unnecessary expence
to individuals, which ought certainly to be avoided in large
promiscuous
societies, because
all
cannot
equally
afford it. But, if any man has acquired so depraved an appetite, that he cannot endure four or six hours exercise (and a general review, if properly conducted, will not require more time)
without taking food or liquor,
he ought to be esteemed totally unqualified for the Association, till he can cure himself of such an
unmanly
and disgraceful habit, which is entirely inconsistent with the
military duty
even of
a citizen.
Single decennaries, single platoons, or even single companies, should not be permitted to march into the country,
with their arms and uniforms,
by way of exercise or
amusement to themselves,
without an express leave, given by a general meeting of the associators, nor without due caution to be taken for preserving good order, by the attendance of a sufficient number of peace-officers, to prevent any disputes or affrays with strangers, lest the indiscretion of a few individuals of the corps, on such an excursion, should injure the reputation of the whole body of associators. And the third rule, given by a very ingenious and learned writer, in a tract, entitled
An Inquiry into the legal Mode of suppressing Riots,
should be strictly observed; that the Association should
not,
UNNECESSARILY,
march through streets or highroads, nor make any the least
MILITARY PARADE,
but consider themselves entirely as a part of the
CIVIL STATE.
And they ought also carefully to observe the caution referred to by his fifth rule, respecting the use of
arms in suppressing
RIOTS,
viz.
that it is extremely hazardous for private persons to proceed to those extremities in common cases;
and that they should not attend to any
private
person that shall
PRESUME
to raise the power of the county, which is the province of the sheriff, under-sheriff, or magistrate,
but let them wait for a
legal
summons from those that have the proper authority, before they
take their arms
to assist in keeping the peace; though they have certainly a right to assemble as
neighbours, without their arms,
to consult, and use all peaceable endeavours to allay or prevent the ill consequences of any sudden commotion that has occasioned an alarm.
By the constitution of this kingdom, as well as by many express laws still in force,
apprentices, wards, and indeed laymen, of all ranks and conditions, from fifteen to sixty years of age,
are required
to have arms,
and be duly
exercised
in the use of them, for the national defence. (See p. 9-24.) It would therefore well become the housekeepers of every ward, and particularly those who are members of any ward-association, to encourage their
apprentices, servants,
and
dependents,
to learn their
military exercise,
(with the common
militia-arms
belonging to each house,) at such places in the ward as may be appointed for that purpose; the expence of which should first be defrayed by the respective
ward-associations,
until the utility of the measure is rendered obvious to the wards at large, that the house-keepers at each wardmote maybe induced to adopt it. For, by these means, the house-keepers might always have a sufficient number of able and well-instructed
substitutes, to serve for them in the militia,
which would thereby be rescued from the opprobrium of
incapacity,
with which it has so frequently of late been charged; and the necessity of any
new reform of the City-Militia
(which might be attended with very dangerous consequences to the rights and liberties of citizens) would be thereby precluded. And if, in case of any more tumults or riots,
an armed City-watch
should again be thought necessary, these disciplined
Militia-substitutes in each ward
might be enrolled in a
Roster
for that particular service, under the proper Militia-officers; and their attendance might be so divided and diminished, by a due
Roster,
as to be very little burthensome to the individuals enrolled; whereby a small stipend to each, for the time of his actual attendance, would be sufficient to render the service
voluntary.
Or
Volunteers
might be invited, by rewarding a certain adequate proportion of
watch-duty
with the
freedoms of the city;
and by ordaining that no artificer or journeyman, employed in the city, be molested as a
Non-freeman,
provided he enters himself a
Volunteer
on the watch-roll of the ward wherein he is employed.
The appearance, also, of the City Militia might be rendered more respectable, by the addition of
drill-jackets,
with some proper distinction of
uniform facings,
to denote the ward or district of each company.
INDEX.
A.
ABSOLUTE
WILL of a monarch over his subjects, a mark of the beast, 61, n.
Acherley,
Mr. cited, 68, n.
Adomar,
bishop of Winchester, 68, n.
Aland,
Mr. Justice Fortescue, cited, 19, 27.
All
persons, of
all
ranks, that are laymen, (
apprentices,
servants, labourers, wards,
&c.
) required to have arms, and be
exercised
in the use of them, 9-24, 81.
Antidote
against the evil of
royal will,
61, 2d n.
Apprentices, &c.
should be encouraged by the housekeepers to learn the
military exercise,
81.
Archery,
11, 12, 13, 14.
Armour,
10.
Arms
of defence and peace, 6, 17, 19, 24, 27.
Arms
of offence and robbery, 7, n.
Army;
see
Standing army.
Association.
To
associate
for
common defence
is a
right
of the people, founded on the law of
reason
and
nature,
and therefore an
immutable right of the common-law,
which cannot be annulled by act of parliament, 5-9. Ancient statutes bear testimony to this popular right of
association,
and the being
exercised in arms,
9-18. These
rights
as necessary, at present, as ever, 24. Had they not been fatally neglected, the late rioters would have been quelled in their first attempts, 25. The purpose of
military Associations,
73. They should be formed on principles as opposite as possible to those of
standing armies,
ibid.
viz.
in preserving the
civil capacity
of individuals, and by the
freedom
of
election
in the appointment of officers, 74. The choice of tithing-men, or serjeants, ibid. The lord-mayor or sheriff the legal commander of them, 75. Platoon-exercise recommended, 75, 76. Places for drilling to be appointed, 76. also a general rendezveous in each ward, 77. Precautions, that the
civil capacity
of individuals may not be injured, 77-79. Small parties should not be permitted to march into the country, without leave from a general meeting, and due caution for the peace, 79.
Associations
should not
unnecessarily
march through streets or high roads, nor make any
military parade,
but consider themselves as part of the
civil state;
not to use arms in common cases; not to attend to any
private person
that shall presume to raise the power of the county, but wait for a
legal
summons, before they
take their arms
to assist in keeping peace; 80. but may assemble, as neighbours,
without their arms,
to use all peaceable endeavours,
&c.
81.
Atkins,
judge, cited, 58, 59.
B.
Babylonian government
described, 61-64.
Bacon, Nathaniel,
cited, 23.
Barriers
of the city ought to have been reserved, 25.
Beasts
are the prophetical emblems of arbitrary dominion among men, 60-64.
Beast
of the Babylonian monarchy, 61-64, n.
Beast
of the Medo-Persian monarchy, 64, n.
Beast
of the Grecian monarchy, 64, n. The last, or 4th,
Beast,
which still exists in power, 65, n. The law of England guards against the
bestial power,
by requiring due
limitations
in government, 65-69.
Belluina potestas:
what it is, 60-61. how introduced, by
innovations, corruptions,
and
standing armies,
69, n.
Bland,
general, his description of a
roster,
37, 38. His account of the
platoon-exercise,
75.
Bows and Arrows,
11, 12, 13. called the
continual defence of the realm of England,
14. Legal distance for shooting with them at a mark, 12.
Bracton,
cited, 6, 21, 22, 24, 29, 65, 67.
Butts,
12, 13, 15, 16.
C.
Calvin's case,
reported by lord Coke, contains many instances of erroneous doctrines, 29.
Camp of discipline,
45.
Camp of service,
46.
Canutus
the great; a notable instance of his virtue and justice, in
withdrawing his armies from this realm,
on the requisition of the peers of England: the consequences of that noble action are misrepresented by the judge who cited it on Calvin's case, 29-32.
Cherubim,
a type of the hosts of Israel, acting by
rotation,
40, 41, n.
Choice of Officers
by public
folkmotes,
58. by decennaries, 74. by platoons, 75. by a
general meeting,
74, 75.
City pike-men,
57.
Civil capacity
of individuals, serving in the militia, may be preserved by the
regularity
of
rotation,
and precaution in training,
&c.
37, 41, 43, 47, 74, 77, 78. but is gradually lost by long continuance in service, whereby the
national militia
are rendered mere
soldiers,
47.
Clarendon,
lord, cited, 54-58.
Coke,
lord, cited, 21, 22, 29-31.
Command,
when not duly limited, is
merum imperium
and
belluina potestas,
59, n.
&c.
"
Commandment of the king,
according to law," 21, n.
Commandment of the king,
which falls not within this description, not binding, 21.
Confessor's laws,
cited, 19.
Connecticut,
58.
Cowell,
Dr. quoted, 6.
Cromwell,
the usurper, kept up an
army
to support himself and his tyranny, 27, n.
D.
Daniel,
quoted, 60, 61.
Decennaries
should choose their own
tithing-men,
or
serjeants,
74.
Declaration of rights,
17.
Defence,
against unjust violence, a
natural right
of man, 6-9.
Devil.
He is a minister of the
Devil
who commits injustice, 22, n. 66, n.
Discipline,
(military,) sufficient for
real
service, easily acquired, 58.
Disloyalty,
30, n.
Doctor and Student,
quoted, 7, 8.
Drilling
and private exercise in arms, 76, 77.
E.
Earth
is filled with violence, 7, 62, n.
Eirenarcha;
see
Lambard.
Elements
of
tempest
and
fire
reserved to execute God's wrath, 7, n.
Emperor,
the original signification of that title, 59, n.
Englishman.
No Englishman can be
loyal,
who opposes the principles of the
English law,
which require the people to be armed, 27, 30.
Executive power
of this
limited
monarchy cannot legally flow through any other channels than the king's courts of justice, by
due process of the law,
21, n.
Exercise,
(military,) 11-14, 16, 18, 54, 58, 81.
Places
for it should be appointed in each ward, 76. and
hours
for it, both in the morning and evening, 77.
Public exercise,
in large bodies, not to be more frequent than is necessary for a moderate and useful discipline, 77. No food or liquor to be taken while out on exercise, 78, 79.
F.
Fire;
see
Elements.
Fleta,
22, n.
Force.
It is lawful to use
force
to repel
force
and
unjust violence,
6-9.
Fortescue,
chancellor, 18, 19.
Freemen.
None but
freemen
ought to be trusted with arms in a
free
country, 30, n.
G.
Gisarms;
what they are, 11, 2d n.
Good and evil.
The right of judging between
good
and
evil
indispensible to
man,
to distinguish him from the
brutes,
60-64.
Government,
by
arms and armies,
odious to the ancient English nobility, 30, 32. Every
Englishman,
who has not the
same distaste,
is
disaffected
to the true constitution, and may be justly charged with
disloyalty,
27, 30, n.
Grecian dominion,
or empire, 64, n.
Greece.
Causes of disunion among the ancient states thereof, 39, 40.
H.
Harnesse,
10.
Hue and Cry,
20.
I.
Image of tyranny,
60, n.
Inhabitants
of
every city, borough, and market-town,
may have guns, and exercise themselves in the use thereof, 16, 17, 18. Ought
all
to be
armed,
and be expert in
arms,
18—20. Are
themselves
the proper POWER to prevent damages by rioters, 20—25. There is a greater necessity for
arming
and
training
them than formerly, 26.
Innovations.
Triennial and septennial elections, 69, n.
Inquiry into the legal Mode of suppressing Riots,
cited, 80.
Israelites.
The
Laws of God
were to openly tendered to the people, and by them so amply confirmed by repeated declarations of popular assent, that they became the regular
statutes
of that nation, 61, 2d n.
K.
"King can do no wrong;"
this doctrine explained, 21, n. Has no
prerogative
which may derogate from justice and equity, 21, 22, n. Ceases to be
the minister of God,
and becomes
the minister of Satan,
when he presumes to rule
contrary to law,
22, 66.
No legal king, where
WILL
governs, and not
LAW, 22, 61, 2d n. 65, 66. Antidote against
royal
WILL, 61, 62, 2d n. King should be
limited
by the laws of God, and is bound to read therein, that he may
"not lift up his heart above his brethren,"
62, 2d n. for, if duly limited, the
crown
(or dominion) will not be liable to be broken by the approaching kingdom of God, 63. King is
supreme
in personal rank, but not in power, 66, 67, n. King has a
superior, viz.
God; also the
Law,
also his
Court, (i. e.
of parliament, earls, barons,
&c.)
67, n. King Canute, 29—32. King Richard II. 27. King Henry VII. 27, n. King Henry VIII. 13, 14, 18, 27, n. Queen Elizabeth, 17. King Charles I. 66. King Charles II. 27. King William, 28, n.
Kingdom of God
will destroy the tyranny of all temporal
empires
and
kingdoms,
and will
fill the whole earth,
60, n.
under the whole heaven,
63, 2d n. Nothing but
righteousness
and the due
limitation
of WILL, by the laws of God and the just rights of the people, can save any crown (or regal dominion) from being
broken to pieces
by this approaching KINGDOM, 63, n.
L.
Lacombe,
Mr. 11, n.
Lambard's Eirenarcha,
cited, 9, 11, 12.
Laws of reason and nature
immutable, 8. Those who attempt to subvert
the ancient laws
lose the benefit of the
laws,
27, n.
Laymen,
of all ranks and conditions, required to have
arms,
and be
exercised
in the use of them, 9—24, 81.
Limitation
of government. The want of it induces the
princes of the world "to lift up their heads above their brethren,"
whereby they are rendered dreadfully obnoxious to the vengeance of the approaching
kingdom of God,
62, 63. The want of it is an abomination in the eye of the English common-law, 65, n.
London.
If the
proper barriers had been reserved,
the citizens would have had time to get under arms on the first notice of the late riots, and might have preserved the peace of the city: an attack upon the gates would have justified an immediate discharge of fire-arms, 25. The
inhabitants themselves
form that proper
power,
from which the
law
requires the
prevention
of damages from rioters, 25, 26.
Long-bow.
To be exercised in the use of it was formerly the duty of
every man,
14. The reason of the law doth equally require the general exercise of
all men
in the use of the musquet and bayonet, 15.
Lord-mayor
and sheriffs, the
legal
commanders of military associations, 75.
Loyalty.
No Englishman can be
loyal,
who opposes the principles of the English
law,
whereby the people are required to have
arms of defence and peace,
27. nor who does not
distaste
a government by
arms
and
armies,
30.
M.
Matthew,
of Westminster, cited, 32.
Medo-Persian
dominion, 64, n.
Merum imperium,
60, n.
Metastasius,
(Leopold,) cited, 60, n.
MILITIA. A
general militia,
acting by
rotation,
the only safe means of defending a
free
people, 35—49. The
militia
of England might supply a constant army in the field of 125,000 men, and yet retain, in every part of the country, eleven parts out of twelve of its strength, duly trained by the rotation, 42, 44, 46. Might afford to lose six such capital armies, before it would be necessary to double the time of service on the roster, 46, 47.
Militia,
without rotation, becomes a
standing army
of mere
sold-iers,
47.
Militia
of London; see
Trained Bands. Militia
of the counties; the present establishment thereof savours too much of a
standing army,
59. Should be constituted on principles as opposite as possible to
standing armies,
66—68. Militia of New-England and Connecticut, 58. A
free
militia the only just means of internal national defence, 69, n.
Minsheu,
cited, 10.
Musquet and Bayonet.
The laws, which required
every man
to be exercised in the use of the
long-bow,
when esteemed the most effectual weapon, by parity of
reason,
do equally require the exercise of the present fashionable weapons, the
musquet
and
bayonet,
14, 15.
Musquets,
or hand-guns, the
right
of
all the inhabitants of cities, boroughs, and market-towns,
to be armed therewith, acknowledged by statute, 15, 16, 17, 18.
Myrror of Justices,
cited, 20.
N.
Necessity
of rejecting the dangerous expedient of keeping
standing armies
for defence, 36.
Newbery.
Account of the battle near that place, 55-57.
New-England militia,
58.
O.
Odimus aecipitrem, &c.
an old English maxim never to be forgotten, 30-32.
P.
Parliaments
ought to be newly
elected every session,
68, n. and in an
equal
proportion of
representation,
which would be most conducive to the true interest both of king and people, 69, n.
People.
Their right to
associate
for common defence, 5—9. and to repel force and injury with force, 6, 7, 8. To have armour, harness, arms, 10—13. To be
exercised in the use of such arms
as are esteemed the best for the safeguard of the realm, 14—24. Their power (
viz.
the power of the
commons
in parliament) is independent, 68, n.
Persian Government;
see
Medo-Persian.
Petrus de Montford,
68, n.
Platoons,
75, 76.
Power of the commons
is independent, of which an example is cited, 68, n. There is no
supreme
power without their concurrence, 68, 69, n.
Power of the county,
9, 20.
Power of the king
is not supreme, 66—69, n.
Prerogative.
No prerogative of the king
against justice
,
22, n.
Process of the law,
through the king's courts, is the only proper mode of exerting the
executive power
in this
limited
monarchy, 21, n. and the sheriffs, attended by the
power of the countie,
must execute the king's (legal) writs, 20, 21.
Prot
stant subjects
may have
arms
for their defence, 17.
R.
Rapin,
cited, 55, 56.
Reason,
the first foundation of English law, 8. The laws of
reason
are immutable, ibid.
Rendezvous
(general) should be appointed in every ward, in case of sudden alarm, 77.
Res
stance
against unjust violence
lawful,
6—9, 24.
Right of associating,
for common defence and peace, a
n
ral right,
and therefore
immutable,
6, 8, 9.
R
ght
alone can establish the throne, 22, 63.
R
ters
(the late) would have been quelled in their first attempts, had not the ancient English constitution, respecting the use of arms, been fatally neglected, 24, 25.
Roman dominion,
65, n. 69, n.
Roster,
or rotation
of service,
as proposed for a general national militia, 36-47.
A general rotation
of public duty may be compared to the
cherubim,
representing the hosts of Israel, 40, 41, n. and would preserve the people in their
civil capacity
and
ordinary occupations,
41. and limit the power of commanders, without
injuring individuals,
42. The proportion of a
roster
for England, 42, 43.
Roster
for the city watch, 82, 83.
Rupert,
(prince,) with the choice horse, repulsed by the city
trained-bands,
55-57.
S.
Scriptures,
(holy,) cited:
Exod.
xxiv. 37. p. 61.—
Deut.
xvii. 18, 20. p. 61. —
Ps.
lxxv. 6. lxxvi. 12. p. 63. lxxxiii. 13-15. cxlviii. 8. p. 7, n. —
Isa.
xvii. 13. p. 7, n. —
Dan.
ii. 35. p. 7, n. ii. 35-44. p. 60, 61.—v. 19, 20. p. 63.— vii. 27. p. 63. — vii. 4. p. 64. — xi. 3. p. 64.—xi. 36. p. 65. — 2
Thess.
i. 8. p. 7, n.— 2
Pet.
iii. 7. p. 7, n.—
Rev.
xi. 18. p. 61.
Skippon,
(major general,) 54.
Serjeants,
74.
Servants, &c.
should be encouraged to learn the military exercise, 81. that there may be always a sufficient number of persons well instructed, to serve as substitutes in the militia, or
armed city-watch,
82.
Sheriffs
to raise the power of the county, 9, 10, 20, 21.
Sold-iers,
dependent on their military
sold,
are apt to acquire a slavish and
dishonourable
submission to
command,
47-49, 59, 60, n. and to give up the indispensible human right of judging between
good
and
evil,
60-62. whereby
standing armies
are constantly the bane of all good and
limited
government, 63, 64.
Standing army.
The establishment thereof in England affords no argument against arming and training
the inhabitants in general,
26. The expence of the standing army enormous and ruinous, 26. and the establishment of it repugnant to the constitution of England and the genius of its inhabitants, 27, 28 Is dangerous and fatal to the liberties of every nation upon earth, 35, 49, 60. as well as to the true permanent interest of
legal
kings, 63, 2d n. Is the bane of all
limited government,
63, 64. and is the regular means of introducing the
belluina potestas
of imperial
will,
against which divine vengeance is announced, 69. n. The first appointment of guards, and the encroachments that ensued, 27-29, n.
Statutes,
cited, 13-18, 20.
Supreme power;
what, 66, 67, n. if
corrupted
by
innovations, venality,
and
inequality of representation,
will become a
supreme evil,
69, n.
T.
Taylor,
(bishop,) cited, 66, 67, n.
Tempest and fire
reserved to execute God's wrath, 7, n.
Tithing-men,
74.
Trained-bands
of London have never misbehaved in
actual service,
53, 69. Their
annual musters
are rather musters of
arms
than
men,
53. The utility of
training
and
exercising
them, 54. Attended, as a guard, to the parliament, 54. Called a
tumultuary army,
55. Nevertheless, by their steady behaviour at the battle of Newbery, they repeatedly repulsed prince Rupert's choice cavalry, 55-57. Recommended as a pattern of military discipline by lord Clarendon, 57. A moderate and sufficient discipline for them may easily be acquired after the hours of labour, 58. A new reform of the city-militia dangerous at this time, 82. Their appearance might be rendered more respectable by uniforms, 83.
Traitors,
the advisers of
illegal
measures, or of such measures as require an
undue influence
in parliament, 22, n. 30, 69, n.
V.
Vicar and minister of the eternal King.
Such is a king who
limits
his power by
justice
and
law,
22, n. 65, n.
Voluntary service,
in an
armed city-watch,
or as
militia substitutes;
how to be promoted, 82, 83.
Voluntas;
see
Will.
W.
War
against trade, 7, n.
Watch-duty.
Volunteers to it, how to be encouraged, 83.
Weapons.
Such as are liable to be concealed, unlawful, 18.
Will,
(or
voluntas,
) when it governs, and not law, destroys the
legal
authority of the sovereign, 22, n. 65, 66, n.
Will,
(unlimited,) or
merum imperium,
is
belluina potestas,
a beastly power, the characteristical property of all the figurative
beasts
in prophecy, 60-65. See also
King.
Wolsey,
(cardinal,) 27.
THE END.