A SHORT TRACT CONCERNING THE DOCTRINE OF
Nullum Tempus occurrit Regi:
SHEWING The particular Cases to which it is applicable; AND That it cannot, according to LAW, be effectual FOR THE Recovery of Manors, Lands, or Tenements, Alienated from the Crown.
LONDON: PRINTED IN THE YEAR M.DCC.LXXIX.
Extract of a Letter from the Author of the following Tract to —, dated the 6th of May, 1771, which is prefixed to the
MS.
Copy of the Tract in the Hands of the Editor.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
As I have lately heard that it is now disputed, whether or not
you
ought to be excluded from the benefit of the late
Nullum tempus act for quieting the possessions of the subject,
I have taken the liberty to inclose, for your — perusal, a short tract on the general doctrine of
Nullum tempus. occurrit regi.
How far the same may be applicable to the point in contest between
you
and the treasury-board, I cannot pretend to judge, because my information concerning that affair arises merely from common report, so that, of course, I must profess myself a stranger to the particular circumstances of the case. Nevertheless, as I happened, in the course of my reading the other day, to light upon a passage in Bracton, which, to me, seemed capable of affording a clear explanation of the
Nullum tempus doctrine,
I thought it a duty incumbent on me, to send
you
my thoughts upon it. It may indeed be said that Bracton is in the hands of every lawyer, and that I ought to have known that the learned gentlemen of the law, employed by
you,
are already apprized of the passage to which I refer, as they must certainly, at some time or other, have read it; nevertheless, there is sufficient reason for me to
presume
that they have entirely
overlooked or forgot it in the present case;
and that even the whole legislature have also either forgot it, or else are entirely ignorant of it, because the late act of parliament (which was made expressly to guard against the
mistaken doctrine of Nullum tempus
) must otherwise
appear absurd and superfluous.
I think it necessary to presume thus much, —, by way of excuse for having presumed to write to
you
about business which does not in the least concern me, as it might otherwise be deemed impertinent in me, to suppose that
you
have not already the most learned advice that can be procured. If the little tract contains any hints that are thought capable of being enforced to your — advantage, it will give me real pleasure; for indeed I have no greater happiness than that of being serviceable (when it lies in my power) to any man whatever, whether friend or stranger.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(Signed) "GRANVILLE SHARP."
PREFACE.
WHEN an author pretends to write a treatise on any particular subject, he ought to have leisure sufficient to examine and thoroughly consider every thing that has an intimate connexion with it; but, as the Writer of this has no such leisure, it is necessary for him to declare that he professes no other knowledge of the subject, in question, than what has occurred to him occasionally in consulting the law-books on other points; and, therefore, he offers this little Tract to his readers, not as a complete and regular system, but rather as a ground-work for future enquiries upon the subject, by Writers who are blessed with more leisure and abilities for such researches than himself; and who may, perhaps, be hereby induced either to build upon the same foundation, or to establish a better in its room.
A SHORT TRACT CONCERNING THE Doctrine of
Nullum Tempus occurrit Regi,
&c.
PART I.
THE doctrine of
Nullum Tempus occurrit Regi,
if admitted in an unlimited and general sense, is capable of being wrested to the most arbitrary purposes, and may seem to authorize the most dangerous and oppressive pretensions and claims on the property of the subject.
As
a general doctrine,
therefore, it is
unreasonable;
and, consequently, inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the
common law;
for which reason I never could esteem the
Nullum Tempus
doctrine as
a maxim
of the common law; and I have since found that my opinion of it was in some degree right, and that the doctrine is so far from being
a general maxim,
that it ought never to be mentioned without its peculiar
exceptions,
lest it should do injury, by being applied to improper cases, and be mistaken for
a maxim,
to the perversion of justice: for the true and proper
maxims
of the common law demand the utmost deference when they are cited, their authority being unquestionable; because
Contra negantem principia
(vel maxima)
non est disputandum.
(Co. Lit. 343. Doctor & Student,
&c.
c. 8. p. 27.)
This maxim may indeed seem applicable to myself, for denying that the authority and weight of
a maxim
is due to the doctrine of
Nullum Tempus, &c.
But I hope to be able, in the course of this work, to obviate any such imputation, and to prove
that it really is not a general maxim.
In order to set this point in a clear light, it will be necessary first of all to take a short view of those particular
rights of the crown,
which,
in law,
are justly esteemed
unalienable,
and which I apprehend to be as follows.
The king is invested, by his office, with a kind of
limited property
in the persons of all his
free subjects,
by which he is enabled, and, indeed, bound in duty to claim, and
free
them whenever their persons are unlawfully seized, imprisoned, or otherwise detained at home or abroad, under pretence of right of service, whereby their
persons
are claimed as
private property,
acquired by purchase, custom, or any other mode of acquisition
Query. How far may this hold good since the making of the Habeas Corpus act, which supposes that a man may be transported against his will if he has signed a written contract? Sect. 13. This section, however, gives no authority for such a forcible transportation; it only informs us, that the act does NOT
"extend to give benefit" in such case;
but the common law, we may presume, will or ought to
"give benefit"
in this, as in every other case, of
violence
and
wrong,
because
"Lex semper dabit remedium:"
and I have already shewn that the right of the Crown is
unalienable
in this kind
of property,
for the maintainance of
freedom.
whatsoever. For no claims of this kind, upon a
freeman,
are to be favoured in law, or can possibly be accounted valid, because the maxim assures us that
"Liber homo"
is
"res quasi sacra," "which may not be sold:"
Item quasi res sacra ut
liber homo
qui vendi non potest, cùm
libertas
non recipiat aestimationem,
&c.
Bracton, lib. 2, p. 14.
so that there can be no just claim of property
in the person of a freeman,
except the
official right
and
claim of property
vested in the king; and, as this is
limited
by the laws for the benefit and
freedom of the subject,
it is, for that very reason,
unalienable from the crown.
Other
unalienable rights of the Crown
are those which form the public revenue, and belong to the king's exchequer, all which are included by this author in the term
"Res fiscalis,"
Et est res quasi sacra,
Res fiscalis,
quae dari non potest, nec vendi, nec ad alium transferri a principe vel a rege regnante—
and which he also esteems
"res quasi sacra."
To this rule, about
Res fiscalis,
there are some necessary exceptions which will hereafter be mentioned.
There are also several other rights, which are inherent in the Crown,
for the public good,
and cannot therefore be disposed of, or alienated, viz. such as
Peace, Justice,
&c. —
et quae faciunt ipsam coronam, et communem utilitatem respiciunt, sicut est
Pax
et
Justitia,
&c.
To all such things we may safely apply the doctrine of
Nullum tempus occurrit regi.
— The same is likewise applicable to a few other things, even of an inferior or second class; I mean such as are nevertheless so far
alienable,
that they may lawfully, without damage to the king or his subjects, be transferred,
for a time,
to other persons. —
Sunt et aliae res quae pertinent ad coronam propter privilegium regis, et ita communem non respiciunt utilitatem, quin dari possunt et ad alium transferri, quia, si transferantur, translatio nulli erit damnosa, nec ipsi regi sive principi, &c.
—The things, ranked in this class of
Royal Property,
are,
sea-wrecks, treasures found, great fish,
as
whales, sturgeons,
and other
royal fish.
And whosoever pretends to have a right to enjoy the profits arising from these particular things, must be able to produce a special
warrant
for that purpose; because
prescription,
even of a very long time, is not sufficient to justify the pretension:
Diuturnitas enim temporis,
in hoc casu,
injuriam
non minuit, sed auget, nec in primo casu,
NEC IN ISTO, CURRIT TEMPUS CONTRA REGEM, nec incumbit ei probatio quia ad ipsum pertineant, cum constare debeat singulis, quod hujusmodi de jure gentium pertineant ad coronam.
But, with respect to things of a third class, as
crown-manors, lands, tenements,
&c. the case is widely different, for the doctrine of
Nullum tempus,
&c. affects them not at all! And I am astonished that so many gentlemen, learned in the law, whose attention has lately been employed upon this point, should have thought it necessary to provide, by a special act of parliament, against this doctrine, when
the common law of England,
that ought always to be preferred,
When common law and statute law concur, the common law shall be preferred.
4. Co. 71.
has already sufficiently guarded us against the tyrannical construction of the phrase, which, like a mere bug-bear, is formidable only whilst misunderstood, though it has raised an epidemical panic, of which the late act is a proof. —
Sunt etiam
aliae res
quae pertinent ad coronam, quae
non sunt ita sacrae,
quin transferri possunt, sicut sunt, FUNDI, TERRAE,
et
TENEMENTA,
et
HUJUSMODI per quos corona regis roboratur, et in quibus CURRIT TEMPUS CONTRA REGEM,
sicut contra quamlibet privatam personam.
Thus we are assured, by the authority of an ancient and unexceptionable writer, that
crown-lands
are exactly upon
the same footing
as
private freeholds,
with respect to
time
or
prescription,
which is the very reverse of the
Nullum tempus
doctrine, lately adopted by the Treasury.
Now, it is a maxim in law, that a quiet and uninterrupted
possession
for sixty years creates a proper title.
Possessio pacifica
POUR ANNS 60
facit jus.
(Prin. Leg. et Aeq. p. 81. See also Jenk. cent. 26.) And, therefore, as we have before shewn, that
Crown manors, lands,
and
tenements,
are exactly upon the same footing with respect to
time
or prescription
as private freeholds,
we must necessarily conclude that the king entirely loses his title to alienated lands, if there are better proofs of such a
peaceable possession,
on the one side, than of
a continued claim
on the other; in which case the lands must become wholly and entirely the property of the possessor. And, even when
alienated crown lands
are claimed within any shorter term than sixty years, the king
may not seize,
for it is a maxim,
That the
king can disseize no man,
nor be disseized;
(Doctor & Student);
Item pro maximo habetur in legibus Angliae, quod
nullus potest dominum regem disseisire,
NEC DOMINUS REX ALIQUEM DISSEISIRE POTERIT, ita quod liberum tenementum per talem disseisinam transferetur de rege ad alium, NEC E CONTRA.
Chap. 8.
and, even though the king
cannot be disseized,
yet this is not to be construed so as to annul that interest, which private persons acquire,
by time,
in the possession of alienated lands, for that is sufficiently established by an act of 1 Edw. III. c. 12. which ordains, with respect to
lands and tenements holden of the king in chief, and
ALIENED WITHOUT LICENCE
— that the
king shall
NOT HOLD THEM AS FORFEIT
in such case, but
—
there shall be a reasonable fine taken in Chancery by
DUE PROCESS.
Here is no limited time for possession, so that the act is as efficacious for those who have been
in possession only
3
years,
as for those who have held 20
times
3
years
as above. See also 9 Edw. III. c. 2. 21 Jac. c. 25. 8. Hen. VI. c. 9. § 7. and 31 Eliz. c. 11.
By the two last mentioned acts a peaceable and quiet possession
for
3
years
creates a right that will justify "
keeping possession
WITH FORCE:" but as the king is not expressly named, I conceive that so short a time doth not bar his title to any
reasonable fines,
not prohibited by 12 Char. II. c. 24.
See sect. 1, 5, and 6, particularly the latter.—
Provided always and be it enacted, that any thing herein contained shall not take away, nor be construed to take away,
any fines for alienation,
due by particular customs of particular manors and places,
other
than fines for alienations of lands or tenements holden immediately of the king in
capite.
because it is a maxim that
the king is not bound by statute law, unless expressly named.
What hath hitherto been advanced, I hope, will be thought sufficient to establish the
absolute property
of
all persons,
who shall be able to prove
a peaceable possession of alienated crown-lands, unclaimed for
60
years,
and also that those persons who have held
alienated crown-lands for more than
three
years unclaimed,
have a right
to continue in possession,
on paying a
reasonable fine;
and consequently that
the doctrine of Nullum tempus,
&c. is by no means
effectual
for the recovery of
manors, lands,
or
tenements, alienated from the crown.
And I trust that my candid readers will acknowledge and hold fast this my opinion, until they see
more authentic vouchers
produced in support of the contrary doctrine.
(Signed) GRANVILLE SHARP.
PART II. Concerning some Precautions and Conditions necessary to be observed in the granting of Crown Lands, Tenements,
&c.
THE crown is limited, as well in the mode of
granting,
as in the conditions to
be granted;
insomuch that when any grant or lease is made
contrary to the rules prescribed by law,
the same is thereby rendered
null and void.
I shall not pretend to speak of all the particular precautions and conditions necessary to be observed on these occasions, but only some few of the most essential, which, I apprehend, have not been so much regarded
of late
as they ought.
The legislature hath agreed, and laid it down as a rule, that all the ancient and
military tenures of lands, and
even
SOCCAGE IN CAPITE,
of the king, and the consequents upon the same, have been much more burthensome, grievous, and
PREJUDICIAL,
to the kingdom, than they have been
BENEFICIAL
to the king.
(See Preamble to 12 Cha. II. cap. 24.) For this just reason,
founded on experience,
the king hath ever since been
restrained by the law
from granting any part of his dominions upon such conditions.
I have, indeed, heard of a foreign island being granted to a noble lord upon some such
antiquated conditions,
whereby he is said to be established as
lord paramount,
with a peculiar unconstitutional authority; but this, I am willing to presume, is merely report; and, even if it were true, the grant would be innocent enough, because it is
null and void in itself,
as the king has had no right since 12 Cha. II. to make a grant
on any other tenure than that of free and common soccage.
Sect. 4.
And be it farther enacted,
&c.
That all tenures hereafter to be created by the king's majesty, his heirs, or successors, upon any gifts or grants of any manors, lands, tenements, or hereditaments, of any estate of inheritance, at the common law, shall be in
free and common socage,
and shall be adjudged to be in
free and common socage only,
and not by knights service, or in capite, and shall be discharged of all wardship,
&c.
any law, statute, or reservation to the contrary thereof in any wise notwithstanding.
— The king is also bound to have respect to
former grants,
because, even in cases when the king hath granted
during pleasure,
a second grant,
not mentioning the former, shall be void.
(
Hen. VIII. c. 15).
Now, in order to set forth more clearly some
other
circumstances wherein the crown is
limited
in the mode of granting, and in the conditions to be granted, I shall beg leave to
suppose
a case. —
Suppose
a crafty and litigious person makes interest with the
lord-treasurer,
or
the commissioners of the treasury,
for a grant of alienated crown-lands, on condition that he shall,
at his own expence,
prove and establish
the right of the crown, and recover the lands from the present possessor.
Let us also
suppose
a lord-treasurer, or commissioners of the treasury,
so regardless of the necessary and legal precautions against abuses in granting crown-lands,
that they approve the clandestine offer, and procure
a grant
from their royal master agreeable to the wishes of the proposer.
But what will such an adventurer gain by his parchments, whilst the king's courts are worthy to be esteemed
courts of justice and law?
Be pleased to observe that my
suppositions
are now at a stand. They extend no farther than the
imaginary case
already laid down. For I am not
to suppose,
or
conceive,
that any learned persons, who preside in the king's courts, are subject to venal
time-serving,
or the factious spirit of party influence, which is the source of the most dangerous
partiality;
because
partiality
is entirely inconsistent with the high character of
judges,
and must necessarily make shipwreck of their souls!
For a
partial judge
cannot truly be said to
"have the fear of God before his eyes:"
and, as this is the
first principle
which the common law of England requires, and deems absolutely necessary in all ranks of the community, but more particularly in
judges,
I am bound in Christian charity not to suspect such
a legal incapacity
in any of them, until I am convinced, by experience, to the contrary.
For this reason I have not attempted, by declamation and far-fetched arguments, to establish my opinion; nor do I rely on the interest and number of my friends to make it pass current; neither do I demand favour of my readers, as being a friend to administration; but I have founded my opinion merely
on the authority of law;
and, whilst our judges as well as juries are susceptible of that
just and indispensible fear
before mentioned, and are in the least
mindful of the solemn account which they themselves must one day give,
so long shall I presume that our courts are
impartial;
and that they will carefully and conscientiously weigh and determine every case that is laid before them according
to the known laws of the land;
and, consequently, that they would reject, with disdain, the claim of
my supposed adventurer,
if his pretensions to the alienated lands in question had no better foundation than
such a grant
as I have
supposed.
The Courts would inform the litigious adventurer that his grant is of no signification, and cannot convey to him the least right in the alienated lands, because the Crown is bound to prove and establish its own right in all manors, lands,
&c.
before
it can grant them to any person whatever;
for both the lord-chancellor and the lord-treasurer (and consequently the commissioners of the treasury) are absolutely restrained, by an act of parliament, (8 Hen. VI. c. 16.
8 Hen. VI. c. xvi.
To eschew the dolours, grievances, and disherisons, which daily do happen to many of the king's liege-people, by the escheators, for that they take enquests, to inquire before them, as well by virtue of the king's writs, as of their offices, favourably
and not duly,
by people not impannelled, nor returned to them by the sheriffs of the counties, and more often for their
private gain,
and for
the disherison of the king's liege-people, than for the profit of the same our lord the king,
and also, for that the lands and tenements of many of the king's liege-people be seized into the king's hands upon such enquests,
or let
to ferm by the chancellor or treasurer
before such enquests be returned
in the chancery: our lord the king hath ordained,
&c.
that no escheator or commissioner take in any wise
any enquest to enquire,
but of people
returned and impanelled by the sheriff▪
in the county, within which he is escheator or commissioner. And if any escheator or commissioner take
enquests
of people which be not
impanelled,
&c. that he incur the penalty of 40 l. &c. And that no lands nor tenements, seised into the hand of our lord the king, upon such enquests taken before the escheators or commissioners, be not in any wise
let
nor
granted to ferm by the chancellor or treasurer of England,
or any other the king's
officer,
until the same
enquests
and
verdicts
be fully returned
in the chancery,
or in the exchequer, but all such lands, &c. shall intirely and continually remain
in the hands of our lord the king
until the said enquests and verdicts be returned, &c.
— See also 36 Ed. III. c. 13. to which this act refers for the form of letting.
) from letting or granting the king's lands
to farm,
until
lawful enquests
and
verdicts
(that is from
good towns,
and
of good people,
36 Ed. III. c. 13; or
a jury of twelve sufficient men,
1 Hen. VIII. c. 8.) have been taken thereupon, and
be fully returned
in the Chancery, or in the Exchequer, but all such lands and tenements shall entirely and continually remain in the hands of our lord the king, until the said enquests and verdicts be returned,
&c.
— And, when the persons
grieved by the same enquests, or putting out of their lands and tenements,
come into the Chancery, and proffer themselves to traverse the said enquests, and then offer to take the same lands or tenements to ferm. And, if they so do, that then the same lands,
&c.
be committed
to them if they shew good evidence, &c.
So that there is no possibility for the crown to make
a valid grant
upon the conditions before described,
viz.
the establishing of the Crown's right at the expence of the grantee.
And another act was made in the eighteenth year of the same reign, (cap. 6.) expressly as a remedy to prevent such
subtle and designing persons
from suing
to obtain such gifts, and grants, and ferms, by the king's letters patents, before any inquisition
(as above)
or title found for the king of the same, pretending such gifts and grants not comprised and remedied by the said statute, &c.
And, if any letters patents be made to the contrary, they shall BE VOID AND HOLDEN FOR NONE.
— So that our adventurer's claim, founded on
a grant
made
previous to these necessary steps,
is absolutely
null and void of itself.
And the very conditions of it (viz. that of establishing the right of the crown at the grantee's own expence) would afford substantial proof, without any farther examination, that the crown had neglected all these
legal precautions,
which are absolutely necessary for the foundation and existence of every grant: and, consequently, such a condition is, of itself, sufficient to render any grant a
mere nullity.
I must, likewise, observe that the crown, or its ministers, have no right to grant lands on any other terms or conditions whatsoever, besides those which are prescribed by law
utterly void and of none effect,
(says the 1st Stat. of queen Anne, sect. 5.)
unless such
GRANT, LEASE,
&c. be made for some term or estate, not exceeding one and thirty years, or three lives, or for some term of years determinable upon one, two, or three, lives; and, unless such grant, &c. be made to commence from the date or making thereof;
which is impossible in the case that I have supposed, where the right is afterwards to be established by a contest at law.—There are also
other conditions
which are absolutely necessary: a reservation must be made of the ancient and most usual rent, or more, or such rent as hath been reserved, yielded, and paid, for the greater part of twenty years, before the making of the grant; or a reserved rent, not under the third part
of the clear yearly value.
And whatever grant is made since the first of queen Anne, otherwise than according to the tenure and meaning of the said act, is
absolutely null and void.
It would be in vain for a
Treasury-board
to alledge, in such a case, that they abated their legal conditions in consideration of the grantee being bound to prosecute and establish, at his own expence,
the right of the crown:
an impartial court (such as I have described) would freely declare that the crown is not empowered to change the above
prescribed conditions,
on any pretence whatsoever, being absolutely
limited
and bound by this Statute of 1st Anne, which declares (sect. 7.)
that all gifts, grants, &c. of manors, &c. or any part thereof, contrary to the provisions of this act, or any of them, shall
BE NULL AND VOID,
without any inquisition, scire facias, or other proceeding, to determine or make void the same.
But the most material thing to be considered by a lord chancellor, a lord treasurer, or a treasury-board, before they presume to reclaim
alienated lands, &c.
is, what I first of all touched upon, viz. whether the present possessors of lands, &c. have enjoyed a
quiet possession of sixty years?
because that creates a good title; "FACIT JUS," as I have already proved; and such great officers ought to be aware that
Rescriptum principis contra
JUS
non valet;
so that they would betray the honour of their royal master, if they were to endeavour to procure his assent to grants of land, &c. which, by
time and possession,
are thus totally
and irrecoverably alienated;
for
Donatio principis intelligitur
SINE PREJUDICIO TERTII.
(Davis, 75.6.) And
One should be
JUST
before he is
GENEROUS.
The points of law and opinions, which I have here laid down, may perhaps be capable of perversion; for indeed the
plainest truths
may be wrested and
perverted
by long, sophistical, and deceitful, arguments;—but, let my opponents submit their objections to writing, as I have done, and collate them side by side with mine, and it will be impossible for the most subtle prevarication to set aside so many plain and intelligible laws, which acquire a collective force by being thus produced together: and, even if we could suppose an inclination or partiality in any of the king's justices, to favour and confirm
every act of administration whatsoever,
be it
right or wrong;
and, among the rest, such AN ILLEGAL ACT OF THE TREASURY LORDS as I have here stated in this supposed grant; yet, even the most
partial
of them would find themselves exposed to great difficulty, shame, and danger, by attempting to define away the true meaning of so many positive laws, in order to
establish
such
an injustice:
for the private opinions of the king's justices ought to have
no weight,
neither their
will
and
inclination,
except when clearly supported
by law;
because they are not allowed
an arbitrary or wilful discretion,
Also discretion, as it is well described, is
scire per legem quid sit justum.
10 Co. 140.
but merely
a legal discretion,
which is
"discernere per legem quod sit justum."
—
For
discretion
is a science, or understanding, to discern between
falsity
and
truth,
between
right
and
wrong,
between
shadows
and
substance,
between
equity
and
colourable glosses
and
pretences;
and not to do according to their
wills and private affections;
for, as one faith,
Talis discretio discretionem confundit.
5 Co. 345. — If these salutary laws and unalterable maxims have been infringed by any
great officer of the present times,
through
misinformation,
or for want of duly considering the point in question, let them but acknowledge their error, together with a sincere intention to make what reparation may lie in their power, and they will easily regain that public confidence and esteem which they have forfeited by their mistakes; for, sure I am, (with sir Edw. Cook,)
that no wise or true-hearted
Englishman,
that hath been
persuaded
before he was
instructed,
will refuse to be
instructed
in the truth, (which
he may see with his own eyes,
) lest he should be
dissuaded
from error, wherewith blindfold he hath been deceived; for
miserable is his case, and worthy of pity, that hath been
PERSUADED
before he was
INSTRUCTED,
and now will refuse to be
INSTRUCTED
because he will not be
PERSUADED.
But, howsoever applicable the latter part of this quotation may be to any of his majesty's
late
or
present ministers,
yet am I thoroughly persuaded that it will never
be justly
said of himself.
As a man, he is indeed liable to be imposed on, and may perhaps
be persuaded
to give his assent to some improper things, through the insinuation of mere
worldly politicians;
that the same are absolutely NECESSARY; and that he must submit to tread in the beaten tract of
state-policy
(howsoever
corrupt
) to avoid the danger of greater evils.
The NECESSITY of doing
evil
to avoid
a greater evil
is a doctrine too generally adopted by
worldly
politicians, and perfectly accords with the ancient
iniquitous
proposition,
"Let us do
EVIL,
that
GOOD
may come."
But the unhappy state of those wretched politicians, who give such pernicious counsel, is immediately added, —
whose damnation is just!
Rom. iii. 8.
If he ever has yielded to such
fallacious
and
dangerous doctrines,
(for no doctrines are so productive of
violence
and
iniquity,
and consequently so productive of certain
ruin
Our
INIQUITIES,
like the wind, have taken us away.
Isaiah lxiv. 6.
Woe unto them that decree unrighteous decrees.
Isaiah x. 1.
to states and kingdoms, as those which are built on pretended
necessity,
) I am persuaded it was for
want of conviction
that he might safely and with propriety avoid it, but the
rectitude of his intentions,
I am convinced, will never
justly
be called in question.
That he is a good christian, and
sincerely wishes to promote the general good of his people,
I have not the least doubt; and therefore if any man hath
been injured
by such
an illegal grant
as I have described, let him find some means of stating the merits of his case in a proper and respectful manner to our gracious sovereign, and I will FORFEIT MY LIFE,
if he does not find redress.
— MY CONFIDENCE
N. B. This tract is dated in May, 1771.
is not without foundation! I had the honour to stand in his royal presence, when he called
God and man
to witness, in the most solemn and affecting manner that can be described, that he would
rule according to the laws.
From that time to this I have entertained the highest personal esteem and respect for him, and have really more hopes of the re-establishment of public peace and content, from the
sincerity and good heart
(as I conceive)
of that one man,
than from the most earnest endeavours of all the other honest and loyal people of England, who, of themselves, without their royal master at their head, are by far too few and weak to resist the immense tide of
venality and corruption,
which has almost totally overflowed this once happy island.—
Take away the wicked from before the king, and his throne shall be established in righteousness.
Prov. xxv. 5.
(Signed) GRANVILLE SHARP.
THE END.