OBSERVATIONS
ON THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE CLERGY, WHO ASSEMBLED AT CHESTER, FEB. 15TH. 1790, FOR THE PURPOSE OF SUPPORTING THE
Corporation and Test Acts.
IT is allowed that every State has an inherent right to require evidence that those whom it employs in offices of trust and power, are friendly to its constitution; because it is
to be supposed that any State would pursue measures destructive of itself, which the admission
those who are hostile to it, to civil offices, would undoubtedly be. It therefore follows di
ly that some security should be given of the allegiance of those who are so employed. But
question is, what security? It cannot be supposed that the State has a right to
any
and
every
At a Meeting of the Clergy of the Archdeaconry of Chester, held at the city of Chester, on Monday the 15th
of February, 1790, to take into consideration the attempts of the Dissenters, in various parts of the king
,
to obtain a repeal of the Corporation and Test Acts,
and their assertions that those acts
are acknowledged, by
of the established Clergy, to be a grievance and a common evil
—the following Resolutions were agreed to
ANIMOUSLY: The Rev. Archdeacon TRAVIS in the Chair:
1. That every state hath an inherent right to require evidence of the opinions of those, whom it shall em
in its offices of trust and power,
whether they are friendly, or hostile, to the constitution which it hath established;
that this right arises, not merely from laws which may have been enacted by that state, but from that
principle
self-preservation, which belongs to communities as well as to individuals,
and which is antecedent and superior to
law.
kind of security. For instance, it cannot claim a right to such security, as would make the punishment of disaffection more than adequate to the crime. Nor can it claim a right to such a dominion over conscience, as would lead to persecution for religious sentiments, considered merely
as
sentiments. The same observation will hold with respect to all opinions which have not an
immediate
connection with the welfare of the State itself. Otherwise, in deducing consequences from opinions, which are supposed to have a more remote relation to the State, it will be impossible to know where to stop, there being scarcely one principle of a political, moral, or religious nature, but may be represented by its enemies as inconsistent with the established government. And as various governments are guided by various principles, those which are consistent with one government, may be inconsistent with another; on which supposition, the opinions which, in one State, may be regarded as just, and necessary to the support of the community, may in another be considered as destructive of all order and due subordination. The consequence of which would be, that there could be no such thing as political truth or rectitude existing.
But, let us suppose the government to be well calculated to advance the general interests of the community: let the opinions of which it requires a security, be just opinions; yet, if they are such as have not clearly and
immediately
this connection, the State can have no right to claim any evidence of their being admitted by those whom it employs in civil offices. So that both in this and in the former case, these opinions will be found to include, in reality, nothing more than what is implied in the common oaths of allegiance and fid
lity; and a claim of security as to such opinions as these, is what no one would object to complying with—though even this is more than can be justly pretended to. For the very supposition of a claim to security in
opinions,
is in itself absurd. Indeed, what does it, at the utmost, amount to. Merely this: that those from whom such a security is required, should declare their
belief
such opinions. But will any State pretend to judge of the sincerity of such a declaration? When prospects of interest are placed before him who makes it, can it be positively known that these have no influence to bias his mind, and lead him to concealments and reservations? I do not pretend to say that this is always, or generally, the fact; but the very possibility is a clear proof how inadequate Government is to such a claim, and consequently that the security it should require is of a different kind—a security of
conduct.
This is the only test on which the community can reasonably depend: and on this it may depend; especially if personal interest be connected with such conduct, which it certainly is, when the measures of government are generally useful to the community. Every other evidence is delusive; and therefore this only ought to be required.
In determining, also, the
extent
of this security, it is a question of essential importance, what is meant by the
constitution
to which it is referred. For this may either be considered as the whole system of laws which make up the Government, at
the time of giving the security,
or the general
spirit
and
design
of the Government, without reference to any
particular laws
whatever. Now, for the support of the former, no one can be expected to engage; because on this principle no grievances can be redressed, nor even can a single statute be ever abrogated. It must be the latter only, then, to which those who are employed in civil offices may be expected to give evidence of attachment. It therefore by no means follows, that they may not endeavour the repeal of any statutes which appear to them inconsistent with the spirit of the government, though of ever so long a standing, and ever so uniformly acquiesced in. And whenever such expressions are used with respect to the executive part of Government, as convey the idea of obligation on those who are employed in it, to
preserve the constitution,
the whole meaning is, that the general spirit of the government shall be uniformly supported, and the laws enacted from time to time shall be put in execution agreeably to the letter and design of them. The utmost security, therefore, that can be given, is, that this delegation shall be faithfully executed; which it certainly may by
all,
what sentiments soever they may entertain as to matters of religion or philosophy.
The principle also on which this security is said to be claimed, that of
self-preservation,
is an additional proof that this claim can be extended no farther. For this principle is to be restricted, in societies as well as individuals, by reason and justice. Now neither of these can warrant the claim of more security than is necessary in this case. If, therefore, a solemn engagement on the part of a person appointed to civil offices, that he will discharge these offices truly and faithfully, be just and complete, no other ought to be required. For the claims of society and government are not to be regarded as
indefinite;
but are to be regulated by the same principles of morality as those of individuals; and whenever they are exorbitant, ought to be remonstrated against, and opposed.
On these accounts, the principle which makes the first of the resolutions of the Chester Clergy, ought to have been expressed in this manner:—
"Every State, though it has an inherent right to a security from those whom it may employ in offices of trust and power, that they will not pursue measures hostile to the constitution which it has established, has only that right which it is competent to the exertion of; namely, the engaging its officers by a solemn promise, that that they will not
act
inconsistently with the interests of the State. This right arises from the nature of the society itself, and from the principle of self-preservation. But as to
opinions,
these being out of the reach of human knowledge, must therefore be beyond the extent of human power; and in these the State cannot, from the nature of the things, have any concern."
Hence, therefore,
2. That, upon the same principle, every state hath a right to declare what shall be deemed a sufficient proof, or TEST, whether such opinions are, or are not, friendly to its establishments.
II. No state has a right to any Test which has for its object
opinions
only, or to one of which
opinions
make a part.
I cannot help, under this head, remarking the palpable absurdity of the second resolution of the Chester clergy.
"Every state hath a right to DECLARE what shall be DEEMED
I suppose this means deemed
by the state,
for on these principles there can be
no judge besides the state.
a sufficient PROOF or TEST, whether such opinions are or are not friendly to its establishments."
I shall not take notice of the artful introduction of the
plural establishments,
instead of the singular number, which is the only idea expressed in the first resolution, and which is referable to the
civil
establishment only; nor shall I say any thing of the tendency of such an alteration to confound the church and state together, and apply the arguments which relate merely to the latter, to both of these collectively taken!—I will only ask the learned divines who composed that assembly, on what logical principles this assertion is founded; the plain meaning of which is precisely this;
"
that the friendly or unfriendly nature of any opinions as to the establishments of civil government, is to be judged of, not by the intrinsic nature of these opinions, but by the m
re DECLARATION of the STATE itself; and that this declaration is to be admitted as a sufficient PROOF or TEST, whatsoever be the nature of the opinions themselves.
"
3. That a compliance with the tests of conformity, which now subsist in this kingdom, is required from those, who are employed by the state, as a pledge, or security, that they will not attempt any thing hostile to the established constitution; that, under this view, such
Tests
are not punishments for an opinion, but
restraints to prevent an evil:
not instruments of oppression, but
institutions to preserve the public peace.
And we are so far from considering them as
"
grievances or common evils,
"
that we think ourselves warranted, from the experience of more than a century, to express our desires, that they may be continued in force (or that some
other equivalent obligations
may be substituted in their place) as wise and just provisions for the safety of the state.
III. Since therefore no state has a right to a test of
opinions
in any case, it can have no right to a declaration of conformity to the church of England, as a qualification for offices. Consequently, though some pledge or security may be justly required that those who are employed by the state, will not attempt any thing hostile to it, this pledge or security, must be of a
civil
nature only, and can have no reference to the established church. Therefore religious tests of all kinds are unlawful. And whether they are intended as
restraints to prevent an evil,
or institutions to
preserve the public peace,
they cannot have place in any civil view. Of consequence, though they were even such as contained true and acknowledged principles only, and consequently did not compel a single person to declare a belief of what he was not already persuaded of, they would, nevertheless, be a grievance even on
this
supposition, as being the application of a sanction to which no state can plead a right in any case whatever.
If it be urged, that the
church
also is concerned in this; and that this religious test has also a tendency to preserve the
ecclesiastical constitution;
the right to such test in this respect, must depend upon one or more of these principles;—that an exclusive religious establishment is a right arising from the nature of society in general; or from the nature of a
particular
society; or from the nature of the British government. But on the first principles, since the rights of conscience are equal, religious opinions, as to their claims, must be equal, and consequently there cannot be a predominant established church consistently with the design of society, and the unalienable rights of conscience; nor can it arise from the nature of a particular society; because either every religious establishment is a good one; or some one is better than all the others. The former of which suppositions, as it totally destroys the idea of the importance of religious truth, will be admitted by none, but those who disregard religion altogether: And the latter, though true, involves this question; which (of all the religio
s in the world, that claim a right to establishment), is the only true one, and the only one calculated to advance the interests of society and just government?—When this question is satisfactorily answered, so as to convince
all mankind,
(for less than this cannot establish the right pleaded for) then the right of exclusive establishments may possibly deserve some attention.
This is precisely the case as to the Church establishment in England. Besides the obligation which lies upon its advocates to prove that its claims as an establishment are not incompatible with the equal and unalienable rights of conscience; it ought to be shewn by them, that the nature of the Church itself is the best formed to preserve and support the spirit of the Government, to establish the rights of the people, and to promote those principles of justice, sobriety, and due subordination, without which no society can exist or flourish.
It may be also a question of no small importance, on supposition that the Church of England is the best calculated to support the British constitution, what are we to think of the Scotch ecclesiastical establishment? Have two establishments of a directly opposite nature a tendency to produce the same effect? Or is it the nature of the Scotch establishment to destroy or impair the British constitution?
Now, without detracting from the merits of the Church in this respect; I may venture to assert, that all these principles are equally taught by every party of the Dissenters also; and applied with at least as much consistence and force to the very same purposes. All these sectaries, therefore, have an equal right to exclusive establishent with the Church of England. But equal and contradictory rights are self destructive. Therefore none of them, not even the Church itself has a right to an exclusive establishment. If it be said, in reply to this, that their claims cannot be equal, because the Members of the Church compose the majority of the nation; it is a point which calls for all the proof which the Clergy can produce, that the rights of conscience in the majority of a nation are necessarily and justly of such a kind, as to infer a dominion over the rights of conscience in the rest of the nation.
But these things the Dissenters do not contend for. They are willing to contribute to the support even of the ministers of a Church which they disapprove, provided they be not held up as bad subjects to the civil government in their principles or conduct. And this they certainly are, even on the supposition that the tests of conformity, with which they cannot conscientiously comply, are used as
restraints only to prevent an evil
apprehended from them, and institutions
to preserve the public peace,
which, if they were admitted to civil offices, would be in danger of being disturbed.
The principles of the Dissenters, as far as they relate to civil government, are perfectly agreeable to the principles of the British constitution: a constitution which they have always supported, and which indeed, in a great measure, owes its present perfection to their services: This is acknowledged by Mr. Hume himself, who though far from being friendly to the Dissenters, bears this honourable testimony to them, (Hist. v. 5. p. 189.) that
"
the precious spark of liberty
was kindled and preserved by the Puritans
alone;
and it was to this sect (from whom the present Dissenters derive their origin) that the English owe the
whole freedom of their constitution.
"
Their
religious
principles, at least those in which they
all
agree, are reducible to these: That as men and members of a religious community, all mankind have equal rights of conscience; that persecution of every kind, even to the lowest degree of civil restraint, on account of religious sentiments, is unjust and unlawful; and that, therefore, as Christians, all have an equal right to study the Scriptures, and apply them as the only rule of faith and manners. And these are the only principles on which the separation of the Church of England from that of Rome, is, or can be vindicated.
When the friends of the Church can make it appear that these sentiments are dangerous to any well-governed State, and particularly to that of Great Britain, I will then acknowledge (how inconsistent soever this may be with the principles just laid down) that it is high time, not only to lay restraint upon the professors of them, but totally to proscribe and banish them from the community. But if, on the contrary, they are essential to the well-being of every State, to lay the smallest restraint on them is really a
grievance,
and indeed a
common evil,
since it operates as a discouragement to the only foundations of good government and true religion; and ought, therefore, on every principle on which these depend, to be absolutely and totally abrogated.
4. That it is no valid objection to these TESTS, that they call in the
sanctions of religion to purposes merely civil.
To secure allegiance to lawful government, certainty to the payment of its taxes and tributes, and veracity to legal testimony in its courts of judicature, are
purposes merely civil;
and yet they are ALL required and enforced under the
religious sanction of an oath.
IV. It is certainly a completely valid objection, that these religious tests are made subservient to
civil purposes.
For this supposes a right in the magistrate to interfere in the regulation of the opinions on which these tests are founded; the contrary to which was proved under the 1st. Article. And the argument which is drawn in favour of them from the religious nature of an
oath,
the application of which to civil purposes is admitted on all hands, is an argument drawn from what is totally
dissimilar,
and inapplicable to the tests in question. For from the sanction of an oath, the utmost which can be argued, is, that the person who takes it believes the truth of the Christian Religion,
In the case of evidence in a court of justice, not even this is required: but the witnesses are sworn on the principles of
that religion only which they admit
as of divine authority.
which does not conclude at all against the
Dissenters,
who universally admit the Christian Religion;—but the tests with which an oath is here compared, imply the belief of a
particular set of principles, deduced by men
only from this religion, and which, being liable to dispute, cannot have an authority
equal
to that of the Gospel itself. The admission, indeed, of the sanction of the former, as it implies divine authority in that from which it is derived, by no means
infers,
indeed it
rejects
the sanction of the latter, which is founded on human authority only. And it may be justly inquired, why, when an oath is completely sufficient to secure a due allegiance to civil government, any other sanction should be called for? And whether one, who is capable of breaking through obligations derived from a religion acknowledged by him to be divine, will not be likely to break through those which arise from only one
particular system
of that religion; many of the principles of which system are, at best, of very dubious authority?
This proceeds on the supposition that the tests themselves are unambiguous declarations of attachment to the Church which imposes them; and therefore if the arguments against such tests are complete and conclusive, they must be still more so against the
sacramental
test required in the Church of England, which is capable of, and naturally leads to prevarication and deceit in those who submit to it; and has been, and is perpetually applied to purposes the most directly contrary to the very design with which it was instituted. Before, therefore, the least plea can be advanced in favour of such a test, it lies upon its advocates to shew clearly, that the receiving of the Lord's Supper, for the purpose of taking up a commission in the army, a place in the customs, the occupation of an exciseman, or indeed any worldly and lucrative employment, is
perfectly consistent
with the end for which Christ appointed it, which was the religious remembrance of his life, sufferings and death?
5. That to insist upon
natural
claims to
civil
offices, is to advance a palpable absurdity; because no member, of any society, can have any
civil rights,
except such as are conveyed to him by the
laws of that society.
V. It is a sufficient proof of the absurdity of the fifth resolution, that it confounds together two totally contrary ideas, and makes that to be the
cause
which is the
effect,
and the
effect
to be the
cause: Civil rights,
instead of being the
consequence
of the laws of society, are in reality the
causes
of the laws;—which are expressly appointed for their
protection.
They are, therefore,
antecedent
in their very nature to these laws. The enjoyment and peaceable possession of civil rights is indeed
secured
by the laws, but the rights themselves stand upon the original foundation of nature: and to talk of rights being
conveyed
by the laws, is not only to make the laws the
creators
of these rights, but to take it also for granted, that the laws of
every community, as laws,
must be universally founded on justice—the absurdity of which is evident, not only from the applications which are made for the repeal of laws deemed oppressive, but from the very acknowledgment that there are governments existing which are supported by
just
laws.
If, therefore, there are civil rights antecedent to law, there must be
natural claims to civil offices;
for the latter is included in the former. Every member of a community has a natural claim to a share in the direction of the affairs of that community; otherwise he is supposed to surrender all, at least some of his dearest rights, on entering into it. As it is impossible to suppose this, the justice of his claim is in this case plainly established: and consequently (which is indeed the
same thing
) his natural right to civil offices is equally established.
I cannot, however, dismiss this article, without expressing my utter astonishment at a declaration of this sort. That men have from nature
no civil rights,
but that th
se depend merely on the laws and regulations which are made by Government, is a principle which tends so directly to the establishment of the most exorbitant
tyranny
on the side of the Governors, and the most abject and
Slavish passive obedience
on that of subjects, as cannot be thought of without abhorrence and detestation.
6. That as the Dissenters do not suffer, or even alledge that they suffer, any restraints on their
religious liberties,
it is evident, that their present design, (which indeed some of their le
ders openly avow)
is a contest for the possession of the civil offices of the state.
But we conceive that those offices are to be considered only as TRUSTS
for the benefit of the state;
and, therefore, that they ought not to be confided to those, who testify their
disaffection to the state,
by their
aversion to its establishments.
VI. This resolution consists so much of palpable misrepresentation, that it scarcely deserves any thing better than a plain and positive denial.
That the diffenters do not suffer, or even alledge they suffer any restraint on their religious liberties,
is with respect to the latter part of the assertion particularly, so glaringly false, as even their present efforts for the repeal of acts which they account oppressive on their religious liberties, are of themselves sufficient to shew. Will the author of these resolutions deny this, and say that civil restraints merely on account of religious sentiments are no restraints on religious liberty? Is there any essential difference between laying a man under fines and penalties on this account, and preventing him from obtaining the natural right of citizens? If the former is,
all must allow, persecution in a
high
degree, is not the other persecution in a degree somewhat
lower?
In some respects it may not be in a
lower
degree. For restraint from civil offices may, to those men who are peculiarly fitted for doing honour to them, be a means of preventing them from reaping the highest emoluments and advantages during their whole lives; whereas a fine is temporary, and may have an influence only for a moment.
In this view, therefore, the Dissenters, instead of contending for power, are really contending for the proper rights of human nature: and their efforts reflect honour upon themselves, and have a tendency, and, it is to be hoped, will have an
efficacy
to produce the general liberty and happiness of the Society to which they belong.
But this is not the only restraint they suffer on their religious liberties. Though as men and Christians, they have a right to vindicate their religious principles, and as Dissenters, they cannot in vindicating them, avoid reflecting on those tenets which differ from theirs; yet this very circumstance may be construed into a reviling and derogation of the Liturgy; in which case, they are liable to the penalty of fines and perpetual imprisonment. This is an oppression on
all
Dissenters without exception;—and in the case of those among them who cannot admit the doctrine of the Trinity, (which is indeed a stumbling-block to many of the best and wisest among the Episcopalians themselves) the punishment is no less than
a total loss of legal rights,
and
three years imprisonment
without bail. It is happy for Dissenters that heresy is left undefined in the English law, else the punishment of this, which is the same with that which is annexed to the denial of the Trinity, would have hung like a dreadful
over the heads of innocent Nonconformists.
Let the Chester Clergy, after finding these to be facts, say, if they can, that the Diffenters
suffer no restraint on their religious liberties.
If this state of the case be just (and no one can deny it) would it not have been better, and indeed more consistent with truth, to have ascribed the present
contest
(as it is called) of the Dissenters, to a reasonable and laudable principle of recovering their natural rights, rather than to have stigmatized it by the appellation of
a contest for the possession of the offices of the State?
A contest it is (if you please to use that name) and a contest for
power
in
one
sense. But it is a contest, like that at the Reformation, or at the Revolution, for the noblest privileges of humanity; a contest which, whether successful or not, will enroll their names among the glorious defenders of civil and religious liberty, and make them shine with the brightest splendour, to ages yet unborn.
I would not be improperly warm, even on the subject of religious liberty. I shall therefore quit this topic, with only proposing to the Chester Clergy these queries:—
Is a contest for civil offices unlawful in itself? Is a contest for civil rights unlawful in itself? Do not civil rights imply a right to civil offices?
And if this contest is not in itself unlawful. I call upon them to tell the world in the most plain and unambiguous manner,
what is there in the principles, the conduct, or the character of the Protestant Dissenters, which does not render them in every respect capable of being employed in the executive
(as they are already in the most important branch, the legislative)
department of a good, and well-regulated Government?
After this, there is scarcely any necessity to remark on the next passage.
Civil offices are trusts for the benefit of the State
—So say the Dissenters too; and I will add (as to all those who conduct themselves agreeably to the dissenting principles) so
act
they also. They, therefore are among the best, if not actually the best subjects, in this free and well-governed State; and as such, have a corresponding right to its emoluments and offices. As, therefore, I agree perfectly with the Chester Clergy,
that these emoluments and offices ought not to be entrusted to those who testify their disaffection to the State;
the conclusion I draw is, that the Dissenters, not only on account of their natural rights as men, but also on account both of their princiciples and conduct as citizens, have an equal right with all the other members of the State, to a proportional share in its offices, emoluments, and honours.
In the last clause of this resolution,
aversion to the establishments of the State,
is mentioned as a reason for excluding Dissenters from civil offices. What is the meaning of this word Establishments? Is it
established laws?
If so, an aversion to some of them is by no means a reason for excluding Dissenters
only,
but
all
who wish for and endeavour after the abrogation of oppressive statutes, are unfit for offices. But this idea is too absurd to be dwelt upon. Is it the establishment of the Church of England? In truth Dissenters give themselves little trouble about it. Provided they can secure those just rights of a civil and religious nature which have been already stated, they willingly leave the honours and emoluments of the Church to remain as they are.
7. That although we hold sacred the rights of private conscience, and regard, with christian charity, those who, through its dictates,
mistakenly
(as we believe) reject the terms of our communion; yet we consider that very plea of conscience, as an insuperable objection to their admission into the
civil offices of the state.
For where the separation of any Christians, from the established communion, is made
because the terms of that communion are held to be sinful,
such separatists would not be justifiable, on any consistent principles, if they did not exert all the power and authority, which the possession of civil offices might confer, in order to substitute
their
tenets and terms of communion, in the place of those of the establishment:
in which, however, they could not succeed, but by the destr
ction of our present constitution in church and state.
VII. This resolution is certainly a most curious one.
In proportion to the sincerity of dissenters
is the danger of the Church.
It would be a sufficient reply to say,
In proportion to the sincerity of the members of the Church of England is the danger of dissenters.
As both these propositions are
equally
true (for
neither
of them is so) let me suggest the following antidote to the poison which is apprehended to the church from the part of the dissenters. Let the church shew the truth of its principles: let it confute the pretensions of the dissenters: let its teachers, in life, in conversation, in preaching, and in doctrine, surpass those of the Sectarists; and I will engage that the Church will never be in danger as to its honours or emoluments. But if this either cannot or will not be done; I can only say, that I believe there is not even one religious Episcopalian but will join with me, in wishing well to that profession in which the interests of religion are best supported, and in endeavouring after a complete reformation of those things in which they happen to be wilfully and criminally neglected.
8. That for these reasons and considerations, as it is our earnest desire on the one hand, that they, who dissent from the established worship, should enjoy a COMPLEAT TOLERATION
in the offices of religion,
so it is equally our wish, on the other hand, that they may be
excluded from the civil offices of the state;
it being our humble, yet firm and decided opinion, that, as a
good
government cannot
give them too much case,
so a
wise
government cannot
trust them with too little power.
VIII. For these reasons and considerations (may the dissenters say) as we are always ready to return our grateful thanks to those who wish us well; so we do it sincerely and heartily to our Brethren the Chester Clergy, who though they do not appear to us to entertain sufficiently enlarged ideas of Christian liberty,
yet express an earnest desire, that we should enjoy a complete toleration in the offices of religion:
At the same time we beg them to consider the foregoing arguments, before they draw the hasty conclusion, that on account of our loyalty, our sincerity, and our love of liberty
we should be excluded from the civil offices of the state;
for it is our firm and decided opinion that a wise and good government
cannot grant us too much liberty. And we call, in this public manner upon those who have stood forth as our enemies, to prove what we are persuaded they falsely assert, that we cannot be trusted with too
LITTLE POWER.