THE EVIDENT ADVANTAGES TO
Great Britain
and its ALLIES FROM THE Approaching WAR: Especially in Matters of TRADE.
To which is Added Two Curious Plans, One of the PORT and BAY of HAVANA; the other of PORTO-BELO.
LONDON:
Printed; And Sold by J. ROBERTS in
Warwick-Lane
; and A. DODD in the
Strand,
1727. [Price 1
s.
]
February 2, 1726/7.
This Day is Publish'd the SECOND EDITION of
The Evident Approach of a WAR; and Something of the Necessity of it, in order to Establish PEACE, and Preserve TRADE.
Pax Quaeritur Bello.
To which is Added, an Exact Plan and Description of the Bay and City of
Gibraltar.
PREFACE.
THE evident Approach of a War having been spoken to, with some Approbation; the evident Advantages of it to
Great-Britain
seem as natural to be spoken to, as they are necessary.
The same Hand therefore applies it self to this Part however officiously, yet with the same Sincerity, to encourage the Nation in the prosecuting of the War, when it shall be begun.
If the many Disappointments which the
Spaniards
have met with in forming their Designs, and the dull Prospects they have before them in carrying them on, have not prevail'd on them to take better Measures, or to act a wiser Part; but that they will go on, in spight, not of Reason only, but even of Nature; that very Obstinacy is an Encouragement to us, who have so many Assurances of Success in every Branch of the War.
But when the Advantages to our Commerce come to be weighed also, and added to the Advantages of the War, one would be apt to say that as the
Spaniards
seem infatuated in the Beginning it; we should all be infatuated, if we did not take hold of the Occasion.
The Author desires to capitulate for so much Favour, (however otherwise discouraged,) that as this Tract is written with the same sincere Affection to the publick Interest, as well of the Government as of the whole Nation, as the former, it may be accepted in the same manner; he earnestly wishes that the Advantages to our Commerce, which so evidently offer on the Occasion of this War, may be embrac'd; that our Trade, which at this Time suffers under many other Difficulties, may at least revive upon the Follies of our Enemies, and by those very Steps by which they think to ruin it.
He is also ready at any time to disclose some remaining Advantages of this War, as they relate to Commerce, which seem yet not to be noticed by our Superiors, and to recommend them to Practice, and that without any Prospect of Interest, or Hopes of Reward.
THE EVIDENT
Advantages
to GREAT BRITAIN, and its ALLIES, from the
Approaching
WAR.
CHAP. I.
That the first Scheme of the
Spaniards
Designs might be said to have some Weight in them. That the Disappointments they have met with ought to have made them despair, and give over; but that their obstinate pursuing those broken Measures, notwithstanding their Disappointments, makes them appear Ridiculous and Absurd.
WHAT has hitherto been spoken of the Certainty and Necessity of a War, and of its Evident Approach, has been founded upon the Discoveries made by the Enemy themselves, or by the general Knowledge of Things; as the Publick Affairs of
Europe
had an evident Tendency in their Consequences to a Rupture.
What can't be otherwise, must be so.
It is no great Concession in this Argument, for an Author to say he is no Privy-Counsellor, no Secret-Service Man; that he sees only
without Doors,
and judges only from
what is,
to
what may be.
The
Spaniards,
and even the
Imperialists,
(who in this Discourse, and for this Occasion in particular, we call the Enemy) have taken care to act, not as if they design'd the Thing should be a Secret, or that they would amuse the World about it, and that we should be at an Uncertainty in the Question, whether they design'd to make a War of it, or no; they seem rather to be removing all possible Doubts about it from our Thoughts, and making it appear, not that they really intended it, but that it can be no otherwise; that the
Rubicon
was past, the Thing determined, and that it could not be avoided.
This made the former Discourse upon this Subject bear the Title of Evident,
The Evident Approach,
&c. intimating, that the War was Evident and Visible in its Approach, and that they must have some Defect in their Understanding, who made any longer Doubt of it; that the Parties were as they say of Armies, in full March to Engage. Indeed, it seems to cost the
Spaniards
some Pains to obtain a Belief among Mankind, that they were in Earnest; for such Difficulties offered themselves in the Thing it self, to the meanest and most common Observation, that it was not easy to bring People to believe the
Spaniards
Weak enough to be in Earnest, or that they were really entering upon a War (and especially making themselves Aggressors) in which they were as certain to be Losers, as as they were to be Parties; as certain to be beaten, as to fight, and in which indeed it could (by the Nature of Things) be no otherwise.
For this Reason, I must confess it seemed a necessary Piece of Work, to perswade the People to believe the
Spaniards
intended a War, and that therefore That was first to be laid down as a Principle, and rendered as Undeniable as all Principles in Matters of Dispute ought to be; and how could this be done better, than by the concurring Testimony of the Enemy themselves, either declared in plain Words at length, or gathered as the Natural Consequences of all their Actions?
When I say, the Meaning of an Enemy appears from the natural Consequences of their Actions, I must be allowed to argue thus: When I see plainly, that a Man resolves to put such Hardships, such Pieces of Injustice, and such Affronts upon me, as he has good Reason to know I will not and ought not to bear, without the most Scandalous Reproach to my Character, the utmost Damage and Loss to my Interest, and the utmost Danger and Hazard to my Life; and that therefore he knows at the same Time, such Usage of me will force me to resist him, and repel Force with Force; when I see him, I say, acting in such a Manner, I may (without Injury to him) conclude, That in short he designs to Quarrel with me; it is the natural Consequence of the Thing; the Language of his Behaviour speaks it as plain, as if he sent me a Challenge, or defy'd me in Words at length.
Thus in Case of the Conduct of the several Powers we are now speaking of: When we see them Leaguing and Confederating together, forming a Strength of Interests, entering into Secret Engagements, and those Secret Engagements pointed directly and particularly at the Interest of
Great Britain,
at the Person, Honour, and Royal Dignity of his Majesty, as King of
Great Britain
:
It we see them concerting Measures for the somenting Divisions, Feuds, and Factions among the People, and raising Rebellion and Civil War in the Heart of his Majesty's Dominions:
If we see them breaking all Faith and Honour, Pledg'd and Engaged in the most solemn Manner, by espousing that despicable Interest which they had Renounced, and Promised effectually to Abandon and Reject; I mean that of the Pretender, whom they had mutually engag'd not to Assist or Support in any manner whatsoever; and that those Engagements were entered into in such Terms
The Terms of the mutual Engagement between the two Courts of
Vienna
and
Madrid,
are said to be expresly thus:
To Undertake to place the Pretender upon the Throne of
Great Britain.
as could not be broken without a Violation of Honour, in such a Manner, as few Persons of such Dignity, in the World, could ever satisfie themselves to be guilty of:
If we see them, tho' Crowned Heads, tho' Princes, and Christian Princes, stooping so far below the Dignity of Crowned Heads, as to encourage Treason and Rebellion, supporting Subjects in Traiterous Designs against their Sovereign; which Sovereign, both these Crowned Heads had Own'd and Receiv'd in the Quality of Lawful and Rightful; and had Solemnly, and in a particular Manner Engaged, not to disturb in the Possession of his said Lawful and Rightful Government, as above:
The Sixth Article of the Treaty of
Utrecht,
runs thus:
'The Catholick King doth Promise, as well in his own Name, as in that of his Heirs and Successors. That they will not at any Time disturb or molest the QUEEN, her Heirs and Successors of the
Protestant
Line, being in Possession of the Crown of
Great Britain,
and the Dominions Subject thereunto: Neither will the said Catholick King, or any of his Successors, give at any Time any
Aid, Succour, Favour
or
Counsel,
directly, or indirectly, to any Person or Persons, who on any Cause or Pretence, shall hereafter endeavour to Oppose the said Succession, by Open War, or by any Conspiracies, against such Prince and Princes possessing the said Throne of
Great Britain,
as aforesaid.'
If we see them Leaguing and Confederating, for the forming Interests destructive to the Commerce of these Kingdoms; laying open such Branches of Trade as by former Leagues and Conventions were expresly Limited and Restrain'd; Invading the Commerce, which it was expresly Stipulated should not be invaded, and breaking in upon the Property of a Nation, as well as of particular Persons in the said Commerce:
If, I say, these things are evident, and that we know they are such as the Nation of
Great Britain
will not sit down satisfied with, or, as we may justly say, cannot but resent, and that with the utmost Indignation; and that the said Enemy must know they would be so resented; we must conclude them likewise in earnest to quarrel with the People of
Great Britain,
and to begin a War.
It has not therefore been insignificant, in Order to convince the People of
Great Britain,
of the stated and settled Resolutions of the said
Spaniards
and
Imperialists
to insult and affront his Majesty, and to bring about a War in
Europe,
for the carrying those Designs and Resolutions on; I say, it has not been insignificant to those Ends, that Methods have been taken to expose the private, and, as I may call them, Clandestine Methods of the said Confederating Powers, for the encouraging Treason and Rebellion among the King's Subjects, for animating disaffected Parties, and for forming unjustifiable Schemes of Trade, such as must necessarily end in War and Confusion.
To prove that the Enemy resolve to bring the Allies to a Necessity of making War in their own Defence, is to prove that a War will necessarily be the Consequence; and in such Case, if the
Spaniards
resolve to prompt that Necessity, 'tis the
Spaniards
make the War, not the Confederates.
To put things upon us which it is not reasonable we shou'd bear, which no Nation in their Senses can bear, and which they may depend upon his Majesty will not bear, or his Allies either, is indeed to begin the War, or at least to declare the War to be inevitable.
It was not therefore so remote from the Question in hand to say we shou'd go to the King of
Spain,
and to the Emperor, and ask them whether we shall have
War
or
Peace
; it is for them to answer that Question; and their Actions have indeed determin'd it already, they have made the War a thing not only Certain, but, as I say, Inevitable; nay they have begun the War by a secret clandestine Conduct, full of Machinery, full of Secret, and yet Evident Acts of Hostility; and by carrying on such Mines and subterranean Attacks against the
Hanover
Allies, as they might easily know and be sure those Allies would not bear, and such as indeed they ought not to expect wou'd be born with.
In a Word, all the Conduct of the
Hanover
Allies has been Pacific, Healing, and visibly endeavouring to heal and make up the Breaches which have appear'd, and to preserve a good Understanding between the Powers of
Europe
; on the other hand, all the Conduct of the Enemy has been menacing, provoking, and insulting; Clouds big with Thunder, tho' empty of Force;
Brutum fulmen
; Noise without a Bolt; Threats without a Hand to execute; pointing, but not pointed. In a Word, They have breathed War on every Occasion, that if possible they might make it necessary to the Allies to begin it.
It seems they have 'till this time been able to do little more than Urge and Provoke, using all the Methods possible to show their ill Will, except that of Force; which tho' they have been unable to make much use of, they have shown evidently, that they intend all that is or shall be in their Power, to injure and offend the
Hanover
Allies, and his
Britannick
Majesty in particular, that so a War may follow of Course.
Not but that this Consequence may happen much sooner than they will find for their Advantage, and before they may be thoroughly ready for it; yet it might be very needful to ask upon what particular Foundation they, who are in reality so ill able to carry it on, seem so very hasty for bringing it to pass? Whether they have not met with some Disappointments since they begun thus to show themselves, and whether those Disappointments ever made any visible Alterations in their Schemes, or no?
That they have met with some Disappointments, is evident, and that in several Articles. Nothing is more certain than that they had a View of several things, which in their Embrio appear'd probable and encouraging, which they have since found Reason to conclude will not answer their End, and the Deficiency of which renders their Designs far less promising and hopeful than at first. For Example:
1.
'Tis evident,
they had Hopes of obtaining some tolerable Conditions for the Preserving the
East-India
Trade, that is to say, for upholding the
East-India
Company erected at
Ostend
; by which Commerce, the Imperial Court depended upon it, a large Revenue would accrue to the Publick, as does by the like Company to the Governments in
England, Holland
and
France.
2.
'Tis Evident,
they hoped for a mutual Assistance and Communication between the united Powers of
Vienna
and
Madrid,
the one assisting the other with Money, and the other reciprocally supplying Powerful Bodies of Troops to carry on an offensive War. The Imperial Court, I doubt not, depended upon vast Supplies of Money in Specie; at least all the stipulated Sums, which were very great; by which Money the Imperial Armies, great and numerous already, wou'd be still made greater and more powerful, and the War be carry'd on into the Dominions of the
Hanover
Allies to great Advantage.
3.
'Tis Evident,
they hoped to bring off
France
from its Attachment to the Interest of the Allies of
Hanover,
and particularly from its warm Adherence to all such farther Measures as might embarrass the said Courts of
Spain
and
Vienna
in a War with
France
; believing perhaps, that at the worst,
France
would not have come into an offensive Alliance against
Spain,
and have turn'd its Arms against a Branch of the House of
Bourben
; in which also we doubt not they are happily disappointed.
4. It is evident,
Spain
is particularly under a most mortifying Disappointment, in the
British
Squadron blocking up their Plate-Fleet at
Porto-Belo,
and stopping the Returns of those immense Sums of Money which should have been brought to
Europe
by the Galeons and the
Flota
; which had they come safe, had (as they tell us) brought them at one time forty Millions of Pieces of Eight in Specie, which, with the Merchandizes loaded on board those Ships at the same time, amounted to above Ten Millions Sterling; which immense Sum, tho' much the greater Part of it was the Property of their own Subjects, and of the Subjects of the Allies, as Merchants; yet perhaps the King of
Spain
might have thought fit, at such a Juncture as that of a War, to have borrowed some of, or otherwise to have appropriated it to the publick Uses, for the maintaining the Engagements mentioned above; perhaps however making Satisfaction to the Proprietors by some other way▪
I may name several other Heads of Disappointment in the first Views which the
Spaniards
had of these things, in their Order, and which had they foreseen, they would perhaps have acted something more warily than they have done, and so have given less Umbrage to the Allies, or at least stopp'd their Hands, 'till they had gotten the Money, upon which all the Rest so much depended, into their Hands.
But I must note as I go, that here they have been overshot in their own Bow: Here the Allies have been too old for them: And now it seems they are going on without their Crutches, walking without their Legs, and in a word, making the War without the Money. I return to the Disappointments.
It is evident, besides all this, that the
Spaniards
met with a very great Disappointment in the
Baltick,
where we are pretty well assured they promised themselves great Assistance; and from whence we are told they expected a Supply of Naval Strength; which Supply they found as effectually lock'd up in the Port of
Revel,
as they did the Money (that was to pay for it) in the Haven of
Porto-Belo.
The
Muscovites
could no more part with their Ships, or cause a Squadron of Men of War to sail without Money, than the
Imperialists
could cause their Armies to march without the same Supply; and if they (the
Spaniards
) expected it otherwise, if they expected fifteen Sail of
Russian
Men of War would come to their Assistance without Money, they were much mistaken, and acted more like F
s than the
Spaniards
generally used to do.
Nor is it less wonderful to me, that the
Spaniards,
who used to act in former Days with such consummate Wisdom, and by such impenetrable Councils, that it was said of
Don Lewis de Haro,
he obey'd the Scripture in his Politicks, whatever he did in his Alms, and that he did not
let his right Hand know
what
his left Hand did
; that these very wary circumspect
Spaniards
should let so much of their secret Service come to light, and act in such an unwary and impolitick Manner, as to have their Measures be talk'd publickly of, in the ordinary Conversation at
Petersburgh,
as I have been inform'd has been the Case.
Nothing can excuse the Folly of it, in my Opinion, unless I shall with some People suggest, that the Improbability of their Schemes and Chimeras being Successful, should argue they were not at all in earnest about them: But this has so much of the
Jacobite
in it, and so little of the Politician, that I think 'tis scarce worth repeating; 'tis much more certain, that the locking up the
Muscovite
Fleet was an inexpressible Disappointment to the
Spaniards
; and that it could not have been, if their Expectations of Help from that
Russian
Fleet had not been very great.
It is true, under all these Disappointments, and more which I shall speak of presently, it might have been expected the
Spaniards
and the
Imperialists,
notwithstanding their Confederacy, should have laid aside the Design it self, and should have carried on the Project no farther; and indeed, this gave Occasion to my calling the Design in general absurd and ridiculous, supposing the
Spaniards
could not be so weak as to go on with it, and that if they were in Earnest before, they could not be so now.
But since it is so, that the
Spaniards,
or the
Imperialists,
think themselves still able to carry on their Designs, and that they are not sufficiently discourag'd by their Disappointments, let us then turn the Tables as they do, and talk seriously of it as a thing really intended. And here, as I said before, tho' the
Spaniards
are not so Considerable as to fright us, I hope we may allow that they are not so Inconsiderable as not to awaken us. They are certainly strong enough to justifie our Preparations, tho' not so strong as to fill us with Apprehensions.
Hence all the Precautions which have been made use of by our Government, and by his Majesty's particular Direction, have been not justified only, but are to be esteem'd as Effects of the most wise and successful Councils imaginable; a Prudence that has had something more than common in it, and which has been the Foundation of all those (happy) Disappointments to the Enemy:
Happy Disappointments
I say to us, Unhappy enough to them, and which at this time may be said to compleat the History of the Conduct and Success of the
Vienna Alliance.
These Precautions and Provisions, at the same time that they have disappointed the Executions of the
Spaniards
Design, have also made the carrying it on farther, absurd and foolish; have really turn'd the Tables upon the Enemy, and made their too-well-concerted Schemes become ridiculous; the Measures which, as first proposed among themselves, appear'd rational and probable, agreeable to a wise and prudent Nation, and to the Counsel of able Statesmen and Ministers, are by these Means become scandalously vain and imprudent; and we may bless the Precaution, I say, at the same time that we make a Jest of the
Spaniards
Obstinacy, in carrying on these Designs, after they were so render'd ridiculous.
To justifie this Argument, let us return to the first Scheme; let us examine the first Prospects upon which they were form'd, the Foundation upon which the
Spaniards
and the House of
Austria
united, and upon which the Treaty of
Vienna
was made; and in doing this, we shall not perhaps find the
Spaniards
such weak People as they seem to be now: We shall find, that 'tis rather their obstinate persisting in their Pursuit of a blasted Undertaking that renders them ridiculous, than any Absurdity or incongruous Acting in the first Scheme, or in the Foundation those Schemes were built upon.
Had the
Spaniards
(close in their Councils, and prudent in their Conduct) kept their Affairs within the Compass of their own Cabinet, as they formerly used to do, and secured the Secret in their own Breasts; Had they been so far the Masters of their own Schemes, as to have secur'd the Supports and Supplies they wanted, so that they could neither have been kept from a Squadron by blocking up
Revel,
or from the Galeons by blocking up
Porto-Belo
;
Had they first receiv'd the Support of fifteen Men of War, which is said to be the Number they expected from the
Czarina,
and the Supply of forty Millions of Pieces of Eight from
Porto-Belo
; had they brought in the King of
Sardinia,
and the King of
Sweden,
and the King of
Poland,
and the King of
and several other Princes and Powers into the
Vienna
Treaty, as I make no doubt they at first expected, and as they indeed at first reported;
Had they brought his most Christian Majesty, and the
States-General
to a Neutrality, as they say they have obtain'd of the King of
Portugal,
and the Duke of
Lorrain,
and as I doubt not they earnestly endeavour'd with the two first:
In a word, had all these Points been gain'd, and had they met with none of the other Disappointments already mention'd, I most readily grant they had form'd a Body of Power truly terrible and formidable to the Protestant Interest; and we had had more Reason (much more Reason) to be alarm'd, and indeed frighted with the Apprehensions of what might have been the Consequence of these things, than I hope we have had yet, or are like to have now.
Not but even with all those I should still say, and hope it would appear, that the Naval Strength of
Great Britain
might, under Providence, have been our Protection against them all.
But they have been disappointed in almost every Part. Even the
Venetians
themselves, tho' a State under infinite Obligations to the House of
Austria,
and to the Crown of
Spain,
ever since the Battel of
Lepanto,
yet so ill have they manag'd, that we do not find they have been able to bring that wise People to espouse their Cause, or so much as to promise a Neutrality, or to act as Auxiliars, by Land or by Sea.
This Consideration however may serve to give us the useful Reflection mention'd above; (
viz.
) How Just have been the Cautions, and how Prudent have been the Measures taken on this Side, (be it by who you will) to dive into these Secrets, to detect these Contrivances! and, which is still more, how Successful, happily Successful the Discovery! How many Ways has it been advantageous, and particularly how useful, in having given time for the Preparations of the
Hanover
Allies; nay, for the forming the Treaty it self; and in having opened the Eyes of other Powers, and bringing Them into it, who seem'd doubtful whether they should accede or no!
Again; Of what Use has the preventing those things been to us! that from such a formidable Appearance, from such a deep-laid Design, that was capable of being made thus terrible, they should be brought to so despicable, and truly concontemptible a Figure, that 'tis hardly reasonable to talk of them at the same Time, or hardly think of them in the same Class, or under the same Rank.
Had not his Majesty's penetrating Councils evidently reach'd to the Bottom of all their Designs, gotten the Knowledge of their Schemes, and div'd into the Depth of all their most considerable Projects, None of all these preventive Measures had been taken, none of these preventive Medicines had been made use of; the several mischievous Things which they had concluded on, had not been calmly countermin'd and unhing'd, or the Contrivers of them been so effectually detected and disappointed, as now they are.
I am far therefore from saying, or suggesting, that the Designs and Schemes of those Powers had not been capable of great Attempts; that the Naval Power of
Spain
and
Muscovy
join'd, might not have been sufficient to have brought the Pretender upon the Stage in some Part or other, or at least to have given him some Expectations, and have put him, and his easily deluded Party, in hopes of great things to be done for him that Way: Or that the numerous Armies of the
Muscovites,
and the King of
Spain,
united, with such Allies too as are mentioned, might not have been able to have given us great Uneasiness, and to have even endanger'd the Safety of all the Protestant Interests of
Europe,
as well as of these united Kingdoms of
Great Britain.
As then I grant the Danger to have been
thus Great,
had they gone on uninterrupted; I must allow also, that the Discovery having been thus happy, it behoves us to keep the Hold that is gain'd, to preserve the Advantages of the Discovery, to keep the separated Powers in the same state of Separation; to keep up the engag'd Powers to their Engagements, and by all lawful means to preserve the Consederacy of the several Nations that are thus confederated; to cultivate the Union that they are now brought to, and if possible to encrease it; This I think is the only way to preserve our Religion and Liberties, our Superiority of Power, and also our Commerce, in the Condition it stands in at this Time.
Heav'ns be prais'd! the Snare is laid open; the Enchantment is broken; the Plot for the cementing the Powers proposed is discovered: No Application can be too Great, no Charge or Expence ought to be spar'd to keep it where it is: and therefore all that his Majesty has recommended to the Two Houses of Parliament, for their engaging themselves vigorously in their own Defence, is of sufficient Weight on that Side: Nor can any one object that the utmost Application ought not to be used, to render all those Attempts as Abortive, as I think they are now become Ridiculous.
To do this, the proper Steps are taken indeed; the Money is lock'd up, and the Ships are lock'd in; the
Spaniards
are disappointed, and nothing remains but so to double and redouble the same Efforts, as to make those Lockings-up more effectual, and to take from the King of
Spain
all Hopes of removing those Obstructions.
I am told, while these Sheets were writing, that I write too much with an Air of Contempt, when I mention the
Spanish
Affairs; as if a Squadron of Ships at
Porto-Belo
could effectually stop the whole Channel of Silver, and that not a Ship could escape us, that nothing could pass from
America
to old
Spain
without our Leave; and that we are as sure of intercepting all the Ships that shall stir out, as if we had them in Tow.
But the Objector is mistaken: I no where suggest that the King of
Spain
shall be able to bring no Money home, that we shall stop it all, so that nothing shall go by us: But I may venture to say, the
British
Squadrons, if well posted, and if the Commanders do their Duty, will so narrowly watch the
Spaniards,
that they must run great Hazards, if they attempt to come away with any great Quantity; and that such Hazards, as I am perswaded the
Spaniards
will not think fit to venture their Treasure upon it.
Perhaps it may not be possible so effectually to shut up all the Ports which the
Spaniards
possess on the Coast of
America,
or so effectually to ply
off
and
on
upon all the Coast of Old
Spain,
as that no Ship, not one Ship, shall be able to slip out on the one hand, or find its way in on the other, without falling into our Hands, or into some of the Hands of those that would be willing to snap and lay hold on them; and I could fruitfully employ some Pages here to show how and which way such things might probably be done, and might more probably be prevented.
But as, in the first place, our Governors do not seem to want Directions for the preventing it; so, on the other hand, I am not
Spaniards
enough to show the Enemy, if they stood in more need of it than they do, how to defeat the Measures taken by
Great Britain,
to meet with and surprise them.
But to go on. I may grant, that it is not probable the Confederate Fleets or Squadrons, however Vigilant, or how diligently soever they may guard the Coast, and spread the Seas, either on one side or the other, should ever be able to surprise the
Spaniards
so effectually, that not one Ship should be able to come safe in.
The Sea is a wide Place, and it must be very well spread to secure every Ship, and lie upon every Point of the Compass, so that nothing should be able to go by: We see here that notwithstanding Admiral
Hosier
's Squadron on the Coast of the
Isthmus,
and notwithstanding Admiral
Hopson
is cruising off of the Southward
Cape
; yet Fame tells us, that three or four Ships have found their way into the Ports of
Spain
; and coming by such different Courses as they have done, it is not at all strange that they should: It is true, we are told they bring no Silver, at least, none that we know of; and had they been all deeply loaden with Silver, it might have been the same thing, and no Body to blame neither.
On the other hand, we must have exceeding bad Luck indeed, and such as we have no reason to expect, considering the Numbers of our Ships, and the Vigilance and expert Knowledge of our Seamen, if they shou'd go all safe, and none of them shou'd fall into our Hands; in which Case I must add, that the
Spaniards
Treasure comes in such good round Lumps, and such merry Sums together, that if it shou'd be but
now and then
that a Galeon shou'd fall into our Hands, it would make the Fortune of the War go smilingly forward on our Side; a few such Prizes might make good a Summer's Service, and help the Government to carry on the War.
How often do we find the Loading of but one Ship amount to four, five or six Millions of Pieces of Eight; and if we shou'd chance to make such a Ship or two find their way up to
Woolwich
in a Year, or to' deliver her Loading at
Towerwharf,
it would go a great way towards carrying on the War, and would be a much better way of raising Money, than four Shillings in the Pound upon Land.
This very Consideration will no doubt exceedingly weigh with the
Spaniards
in that particular Case,
viz.
as to venturing out with their Silver; I mean not the Loss only to themselves, tho' that would be very considerable; (and the Discouragement and Damage to them in case of such a Loss, is not easily describ'd:) But the Encouragement it wou'd be to their Enemies. The Loss to themselves would be inexpressibly great; especially as they have no other Source of Wealth, no other Fund of Treasure; all the Produce of their own Dominions is able to do little for them, compar'd to this; and if either the Galeons are kept entirely back, or shou'd miscarry in coming forward, and fall into the Hands of the
Hanover
Allies, we may, without affronting the
Spaniards,
say they will be but in a sorry Condition to carry on the War, and to support their new-bought Friends.
But that is not all: The Triumph of their Enemies over them, shou'd the Money fall into the Hands of the
Hanover
Allies, would be infinitely a greater Mortification to
Spain,
as well to their Pride as their Power, than the Loss of the Money; for this wou'd be enabling the said Allies to carry on a War against
Spain
at the
Spaniards
Expence; and this I make no question they shall do, though they shou'd not take the Treasure at Sea at all. But of that by it self.
In the mean time we need not fear but we shall catch some by the way, though it may not come all to Hand: As I said above, we must have very bad Luck indeed if none of their Ships fall in our way; and if any are taken, they are generally worth bringing home.
The Probability of this is one of the Reasons on which it has been so openly said, that
England
may Gain by a War with
France,
but never Loses by a War with
Spain
; of which we shall have room to say more from a particular Enquiry into our
English
History, where (unless upon taking a
Spanish Flota,
a
Vigo
Account shou'd be given of it, (
viz.
) where much shou'd be lost, and but little gain'd,) we might find large Sums have been brought into
England,
taken from the
Spaniards
on all Occasions of a War; as particularly at the taking of
Cadiz
by the
English
and
Dutch,
when it was said that besides the publick Gain upon redeeming the City, and other Articles; all the Officers and Soldiers got not enough only, but enough to make them rich. But of this again in its Place.
In the mean time, though the Prizes we might take should be but few, yet 'tis not unlikely we may have some Share of Booty in such a War, as well private as publick; such as may amount to another Disappointment to
Spain,
and that, such a Disappointment as
Spain
will not easily recover, and of which they may have time enough to repent. And this brings me most naturally to the chief Design of this Work, (
viz.
) the Advantages
Spain
is likely to make of this War which they are so forward to engage in: or, to speak plain, the Advantages the
Hanover
Allies are likely to make of it. In our Enquiry after which, it may be determin'd by the most ordinary Judgment, whether I have pass'd a wrong Censure in saying that the Conduct of the
Spaniards
is absurd and ridiculous, or no.
CHAP. II.
Of the Advantages which offer by this War to the
Hanover
Allies, and to
Great Britain
in particular, as they relate to the Trade of the
Spanish West-Indies.
THE Necessity of a War has been spoken to. The Conduct of our Enemies, however ridiculous, as well as the Conduct of
Great Britain,
however deliberate, concur to make that Necessity evident.
Let the
Spaniards
go on,
(as the Clarks say to a Prisoner who they know will be hang'd,)
God send them a good Deliverance.
How backward have the
Hanover
Allies been to quarrel? How have they been so far from seeking Occasions, that they have even refus'd to take Occasion when offer'd?
How reluctant have the
British
Court been in drawing the Sword? how willing to prevent the feeble Enemy from blust'ring with theirs?
What Pacific Measures have they all along pursu'd? what Opportunities of offending have they pass'd over? nay, what needful Defendings have they seem'd to omit? Let us see a little into the Nature of all these things.
Whether has the Backwardness of the Allies to a War been occasion'd by their Fear of the formidable Power of the Enemy? or, Has it been from a full Persuasion that the Enemy having no Advantages in view from the War could not be in earnest, in all or in any thing they have said or done about it,
or at least would remain so but a very little while
?
As nothing they have said about War has been rational, so nothing they have done towards a War hitherto seems to have been founded in Reason.
No Man fights meerly because he Hates, but because he Hopes. Defensive War is entred into by Force and Necessity, but it is too with Hopes of being able to defend, able to repell the Force they fear.
But Offensive War is founded on a firm Belief of Victory and Hope of Conquest; it can stand upon no other Bottom; and therefore in old Times, entring into War was usually call'd an Act
of Faith,
rather than
of Hope,
being an Opinion, nay a Confidence, of Success; either trusting
in Heaven
for it from the Justice of the Cause, or in themselves from the Strength of their Arms.
But here's a War to be undertaken, with neither Faith in Heaven, or Hope on Earth: Neither a View of Defending, or Hope of Offending. How the Heroes of
Spain
will come off with the Credit of their Understanding, That we see nothing of;
Time must discover it.
Since then we cannot see any Gain the
Spaniards
can make of the War, nor any Loss we can sustain by it; let us see what are like to be the Consequences of it, one way or other. 1. If the
Spaniards
are not like to Gain, let us enquire, What they are like to Lose by it; for War is a Game in which the Parties seldom draw Stakes, they generally gain much, or lose much. 2. Since the Allies cannot (with any manner of Reason) apprehend much Loss by the War, let us see what Gain may be made by it
on their Side.
The Learned in Politicks have an ancient Way of Talking (as old as Queen
Elizabeth
) about
England
's making War, which (with a little Amendment) reads thus: ENGLAND
may Gain by a War with
France,
but never Loses by a War with
SPAIN.
'Tis my stated Opinion (speaking without National Prejudice) that
England
is so far from being in Danger by a War with
Spain,
that it would be no Loss to us if we never had any Peace with them; and I believe we have much more to say for a continued War with
Spain,
than the
Spaniards
have for a continued War with the
Turks
and
Moors.
'Tis plain (as the
Spaniards
themselves say) they have carried on the War in
Africk,
these Eighty Years past, without Fighting, and a Commerce these Hundred Years, without Trading. The
Moors
have indeed besieged
Ceuta
(after their way) for above Forty Years; but the
Spaniards
say, that by the Commissary's Account of Ammunition, the Garrison of
Cadiz
have spent more Powder at the Puntals there in Salutes, than the Garrison of
Ceuta
have spent in Defending themselves, during all the Siege; the late particular Expedition of the Marquis
de Lede
excepted, which was but short.
This Resolution of
Spain,
never to enter into any Treaty with the
Moors,
has been derived from one or both of these two following simple Causes: 1. A religious, rigid Separation, and fiery Zeal against
Paganism,
and against
Mahomet
; resolving that the true Catholick Church should have no Commerce, no Peace, no Communication with the Enemies of
Christ
; the same futious Zeal which they have likewise carried on against the
Jews.
Or, 2. and which I take to be the truer and more rational Account of it, A haughty Insolence, founded on the cruel Animosity of that War, which for so many Years was carried on against the
Moors
in
Spain,
'till their utter Extirpation; in which War they gave no Quarter, took no Prisoners, not would admit even the Remains of those People (tho' willing to become their Subjects) so much as to live among them.
Unhappy Pride! How many Nations, as well as private People, has it struck blind, and cover'd their Eyes from their own Felicities? The
Spaniards
could carry on no Trade in the World more to their own Advantage, than that with the
Moors of Africa,
and yet they won't trade with them, either from a Civil Pride, that they will only make Slaves of them, or from a Religious Pride, that they will not converse with Infidels.
Trade knows no Religions, no Sects, no Parties, no Divisions. We may ('tis hoped) be as zealous to hate God's Enemies, as the
Spaniards
; and yet we trade with the
Turks,
Jews, Mahometans, Moors,
or Pagan
Negroes
; and deal with the Idolaters of
China
and
Malabar,
as well as with the Native Savages and
Cannibals
of
Virginia
and the
Carribees.
There's no Idolatry in Commerce; if the
Spaniards
reject the gainful Trade of
Africa,
on Pretence of Sanctity and Religion, Is that a Religious Separation? I say, No: 'Tis not because they are Wiser or Better, but because they are
Spaniards,
that is to say, eaten up with Pride, Self-Opinion and Haughtiness.
That the
Spaniards
might trade with the
Moors
to great Advantage, is evident, in that the little Trade they have to
Africa
(and which they may be said to have with the Place, not with the People) is very much to their Gain, and would be much more so, if they extended it as they might do. But they trade with the
English
and
French
Merchants residing in
Africa,
not with the
Moors
; and rather buy the Goods they demand there, at second and third Hand, than take them directly of the
Moors
; so they give away their Profit of the Trade to the
European
Nations, to gratify the Aversion they have to the People.
It is an undoubted Maxim in Trade,
That we ought to Trade with every Nation, and with every People that we can get Money by.
This the
Spaniards
are so far from pursuing, that they will not deal with the
Moors,
even for the Things which in Commerce they may be said to be in Distress for, only because they won't deal with them.
In the utmost Distress which the
Spaniards
are sometimes in for want of Corn, how do they chuse to send to
England,
to
Holland,
to the
Levant,
or indeed any where for Corn, rather than to
Africa,
rather than deal with the
Barbarians,
tho' the
Barbary
Coast sometimes has a great Plenty, and tho' they give two Dollars
per
Bushel for the Corn, which they could buy there for
3s.
or thereabouts, and sometimes for much less.
In their rejecting now the Manufactures of
Europe,
how easy would it be to supply themselves with a Quantity of Wool from
Barbary,
which, with a small Application, would mix and work up with the
Spanish
Wool, and make all the several Manufactures of
England
to Perfection, and to the infinite Advantage of
Spain
it self: But, forsooth, they must not Buy or Sell with the
Mahometans
and Enemies of Christ; tho' Himself gave them a quite different Example, accepting of a Draught of cold Water from the
Samaritan,
with whom the
Jews
(
Spaniard-like
) had no Dealings.
But (contrary to the Beneficent, Humble, and Gracious Example of Christ himself) the proud
Spaniards
(pretending Religion) throw away their Commerce, scorn the Blessings of an advantageous Trade, and rather maintain a constant unreconciled National Feud, a foolish, faint, and unactive War; refusing to trade with the
Moors,
and carrying on neither Peace or War.
As this Case stands with
Spain
and the
Barbary
Shore, the Former is infinitely to blame, and may be said to act ridiculously, because, as above (speaking in the Language of Merchants) every Body should be Traded with that you can gain by. No Nation willingly interrupt their own Commerce, or refuse to let their Subjects trade with such other Nations as they can gain by. For a Trading Nation to Prohibit the Importation of such Goods as they want, is like Prohibiting the bringing in Corn in a Famine, or Prohibiting Arms and Ammunition in a War. When the War was hottest between
England
and
France,
and the
French
King prohibited almost all the rest of our
English
Goods, forbidding, upon the severest Penalties, the bringing any of those Goods into any Part of his Dominions, it was observable however that they always excepted
Wool, Leather,
and
Lead
; these were never Prohibited; the Reason was plain, they had none, or but very little of their own, and very much wanted them all; nor could they be supplyed (at least not sufficiently) from any other Place.
Now the
Spaniards
act by none of these Prudentials, for they refuse to Trade with the
Moors,
or Merchants of
Africa,
though they might gain very considerably by it. The
Africans
have Corn, Copper, Wax, Wool, all which the
Spaniards
extremely want, and yet will not buy, because (forsooth) they don't like the
Moors
worshipping
Mahomet
; as if Religion had any thing to do with Commerce, and as if the Bread made of
African
Corn, would infect their People with Idolatry.
Now I alledge, and insist upon it, That in a constant State of War between
England
and
Spain,
the Case would be quite otherwise, for here would be War without Prohibition; as in their Management with the
Moors,
they have Prohibition without War. I explain my self thus:
As we Trade with
Spain,
the State of Things lies so much to the Advantage of
Spain,
that tho' the most violent War that it is possible to imagine was to be carried on between the Nations, the
Spaniards
(that is to say, the Merchants) would endeavour with the utmost Art to carry on the Trade, notwithstanding the strictest Prohibitions: The Reason is plain;
They would Trade, because they gain by the Trade; the Trade to
Great-Britain
takes off the Growth and Produce, which they are ruin'd if they do not Sell, and supplies them with Necessaries which they are ruin'd if they cannot Buy: In a word, they have no Commerce without us; their whole Export is stagnated; their Fruits (their Wines, and their Oyl) would rot upon the Trees, and not be worth gathering; their Lands lye uncultivated, and no Hands be employ'd; the Poor would starve, and the Rich be beggar'd and undone: In short, we buy nothing of
Spain,
but what we can very well be without, and the
Spaniards
take nothing of us, but what they extremely want.
On the other Hand, take the Alternative in the Commerce; what the
English
buy in
Spain,
as it is the Growth and Produce of the Country, 'tis essential to the
Spaniards
to have those Goods taken off their Hands, and by the
English
too in particular; the Reason is, because if the
English
do not take them off, no other Nation can do it.
For Example
:
The Growth and Product of
Spain
consists (so far as it regards Trade) of Wines, that is to say,
Sherry, Alicant, Tent,
Mountain-Malaga
;
Galitia
and
Viana
Reds;
Barcelona
and
Bene Carlo
Reds, and
Canary
Whites;
Barcelonian
Brandy,
&c.
also Fruits, such as
Malaga
and
Alicant
Raisins, Oranges, Limons, Almonds: besides
Spanish
Wool,
Spanish
Iron, and lastly, Oil and Soap.
These Things being the Growth of
Spain,
the
English
buy in very great Quantities; if they are not bought off,
Spain,
as to the Trade of it, is ruin'd and undone: whereas if
England
bought none of those Goods from
Spain,
they could either do without them (for neither Wine, or Brandy, or Raisins, or Oranges, or Lemons, are so necessary to Life, or to Trade, as that we cannot, as to the most of them, live without them) or as to Trade, have them somewhere else.
So that upon the whole, there is no absolute Necessity on our Side, to have the Growth of
Spain
; but there is a Necessity on the Side of
Spain
to be Traded with, so as to have their Goods taken off.
It is true, the taking off the
British
Manufacture by the
Spaniards,
is very much the Advantage of
Great Britain
; but all that is Advantageous is not Necessary: We are able to subsist in Trade, without the Profits of our Manufactures, better than the
Spaniards
are able to subsist in Life, without the Use of them. Nor is that all; for let the King of
Spain
pass what Negatives and Prohibitions he pleases, the Necessity of those Manufactures will make their own Way, and the People must wear them, or wear nothing at all, for they have no equivalent Manufacture to place in the room of them; and if they have them not from
England,
they will have them from
Portugal,
from
Italy,
or from other Places, as has been the Case in all the Wars which have happened between
England
and
Spain,
in which Commerce has been Prohibited.
But the Weight does not lye in this Part. The
Spaniards
may Prohibit Trade with
England
when they please, they will punish themselves infinitely more than
England.
But take the Trade of
America
into the Consideration, and truly there let the
Spaniards
have a Care what they do: Let them take heed, lest instead of Prohibiting their People Trading with us, that is, with
England
; I say, let them take heed that we (
England
) do not Prohibit their Trade with one another, and among themselves.
By Prohibiting the Trade among themselves, and with one another, I mean (for it requires Explanation) that it is in the Power of
England
(in consequence of this War, and by the Means of it) entirely to Interrupt, nay, to Stop the Commerce between
America
and
Old Spain
: And thus I am come to my Text, namely, to enquire into what the Allies may gain by this War: How it may be carried on by the
English
or
British
Nation, in such a Manner, as that Old
Spain
should never more have any Commerce with
America
; that is to say, not
Exclusively,
that they should no more call it their own Trade, but the
Spaniards
in
America
shall be entirely set free, as to Trade; shall be Independent of Old
Spain
; receive no Laws or Limitations from them; but be at full Liberty to Trade with all the World, if they please; or if we please, rather; for it would be meet to insist upon some Limitation on our Side too.
Nor do I concern the Civil Government of
New Spain,
in any Part of this Provision;
England
(or
Great-Britain
) seeks no Conquests; all they covet is to establish Peace, and extend Trade, and this we seem to have fairly before us in the approaching War. If the
Spaniards
cannot see the Fate that attends them in it (as it seems to me they do not) they must go on, and venture the Consequences; the thing is plain to me, they run the Hazard of losing all the Sovereignty of their Trade in
America,
by a War.
They may keep the Sovereignty of the Country, if they please, or if they can; that is, if the Natives will submit to it: but they would soon have no Commerce to it, no Communication with it, other than in common with the rest of
Europe.
This, I say,
England
will have it in their Power to limit and restrain; that is, it shall be in the Power of
England
to take off all the Restraints and Limitations of Trade, which the
Spaniards
have imposed, and do now impose upon the
Americans,
and upon their own People there, and lay the Trade open to the whole World; holding the Hands of the
Spanish
Government so, that they should have no Power to impose any Terms of Commerce upon them in
America,
any more.
This is explaining my self fully, as to the General Head of Commerce; and as that Commerce is now Stated by the
Spanish
Government, between their Colonies in
America,
and Old
Spain,
or indeed all the rest of
Europe.
It is observable, that the State of the Trade between Old and New
Spain,
stands thus: The
Spaniards
having Planted
Mexico,
and
Peru,
and all the vast Country between, in the Nature of a Colony; conquered, or extirpated the Natives, and taken Possession of the Country as their own; in consequence of this Right, they give Laws of Commerce to the Inhabitants, as well Natives, as
Spaniards
settled there; these Laws (like our Act of Navigation) are made up briefly thus,
viz.
That the
Spanish
Colonies in
America
should drive no Trade, or in any manner Correspond or Negotiate with any Nation of
Europe,
Directly, or Indirectly, but by the Licentiate, or Allowance of the
Consulade
at
Seville,
that is to say, the Chamber of the
Contractration
at
Seville,
and by their Order; and in such
Spanish
Ships, and no other, as shall be Licensed in the same
Consulade,
or Council of Trade: which, by the way, is call'd a Royal
Council of Commerce,
and so it is the License of the King.
This
Council of Commerce
not only limits what Ships shall go out, but the Persons who shall be allowed to go over in those Ships, and all the Cargoes or Quantities of Goods that they shall carry with them, and the Returns made for them; which are all Registred in their Books: They have also other particular Powers and Limitations, which the
Spanish
Trade is bound to submit to; but I am now upon Generals only, I shall come farther into the Particulars presently.
As
America
is to Old
Spain
what we properly call a conquer'd Country, so they (even the
Spaniards
that are settled there) are Govern'd in an Arbitrary Way, as a conquered Nation, and that notwithstanding their being Subjects of Old
Spain.
Under the weight of this Arbitrary Government, they submit to this among the rest, That no Ships are allowed to come into any of their Ports from any Place in the World, except from Old
Spain,
or by
Assiento
from Old
Spain,
as above, or some Place or other limited in the first Establishment of Old
Spain
; that is to say, from
Guinea,
or any Part of the Coast of
Africa,
they may come loaden by the said
Assiento
with
Negroes,
and with them only.
From the
Canary
Islands they may go so far as the
Havana,
carrying no other Goods but Wines and Pipe-staves, the Growth of that Island; and even of that, the Quantity is limited, as well as the Ships.
Thus the whole
Spanish
Interest is brought under one Head of Universal Commerce, and is call'd the Trade of New
Spain,
or
America
; and is strictly confined, limited, and restrained to Old
Spain
in particular, as is mentioned above; and the
Spaniards
in
America,
and the
Spaniards
in Old
Spain,
or New
Spain,
have no Commerce, or Liberty of Commerce one with another, but by the License of their Government.
Now there remains a Question or two fit for the Government of Old
Spain
to answer, rather than an
English
Author; but which if they cannot answer to their own Satisfaction, it will be yet harder for them to answer another Grand Question which follows it. The first Questions are,
1. Are the People of New
Spain
(whether Natives, that is
Indians,
or natural
Spaniards
) compleatly easy and satisfied with those Limitations? And would they not shake them off if it lay in their Power?
2. Are the Government and People of Old
Spain
able to keep fast those Bolts and Bars by which the Trade is limited, and prevent the People of New
Spain
trading with the
Europeans,
in case of a War?
Then the Grand Question follows,
viz.
How are the
Spaniards
sure, that if the Inhabitants of
America
shall at any time come into a free Trade with
Europe,
by the Means of a War, they will ever be brought to quit that Commerce again, having tasted the Sweets of it, especially if they in Old
Spain
cannot force them to it?
These Questions, rightly inquir'd into, will let the
Spaniards
see (if their Eyes are not closed) upon what precarious Terms and Conditions their Tenure of the
American
Trade stands, and how soon they may irrecoverably lose it, if they put the Powers of
Europe
upon a Necessity of Humbling their Insolence by a War. I shall speak more particularly to it in its Place.
CHAP. III.
The State of the
Spanish
Trade in
America.
How tho' it is the Property of
Spain,
yet it depends upon the Justice and Friendship of the rest of the Powers of
Europe.
How those Powers (if they think fit to withdraw that Friendship, or are provok'd to do themselves Justice upon the
Spaniards
in
Europe
) are able to lay open the Trade to New
Spain
at one Blow, and never suffer it to return to its former Channel.
IN almost all the Treaties which the
Spaniards
have made with the rest of the Powers of
Europe,
whether Treaties of Peace, or of Commerce, they have always (from a Sense of their own Weakness in this particular Case) taken care to Guarrantee their
American
Commerce, by Negative Clauses; wherein the said Nations and Powers have generally consented, Not to Interfere in the said Trade, that is to say, Not to suffer, or at least not to authorize, their Subjects to carry on any Trade immediately to New
Spain
; contenting themselves with carrying on the said Commerce, or such Share of it as their Subjects respectively carried on, in the ordinary Channel, and that the
Spaniards
should enjoy the said Trade in Property as their own.
It is needless to look back to the several Clauses in the Treaties with
Spain
and other Nations, for the Confirmation of this Article; 'tis enough that it is particularly Stipulated in the several Treaties between
England
and
Spain,
and confirm'd by subsequent Treaties since that of 1670: Which I mention here, not to enquire how well those Treaties have been observ'd, either on one Side or other; (tho' it may not be improper to speak of that also in its Place) but I mention it here, I say, to let it be seen how sensible
Spain
has always been of its own Weakness and Inability to preserve that Commerce, notwithstanding all the Right they may claim to it, without the voluntary Consent of the
European
Powers stipulating to yield and give it up, as above.
It is not thus with our Possessions in
America
; the
English,
and even the
French
also, have indeed the same exclusive Right to the sole Trade of their own Colonies in
America,
as the
Spaniards
claim to these of New
Spain
; and they have Laws likewise respectively enacted, such as the Act of Navigation in particular, binding their Subjects to such particular Restraints and Limitations of Commerce, as are proper to secure the Property and Sovereignty of those Trades to the respective Powers whose Subjects they are.
But the
English
and
French,
secure in their own Strength, and always believing themselves able to support and defend their own Right, have trusted to that Strength for their Defence; not at all seeking the Guarantee or Protection of any other Powers, for the Security of their Trade.
The first Inference I draw from these Premises, is, that a War breaking out, supposing that Part to be certain, and especially the
Spaniards
becoming Aggressors, and beginning that War, the Powers with whom such a War is begun are then evidently discharg'd from all the former Obligations of those Treaties; their Subjects become from that Moment free from all the stipulated Engagements and Restraints relating to that Trade; our Ships may then as freely trade to the Ports of New
Spain,
as they may to any other Part of the World: I mean freely, with respect to any Restraint to be laid upon them from their own Respective Sovereigns; as to the
Spaniards,
they must do as well as they can; if their Ships of War attack our Merchants, that's allowed to be but fair, and we must bear it as well as we can; but if their People will come off to our Ships or Sloops, and buy or sell, that can be no Breach on our Side; for the War is begun already, and all Obligations to limit that Commerce ceases.
The Argument is Short, and to the Purpose; the
Spaniards
may indeed punish their own
American
Subjects as they please, and treat them as Traytors for entring into this Commerce, as it is contraband and prohibited by their own Laws, which Laws are binding to their own Subjects.
But the Allies are, by vertue of the War mutually declar'd against
Spain,
and by
Spain
against them, effectually, and
ipso Facto,
discharg'd from all Limitations of former Treaties forbidding this Commerce: And I take the more Notice of it, because 'tis to be hoped the said Allies, especially the Powers of
Great Britain
and the
States-General,
will consider very well of it, at any subsequent Treaty, before they consent again to limit their own Subjects from a Commerce, which is so many ways advantageous to them.
What Reason have trading Nations to tye themselves down to the arbitrary Laws of Commerce, which the
Spaniards
may think fit tyrannically to impose upon their own People? 'Tis enough that they refuse to admit any of the Protestant Nations of
Europe
so much as to set foot among them, much less to trade and live among them; a Liberty which we no where deny to the
Spaniards.
I say, 'tis enough to be thus excluded from residing among them; but if their own People,
at whatever Hazard,
are content to trade with us, I cannot see why we should pay so much Veneration to their Government, and their Arbitrary Laws, as to tye down the Merchants from a fair Correspondence and Commerce together.
Let Trade take its Course; let Exchange of Goods and Money take its due Course, and be uninterrupted on all Sides; let the
Spaniards
and the Ally'd Powers come to a good Understanding, as soon as our Government pleases; let them fight and agree as his Majesty thinks fit; let the Merchants be at Liberty to extend the
British
Commerce with their utmost Skill; this need be no Interruption to a Peace; for what has the peaceable Merchant to do with War and Government?
It is a strange fit of religious Strictness, which the
Spaniards
think good to practise by the Power of their
right bloody
Inquisition; (
viz.
) that they will suffer no Strangers whatsoever, unless
Roman
Catholicks, so much as to set a foot in New
Spain,
much less to live among them; and if any
Englishman
or
Dutchman
attempt to live among them, if they are discover'd, they are condemned to the Mines, and must go to work at
Potest
Nay, so cruel are they, and so unmerciful, that if an
English
Ship should come upon their Coast, in the greatest Distress; whether in Distress by Storm, and so wanting perhaps Masts or Sails, Anchors or Cable, or Carpenters; or in Distress for Provisions, and are wanting Fresh-water, Bread, and other Provisions; in none of these Extremities will they (as I have been inform'd) give them Relief, tho' they are by express Treaties oblig'd to do it: A Piece of Inhumanity, which I do not find the
Turks
or
Pagans
are arriv'd to, in any of the known Parts of the World.
But these Catholick Christians on the other hand, will, even in these Cases of Distress, which all other Christian Nations consider, use all possible Stratagems to get the Ship into their Hands; in which case the Cargo and Ship is consiscated, and the poor Men, tho' no way offending, are perhaps made Slaves, and sent to the Mines without Redemption. Which, by the way, (not to say any thing of the particular Cruelty with which the
Spaniards
treat their Slaves, and which few of them are able to survive many Years) is a degree beyond what is practis'd, either at
Algier
or
Salle, Tunis
or
Tripoli,
or by any the
Moors
of the
Barbary
Coast.
I need go no farther for the Proof of these Things, than the Authentick Relations of those of our own Country, who have been upon the Spot, and who have partly suffered under those Barbarities, and partly been Eye-witnesses to the Sufferings of others, and to the particular Method by which the
Spaniards
render themselves so odious to the rest of the Christian World for Cruelty and Injustice.
That no Nation but the
Spaniards,
at least no Christian or
Mohometan
Nation that I have read of, do this but the
Spaniards,
I think I may appeal for the Proof of, to the general Practice of the
English, Dutch
and
French,
in like Cases, and in the same Country.
It is true, that neither of these Nations permit any other Nations to trade in their respective Colonies: Reasons of Trade, the Interests of Nations, and the Property of Commerce demands it, that it should be so; that the Trade of the particular Colony may be reserv'd carefully, separately and distinctly, to the Use and Benefit of the respective Nation to which it of Right belongs.
But in any of the said Colonies, if a Ship belonging to another Nation is manifestly driven into the Port or Harbour by stress of Weather, or is in Distress for Fresh-water, or Provisions, the Government will allow them Shelter, and will allow them to take Fresh-water, and purchase Provisions for their Voyage; and this notwithstanding the strictest Prohibitions of Commerece: according to the express Scripture-Law;
If thine Enemy be hungry give him Bread to eat, and if he be thirsty give him Water to drink.
Prov. xxv. 21. For all Ships of another Nation are, in the Language of Trade, and in the Sense of those Laws of Navigation,
a kind of Enemy
; as to Commerce, I mean, tho' otherwise in full Amity; and even if they were in Confederacy it would be the same.
It is true, if the Ship so distress'd shall transgress the Law, and break in upon the Hospitality which they meet with, and shall clandestinely and privately offer to trade with the Inhabitants, shall
break Bulk
as they call it, and sell any Part of her Cargo, other than shall be allow'd by the Government of the Place, for the Payment of such Provisions as they are allow'd to buy, in such case they are liable to be stopp'd, feiz'd upon, and the whole Ship and Goods confiscated; and this is no Wrong done to them, because they are the Offenders, and know before-hand the Consequence of such a Trespass, if it was discover'd.
Yet even in this Case, tho' the Ship and Goods are confiscated, yet the poor Men are not made Slaves; on the contrary, they are let go, and may shift for themselves; and are oftentimes reliev'd and treated with Humanity; as may be prov'd by very many Examples, even upon the
Spaniards
themselves.
Again: If a
Spaniard,
or a Boat full of
Spaniards,
should come to any of the
English
or
French
Colonies, and land there,
so be it,
that they offer to bring no Goods to land there, against the Constitution of the Commerce mention'd above, they are admitted to come on Shore, may land, and go freely up and down, take themselves a Lodging, may trade as Merchants, or dwell as Strangers; submitting only to all the particular Laws of Commerce, which other People submit to; nor will they meet with any Molestation or Obstruction; while, on the contrary, the bare coming on Shore among the
Spaniards,
in any of their
American
Colonies, is Death, or perpetual Slavery, which, as the
Spaniards
order it, is worse than Death: For, without injuring the
Spaniards,
as they are but indifferent Servants, when Servitude is their Lot; so they are the worst Masters in the World, at least among either Christians or
Turks,
This then being the State of the
Spanish
Colonies, and of the Commerce, and it being (as is said) conceded to by the
European
Nations, by sundry Treaties of Peace and Commerce; hence it follows, that if any of the Subjects of the said
European
Nations, tempted by the extraordinary Gain of a private Commerce with the
Spaniards,
do either lie
off
and
on
(as they call it) upon the Coast, with Sloops and Ships, and so trade in the Night with the
Spanish Perioguas
and
Canoes
which come off to them; as the
English
of
Jamaica
and the
Dutch
of
Curacao
frequently do; or do land in the Bay of
Campeache,
and cut Log-wood, as the
English
from
Jamaica
and
New-England
have always done; or trade by Force upon the Coast of
Chili
and
Peru,
as the
French
have done since their late License during the Time of War;
If, I say, in these Cases, the
Spaniards
happen to fall upon them, and take them, burn or sink their Ships, and use the Men after their usual
Spanish
Severity, tho' it be too inhumane even to mention, yet the several Nations to which they belong do not usually make this any Matter of Complaint, or reclaim the Ships or Men as if injuriously taken, the Trade it self being contraband; an Example of which we have lately had in some
Dutch
Ships taken on the Coast of
Chartagena
and
Saint Martha,
or thereabouts, by the
Spanish
Cruizers, who they call
Garde de Costa's,
or Guardships,
Not but that those
Carde de Costa's,
as the
Spaniards
call them, commit several Depredations and almost Pyracies in taking Ships, which are not Traders or trading; and this the
English
complain of at this Time, and that I believe with good Cause. But that by the way.
In General, it is true, that this Right of an exclusive Commerce, as it was at first assum'd by the
Spaniards
as a Property, so it is conceded to them by the Assent of their Neighbour Nations, and agreed to by Treaty; the very obtaining of which Treaty is a tacit Acknowledgment that they are not able to maintain the exclusive Commerce by their own Power; nor able either to restrain their own People, or keep the Ships of other Nations from their Coast; and this is the Reason of my entring thus far into the Case of the Limitations of the Commerce, which otherwise would not be to the purpose, in the Case before me.
But to bring it down directly to the Case in hand. With a War, (in which War, as it is evident, the
Spaniards
themselves are Aggressors) all these Limitations and Reserves of Commerce cease at once; the Trade is laid open, and it is fair working not only to break in upon their Trade by all such Methods as we find practicable, but to make such Gaps and Openings in it, as it shall never be in the Power of the
Spaniards
to close and make up again, no not by a Treaty of Peace.
Thus the
Spaniards,
(who, in Breach of those very Treaties, by which their exclusive Trade was conceded to them, have unjustly attempted to open the Trade to a Nation expresly shut out,) may find themselves left naked of the just Defence which those former Treaties always were to them, and so may never be able to recover the exclusive Commerce of the
Spanish West-Indies,
which has been of such infinite Advantage to their whole Nation, or to call the Trade their Own any more.
Nor would it be any Injustice to the
Spaniards,
especially as (I say) they are the Aggressors in this War; for if during the past Ages those
European
Nations, now ally'd against
Spain,
were less opulent and less powerful in Trade, and which is above all the rest, were less united in Interests (trading Interests I mean) than they may be now; and were perhaps willing to keep Measures with the
Spaniards,
which might in some things be to their Disadvantage, rather than to let them be laid too low, or perhaps rather than another shou'd reap the separate Advantage of it, as was the Case in the late War, when
France
obtain'd an Admission into the Trade to the
Spanish America
: I say, tho' in those Times these Concessions might be made to the
Spaniards,
and their Pretensions to an exclusive Trade were so far confirm'd, it may not be always so.
If this has been the Case, it was the
Spaniards
Business to have preserved the Advantages which that divided Situation of the Affairs and Interests of
Europe
gave them, and to have cultivated that Friendship which alone was the Safety of their Commerce; and not by such precipitate Councils as these to open the Door of that Commerce to a People no way in condition to carry it on, or to protect the
Spaniards
in it, and pretend (I might say, foolishly pretend) to shut those out who are able to let themselves in, and even to dispossess
Spain
it self, not of the Trade only, but of the very Country too, whenever they please.
These are the Advantages which I mean, when I speak of the Probable Consequences of this War; and this is that which I call going to the Bottom of things. A full Enquiry into which will open the Eyes of
Europe,
and let us see farther perhaps than ever before, whether I have wrong'd the
Spaniards
in saying they know not what they are doing; that their Measures are absurd and ridiculous: in a Word, if I had said they were mad, (that is to say their Ministers and Managers, whoever they are; I say, if I had concluded them mad, or next door to it;) it had been, in my Opinion, the kindest thing I could have said of them.
To have said, they had taken these Steps with their Eyes open, with their Reason in its full Exercise, with their Politicks free from Distraction, must have been to have suggested worse things of them than I am willing to charge them with, and to have intimated, that they were a Set of Men in a Plot or Conspiracy to betray their Master, and ruin their Country.
But be it which of the two you please, it seems to me that
Spain
may have an Occasion to look back with some Reproach upon its late Politicks, in Leaguing with a Prince so very lately their Enemy, and so ill able to be their Friend; against two Powers,
Great-Britain
and
France,
so very able to ruin them, and which should have been the two last Nations in the World that
Spain
ought to have differ'd with; and out of which Quarrel they will not find it so easy to deliver themselves, as perhaps they imagine; that is to say, without deep Wounds in their Constitution, especially as to Trade. And this is what I meant, when I said, as the Clerks (
Culprit
) do to the Prisoner, who they know will be cast upon his Tryal,
God send you a good Deliverance
; intimating at the same time, that 'tis not at all likely.
CHAP. IV.
Of the Condition of the
Spaniards
and their Colonies in the
West-Indies
; and the Manner how this War may be carried on, to the Advantage of
Great-Britain,
without making any Conquests upon the Continent of
America
; or to do no Injury, or offer any Affront to any of the
Hanover
Allies.
TRading Nations seek no Conquest, aim at no Encrease of Power, or Agrandising of Persons or Families.
Great-Britain
is Rich, and Strong, and Opulent enough in her own Wealth, Power, and Commerce. She seeks no more but a peaceable Possessing her just Rights, and preserving to her People the free Extending their Commerce, that they may Trade in Peace with all the World, and all the World with them.
As is the Nation, so is the Prince that governs them; Satisfied in his own Greatness, King
George
fights for the Peace and Good of his own People, and of all Mankind. His Majesty enters upon this War on the most honourable, and most justifiable Grounds in the World, namely, to Establish the World upon the immovable Basis of Peace; that every Nation, and every Prince, and every Power, restrain'd only by Just and Capitulated Limitations, may with Safety enjoy their Own, and mutually Guarrantee the Property of all their Subjects.
Contrary to the meaner Principles upon which Princes too often make War, the King fights not for Fame: He is placed by Heaven on a Seat above all the empty Things we foolishly call Glory; and were my Business
Panegyrick,
or my Design
Flattery,
what could I not say here, to exalt the happy Prospect of his Majesty's present Undertaking!
Even the King himself cannot look upon it without lifting up some Thoughts to Heaven, and blessing the Power that has singled his Majesty out to act in a Scene of so much superior Glory; superior to all the Kings of the Earth, as it affimulates the Deity, and represents a King acting by immediate Commission from his Maker, and in a perfect Harmony with his Providence.
As Thunders dissipate the noxious Air,
And raging Storms the sequent Calms prepare;
So Nations, by his Pow'r restrain'd from Feud,
Are to their
own Felicity
subdu'd.
With awful Voice be calls at every Door,
And warns their Monarchs not to
ronze
his Pow'r.
His Sword, half
drawn,
makes their Commotions cease;
He Frowns,
to Smile,
and he contends
for Peace.
His Rebels crush'd, are,
under Conquest,
free;
And only
are confin'd
to Liberty.
This seems then to be the State of the approaching War.
Great-Britain
acts the Part of the World's Protector. The King, linking the Nations in a strong Confederacy, opposes the aggressing Disturbers with such an early and superior Hand, that they find themselves disabled in the very Infancy of their Undertaking.
The
Spaniards
(obstinate and opiniatre) beginning at the wrong End of their Work, break out into a War, with so little Prospect of Success, that the World looks on with Surprize, to see them act so as their Friends can have no Hope, and their Enemies no Fear, from the Event of the Undertaking.
A Town impregnable, even by its Situation, and made more so by the Addition of terrible Fortifications; open to the Sea, and their Enemies Masters of the Bay, able to relieve it as often as they please: What strange, unaccountable Beginnings are these:
Spain
ought to remember their Ancestors ill Conduct at the Siege of
Ostend,
which on the single Article of its being easily reliev'd by Sea,
held out a Siege
of three Years and four Months, and cost the
Spaniards
66000 Men to conquer; whereas being not to be reliev'd by Sea, the late Duke of
Marlborough
took it in twelve Days.
This Town, with all the Advantages of Situation and Fortification, has in it a numerous Garrison of old Veteran Soldiers, commanded by experienc'd Officers, furnished with all things needful for a vigorous Defence, and covered with a strong Squadron of twelve large capital Men of War, such as no twenty Ships that the King of
Spain
may get together will dare to engage.
To attack this Place, the
Spaniards
whole Infantry are about 20000 at the most, who (if I may speak without boasting) are no more able to attack the Town, to any purpose, than twenty Men would be to take the Tower of
London.
If the King of
Spain
fails in this Enterprize, 'tis very likely he ruins the Infantry who are before it; and tho' his Kingdoms are indeed very large, yet we all know, that it is not the easiest thing in the World to raise a new Army in
Spain
; 'tis not like
Germany,
which (as one says, travelling thro' it) is an inexhaustible Store-house for Men, and those Men all born Soldiers.
But in
Spain
it is quite a different Case: not but that the
Spaniards
are very good Troops, when well paid, well cloath'd, disciplin'd, and led abroad from Home; but
Spain
is more fruitful of any thing than Men: there are so many go abroad, and so very few stay at home; so many turn Priests, and must not fight; are poor, dejected, and cannot fight; or are
Lazy Dons
among the Gentry, and will not fight, that it is the hardest thing in the World to raise an Army in
Spain,
at least with Expedition.
Thus stands their Affair at home, and in this unhappy Posture they are beginning the War; a Posture that I think they are the first People that ever began a War in before.
As soon as they strike a Stroke at
Gibraltar,
they ought to expect all the Allies to declare against, and fall upon them;
France
in the first Place, we may suppose will be expected upon their Frontiers with two Armies, one in
Navarr,
and the other in
Rousillion
; and in that Figure we shall soon see how they will go on.
Let us now take a View of the Situation of their Affairs as to Trade, and particularly as to that Part of their Commerce of which I have spoken so much,
viz.
the Trade of New
Spain.
While the
British
Squadron remains on the Coasts of
America,
suppose in the Gulph of
Mexico,
or upon the Coasts of
Porto-Belo
and
Carthagena,
either the
Spaniards
must fight that Fleet, or otherwise remove it, or there's an end put to their Commerce on that Side, all at once.
It is objected, that a
British
Squadron may indeed interrupt the Commerce in this or that particular Place, but that this will not effectually ruin the
Spanish
Trade. The Coast of
America
(as possess'd by the
Spaniards
) is a large Place, 'tis extended in a vast Length, from the Gulph of
Florida,
or the North-most Part of the Gulph of
Mexico,
and in the Latitude of 24 to 25 Degrees to the Coast of
Surinam,
and even to the Month of the Gulph of
Paria,
and the lsle of
Trinidado,
and farther, to the Latitude of five Degrees: So that here is a Length of 1000 Miles, or thereabouts, in a Line North and South, besides reckoning the Depth of the Bay, and the Indentings of the Coast of
Yacatan,
the Bay of
Campeachy,
the Gulph of
Honduras, Darien,
and others, which make the Coast above 2500 Miles in Length; of all which I shall speak again in the next Chapter.
In the mean time, to give the Objection its utmost Stress, they add, that the Heat of the Climate, the Unhealthiness of the particular Places where the Station of such Ships must be, and the want of Provisions, are such, as that no
European
Fleet can bear to be constantly station'd in those Seas.
That as well at
La Vera Cruz,
as at
Porto-Belo,
which are the two Centres of the
Spanish
Commerce, the Air is so unhealthy by reason of the excessive Heats, that even the
Spaniards
themselves cannot dwell there, and only come at the particular times of Trade, when the Ships from Old
Spain
arrive, when they buy their Goods, deliver their Money, finish their Dispatches and Letters to
Europe,
and return again, the former to the great City of
Mexico,
and the latter to
Panama,
and thence to
Lima,
and the other Ports on the Coast of
Peru
and
Chili
in the
South-Seas.
That this is evident at this time, for that the Galeons being (as it were) besieged, or block'd up by the
English
Squadron, their Men presently grow sickly, and dye a-pace; nor perhaps are the Men in the Squadron it self quite free, tho' being better furnish'd with Provisions than the
Spaniards, for the Country yields little or nothing there-abouts
; I say, the
British
Sailors being better furnished, and better taken care of, and better fed, the Men are by consequence better able to bear the Inconvenience of the Season: yet the Place is allowed to be such as admits no long Stay.
Porto Belo
That the
Scots,
in their Settlement at
Darien,
which is but a little South from
Porto-Belo,
found by sad Experience, that there was no bearing the Situation; tho' the
Scots
are as hardy a People, and as able to bear the Extremities of Weather, as most Nations in
Europe.
I am the more willing to give the utmost Length to these seeming Objections, because when they shall be fully and unanswerably removed, they will leave the less to say by a Set of People who deal in Misrepresentations and Discouragements, as a particular Traffick of their own; and calculated for a particular Cause, which wanting some Cordials, knows not where to find or make any better.
It is true, the Coast of
America
(as now possess'd by the
Spaniards
) is exceeding large, as is described; and that the great Gulph of
Mexico
is not to be block'd up by a Squadron of Ships; the several Ports for Trade being so remote one from another, and that in the whole the Coast may lie extended above 2000 Miles.
It is likewise true, that the Ports of
La Vera Cruz
and
Porto Belo,
which are at present the Centre of the
Spanish
Commerce in those Parts, are unhealthy dangerous Climates, the Shores destitute of Provisions, the Heats excessive, airless, and not refresh'd with Land Breezes, as in other Places; and that even the
Spaniards
themselves are not able to bear the Extreams of the intemperate Seasons, such as the Summer's Heat, and the Winter's Rain, especially about
Porto Belo.
But the Mistake of all this lies in the Ignorance of those that lay the Stress of this Cause, upon the posting an
English
Navy or Squadron only for the Interrupting this Commerce; whereas there is nothing more plain, than that the Ally'd Powers are able at once, not only to Interrupt the
Spanish
Commerce, but to put an entire End to it, and in a Word, break off all settled Correspondence between the two Countries, I mean of Old
Spain
and New
Spain,
and this without hazarding their Ships or Men to lye upon an unwholesome Coast, and poison themselves with the stagnate Air of
Darien
or the
Bastimentos.
Not but that on this Occasion, the Galeons being in the Port, it became necessary to post a Squadron, as Admiral
Hosier
has been posted; to stagnate the Money, as well as give the
Spaniards
a Taste of the stagnate Vapours of the Place, and to keep them where they were. If they are ill furnish'd with Provisions, if the Country cannot supply them, if the Stores in their Ships are not sufficient for them, they are at home, they must take care of themselves; no doubt but by Land-Carriage, or by the great Lake of
Nicaragua,
which runs eighty Leagues within the Land, and reaches within fifteen Leagues of the
South-Sea,
they may be sufficiently furnished with Provisions, at least may have some Relief in their present Exigence; for it is very well known, that the Country of
Guatimala,
bordering on that great Lake, is the most fruitful, pleasant, and plentiful of any Part of
Spanish America
; or else their own Accounts of it are very false, and they have described it much more to their own Advantage, than they can make out, when they find occasion to make use of it.
But if it should be so, that they are distress'd, for Provisions, as I say above,
they are at Home
; they are under no Restraints; they have no Enemies landed upon them; they may send for Provisions where they are to be had, and may send Expresses to the Governours of the several Countries to supply them, and to find Means to convey them: Certainly the Governours will not suffer the King of
Spain
's Ships to want Victualing, or suffer the poor Seamen to starve upon their own Coasts, and (as may be said) at their own Doors.
But we are not speaking of an Advantage to
Great Britain
only in this present depending Article of Blocking up the
Spanish
Galeons, which is a thing of to-day, and, as we may say, will be over to-morrow; is done to serve a particular Occasion, and will serve that Occasion most effectually; for we see how ill able the
Spaniards
are to bear the Disappointment, and what a Check it gives to their Enterprizes, how low their Credit runs in
Europe,
and how even their Auxiliaries and Confederates (as it were) stand still 'till they see from what other Springs the promis'd Streams of Money will flow.
The Occasion therefore is abundantly served by the
British
A'dmiral posting his Squadron at the Entrance of the Harbour of
Porto Belo,
and hindering the Galeons from coming out, spreading the Sea with his Cruisers, and interrupting their Commerce; and in a Word, locking up their Money so, as that tho' it be in their own Possession, it is yet out of their Reach, and rendered (at least for the present) as useless to them, as if it was in the Mines at
Potost.
And tho' it is far from being mention'd as any part of the Advantages hinted at in my Title, and which are offer'd to the Allies in the present War, any farther than it is an Accident to the Beginning, and a particular Circumstance which falls in to the Encouragement of our Friends, and the great Disappointment of the Enemy; yet it must be acknowledged too, that it is a very great Advantage in its Kind; and it shows the World, that the
Spaniards,
with all the Funds of their immense Treasure, which it may be said they are Masters of, beyond all the Nations of
Europe
; yet are so unhappily situated, that they must as it were be oblig'd to ask their Neighbours leave to bring it home, and dare not venture abroad with it, if but nine or ten Men of War appear upon their Coasts.
But notwithstanding all this, and supposing this Expedition of
Porto-Belo
were to be reckon'd as nothing in the present Account of the Advantages of the War; it is manifest that their whole
West-India
Commerce is in the Hands, and at the Mercy of the Allies, in this War; that we are able to put an End to it at once, if we think fit; and that not for the present only, but for the time to come, whenever the Government thinks fit to enter into Measures for that Purpose.
And not to pretend to lead our Leaders, or to direct them, in whose Direction the whole Government is already so wisely steer'd; I may venture to lay before you the Schemes of former Times, and make some small Inferences from them; which if our Governours please to make any Use of, they may doubtless very much improve; and if they do not think fit to make use of, they will, 'tis hoped, not be displeas'd at any well-designing Subject (however injuriously misrepresented) mentioning such things for their Service as are apparently capable of answering the End if accepted, and can be Hurtful to none if rejected.
Nor can it be said, that it is a discovering the Weakness of the Enemy to themselves, and putting them upon securing themselves where they lie open, since the Enemy are far from being ignorant of the Disadvantage they lie under; they are not so insensible of the weak Part, and have been sensible of it many Years ago, but find there is no Possibility of preventing the Consequences, but by being Masters at Sea; which is an Article that never was but once their Chance, and is never likely to happen to them again; at least it will not in this War, whatever it may do in After-times.
If some things offer in
this War,
which have not offer'd before, at least not to be so practicable in any former War; and if wiser Heads than mine have not yet seen them, or rather not look'd into them, so much as perhaps they may see reason to do hereafter; I hope it will be no Offence to give any Lights, however unworthy and ill-esteem'd the Person, who so officiously offers them for the publick Service, and however sinking under the Weight of unjust Calumny his Opinion may be slighted, yet he may boldly say, his Reasons shall not be confuted, nor any Scheme he lays down be justly objected against by the most envious, either on one Side or other. As to their being made use of, or not made use of, that is an Affair by it self, and which at present it becomes him to say nothing about, unless it is made his Duty.
CHAP. V.
Of the particular Advantages the present Prospect of a War offers to the
British
Nation, with respect to the Commerce of the
Spanish West-Indies.
OLIVER CROMWELL, whatever other things may be said of him, and how ill soever his Name may sound at the Head of any Affair as a Precedent, yet was certainly no Fool; He was no more void of Counsel than of Courage. I do not find that his Enemies, even of those Times, ever gave it as a part of his Character, that he was either a
Fool
or a
Coward.
In consequence of his Usurpation, and while the Administration might be said to be in his Hands; among all the Foreign Nations whom he differ'd with, he declar'd War against the
Spaniards
: The Reasons and Occasion of the War are known, History is full of them, and I have no room for Quotations, the Reading World know where to look for them.
In that War,
France
was a Confederate
as now,
and their Forces in Conjunction with the
England
took
Dunkirk
; but
Oliver,
who was not us'd to give up any thing he could keep, took care also to have that important Conquest put into his own Hands (and lest it to the
Englash
Government at his Decease) leaving the
French
to make the best of the War for themselves in remoter Parts. How the
English
kept it,
publish it not in Gath,
—
But
Oliver,
willing to touch the
Spaniards
in a more sensible Manner, and in Consequence of the Experience of former Ages, observing that by attacking
Spain
in the
West-Indies,
he should not only wound that Monarchy in the tenderest Part of its Government, but carry on the War in that Part of the World where most was to be gotten by it, turn'd his Eye towards
America.
In calling up this short piece of History, I desire my Readers to keep their Eyes strictly upon the exact Parallel of Times and Circumstances, leaving the Persons quite out of the Question, and to stand and fall as their Fate has long ago directed; and let it be
Oliver,
or
Oliver's Master,
the—it matters not here, as the great
Andrew Marvel
said of him.
Tho' his Government did a Tyrant resemble,
He made
England
Great, and her Enemies Tremble.
His Measures at Home are nothing to me, nor much indeed to any of us, now they are over. Heaven suffer'd him to overturn things, and then Heaven over-turn'd things again; and having visited the Nation for their Crimes, visited their Afflictors afterwards, scourg'd the Scourgers, and restor'd the Government. Just as in ancient Times he delivered up his People to the
Assyrian,
and then restor'd his People again, and destroyed their Destroyers.
But I am talking not of
Oliver
's Conduct at home, or his Measures with his Governours, but his Measures with the
Spaniards,
and with them only.
It was about the Year 1655, when the War with
Spain
continuing, after several other Attempts, the Council of War received some Proposals laid before them by the Government's Order, for an Expedition to the
Spanish West-Indies
; (and as I had it not from History, but by a very Authentick, tho' Verbal Relation, from a Member of the very Council of War, to whom it was referr'd) a Descent was propos'd to be made upon the Continent of New
Spain
; This was in order to seize some Strength there, keep the Possession of it, fortifie and place a Garrison in it, to be defended afterwards against all the Power of the
Spaniards,
so by that means to extend themselves Gradually into the Country, plant and cultivate, still fortifying as they should go on, 'till at length they might establish a Colony there, and so share with the
Spaniards
the Possession of
America
; and perhaps lying between the two great Empires which the
Spaniards
possess,
viz.
North and South
America,
or as in particular they may be call'd,
Mexico
and
Peru,
cut off the Communication, and possess the Shores of both Seas, that is to say, the Ports of
Nombre de Dios,
(which is much the same as
Porto Belo
) and
Panama.
By this Proposal, it was suppos'd, a Door would be immediately open'd to a Commerce with the
Spaniards
in
America,
that a Trade would be carried on to infinite Advantage, a vast Expence of the Woollen Manufacture follow, and a return in Specie be immediately and directly made to
England
; without trading about by old
Spain,
and under the Limitations and Restrictions of the
Spaniards,
as it always was before; and that in particular, while the War continued, very great Sums would frequently fall into the Hands of the
English,
by keeping a certain Number of Ships of War always cruising in those Seas; and having the Port of such Place as should be conquer'd to retreat into, refit, revictual, and shelter themselves upon all Occasions.
The Offer was specious, the Adventure bold, and the Success promising: But upon farther and mature Deliberation, tho' the Enterprise was accepted and undertaken in the General, yet the Measures were chang'd; the Place expected to be attack'd was rejected, and a new Scheme (as some said, of his own) was appointed for the Expendition, and that was to attack the
Havana,
the principal Port, and the chief Strength of the
Spaniards
in
America
; at least it was, and is still a Place of the greatest Importance to the
Spaniards,
of any in all their
American
Dominions, as shall appear presently; The Reasons given for this Alteration of Counsels were such, as presently made an Impression upon All that were consulted about it, and the new Undertaking was unauimously resolv'd on.
In order to carry on an Enterprise of such Importance, a Fleet and an Army was prepar'd, and that with all the Expedition and Secrecy, that such a Design call'd for: Nor 'till the Troops were ready to Embark, was it so much as guess'd at whither they were design'd.
However the jealous
Spaniards,
made afraid from the meer Importance of the Place, rather than by any certain Knowledge of the Design, sent away some Ships of War, with Stores of Ammunition and Supply of Troops for the Garrisons of the
Havana,
and of
Chartagena,
as the two most significant Places they possess'd in all their
American
Dominions, at least on that Side; and these Ships arriv'd before the
English,
some considerable time.
The Design was at last made known: only to amuse the
Spaniards, Carthagena
was given out as the Place intended to be attack'd: The Squauron sail'd, the Troops about 8 or 9000 Men, and commanded by the fam'd Colonels
Penn
and
Venables.
The History of the Voyage is but short in it self, and I shall make it shorter still; the Design upon the
Havana
miscarry'd, principally by the Disagreement in Councils among the Officers; they were mistaken in every thing, landed in a wrong
The Port and Bay of Havana.
Place, (
viz.
) at
Hispaniola
; the Men were harrass'd and fatigued, and the
Spaniards
by that encourag'd; they were repuls'd in two or three Places, and at length they gave over the Enterprise, laying the Blame one upon another reciprocally, as in all humane Disappointments 'tis very frequent to do.
Failing in this Enterprize they reimbark'd their Troops; and tho' the Army had suffer'd some Loss, Abundance of Men dead, besides those kill'd and hurt in Action (which was too many) and the rest very sickly, the General very unavailing to come home empty-handed, and undertake nothing worthy an
English
Army, resolved to attempt the Island of
Jamaica.
Accordingly they sail'd directly to the Place, entred the Port, landed the Army; and being made wise by their Misfortunes, and resolving not to be beaten, unless cut in pieces, they went on with more united Councils, and a better Agreement than before; by which means, and the
Spaniards
being not well provided for their Defence, they took the Island, and, to shorten the Story,
Jamaica
has been
English
ever since.
It is not to be wondred at if the
Spaniards,
after this narrow Escape, went to work with the Fortifications of the
Havana,
and made it very strong; adding a strong Castle at the North Part of the Town it self, and adding several Batteries at the Entrance, whereof one under the Castle
El Morro
has a particular Battery of twelve exceeding long Brass Cannon, which they call the Twelve Apostles, and which carry, if the
Spaniards
may be believ'd, a fifty-six Pound Ball.
Since this, and even while they were alarm'd with the coming of a
French
Squadron into those Seas, in the late War under Monsieur
Pointy,
when they took
Chartagena,
the
Spaniards
apprehending the Design was against the
Havana,
they caused the whole City to be accurately fortified, and a Fort and a Cittadel to be re-built; by which the Town as well as the Port has obtain'd the Name of a very strong Place, tho' far from being what the
Spaniards
pretend to say of it, Invincible. But if it really were so at this time, or if it was five-fold stronger than it is, it is of no Value or Importance in the Scheme I am now to lay down, nor shall it be of any Use to the
Spaniards
in the Case before me, any more than the Strength of any other Place; for what signifies its Strength, when it is not to be attack'd?
It is not the Fortifications upon the Shore that will Import any thing in this War; the Superiority by Sea is the thing we lay the whole Weight upon, and being Masters of the Sea is that which the Sum of Affairs depends upon.
However 'tis necessary a little to state the Importance of this Port of the
Havana,
in as brief Terms as I can, because this was the Reason why
Oliver
and his Council pitch'd upon it to make their Attack. By the Import of it, I mean, the Import of it to the
Spaniards,
as they are now possest of it, and as it would have been to the
English,
if
Oliver
's General had happen'd to take it.
The
Havana
is the best Port without Dispute in all the
Spanish West-Indies
; it is situate on the North Side of the Iste of
Cuba,
opposite to the Gulph of
Florida,
in the Latitude of twenty three Degrees North.
The Gulph of
Florida
being the only practicable Out-let or Passage from the Gulph of
Mexico,
by which all the
Spanish
Ships make their Return from
America,
and by which they enter into Ocean, which they therefore call
Disemboguing
; I say, the Gulph being the only Practicable Way, all the
Galeons
from
Porto-Belo,
and the other Ships called the
Flota,
from
La Vera Craz,
come first to the
Havana
in their Passage home, and there being in Safety from either Seas or Enemies (for it is a Port as safe from Winds and Storms, as from Enemies) they wait 'till they meet from all Parts, and, as they call it, make up their Fleet.
N. B. There is another Way between
Cuba
and
Hispaniola,
which the Seamen call the
Windward Passage,
which the Ships from
Jamaica
sometimes venture thorough. But 'tis hazardous and difficult, and the
Spaniards
never make use of it, especially with their Fleet.
N. B. It should also have been observ'd, that the Fleets from old
Spain,
make this Port of the
Havana
be the first Place of their Arrival, when they are outward bound, and coming so far in a Body; they then separate as their Orders direct: the Ships for the South go away to
PortoBelo,
and those to the West go to
La Vera Cruz
; the Men of War attending them, or not, as they see Occasion, and as Inteiligence of things directs.
So that both ways, whether out or home, the
Havana
is the only Place of Safety, where the Plate Fleet rendezvous, and where they are cover'd from all Dangers; nor wou'd the Voyage be easily made without such a
Halfway-Port
to stop in, to recruit, to take in Refreshments, Provisious, and especially Fresh-water; after so long a Run, as it is from
Cadiz
thither, in which they have no Place to touch at for-Refreshment, except it be the
Canary-Islands,
where their Stay is but very short, the Road being not at all safe, either from Wind or Weather, or Enemies, even the
Turkish
Rovers not excepted.
Having thus given you a full Account of the Import of this Place to the
Spaniards,
I have only this to add; That in the propos'd Advantages to us for cutting off the
Spanish
Commerce, and totally intercepting their Correspondence with one another, which is the Scheme to be proposed, This mighty Port, this well-fortified City, and this excellent Harbour, shall be of no Signification or Importance one way or other; it shall neither be worth any thing to us to take, or to the
Spaniards
to keep: Allowing
England
to have only the Superiority of naval Strength, and to be Masters of the Sea, which I think I may venture to say is not to be doubted, and all the rest shall fall in of Course; the
Havana
shall be as useless to the
Spaniards,
as
Majorca
in the
Mediterranean
(comparatively speaking) nor shall it be able, or the
Spaniards
by its help be able, to prevent our Interrupting their Commerce, and in short, taking it wholly into our own Hands.
The Case is Thus:
There is on the same Island of
Cuba,
and on the same North-Side of it, open to the same grand Passage of the Gulph of
Florida,
another Port or Harbour, call'd the Harbour or Gulph of
Honda
; it is about nine Leagues to the Westward of the
Havana,
and upon the very same Coast.
The Conveniences of this Port (among many others) are some in particular which relate to the Subject in Hand,
viz.
1. That it is a convenient Place to form a Settlement upon, and to fortifie, so as with little Expence to make it unapproachable by Land, and consequently not to be interrupted by the
Spaniards.
2. That it commands a fruitful, and plentiful, and healthy Country, where not only all manner of Provisions may be had, but where such easy and secure Planting would follow, as not
Jamaica
it self would go beyond it, as well for Trade, as supply of Inhabitants.
3. But that which is above all the rest, the Situation is such by Sea, that not a Ship, much less a Fleet of Ships, can go in or out, to or from the
Havana,
from or to the Gulph of
Mexico,
or the Coast of
Carthagena, Porto-Belo,
&c. but they must pass by this Port, and even in sight of the Men of War riding here; so that
England
has no more to do than to post a Squadron of Ships in this Port, making it their Station, and keeping some of them cruising upon the Coast of the
Terra Firma,
as they see Occasion; and let any one that understands the Situation of the
Spanish
Commerce, tell us how they will carry it on without our Leave, and which Way they will get out of the Gulph of
Mexico,
or out of the Gulph of
Honduras,
or (to use their own Language) how they will
Disembogus,
that is, get into the Ocean, wihtout (as I say) asking us Leave.
If this is their Case (to make the just Inference from Things as I go) will any Man say I was too arrogant in saying the
Spaniards
seemed not to know what they were doing, when they begin a Quarrel with
England,
that their Proceedings were absurd, and ridiculons, and that they seemed to be little off from Distraction?
The farther entering into this Scheme of Management, for the interrupting the
Spanish
Commerce, requires more Room than can be allowed to any thing from so mean a Pen. But if any Writer, or Writer's Master, can raise one Objection against it, that cannot with unanswerable Force be refuted, I would be glad to see it.
Let the greatest Friend to the
Spanish
Interest, or the greatest Enemy to the Author of this, tell me, if they can, which way the Flota's from
La Vera Cruz
shall get out into the Ocean, which way the
Galeons
shall beat it up against a Leeward Tide (as the Seamen call it) from
Porto-Belo,
and not come under the command of this Port, or that of
Jamaica.
There is a Passage already mentioned, which sometimes our Ships from
Jamaica
do make use of, which is therefore called the
Windward Passage,
and which runs from the East Point of
Jamaica,
North-West, and then fleering North, goes between the Islands of
Cuba
and
Hispaniola,
and passing among innumerable Islands, Sands, Shoals, Rocks and other Dangers, leaves the Gulph of
Florida
on the Larboard Side, and goes out or disembogues into the Ocean, to the North-East of all the
Bahama
Islands; and it is true, that the
Spaniards
may (that is to say, now and then a Ship may) make their Escape this Way.
But I refer it to the Judgment of the skilful Mariner, whether this is a practicable Way for the whole Trade; and if it were so, whether then the Island of
Jamaica,
which is already
British,
would not be of the same use for that Course, as the Bay of
Honda
would be for the other.
I am no Projector, nor am I laying the thing down as a Proposal, at least not here; but I think it is plain (at least to me) that a
British
Squadron posted in this Bay, may when you please put an end to the
Spanish
Commerce in the
West-Indies,
in such a manner, that the
Spaniards
could never carry on any considerable Trade there again: Always supposing what we have reason to hope will ever be the Case, namely, that the
British
Fleet shall be Masters of the Sea.
It may be pretended, that the
Spaniards
may coast along the South Side of that they call the
North Seas,
that is to say, under the North, Share of the South
America,
the Coast of
St. Marta, Venezcula,
or the
Carata's
; and so to
Bosco del Drago,
the Gulph of
Paria,
and the Isle
De Trimidada
; and so going away East, get into the Ocean that way, and come home with the
Portuguese
Fleets from the
Brasils.
All this, Eke what was said before of the
Windward Passage,
is no more than like a City not entirely invested, or that tho' besieged, may have some such secret Passages, as that now and then a single Messenger may escape in or out, to carry a Letter, or bring particular Intelligence, but which signifies nothing at all towards its Relief, much less towards raising the Stage, and opening a Communication.
Having thus stated the Case of the
Spaniards,
in case of a War, and on supposition of the
British
Superiority at Sea, how their Commerce with
Europe
shall be interrupted and broken off, and how they shall be no more able to trade, no not with their own Subjects, but by Leave from his
Britannick
Majesty, and his Allies: The Inference from hence is as natural, and as plain, as that mentioned above;
viz.
No Man need to ask what are our Advantages by a War with
Spain.
I know some room lyes here for a Question, thus: Suppose you should thus Interrupt their Commerce, what immediate Benefit or Advantage would that be to us? seeing tho' they cannot trade so freely with one another, they may hinder the Commerce of their own Subjects with the Subjects of others; and so, tho' the Interruption of the Trade be a Loss to them, it will be no Gain to us.
I State this Question, not because it is a Question that any one who understands the Nature of the Commerce of New
Spain
will ask, but because there are some People that will ask more Questions in half an Hour, than—
&c.
and because some are (as
Solomon
says)
Wiser in their own Conceit, than those that can render a Reason
: The Reasons to be given in answer to such Questions, if any should be Weak enough to ask them, are resolved into not Argument but Demonstration.
If the
Spaniards
of New
Spain
cannot trade with the
Spaniards
of Old
Spain,
Experience tells us they will trade with any Body: If their own Ships cannot come at them, to bring the Merchandize of
Europe
to them, 'tis evident they must have those Merchandizes, and they will seek to be supply'd with them where they can.
The
Spaniards
themselves know this too well; the Marquis
de Puzz
Bueno,
in his late Memorial, complains of this as one of the Effects of Admiral
Hosier
's Squadron lying at the
Bestimento's,
viz. that it covers and protects what he calls the Contraband Trade, to the Prejudice of their Commerce.
Let any one grant me that taking Post, or Stationing a Squadron at the Bay of
Honda,
shall command the Commerce of
Mexico
and
Peru,
as I think it evidently appears it would, I will answer for the
Spaniards,
that they will grant it shall lay open their Trade Wholly to the Allies.
The
Spaniards
in
America,
rich and at case, abound in Money, and have Plenty of all manner of Provisions, Wine excepted. They have the most delicious Fruits; they have a Profusion of Sugars for Preserving, which they greatly delight in; the finest Sweet meats and Confections in the World being to be had there, in the greatest Plenty; they have the
Cocoa
in such Plenty, that their Chocolate (which is their ordinary Repast) costs them very little. They have Flesh, and Fowl and Fish in abundance, infinitely more than they can consume. And as for Money, their Houses are fill'd with Plate, and their Merchants Ware-houses piled up to the Ceilings with Chests of Silver Coin.
But with all this Affluence they have no Clothes; they have neither Linnen or Woollen, Silk or Hair of their own; I mean manufactured, and of their own making; they have indeed some Cotton, and some Wool, and the
Indians,
or Natives, do in some remote Places make some ordinary things for their own Cloathing, chiefly of Cotton, and some course
peruvian
Wool.
But the
Spaniards
(like the
Lord-Danes
formerly in
England,
from whole Pride and Laziness an Idle Fellow was afterwards call'd a
Lurdan
) are too proud to stoop to any thing called Work, so that they have no Merchandize, and consequently no Cloth, except what they receive from
Europe
; and some
East-India
Goods, such as Callicoes, and wrought Silks of
China
from the
Philipine
Islands, by the way of
Acapulco.
This Supply of Manufactures is (generally speaking) the Loading of the Galeons, including some Wines, and Oyl, and Fruit of the Growth of Old
Spain
; and these Loadings chiefly consist of the Woollen Manufacture of
England,
the Silks of
France
and
Italy,
and the Linnen of
Holland
and
Germany.
This Supply has sometimes been Interrupted by a War, as was in particular the Case in the first War with
France,
when the Galeons were stopped for two or three Years; then it was the oddest thing in the World, to see how shabby and ragged the
Spaniards
appeared, with their Pockets full of Gold, their Tables cover'd with Plate, and their Ware-houses (as above) heap'd up with Silver. And the Author of this speaks of particular Knowledge, that under one of these Disappointments a
Spanish
Merchant came on board a trading Sloop, on the Coast of St.
Martha,
in a
Periagua,
and bought as many Goods at several times as he paid 19000 Pieces of Eight for, and had himself not a Pair of Stockings on his Legs, and the rest of his Cloaths worn into such Rags, as an
Englishman
with but 50
s.
in the World would scorn to be seen in.
He acknowledged that they had Money enough, but no Cloths; that every thing bore such a Price as tempted them that were Merchants to sell till they were almost naked. He brought 5000 Pieces of Eight with him the first time, and looking over the whole Ship's Cargo, bought as much as came to 19000, (the Sum above-mention'd) stay'd in the Sloop all the next Day, when they stood off to Sea to be out of Sight, and went on Shore with his Goods the next Night; returning again the Night after with more Money; and so constantly, 'till he had brought all his Money, and then sent three other Merchants, who bought all the rest of the Cargo.
If this Trade was carry'd on thus, when at the extremest Hazard; what would it be when, under the Protection of the Men of War, the Ships and Sloops should come boldly to their Shores, and the Buyers be under no Restraint. Necessity obliging them to consive at one another on Shore, and no
Guard de Costia's
to take Cognisance at Sea?
Nay, what would it be when the Bay of
Honda
should be a free Fair, and that all the
Spanish
Vessels that thought fit to come thither, should trade under the Protection of the Place, and be safe going and coming, under shelter of the cruising Men of War?
Will any Man say that the Trade will not be wholly our own, that is to say, the Allies? for the
Dutch
at
Curacao
and
Surinam,
and the
French
at
Martinico,
would have their Share in the same Commerce; and any one may answer for it, the Advantage would be such, that we should never be concern'd, tho' there was never to be any more Peace with the
Spaniards,
either on this Side of the World, or on the other.
FINIS.