SECTION I. Preſent Importance of the Subject.

THE difference of the effects of war and peace on the prices of bread-corn, is, from the ſingular rates of the market at this time, a ſubject of diſ⯑cuſſion of the firſt importance. An opinion is entertained by ſome, and encouraged by others of better information, that the natural tendency of the ſtate of war has been at all periods, to raiſe the rates of the market: this is propagated, not in obſcure meetings, but legal aſſemblies: and the committee appointed by the corporation of London, to inquire into the rife of the price of proviſion, has been openly cenſured in court, for ſuppreſſing in their report all mention of the war, which was aſſerted to be the leading cauſe of it, and the ſame perſons have returned to the repetition of this erro⯑neous and inflammatory poſition, on occaſion of a plan now under the conſideration of the cor⯑poration.

[2]The circumſtances of theſe times, in which we are attacked by foreign was and by ſedition at home, render this an error pregnant with the worſt of dangers: the populace will yield a ready ear to the demagogue or agitator who is able to perſuade them, that he is poſſeſſed of a cure for any ſuffer⯑ings they may labour under: and this kingdom never contained in it, ſuch an army of enemies of this deſcription. The calamities of adverſe ſeaſons, they perſuade the uninformed claſs to be the guilt of their governors; and that they themſelves are their only true protectors; the only perſons attentive to their intereſts, which can be ſecured ſolely by em⯑bracing their meaſures. The ruin the diffuſion of ſuch a belief may bring upon us needs not to be enlarged on: in this ſtate of ſuffering of the poor, the ſeeds of commotion are widely ſown; and the eruption of a ſingle riot may be the commencement of a formidable inſurrection; and that the ſignal of more.

SECTION II. The Queſtion, whether war increaſes the price of Corn? treated on general principles.

THERE are two ways which may be employed to inveſtigate the difference of the effects of war and peace on the prices of wheat in paſt periods, [3]in order to determine how far its preſent rate is to be aſcribed to the former. The firſt by general principles, as they are called; the ſecond from yearly regiſters of prices for periods of ſufficient duration. In the firſt mode, the cauſes tending to advance or depreſs the rates of the market both in war and peace, may be enumerated: but when we have done this, no preciſe reſult can be de⯑duced from them; we being unable to aſſign, numerically, the effects of any one of either kind; and conſequently to ſtrike a balance between the reſpective ſums of both. An advantage may indeed probably appear on the one ſide or the other: ſtill the concluſion from the nature of ſuch arguments, the reſults of which are probabilities of an indefinite magnitude only, will not be ſo cogent as to ſilence a determined opponent.

The general allegations, on which I conceive it will be attempted to ſhow, that war raiſes the price of proviſions, and principally corn, are the following. ‘It always is attended with a train of new taxes, which although they be not primarily laid upon corn, yet circuitouſly raiſe the market; for if the tax be laid on leather, tea, ſugar, or any other article of his conſumption, the farmer muſt ſell his corn for ſo much more to the ſhoe⯑maker, the grocer, or other vender of the newly taxed article. War beſide, by diminiſhing the number of the cultivators of the land, muſt [4]diminiſh the quantity of its product and enhance its prices: whereas in peace, the capital of the farmer annually increaſing, new lands are yearly cultivated, old ones improved, and the quantity of corn raiſed greatly augmented. And laſtly, the demand for the army and navy is great, and muſt produce an effect on the rate of the market proportionally great.’

On the contrary, it is to be urged, that this circuitous effect of taxes, if not abſolutely an ideal allegation, can be in amount very little. If the conſumption of the newly taxed commodities be not diminiſhed, an effect which very ſeldom takes place, in proportion to the augmentation of their prices, and frequently not at all, the whole body of the conſumers will have ſo much the leſs to expend for all other articles jointly; the prices of which muſt be reduced, or part of them remain unſold: a point fully confirmed by the experience of the firſt (A) 56 years following the revolution. A part of our ſoldiers and land-men for the navy are taken from the cultivation of the land, but a greater number is taken from cities and great towns, in proportion to their population. As the former are the producers, ſo the latter are the conſumers of corn: the inhabitants of the villages are eſtimated to be in number double to thoſe in the cities and great towns^* Now if all ſo taken had [5]been employed in foreign countries and ſubſiſted on their products, and if it ſhould be gratuitouſly allowed, that the product of corn would be diminiſhed in the proportion of the hands em⯑ployed in cultivation; yet the demand of the people remaining in their dwellings, will decreaſe with the number of non-productive conſumers, that is, in a greater proportion. Therefore, if all our ſoldiers and ſailors had been employed on foreign ſervices, and ſubſiſted on foreign product, there would be a great fall of the price of bread-corn. But a great part of them have actually been during the war ſo employed in the Eaſt and Weſt Indies, our garriſons, on the continent, and in Ireland. To theſe are to be added the ordinary and able ſeamen of the navy on many foreign ſtations; who having been ſea-faring men before, were chiefly ſubſiſted by the corn of this iſland, and are now chiefly ſupported by that of other countries: and there remains another conſiderable article to be brought to account, the ſupply of that part of the whole body of officers, which may be taken as permanently abſent; and who were before con⯑ſumers not producers of corn. Thus on the aggregate it appears, if the quantity of corn raiſed be taken to be a little diminiſhed, the demand for it is reduced in a much greater ratio.

And in what is already ſaid, the anſwer to the laſt reaſon alledged to ſhew that war muſt raiſe [6]the price of corn, is in a great meaſure antici⯑pated. Our land and ſea forces are greatly in⯑creaſed in war; and the augmentation, it is certain, is partly ſupplied by corn purchaſed by public contract; but in peace thoſe men had intirely been fed by corn purchaſed by themſelves of the farmers, or by private contract by millers and merchants; and, if a ſmall diminution of the pro⯑duct be admitted, the diminution of the purchaſes will counterbalance it. Beſide, the corn being purchaſed by great contractors to ſupply govern⯑ment, they will procure it cheaper than the con⯑ſumer, who buys his wheat of the farmer, or even than the merchant in extenſive buſineſs; which tends to keep the market lower.

There remains to be conſidered only a ſingle allegation brought to ſhow that war raiſes the price of corn. It is conſtended ‘that war, by diminiſh⯑ing or ſuſpending the increaſe of the productive capital of the farmer, prevents his being able to break up and cultivate new lands, or improve the cultivation of old ones.’ But this may be produced as an inſtance to ſhow how ſpeciouſly a poſition in its general terms may appear, which is totally contrary to fact. If war diminiſh the capital of the farmers, it muſt affect equally thoſe who reſide near waſte lands proper for incloſure, and thoſe who do not. If the former ſo abound in capital, that the number of thoſe who can enter [7]on the expenſive operation of breaking up waſte lands be, in war, increaſed beyond any example of a former term of peace, the latter have the ability of purſuing other improvements increaſed in the ſame proportion. It appears, on the beſt authority, that the number of the bills of incloſure in the latter half or five years of the laſt peace, ex⯑ceeded that of the former, in the proportion of 17 to 10: Now the number of theſe bills in that laſt term of five years was 173, and the annual average 34^*; but in the firſt four years of war, or to the end of 1796, 283, and the yearly average 70^†: theſe improvements in the laſt peace had exceeded all former precedents; but in war the farmers were able to command a capital ſufficient to execute more than twice as much: and they who had occaſion for money for improvements of another kind, in like manner either had it, or were able to acquire it with equal facility. War there⯑fore had not, until the end of the year 1796, re⯑tarded the celerity with which improvements in agriculture were going on at the end of the peace: it was, in fact, from that term, greatly accele⯑rated.

[8]From the commencement of 1797 to the preſent time, the evidence of this point is of another kind: we poſſeſs no documents for thoſe years, ſo particu⯑lar as the Eſtimate of Mr. Chalmers, or the Report of the Lords' Committee. But immediately before the beginning of the term, the intereſt made by pur⯑chaſes in the funds was higher than at any period ſince the death of William: the inducement to em⯑ploy money in the purchaſe of fixed income, rather than as productive capital, was therefore greater: but this inducement decreaſes the frequency of making an active uſe of capital in commerce or agriculture: the facility of acquiring which, in⯑creaſes in proportion as the price of ſtock in⯑creaſes. And taking the preſent rate of the three per cents in the market at £63 per cent, it has been augmented, during the term, nearly in the proportion of 4 to 3. The facility therefore of making incloſures and improvements of land has, ſince the beginning of 1797, been greatly aug⯑mented: inability in the farmers, to make im⯑provements, occaſioned by the war, cannot there⯑fore be among the cauſes of the high price of corn.

SECTION III. The Prices of Wheat for the period ſince the Revolution, and its diviſion into terms of War and Peace.

THUS reaſoning in general terms, there appears ground to infer, that war does not tend to increaſe the price of corn. But the evidence ariſing from the compariſon of the rates of the market, in the terms of war and peace occurring in a paſt period of ſufficient length, is much ſuperior by its definitive preciſion, and higher in its nature. From that evidence there lies no appeal to other diſcuſſions of any kind.

The period to be taken for that properly com⯑mences with the revolution, and terminates with the laſt completed period or peace. It was then Great Britain took her natural poſition in the ſyſtem of the European powers, which in con⯑junction with her individual intereſts, or ſuppoſed intereſts, has determined the frequency, extent, and duration of her ſubſequent wars, and will con⯑tinue to determine them.

[10]

[13]

[14]This Table being the foundation of the conclu⯑ſion to be deduced on this important ſubject, an account ought to be given of the authorities on which its parts are founded, and of the diviſion here made into terms of peace and war.

The prices of the quarter of wheat, to the year 1764 incluſive^*, are taken from Dr. Adam Smith's work on the Wealth of Nations: the ſame prices have been copied and continued to the preſent time, by the Rev. S. Hodſon^†, but he quotes for it the authority of Smith's Corn Tracts. And the quarter he ſtates to be of eight ſtandard Wincheſ⯑ter buſhels: It is material to add, that in this he is ſuppoſed here to be correct.(B.)

Mr. Hodſon has given a ſupplement to the tables of Smith, to the end of the year 1798; in which he takes the price of the year 1765 from that of Windſor market; of the following years, to 1770 incluſive, from Lord Hawkeſbury's office; and of the remaining years from Mr. Catherwood's tables.

Some remarks are neceſſary to be made on the diviſion of the whole period, conſiſting of 111 years, into terms of war and peace. The duration of a term of war, is not properly that elapſed be⯑tween [15]the formality of its proclamation, and the proclamation of the following peace: it more ac⯑curately is taken to begin at the firſt noted act of hoſtilities, and to end at the day of their ceſſation by compact. Beſide, no ſuch declaration was made of the laſt war with France.

Our greater wars only are to be admitted into the account, or all thoſe in which that power took part againſt us. Our petty hoſtilities againſt Spain, taking place in the long term between the peace of Utrecht and the year 1740, are totally paſſed by and not admitted as ſuch. Theſe, which a ſatyrical writer in the Craftsman, called "our peaceful wars^*," are included in the term of 27 years of peace. It is true, war was declared againſt Spain in the month of December, 1718: the peace eſtabliſhment of the navy was at that time 10,000 men^†, and for the years of war 1719, and 1720, there were voted 13,500^‡: it was ter⯑minated in the ſummer of 1721. The treaty of Hanover, in 1725, led to new choſtilities againſt that power: in 1726, 10,000 men were voted for the navy; and in the following year 20,000: and after ſome ineffectual hoſtilities, articles of agree⯑ment were ſigned in May, 1727. The peace eſta⯑bliſhment of the navy was in 1733, of 8000 men; [16]but in conſequence of a diſpute breaking out with the ſame kingdom in that year, it was increaſed in 1734, to 20,000; and in 1735, to 30,000 men^*. The two laſt terms of peace together, amounted to twenty two years; but our occaſional armaments were much more important. Theſe equipments againſt Spain therefore are to be conſidered only, as ſmaller armaments in a long peace: and the three terms are to be here regarded as wars in name only; for the effects of war in the corn market will be as our exertions; and when thoſe are ſmall, the former will not be diſcernible in the prices; being intirely concealed by the much greater effect of the variation of the products of ſeaſons.

James the ſecond had a ſtrong army on foot during the whole of the year 1688; and a navy fully equipped for ſeveral months of it. Moreover, the Dutch army was in the kingdom, and their navy in our ports at the concluſion of it: this is therefore taken as an effective year of war.

The duration of war, determined as above, muſt generally conſiſt of an integer number of years with an added fraction: for hoſtilities may break out nearly at the concluſion of a certain year; continue uninterrupted for a number of in⯑tire years, as eight, and terminate in the beginning of the next: thus there will have been war in ten [17]ſucceſſive years, but its duration may not be more than nine, or very little exceed eight. A ſuperior accuracy in tables of this kind might be obtained, by giving an account of the duration of hoſtilities in months; but the neglect of it will here produce no diſcernible effect on the reſults to be derived from this; where an integer number of years is aſſigned to every war, approaching the moſt nearly to its true duration.

SECTION IV. The determination of the proportion of the price of Bread Corn in War, to that of the following Peace.

FROM the averages of ten complete terms of war and peace, beginning with the year of the revolution, as given in the laſt table; it appears that on an average, the price of wheat in peace has exceeded that in the preceding war, conſi⯑derably more than £. 5 per cent.

This is manifeſt, by collecting the averages into a table of the due form, in the following manner.

[18]

Hence it appears, that in a period of 106 years, in every war on the average of the whole time, the price of wheat has been 2 £. 2 s. 11 d. a quarter; and in every ſubſequent peace, 2 £. 5 s. 3 d. the latter rate exeeding the former 5 £. 8 s. 8 d. ½ per cent.

Thoſe who loudly contend that war raiſes the price of corn, must at the ſame time admit, that the two different ſtates of peace and war, have different but permanent and natural effects on the rates of the market: and what thoſe effects are they cannot deny to be demonſtrated by the rates themſelves; nor that an average of 106 years is on a ſcale extenſive enough to exclude the effects of the accidents of ſeaſons. Or, in other words, that the number of years of great abundance and of great ſcarcity ſhall be found therein, in the ſame proportion to each other, which from natural cauſes unknown to us, permanently obtains. And [19]that therefore the above table exhibits to us what is the true nature of the effect of each ſtate, and its meaſure, indefinitely near the truth. And the difference of the two ſtates, if unchecked, will operate in the ſame manner and with the ſame force in the market, whatever the plenty or the ſcarcity of a year of war may be: that is, keep the proportion of its price in war to that in peace the ſame: unleſs the danger or apprehenſion of a commotion in war, on account of high prices, may induce the government of a country to uſe greater vigilance, and employ more effective meaſures to keep them down. Wherefore if a due com⯑pariſon could be inſtituted between the prices of wheat, in two equal terms of years immediately following each other, the firſt of war and the ſe⯑cond of peace; in which every circumſtance, ſuch as the product and all others affecting the market (the two ſtates excluſively excepted) ſhould be the ſame; the exceſs of the rate of the latter term above the former ſhall be 5 £. 8 s. 8 d. ½ per centum, as before determined.

Therefore, taking the price of wheat at this time at 6 £. 6 s. the quarter, it appears that if peace had been made in the laſt or any preceding year of the war, the market value at the loweſt pro⯑bable rate, would have exceeded that now taking place by 5 £. 8 s. 8 d. ½ per cent; and amounted to 6 £. 12 s. 10 d. or 6 s. 10 d. more: according to the [20]actual average proportion of the prices of war and peace, which has taken place during 106 years before its commencement (c).

It is ſeen in the table, that there was one term of peace in five, that of 1713, in which the price of corn fell below that of the preceding war; and one of war wherein the average was higher than in the preceding peace, the war of 1755. The conſideration of theſe anomalies would run to a length ſeparating the laſt concluſion too far from that next to be inveſtigated, which is very cloſely connected in its nature to it: It is therefore poſt⯑poned for the preſent.

SECTION V. The determination of the proportion of the price of Bread-Corn in Peace, to that of the following War.

FROM the averages of the price of wheat for eight complete terms of peace and war, beginning with the firſt term of peace in the table, that of Ryſ⯑wick, in the year 1698; and ending with the laſt war or with the year 1782; comprehending a pe⯑riod of 85 years; it appears that the price of wheat in peace, has exceeded that of the following war ſomewhat more than 9 £. per cent.

[21]Here the peace of the year 1698 is to be taken as the firſt term in the table of averages, and the war of 1775 as the laſt: and it will ſtand thus:

One remark is to be made on the formation of this table, before any deductions are drawn from it: the columns muſt contain an equal number of terms, and each line two; the average of a com⯑pleted term of peace, and of the war which fol⯑lowed it. Hence that of the peace of 1783 is of neceſſity excluded for two reaſons: the average of the war following it is yet unknown; and until it be concluded, it is impoſſible to aſſign it: and ſecondly, the object of theſe inveſtigations is to compare the prices of the preſent war, and their relations, with what experience has pointed out thoſe of others to have been for a very long term paſt: therefore in order to inſtitute that compariſon rightly, thoſe paſt rates are to be kept apart from the former: for from ſuch ſeparate ſtatement alone [22]it can be clearly determined, whether the preſent high prices be the effect of war, as ſuch, or of other cauſes operating at the ſame time, and raiſing the market.

This being premiſed, we may proceed to the deductions from the table.

The fifth war ended with the year 1782; whence it appears, that during the whole period of 85 years then elapſed, the average price of the quarter of corn in every term of peace having been 2 £. 5 s. 1 d. and in the ſucceeding war 2 £ 1 s. the former rate exceeded the latter by 9 £ 19 s. 2 d. per cent. And if in any one year of thoſe four terms of war, the ſcarcity of corn had been ſuch, as to have raiſed its price to 6 £. 6 s. per quarter; ſuppoſing the ſame deficiency, or other circum⯑ſtances determining the rate, had taken place in the preceding peace, the ſelling price would have been 6 £ 18 s. 6 d. ½ per quarter: and if ſuch an event had happened in any year of the laſt peace, ſuch is the price to which wheat would have riſen. Hence if this proportion be applied to the average price of wheat in the laſt peace, 2 £. 6 s. 2 d. it will appear, that according to the variation of the term of 85 years found above, that average rate of the following or preſent war, would not have ex⯑ceeded 2 £. 1 s. 1 d. ¾. Nor is it to be preſumed that its effect totally differs in nature and kind from the average effect of preceding wars; the difference [23]therefore between the above rate, and that now obtaining in the market, is to be attributed to cauſes independent of the war.

In the former part of the intire period of 106 years, the price of wheat was decreaſing: in the latter it increaſed again, but the re-augmentation appears, upon the face of the table, not to have been equal to the decrement. Thus we ſee the mean average of a preceding peace, exceeds that of the intermediate war, by 9£. 19 s. 2 d. per cent; and that of a following peace, exceeds that inter⯑mediate price, by 5£. 8 s. 8 d.½ only: the arith⯑metic mean of which two rates, is 7£. 13 s. 11 d. ½ per cent. Now by the conſtruction of the table, theſe are the relations of the prices when the ordi⯑nary circumſtances of peace and war obtain: there⯑fore, when the two terms of peace and the interme⯑diate war are of the average length, be that what may; whence the lengths of the two terms of peace are to be taken equal. And the average price of every peace, is evidently that of the middle of the term: and the diſtance in time from the firſt peace average to the ſecond, will be compounded of the following three parts: Firſt, the latter half of the [...]rſt term of peace; ſecondly, the whole intermediate term of war; and laſtly, the firſt half of the ſuc⯑ceeding peace, equal to the latter half of the pre⯑ceding; becauſe their whole terms are equal. And between the extreme inſtants of each of the [24]half terms, or middle of the two terms of peace, a decrement of prices had taken place. Now if peace had continued during the whole of this compounded period, and the decrement had been ſuppoſed to have gone on equally in every year, which, in that circumſtance, is the due aſſumption; then the price in the middle of the intermediate years, now taken as a term of peace inſtead of war, would have been the arith⯑metic mean between that of the firſt year of the firſt, and the laſt of the ſecond half term of peace as above: which alſo would be the average price of the whole intermediate term, if the firſt peace had continued throughout the whole of it; and would have exceeded the actual average of the war by 7£. 13 s. 11½ d. per cent. taking therefore the price of wheat at any aſſigned rate in a year of war, if the preceding peace had continued to the end of that year, the rate would have been higher by 7£. 13 s. 11½ d. per cent. Thus the price of wheat in any year of war being ſix guineas a quarter, the price in that year, if peace had been prolonged thereto, would have been 6£. 15 s. 8¼ d.; exceed⯑ing the former by 9 s. 8¼ d. the quarter. (D)

SECTION VI. The fall of the Price of Wheat in War of 1702, equal to the mean of that preceding and following Peace.— It riſes in the War of 1755: but with leſs celerity than the mean of preceding and following Peace.

AMONG ten terms of war and peace a ſingle in⯑ſtance is found, in which the average price of wheat in peace has fallen below that of the pre⯑ceding war. That of the peace of 1713 was 2£. 0 s. 4 d. per quarter, but of the preceding war 2£. 4 s. 11 d.

But the particular circumſtances of the account ſhow the ſeeming irregularity to form no exception to the general concluſion, that peace does not tend to reduce the price of bread-corn: for from the end of the year 1699 to that of 1744, or during an entire period of forty-five years, a great fall took place in the price of wheat, having been in the firſt term 2£. 12 s. 6 d. the quarter, and in the laſt 1£. 15 s. 5 d.: and its progreſs, it muſt be ob⯑ſerved, was not uniform but undulating. And in ſuch a caſe, if the price of the firſt war fall below that of the firſt peace, and the rate riſe again at the beginning of the ſecond; and after ſuch firſt increaſe it begins again to fall, and the fall be continued a certain number of years, it may at length become leſs than the War price: and the operation of the cauſes of this decline being [26]ſufficiently further prolonged, the average of the whole term may fall below that of the preceding war; as will appear to have been the caſe in the inſtance given above.

For the war of Anne being effectively ended by the ceſſation of hoſtilities in 1712, its average was 2£. 4 s. 11 d. Six years of peace followed; the average of which term was 2£. 6 s. 1 d. In the ſhort hoſtilities, not noticed in the table, which broke out with Spain, that rate amounted to 1£. 16 s. 0 d. only: and between that and the little war of 1734, there was another term of thirteen years, in which the average price of wheat roſe again 2 s. and 11 d. the quarter. War recom⯑menced in 1734; but corn advanced in the two years it continued 2 s. the quarter, owing to ſome conſiderable falling off of the crops of 1735; an event againſt which it is not contended that war is a preſervative. A peace of four years enſued, in which it fell to 1£. 18 s. 1 d.

Upon account of the ſmall ſcale on which theſe wars were carried on, the years in which they took place are, in the general table, included in the long term of twenty-ſeven years of peace. But if the years elapſed between the concluſion of 1712, and that of 1733, had been divided therein into two terms of peace, and one of war, and their averages taken; the war price of corn would have been found to be leſs than either that of the preceding [27]or following peace. But that of the ſhort war of 1734 will thus appear anomalous. (E)

To put this in another point of view: it is now to be proved, that taking the duration of the peace of Utrecht at twenty-ſeven years, as in the tables; the price of wheat having been falling from the be⯑ginning of the peace of Ryſwick, to the end of the former; the great war of the Spaniſh ſucceſſion did not retard that fall.

From the prices of the three terms given, and the duration of each, we are able by a method of calculation firſt given by Sir Iſaac Newton, to aſſign the moſt probable price, on any inſtant of time between the middle of the firſt and laſt term: and thence to get the prices of the firſt and laſt day of the war. (F)

The average price of the war of 1702 (which will be here moſt conveniently ſo expreſſed) was 539 d.; and it is to be taken as that of the middle term thereof: and its duration being eleven years, there were five years and a half of it unexpired. The length of the following peace was twenty-ſeven years: of which, at the middle term, there were thirteen years and a half unexpired; when the rate was fallen to 484 d.: and the period from the middle of the preceding war to the middle of the peace was nineteen years. Moreover the average price of the term, in the middle of the war of 1740 was 425 d.; and the ſemi-term of war four years [28]and a half: the diſtance of time, therefore, from the middle of the peace to that of the following war, was eighteen years.

From theſe elements, proceeding by the method of calculation above referred to, it appears, that at the inſtant of the commencement of the peace, or when five years and a half were expired after the middle of the war; the average price of corn is moſt juſtly to be aſſigned at 523.84 d.: and at at the end of the peace, or thirty-two years and a half after that term, it became 440.41 d. Its de⯑creaſe therefore, during a peace of twenty-ſeven years, was 83.43 d.: or its mean annual decre⯑ment, 3.09 d.

Again the price in the middle of the firſt war having been 539 d.; and in that of the ſecond 425 d.; the difference was 114 d; the ſum of the decrements of peace and the two half terms of war. And the former having been 83.43 d. the lat⯑ter was 30.57 d. But the two whole terms of war having been together twenty years, and the two halves ten; their mean annual decrement was 3.057 d.: nearly equal to that of the interven⯑ing peace, 3.09 d.: the former having fallen ſhort of the latter by 1£. 1 s. 8 d. per cent. only.

By the inſpection of the original table it alſo appears, that the price of corn roſe, in the war of 1755, above the average of the preceding peace: and that exceſs was conſiderable, 3 s. 8 d. the quarter. This ſeems an objection againſt what is [29]here advanced, on which ſome may be diſpoſed to dwell with pertinacity.

To conſider this in a popular way: it is ſeen by the ſame table, that in the term of peace following that war, the average roſe ſtill higher; exceeding that of the war by 7 s. 7 d. the quarter; or ſome⯑thing more than double the advance taking place in the war. The three terms form a period of twenty-ſix years, in which the price of corn was increaſing with conſiderable celerity: this muſt have been owing to ſome cauſe, the effects of which, war, although it could not preclude en⯑tirely, might by its proper tendency diminiſh: and the advance of twelve years in the following peace, having been more than double that of eight years of war, indicates this to have been the caſe.

And the juſtice of this concluſion is fully proved, by a compariſon of the mean annual increment of the price of corn, in the two half terms of the peace of 1749 and 1763, and that of the inter⯑vening war of 1755. For proceeding as before, we find the price of corn at the middle inſtant of the firſt peace, or the beginning of the year 1752, to have been 458 d. per quarter: the term of the middle of the war 1755 was ſeven years, and the price 502 d.: from thence to the middle of the fol⯑lowing peace, there elapſed ten years; and the value of corn was now become 593 d. Whence by [30]the Newtonian method of differentials as before, at the end of three years after the middle of the firſt peace, or the inſtant of the termination thereof, the price of wheat was become 474.87 d.; and at the end of the war, which laſted eight years, or at the end of eleven years after the middle of the firſt peace, that price had increaſed to 534.39 d. or its increment in eight years of war, was 59.52 d.; the yearly average of which was 7.44 d. But the total advance of price, between the middle of the firſt and ſecond of theſe terms of peace, was 135 d.; and that of eight years of war having been 59.52 d., that taking place in the nine years of peace, was 75.48 d.; and its yearly average 8.38 d.—therefore the annual augmenta⯑tion in peace, exceeded that in war 12£. 12 s. 8 d. per cent.

It has been ſeen above, that war does not tend to retard a fall of the price of corn taking place from cauſes, be they what they may, operating for long periods: for in the only period, that of the war of 1702, in which ſuch an effect could be ſuppoſed to have attended it, the annual meaſures of the fall in war and peace were found to be ſub-equal. And as in the other four periods, the price of wheat, in peace, is conſtantly found to riſe above that of the preceding war, that equality muſt be aſcribed to ſome cauſe perturbing the rates of the market; ſuch as conſiderable variations of the quantity of the [31]product in the period in which it took place, or other circumſtances affecting prices in an unuſual but ſimilar manner. And as to the reſults of the compariſon for the war of 1755, it is to be noted, that although a war appears, in every inſtance, to generate a fall, or retard an advance, it cannot to⯑tally prevent; yet the meaſure of the exceſs of the annual augment in peace, above that in war, found for that period 12£. 12 s. 9 d. per cent. ſeems alſo to have been increaſed by a perturbing cauſe, but acting in an oppoſite direction to the former, and affecting the market anomalouſly, and with great ſtrength.

For in all other periods comprehended in the table, except thoſe above examined, a fall of prices in war, is conſtantly obſerved to take place: and from this it ſhould follow, that its effects are to accelerate a decreaſe, and retard a riſe of prices taking place in peace, which are operations of the ſame power. It is now to be inquired, how far this agrees with the two laſt reſults combined with each other.

In order to this let it be ſuppoſed, that the mea⯑ſure of this effect of war was conſtant or equal at both periods above conſidered; and that the ef⯑fects of the perturbing cauſes mentioned above, although ſhewn to be contrary in direction at the two periods, were equal in magnitude: and of theſe aſſumptions, the moſt natural and legitimate [32]which can be made, let the conſequence be ſought. Calling here the rate per cent. by which the an⯑nual increaſe or decreaſe of prices, actually varied in peace and war, in each of the two periods, its meaſure of variation; it follows, that in the firſt period (the perturbing cauſe then in operation tending to counteract the effect of war) 1£. 1 s. 8 d. the actual variation taking place, was the dif⯑ference of the variations which each acting ſepa⯑rately would have produced; but their combined effect having been to retard a fall of rates, that of the perturbing force was the greater of the two. In the ſecond inſtance they acted in conjunction, re⯑tarding a riſe of rates; and the meaſure of varia⯑tion, 12£. 12 s. 8 d. per cent. was the ſum of their effects. The meaſure of this effect of war therefore, retarding an increaſe or accelerating a fall of prices, being the ſmaller of the two, would be a variation equal to half the latter ſum, dimi⯑niſhed by half the former, or (6£. 6 s. 4 d.—o£. 10 s. 10 d.) 5£. 15 s. 6 d. and at this rate per cent. in the pound, on the aſſumption made above, it would have increaſed the fall of prices in the firſt term, if it had not been counteracted; and diminiſhed the fall no more in the ſecond, if it had not been aided by perturbing cauſes; ſuch as diſ⯑ferences of annual product from the average quan⯑tity, and ſome others.

The meaſure of the perturbing cauſe, equal at [33]both times in magnitude, being the greater of the two operating forces, was equal to half the ſum of the obſerved variations, or 6£. 17 s. 2 d. per cent. and hence the truth of the deduction may be proved: for the variation of the annual decrement in war in the firſt period, was equal to the dif⯑ference of the meaſures here found, 6£. 17 s. 2 d. and 5£. 15 s. 6 d.; or [...]£. 1 s. 8 d.: and in the ſecond to their ſum, 12£. 12 s. 8 d. per cent.

And by ſection 4th it was ſhewn, from the rates of 105 years, that the average price of wheat, in every peace, exceeds that of the pre⯑ceding war, by 5£. 8 s. 8½ d. per cent.; very nearly equal to 5£. 15 s. 6 d., the meaſure of the effect of war, thus found to aſſiſt the fall, or coun⯑teract the increaſe of prices.

It will be objected, that this conſequence holds only on the aſſumption of a ſingle caſe; that the meaſures of the effect of the perturbing cauſes were equal: and that the probability is very little, that they were actually ſo proportioned at the two pe⯑riods. To this it may be replied, that thus much is proved hereby, that even the ſeeming irregula⯑rities in the table, when combined, give a reſult reconcileable to what is ſaid of the tendency of war, by making uſe of an aſſumption, the moſt cuſtomary and obvious; and therefore no argu⯑ment againſt it reſults from them. But this aſſump⯑tion [34]of the equality of the perturbing cauſes at the two periods, it muſt be further urged, is not neceſ⯑ſary to obtain probable reſults: they might have been taken unequal; as for example, let the meaſure of that of the firſt period have been 8£. 15 s. 7 d. and of the ſecond, 4£. 18 s. 9 d. per cent. From either of theſe it follows, that the depreſſing power of war was 7£. 13 s. 11 d. per cent. the rate found by the tables, as that by which the price of wheat in a year of war, would have been exceeded by the rate of the market, if the preceding peace had been continued to that term: and it is only neceſſary, that the meaſure of the effect of the firſt perturb⯑ing cauſe be taken at more than 1£. 1 s. 8 d. and leſs than 12£. 12 s. 8 d. per cent. in order to obtain a ſeries of other reſults, alike conſiſtent with what is ſaid of this tendency of war. Within theſe limits, the aſſumptions which may be made are in number infinite; and the meaſures of the two powers may be taken in any poſſible propor⯑tion between the numbers 261 and 1879.

SECTION VII. On the decreaſe of the Price of the Quarter of Wheat to the War of 1740, and its ſubſequent advance; and on their Magnitudes.

THE original table contains the prices of wheat for 105 years: that period is apparently divided into two great parts, hitherto unconſidered. In the firſt the price of wheat was decreaſing: and as the nature of the ſubject determined it, with an undulating diminution. In the ſecond part, in ap⯑pears to have become reaugmented in a manner the converſe of the former: a diviſion, the conſe⯑quences of which deſerve attention.

The prices of wheat in the years 1743 and 1744 are the loweſt in the whole table: and if we re⯑ſpect intirely entries of ſingle years, we muſt fix the minimum, or loweſt price of the period com⯑prized in it, between them; and at the end of the former year. But the rates of ſingle years are too much affected by ſeaſons and other accidents of the market, to fix from them the boundaries of great periods: and recourſe muſt be had to the more accurate method of interpolation, which has before been applied to the ſubject. From the in⯑ſpection of the table it is evident, that the loweſt [36]price took place, in ſome one year, between the mid⯑dle of the ſecond peace and that of the third; two terms of time diſtant twenty one years: the prices of which are determined from thoſe of thirty-three years given. And from theſe, and that of the intermediate war, this minimum or loweſt price, and its period, are to be aſſigned; which will be thus determined from the prices of forty-two years. And in ſo long a period, the anomalies of the market, ariſing from the ſingular ſcarcity or abundance of particular years, and ſuch other cauſes as accidentally depreſs or raiſe its rates; being probably equally mixed, will counterbalance and deſtroy each other; and thus the reſults ob⯑tained will approximate nearly enough to thoſe which would have been found, if the permanent cauſes of the progreſſive variations had operated without diſturbance.

The middle of the year 1726, (or 1725½) was that of the ſecond peace; the duration of the ſecond half was thirteen years and a half; and the price of wheat at that time was 484 d. the quarter: the following war laſted nine years; the price at the middle inſtant whereof was 425 d. and its diſtance from that of the firſt peace eighteen years: there remained of the term four years and a half; and the half of the next or third peace was three years; the diſ⯑tance between which, and the middle of the pre⯑ceding war, was ſeven years and a half. And the [37]price of wheat at the end of the third year of peace; was 458 d. pence. Now with theſe elements pro⯑ceeding as before, the price for every term of the whole period of twenty-five years and a half will be found: and when 14.4 years of this period were expired, the price of wheat, according to the equation of the term, was fallen to 421 d. or 1 £. 15 s. 1 d. per quarter; the loweſt rate or minimum thereof (1). Hence, whatever rates are ſeen in the table below that minimum; their depreſſion is to be attributed to the variations of the ſeaſons and markets from their average ſtate: and the loweſt depreſ⯑ſion of the market, is moſt truly to be taken to have been at the end of the year 1740 (1739. 9)

And, if the whole period of 105 years com⯑priſed in the table, be divided into two equal parts, the diviſion will fall in the middle of the year 1740, being extremely near to the term of the loweſt price aſſigned above. Therefore as all other conſiderations ſet aſide, this diviſion into equal periods is familiarized to us by cuſtom, and approaches very near to that which is moſt accu⯑rate, it is here excluſively followed: no further re⯑gard being paid, either to the true inſtant of the minimum by interpolation, or that exhibited by the original table.

This being taken as a proper diviſion of the period, the variation of a its prices ſhall be now ex⯑amined; firſt by comparing the average of the [38]two equal terms it contains; and ſecondly, the ce⯑lerity of the fall of the firſt, and that of the ad⯑vance taking place in the ſecond.

The number of years contained in the table to the end of the laſt peace are 105; the ſum of the firſt fifty-two prices, with the half of the fifty-third, or that of the year 1740, 1£. 5 s. 4 d. is 116£. 7 s. and the average of the term, being of fifty-two years and a half, 2£. 4 s. 3 d. The like ſum of the prices of the laſt fifty-two years and a half, is 112£. 10 s. 1 d. and the average 2£. 2 s. 10 d. Whence the average price of wheat in the firſt term exceeded that of the laſt, by 1 s. 5 d. the quarter; and by 3£. 6 s. 1 d. per cent.

The celerity of the fall in the firſt term, and of the advance in the ſecond, is thus found. The price of wheat in the middle of the war of the re⯑volution, or at the end of the year 1692, was the average of that term, 2£. 10 s. 8 d. In forty-ſeven years and a half after, or in the middle of the year 1740, it fell to its loweſt rate: but this is to be determined, not from the actual price of the year, but that [...]ound for it by the interpolation of three terms of peace and war, each of conſiderable du⯑ration, which is thus to be taken as 1£. 15 s. 1 d. the amount of the minimum determined by another mode above. The total fall therefore in forty-ſeven years and a half, was 15 s. 7 d. and the an⯑nual average decrement of prices 3.936 d. In the [39]middle of the laſt peace, or at the end of the year 1787, the price of wheat per quarter was 2£. 6 s. 2 d. the augment was 11 s. 1 d. and the term in which it was generated forty-ſeven years and a half: whence the mean annual augment of prices was 2.8 d. and the annual fall of prices in the firſt term, exceeded the advance in the ſecond, by 40£. 11 s. 5 d. per cent (K).

SECTION VIII. On the Cauſes of this fall of the Markets, and of their ſubſequent advance; and on ſome of their conſequences.

THE meaſures of this advance and fall of the price of wheat having been aſſigned, in concluſion ſome obſervations on the cauſes and effects thereof will be given. Dr. Adam Smith conſiders the de⯑crement of the firſt period, as a proof of an increaſe of the value of the precious metals commencing long before the revolution. Nor is this inconſiſtent, as it may be at firſt ſuſpected, with a fact which muſt be admitted, ſome increaſe of the national coin during the whole period of the fall: for if the national product had been increaſed in that period [40]with greater celerity, prices muſt fall, or the value of coin increaſe; in the ſame manner, and for the ſame reaſon, as a like increaſe of the value of money and fall of prices muſt take place; if the product were to remain unincreaſed, while the quantity of coin is diminiſhed: for in both caſes alike, a relative decreaſe, a decrement of the propor⯑tion of money to commodities takes place: and the variation of prices depends on the variation of the proportion, not of the abſolute quantity of each.

It is alſo to be obſerved, that after the quantity of the precious metals annually imported has been for a courſe of years fixed; the latter imports may increaſe the ſtock of money in the general market of Europe very little. For that ſtock being toward the end of the term conſiderably increaſed, its waſte by wear will alſo be increaſed in the ſame proportion; together with its diminution by acci⯑dents; as caſual loſſes, fires, and ſhipwrecks. Some coin is melted down, and together with much bullion waſted by the arts: and the di⯑minution in the laſt mode will be perpetually in⯑creaſing, by the relative fall of the price of the metals, compared with that of every other thing. Moreover from the revolution to the year 1740, the bullion exported to China and India, from Britain and the reſt of Europe, was annually aug⯑menting: and it has been well obſerved, that the Europeans dig ſilver in the Weſt, to carry it to be buried in the Eaſt. Hence even the in⯑creaſe [41]of the quantity of coin in a ſtate, might go on with a celerity perpetually retarded, until it ul⯑timately ceaſed; although its imports of the pre⯑cious metals were every year equal.

Thus, equal quantities of bullion dug from the mines, will increaſe the European ſtock of coin by an annual augment perpetually decreaſing. But if it all were converted into money, not ſubject to wear, exportation, or accidental loſs; the annual increaſe of the ſtock being perpetually equal in amount, its increaſe per cent. would be perpetually diminiſhed: and the truth of this poſition may be very eaſily ſhown. Monteſquieu ſays, that by the diſcovery of America, the ſtock of money was increaſed in two centuries, in the proportion of thirty-two to unity^*; and he conſiders this to have been effected by equal annual imports; which con⯑ſequently amounted to 16£. per cent. of the initial ſtock annually. This ſeems too great an increaſe, even for an aſſumption to illuſtrate this propoſition. Let it therefore for that purpoſe be ſuppoſed, that the average annual import has been 1/20 or 5£. per cent. of the initial European ſtock of coin: and that this influx commenced with the conqueſt of Peru, in the year 1532: then the conſtant annual augment being taken as five, and the original ſtock of coins as 100, it muſt have been as follows: [42]

Thus the ratio of the increaſe to the ſtock will be perpetually diminiſhing, and at firſt rapidly: it is only when that proportion becomes very minute, that the annual augment per cent. approaches to equality. But there are two cauſes which will ſtop that augment altogether: Firſt, the decreaſe of coin by wear, caſualties and the export to the eaſt, which jointly may be taken at a fixed rate per cen⯑tum of its whole amount: let the yearly aggre⯑gate of all theſe be only ½£. per cent. of the whole coin; the ratios of the annual augments to the ſtock in the ſucceſſive periods, are the terms of the reciprocal ſeries, 5/1, 5/2, 5/3, 5/4£. &c. per cent. the tenth term of which is 5/10£. or one half per cent. Thus the annual augment of the coin will ulti⯑mately become equal to its annual decreaſe: and the final ſtock will be as 1,100 or eleven times the initial ſtock. An event which would by this hypo⯑theſis for illuſtration, have taken place in 200 years after the conqueſt of Peru, or in the Year 1732.

But there are cauſes both accelerating and retard⯑ing this period. Among the accelerating cauſes, one of the moſt powerful is, the increaſe of the [43]ſtock of metal itſelf: and if the quantity of com⯑modities to be purchaſed by it, continue fixed or increaſe in a leſs proportion than coin; the real value for which this univerſal equivalent will ex⯑change, will perpetually diminiſh. And the ftock of money, compared with commodities, will probably increaſe with as great celerity in the country of the mines, by what is retained for its uſe, as in Europe: and if Dr. Smith had been followed here, it might be affirmed, with greater. Thus the charge of working the mines will increaſe, and even the undertaker's remainder thus diminiſhed be reduced in proportional value to him; and if at firſt the ſhare of the miner, after paying the king's tax, were eight times the charge of procuring the metal; and prices roſe as in Europe; after eight periods of twenty years, the expence of working a mine becoming eight times as much, would equal his ſhare of the product; the tax being here conſtantly taken to continue unreduced. And the quantity of his ſurplus would be in each ſuc⯑ceſſive period, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0 eighths of the exceſs of the product above the tax. But the value of the metals falling, as the terms of the reciprocal ſeries 1, ½, ⅓, &c. the value of his ſur⯑plus, or the quantity of commodities it will pro⯑cure him, will in the ſucceſſive terms be as thoſe of the ſeries, 7/ [...], 6/2, 5/3, 4/4, ⅗, 2/6, 1/7, 0/8: And the work⯑ing of the mines muſt be abandoned, long before [44]the end of the term; but if the advance of prices in America, conſtantly follow that of Europe at a certain diſtance, as twenty or thirty years; the period of working the mines will be protracted ſo much longer.

But there are cauſes alſo retarding this term: the total quantity of gold to be divided between the king and the adventurer remaining the ſame, whatever increaſes the ſhare of the latter, dimi⯑niſhes the charge of extracting it, or makes it ab⯑ſolutely of greater value to him, will encourage him to continue his undertaking. Reductions of the king's tax are of the firſt kind; improvements in the proceſs of the extraction of the metals are of the ſecond; and an increaſe of the product of other branches of induſtry, and principally ſuch improvements, as procure greater products from the ſame quantity of labour, are of the laſt. And theſe may go on for many years, at particular periods; ſo that the general quantity of products ſhall increaſe with greater celerity than that of coin, although conſtantly augmented: thus the latter will riſe again in its value; and the ſhare of the proprietor of the mine, though not increaſed, become more valuable to him.

And to the miner, the ultimate effects of each of theſe are alike; but they are very different on the prices of commodities. The laſt reduces them; the two firſt by ſudden augmentations of [45]the profits of mining, enable former adventurers to increaſe their undertakings, and attract new capital to new ones; increaſing the product of the metals, and accelerating the fall of money.

Since the diſcovery of America, the product of the mines has generally increaſed with more cele⯑rity, than that of the products of Europe: whence on the whole, there has been a great in⯑creaſe of prices. There may alſo have been periods, in which ſuch products have increaſed faſteſt: the proportion of the augments of each has alſo frequently varied: ſo that the line de⯑ſcribing the fall of the value of money will be un⯑dulated, and even have ſome points of retro⯑greſſion.

But, as explained above, while the quantity of coin in a ſtate abſolutely increaſes, if its product be augmented with greater celerity, it relatively falls, and the price of corn with it. This was our ſtate from 1688 to 1740: and the fall is accounted for on the ſame principle by Dr. A. Smith, al⯑though he takes it as terminating later. But an increaſe of the produce of the mines will raiſe again the rates of the market, and they will con⯑tinue riſing, until the annual import of the metals, ſuppoſed again uniform but of a greater amount, ſhall have produced its utmoſt effect.

It is to ſuch an augmentation, which was not heeded by that writer, that the increaſe of the [46]price of wheat during the latter half of the term here conſidered, is to be attributed.

The hiſtory of this event, from the facts I have been able to collect, is as follows.^* In the year 1723, the court of Spain determined to reduce the duties paid on the precious metals, at the mint of Goanaxuato in Mexico. They probably had imagined, that by a reduction of the duties, the increaſe of the quantity would be ſuch, as even to produce a conſiderable increaſe of the revenue. The quantity of the gold and ſilver brought an⯑nually to this mint, was, on an average of ſixty-five years before the experiment, in value 193, 103£. ſterling. It was th [...]refore ſufficient for a trial of the meaſure upon an adequate ſcale, and that with little hazard to the general amount of the tax on the mines. The aggregate duties on gold bullion were then reduced from 227/10 to 12⅔ per cent; and on the ſilver in ingots, from 20 and 22 per cent, to a rate varying from 127/24 to 102/15 per cent, at different periods.

In Dodſley's annual regiſter of the year 1783, there is a table ſhewing the weight of gold and ſilver, on which duties have been paid, by the accounts made up every five years, from 1665 to 1778 each incluſive, being an ab⯑ſtract of the King's books at the mint. This [47]table has all the appearance of being an official paper; it is ſigned "Juan Ordonnez, keeper of the records." From it the following is cal⯑culated.

Whence the following averages are deduced:

The yearly average of the metals in the firſt period having been 193,103£. and of the ſecond 657,425£. the increaſe was in the proportion of 340.45 to 100, or about 240½£. per cent. Now the mean tax on each of the metals for the firſt period, may be well enough taken at 2155/100 per cent, and for the ſecond at 1247/100; thus it appears in 1723 to have been reduced nearly in the ratio of 57 to 100: and the product of the duties in the firſt period was 42,192£. ſterling, and in the ſecond 81,980£. having been increaſed 94£. 6 s. per cent.

[48]In the original table two columns are added under the titles of duties on ſilver and duties on gold: on a due compariſon with the value of the metals for which theſe duties were paid, they are found both before and after the year 1723, to have been nearly at the equal rate of 1½£. per cent on the total of that value. The columns are therefore the amount of the ſovereignty duty mentioned in the memoir (L); a diſtinct payment from the greater taxes of the fifth and tenth of the amount; of which the table contains nothing.

The reſult of this operation determined the crown of Spain to extend the reduction of the duty to all the mints of America: for we find, that the tax upon ſilver in Peru, was in the year 1736 reduced from one fifth to one tenth of the metals ex⯑tracted^* This meaſure muſt have produced great ef⯑fects on the quantity of the annual product: for thoſe who before entered the product of their mines legally, muſt certainly then have derived ſome profit from them: its rate was now increaſed 10£. per cent; and they extended and multiplied their adventures. The muſt likewiſe have been a numerous claſs of men in thoſe colonies, whom the legal gain could not before induce to embark in the ſearch and [49]working of mines, and who would not run the ſmuggler's hazard; whom this great addition to the regular profits of mining, induced to embark in it. The additional product of the adventurers of the firſt claſs, and the intire product of that of the ſecond, is a real augmentation of the metals dug up every year; a great part of which muſt have increaſed the European import.

The augmentation however cannot be equal to that of the quantity paying duty: part will be retained in America for the uſe of the coloniſts: and many engaged in the clandeſtine trade, when the ſuperiority of its profits were diminiſhed £. 10 per cent, muſt have declined the the hazard of continuing it, and brought their gold and ſilver to the mints according to law. But their works, before clandeſtinely carried on, being now openly wrought, would be continued on a larger ſcale: and here an abſolute increaſe of pro⯑duct would be obtained. Yet ſtill the remaining tax of £. 10 per cent, might operate with conſidera⯑ble power, and much gold and ſilver would con⯑tinue to be ſmuggled. And hence it is to be concluded, that the reduction of the tax in Peru, had conſequences ſimilar to thoſe, which followed the previous adoption of that meaſure at Goan⯑axuato; although the augmentation of the metals paying duty, might fall in ſome proportion which [50]cannot be aſſigned, below that which followed the reduction of 1723. ^*

In four years after the diminution of the tax in Peru, which took place in 1736; or cloſely ad⯑hering to the yearly prices in the firſt corn table, in ſeven years and a half; the augmented import of the metals began to produce its natural effect in our corn market; and continued to augment its prices, until it had raiſed them, to the higheſt rate the new annual ſupply of the metals could ſupport. This took place about the beginning of 1769, ac⯑cording to the firſt table.

In the firſt half of the term compriſed therein, the improvements in agriculture and its product being progreſſive, the demand for the precious metals was increaſing; the annual ſupply being fixed, or perhaps decreaſing from its nature, as ex⯑plained above. Hence the price of corn fell, but that annual ſupply riſing per ſaltum in 1736, with greater celerity than the products of agriculture, the value of the metals muſt have begun to fall. The juſtice of this principle is recognized by [51]Smith^*. He alſo repeatedly mentions the reduc⯑tion of the duties upon gold and ſilver in 1736. But he enters into no inquiry into the effect of that meaſure, upon the annual ſupply of Europe: and when he comes to conſider the prices of corn, from 1688 to the peace of 1763, and the import of the metals conjointly; he all along proceeds upon an aſſumption tacitly made, that this import con⯑tinued uniform. This led him to attribute the riſe of prices actually commencing about 1740, and continued according to his tables to the year 1764, to a ſucceſſion of indifferent or bad ſeaſons^†; not for ten or twelve years, but for twenty-four; a cir⯑cumſtance not to be lightly admitted. But as the prices of corn were ſupported, at a rate not much inferior to what it had riſen to, to the end of the laſt peace, or for a further term of twenty-eight years; and the continuance of the effect, muſt ariſe from the continuance of the ſame cauſe; the error of his account of that riſe of the corn mar⯑ket, is now, much more obvious, than at the time of his writing.

To conclude theſe remarks on the cauſe of the riſe of market rates, after the year 1740. By the table, of the accounts of the mint of Goanaxuato, it ap⯑pears, that the intire ſucceſs of the operation of [52]1736, had induced the court of Spain in September 1777, to try what would be the effect of re⯑ducing the duties on gold and ſilver ſtill further. That on gold bullion was lowered from 12⅔ to three per cent; and the ſeignorage taken off ſilver. The quantity of both, on which the duties were paid, is given in the laſt article of the table, for four years only, ending with 1778; including 2¾ years at the old, and five quarters at the reduced rates. And as far as any conſequences can be drawn from the experience of ſo ſhort a period, the increaſe of the product of the mines by this ſecond meaſure, may be expected nearly to equal that of the firſt (M): for there is little probability that in the following years it became leſs effective. This ſecond experiment had undoubtedly the ſame ob⯑ject as the firſt; and if it ſucceeded, it muſt be in⯑ferred, it was in like manner copied in Peru, in ſome period of the laſt peace. This ſoon pro⯑duced a ſecond important augmentation of the Spaniſh import of the precious metals, which in five or ſix years again affected the corn market of Britain; and continuing its operation, is now a ſtrong and concurring cauſe of the high prices of wheat in the preſent war. For the reduction of the tax on the metal in Peru, in 1736, is to be taken by the table, to have produced its utmoſt effect in the wheat market, about the middle of the peace [53]of 1763; or the year 1768, or in thirty-two years.

But Robertſon, in his Hiſtory of America, has pointed out another probable ſource of the increaſe of the influx of gold and ſilver into Europe, "but little known" to us at the time of his writing: and of which he ſays, it "may be productive of great effects;" and that "it merits attention:" and it certainly merits it here. In the year 1765, the Spaniards, engaged in a war with the Indians on the borders of Mexico, were led into the mountainous diſtricts of the province of Sonora; and ‘in the courſe of this ſervice, marched through countries into which they ſeem not to have penetrated before that time, and diſcovered mines of ſuch value, as was aſtoniſhing even to men acquainted with the riches contained in the mountains of the new world. At Cineguilla, in that province, they en⯑tered a plain of fourteen leagues in extent, in which they found gold in grains at the depth of only ſixteen inches, of ſuch a ſize that ſome of them weighed nine marks, and in ſuch quantities, that in a ſhort time, with a few labourers, they col⯑lected a thouſand marks of gold in grains, even without taking time to waſh the earth that had been dug, which appeared to be ſo rich, that perſons of ſkill computed that it might yield what would be equal in value to a million of Pezos (N). Before the end of the year 1771, [54]above two thouſand perſons were ſettled there, under the government of proper magiſtrates.’ He adds, ‘as ſeveral other mines, not inferior in riches, have been diſcovered both in Sonora and Cinaloa, it is probable, that theſe neglected and thinly-inhabited provinces, may ſoon become as populous and valuable, as any part of the Spaniſh empire in America^*.’ It is evident, that the great effects Robertſon had in contemplation when he wrote, were thoſe of a future fall of the value of money: which the experience of above a century, ſhows to be more manifeſted by the increaſe of the rates of the wheat market in peace than in war, the product of the year being equal in each; be it either deficient; of the average quantity; or even abundant.

But to what has been ſaid of the increaſe of the European import of the metals, one objection will be urged. It appears by the evidence of Sir John Hort, who had many years been his Majeſty's con⯑ſul at Liſbon, which was delivered before the Lords' Committee, on the ſtoppage of payments in caſh at the Bank, that ‘the raw articles of the Brazils have been greatly increaſed of late years, and conſequently, that conſiderable ſums of gold have been ſent back to that country from Por⯑tugal, in payment of its debts and balances. [55]This naturally, (he obſerves,) ſhould diminiſh the import of gold into Portugal, but of this fact, (he adds,) he is not informed.’

Yet it will be ſeen that this leaves it intirely un⯑certain whether the quantity of the metals from the Portugueſe mines, reſting in Europe, be in⯑creaſed or diminiſhed. For by his evidence it ap⯑pears, that in his opinion, the annual import of the metals is alſo increaſed. ‘Some of the mines, he informed the committee, are underſtood to have decayed in their produce, but new ones to a conſiderable amount have been opened.’ And on the whole he concludes, ‘the importation of gold from Brazil to Portugal^* to have been at leaſt equal to what it has been for many years.’ This mode of ſpeaking admits an increaſe to be moſt probable, but ſuggeſts nothing as to its mag⯑nitude. And beſide it appears by the ſame evi⯑dence, that the total ‘quantity is kept ſecret, and has been particularly ſo for ſome years paſt.’ It does not follow from this, that even the increaſe of the import of bullion does not exceed that of the adverſe balance of the export of commodities, if ſuch a balance have taken place; and conſe⯑quently not that it equals the former; or much leſs that it conſiderably exceeds it: which latter muſt be affirmed, or the objection, if allowed, is of little weight. From this evidence it cannot there⯑fore [56]be maintained, that the yearly reſting balance in Portugal is decreaſed. And that of Mr. Whit⯑more, the principal part of whoſe tranſactions had been remittances from Portugal in coin and bul⯑lion for twenty-five years, leaves the matter in the ſame uncertainty. He ſtates himſelf to have ‘reaſon to believe that coin has gone back from Portugal to the Brazils; but declares he can ſay nothing as to the quantity imported^*.’

It is moreover to be obſerved, that the reflux of coin into the Brazils, is not a legitimate proof of the overbalance of its commodities againſt Por⯑tugal, in the caſe ſtated to obtain: for (if it exiſt) it depends upon circumſtances, from which the ſame effect muſt follow likewiſe in the oppoſite caſe. While the bullion coming annually from Brazil exceeds the value of the coin returned, which is here admitted; no ſuch return would take place, unleſs the exertions of the two provincial mints of Rio Janeiro and the bay of All Saints, were totally inadequate to the commerce of the colony; or no proper exchange were eſtabliſhed between it and the mother country; whereby the export of a great and ſuperfluous quantity of bullion by the former, and of coin by the latter the following year, muſt take place: when the buſineſs might have been done by the ſimple^† [57]tranſit of the difference. This bringing of gold acroſs the Atlantic, and ſending it back again in the ſhape of coin, is only a proof that the debts on both ſides are liquidated in a bad manner; but not that the annual balance is either increaſing or de⯑creaſing. And there is ſome reaſon to conjecture a ſtop has been put to the mints in the Brazils: for it appears, coin was formerly imported into Por⯑tugal from them^*: but at preſent, we have the teſtimony of Sir John Hort, that gold comes over only in bars and duſt^†. And as a reaſon why the import of coin was leſſened, Mr. Whitmore alledged, that all the gold paſſed through the King's mint ^‡: by which it is to be naturally underſtood, not the provincial mints, but that of the mother country. Now Smith obſerves, that the greateſt cuſtomers for the new coin of American gold, are the inhabitants of the gold colonies: if Por⯑tugal therefore undertook to ſupply her own, ſhe of neceſſity was obliged to begin to export it to them; but at the ſame time, her own im⯑port was increaſed by the metal formerly coined in her ſettlements. And the recently flouriſhing ſtate of the Brazils, proved by the increaſe of its commodities, has probably drawn the magnitude of this reflux of gold more diſtinctly into notice.

[58]In fine, a conſiderable increaſe of the balance of the value of commodities, in the trade between Portugueſe America and Europe, may be admitted in favor of the former, and even ſome diminution of its export of gold; yet it will not nearly equal the probable increaſe of the European import of bul⯑lion from Spaniſh America.

Other cauſes have concurred to render this cala⯑mity of the weight we feel it to be: the deſolation which the incurſions of France have ſpread over the fineſt provinces of Flanders, Germany, and Italy, have greatly diminiſhed their product: and inſtead of our being able to draw any ſupplies from them to relieve our neceſſities, they moſt probably them⯑ſelves are obliged to ſacrifice ſome part of the re⯑mainder of the ſpecie or effects rapine has left them, for their own ſupply: and they are become competitors with us in other foreign markets to a certain degree. The diſtreſſes of Naples will call for moſt of the corn the known fertility of Sicily can ſpare: nor are the ravages of Egypt and Syria, without their circuitous conſequences.

The laſt calamities of Poland deprived us of much of the ſuccour, we might have derived from thence to alleviate the burthen we labour under: and they far exceeded thoſe produced by its firſt internal commotions, to which Dr. A. Smith aſcribed conſiderable effect in our corn market. It our protection and that of Pruſſia could have [59]been continued to the ſoberly ameliorated conſtitu⯑tion of that country, it might have been now ſo far recovered, as to have become in this hour of our neceſſity, the granary of Britain, as it has for⯑merly been of Europe. But for that protection the junction of both thoſe great powers was neceſſary. The criminal intrigues of an individual raiſed an impolitic clamour againſt this junction at home: by his known agent abroad, he oppoſed and in part defeated the negociations of his country. Thus by a treachery to his unconſcious party, of which he was the oftenſible leader in a certain aſſembly, he expoſed them to the hazard of the reproach of be⯑coming a Ruſſian faction there, and of having lowered themſelves to the level of Swediſh ſenators, penſioners of that power; he delivered over the un⯑fortunate kingdom, to the ſwords of the depoſers and the foreign enemies of its king; and deſtroyed the ample and broad foundation of amound which poli⯑tical wiſdom had laid, and muſt have completed, to ſtop a new deluge from the North, perpetually threatening to overflow all Europe. For Pruſſia diſ⯑graced, injured, and irritated, by this forced deſertion of the Britiſh government, and not over ſolicitous of the juſtice of the means whereby it ſhould gratify its reſentment, and indemnify itſelf for its paſt expences incurred, joined ultimately to deſtroy that conſtitution, the eſtabliſhment of which it had ſo much promoted, and to divide the unhappy [60]kingdom with its former antagoniſt. A conſidera⯑ble part of a nation ſeldom falls into great political errors, without experiencing the bad effect of them in ſome ſhape: our ungrounded clamours againſt the Ruſſian armament, contributed to diſſolve our: connection with Pruſſia, to make Poland the ſcene of new revolutions, and at laſt to deliver her to the dominion of foreign conquerors: the devaſtations which then laid that country waſte, which had been much harraſſed and afflicted before, render it totally unable to be of any conſiderable aid to us, in the preſent ſeaſon of our diſtreſs for corn.

Among the conſequences of the fall of prices, which has been ſhewn to have continued for half a century, there is one which is of weight enough at this criſis to deſerve to be entered into. Until the year 1765 we had a great export trade of corn; ſince the year 1771 a conſtant import has been ne⯑ceſſary for our ſupply^*; in the interval, the balance of import and export may be ſuppoſed to have been fluctuating.

Two cauſes may be aſſigned for this; the firſt of which ſhall be barely ſtated, without entering into any diſcuſſion upon it. Although the number of the inhabitants of the villages be increaſed, to⯑gether with their ſkill in agriculture, whereby its product is conſiderably augmented; yet it appears [61]evident, that our manufactures and manufacturers, who are here to be taken only as conſumers thereof, have increaſed with greater celerity: thus the pro⯑duct of the country is not ſo great as formerly, in pro⯑portion to the number of perſons to ſubſiſt upon it.

The ſecond is, that a greater conſumption of wheat has taken place, by equal numbers of the lower claſs, in the latter period than the former. This may be ſhown to be in the higheſt degree probable, from the prices of the table to the end of the war of 1740. For, from the beginning to the end of that term, which conſiderably exceeded half a century, ſome advance, and that not incon⯑ſiderable, was made in the wages of artizans and labourers in huſbandry. But if, contrary to all teſ⯑timony, and the reaſon of the thing, we ſuppoſe them to have for that term remained fixed, the effect of this long fall of prices would be the ſame in kind, but inferior in degree only.

While the price of the grain reputed the beſt for bread, was decreaſing in every period, and the weekly income of the lower claſs, who had before very much ſubſiſted on ſubſtitutes for it, was en⯑creaſing, or even remaining fixed; it is natural to ſuppoſe that they would deſert the uſe of the latter, or at leaſt greatly diminiſh it, and indulge themſelves in that of the former in its ſtead. At the concluſion of the laſt and the beginning of the preſent century, a mixture of rye or barley with [62]wheat was very common in the bread of the lower claſs: the former was called maſlin. Houghton, in his collections on trade and huſbandry^*, informs us, that barley bread was in ſuch general uſe in ſome parts of England, that of ſeventeen quarters of corn ground weekly, at a mill in one pariſh in Buckinghamſhire, ſixteen were of barley: and in Wales, that a bread had been long in uſe, made of equal weights of wheat meal and of boiled turnips, the juice being preſſed out of them. That bread intirely of wheat was not much eaten by the poor, may be alſo inferred, from what he ſays of that which was made of wheat meal, with the coarſe bran ſiſted out. "This ſort," he informs us, "is chiefly in the country, among able folk, that do value good bread."

But the principal grain uſed in making bread, together with wheat or by itſelf was rye. In the year 1688, Mr. King computed the quantity of wheat grown for conſumption at fourteen millions of buſhels; and of rye at ten millions^†. Thus taking the conſumption to have been as the pro⯑duct, the wheat was only 593/1000 of the bread corn conſumed: but previous to the year 1772, the author of the Political Eſſays on the Britiſh Em⯑pire, informs us, that the conſumption of wheat had been encreaſed to 3,840,000, while that of rye [63]had been diminiſhed to 1,030,000 quarters^*: there fore the conſumption of wheat was now become 788/1000 of the whole of our bread corn; or the average conſumption of wheat per head, was now increaſed in the proportion of 788 to 583; or that of four to three nearly. This circumſtance, oined to the relative increaſe of our artizans and manufacturers, has chiefly contributed change our export trade of wheat, into an import. The uſe of the inferior corns in bread is now confined to a narrow diſtrict; continually encroached upon and diminiſhing, by the borderers falling into the intire uſe of wheat.

The ſtate of the labourer in every department, muſt have been extremely eaſy in the firſt of the terms, that of the fall of prices, ending in the war of 1740. This brought on an augmentation of their indulgences, in the uſe of wheat for rye; which becoming cuſtomary in certain parts of the kingdom, now became to be reputed at leaſt as a neceſſary. This was not the only one of which they contracted ſuch fixed habits, that it became ſuch; others might be mentioned. When the price of wheat and other commodities began to riſe greatly, great additions in the poor's rate took place on thoſe two accounts jointly (O). This conſequence of what has been ſaid, is of too much general importance to have been paſſed by un⯑noticed, [64]but not enough connected with the ſubject to dilate any further upon it.

In the latter part of the ſecond period, as it has been before ſtated, it had become permanently ne⯑ceſſary to import corn in war and peace. The firſt war in which this neceſſity took place was that of 1775: it may be by ſome contended, that this neceſſity will raiſe the war prices above thoſe of peace. On this ſubject one party will argue thus: ‘when we carry on an export trade in war, our wheat muſt in the foreign market pay the home prices, freight and mercantile profit, with the ad⯑dition of inſurance againſt captures: which laſt addition tends to rencer it in war too dear for foreign markets. Thus our ſuperabundance is kept at home, and the prices fall. But when we carry on an import trade in war, the inſurance being added to the import price, the effect of the import to keep down the price of our own pro⯑duct is diminiſhed, and an increaſe of them takes place.’

This concluſion holds good only, as to that part of the corn not imported in neutral bottoms, but in our own veſſels, ſailing without convoy; which was much more frequent in the laſt war, than now ſince the convoy tax. It alſo implies that the na⯑tions with which we are at war, carry on neither an export or import trade in corn. For in that caſe, there will be corn ſhips taken on both ſides; and [65]the balance of captures of ſuch veſſels is to be conſidered. And being moſt powerful at ſea that balance will be in our favour, and counteract the effect of the inſurance. But this inſurance, and the balance of captures, are only oppoſite articles of account, the ſpecific amount of which cannot be annexed to either; and conſequently it cannot be known which ſide exceeds the other. This is capable of being determined only one way, by a compariſon of the prices of corn, in wars during which we ſubſiſted in part by wheat imported; with thoſe of the terms of peace preceding and following them, in which the ſame neceſſity took place. Only one ſuch inſtance has occurred: if the baſis of the concluſion be narrow, it is the wideſt on which any can legitimately be founded: and the circumſtances of it go as far as poſſible, to compenſate for its being a ſingle inſtance only. In the war of 1775, we were en⯑gaged againſt four powers; and, as far as the cap⯑ture of corn veſſels only is concerned, they were naval powers: for by the knowledge the American ſailors poſſeſſed of our coaſts, their privateers which were were numerous, were in proportion to their numbers more formidable than thoſe of any one of our other three enemies: while the royal navy, which gallantly, but with unequal force, ſupported a difficult defenſive againſt the fleets of France, Holland, and Spain, united, could not be applied, [66]as uſual, to ſcour the ſeas of theſe little predatory cruiſers: a duty which it now performs with ſo much effect; while the protection it gives to the corn trade, among others, goes ſo far beyond all former example.

It remains to examine what effect this accumu⯑lation of adverſe circumſtances tending to increaſe the inſurance, and to turn a favourable into an ad⯑verſe balance of captures of corn ſhips, produced. The average price of wheat during the peace of 1763, was 2£. 9 s. 5 d. and of the following war, 2£. 1 s. 11 d. per quarter: the price of the pre⯑ceding peace therefore exceeded that of war, by the very high rate of 17£. 17 s. 10 d. per cent. The conſtant importation is here taken to com⯑mence with the peace; in fact it has continued only for thirty-two years to the preſent time, for which "we have the undoubted autho⯑rity of Lord Liverpoole^*." It therefore com⯑menced with the year 1768, the ſeventh before the commencement of the war: and the average price of wheat for whoſe years was 2£. 10 s. 11 d. per quarter; exceeding that of the following war by 21£. 9 s. 5 d. per cent. The neceſſity of impor⯑tation was indicated by the riſe of prices, and it was ſo demonſtrated to take place at firſt, in the middle of a term of peace.

[67]The price of corn after having fallen in the firſt war, during which we were under a neceſſity of importing it, to 2£. 1 s. 11 d. as above; roſe again in the following peace to 2£. 6 s. 2 d. the average of the term: or 10£. 2 s. 9 d. ½ per cent. If therefore a nation is ſubſiſted in part by corn imported, this example ſhows that a war, of which every circum⯑ſtance ſeemed to tend to increaſe the inſurance to the utmoſt, did notwithſtanding greatly reduce the price.

From what is ſtated the concluſion is, that the effect of war is to reduce the price of wheat; and it is probable, by parity of reaſon, that of all the prime neceſſaries of life which are not directly taxed. And that the prices of wheat have exhibited in the time of no war any appearance of being affected by the circuitous effect of any taxes it has brought upon us^*. And it will hardly be alledged that there is any thing in the nature or circumſtances of the preſent war, ſo far differing from all pre⯑ceding wars ſince the abdication, as to render its effect diametrically oppoſite to all ſuch, or make it tend to advance prices. The true cauſes of the melancholy ſtate of the market are a deficiency of the product of laſt year, (P) joined perhaps to ſome others; among which muſt be reckoned that ſpirit [68]of ſpeculation, ſeaſons favourable to its effects never fail to excite. Whether its ſyſtem has not received great improvements, its combinations become more extenſive, and its ſpirit more keen, are inquiries not purpoſed to be entered upon.

There are a ſet of perſons, it muſt be here in concluſion added, who have lately conſidered it as matter of no ſmall criminality, to urge any argu⯑ments which may be employed afterwards as topics to defend the continuance of war, in any caſe. Peace conſidered in the abſtract is preferable to war. But if any one ſhould now, with Eraſmus^*, have the temerity to deny this; before it could be ſhown to be true, it would be neceſſary accurately to enu⯑merate what are the leading conſequences of both. No falſity in that enumeration, can afford a le⯑gitimate baſis of an argument for this truth: we have the experience of above a century to de⯑monſtrate the groſs error, of reckoning an augmen⯑tation of the price of corn among the conſequences of war; and if we were involved in a war, ever ſo unjuſt and unneceſſary, it would be betraying a good cauſe to argue for its being put an end to, from ſo falſe a poſition.

Admit now that it were true that war raiſes the rates of the corn market, what is that conſequence thereof to ſociety? a phyſical or natural evil. But [69]if the war a nation be engaged in be juſt and neceſſary, from the nature of neceſſity, that evil and the others incident to war would be overbalanced by different evils, but the ſame in kind, if we did not exert our ſtrength by war to repel them. It is therefore, even in conjunction with others, in a juſt cauſe to be vo⯑luntarily ſubmitted to, as the leſs of two evils.

But it is only one claſs of thoſe who will cenſure the concluſion here deduced, to whom this is a reply. Others may ſay, that ‘arguments liable to be perverted into a recommendation of the ſtate of war, ought not to be urged by the miniſters of our church. That it is of little avail to admit in general terms the criminality of an unjuſt war, when among its conſequences, a fall of the price of wheat is aſſerted to be one; it being an object which a great claſs of ſociety always reckons among its firſt intereſts to ſecure.’ To this it is replied, that by parity of reaſoning, if a moral writer or a preacher, in treating on ſome of the greater vices, were to admit that they in a certain ſhape, and under certain circumſtances, promote a man's preſent intereſt, he might be re⯑proached as favouring the extenſion of thoſe vices. If it is here ſaid that war reduces the price of wheat by a certain number of pence in the pound, or a certain rate per cent, the moſt applauded writers have ſaid much more without reprehenſion. Has [70]not a profeſſor of moral philoſophy in the univer⯑ſity of Edinburgh, affirmed, that ‘it is in vain to expect that we can give to the multitude of a people a ſenſe of union among themſelves, without admitting hoſtility to thoſe who oppoſe them. Could we at once, in the caſe of any nation, extinguiſh the emulation which is ex⯑cited from abroad, we ſhould probably break or weaken the bands of ſociety at home, and cloſe the buſieſt ſcenes of national occupations and virtue^*.’ Fuller citations might be brought from Lord Kaim; but there are on this point juſt exceptions againſt him, as an example: thoſe however lie not againſt that excellent father of our church, the great Dr. Barrow, the pre⯑curſor of Newton; who concludes the arguments of his ſermon, on the proof of the being of God from the frame of human nature, with the follow⯑ing words. ‘I might conſider the benefit that ariſes, as in the natural world from contrary qualities and motions, ſo in the humane world even from wars and contentions; how theſe rouze men from ſloth, bruſh away divers vices, ferment and purge things into a better condition; but I will not ſtrive to be ſo minute and ſub⯑tile^*.’ [71]Yet it is to be preſumed, that for this declaration, he will not be accuſed as the advocate of unjuſt and unneceſſary war; or cenſured for having violated, even the ſanctity of that place where it was delivered.