I.

THE following day being Sunday, our Philoſophers lay long in bed, while the reſt of us went to Church in the Neighbouring Town, where we dined at Euphranor's, and after evening Service returned to the two Philoſophers, whom we found in the Library. They told us, That, if there was a God, he was preſent every where, as well as at Church; and that if we had been ſerving him one way, they did not neglect to do as much another; inaſmuch as a free exerciſe of Reaſon muſt be allowed the moſt acceptable ſer⯑vice and Worſhip, that a rational creature can of⯑fer to its Creator. However, ſaid Alciphron, if you, Gentlemen, can but ſolve the difficulties which I ſhall propoſe to-morrow morning, I pro⯑miſe to go to Church next Sunday. After ſome general converſation of this kind, we ſate down to a light Supper, and the next morning aſſembled at the ſame place as the day before, where being all ſeated, I obſerved, that the foregoing Week our Conferences had been carried on for a longer time, and with leſs interruption than I had ever known, or well cou'd be, in town, where Mens hours are ſo broken by viſits, buſineſs, and amuſe⯑ments, that whoever is content to form his noti⯑ons from converſation only, muſt needs have them [3] very ſhatter'd and imperfect. And what have we got, replied Alciphron, by all theſe continued Conferences? For my part, I think my ſelf juſt where I was, with reſpect to the main point that divides us, the Truth of the Chriſtian Religion. I anſwered, That ſo many points had been exa⯑mined, diſcuſſed, and agreed between him and his adverſaries, that I hoped to ſee them come to an intire agreement in the end. For in the firſt place, ſaid I, the principles and opinions of thoſe who are called Free-thinkers, or Minute Philo⯑ſophers, have been pretty clearly explained. It hath been alſo agreed, that Vice is not of that benefit to the Nation, which ſome Men imagine: That Virtue is highly uſeful to Mankind: But that the beauty of Virtue is not alone ſufficient to engage them in the practice of it: That therefore the belief of a God and Providence ought to be encouraged in the State, and tolerated in good Company, as a uſeful notion. Further, it hath been proved that there is a God: That it is reaſon⯑able to worſhip him: And that the Worſhip, Faith, and Principles preſcribed by the Chriſtian Religion have a uſeful tendency. Admit, replied Alciphron, addreſſing himſelf to Crito, all that Dion ſaith to be true: Yet this doth not hinder my be⯑ing juſt where I was, with reſpect to the main point. Since there is nothing in all this that proves the Truth of the Chriſtian Religion: Though each of thoſe particulars enumerated may, perhaps, prejudice in its favour. I am therefore to ſuſpect my ſelf at preſent for a prejudiced perſon; prejudiced, I ſay, in favour of Chriſti⯑anity. This, as I am a lover of Truth, puts me upon my guard againſt deception. I muſt there⯑fore look ſharp, and well conſider every ſtep I take.

II.

CRI. You may remember, Alciphron, you propoſed for the ſubject of our preſent conference the conſideration of certain Difficulties and Ob⯑jections, which you had to offer againſt the Chriſti⯑an Religion. We are now ready to hear and con⯑ſider whatever you ſhall think fit to produce of that kind. Atheiſm, and a wrong notion of Chri⯑ſtianity, as of ſomething hurtful to Mankind, are great Prejudices; the removal of which may diſ⯑poſe a Man to argue with candor and ſubmit to reaſonable proof: But the removing Prejudices a⯑gainſt an opinion, is not to be reckoned prejudi⯑cing in its favour. It may be hoped therefore, that you will be able to do juſtice to your cauſe, with⯑out being fond of it. ALC. O Crito! that Man may thank his ſtars to whom Nature hath given a ſub⯑lime Soul, who can raiſe himſelf above popular opinions, and, looking down on the herd of Man⯑kind, behold them ſcattered over the ſurface of the whole earth, divided and ſubdivided into num⯑berleſs Nations and Tribes, differing in Notions and Tenets, as in Language, Manners, and Dreſs. The Man who takes a general view of the World and its Inhabitants, from this lofty ſtand, above the reach of Prejudice, ſeems to breathe a purer air, and to ſee by a clearer light: But how to im⯑part this clear and extenſive view to thoſe who are wandering beneath in the narrow dark paths of Error! This indeed is a hard task; but, hard as it is, I ſhall try if by any means,

Know then, that all the various Caſts or Sects of the ſons of Men have each their Faith, and their [5] religious Syſtem, germinating and ſprouting forth from that common grain of Enthuſiaſm, which is an original ingredient in the compoſition of Humane Nature, they ſhall each tell of in⯑tercourſe with the inviſible World, Revelati⯑ons from Heaven, divine Oracles, and the like. All which pretenſions, when I regard with an impartial eye, it is impoſſible I ſhou'd aſſent to all, and I find within my ſelf ſomething that with⯑holds me from aſſenting to any of them. For al⯑though I may be willing to follow, ſo far as com⯑mon Senſe, and the light of Nature lead; yet the ſame reaſon that bids me yield to rational proof, forbids me to admit opinions without proof. This holds in general againſt all Revelations whatſo⯑ever. And be this my firſt Objection againſt the Chriſtian in particular. CRI. As this Objection ſuppoſes there is no proof or reaſon for believing the Chriſtian, if good reaſon can be aſſigned for ſuch belief, it comes to nothing. Now I preſume you will grant, the authority of the reporter is a true and proper reaſon for believing reports: And the better this authority, the juſter claim it hath to our aſſent: But the authority of God is on all accounts the beſt: Whatever therefore comes from God, it is moſt reaſonable to believe.

III.

ALC. This I grant, but then it muſt be proved to come from God. CRI. And are not Miracles, and the accompliſhments of Prophecies, joined with the excellency of its Doctrine, a ſuffi⯑cient proof that the Chriſtian Religion came from God? ALC. Miracles, indeed, wou'd prove ſome⯑thing: But what proof have we of theſe Miracles? CRI. Proof of the ſame kind that we have or can have of any facts done a great way off, and a long time ago. We have authentic accounts tranſmit⯑ted down to us from eye-witneſſes, whom we can⯑not [6] conceive tempted to impoſe upon us by any humane Motive whatſoever; inaſmuch as they act⯑ed therein contrary to their Intereſts, their Preju⯑dices, and the very Principles in which they had been nurſed and educated. Theſe accounts were confirmed by the unparallel'd ſubverſion of the City of Jeruſalem, and the diſperſion of the Jewiſh Nation, which is a ſtanding teſtimony to the Truth of the Goſpel, particularly of the Predicti⯑ons of our bleſſed Saviour. Theſe accounts, with⯑in leſs than a Century, were ſpread throughout the World, and believed by great numbers of People. Theſe ſame accounts were committed to writing, tranſlated into ſeveral languages, and handed down with the ſame reſpect and conſent of Chriſtians in the moſt diſtant Churches. Do you not ſee, ſaid Alciphron, ſtaring full at Crito, that all this hangs by Tradition? And Tradition, take my word for it, gives but a weak hold: It is a chain, whereof the firſt links may be ſtronger than ſteel, and yet the laſt weak as wax, and brittle as glaſs. Imagine a picture copied ſucceſſively by an hundred Painters, one from another; how like muſt the laſt copy be to the original! How lively and diſtinct will an image be, after an hundred reflections between two parallel Mirrours! Thus like, and thus lively do I think a faint vaniſhing Tradition, at the end of ſixteen or ſeventeen hundred years. Some Men have a falſe heart, others a wrong head; and where both are true, the memory may be treacherous. Hence there is ſtill ſomething added, ſomething omitted, and ſomething varied from the Truth: And the ſum of many ſuch additions, deductions, and alterations, accumulated for ſeveral ages, do, at the foot of the account, make quite another thing. CRI. Ancient facts we may know by Tradition, oral or written: And this latter we may divide into two kinds, private and public, as [7] Writings are kept in the hands of particular Men, or recorded in public Archives. Now all theſe three ſorts of Tradition, for ought I can ſee, con⯑cur to atteſt the genuine antiquity of the Goſpels. And they are ſtrengthened by collateral evidence from Rites inſtituted, Feſtivals obſerved, and Mo⯑numents erected by ancient Chriſtians, ſuch as Churches, Baptiſteries, and Sepulchres. Now allowing your objection holds againſt oral Tradi⯑tion, ſingly taken, yet I can think it no ſuch diffi⯑cult thing to tranſcribe faithfully. And things once committed to writing, are ſecure from ſlips of memory, and may with common care be pre⯑ſerved intire ſo long as the Manuſcript laſts: And this, experience ſhews may be above a thouſand years. The Alexandrine Manuſcript is allowed to be above twelve hundred years old; and it is high⯑ly probable there were then extant copies four hundred years old. A Tradition therefore of a⯑bove ſixteen hundred years, need have only two or three links in its chain. And theſe links, not⯑withſtanding that great length of time, may be very ſound and intire. Since no reaſonable Man will deny, that an ancient Manuſcript may be of much the ſame credit now, as when it was firſt written. We have it on good authority, and it ſeems probable, that the primitive Chriſtians were careful to tranſcribe copies of the Goſpels and E⯑piſtles for their private uſe, and that other copies were preſerved as public records, in the ſeveral Churches throughout the World, and that porti⯑ons thereof were conſtantly read in their aſſemblies. Can more be ſaid to prove the writings of Claſſic Authors, or ancient Records of any kind authen⯑tic? Alciphron, addreſſing his diſcourſe to Euphra⯑nor, ſaid, It is one thing to ſilence an adverſary, and another to convince him. What do you think, Euphranor? EUPH. Doubtleſs it is. ALC. [6] [...] [7] [...] [8] But what I want, is to be convinced. EUPH. That point is not ſo clear. ALC. But if a Man had ever ſo much mind, he cannot be convinced by probable arguments againſt Demonſtration. EUPH. I grant he cannot.

IV.

ALC. Now it is as evident as demonſtra⯑tion can make it, that no divine Faith can poſſibly be built upon Tradition. Suppoſe an honeſt credu⯑lous Countryman catechiſed and lectured every Sun⯑day by his Pariſh-Prieſt: It is plain he believes in the Parſon, and not in God. He knows nothing of Revelations, and Doctrines, and Miracles, but what the Prieſt tells him. This he believes, and this Faith is purely humane. If you ſay he has the Li⯑turgy and the Bible for the foundation of his Faith, the difficulty ſtill recurs. For as to the Liturgy, he pins his faith upon the civil Magiſtrate, as well as the Eccleſiaſtic: neither of which can pretend divine Inſpiration. Then for the Bible, he takes both that and his Prayer-Book on truſt from the Printer, who, he believes, made true Editions from true Copies. You ſee then faith, but what faith? Faith in the Prieſt, in the Magiſtrate, in the Printer, Editor, Tranſcriber, none of which can with any pretence be called Divine. I had the hint from Cratylus; it is a ſhaft out of his quiver, and believe me, a keen one. EUPH. Let me take and make trial of this ſame ſhaft in my hands. Suppoſe then your Countryman hears a Magiſtrate declare the Law from the Bench, or ſuppoſe he reads it in a Statute Book. What think you, is the Printer or the Juſ⯑tice the true and proper object of his Faith and Submiſſion? Or do you acknowledge a higher autho⯑rity whereon to found thoſe loyal acts, and in which they do really terminate? Again ſuppoſe you read a paſſage in Tacitus that you believe true; wou'd you ſay you aſſented to it on the authority of the [9] Printer or Tranſcriber rather than the Hiſtorian? ALC. Perhaps I wou'd, and perhaps I wou'd not. I do not think my ſelf obliged to anſwer theſe points. What is this but transferring the queſtion from one ſubject to another? That which we conſidered was neither Law nor prophane Hiſtory, but religious Tradition, and Divine Faith. I ſee plainly what you aim at, but ſhall never take fro an anſwer to one dif⯑ficulty, the ſtarting of another. CRI. O Al⯑ciphron, there is no taking hold of you who expect that others ſhou'd (as you were pleaſed to expreſs it) hold fair and ſtand firm, while you plucked out their prejudices: How ſhall he argue with you but from your conceſſions, and how can he know what you grant except you will be pleaſed to tell him? EUPH. But to ſave you the trouble, for once I will ſuppoſe an anſwer. My queſtion admits but of two anſwers; take your Choice. From the one it will follow, that by a parity of reaſon we can eaſily conceive, how a Man may have Divine Faith, though he never felt Inſpiration or ſaw a Miracle: inaſmuch as it is equally poſſible for the mind, through whatever conduit, oral or ſcriptural, di⯑vine Revelation be derived, to carry its thought and ſubmiſſion up to the ſource and terminate its faith, not in Humane but Divine authority: not in the inſtrument or veſſel of conveyance, but in the great origine it ſelf as its proper and true object. From the other anſwer itwill follow, that you introduce a general ſcepticiſm into Humane Knowledge, and break down the hinges on which civil Government, and all the affairs of the World turn and depend: in a word that you wou'd deſtroy Humane Faith to get rid of Divine. And how this agrees with your profeſſing that you want to be convinced I leave you to conſider.

V.

ALC. I ſhou'd in earneſt be glad to be con⯑vinced one way or other, and come to ſome conclu⯑cluſion. [10] But I have ſo many objections in ſtore, you are not to count much upon getting over one. Depend on it you ſhall find me behave like a Gen⯑tleman and lover of Truth. I will propoſe my objections briefly and plainly, and accept of rea⯑ſonable anſwers as faſt as you can give them. Come, Euphranor, make the moſt of your Tradition; you can never make that a conſtant and univerſal one, which is acknowledged to have been unknown, or at beſt diſputed in the Church for ſeveral Ages: And this is the Caſe of the Canon of the new Teſ⯑tament. For though we have now a Canon as they call it ſettled; yet every one muſt ſee and own that Tradition cannot grow ſtronger by Age; and that what was uncertain in the primitive times cannot be undoubted in the ſubſequent. What ſay you to this, Euphranor? EUPH. I ſhou'd be glad to conceive your meaning clearly before I return an anſwer. It ſeems to me this objection of yours ſup⯑poſeth, that where a Tradition hath been conſtant and undiſputed, ſuch Tradition may be admitted as a proof, but that where the Tradition is defec⯑tive, the proof muſt be ſo too. Is this your mean⯑ing? ALC. It is. EUPH. Conſequently the Goſ⯑pels and Epiſtles of St. Paul, which were univer⯑ſally received in the beginning, and never ſince doubted of by the Church, muſt, notwithſtanding this objection, be in reaſon admitted for genuine. And if theſe Books contain, as they really do, all thoſe points that come into controverſy between you and me; what need I diſpute with you about the authority of ſome other Books of the new Teſ⯑tament, which came later to be generally known and received in the Church? If a Man aſſents to the undiſputed Books he is no longer an Infidel; though he ſhou'd not hold the Revelations, or the Epiſtle of S. James or Jude, or the latter of S. Peter, or the two laſt of S. John to be Canonical. [11] The additional authority of theſe portions of Holy Scripture may have its weight, in particular con⯑troverſies between Chriſtians, but can add nothing to arguments againſt an Infidel as ſuch. Wherefore though I believe good reaſons may be aſſigned for receiving theſe Books, yet theſe reaſons ſeem now beſide our purpoſe. When you are a Chriſtian it will be then time enough to argue this point. And you will be the nearer being ſo, if the way be ſhorten'd by omitting it for the preſent. ALC. Not ſo near neither as you perhaps imagine: For, notwithſtanding all the fair and plauſible things you may ſay about Tradition, when I conſider the Spirit of Forgery which reigned in the primitive times, and reflect on the ſeveral Goſpels, Acts, and Epiſtles attributed to the Apoſtles, which yet are acknowledged to be ſpurious, I confeſs, I cannot help ſuſpecting the whole. EUPH. Tell me, Alciphron, do you ſuſpect all Plato's Writings for ſpurious, becauſe the Dialogue upon Death, for inſtance, is allowed to be ſo? Or will you admit none of Tully's Writings to be genuine, becauſe Sigonius impoſed a Book of his own writing for Tully's Treatiſe de Conſolatione, and the impoſture paſſed for ſome time on the World? ALC. Sup⯑poſe I admit for the Works of Tully and Plato thoſe that commonly paſs for ſuch. What then? EUPH. Why then I wou'd fain know, whether it be equal and impartial in a Free-thinker, to meaſure the credibility of profane and ſacred Books by a different rule. Let us know upon what foot we Chriſtians are to argue with Minute Philoſo⯑phers; whether we may be allowed the benefit of common maxims in Logic and Criticiſm? If we may, be pleaſed to aſſign a reaſon why ſuppoſiti⯑tious Writings, which in the ſtyle and manner and matter bear viſible marks of impoſture, and have accordingly been rejected by the Church, can be [12] made an argument againſt thoſe which have been univerſally received, and handed down by an unani⯑mous conſtant Tradition. There have been in all Ages and in all great Societies of Men, many capricious, vain or wicked Impoſtors, who for different ends have abuſed the World by ſpurious Writings, and created work for Critics both in profane and ſacred Learning. And it would ſeem as ſilly to reject the true Writings of profane Authors for the ſake of the ſpurious, as it wou'd ſeem unreaſonable to ſup⯑poſe, that among the Hereticks and ſeveral Sects of Chriſtians, there ſhou'd be none capable of the like Impoſture.

VI.

ALC. But, be the Tradition ever ſo well atteſted, and the Books ever ſo genuine, yet I can⯑not ſuppoſe them wrote by perſons divinely inſpir⯑ed, ſo long as I ſee in them certain Characters in⯑conſiſtent with ſuch a ſuppoſition. Surely the pureſt language, the moſt perfect ſtyle, the ex⯑acteſt method, and in a word all the excellencies of good writing, might be expected in a piece com⯑poſed or dictated by the Spirit of God: But Books, wherein we find the reverſe of all this, it were im⯑pious, not, to reject, but, to attribute to the Di⯑vinity. EUPH. Say, Alciphron, are the Lakes, the Rivers, or the Ocean bounded by ſtraight Lines? Are the Hills and Mountains exact Cones or Pyramids? or the Stars caſt into regular figures? ALC. They are not. EUPH. But in the works of Inſects, we may obſerve figures as exact as if they were drawn by the rule and compaſs. ALC. We may. EUPH. Shou'd it not ſeem therefore that a regular exactneſs, or ſcrupulous attention to what Men call the rules of art, is not obſerved in the great productions of the Author of Nature? ALC. It ſhou'd. EUPH. And when a great Prince declareth his Will in Laws and Edicts to [13] his Subjects, is he careful about a pure ſtyle or elegant compoſition? Does he not leave his Secre⯑taries and Clerks to expreſs his ſenſe in their own words? Is not the phraſe on ſuch occaſions thought proper if it conveys as much as was intended? And wou'd not the divine ſtrain of certain modern Cri⯑tics be judged affected and improper for ſuch uſes? ALC. It muſt be owned, Laws and Edicts and Grants, for Soloeciſm and Tautology, are very of⯑fenſive to the harmonious ears of a fine Writer. EUPH. Why then ſhou'd we expect in the Ora⯑cles of God an exactneſs, that wou'd be misbecom⯑ing and beneath the dignity of an earthly Monarch, and which bears no proportion or reſemblance to the magnificent works of the Creation? ALC. But granting that a nice regard to particles and critical rules is a thing too little and mean to be expected in Divine Revelations; and that there is more force and ſpirit and true greatneſs in a negli⯑gent, unequal ſtyle, than in the well-turned periods of a polite writer; Yet what is all this to the bald and flat compoſitions of thoſe you call the Divine Penmen? I can never be perſuaded, the ſupreme Being wou'd pick out the pooreſt and meaneſt of ſcriblers for his Secretaries. EUPH. O Alciphron, if I durſt follow my own judgment, I ſhou'd be apt to think there are noble beauties in the ſtyle of the Holy Scripture: in the narrative parts a ſtrain ſo ſimple and unaffected; in the devotional and prophetic, ſo animated and ſublime: and in the doctrinal parts ſuch an air of dignity and authority as ſeems to ſpeak their original divine. But I ſhall not enter into a diſpute about Taſte; much leſs ſet up my judgment on ſo nice a point againſt that of the wits, and Men of genius, with which your Sect abounds. And I have no temptation to it, inaſ⯑much as it ſeems to me, the Oracles of God are not the leſs ſo for being delivered in a plain dreſs [14] rather than in the enticing words of Man's wiſdom. ALC. This may perhaps be an apology for ſome ſimplicity and negligence in writing.

VII.

But what apology can be made for Non⯑ſenſe, crude Nonſenſe? Of which I cou'd eaſily aſſign many inſtances, having once in my Life read the Scripture through with that very view. Look here, ſaid he, opening a Bible, in the forty ninth Pſalm, the Author begins very magnificently, call⯑ing upon all the inhabitants of the Earth to give ear, and aſſuring them his mouth ſhall ſpeak of wiſ⯑dom, and the meditation of his heart ſhall be of underſtanding.

He hath no ſooner done with his Preface, but he puts this ſenleleſs queſtion. ‘Wherefore ſhou'd I fear in the days of evil; when the wickedneſs of my heels ſhall compaſs me about?’ The iniquity of my heels! What Nonſenſe after ſuch a ſolemn introduction! EUPH. For my own part, I have naturally weak eyes, and know there are many things that I cannot ſee, which are nevertheleſs diſtinctly ſeen by others. I do not therefore con⯑clude a thing to be abſolutely inviſible; becauſe it is ſo to me: And ſince it is poſſible it may be with my underſtanding, as it is with my eyes, I dare not pronounce a thing to be Nonſenſe, be⯑cauſe I do not underſtand it. Of this paſſage many interpretations are given. The word render'd heels may ſignify fraud or ſupplantation: By ſome it is tranſlated paſt wickedneſs, the heel being the hin⯑der part of the foot; by others iniquity in the end of my days, the heel being one extremity of the body; by ſome the iniquity of my Enemies that may ſupplant me; by others my own faults [15] or iniquities which I have paſſed over as light mat⯑ters, and trampled under my feet. Some render it the iniquity of my ways; others my tranſgreſ⯑ſions which are like ſlips and ſlidings of the heel: And after all might not this expreſſion ſo harſh and odd to Engliſh ears have been very natural and ob⯑vious in the Hebrew Tongue, which, as every other Language, had its idioms? the force and propriety whereof may as eaſily be conceived loſt in a long tract of time, as the ſignification of ſome Hebrew words, which are not now intelligible, though no body doubts but they had once a meaning as well as the other words of that Language. Granting therefore that certain paſſages in the Holy Scrip⯑ture may not be underſtood, it will not thence fol⯑low that its Penmen wrote Nonſenſe: For I con⯑ceive Nonſenſe to be one thing and unintelligible another. CRI. An Engliſh Gentleman of my ac⯑quaintance one day entertaining ſome Foreigners at his Houſe, ſent a Servant to know the occaſion of a ſudden tumult in the yard, who brought him word, the Horſes were fallen together by the ears: his Gueſts inquiring what the matter was, he tran⯑ſlates it literally; Les Chevaux ſont tombez enſemble par les oreilles. Which made them ſtare; what ex⯑preſſed a very plain ſenſe in the original Engliſh, being incomprehenſible when rendered word for word into French: And I remember to have heard a Man excuſe the bulls of his Countrymen, by ſuppo⯑ſing them ſo many literal tranſlations. EUPH. But not to grow tedious, I refer to the Critics and and Commentators where you will find the uſe of this remark, which clearing up ſeveral obſcure paſ⯑ſages you took for Nonſenſe, may poſſibly incline you to ſuſpect your own judgment of the reſt. In this very Pſalm you have pitched on, the good ſenſe and moral contained in what follows, ſhou'd, methinks, make a candid reader judge favourably [16] of the original ſenſe of the Author, in that part which he cou'd not underſtand. Say, Alciphron, in reading the Claſſics, do you forthwith conclude every paſſage to be Nonſenſe, that you cannot make ſenſe of? ALC. By no means; difficulties muſt be ſuppoſed to riſe from different idioms, old cuſtoms, hints and alluſions, clear in one time or place, and obſcure in another. EUPH. And why will you not judge of Scripture by the ſame rule. Thoſe ſources of obſcurity you mention are all common both to ſacred and profane Writings: And there is no doubt, but an exacter knowledge in Language and Circumſtances wou'd in both, cauſe difficulties to vaniſh like ſhades before the light of the Sun. Jeremiah to deſcribe a furious invader ſaith; Behold, he ſhall come up as a Lion from the ſwelling of Jordan againſt the habitation of the ſtrong. One wou'd be apt to think this paſſage odd and improper, and that it had been more reaſonable to have ſaid, a Lion from the mountain or the deſart. But travellers, as an ingenious Man obſerves, who have ſeen the River Jordan bounded by low Lands with many reeds or thickets affording ſhelter to wild Beaſts, (which being ſuddenly diſlodged by a rapid overflowing of the River, ruſh into the up⯑land Country) perceive the force and propriety of the Compariſon; and that the difficulty proceeds, not from Nonſenſe in the Writer, but from Igno⯑rance in the Reader. It is needleſs to amaſs to⯑gether inſtances which may be found in every Com⯑mentator: I only beg leave to obſerve, that ſome⯑times Men, looking higher or deeper than they need for a profound or remote ſenſe, overlook the natural obvious ſenſe, lying, if I may ſo ſay, at their feet, and ſo make difficulties inſtead of finding them. This ſeems to be the caſe of that celebrated paſſage, which hath created ſo much work in St. Paul's firſt Epiſtle to the Corinthians. ‘What [17] ſhall they do which are baptized for the dead, if the dead riſe not at all? why are they then bap⯑tized for the dead?’ I remember to have heard this text explained by Laches the Vicar of our Pariſh to my Neighbour Lycon, who was much perplexed about its meaning. If it had been tran⯑ſlated as it might very juſtly, baptized for the ſake of the dead, I do not ſee, ſaid Laches, why people ſhou'd be puzzled about the ſenſe of this paſſage; for tell me, I beſeech you, for whoſe ſake do you think thoſe Chriſtians were baptized? For whoſe ſake, anſwered Lycon, but their own? How do you mean, for their own ſake in this life, or the next? Doubtleſs in the next, for it was plain they could get nothing by it in this. They were then, replied Laches, baptized not for the ſake of them⯑ſelves while living, but for the ſake of themſelves when dead; not for the living, but the dead. I grant it. Baptiſm therefore muſt have been to them a fruitleſs thing, if the dead riſe not at all. It muſt. Whence Laches inferred, That St. Paul's argument was clear and pertinent for the Reſur⯑rection: And Lycon allowed it to be argumentum ad hominem to thoſe who had ſought Baptiſm. There is then, concluded Laches, no neceſſity for ſuppoſing, that living Men were in thoſe days bap⯑tized inſtead of thoſe who died without Baptiſm, or of running into any other odd Suppoſitions, or ſtrained and far-fetched Interpretations to make ſenſe of this paſſage. ALC. Here and there a difficult paſſage may be cleared: But there are many which no art or wit of Man can account for. What ſay you to thoſe diſcoveries, made by ſome of our learned Writers, of falſe citations from the Old Teſtament found in the Goſpel? EUPH. That ſome few paſſages are cited by the Writers of the New Teſtament, out of the Old, and by the Fathers out of the New, which are not in ſo [18] many words to be found in them, is no new diſ⯑covery of Minute Philoſophers, but known and obſerved long before by Chriſtian Writers; who have made no ſcruple to grant, that ſome things might have been inſerted by careleſs or miſtaken Tranſcribers into the Text, from the Margin, o⯑thers left out, and others altered; whence ſo many various readings. But theſe are things of ſmall moment, and that all other ancient Authors have been ſubject to; and upon which no point of Doc⯑trine depends, which may not be proved without them. Nay further, if it be any advantage to your cauſe, it hath been obſerved, that the eighteenth Pſalm, as recited in the twenty ſecond chapter of the ſecond book of Samuel, varies in above forty places, if you regard every little verbal or literal difference: And that a Critic may now and then diſcover ſmall variations, is what no body can de⯑ny. But to make the moſt of theſe conceſſions, what can you infer from them, more than that the deſign of the Holy Scripture was not to make us exactly knowing in Circumſtantials? and that the Spirit did not dictate every Particle and Syllable, or preſerve them from every minute alteration by Miracle? which to believe, wou'd look like Rabi⯑nical Superſtition. ALC. But what marks of Divi⯑nity can poſſibly be in writings which do not reach the exactneſs even of Humane Art? EUPH. I never thought nor expected that the Holy Scrip⯑ture ſhou'd ſhew it ſelf divine, by a circumſtantial accuracy of Narration, by exactneſs of Method, by ſtrictly obſerving the rules of Rhetoric, Grammar, and Criticiſm, in harmonious Periods, in elegant and choice Expreſſions, or in technical Definitions and Partitions. Theſe things wou'd look too like a Humane Compoſition. Methinks there is in that ſimple, unaffected, artleſs, unequal, bold, figura⯑tive Style of the Holy Scripture, a character ſin⯑gularly [19] great and majeſtic, and that looks more like divine Inſpiration, than any other Compoſiti⯑on that I know. But, as I ſaid before, I ſhall not diſpute a point of Criticiſm with the gentlemen of your Sect, who, it ſeems, are the modern ſtandard for Wit and Taſte. ALC. Well, I ſhall not inſiſt on ſmall ſlips, or the inaccuracy of citing or tran⯑ſcribing: And I freely own, that Repetitions, want of Method, or want of Exactneſs in circum⯑ſtances, are not the things that chiefly ſtick with me; no more than the plain patriarchal Manners, or the peculiar Uſages and Cuſtoms of the Jews and firſt Chriſtians ſo different from ours; and that to reject the Scripture on ſuch accounts wou'd be to act like thoſe French Wits, who cenſure Homer be⯑cauſe they do not find in him the Style, Notions and Manners of their own Age and Country. Was there nothing elſe to divide us, I ſhou'd make no great difficulty of owning, That a popular uncor⯑rect Style might anſwer the general ends of Reve⯑lation, as well, perhaps, as a more critical and exact one: But the Obſcurity ſtill ſticks with me. Methinks if the ſupreme Being had ſpoke to Man, he wou'd have ſpoke clearly to him, and that the Word of God ſhou'd not need a comment.

VIII.

EUPH. You ſeem, Alciphron, to think Obſcurity a defect; but if it ſhou'd prove to be no defect, there wou'd then be no force in this Objection. ALC. I grant there wou'd not. EUPH. Pray tell me, are not Speech and Style inſtrumen⯑tal to convey Thoughts and Notions, to beget Knowledge, Opinion, and Aſſent? ALC. This is true. EUPH. And is not the perfection of an inſtrument to be meaſured by the uſe to which it is ſubſervient? ALC. It is. EUPH. What there⯑fore is a defect in one inſtrument, may be none in another. For inſtance, edged tools are in general [20] deſigned to cut; but the uſes of an Ax and a Ra⯑zor being different, it is no defect in an Ax, that it hath not the keen edge of a Razor; nor in a Razor, that it hath not the weight or ſtrength of an Ax. ALC. I acknowledge this to be true. EUPH. And may we not ſay in general, that every inſtrument is perfect, which anſwers the purpoſe or intention of him who uſeth it? ALC. We may. EUPH. Hence it ſeems to follow, that no Man's Speech is defective in point of Clearneſs, though it ſhou'd not be intelligible to all Men, if it be ſufficiently ſo to thoſe who, he intended, ſhou'd underſtand it; or though it ſhou'd not in all parts be equally clear, or convey a perfect knowledge, where he intended only an imperfect hint. ALC. It ſeems ſo. EUPH. Ought we not therefore to know the intention of the Speaker, to be able to know whether his ſtyle be obſcure through defect or deſign? ALC. We ought. EUPH. But is it poſſible for Man to know all the ends and purpo⯑ſes of God's Revelations? ALC. It is not. EUPH. How then can you tell, but the obſcurity of ſome parts of Scripture may well conſiſt with the pur⯑poſe which you know not, and conſequently be no argument againſt its coming from God? The books of Holy Scripture were written in ancient langua⯑ges, at diſtant times, on ſundry occaſions, and very different ſubjects: Is it not therefore reaſonable to imagine, that ſome parts or paſſages might have been clearly enough underſtood by thoſe, for whoſe proper uſe they were principally deſigned, and yet ſeem obſcure to us, who ſpeak another language, and live in other times? Is it at all ab⯑ſurd or unſuitable to the notion we have of God or Man, to ſuppoſe that God may reveal, and yet reveal with a reſerve, upon certain remote and ſublime ſubjects, content to give us hints and glimpſes, rather than views? May we not alſo ſup⯑poſe [21] from the reaſon of things, and the analogy of Nature, that ſome points, which might otherwiſe have been more clearly explained, were left obſcure meerly to encourage our diligence and modeſty? Two virtues, which, if it might not ſeem diſreſ⯑pectful to ſuch great Men, I wou'd recommend to the Minute Philoſophers. Lyſicles replied, This indeed is excellent: You expect that Men of ſenſe and ſpirit ſhou'd in great humility put out their eyes, and blindly ſwallow all the abſurdities and nonſenſe that ſhall be offered to them for divine Re⯑velation. EUPH. On the contrary, I wou'd have them open their eyes, look ſharply, and try the Spirit, whether it is of God; and not ſupinely and ignorantly condemn in the groſs, all Religions to⯑gether, Piety with Superſtition, Truth for the ſake of Error, matters of Fact for the ſake of Fictions; a conduct, which at firſt ſight wou'd ſeem abſurd in Hiſtory, Phyſick, or any other branch of Humane Inquiry: But to compare the Chriſtian Syſtem, or Holy Scriptures, with other pretences to divine Revelation, to conſider impartially the Doctrines, Precepts, and Events therein contained; weigh them in the balance with any other religious, na⯑tural, moral, or hiſtorical accounts; and diligently to examine all thoſe proofs internal and external, that for ſo many ages have been able to influence and perſuade ſo many wiſe, learned and inquiſitive Men: Perhaps they might find in it certain pecu⯑liar characters, which ſufficiently diſtinguiſh it from all other Religions and pretended Revelati⯑ons, whereon to ground a reaſonable Faith. In which caſe I leave them to conſider, whether it wou'd be right to reject with peremptory ſcorn a Revelation ſo diſtinguiſhed and atteſted, upon ac⯑count of Obſcurity in ſome parts of it? and whe⯑ther it wou'd ſeem beneath Men of their Senſe and Spirit to acknowledge, that, for ought they know, [22] a light inadaequate to things, may yet be adaequate to the purpoſe of Providence? and whether it might be unbecoming their ſagacity and critical skill to own, that literal Tranſlations from Books in an ancient Oriental tongue, wherein there are ſo many peculiarities, as to the manner of writing, the figures of Speech, and ſtructure of the Phraſe, ſo remote from all our modern Idioms, and in which we have no other coaeval writings extant, might well be obſcure in many places, eſpecially ſuch as treat of ſubjects ſublime and difficult in their own nature, or allude to things, cuſtoms or events, very diſtant from our knowledge? And laſtly, whether it might not become their character, as impartial and unprejudiced Men, to conſider the Bible in the ſame light they wou'd profane Au⯑thors? They are apt to make great allowance for Tranſpoſitions, Omiſſions, and literal Errors of Tranſcribers in other ancient Books, and very great for the difference of Style and Manner, eſpecially in eaſtern Writings, ſuch as the remains of Zoroaſter and Confucius, and why not in the Prophets? In reading Horace or Perſius to make out the ſenſe, they will be at the pains to diſcover a hidden Dra⯑ma, and why not in Solomon or St. Paul? I hear there are certain ingenious Men who deſpiſe King David's Poetry, and yet profeſs to admire Homer and Pindar. If there be no prejudice or affectati⯑on in this, let them but make a literal verſion from thoſe Authors into Engliſh Proſe, and they will then be better able to judge of the Pſalms. ALC. You may diſcourſe and exſpatiate; but notwith⯑ſtanding all you have ſaid or ſhall ſay, it is a clear point that a Revelation, which doth not reveal, can be no better than a contradiction in terms. EUPH. Tell me, Alciphron, do you not acknow⯑ledge the light of the Sun to be the moſt glorious production of Providence in this natural World? [23] ALC. Suppoſe I do. EUPH. This light, never⯑theleſs, which you cannot deny to be of God's making, ſhines only on the ſurface of things, ſhines not at all in the Night, ſhines imperfectly in the twilight, is often interrupted, refracted, and ob⯑ſcured, repreſents diſtant things, and ſmall things dubiouſly, imperfectly, or not at all. Is this true or no? ALC. It is. EUPH. Shou'd it not fol⯑low therefore, that to expect in this World a light from God without any mixture of ſhade or myſtery, wou'd be departing from the rule and a⯑nalogy of the Creation? and that conſequently it is no argument the light of Revelation is not Di⯑vine, becauſe it may not be ſo clear and full as you expect. ALC. As I profeſs my ſelf candid and indifferent throughout this debate, I muſt needs own you ſay ſome plauſible things, as a Man of argument will never fail to do in vindication of his prejudices.

IX.

But, to deal plainly, I muſt tell you once for all, that you may queſtion and anſwer, illuſtrate and enlarge for ever, without being able to con⯑vince me that the Chriſtian Religion is of Divine Revelation. I have ſaid ſeveral things, and have many more to ſay, which, believe me, have weight not only with my ſelf, but with many great Men my very good friends, and will have weight what⯑ever Euphranor can ſay to the contrary. EUPH. O Alciphron, I envy you the happineſs of ſuch ac⯑quaintance. But, as my lot fallen in this remote corner deprives me of that advantage, I am ob⯑liged to make the moſt of this opportunity, which you and Lyſicles have put into my hands. I con⯑ſider you as two able Chirurgeons, and you were pleaſed to conſider me as a Patient, whoſe cure you have generouſly undertaken. Now a Patient muſt have full liberty to explain his caſe, and tell [24] all his Symptoms, the concealing or palliating of which might prevent a perfect cure. You will be pleaſed therefore to underſtand me, not as object⯑ing to, or arguing againſt, either your Skill or Medicines, but only as ſetting forth my own caſe and the effects they have upon me. Say, Alci⯑phron, did you not give me to underſtand that you wou'd extirpate my prejudices? ALC. It is true: a good Phyſician eradicates every fibre of the diſ⯑eaſe. Come, you ſhall have a patient hearing. EUPH. Pray, was it not the opinion of Plato, that God inſpired particular Men, as Organs or Trumpets, to proclaim and ſound forth his Oracles to the World? ^* And was not the ſame opinion alſo embraced by others the greateſt Writers of Antiquity? CRI. Socrates ſeems to have thought that all true Poets ſpoke by Inſpiration; and Tul⯑ly, that there was no extraordinary Genius with⯑out it. This hath made ſome of our affected Free-thinkers attempt to paſs themſelves upon the World for Enthuſiaſts. ALC. What wou'd you infer from all this? EUPH. I wou'd infer that inſpi⯑ration ſhou'd ſeem nothing impoſſible or abſurd, but rather agreeable to the light of reaſon and the no⯑tions of Mankind. And this, I ſuppoſe, you will acknowledge, having made it an Objection againſt a particular Revelation, that there are ſo many pretences to it throughout the World. ALC. O Euphranor, he, who looks into the bottom of things, and reſolves them into their firſt principles, is not eaſily amuſed with words. The word In⯑ſpiration ſounds indeed big, but let us, if you pleaſe, take an original view of the thing ſignified by it. To inſpire is a word borrowed from the Latin, and ſtrictly taken means no more than to breathe or blow in: nothing therefore can be in⯑ſpired but what can be blown or breathed, and nothing can be ſo but wind or vapour, which in⯑deed [25] may fill or puff up Men with fanatical and hypochondriacal ravings. This ſort of Inſpiration I very readily admit. EUPH. What you ſay is ſubtle, and I know not what effect it might have upon me, if your profound diſcourſe did not hin⯑der its own operation. ALC. How ſo? EUPH. Tell me, Alciphron, do you diſcourſe or do you not? To me it ſeems that you diſcourſe admirably. ALC. Be that as it will, it is certain I diſcourſe. EUPH. But when I endeavour to look into the bottom of things, behold! A ſcruple riſeth in my mind how this can be; for to diſcourſe is a word of Latin derivation, which originally ſignifies to run about; and a Man cannot run about, but he muſt change place and move his Legs; ſo long there⯑fore as you ſit on this Bench, you cannot be ſaid to diſcourſe. Solve me this difficulty, and then perhaps I may be able to ſolve yours. ALC. You are to know, that diſcourſe is a word bor⯑rowed from ſenſible things, to expreſs an inviſible action of the mind, reaſoning or inferring one thing from another; and in this tranſlated ſenſe, we may be ſaid to diſcourſe, though we ſit ſtill. EUPH. And may we not as well conceive, that the term Inſpiration might be borrowed from ſen⯑ſible things to denote an action of God, in an ex⯑traordinary manner, influencing, exciting, and en⯑lightening the mind of a Prophet or an Apoſtle? who, in this ſecondary, figurative, and tranſlated ſenſe, may truly be ſaid to be inſpired, though there ſhou'd be nothing in the caſe of that wind or vapour implied in the original ſenſe of the word? It ſeems to me, that we may by looking into our own minds plainly perceive certain inſtincts, im⯑pulſes, and tendencies, which at proper periods and occaſions ſpring up unaccountably in the Soul of Man. We obſerve very viſible ſigns of the ſame in all other Animals. And theſe things being or⯑dinary [26] and natural, what hinders but we may con⯑ceive it poſſible for the humane Mind, upon an extraordinary account, to be moved in an extra⯑ordinary manner, and its faculties ſtirred up and actuated by a ſupernatural Power? That there are and have been, and are likely to be wild viſions and hypochondriacal ravings, no body can deny; but to infer from thence, that there are no true Inſpi⯑rations wou'd be too like concluding, that ſome Men are not in their ſenſes, becauſe other Men are fools. And though I am no Prophet, and conſequently cannot pretend to a clear notion of this matter; yet I ſhall not therefore take upon me to deny, but a true Prophet or inſpired Perſon, might have had as certain means, of diſcerning be⯑tween divine Inſpiration and hypochondriacal fan⯑cy, as you can between ſleeping and waking, till you have proved the contrary. You may meet in the Book of Jeremiah with this paſſage: ‘The Prophet that hath a dream let him tell a dream: And he that hath my word, let him ſpeak my word faithfully: what is the chaff to the Wheat, ſaith the Lord? Is not my word like as a fire, ſaith the Lord, and like a hammer that breaketh the rock in pieces?’ *You ſee here a diſtinction made between Wheat and Chaff, true and ſpurious, with the mighty force and power of the former. But I beg pardon for quoting Scrip⯑ture to you, I make my appeal to the general ſenſe of Mankind, and the Opinion of the wiſeſt Hea⯑thens, which ſeems ſufficient to conclude Divine Inſpiration poſſible, if not probable, at leaſt till you prove the contrary.

X.

ALC. The poſſibility of Inſpirations and Revelations I do not think it neceſſary to deny. Make the beſt you can of this conceſſion. EUPH. ² [27] Now what is allowed poſſible we may ſuppoſe in fact. ALC. We may. EUPH. Let us then ſup⯑poſe, that God had been pleaſed to make a Reve⯑lation to Men; and that he inſpired ſome as a means to inſtruct others. Having ſuppoſed this, can you deny, that their inſpired Diſcourſes and Revelations might have been committed to Wri⯑ting, or that being written, after a long tract of time they might become in ſeveral places obſcure; that ſome of them might even originally have been leſs clear than others, or that they might ſuf⯑fer ſome alteration by frequent tranſcribing, as o⯑ther Writings are known to have done? Is it not even very probable that all theſe things wou'd hap⯑pen? ALC. I grant it. EUPH. And granting this, with what pretence can you reject the Holy Scriptures as not being divine, upon the account of ſuch ſigns or marks, as you acknowledge wou'd probably attend a Divine Revelation tranſmitted down to us through ſo many Ages? ALC. But allowing all that in reaſon you can deſire, and granting that this may account for ſome obſcurity, may reconcile ſome ſmall differences, or ſatisfy us how ſome difficulties might ariſe by inſerting, o⯑mitting or changing here and there a letter, a word, or perhaps a ſentence: Yet theſe are but ſmall matters, in reſpect of the much more conſi⯑derable and weighty objections I cou'd produce, againſt the confeſſed doctrines, or ſubject matter of thoſe Writings. Let us ſee what is contained in theſe ſacred Books, and then judge whether it is probable or poſſible, ſuch Revelations ſhou'd ever have been made by God? Now I defy the wit of Man to contrive any thing more extraya⯑gant, than the accounts we there find of Appari⯑tions, Devils, Miracles, God manifeſt in the fleſh, Regeneration, Grace, Self-denial, Reſurrection of the dead, and ſuch like aegri ſomnia: things ſo odd, [28] unaccountable, and remote from the apprehenſi⯑on of Mankind, you may as ſoon waſh a Blacka⯑more white, as clear them of abſurdity. No critical skill can juſtify them, no tradition recommend them, I will not ſay for Divine Revelations, but even for the inventions of Men of Senſe. EUPH. I had always a great opinion of your ſagacity, but now, Alciphron, I conſider you as ſomething more than Man; elſe how ſhou'd it be poſſible for you to know, what or how far it may be proper for God to reveal? Methinks it may conſiſt with all due deference to the greateſt of Humane Un⯑derſtandings, to ſuppoſe them ignorant of many things, which are not ſuited to their faculties, or lie out of their reach. Even the Counſels of Prin⯑ces lie often beyond the ken of their Subjects, who can only know ſo much as is revealed by thoſe at the helm; and are often unqualified to judge of the uſefulneſs and tendency even of that, till in due time the ſcheme unfolds, and is account⯑ed for by ſucceeding events. That many points contained in holy Scripture are remote from the common apprehenſions of Mankind, cannot be de⯑nied. But I do not ſee, that it follows from thence they are not of Divine Revelation. On the con⯑trary, ſhou'd it not ſeem reaſonable to ſuppoſe, that a Revelation from God ſhou'd contain ſome⯑thing different in kind, or more excellent in de⯑gree, than what lay open to the common ſenſe of Men, or cou'd even be diſcovered by the moſt ſa⯑gacious Philoſopher? Accounts of ſeparate Spi⯑rits, good or bad, Propheſies, Miracles and ſuch things are undoubtedly ſtrange; but I wou'd fain ſee how you can prove them impoſſible or abſurd. ALC. Some things there are ſo evidently abſurd, that it wou'd be almoſt as ſilly to diſprove them as to believe them: and I take theſe to be of that claſs.

XI.

EUPH. But is it not poſſible, ſome Men may ſhew as much prejudice and narrowneſs in rejecting all ſuch accounts, as others might eaſineſs and credulity in admitting them? I never durſt make my own obſervation or experience, the rule and meaſure of things ſpiritual, ſupernatural, or relating to another World, becauſe I ſhou'd think it a very bad one, even for the viſible and natural things of this; It wou'd be judging like the Si⯑ameſe, who was poſitive it did not freeze in Hol⯑land, becauſe he had never known ſuch a thing as hard water or ice in his own Country. I cannot comprehend why any one, who admits the union of the Soul and Body, ſhou'd pronounce it impoſ⯑ſible for the Humane Nature to be united to the Divine, in a manner ineffable and incomprehenſi⯑ble by Reaſon. Neither can I ſee any abſurdity in admitting, that ſinful Man may become regene⯑rate or a new Creature, by the grace of God re⯑claiming him from a carnal Life to a ſpiritual Life of Virtue and Holineſs. And ſince, the being go⯑verned by Senſe and Appetite is contrary to the happineſs and perfection of a rational Creature, I do not at all wonder that we are preſcribed Self⯑denial. As for the Reſurrection of the dead, I do not conceive it ſo very contrary to the Analogy of Nature, when I behold Vegetables left to rot in the earth, riſe up again with new Life and Vigour, or a Worm to all appearance dead change its Na⯑ture, and that, which in its firſt being crawled on the Earth, become a new ſpecies, and fly abroad with Wings. And indeed when I conſider, that the Soul and Body are things ſo very different and heterogeneous, I can ſee no reaſon to be poſitive, that the one muſt neceſſarily be extinguiſhed upon the diſſolution of the other; eſpecially ſince I find in my ſelf a ſtrong natural deſire of Immorta⯑lity, [30] and I have not obſerved that natural Appe⯑tites are wont to be given in vain, or meerly to be fruſtrated. Upon the whole thoſe points, which you account extravagant and abſurd, I dare not pro⯑nounce to be ſo till I ſee good reaſon for it.

XII.

CRI. No, Alciphron, your poſitive airs muſt not paſs for proofs; nor will it ſuffice to ſay, things are contrary to common ſenſe, to make us think they are ſo: By common Senſe, I ſuppoſe ſhou'd be meant either the general ſenſe of Man⯑kind, or the improved reaſon of thinking Men. Now I believe that all thoſe Articles, you have with ſo much capacity and fire at once ſummed up and exploded, may be ſhewn to be not diſagreeable, much leſs contrary to common ſenſe in one or other of theſe acceptations. That the Gods might ap⯑pear and converſe among Men, and that the Di⯑vinity might inhabit Humane Nature, were points allowed by the Heathens; and for this I appeal to their Poets and Philoſophers, whoſe Teſtimonies are ſo numerous and clear, that it wou'd be an af⯑front to repeat them to a Man of any Education. And though the notion of a Devil may not be ſo obvious, or ſo fully deſcribed, yet there appear plain traces of it, either from Reaſon or Tradition. The latter Platoniſts, as Porphyry and Iamblichus, are very clear in the point, allowing that evil Dae⯑mons delude and tempt, hurt and poſſeſs Mankind. That the ancient Greeks, Chaldaeans, and Aegypti⯑ans, believed both good and bad Angels, may be plainly collected from Plato, Plutarch, and the Chaldaean Oracles. Origen obſerves, That almoſt all the Gentiles, who held the being of Daemons, allowed there were bad ones ^*. There is even ſomething as early as Homer, that is thought by the [31] learned Cardinal Beſſarion ^† to allude to the fall of Satan, in the acount of Ate, whom the Poet repre⯑ſents as caſt down from Heaven by Jove, and then wandring about the Earth, doing miſchief to Mankind. This ſame Ate is ſaid by Heſiod, to be the Daughter of Diſcord; and by Euripides, in his Hippolitus, is mentioned as a tempter to evil, And it is very remarkable, that Plutarch, in his Book, De vitando aere alieno, ſpeaks after Empedocles, of certain Daemons that fell from Heaven, and were baniſhed by God, [...]. Nor is that leſs remarkable which is obſerved by Ficinus from Pherecydes Syrus, That there had been a downfal of Daemons who revolted from God; and that Ophioneus (the old Serpent) was head of that rebellious Crew ^*. Then as to other articles, let any one conſider what the Pytha⯑goreans taught of the Purgation and [...], or Deliverance of the Soul: What moſt Philoſophers, but eſpecially the Stoics, of ſubduing our Paſſions: What Plato and Hierocles have ſaid of forgiving In⯑juries: What the acute and ſagacious Ariſtotle writes, in his Ethics to Nicomachus, of the ſpiritual and divine Life, that Life, which, according to him, is too excellent to be thought Humane; inſomuch as Man, ſo far forth as Man, cannot attain to it, but only ſo far forth as he hath ſomething divine in him: And particularly, let him reflect on what Socrates taught, to wit, That Virtue is not to be learned from Men, that it is the Gift of God, and that good Men are not good by virtue of Humane Care or Diligence, [...] ^†. Let any Man, who really thinks, but conſider what other thinking Men have thought, who cannot be ſuppoſed prejudiced in [32] favour of Revealed Religion; and he will ſee cauſe, if not to think with reverence of the Chriſtian Doc⯑trines of Grace, Self-denial, Regeneration, Sanc⯑tification, and the reſt, even the moſt myſterious, at leaſt to judge more modeſtly and warily, than thoſe who ſhall, with a confident air, pronounce them abſurd, and repugnant to the Reaſon of Man⯑kind. And in regard to a future State, the com⯑mon ſenſe of the Gentile World, modern or ancient, and the opinions of the wiſeſt Men of Antiquity, are things ſo well known, that I need ſay nothing about them. To me it ſeems, the Minute Philoſo⯑phers, when they appeal to Reaſon and common Senſe, mean only the Senſe of their own Party: A coin, how current ſoever among themſelves, that other Men will bring to the touchſtone, and paſs for no more than it is worth. LYS. Be thoſe notions agreeable to what or whoſe Senſe they may, they are not agreeable to mine. And if I am thought ignorant for this, I pity thoſe who think me ſo.

XIII.

I enjoy my ſelf, and follow my own courſes, without remorſe or fear; which I ſhould not do, if my Head were filled with Enthuſiaſm; whether Gentile or Chriſtian, Philoſophical or Re⯑vealed, it is all one to me. Let others know or believe what they can, and make the beſt on't, I, for my part, am happy and ſafe in my Ignorance. CRI. Perhaps not ſo ſafe neither. LYS. Why, ſurely you won't pretend that Ignorance is crimi⯑nal? CRI. Ignorance alone is not a crime. But that wilful Ignorance, affected Ignorance, Ignorance from Sloth, or conceited Ignorance, is a fault, might eaſily be proved by the teſtimony of Heathen Writers; and it needs no proof to ſhew, that if Ignorance be our fault, we cannot be ſecure in it as an excuſe. LYS. Honeſt Crito ſeems to hint, [33] that a Man ſhou'd take care to inform himſelf, while alive, leſt his neglect be puniſhed when he is dead. Nothing is ſo puſillanimous and unbecom⯑ing a Gentleman, as Fear: Nor cou'd you take a likelier courſe to fix and rivet a Man of honour in Guilt, than by attempting to frighten him out of it. This is the ſtale, abſurd Stratagem of Prieſts, and that which makes them, and their Religion, more odious and contemptible to me than all the other Articles put together. CRI. I wou'd fain know why it may not be reaſonable for a Man of honour, or any Man who has done amiſs to fear? Guilt is the natural Parent of fear; and nature is not uſed to make men fear where there is no occa⯑ſion. That impious and profane Men ſhou'd expect divine puniſhment, doth not ſeem ſo abſurd to con⯑ceive: And that under this expectation they ſhou'd be uneaſy and even afraid, how conſiſtent ſoever it may or may not be with honour, I am ſure conſiſts with reaſon. LYS. That thing of Hell and eter⯑nal Puniſhment is the moſt abſurd, as well as the moſt diſagreeable thought that ever entered into the head of mortal Man. CRI. But you muſt own that it is not an abſurdity peculiar to Chriſ⯑tians, ſince Socrates, that great Free-thinker of Athens, thought it probable there may be ſuch a thing as impious Men for ever puniſhed in Hell ^*. It is recorded of this ſame Socrates, that he has been often known to think for four and twenty hours together, fixed in the ſame poſture, and wrapt up in meditation. LYS. Our modern Free-thinkers are a more lively ſort of Men. Thoſe old Philoſo⯑phers were moſt of them whimſical. They had in my judgment a dry, narrow, timorous way of think⯑ing, which by no means came up to the frank hu⯑mour of our times. CRI. But I appeal to your own judgment, if a Man, who knows not the na⯑ture [34] of the Soul, can be aſſured by the light of reaſon, whether it is mortal or immortal?

LYS. But what if I know the nature of the Soul? What if I have been taught that whole ſecret by a modern Free-thinker? a Man of ſcience who diſ⯑covered it not by a tireſome introverſion of his fa⯑culties, not by amuſing himſelf in a labyrinth of no⯑tions, or ſtupidly thinking for whole days and nights together, but by looking into things and ob⯑ſerving the analogy of nature.

XIV.

This great Man is a Philoſopher by fire, who has made many proceſſes upon vegetables. It is his opinion that Men and Vegetables are really of the ſame ſpecies; that Animals are moving Vege⯑tables, and Vegetables fixed Animals; that the mouths of the one and the roots of the other ſerve to the ſame uſe, differing only in poſition; that bloſſoms and flowers anſwer to the moſt indecent and concealed parts in the humane body; that ve⯑getable and animal bodies are both alike organized, and that in both there is Life or a certain motion and circulation of juices through proper Tubes or Veſſels. I ſhall never forget this able Man's unfold⯑ing the nature of the Soul in the following manner. The Soul, ſaid he, is that ſpecific form or prin⯑ciple from whence proceed the diſtinct qualities or properties of things. Now, as Vegetables are a more ſimple and leſs perfect compound, and con⯑ſequently more eaſily analyſed than Animals, we will begin with the contemplation of the Souls of Vegetables. Know then, that the Soul of any Plant, Roſemary for inſtance, is neither more nor leſs than its eſſential Oil. Upon this depends its pe⯑culiar [35] fragrance, taſte, and medicinal virtues, or in other words its life and operations. Separate or extract this eſſential Oil by Chymic art, and you get the Soul of the Plant: what remains being a dead Carcaſe, without any one property or virtue of the Plant, which is preſerved entire in the Oil, a Drachm whereof goes further than ſeveral pounds of the Plant. Now this ſame eſſential Oil is it ſelf a compoſition of Sulphur and Salt, or of a groſs unctuous ſubſtance, and a fine ſubtile prin⯑ciple or volatile Salt impriſoned therein. This volatile Salt is properly the eſſence of the Soul of the Plant, containing all its virtue, and the Oil is the vehicle of this moſt ſubtile part of the Soul, or that which fixes and individuates it. And as, upon ſeparation of this Oil from the Plant, the Plant died, ſo a ſecond death or death of the Soul enſues upon the reſolution of this eſſential Oil into its prin⯑ciples; as appears by leaving it expoſed for ſome time to the open air, ſo that the volatile Salt or Spirit may fly off; after which the Oil remains dead and inſipid, but without any ſenſible diminu⯑tion of its weight, by the loſs of that volatile eſ⯑ſence of the Soul, that aethereal aura, that ſpark of entity, which returns and mixes with the Solar light, the univerſal Soul of the World, and only ſource of Life, whether Vegetable, Animal, or Intellectual; which differ only according to the groſsneſs or fineneſs of the vehicles, and the different textures of the natural Alembics, or in other words, the organized Bodies, where the abovementioned volatile eſſence inhabits and is elaborated, where it acts and is acted upon. This Chymical Syſtem lets you at once into the nature of the Soul, and accounts for all it's phaenomena. In that compound which is called Man, the Soul or eſſential Oil is what commonly goes by the name of Animal Spirit: for you muſt know, it is a point agreed by Chymiſts, that [36] Spirits are nothing but the more ſubtile Oils. Now in proportion, as the eſſential Oil of Man is more ſubtile than that of other Creatures, the volatile Salt that impregnates it is more at liberty to act, which accounts for thoſe ſpe⯑cifick properties and actions of Humane Kind, which diſtinguiſh them above other Creatures. Hence you may learn why among the wiſe ancients, Salt was another name for wit, and in our times a dull Man is ſaid to be inſipid or inſulſe. Aromatic Oils maturated by great length of time turn to Salts: this ſhews why Humane Kind, grow wiſer by age. And what I have ſaid of the twofold death or diſſolution, firſt of the compound, by ſe⯑parating the Soul from the organical Body, and ſe⯑condly of the Soul it ſelf, by dividing the volatile Salt from the Oil, illuſtrates and explains that no⯑tion of certain ancient Philoſophers: that as the Man was a compound of ſoul and body, ſo the Soul was compounded of the mind or intellect, and its aethereal vehicle; and that the ſeparation of Soul and Body or death of the Man is, after a long tract of time, ſucceeded by a ſecond death of the Soul it ſelf, to wit the ſeparation or delive⯑rance of the intellect from its vehicle, and reunion with the Sun. EUPH. O Lyſicles your ingeni⯑ous friend has opened a new Scene, and explained the moſt obſcure and difficult points in the cleareſt and eaſieſt manner. LYS. I muſt own this account of things ſtruck my fancy. I am no great lover of Creeds or Syſtems; but when a notion is reaſonable and grounded on experience I know how to value it. CRI. In good earneſt, Lyſicles, do you believe this account to be true? LYS. Why then in good earneſt I don't know whether I do or no. But I can aſſure you the ingenious Artiſt himſelf has not the leaſt doubt about it. And to believe an Artiſt in his art is a juſt maxim and ſhort way [37] to Science. CRI. But what relation hath the Soul of Man to Chymic art? The ſame reaſon, that bids me truſt a skilful Artiſt in his art, inclines me to ſuſpect him out of his art. Men are too apt to reduce unknown things to the ſtandard of what they know, and bring a prejudice or tincture from things they have been converſant in, to judge there⯑by of things in which they have not been conver⯑ſant. I have known a Fidler gravely teach that the Soul was Harmony; a Geometrician very po⯑ſitive that the Soul muſt be extended; and a Phy⯑ſician, who having pickled half a doozen embryos and diſſected as many Rats and Frogs, grew con⯑ceited and affirmed there was no Soul at all, and that it was a vulgar error. LYS. My notions ſit eaſy. I ſhall not engage in pedantic diſputes about them. They who don't like them may leave them. EUPH. This, I ſuppoſe, is ſaid much like a Gentelman.

XV.

But pray, Lyſicles, tell me whether the Clergy come within that general rule of yours; that an Artiſt may be truſted in his art? LYS. By no means. EUPH. Why ſo? LYS. Becauſe I take my ſelf to know as much of thoſe matters as they do. EUPH. But you allow, that in any other profeſſion, one who hath ſpent much time and pains may attain more knowledge, than a Man of equal or better parts, who never made it his particular buſineſs. LYS. I do. EUPH. And nevertheleſs in things religious and divine you think all Men equally knowing. LYS. I do not ſay all Men. But I think all Men of ſenſe competent judges. EUPH. What! are the divine attributes and diſpenſations to Mankind, the true end and happineſs of rational Creatures, with the means of improving and perfecting their Beings, more eaſy and obvious points than thoſe which make the ſub⯑ject [38] of every common profeſſion? LYS. Perhaps not: but one thing I know, ſome things are ſo manifeſtly abſurd, that no authority ſhall make me give into them. For inſtance, if all Mankind ſhou'd pretend to perſuade me that the Son of God was born upon earth in a poor Family, was ſpit upon, buffeted and crucified, lived like a Beggar and died like a Thief, I ſhou'd never believe one ſyllable of it. Common ſenſe ſhews every one, what figure it wou'd be decent for an earthly Prince or Ambaſſa⯑dor to make; and the Son of God, upon an am⯑baſſy from Heaven, muſt needs have made an ap⯑pearance beyond all others of great eclat, and in all reſpects the very reverſe of that which Jeſus Chriſt is reported to have made, even by his own Hiſtorians. EUPH. O Lyſicles, though I had ever ſo much mind to approve and applaud your inge⯑nious reaſoning, yet I dare not aſſent to this for fear of Crito. LYS. Why ſo? EUPH. Becauſe he obſerved juſt now, that Men judge of things they do not know, by prejudices from things they do know. And I fear he wou'd object that you, who have been converſant in the grand Monde, having your head filled with a notion of Atten⯑dants and Equipage and Liveries, the familiar bad⯑ges of Humane Grandeur, are leſs able to judge of that which is truly divine; and that one who had ſeen leſs, and thought more, wou'd be apt to ima⯑gine a pompous parade of worldly greatneſs, not the moſt becoming the Author of a ſpiritual Reli⯑gion, that was deſigned to wean Men from the world, and raiſe them above it. CRI. Do you think, Lyſicles, if a Man ſhou'd make his en⯑trance into London in a rich ſuit of Clothes, with a hundred gilt Coaches, and a thouſand laced Foot⯑men; that this wou'd be a more divine appearance, and have more of true grandeur in it, than if he had power with a word to heal all manner of diſeaſes, [39] to raiſe the dead to life, and ſtill the raging of the Winds and Sea? LYS. Without all doubt it muſt be very agreeable to common ſenſe to ſuppoſe, that he cou'd reſtore others to life who cou'd not ſave his own. You tell us, indeed, that he roſe again from the dead: but what occaſion was there for him to die, the juſt for the unjuſt, the Son of God for wicked Men? and why in that individual place? Why at that very time above all others? Why did he not make his appearance earlier, and preach in all parts of the World, that the benefit might have been more extenſive? Account for all theſe points and reconcile them, if you can, to the common notions and plain ſenſe of Mankind. CRI. And what if thoſe, as well as many other points, ſhou'd lie out of the road that we are acquainted with; muſt we therefore explode them, and make it a rule to condemn every proceeding as ſenſeleſs, that doth not ſquare with the vulgar ſenſe of Man; If the precepts and certain primary tenets of Religi⯑on appear in the eye of Reaſon good and uſeful; and if they are alſo found to be ſo by their effects; we may, for the ſake of them, admit certain other points or doctrines recommended with them, to have a good tendency, to be right and true; al⯑though we cannot diſcern their goodneſs or truth by the meer light of Humane Reaſon, which may well be ſuppoſed an inſufficient judge of the pro⯑ceedings, counſels, and deſigns of Providence, and this ſufficeth to make our conviction reaſonable.

XVI.

It is an allowed point that no Man can judge of this or that part of a machine taken by it ſelf, without knowing the whole, the mutual relation or dependence of its parts, and the end for which it was made. And, as this is a point acknowledged in corporeal and natural things, ought we not by a parity of reaſon to ſuſpend our [40] judgment of a ſingle unaccountable part of the Di⯑vine Oeconomy, till we are more fully acquainted with the moral Syſtem, or world of Spirits, and are let into the deſigns of God's Providence, and have an extenſive view of his diſpenſations paſt, preſent, and future? Alas! Lyſicles, what do you know even of your ſelf, whence you come, what you are, or whither you are going? To me it ſeems, that a Minute Philoſopher is like a conceit⯑ed Spectator, who never looked behind the Scenes, and yet wou'd judge of the machinery; who from a tranſient glimpſe of a part only of ſome one ſcene, wou'd take upon him to cenſure the plot of a Play. LYS. As to the plot I won't ſay; but in half a Scene a Man may judge of an abſurd Ac⯑tor. With what colour or pretext can you juſtify the vindictive, froward, whimſical behaviour of ſome inſpired Teachers or Prophets? Particulars that ſerve neither for profit nor pleaſure I make a ſhift to forget; but in general the truth of this charge I do very well remember. CRI. You need be at no pains to prove a point I ſhall neither juſ⯑tify nor deny. That there have been humane paſ⯑ſions, infirmities, and defects in perſons inſpired by God, I freely own; nay, that very wicked Men have been inſpired, as Balaam for inſtance and Caia⯑phas, cannot denied. But what will you infer from thence? Can you prove it impoſſible, that a weak or ſinful Man ſhou'd become an inſtrument to the Spirit of God, for conveying his purpoſe to other Sinners? Or that Divine Light may not, as well as the light of the Sun, ſhine on a foul veſſel with⯑out polluting its rays? LYS. To make ſhort work, the right way wou'd be to put out our eyes, and not judge at all. CRI. I do not ſay ſo, but I think it wou'd be right, if ſome ſanguine perſons upon certain points ſuſpected their own judgment. ALC. But the very things ſaid to be inſpired, [41] taken by themſelves and in their own nature, are ſometimes ſo wrong, to ſay no worſe, that a Man may pronounce them not to be divine at firſt ſight; without troubling his head about the Syſtem of Providence or Connexion of Events: As one may ſay that Graſs is green, without knowing or conſi⯑dering how it grows, what uſes it is ſubſervient to, or how it is connected with the mundane Syſtem. Thus for inſtance, the ſpoiling of the Aegyptians, and the extirpation of the Canaanites, every one at firſt glance ſees to be cruel and unjuſt, and may therefore without deliberating pronounce them unworthy of God. CRI. But, Alciphron, to judge rightly of theſe things, may it not be proper to conſider how long the Iſraelites had wrought under thoſe ſevere Task-maſters of Egypt, what injuries and hardſhips they had ſuſtained from them, what crimes and abominations the Canaanites had been guilty of, what right God hath to diſpoſe of the things of this World, to puniſh Delinquents, and to appoint both the manner and the inſtruments of his Juſtice? Man, who has not ſuch right over his fellow-creatures, who is himſelf a fellow-ſinner with them, who is liable to error as well as paſſion, whoſe views are imperfect, who is governed more by Prejudice, than the Truth of things, may not improbably deceive himſelf, when he ſets up for a judge of the proceedings of the holy, omniſcient, impaſſive Creator and Governor of all things.

XVII.

ALC. Believe me, Crito, Men are never ſo induſtrious to deceive themſelves, as when they engage to defend their Prejudices. You wou'd fain reaſon us out of all uſe of our Reaſon: Can any thing be more irrational? To forbid us to rea⯑ſon on the Divine Diſpenſations, is to ſuppoſe, they will not bear the teſt of reaſon; or, in other words, that God acts without reaſon, which ought [42] not to be admitted, no, not in any ſingle inſtance: For if in one, why not in another? Whoever there⯑fore allows a God, muſt allow that he always acts reaſonably. I will not therefore attribute to him Actions and Proceedings that are unreaſonable. He hath given me Reaſon to judge withal; and I will judge by that unerring Light, lighted from the univerſal lamp of Nature. CRI. O Alciphron! as I frankly own the common remark to be true, That when a Man is againſt Reaſon, it is a ſhrewd ſign Reaſon is againſt him; ſo I ſhou'd never go about to diſſuade any one, much leſs one who ſo well knew the value of it, from uſing that noble talent. On the contrary, upon all ſubjects of moment, in my opinion, a Man ought to uſe his Reaſon; but then, whether it may not be reaſonable to uſe it with ſome deference to ſuperior Reaſon, it will not, perhaps, be amiſs to conſider. ALC. It muſt ſurely derogate from the Wiſdom of God, to ſup⯑poſe his conduct cannot bear being inſpected, not even by the twilight of Humane Reaſon. EUPH. You allow, then, God to be wiſe? ALC. I do. EUPH. What! infinitely wiſe? ALC. Even in⯑finitely. EUPH. His Wiſdom, then, far exceeds that of Man. ALC. Vaſtly. EUPH. Probably more than the Wiſdom of Man, that of a Child. ALC. Without all queſtion. EUPH. What think you, Alciphron, muſt not the conduct of a Parent ſeem very unaccountable to a Child, when its in⯑clinations are thwarted, when it is put to learn the Letters, when it is obliged to ſwallow bitter Phy⯑ſick, to part with what it likes, and to ſuffer, and do, and ſee many things done contrary to its own judgment, however reaſonable or agreeable to that of others? ALC. This I grant. EUPH. Will it not therefore follow from hence by a parity of rea⯑ſon, that the little child, Man, when it takes up⯑on [43] it to judge of the Schemes of Parental Providence, and a thing of yeſterday, to criticiſe the Oeconomy of the Ancient of days? will it not follow, I ſay, that ſuch a judge, of ſuch matters, muſt be apt to make very erroneous judgments? eſteeming thoſe things in themſelves unaccountable, which he can⯑not account for; and concluding of ſome certain points, from an appearance of arbitrary carriage towards him, which is ſuited to his infancy and ignorance, that they are in themſelves capricious or abſurd, and cannot proceed from a wiſe, juſt, and benevolent God. This ſingle conſideration, if duly attended to, wou'd, I verily think, put an end to many conceited reaſonings againſt Revealed Religion. ALC. You wou'd have us then con⯑clude, that things, to our wiſdom unaccountable, may nevertheleſs proceed from an abyſs of Wiſdom which our line cannot fathom; and that proſpects viewed but in part, and by the broken tinged light of our Intellects, though to us they may ſeem diſ⯑proportionate and monſtrous, may nevertheleſs ap⯑pear quite otherwiſe to another eye, and in a dif⯑ferent ſituation: In a word, that as Humane Wiſ⯑dom is but childiſh Folly, in reſpect of the divine, ſo the Wiſdom of God may ſometimes ſeem Foo⯑liſhneſs to Men.

XVIII.

EUPH. I wou'd not have you make theſe concluſions, unleſs in reaſon you ought to make them: But if they are reaſonable, why ſhou'd you not make them? ALC. Some things may ſeem reaſonable at one time, and not at another: And I take this very apology you make, for Cre⯑dulity and Superſtition, to be one of thoſe things. When I view it in its Principles, it ſeems naturally to follow from juſt conceſſions; but when I conſi⯑der its conſequences, I cannot agree to it. A Man had as good abdicate his Nature, as diſclaim the [44] uſe of Reaſon. A Doctrine is unaccountable, therefore it muſt be Divine! EUPH. Credulity and Superſtition are qualities ſo diſagreeable and degrading to Humane Nature, ſo ſurely an effect of weakneſs, and ſo frequently a cauſe of wicked⯑neſs, that I ſhou'd be very much ſurpriſed to find a juſt courſe of reaſoning lead to them. I can never think that Reaſon is a blind guide to folly, or that there is any connexion between Truth and Falſ⯑hood, no more than I can think a thing's being unaccountable a proof that it is Divine: Though at the ſame time I cannot help acknowledging, it follows from your own avow'd principles, that a thing's being unaccountable, or incomprehenſible to our Reaſon, is no ſure argument to conclude it is not Divine; eſpecially when there are collateral proofs of its being ſo. A Child is influenced by the many ſenſible effects it hath felt, of paternal love and care and ſuperior wiſdom, to believe and do ſeveral things with an implicit faith and obe⯑dience: And if we in the ſame manner, from the truth and reaſonableneſs which we plainly ſee in ſo many points within our cogniſance, and the advantages which we experience from the ſeed of the Goſpel ſown in good ground, were diſpoſed to an implicit Belief of certain other points, re⯑lating to ſchemes we do not know, or ſubjects to which our Talents are perhaps diſproportionate, I am tempted to think it might become our duty without diſhonouring our Reaſon; which is never ſo much diſhonoured as when it is foiled, and never in more danger of being foiled, than by judging where it hath neither means nor right to judge. LYS. I wou'd give a good deal, to ſee that ingenious Gameſter Glaucus have the handling of Euphranor one night at our Club. I own he is a peg too high for me in ſome of his notions: But [45] then he is admirable at vindicating Humane Rea⯑ſon againſt the impoſitions of Prieſtcraft.

XIX.

ALC. He wou'd undertake to make it as clear as day light, that there was nothing worth a ſtraw in Chriſtianity, but what every one knew, or might know, as well without as with it, before as ſince Jeſus Chriſt. CRI. That great Man, it ſeems, teacheth, that common ſenſe alone is the Pole-Star; by which Mankind ought to ſteer; and that what is called Revelation muſt be ridiculous, becauſe it is unneceſſary and uſeleſs, the natural talents of every Man being ſufficient, to make him happy, good, and wiſe, without any further cor⯑reſpondence with Heaven either for light or aid. EUPH. I have already acknowledged how ſen⯑ſible I am, that my ſituation in this obſcure cor⯑ner of the Country deprives me of many advanta⯑ges, to be had from the converſation of ingenious Men in Town. To make my ſelf ſome amends, I am obliged to converſe with the dead and my own Thoughts, which laſt I know are of little weight againſt the authority of Glaucus, or ſuch like great Men in the Minute Philoſophy. But what ſhall we ſay to Socrates, for he too was of an opi⯑nion very different from that aſcribed to Glaucus? ALC. For the preſent we need not inſiſt on autho⯑rities, ancient or modern, or inquire which was the greater Man Socrates or Glaucus. Though, me⯑thinks, for ſo much as authority can ſignify, the preſent times, gray and hoary with age and ex⯑perience, have a manifeſt advantage over thoſe that are falſly called ancient. But not to dwell on au⯑thorities, I tell you in plain Engliſh, Euphranor, we do not want your Revelations; and that for this plain reaſon, thoſe that are clear every body knew before, and thoſe that are obſcure no body is the better for. EUPH. Whether it was poſ⯑ſible [46] for Mankind to have known all parts of the Chriſtian Religion, beſides myſteries and poſitive inſtitutions, is not the queſtion between us; and that they actually did not know them, is too plain to be denied. This, perhaps, was for want of making a due uſe of Reaſon. But, as to the uſe⯑fulneſs of Revelation, it ſeems much the ſamething whether they cou'd not know, or wou'd not be at the pains to know, the Doctrines revealed. And as for thoſe Doctrines which were too obſcure to penetrate, or too ſublime to reach, by natural Reaſon; how far Mankind may be the better for them is more, I had almoſt ſaid, than even you or Glaucus can tell.

XX.

ALC. But whatever may be pretended as to obſcure Doctrines and Diſpenſations, all this hath nothing to do with Prophecies, which, being altogether relative to Mankind, and the events of this World, to which our faculties are ſurely well enough proportioned, one might expect ſhou'd be very clear, and ſuch as might inform inſtead of puzzling us. EUPH. And yet it muſt be al⯑lowed that as ſome Prophecies are clear, there are others very obſcure; but left to my ſelf, I doubt I ſhou'd never have inferred from thence that they were not Divine. In my own way of thinking I ſhou'd have been apt to conclude, that the Prophe⯑cies we underſtand are a proof for Inſpiration; but that thoſe we do not underſtand are no proof againſt it. Inaſmuch as for the latter our ignorance or the reſerve of the Holy Spirit may account, but for the other nothing, for ought that I ſee, can account but Inſpiration. ALC. Now I know ſeveral ſa⯑gacious Men, who conclude very differently from you, to wit, that the one ſort of Prophecies are nonſenſe, and the other contrived after the events. Behold the difference between a Man of free thought [47] and one of narrow principles! EUPH. It ſeems then they reject the Revelations becauſe they are obſcure, and Daniel's Prophecies becauſe they are clear. ALC. Either way a Man of ſenſe ſees cauſe to ſuſpect there has been foul play. EUPH. Your Men of ſenſe are, it ſeems, hard to pleaſe. ALC. Our Philoſophers are Men of piercing eyes. EUPH. I ſuppoſe ſuch Men never make tranſient judgments from tranſient views; but always eſtabliſh fixed concluſions upon a thorough inſpection of things. For my own part, I dare not engage with a Man, who has examined thoſe points ſo nicely, as it may be preſumed you have done: But I cou'd name ſome eminent writers of our own, now living, whoſe Books on the ſubject of Prophecy have giv⯑en great ſatisfaction to Gentlemen, who paſs for Men of ſenſe and learning, here in the Country. ALC. You muſt know. Euphranor, I am not at leiſure to peruſe the learned Writings of Divines, on a ſubject which a Man may ſee through with half an eye. To me it is ſufficient, that the point it ſelf is odd and out of the road of nature. For the reſt, I leave them to diſpute and ſettle among themſelves, where to fix the preciſe time when the Scepter departed from Judah; or whether in Daniel's Prophecy of the Meſſiah we ſhou'd com⯑pute by the Chaldaean or the Julian year. My only concluſion concerning all ſuch matters is, that I will never trouble my ſelf about them. EUPH. To an extraordinary genius, who ſees things with half an eye, I know not what to ſay: But for the reſt of Mankind, one wou'd think it ſhou'd be very raſh in them to conclude, without much and ex⯑act inquiry, on the unſafe ſide of a queſtion which concerns their chief intereſt. ALC. Mark it well: a true Genius in purſuit of Truth makes ſwift advances on the wings of General maxims, while little minds creep and grovel amidſt mean [48] particularities. I lay it down for a certain Truth; that by the fallacious arts of Logic and Criticiſm, ſtraining and forcing, palliating, patching and diſ⯑tinguiſhing, a Man may juſtify or make out any thing; and this remark, with one or two about prejudice, ſaves me a world of trouble. EUPH. You, Alciphron, who ſoar ſublime on ſtrong and free pinions, vouchſafe to lend a helping hand to thoſe whom you behold entangled in the birdlime of prejudice. For my part, I find it very poſſible to ſuppoſe Prophecy may be Divine, although there ſhou'd be ſome obſcurity at this diſtance, with reſpect to dates of time or kinds of years. you your ſelf own Revelation poſſible; and allow⯑ing this I can very eaſily conceive it may be odd, and out of the road of nature. I can without a⯑mazement meet in Holy Scripture divers Prophe⯑cies, whereof I do not ſee the completion, divers texts I do not underſtand, divers myſteries above my comprehenſion, and ways of God to me unac⯑countable. Why may not ſome Prophecies relate to parts of Hiſtory I am not well enough acquainted with, or to events not yet come to paſs? It ſeems to me that Prophecies unfathomed by the hearer, or even the ſpeaker himſelf, have been afterward verified and underſtood in the event; and it is one of my maxims, That, what hath been may be. Though I rub my Eyes, and do my utmoſt to ex⯑tricate my ſelf from prejudice, yet it ſtill ſeems very poſſible to me, that, what I do not, a more acute, more attentive, or more learned Man may underſtand: At leaſt thus much is plain; the dif⯑ficulty of ſome points or paſſages doth not hinder the clearneſs of others, and thoſe parts of Scripture, which we cannot interpret, we are not bound to know the ſenſe of. What evil or what inconveni⯑ence, if we cannot comprehend what we are not obliged to comprehend, or if we cannot account [49] for thoſe things which it doth not belong to us to account for? Scriptures not underſtood, at one time, or by one perſon, may be underſtood at ano⯑ther time, or by other perſons. May we not per⯑ceive, by retroſpect on what is paſt, a certain pro⯑greſs from darker to lighter, in the ſeries of the Divine Oeconomy towards Man? And may not fu⯑ture events clear up ſuch points as at preſent ex⯑erciſe the faith of Believers? Now I cannot help thinking (ſuch is the force either of truth or pre⯑judice) that in all this, there is nothing ſtrained or forced, or which is not reaſonable and natural to ſuppoſe.

XXI.

ALC. Well, Euphranor, I will lend you a helping hand, ſince you deſire it, but think fit to alter my method: For you muſt know, the main points of Chriſtian Belief have been infuſed ſo early, and inculcated ſo often, by nurſes, paeda⯑gogues, and prieſts, that, be the proofs ever ſo plain, it is a hard matter to convince a mind, thus tinctured and ſtained, by arguing againſt revealed Religion from its internal characters. I ſhall there⯑fore ſet my ſelf to conſider things in another light, and examine your Religion by certain external characters or circumſtantials, comparing the ſyſtem of Revelation with collateral accounts of ancient Heathen writers, and ſhewing how ill it conſiſts with them. Know then, that the Chriſtian Reve⯑lation ſuppoſing the Jewiſh, it follows, that if the Jewiſh be deſtroyed the Chriſtian muſt of courſe fall to the Ground. Now, to make ſhort work, I ſhall attack this Jewiſh Revelation in its head. Tell me, are we not obliged, if we believe the Moſaic account of things, to hold the world was created not quite ſix thouſand years ago? EUPH. I grant we are. ALC. What will you ſay now, if other ancient records carry up the Hiſtory of the world [50] many thouſand years beyond this period? What if the Aegyptians and Chineſe have accounts extending to thirty or forty thouſand years? What if the former of theſe nations have obſerved twelve hundred eclip⯑ſes, during the ſpace of forty eight thouſand years, before the time of Alexander the great? What if the Chineſe have alſo many obſervations antecedent to the Jewiſh account of the Creation? What if the Chaldaeans had been obſerving the Stars for above four hundred thouſand years? And what ſhall we ſay if we have Succeſſions of Kings and their Reigns, marked for ſeveral thouſand years before the begin⯑ning of the world, aſſigned by Moſes? Shall we reject the accounts and records of all other nations, the moſt famous, ancient, and learned in the world, and preſerve a blind reverence for the Legiſlator of the Jews? EUPH. And pray if they de⯑ſerve to be rejected, why ſhou'd we not reject them? What if thoſe monſtrous Chronologies contain no⯑thing but names without Actions and manifeſt fa⯑bles? What if thoſe pretended obſervations of Aegyptians and Chaldaeans were unknown or unre⯑garded by ancient Aſtronomers? What if the Jeſuits have ſhewn the inconſiſtency of the like Chineſe pretentions with the Truth of the E⯑phemerides? What if the moſt ancient Chi⯑neſe obſervations allow'd to be authentic, are thoſe of two fixed Stars, one in the winter Solſtice, the other in the Vernal Equinox, in the reign of their King Yao, which was ſince the Flood? ^* ALC. You muſt give me leave to obſerve, the Romiſh Miſſionaries are of ſmall credit in this point. EUPH. But what knowledge have we, or can we have, of thoſe Chineſe affairs, but by their means? The ſame perſons that tell us of theſe accounts refute them; if we reject their authority in one caſe, what right have we to build upon it in another? ALC. When I conſider that the [51] Chineſe have annals of more than forty thouſand years, and that they are a learned ingenious and ac⯑cute People, very curious, and adicted to Arts and Sciences, I profeſs I cannot help paying ſome re⯑gard to their accounts of time. EUPH. What⯑ever advantage their ſituation and political maxims may have given them, it doth not appear they are ſo learned or ſo acute in point of Science as the Europeans. The general character of the Chineſe, if we may believe Trigaltius and other writers, is that they are men of a trifling and credulous curio⯑ſity, addicted to ſearch after the Philoſopher's Stone, and a Medicine to make Men immortal, to Aſtrology, Fortune-telling, and Preſages of all kinds. Their ignorance in Nature and Mathe⯑matics is evident, from the great hand the Jeſuits make of that kind of knowledge among them. But what ſhall we think of thoſe extraordinary an⯑nals, if the very Chineſe themſelves give no credit to them for more than three thouſand years before Jeſus Chriſt? If they do not pretend to have be⯑gun to write hiſtory above four thouſand years ago? And if the oldeſt books they have now extant in an in⯑telligible character, are not above two thouſand years old? One wou'd think a Man of your Sagacity, ſo apt to ſuſpect every thing out of the common road of nature, ſhou'd not without the cleareſt proof ad⯑mit thoſe annals for authentic, which record ſuch ſtrange things as the Sun's not ſetting for ten days, and Gold raining three days together. Tell me, Alciphron, can you really believe theſe things with⯑out inquiring by what means the tradition was pre⯑ſerved, through what hands it paſſed, or what re⯑ception it met with, or who firſt committed it to writing? ALC. To omit the Chineſe and their Story, it will ſerve my purpoſe as well to build on the authority of Manetho that learned Egyptian Prieſt, who had ſuch opportunities of ſearching [52] into the moſt ancient accounts of time, and copy⯑ing into his Dynaſties the moſt venerable and au⯑thentic records inſcribed on the pillars of Hermes. EUPH. Pray, Alciphron, where were thoſe chro⯑nological pillars to be ſeen? ALC. In the Sc⯑riadical land. EUPH. And where is that coun⯑try? ALC. I don't know. EUPH. How were thoſe records preſerved for ſo many ages down to the time of this Hermes, who is ſaid to have been the firſt inventor of letters? ALC. I do not know. EUPH. Did any other writers, before or ſince Manetho, pretend to have ſeen, or tranſcribed, or known any thing about theſe pil⯑lars? ALC. Not that I know. EUPH. Or about the place where they are ſaid to have been. ALC. If they did, it is more than I know. EUPH. Do the Greek Authors that went into Aegypt, and conſulted the Aegyptian prieſts, agree with theſe accounts of Manetho? ALC. Sup⯑poſe they do not. EUPH. Doth Diodorus, who lived ſince Manetho, follow, cite, or ſo much as mention this ſame Manetho? ALC. What will you infer from all this? EUPH. If I did not know you and your principles, and how vigi⯑lantly you guard againſt impoſture, I ſhou'd infer that you were a very credulous Man. For what can we call it but credulity to believe moſt incre⯑dible things on moſt ſlender authority, ſuch as frag⯑ments of an obſcure writer, diſagreeing with all other Hiſtorians, ſupported by an obſcure autho⯑rity of Hermes's pillars, for which you muſt take his word, and which contain things ſo improbable as Succeſſions of Gods and Demi-gods, for many thouſand years, Vulcan alone having reigned nine thouſand? There is little in theſe venerable Dy⯑naſties of Manetho, beſides names and numbers; and yet in that little we meet with very ſtrange things, that wou'd be thought Romantic in another [53] writer: For inſtance, the Nile overflowing with honey, the Moon grown bigger, a ſpeaking Lamb, ſeventy Kings who reigned as many days one after another, a King a day ^*. If you are known Al⯑ciphron, to give credit to theſe things, I fear you will loſe the honour of being thought incredulous. ALC. And yet theſe ridiculous fragments, as you wou'd repreſent them, have been thought worth the pains and lucubrations of very learned Men. How can you account for the work that the great Joſeph Scaliger and Sir John Marſham make about them? EUPH. I do not pretend to account for it. To ſee Scaliger add another Julian period to make room for ſuch things as Manetho's Dynaſ⯑ties, and Sir John Marſham take ſo much learned pains to piece, patch, and mend thoſe obſcure frag⯑ments, to range them in Synchroniſms, and try to adjuſt them with ſacred Chronology, or make them conſiſtent with themſelves and other accounts, is to me very ſtrange and unaccountable. Why they, or Eu⯑ſebius, or yourſelf, or any other learned Man ſhou'd i⯑magine thoſe things deſerve any regard I leave you to explain.

XXII.

ALC. After all it is not eaſy to con⯑ceive what ſhou'd move, not only Manetho, but al⯑ſo other Aegyptian Prieſts, long before his time, to ſet up ſuch great pretences to antiquity, all which however differing from one another, agree in this, that they overthrow the Moſaic Hiſtory? How can this be accounted for without ſome real foun⯑dation? What point of pleaſure or profit, or pow⯑er, cou'd ſet Men on forging Succeſſions of anci⯑ent names, and periods of time for ages before the world began? EUPH. Pray, Alciphron, is there any thing ſo ſtrange or ſingular in this vain humour of extending the antiquity of nations beyond the Truth? Hath it not been obſerved in moſt parts [54] of the world? Doth it not even in our own times ſhew it ſelf, eſpecially among thoſe dependent and ſubdued people, who have little elſe to boaſt of. To paſs over others of our Fellow-ſubjects, who, in proportion as they are below their neigh⯑bours in wealth and power, lay claim to a more remote antiquity; are not the pretenſions of Iriſh men in this way known to be very great? If I may truſt my Memory O Flaherty, in his Ogygia, men⯑tions ſome tranſactions in Ireland before the Flood. The ſame humour, and from the ſame cauſe, ap⯑pears to have prevailed in Sicily, a Country for ſome Centuries paſt, ſubject to the Dominion of Foreigners: During which time, the Sicilians have publiſhed divers fabulous accounts, concerning the original and antiquity of their cities, wherein they vye with each other. It is pretended to be prov⯑ed by ancient Inſcriptions, whoſe exiſtence or au⯑thority ſeems on a level with that of Hermes's Pil⯑lars, that Palermo was founded in the days of the Patriarch Iſaac by a colony of Hebrews, Phoenicians and Syrians, and that a Grandſon of Eſau had been Governor of a tower ſubſiſting within theſe two hundred years in that city ^*. The antiquity of Meſſina hath been carried ſtill higher, by ſome who wou'd have us think it was enlarged by Nim⯑rod ^†. The like pretenſions are made by Catania, and other Towns of that Iſland, who have found Authors of as good credit as Manetho to ſupport them. Now I ſhou'd be glad to know why the Aegyptians, a ſubdued people, may not probably be ſuppoſed to have invented fabulous accounts from the ſame motive, and like others valued them⯑ſelves on extravagant pretenſions to Antiquity, when in all other reſpects they were ſo much infe⯑rior to their Maſters? That people had been ſuc⯑ceſſively [55] conquered by Ethiopians, Aſſyrians, Ba⯑bylonians, Perſians, and Grecians, before it ap⯑pears that thoſe wonderful Dynaſtics of Manetho and the Pillars of Hermes were ever heard of; as they had been by the two firſt of thoſe Nations before the time of Solon himſelf, the earlieſt Greek that is known to have conſulted the Prieſts of Ae⯑gypt: Whoſe accounts were ſo extravagant that e⯑ven the Greek Hiſtorians, though unacquainted with Holy Scripture, were far from given an in⯑tire credit to them. Herodotus making a report upon their authority, ſaith, Thoſe to whom ſuch things ſeem credible may make the beſt of them, for himſelf declaring that it was his purpoſe to write what he heard ^*. And both he and Diodorus do, on divers occaſions, ſhew the ſame Diffidence in the narratives of thoſe Aegyptian Prieſts. And as we obſerved of the Aegyptians, it is no leſs cer⯑tain that the Phoenicians, Aſſyrians and Chaldaeans were each a conquered and reduced People, be⯑fore the reſt of the world appear to have heard any thing of their pretenſions to ſo remote Antiquity. CRI. But what occaſion is there to be at any pains to account for the humour of fabulous Writers? Is it not ſufficient to ſee that they relate Abſurdi⯑ties; that they are unſupported by any foreign E⯑vidence; that they do not appear to have been in Credit, even among their own Countrymen, and that they are inconſiſtent one with another? That Men ſhou'd have the Vanity to impoſe on the World by falſe accounts, is nothing ſtrange; it is much more ſo, that after what hath been done to⯑wards undeceiving the world by ſo many learned Crities, there ſhou'd be Men found capable of be⯑ing abuſed by thoſe paltry ſcraps of Manetho, Be⯑roſus, Cteſias, or the like fabulous or Counterfeit [56] Writers. ALC. Give me leave to obſerve, thoſe learned Critics may prove to be Eccleſiaſtics, perhaps ſome of them Papiſts. CRI. what do you think of Sir Iſaac Newton, was he either Papiſt or Eccleſiaſtic? Perhaps you may not allow him to have been in Sagacity, or Force of mind, equal to the great Men of the Minute Philoſophy: But it cannot be denied that he had read and thought much upon the ſubject, and that the reſult of his inquiry was a perfect contempt of all thoſe cele⯑brated Rivals to Moſes. ALC. It hath been obſerv⯑ed by Ingenious Men, that Sir Iſaac Newton, though a Layman, was deeply prejudiced, witneſs his great regard to the Bible. CRI. And the ſame may be ſaid of Mr. Locke, Mr. Boyle, Lord Bacon, and other famous Laymen, who, however know⯑ing in ſome points, muſt nevertheleſs be allowed not to have attained that keen Diſcernment, which is the peculiar diſtinction of your Sect.

XXIII.

But perhaps there may be other rea⯑ſons beſide prejudice, to incline a Man to give Moſes the preference, on the Truth of whoſe Hi⯑ſtory the Government, Manners, and Religion of his Countrymen were founded and framed; of whoſe Hiſtory there are manifeſt traces in the moſt ancient books and traditions of the Gentiles, parti⯑cularly of the Brachmans and Perſees; whoſe hiſto⯑ry is confirmed by the late Invention of arts and ſciences, the gradual Peopling of the world, the very Names of antient nations, and even by the Authority and Arguments of that renowned Phi⯑loſopher Lucretius, who, on other points, is ſo much admired and followed by thoſe of your Sect. Not to mention that the continual Decreaſe of flu⯑ids, the Sinking of hills, and the Diminution of Planetary motions afford ſo many Natural Proofs, which ſhew this world had a beginning; as the [57] Civil or Hiſtorical proofs abovementioned do plainly point out, this beginning to have been a⯑bout the time aſſigned in Holy Scripture. After all which I beg leave to add one Obſervation more. To any one who conſiders that, on digging into the earth, ſuch quantities of ſhells, and, in ſome places, bones and horns of animals are found, ſound and intire after having lain there in all pro⯑bability ſome thouſands of years; it ſhou'd ſeem probable, that Gems, Medals, and Implements in metal or ſtone, might have laſted intire, buried un⯑der ground forty or fifty thouſand years, if the world had been ſo old. How comes it then to paſs that no remains are found, no antiquities of thoſe numerous ages preceding the Scripture ac⯑counts of time; no fragments of buildings, no publick monuments, no intaglias, cammeos, ſta⯑tues, baſſo relievos, medals, inſcriptions, utenſils, or artificial works of any kind are ever diſcover'd, which may bear teſtimony to the exiſtence of thoſe mighty Empires, thoſe Succeſſions of Monarchs, Heroes, and Demi-gods, for ſo many thouſand years? Let us look forward and ſuppoſe ten or twenty thouſand years to come, during which time we will ſuppoſe, that plagues, famines, wars, and earthquakes ſhall have made great havock in the world, is it not highly probable that at the end of ſuch a period, Pillars, Vaſes, and Statues now in being of Granite, or Porphyry, or Jaſper, (Stones of ſuch hardneſs, as we know them to have laſted two thouſand years above ground, without any conſiderable alteration) wou'd bear record of theſe and paſt ages? or that ſome of our current Coins might then be dug up, or old Walls and the foun⯑dations of Buildings ſhew themſelves, as well as the ſhells and ſtones of the Primaeval World are preſerved down to our times. To me it ſeems to follow from theſe conſiderations, which common [58] ſenſe and experience make all men judges of, that we may ſee good reaſon to conclude, the world was created about the time recorded in Holy Scripture. And if we admit a thing ſo extraordinary as the Creation of this World, it ſhou'd ſeem that we ad⯑mit ſomething ſtrange, and odd, and new to Hu⯑mane Apprehenſion, beyond any other miracle whatſoever.

XXIV.

Alciphron ſate muſing and made no an⯑ſwer, whereupon Lyſicles expreſſed himſelf in the following manner. I muſt own I ſhou'd rather ſuppoſe with Lucretius, that the world was made by chance, and that Men grew out of the earth, like Pompions, than pin my faith on thoſe wretch⯑ed fabulous fragments of Oriental Hiſtory. And as for the learned Men, who have taken pains to illuſtrate and piece them together, they appear to me no better than ſo many muſty Pedants. An ingenious Free-thinker may perhaps now and then make ſome uſe of their Lucubrations, and play one abſurdity againſt another. But you are not there⯑fore to think, he pays any real regard to the au⯑thority of ſuch apocryphal Writers, or believes one ſyllable of the Chineſe, Babylonian, or Egyptian Traditions. If we ſeem to give them a prefe⯑rence before the Bible, it is only becauſe they are not eſtabliſhed by Law. This is my plain ſenſe of the matter, and I dare ſay it is the general ſenſe of our Sect; who are too rational to be in earneſt on ſuch trifles, though they ſometime give hints of deep Erudition, and put on a grave face to divert themſelves with Bigots. ALC. Since Lyſicles will have it ſo, I am content not to build on accounts of time preceding the Moſaic. I muſt nevertheleſs beg leave to obſerve, there is another point of a different nature, againſt which there do not lie the ſame exceptions, that deſerves to be conſider⯑ed, [59] and may ſerve our purpoſe as well. I pre⯑ſume it will be allowed that Hiſtorians, treating of times within the Moſaic account, ought by impar⯑tial Men to be placed on the ſame foot with Moſes. It may therfore be expected, that thoſe, who pre⯑tend to vindicate his Writings, ſhou'd reconcile them with parallel accounts of other Authors, treat⯑ing of the ſame times, things, and perſons. And, if we are not attached ſingly to Moſes, but take our notions from other Writers, and the probability of things, we ſhall ſee good cauſe to believe, the Jews were only a crew of leprous Aegyptians, driven from their Country on account of that loathſome Di⯑ſtemper; and that their Religion, pretended to have been delivered from Heaven at mount Sinai, was in truth learned in Egypt, and brought from thence. CRI. Not to inſiſt, on what cannot be denied, that an Hiſtorian writing of his own times is to be believed, before others who treat of the ſame ſubject ſeveral ages after, it ſeems to me that it is abſurd to expect we ſhou'd reconcile Moſes with profane Hiſtorians, till you have firſt recon⯑ciled them one with another. In anſwer therefore to what you obſerve, I deſire you wou'd conſider in the firſt place, that Manetho, Chaeremon, and Lyſimachus had publiſhed inconſiſtent accounts of the Jews, and there going forth from Aegypt ^*: In the ſecond place, that their Language is a plain proof they were not of Aegyptian, but either of Phoenician, of Syrian, or of Chaldaean, original: and in the third place, that it doth not ſeem very probable to ſuppoſe, their Religion, the Baſis or Fundamental principle of which was the Worſhip of one only Supreme God, and the principal De⯑ſign of which was to aboliſh Idolatry, cou'd be de⯑rived from Aegypt, the moſt Idolatrous of all nati⯑ons. It muſt be owned, the ſeparate ſituation and [60] inſtitutions of the Jews occaſioned, their being treated by ſome Foreigners, with great ignorance and contempt of them and their original. But Stra⯑bo, who is allowed to have been a judicious and in⯑quiſitive Writer, though he was not acquainted with their true Hiſtory, makes more honourable mention of them. He relates that Moſes, with many other Worſhippers of one Infinite God, not approving the Image worſhip of the Egyptians and other nations, went out from Aegypt and ſettled in Jeruſalem, where they built a Temple to one only God without Images ^*.

XXV.

ALC. We who aſſert the cauſe of Li⯑berty againſt Religion, in theſe later ages of the world, lie under great diſadvantages, from the loſs of ancient Books, which cleared up many points to the eyes of thoſe great Men, Celſus, Porphyry, and Julian, which at a greater diſtance and with leſs help cannot ſo eaſily be made out by us: but, had we thoſe Records, I doubt not we might demo⯑moliſh the whole Syſtem at once. CRI. And yet I make ſome doubt of this; becauſe thoſe great Men, as you call them, with all thoſe advantages cou'd not do it. ALC. That muſt needs have been owing to the Dulneſs and Stupidity of the world in thoſe days, when the art of reaſoning was not ſo much known and cultivated as of late: But thoſe Men of true genius ſaw through the deceit themſelves, and were very clear in their opinion, which con⯑vinces me they had good reaſon on their ſide. CRI. And yet that great Man Celſus ſeems to have had very ſlight and inconſtant notions: One while, he talks like a thorough Epicurean; another, he ad⯑mits Miracles, Propheſies, and a future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments. What think you, Al⯑ciphron, is it not ſomething capricious in ſo great a Man, among other advantages which he aſcribes [61] to Brutes above Humane Kind, to ſuppoſe they are Magicians and Prophets; that they have a nearer commerce and union with the Divinity; that they know more than Men; and that Ele⯑phants, in particular, are of all others moſt religi⯑ous animals and ſtrict obſervers of an Oath ^*. ALC. A great genius will be ſometimes whim⯑ſical. But what do you ſay to the Emperor Juli⯑an, was not he an extraordinary Man? CRI. He ſeems by his writings to have been lively and ſaty⯑rical. Further, I make no difficulty of owning that he was a generous, temperate, gallant, and facetious Emperor: But at the ſame time it muſt be allow'd, becauſe his own Heathen Panegyriſt Ammianus Marcellinus ^† allows it, that he was a prating, light, vain, ſuperſtitious ſort of Man. And therefore his Judgment or Authority can be but of ſmall weight with thoſe, who are not prejudi⯑ced in his favour. ALC. But of all the great Men who wrote againſt Revealed Religion, the great⯑eſt without queſtion was that truly great Man Porphyry, the loſs of whoſe invaluable work can never be ſufficiently lamented. This profound Philoſopher went to the bottom and original of things. He moſt learnedly confuted the Scrip⯑tures, ſhew'd the Abſurdity of the Moſaic accounts, undermined and expoſed the Propheſies, and ridi⯑culed allegorical Interpretations ^*. The moderns, it muſt be owned, have done great things and ſhewn themſelves able Men; yet I cannot but regret the loſs of what was done by a perſon of ſuch vaſt a⯑bilities, and who lived ſo much nearer the Foun⯑tain-head; though his authority ſurvives his writ⯑ings, and muſt ſtill have its weight with impartial Men, in ſpight of the enemies of Truth. CRI. [62] Porphyry, I grant was a thorough Infidel, though he appears by no means to have been incredulous. It ſeems he had a great opinion of Wizards and Necromancers, and believed the Myſteries, Mira⯑cles, and Propheſies of Theurgiſts and Egyptian prieſts. He was far from being an enemy to ob⯑ſcure Jargon; and pretended to extraordinary Ex⯑taſies. In a word this great Man appears to have been as unintelligible as a Schoolman, as ſuperſti⯑tious as a Monk, and as fanatical as any Quietiſt or Quaker; and, to compleat his character as a Minute Philoſopher, he was under ſtrong tempta⯑tions to lay violent hands on himſelf. We may frame a notion of this Patriarch of Infidelity, by his judicious way of thinking upon other points as well as the Chriſtian Religion. So ſagacious was he as to find out, that the Souls of inſects, when ſepa⯑rated from their bodies, become rational: That Dae⯑mons of a thouſand ſhapes aſſiſt in making Phil⯑trums and Charms, whoſe ſpiritual bodies are nou⯑riſhed and fattened by the Steams of libations and ſacrifices: that the Ghoſts of thoſe, who died vio⯑lent deaths, uſe to haunt and appear about their Sepulchres. This ſame egregious Philoſopher ad⯑viſeth a wiſe Man not to eat fleſh, leſt the impure Soul of the Brute that was put to violent death ſhou'd enter, along with the fleſh, into thoſe who eat it. He adds, as a matter of fact confirmed by many experiments, that thoſe who wou'd inſinuate into themſelves the Souls of ſuch animals, as have the gift of foretelling things to come, need only eat a principal part, the heart for inſtance of a Stag or a Mole, and ſo receive the Soul of the a⯑nimal, which will propheſy in them like a God ^*. No wonder if Men whoſe minds were preoccupi⯑ed by Faith and Tenets of ſuch a peculiar kind ſhou'd be averſe from the reception of the Goſpel. [63] Upon the whole, we deſire to be excuſed if we do not pay the ſame deference to the judgment of men, that appear to us whimſical, ſuperſtitious, weak and viſionary, which thoſe impartial Gentle⯑men do, who admire their Talents, and are proud to tread in their Footſteps. ALC. Men ſee things. in different views: what one admires another con⯑temns; it is even poſſible for a prejudiced mind, whoſe attention is turned towards the Faults and Blemiſhes of things, to fanſy ſome ſhadow of de⯑fect in thoſe great Lights which in our own days have enlightened, and ſtill continue to enlighten the world.

XXVI.

But pray tell me, Crito, what you think of Joſephus? He is allowed to have been a Man of learning and judgment. He was himſelf an aſſer⯑ter of revealed Religion. And Chriſtians, when his authority ſerves their turn, are uſed to cite him with reſpect. CRI. All this I acknowledge. ALC. Muſt it not then ſeem very ſtrange, and very ſuſpi⯑cious to every impartial Inquirer, that this learned Jew writing the Hiſtory of his own Country, of that very place, and thoſe very times, where and when Jeſus Chriſt made his appearance, ſhou'd yet ſay nothing of the character, miracles, and doctrine of that Extraordinary Perſon? Some ancient Chri⯑ſtians were ſo ſenſible of this, that, to make a⯑mends, they inſerted a famous Paſſage in that Hiſ⯑torian; which impoſture hath been ſufficiently detected by able Critics in the laſt age. CRI. Though there are not wanting able Critics on the other ſide of the queſtion, yet, not to enter upon the diſcuſſion of that celebrated paſſage, I am con⯑tent to give you all you can deſire, and ſuppoſe it not genuine, but the pious fraud of ſome wrong-headed Chriſtian, who cou'd not brook the omiſſi⯑on in Joſephus: But this will never make ſuch [64] omiſſion a real objection againſt Chriſtianity. Nor is there, for ought I can ſee, any thing in it where⯑on to ground either admiration or ſuſpicion; inaſ⯑much as it ſhou'd ſeem very natural, ſuppoſing the Goſpel account exactly true, for Joſephus to have ſaid nothing of it; conſidering that the view of that writer was to give his country ſome figure in the eye of the World, which had been greatly prejudiced againſt the Jews, and knew little of their hiſtory, to which end the Life and Death of our Saviour wou'd not in any wiſe have conduced; conſidering that Joſephus cou'd not have been an eye-witneſs of our Saviour or his Miracles; con⯑ſidering that he was a Phariſee of Quality and Learning, foreign as well as Jewiſh, one of great Employment in the State, and that the Goſpel was preached to the poor; that the firſt Inſtru⯑ments of ſpreading it, and the firſt Converts to it were mean and illiterate, that it might not ſeem the work of Man, or beholding to Humane intereſt or power; conſidering the general prejudice of the Jews, who expected in the Meſſiah a temporal and conquering Prince, which prejudice was ſo ſtrong, that they choſe rather to attribute our Saviour's miracles to the Devil, than acknowledge him to be the Chriſt: Conſidering alſo the helliſh Diſorder and Confuſion of the Jewiſh State in the Days of Joſephus, when Mens minds were filled and aſton⯑iſhed with unparallel'd wars, diſſenſions, maſſacres, and ſeditions of that devoted people. Laying all theſe things together, I do not think it ſtrange, that ſuch a man, writing with ſuch a view, at ſuch a time, and in ſuch circumſtances, ſhou'd omit to deſcribe our Bleſſed Saviour's life and death, or to mention his miracles, or to take notice of the State of the Chriſtian Church, which was then as a grain of Muſtard ſeed beginning to take Root and germinate. And this will ſeem ſtill leſs ſtrange, [65] if it be conſidered, that the Apoſtles in a few years after our Saviour's death departed from Jeruſalem, ſetting themſelves to convert the Gentiles, and were diſperſed throughout the world; that the Converts in Jeruſalem were, not only of the meaneſt of the people, but alſo few; the three thouſand, added to the Church in one day upon Peter's preaching in that city, appearing to have been not Inhabi⯑tants but Strangers from all parts aſſembled to celebrate the feaſt of Pentecoſt; and that all the time of Joſephus and for ſeveral years after, during a Succeſſion of fifteen Biſhops, the Chriſtians at Jeruſalem obſerved the Moſaic Law ^*, and were conſequently, in outward appearance, one people with the reſt of the Jews, which muſt have made them leſs obſervable. I wou'd fain know what reaſon we have to ſuppoſe, that the Goſpel, which in its firſt Propagation ſeemed to overlook the great or conſiderable men of this world, might not alſo have been overlooked by them, as a thing not ſuited to their apprehenſions and way of thinking? Beſides, in thoſe early times might not other learn⯑ed Jews, as well as ^† Gamaliel, ſuſpend their judg⯑ment of this new way, as not knowing what to make or ſay of it, being on one hand unable to quit the Notions and Traditions in which they were brought up, and, on the other, not daring to reſiſt or ſpeak againſt the Goſpel, leſt they ſhou'd be found to fight againſt God? Surely at all events, it cou'd never be expected, that an unconverted Jew ſhou'd give the ſame account of the Life, Mi⯑racles, and Doctrine of Jeſus Chriſt, as might be⯑come a Chriſtian to have given; nor on the other hand was it at all improbable, that a Man of ſenſe ſhou'd beware to leſſen or traduce what, for ought [66] he knew, might have been a heavenly Diſpenſati⯑on, between which two courſes the middle was to ſay nothing, but paſs it over in a doubtful or a reſpectful ſilence. And it is obſervable, that where this Hiſtorian occaſionally mentions Jeſus Chriſt in his account of St. James's death, he doth it with⯑out any reflection, or ſaying either good or bad, though at the ſame time he ſhews a regard for the Apoſtle. It is obſervable, I ſay, that ſpeaking of Jeſus his expreſſion is, who was called the Chriſt, not who pretended to be the Chriſt, or who was falſly called the Chriſt, but ſimply [...] ^*. It is evident Joſephus knew there was ſuch a Man as Jeſus, and that he was ſaid to be the Chriſt, and yet he condemns neither him nor his followers; which to me ſeems an Argument in their favour. Certainly if we ſuppoſe Joſephus to have known or been perſuaded that he was an Impoſtor, it will be difficult to account for his not ſaying ſo in plain terms. But if we ſuppoſe him in Gamaliel's way of thinking, who ſuſpended his judgment, and was afraid of being found to fight againſt God, it ſhou'd ſeem natural for him to behave in that very man⯑ner, which according to you makes againſt our Faith, but I verily think makes for it. But what if Joſephus had been a Bigot, or even a Sadducee, an Infidel, an Atheiſt? What then! we readily grant there might have been Perſons of Rank, Po⯑liticians, Generals, and Men of Letters, then as well as now, Jews as well as Engliſhmen, who be⯑lieved no revealed Religion: And that ſome ſuch perſons might poſſibly have heard of a man in low life, who performed miracles by Magic, without informing themſelves, or perhaps ever inquiring, about his Miſſion and Doctrine. Upon the whole, I cannot comprehend, why any Man ſhou'd con⯑clude [67] againſt the Truth of the Goſpel, from Joſe⯑phus's omitting to ſpeak of it, any more than from his omitting to embrace it. Had the firſt Chriſti⯑ans been Chief Prieſts and Rulers, or Men of ſci⯑ence and learning, like Philo and Joſephus, it might perhaps with better colour have been objected, that their Religion was of Humane Contrivance, than now that it hath pleaſed God by weak things to confound the Strong. This I think ſufficiently accounts, why in the beginning the Goſpel might overlook or be overlooked by Men of a certain rank and character.

XXVII.

ALC. And yet it ſeems an odd argu⯑ment in proof of any Doctrine, that it was preach⯑ed by ſimple people to ſimple people. CRI. In⯑deed if there was no other atteſtation to the Truth of the Chriſtian Religion, this muſt be owned a very weak one. But if a Doctrine begun by inſtru⯑ments, mean as to all Humane Advantages, and making its firſt progreſs among thoſe, who had neither wealth nor Art nor power to grace or en⯑courage it, ſhou'd in a ſhort time by it's own in⯑nate Excellency, the mighty force of Miracles, and the demonſtration of the Spirit, not only with⯑out, but againſt, all worldly Motives ſpread through the world, and ſubdue Men of all ranks and condi⯑tions of life, wou'd it not be very unreaſonable to reject or ſuſpect it, for the want of humane means? And might not this with much better reaſon be thought an Argument of its coming from God? ALC. But ſtill an inquiſitive Man will want the Teſtimony of Men of learning and knowledge. CRI. But from the firſt Century onwards, there was never wanting the teſtimony of ſuch Men, who wrote learnedly in defence of the Chriſtian Reli⯑gion, who lived, many of them, when the memory of things was freſh, who had abilities to judge and [68] means to know, and who gave the cleareſt proofs of their conviction and ſincerity. ALC. But all the while theſe Men were Chriſtians, prejudiced Chriſtians, and therefore their Teſtimony is to be ſuſpected. CRI. It ſeems then you wou'd have Jews or Heathens atteſt the Truths of Chriſtianity. ALC. That is the very thing I want. CRI. But how can this be? or if it cou'd, wou'd not any rational Man be apt to ſuſpect ſuch Evidence, and ask, how it was poſſible for a Man really to believe ſuch things himſelf and not become a Chriſ⯑tian? the Apoſtles and firſt Converts were them⯑ſelves Jews, and brought up in a veneration for the Law of Moſes, and in all the prejudices of that people: many Fathers, Chriſtian Philoſophers, and learned Apologiſts for the Faith, who had been bred Gentiles, were without doubt imbued with prejudices of Education: and if the finger of God and force of Truth converted both the one and the other from Judaiſm or Gentiliſm, in ſpight of their prejudices to Chriſtianity, is not their Teſtimony ſo much the ſtronger? You have then the ſuffrages of both Jews and Gentiles, atteſting to the Truth of our Religion in the earlieſt ages. But to expect or deſire the atteſtation of Jews remaining Jews, or of Gentiles remaining Gentiles, ſeems un⯑reaſonable: nor can it be imagined that the Teſti⯑mony of Men, who were not converted themſelves, ſhou'd be the likelieſt to convert others. We have indeed the Teſtimony of Heathen Writers to prove, That about the time of our Saviour's birth, there was a general expectation in the eaſt of a Meſſiah or Prince, who ſhou'd found a new Dominion: That there were ſuch people as Chriſtians: That they were cruelly perſecuted and put to death: That they were innocent and holy in life and wor⯑ſhip: And that there did really exiſt in that time, certain perſons and facts mentioned in the New [69] Teſtament: And for other points, we have learned Fathers, ſeveral of whom had been, as I already obſerved, bred Heathens, to atteſt their Truth. ALC. For my part I have no great opinion of the capacity or learning of the Fathers, and many learned Men, eſpecially of the reformed Churches abroad, are of the ſame mind, which ſaves me the trouble of looking my ſelf into their voluminous Writings. CRI. I ſhall not take upon me to ſay, with the Minute Philoſopher Pomponatius ^*, that Origen, Baſil, Auguſtin, and divers other Fa⯑thers, were equal to Plato, Ariſtotle, and the greateſt of the Gentiles in Humane Knowledge. But, if I may be allowed to make a judgment from what I have ſeen of their writings, I ſhou'd think ſeveral of them Men of great parts, eloquence, and learn⯑ing, and much ſuperior to theſe who ſeem to un⯑dervalue them. Without any affront to certain modern Critics or Tranſlators, Eraſmus may be al⯑lowed a man of fine taſte, and a fit judge of ſenſe and good writing, though his judgment in this point was very different from theirs. Some of our reformed Brethern, becauſe the Romaniſts attribute too much, ſeem to have attributed too little to them, from a very uſual, though no very judicious op⯑poſition; which is apt to lead men to remark de⯑fects, without making proper allowances, and to ſay things which neither piety, candour, nor good ſenſe require them to ſay.

XXVIII.

ALC. But though I ſhou'd acknow⯑ledge, that a concurring Teſtimony of many learn⯑ed and able Men throughout the firſt ages of Chriſ⯑tianity may have its weight, yet when I conſider the great number of Forgeries and Hereſies that ſprung up in thoſe times, it very much weakens [70] their credit. CRI. Pray, Alciphron, wou'd it be allowed a good Argument in the mouth of a Papiſt againſt the Reformation, that many abſurd Sects ſprung up at the ſame time with it? Are we to wonder, that when good ſeed is ſowing, the enemy ſhou'd ſow tares? But at once to cut off ſeveral Objections, let us ſuppoſe in fact, what you do not deny poſſible, that there is a God, a Devil, and a Revelation from Heaven committed to writing many Centuries ago. Do but take a view of Humane Nature, and conſider, what wou'd probably follow upon ſuch a ſuppoſition; and whe⯑ther it is not very likely there ſhou'd be Half⯑believers, miſtaken Bigots, holy Frauds, ambitious, intereſted, diſputing, conceited, ſchiſmatical, hae⯑retical, abſurd Men among the Profeſſors of ſuch revealed Religion, as well as after a courſe of ages, various readings, omiſſions, tranſpoſitions, and ob⯑ſcurities in the text of the ſacred Oracles? And if ſo, I leave you to judge, whether it be reaſonable to make thoſe events an Objection againſt the being of a thing, which wou'd probably and naturally fol⯑low upon the Suppoſal of its Being. ALC. Af⯑ter all, ſay what you will, this variety of Opinions muſt needs ſhake the faith of a reaſonable Man. Where there are ſo many different Opinions on the ſame point, it is very certain they cannot all be true, but it is certain they may all be falſe. And the means to find out the Truth! when a Man of ſenſe ſets about this Inquiry, he finds himſelf on a ſudden ſtartled and amuſed with hard words and knotty queſtions. This makes him abandon the purſuit, thinking the game not worth the chaſe. CRI. But wou'd not this Man of ſenſe do well to conſider, it muſt argue want of diſcernment, to reject divine Truths for the ſake of Humane Fol⯑lies? Uſe but the ſame candour and impartiality in treating of Religion, that you wou'd think pro⯑per [71] on other ſubjects. We deſire no more, and ex⯑pect no leſs. In Law, in Phyſic, in Politics, where⯑ever men have refined, is it not evident they have been always apt to run into diſputes and chicane? But will that hinder you from admitting, there are many good rules and juſt notions, and uſeful truths in all thoſe profeſſions. Phyſicians may diſ⯑pute, perhaps vainly and unintelligibly, about the Animal Syſtem: they may aſſign different cauſes of Diſtempers, ſome explaining them by the ele⯑mentary qualities, hot and cold, moiſt and dry, yet this doth not hinder, but the Bark may be good for an Ague, and Rhubarb for a Flux. Nor can it others by chymical, others by mechanical principles, be inferred from the different ſects, which from time to time have ſprung up in that profeſſion, the Dogmatic, for inſtance, Empiric, Methodic, Galenic, Paracelſian, or the hard words and knot⯑ty queſtions and idle theories which have grown from them, or been engrafted on them, that, there⯑fore, we ſhou'd deny the Circulation of the Blood, or reject their excellent rules about Exerciſe, Air, and Diet. ALC. It ſeems you wou'd ſcreen Re⯑ligion by the example of other profeſſions, all which have produced Sects and Diſputes as well as Chriſ⯑tianity, which may in itſelf be true and uſeful, not⯑withſtanding many falſe and fruitleſs Notions en⯑grafted on it by the wit of Man. Certainly if this had been obſerved or believed by many acute Rea⯑ſoners, they wou'd never have made the multipli⯑city of Religious Opinions and Controverſies an Argument againſt Religion in general. CRI. How ſuch an obvious Truth ſhou'd eſcape Men of ſenſe and inquiry I leave you to account: But I can very eaſily account for groſs miſtakes in thoſe, who paſs for Free-thinkers without ever thinking; or, if if they do think, whoſe meditations are employ'd [72] on other points of a very different nature, from a ſerious and impartial Inquiry about Religion.

XXIX.

But to return: what or where is the profeſſion of Men, who never ſplit into ſchiſms, or never talk nonſenſe? Is it not evident, that out of all the kinds of knowledge, on which the Humane mind is employ'd, there grow certain ex⯑creſcences, which may be pared off, like the clip⯑pings of hair or nails in the body, and with no worſe conſequence. Whatever Bigots or Enthu⯑ſiaſts, whatever notional or ſcholaſtic Divines may ſay or think, it is certain the Faith derived from Chriſt and his Apoſtles, was not a piece of empty Sophiſtry; they did not deliver and tranſmit down to us [...] but [...], to uſe the ex⯑preſſion of a holy Confeſſor ^*. And, to pretend to demoliſh their foundation for the ſake of Hu⯑mane Superſtructure, be it hay or ſtubble or what it will, is no Argument of juſt thought or reaſon; any more than it is of fairneſs, to ſuppoſe a doubt⯑ful ſenſe fixed, and argue from one ſide of the queſ⯑tion in diſputed points. Whether, for inſtance, the beginning of Geneſis is to be underſtood in a literal or allegorical ſenſe? Whether the Book of Job be an Hiſtory or a Parable? Being points diſ⯑puted between Chriſtians, an Infidel can have no right to argue from one ſide of the Queſtion, in thoſe or the like caſes. This or that Tenet of a Sect, this or that contraverted Notion is not what we contend for at preſent, but the general Faith taught by Chriſt and his Apoſtles, and preſerved by univerſal and perpetual Tradition in all the Churches down to our own times. To tax or ſtrike at this Divine Doctrine, on account of things foreign and adventitious, the ſpeculations and diſputes of curious Men, is in my mind an abſurdity of the ſame kind, as it wou'd be to cut down a fine tree yielding Fruit and Shade, becauſe its leaves afforded [73] nouriſhment to Caterpillars, or becauſe Spiders may now and then weave cobwebs among the bran⯑ches. ALC. To divide and diſtinguiſh wou'd take time. We have ſeveral Gentlemen very capa⯑ble of judging in the groſs, but that want of attention for irkſome and dry Studies or minute Inquiries. To which as it would be very hard to oblige Men againſt their will, ſo it muſt be a great wrong to the world, as well as themſelves, to debar them from the Right of deciding according to their na⯑tural ſenſe of things. CRI. It were to be wiſhed thoſe capable Men wou'd employ their judgment and attention on the ſame objects. If theolo⯑gical Inquiries are unpalatable, the field of na⯑ture is wide. How many Diſcoveries to be made! how many Errors to be corrected in arts and ſcien⯑ces! how many Vices to be reformed in life and manners! Why do men ſingle out ſuch points as are innocent and uſeful, when there are ſo many pernicious miſtakes to be amended? Why ſet themſelves to deſtroy the hopes of Humane Kind and encouragements to Virtue? Why delight to judge where they diſdain to inquire? Why not employ their noble Talents on the Longitude or Perpetual Motion? ALC. I wonder you ſhou'd not ſee the difference between points of Curioſity and Religion. Thoſe employ only Men of a ge⯑nius or humour ſuited to them; but all Mankind have a right to cenſure, and are concerned to judge of theſe, except they will blindly ſubmit to be governed, by the ſtale wiſdom of their Anceſtors and the eſtabliſhed Laws of their Country. CRI. It ſhou'd ſeem, if they are concerned to judge, they are not leſs concerned to examine before they judge. ALC. But after all the examination and inquiry that mortal Man can make about Revealed Religion, it is impoſſible to come at any rational ſure footing.

XXX.

There is, indeed, a deal of ſpecious talk about Faith founded upon Miracles; but when I examine this matter throughly, and trace Chriſ⯑tian Faith up to its original, I find it reſts upon much darkneſs and ſcruple and uncertainty. Inſtead of points evident or agreeable to Humane Reaſon, I find a wonderful narrative of the Son of God tempted in the wilderneſs by the Devil, a thing utterly unaccountable, without any end, or uſe or reaſon whatſoever. I meet with ſtrange Hiſtories of Apparitions of Angels and Voices from Heaven, with ſurpriſing accounts of Daemoniacs, things quite out of the road of common Senſe or Obſervation, with ſeveral incredible feats ſaid to have been done by Divine Power, but more probably the Inventions of Men; nor the leſs likely to be ſo, becauſe I cannot pretend to ſay with what view they were invented. Diſigns deeply laid are dark, and the leſs we know the more we ſuſpect: But, admit⯑ting them for true, I ſhall not allow them to be miraculous, until I thoroughly know the power of what are called ſecond cauſes and the force of Ma⯑gic. CRI. You ſeem, Alciphron, to analyſe, not Faith, but Infidelity, and trace it to its Principles; which, from your own account, I collect to be dark and doubtful ſcruples and ſurmiſes, haſtineſs in judging, and narrowneſs in thinking, grounded on a fanciful notion which over-rates the little ſcant⯑ling of your own Experience, and on real ignorance of the views of Providence, and of the qualities, operations, and mutual reſpects of the ſeveral kinds of beings, which are, or may be, for ought you know, in the Univerſe. Thus obſcure, uncertain, conceited, and conjectural are the Principles of In⯑fidelity. Whereas on the other hand, the Principles of Faith ſeem to be points plain and clear. It is a clear point, that this Faith in Chriſt was ſpread [75] abroad throughout the world ſoon after his death. It is a clear point, that this was not effected by humane Learning, Politics, or Power. It is a clear point, that in the early times of the Church there were ſeveral men of Knowledge and Integrity, who embraced this Faith not from any, but againſt all, temporal motives. It is a clear point, that, the nearer they were to the fountain-head, the more opportunity they had to ſatisfy themſelves, as to the Truth of theſe facts which they believed. It is a clear point, that the leſs intereſt there was to perſuade, the more need there was of Evidence to convince them. It is a clear point, that they relied on the Authority of thoſe who declared themſelves Eye-witneſſes of the Miracles and Reſurrection of Chriſt. It is a clear point, that thoſe profeſſed Eye-witneſſes ſuffered much for this their Atteſta⯑tion, and finally ſealed it with their Blood. It is a clear point, that theſe Witneſſes, weak and con⯑temptible as they were, overcame the world, ſpread more light, preached purer morals, and did more benefit to Mankind, than all the Philoſophers and Sages put together. Theſe points appear to me clear and ſure, and, being allow'd ſuch, they are plain, juſt, and reaſonable motives of aſſent; they ſtand upon no fallacious ground, they contain no⯑thing beyond our ſphere, neither ſuppoſing more knowledge nor other faculties than we are really maſters of; and if they ſhou'd not be admitted for morally certain, as I believe they will by fair and unprejudiced Inquirers, yet the allowing them to be only probable is ſufficient to ſtop the mouth of an Infidel. Theſe plain points, I ſay, are the Pillars of our Faith, and not thoſe obſcure ones by you ſuppoſed, which are in truth the unſound, uncer⯑tain Principles of Infidelity, to a raſh, prejudiced, and aſſuming Spirit. To raiſe an Argument, or anſwer an objection, from hidden powers of Nature [76] or Magic is groping in the dark; but by the evident light of ſenſe men might be ſufficiently certified of ſenſible Effects, and matters of Fact, ſuch as the Miracles and Reſurrection of Chriſt: and the Teſtimony of ſuch Men may be tranſmitted to After-ages, with the ſame moral certainty as other Hiſto⯑rical Narrations: and thoſe ſame miraculous Facts, compared by Reaſon with the Doctrines they were brought to prove, do afford to an unbiaſſed mind ſtrong Indications of their coming from God, or a ſuperior Principle, whoſe Goodneſs retrieved the Moral World, whoſe Power commanded the Na⯑tural, and whoſe Providence extended over both. Give me leave to ſay, that nothing dark, nothing incomprehenſible, or myſterious, or unaccountable, is the ground or motive, the principle or founda⯑tion, the proof or reaſon of our Faith, although it may be the object of it. For it muſt be owned, that, if by clear and ſure principles we are ratio⯑nally led to believe a point leſs clear, we do not therefore reject ſuch point, becauſe it is myſterious to conceive, or difficult to account for, nor wou'd it be right ſo to do. As for Jews and Gentiles, an⯑ciently attributing our Saviour's Miracles to Magic, this is ſo far from being a proof againſt them, that to me it ſeems rather a Proof of the Facts, with⯑out diſproving the Cauſe to which we aſcribe them, As we do not pretend to know the Nature and Operations of Daemons, the Hiſtory, Laws, and Syſtem of rational Beings, and the Schemes or Views of Providence, ſo far as to account for every action and appearance recorded in the Goſpel; ſo neither do you know enough of thoſe things, to be able from that Knowledge of yours to object a⯑gainſt Accounts ſo well atteſted. It is an eaſy matter to raiſe Scruples upon many authentic parts of Civil Hiſtory, which, requiring a more perfect knowledge of Facts, Circumſtances, and Councils, [77] than we can come at to explain them, muſt be to us inexplicable. And this is ſtill more eaſy with reſpect to the Hiſtory of Nature, in which, if Surmiſes were admitted for Proofs againſt things odd, ſtrange, and unaccountable, if our ſcanty Ex⯑perience were made the rule and meaſure of Truth, and all thoſe Phaenomena rejected, that we, through ignorance of the Principles, and Laws, and Syſtem of Nature, cou'd not explain, we ſhou'd indeed make Diſcoveries, but it wou'd be only of our own Blindneſs and Preſumption. And why Men that are ſo eaſily and ſo often gravell'd in common Points, in things natural and viſible, ſhou'd yet be ſo ſharp⯑ſighted and dogmatical about the inviſible World, and its Myſteries, is to me a point utterly unac⯑countable by all the Rules of Logic and good Senſe. Upon the whole, therefore, I cannot help thinking there are Points ſufficiently plain, and clear, and full, whereon a Man may ground a reaſonable Faith in Chriſt: but that the attacks of Minute Philoſophers againſt this faith are grounded upon Darkneſs, Ignorance, and Preſumption. ALC. I doubt I ſhall ſtill remain in the dark as to the Proofs of the Chriſtian Religion, and always pre⯑ſume there is nothing in them.

XXXI.

For how is it poſſible, at this remote diſtance, to arrive at any Knowledge, or frame a⯑ny Demonſtration about it? CRI. What then? Knowledge, I grant, in a ſtrict ſenſe cannot be had without Evidence or Demonſtration; but proba⯑ble Arguments are a ſufficient ground of Faith. Who ever ſuppoſed that ſcientifical Proofs were neceſſary to make a Chriſtian? Faith alone is re⯑quired; and provided that, in the main and upon the whole, Men are perſuaded, this ſaving Faith may conſiſt with ſome degrees of Obſcurity, Scru⯑ple, and Error. For although the Light of Truth [78] be unchangeable, and the ſame in its eternal Source, the Father of Lights: Yet, with reſpect to us, it is variouſly weakened and obſcured, by paſſing through a long Diſtance or groſs Medium, where it is intercepted, diſtorted, or tinctured by the Prejudices and Paſſions of Men. But all this not⯑withſtanding, he that will uſe his Eyes may ſee enough for the purpoſes either of Nature, or of Grace; though by a light, dimmer indeed, or clear⯑er, according to the Place, or the Diſtance, or the Hour, or the Medium. And it will be ſufficient, if ſuch Analogy appears between the Diſpenſations of Grace and Nature, as may make it probable (al⯑though much ſhou'd be unaccountable in both) to ſuppoſe them derived from the ſame Author, and the workmanſhip of one and the ſame Hand. ALC. Thoſe who ſaw and touched and handled Jeſus Chriſt after his Reſurrection, if there were any ſuch, may be ſaid to have ſeen by a clear Light: But to us the Light is very dim, and yet it is expected we ſhou'd believe this Point as well as they. For my part, I believe, with Spinoſa, that Chriſt's Death was Literal, but his Reſurrection Allegori⯑cal ^*. CRI. And for my part, I can ſee nothing in this celebrated Infidel, that ſhou'd make me de⯑ſert matters of Fact, and moral Evidence, to a⯑dopt his Notions. Though I muſt needs own I admit an allegorical Reſurrection that proves the real, to wit, a Reſurrection of Chriſt's Diſciples from Weakneſs to Reſolution, from Fear to Cou⯑rage, from Deſpair to Hope, of which, for ought I can ſee, no rational Account can be given, but the ſenſible Evidence that our Lord was truly, re⯑ally, and literally riſen from the dead: But as it cannot be denied that his Diſciples, who were Eye-witneſſes of his Miracles and Reſurrection, had ſtronger Evidence than we can have of thoſe Points: [79] So it cannot be denied, that ſuch Evidence was then more neceſſary, to induce Men to embrace a new Inſtitution, contrary to the whole Syſtem of their Education, their Prejudices, their Paſſions, their Intereſts, and every Humane Motive. Though to me it ſeems, the moral Evidence and probable Arguments within our reach, are abundantly ſufficient to make prudent thinking Men adhere to the Faith, handed down to us from our Anceſtors, eſtabliſh⯑ed by the Laws of our Country, requiring Sub⯑miſſion in Points above our Knowledge, and for the reſt recommending Doctrines the moſt agreea⯑ble to our Intereſt and our Reaſon. And, how⯑ever ſtrong the Light might have been at the Foun⯑tain-head, yet its long Continuance and Propaga⯑tion, by ſuch unpromiſing Inſtruments throughout the World, have been very wonderful. We may now take a more comprehenſive View of the Con⯑nexion, Order, and Progreſs of the divine Diſpen⯑ſations, and, by a retroſpect on a long Series of paſt Ages, perceive a Unity of Deſign running throughout the whole, a gradual diſcloſing and fulfilling the purpoſes of Providence, a regular Progreſs from Types to Antitypes, from things Carnal to things Spiritual, from Earth to Heaven. We may behold Chriſt crucified, that ſtumbling-block to the Jews, and fooliſhneſs to the Greeks, putting a final Period to the Temple Worſhip of the one, and the Idolatry of the other, and that Stone, which was cut out of the Mountain with⯑out Hands, and brake in Pieces all other King⯑doms, become it ſelf a great Mountain.

XXXII.

If a due Reflection on theſe things be not ſufficient to beget a Reverence for the Chriſtian Faith in the Minds of Men, I ſhou'd rather impute it to any other Cauſe, than a wiſe and cautious In⯑credulity: When I ſee their eaſineſs of Faith in the [80] common concerns of Life, where there is no Pre⯑judice or Appetite to bias or diſturb their natural Judgment: When I ſee thoſe very Men that in Religion will not ſtir a ſtep without Evidence, and at every turn exſpect Demonſtration, truſt their Health to a Phyſician, and their Lives to a Sailor with an implicit Faith, I cannot think they de⯑ſerve the honour of being thought more incredu⯑lous than other Men, or that they are more ac⯑cuſtom'd to know, and for this reaſon leſs inclined to believe. On the contrary, one is tempted to ſuſpect, that Ignorance hath a greater ſhare than Science in our modern Infidelity, and that it pro⯑ceeds more from a wrong Head, or an irregular Will, than from deep Reſearches. LYS. We do not, it muſt be owned, think that Learning or deep Reſearches are neceſſary to paſs right Judg⯑ments upon things. I ſometimes ſuſpect that Learn⯑ing is apt to produce and juſtify Whims, and ſin⯑cerely believe we ſhou'd do better without it. Our Sect are divided on this Point, but much the greater part think with me. I have heard more than once very obſerving Men remark, that Learn⯑ing was the true humane Means which preſerved Religion in the World, and that, if we had it in our power to prefer Blockheads in the Church, all wou'd ſoon be right. CRI. Men muſt be ſtrange⯑ly in love with their Opinions, to put out their Eyes rather than part with them. But it has been often remarked, by obſerving Men that there are no greater Bigots than Infidels. LYS. What a Free-thinker and a Bigot, impoſſible! CRI. Not ſo impoſſible neither, that an Infidel ſhou'd be bi⯑goted to his Infidelity. Methinks I ſee a Bigot, wherever I ſee a Man over-bearing and poſitive without knowing why, laying the greateſt ſtreſs on Points of ſmalleſt moment, haſty to judge of the Conſcience, Thoughts, and inward Views of other [81] Men, impatient of reaſoning againſt his own Opi⯑nions, and chooſing them with Inclination rather than Judgment, an Enemy to Learning, and at⯑tached to mean Authorities. How far our Mo⯑dern Infidels agree with this Deſcription, I leave to be conſidered by thoſe who really conſider and think for themſelves. LYS. We are no Bigots, we are Men that diſcover Difficulties in Religion, that tie Knots and raiſe Scruples, which diſturb the Repoſe and interrupt the golden Dreams of Bigots, who therefore cannot endure us. CRI. They who caſt about for Difficulties, will be ſure to find or make them upon every ſubject: But he that wou'd, upon the foot of Reaſon, erect himſelf in⯑to a Judge, in order to make a wiſe Judgment on a Subject of that nature, will not only conſider the doubtful and difficult Parts of it, but take a comprehenſive View of the whole, conſider it in all its Parts and Relations, trace it to its Original, examine its Principles, Effects, and Tendencies, its Proofs internal and external; he will diſtinguiſh between the clear Points and the obſcure, the cer⯑tain and the uncertain, the eſſential and circum⯑ſtantial, between what is genuine and what foreign: he will conſider the different ſorts of Proof, that belong to different things, where Evidence is to be expected, where Probability may ſuffice, and where it is reaſonable to ſuppoſe there ſhou'd be Doubts and Scruples: He will proportion his Pains and Exactneſs to the Importance of the Inquiry, and check that Diſpoſition of his Mind to conclude all thoſe Notions, groundleſs Prejudices, with which it was imbued before it knew the Reaſon of them. He will ſilence his Paſſions, and liſten to Truth: He will endeavour to untie Knots as well as to tie them, and dwell rather on the light parts of things than the obſcure: He will balance the force of his Underſtanding with the difficulty of the [82] Subject, and to render his Judgment impartial, hear Evidence on all ſides, and, ſo far as he is led by Authority, chooſe to follow that of the honeſt⯑eſt and wiſeſt Men. Now it is my ſincere Opinion, the Chriſtian Religion may well ſtand the Teſt of ſuch an Inquiry. LYS. But ſuch an Inquiry wou'd coſt too much Pains and Time. We have thought of another Method, the bringing Religion to the Teſt of Wit and Humour: This we find a much ſhorter, eaſier, and more effectual Way. And as all Enemies are at liberty to chooſe their Weapons, we make choice of thoſe we are moſt expert at: And we are the better pleaſed with this Choice, having obſerved that of all things a ſolid Divine hates a Jeſt. To conſider the whole of the Subject, to read and think on all ſides, to object plainly, and anſwer directly, upon the foot of dry Reaſon and Argument, wou'd be a very tedious and trouble⯑ſome Affair. Beſides it is attacking Pedants at their own Weapons. How much more delicate and artful is it, to give a hint, to cover one's ſelf with an Aenigma, to drop a double Entendre, to keep it in one's Power to recover, and ſlip aſide, and leave his Antagoniſt beating the Air? This hath been practiſed with great Succeſs, and I be⯑lieve it the top Method to gain Proſelytes, and con⯑found Pedants. CRI. I have ſeen ſeveral things written in this way, which, I ſuppoſe, were copi⯑ed from the Behaviour of a ſly ſort of Scorners one may ſometimes meet with. Suppoſe a con⯑ceited Man that wou'd paſs for witty, tipping the Wink upon one, thruſting out his Tongue at ano⯑ther; one while waggiſhly ſmiling, another with a grave Mouth and ludicrous Eyes; often affecting the Countenance of one who ſmother'd a Jeſt, and ſometimes burſting out in a Horſe-laugh: What a Figure wou'd this be, I will not ſay in the Senate or Council, but in a private Viſit among [83] well-bred Men? And yet this is the Figure that certain great Authors, who in this Age wou'd paſs for Models, and do paſs for Models, make in their polite and elaborate Writings on the moſt weighty Points. ALC. I who profeſs my ſelf an Admirer, an Adorer of Reaſon, am obliged to own, that in ſome Caſes the Sharpneſs of Ridicule can do more than the Strength of Argument. But if we exert our ſelves in the uſe of Mirth and Hu⯑mour, it is not for want of other Weapons. It ſhall never be ſaid that a Free-thinker was afraid of Reaſoning. No, Crito, we have Reaſons in ſtore, the beſt are yet to come; and if we can find an Hour for another Conference before we ſet out to morrow morning, I'll undertake you ſhall be pli⯑ed with Reaſons, as clear, and home, and cloſe to the Point as you cou'd wiſh.

I.

THE Philoſophers having reſolved to ſet out for London next Morning, we aſſembled at break of day in the Li⯑brary. Alciphron began with a De⯑claration of his Sincerity, aſſuring us he had very maturely and with a moſt unbiaſſed Mind conſidered all that had been ſaid the day be⯑fore. He added that upon the whole he cou'd not deny ſeveral probable Reaſons were produced for embracing the Chriſtian Faith. But, ſaid he, thoſe Reaſons being only probable can never pre⯑vail againſt abſolute Certainty and Demonſtration. If therefore I can demonſtrate your Religion to be a thing altogether abſurd and inconſiſtent, your probable Arguments in its defence do from that Moment loſe their Force, and with it all Right to be anſwer'd or conſidered. The concurring Teſtimony of ſincere and able Witneſſes hath with⯑out queſtion great weight in humane Affairs. I will even grant that things odd and unaccountable to Humane Judgment or Experience, may ſometimes claim our Aſſent on that ſole Motive. And I will alſo grant it poſſible, for a Tradition to be con⯑vey'd with moral Evidence through many Centu⯑ries. But at the ſame time you will grant to me, that a thing demonſtrably and palpably falſe is not to be admitted on any Teſtimony whatever, which [86] at beſt can never amount to Demonſtration. To be plain, no Teſtimony can make Nonſenſe Senſe; no moral Evidence can make Contradictions conſi⯑ſtent. Know then, that as the Strength of our Cauſe doth not depend upon, ſo neither is it to be decided by any critical Points of Hiſtory, Chro⯑nology, or Languages. You are not to wonder, if the ſame ſort of Tradition and moral Proof, which governs our Aſſent with reſpect to Facts in civil or natural Hiſtory, is not admitted as a ſufficient Voucher for metaphyſical Abſurdities and abſolute Impoſſibilities. Things obſcure and unaccounta⯑ble in humane Affairs, or the Operations of Na⯑ture, may yet be poſſible, and, if well atteſted, may be aſſented unto: But religious Aſſent or Faith can be evidently ſhewn in its own nature to be impracticable, impoſſible, and abſurd. This is the primary Motive to Infidelity. This is our Citadel and Fortreſs, which may, indeed, be gra⯑ced with outworks of various Erudition, but, if thoſe are demoliſhed, remains in it ſelf and of its own proper Strength impregnable. EUPH. This, it muſt be owned, reduceth our Inquiry within a narrow Compaſs: Do but make out this, and I ſhall have nothing more to ſay. ALC. Know then, that the ſhallow Mind of the Vulgar, as it dwells only on the outward Surface of things, and conſiders them in the groſs, may be eaſily impoſed on. Hence a blind Reverence for Religious Faith and Myſtery. But when an acute Philoſopher comes to diſſect and analyſe theſe Points, the Im⯑poſture plainly appears: And as he has no Blind⯑neſs, ſo he has no Reverence for empty Notions, or, to ſpeak more properly, for meer Forms of Speech, which mean nothing, and are of no uſe to Mankind.

II.

Words are Signs: They do or ſhou'd ſtand for Ideas; which ſo far as they ſuggeſt they are ſig⯑nificant. But words that ſuggeſt no Ideas are inſig⯑nificant. He who annexeth a clear Idea to every Word he makes uſe of ſpeaks Senſe; but where ſuch Ideas are wanting, the Speaker utters Non⯑ſenſe. In order therefore to know whether any Man's Speech be ſenſeleſs and inſignificant, we have nothing to do but lay aſide the Words and conſider the Ideas ſuggeſted by them. Men, not being able immediately to communicate their Ideas one to another, are obliged to make uſe of ſenſible Signs or Words; the uſe of which is to raiſe thoſe Ideas in the Hearer, which are in the Mind of the Speaker: And if they fail of this End they ſerve to no Purpoſe. He who really thinks hath a train of Ideas ſucceeding each other and connected in his Mind: And when he expreſſeth himſelf by Diſ⯑courſe, each Word ſuggeſts a diſtinct Idea to the Hearer or Reader; who by that means hath the ſame train of Ideas in his, which was in the Mind of the Speaker or Writer. As far as this Effect is produced, ſo far the Diſcourſe is intelligible, hath ſenſe and meaning. Hence it follows, that whoe⯑ver can be ſuppoſed to underſtand what he reads or hears muſt have a train of Ideas raiſed in his Mind, correſpondent to the train of Words read or heard. Theſe plain Truths, to which Men rea⯑dily aſſent in Theory, are but little attended to in Practice, and therefore deſerve to be enlarged on and inculcated however obvious and undeniable. Mankind are generally averſe from thinking though apt enought to entertain Diſcourſe either in them⯑ſelves or others: the Effect whereof is, that their Minds are rather ſtored with Names than Ideas, the husk of Science rather than the thing. And yet theſe Words without meaning do often make Diſtinctions of Parties, the Subject matter of their [88] Diſputes, and the Object of their Zeal. This is the moſt general Cauſe of Error, which doth not influence ordinary Minds alone, but even thoſe who paſs for acute and learned Philoſophers are often employ'd about Names inſtead of Things or Ideas, and are ſuppoſed to know when they only pronounce hard Words without a meaning.

III.

Though it is evident that as Knowledge is the Perception of the Connexion or Diſagreement between Ideas, he who doth not diſtinctly perceive the Ideas marked by the terms, ſo as to form a mental Propoſition anſwering to the verbal, can⯑not poſſibly have Knowledge: No more can he be ſaid to have Opinion or Faith which imply a weak⯑er Aſſent, but ſtill it muſt be to a Propoſition, the Terms of which are underſtood as clearly, al⯑though the Agreement or Diſagreement of the I⯑deas may not be ſo evident, as in the caſe of Know⯑ledge. I ſay, all degrees of Aſſent whether found⯑ed on Reaſon or Authority, more or leſs cogent, are internal Acts of the Mind which alike terminate in Ideas as their proper Object: Without which there can be really no ſuch thing as Knowledge, Faith, or Opinion. We may perhaps raiſe a Duſt and Diſpute about Tenets purely verbal; but what is this at bottom more than meer trifling? All which will be eaſily admitted with reſpect to Humane Learning and Science; wherein it is an allowed Method to expoſe any Doctrine or Tenet by ſtripping them of the Words, and examining what Ideas are underneath, or whether any Ideas at all? This is often found the ſhorteſt way to end Diſputes, which might otherwiſe grow and multi⯑ply without end, the Litigants neither underſtanding one another nor themſelves. It were needleſs to illuſtrate what ſhines by its own Light, and is ad⯑mitted by all thinking Men. My endeavour ſhall [89] be only to apply it in the preſent Caſe. I ſuppoſe I need not be at any pains to prove, that the ſame Rules of Reaſon and good Senſe which obtain in all other Subjects ought to take place in Religion. As for thoſe who conſider Faith and Reaſon as two diſtinct Provinces, and wou'd have us think good Senſe has nothing to do where it is moſt con⯑cerned, I am reſolved never to argue with ſuch Men, but leave them in quiet Poſſeſſion of their Prejudices. And now, for the particular Appli⯑cation of what I have ſaid, I ſhall not ſingle out a⯑ny nice diſputed Points of School Divinity, or thoſe that relate to the Nature and Eſſence of God, which being allow'd infinite you might pretend to ſcreen them, under the general Notion of Difficul⯑ties attending the Nature of Infinity.

IV.

Grace is the main Point in the Chriſtian Diſpenſation, nothing is oftener mentioned or more conſidered throughout the New Teſtament; where⯑in it is repreſented as ſomewhat of a very particu⯑lar kind, diſtinct from any thing revealed to the Jews, or known by the light of Nature. This ſame Grace is ſpoken of as the Gift of God, as coming by Jeſus Chriſt, as reigning, as abounding, as o⯑perating. Men are ſaid to ſpeak through Grace, to believe through Grace. Mention is made of the Glory of Grace, the Riches of Grace, the Stew⯑ards of Grace. Chriſtians are ſaid to be Heirs of Grace, to receive Grace, grow in Grace, be ſtrong in Grace, to ſtand in Grace, and to fall from Grace. And laſtly, Grace is ſaid to juſtify and to ſave them. Hence Chriſtianity is ſtyled the Covenant of Diſpenſation of Grace. And it is well known that no Point hath created more Controverſy in the Church than this Doctrine of Grace. What Di⯑ſputes about its Nature, Extent, and Effects, a⯑bout univerſal, efficacious, ſufficient, preventing, [90] Irriſiſtible Grace have employ'd the Pens of Pro⯑teſtant as well as Popiſh Divines, of Janſeniſts and Moliniſts, of Lutherans, Calviniſts, and Armi⯑nians, as I have not the leaſt curioſity to know, ſo I need not ſay. It ſufficeth to obſerve, that there have been and are ſtill ſubſiſting great conteſts up⯑on theſe Points. Only one thing I ſhou'd deſire to be informed of, to wit, what is the clear and diſ⯑tinct Idea marked by the Word Grace? I preſume a Man may know the bare meaning of a Term, without going into the depth of all thoſe learned In⯑quiries. This ſurely is an eaſy Matter, provided there is an Idea annexed to ſuch Term. And if there is not, it can be neither the ſubject of a rati⯑onal Diſpute, nor the Object of real Faith. Men may indeed impoſe upon themſelves or others, and pretend to argue and believe, when at bottom there is no Argument or Belief, farther than meer verbal trifling. Grace taken in the vulgar Senſe, either for Beauty, or Favour, I can eaſily under⯑ſtand. But when it denotes an active, vital, ruling Principle, influencing and operating on the Mind of Man, diſtinct from every natural Power or Mo⯑tive, I profeſs my ſelf altogether unable to under⯑ſtand it, or frame any diſtinct Idea of it; and there⯑fore I cannot aſſent to any Propoſition concerning it, nor conſequently have any Faith about it: And it is a ſelf evident Truth, that God obligeth no Man to Impoſſibilities. At the requeſt of a Philo⯑ſophical Friend, I did caſt an Eye on the Writings he ſhew'd me of ſome Divines, and talked with o⯑thers on this Subject, but after all I had read or heard cou'd make nothing of it, having always found whenever I laid aſide the Word Grace, and looked into my own Mind, a perfect vacuity or privation of all Ideas. And, as I am apt to think Mens Minds and Faculties are made much alike, I ſuſpect that other Men, if they examined what [91] they call Grace with the ſame exactneſs and indif⯑ference, wou'd agree with me that there was no⯑thing in it but an empty Name. This is not the only Inſtance, where a Word often heard and pro⯑nounced is believed intelligible, for no other rea⯑ſon but becauſe it is familiar. Of the ſame kind are many other Points reputed neceſſary Articles of Faith. That which in the preſent caſe impoſeth upon Mankind I take to be partly this. Men ſpeak of this holy Principle as of ſomething that acts, moves, and determines, taking their Ideas from corporeal things, from Motion and the Force or Momentum of Bodies, which being of an obvi⯑ous and ſenſible Nature they ſubſtitute in place of a thing ſpiritual and incomprehenſible, which is a manifeſt Deluſion. For though the Idea of cor⯑poreal Force be never ſo clear and intelligible, it will not therefore follow that the Idea of Grace, a thing perfectly incorporeal, muſt be ſo too. And though we may reaſon diſtinctly, perceive, aſſent, and form Opinions about the one, it will by no means follow that we can do ſo of the other. Thus it comes to paſs, that a clear ſenſible Idea of what is real produceth, or rather is made a pre⯑tence for, an imaginary ſpiritual Faith that termi⯑nates in no Object; a thing impoſſible! For there can be no Aſſent where there are no Ideas: And where there is no Aſſent there can be no Faith: And what cannot be, that no Man is obliged to. This is as clear as any thing in Euclid.

V.

The ſame Method of Reaſoning may be ap⯑plied by any Man of Senſe, to conſute all other the moſt eſſential Articles of the Chriſtian Faith. You are not therefore to wonder that a Man who proceeds on ſuch ſolid Grounds, ſuch clear and evi⯑dent Principles, ſhou'd be deaf to all you can ſay from moral Evidence, or probable Arguments, [92] which are nothing in the balance againſt Demonſtra⯑tion. EUPH. The more Light and Force there is in this Diſcourſe, the more you are to blame for not having produced it ſooner. For my part, I ſhou'd never have ſaid one Word againſt Evidence. But let me ſee whether I underſtand you rightly. You ſay, every Word in an intelligible Diſcourſe muſt ſtand for an Idea; which Ideas as far as they are clearly and diſtinctly apprehended, ſo far the Diſcourſe hath meaning, without which it is uſeleſs, and inſignificant. ALC. I do. EUPH. For inſtance, when I hear the Words Man, Triangle, Colour, pronounced; they muſt excite in my Mind diſtinct Ideas of thoſe things whereof they are Signs, otherwiſe I cannot be ſaid to underſtand them. ALC. Right. EUPH. And this is the only true uſe of Language. ALC. That is what I affirm. EUPH. But every time the Word Man occurs in Reading or Converſation, I am not conſcious that the particular diſtinct Idea of a Man is excited in my mind. For inſtance, when I read in St. Paul's Epiſtle to the Galatians theſe Words: If a Man thinketh himſelf to be ſomething, when he is nothing, he deceiveth himſelf. Methinks I com⯑prehend the Force and Meaning of this Propoſition, although I do not frame to my ſelf the particular diſtinſt Idea of a Man. ALC. It is very true, you do not form in your Mind the particular Idea of Peter, James, or John, of a fair or a black, a tall or a low, a fat or a lean, a ſtraight or a crooked, a wiſe or a fooliſh, a ſleeping or waking Man, but the abſtract general Idea of Man, preſcinding from, and excluſive of all particular Shape, Size, Com⯑plexion, Paſſions, Faculties, and every individual Circumſtance. To explain this Matter more fully, you are to underſtand there is in the Humane Mind, a Faculty of contemplating the general Na⯑ture of things, ſeparate from all thoſe Particulari⯑ties [93] which diſtinguiſh the Individuals one from a⯑nother. For Example, in Peter, James, and John, you may obſerve in each a certain Collection of Stature, Figure, Colour, and other peculiar Properties by which they are known aſunder, diſ⯑tinguiſhed from all other Men, and, if I may ſo ſay, individuated. Now leaving out of the Idea of a Man, that which is peculiar to the Individual, and retaining only that which is common to all Men, you form an abſtract univerſal Idea of Man or Humane Nature, which includes no particular Stature, Shape, Colour, or other quality whether of Mind or Body. After the ſame manner you may obſerve particular Triangles to differ one from another, as their ſides are equal or unequal, and their Angles greater or leſſer; whence they are denominated aequilateral, aequicrural, or ſcalenum, obtuſangular, acutangular, or rectangular. But the Mind excluding out of its Idea, all theſe pe⯑culiar Properties and Diſtinctions frameth the ge⯑neral abſtract Idea of a Triangle; which is nei⯑ther aequilateral, aequicrural, nor ſcalenum, nei⯑ther obtuſangular, acutangular, nor rectangular, but all and none of theſe at once ^*. The ſame may be ſaid of the general abſtract Idea of Colour, which is ſomething diſtinct from and excluſive of Blue, Red, Green, Yellow, and every other par⯑ticular Colour, including only that general Eſſence in which they all agree. And what has been ſaid of theſe three general Names, and the abſtract ge⯑neral Ideas they ſtand for may be applied to all o⯑thers. For you muſt know, that particular Things or Ideas being infinite, if each were marked or ſignified by a diſtinct proper Name, Words muſt have been innumerable, and Language an endleſs impoſſible thing. Hence it comes to paſs, that [94] appellative or general Names ſtand, immediately and properly, not for particular but for abſtract general Ideas, which they never fail to excite in the mind, as oft as they are uſed to any ſignificant Purpoſe. And without this, there cou'd be no Communication or Enlargement of Knowledge, no ſuch thing as univerſal Science or Theorems of any kind. Now for underſtanding any Propoſition or Diſcourſe, it is ſufficient that diſtinct Ideas are thereby raiſed in your mind, correſpondent to thoſe in the Speaker's, whether the Ideas ſo raiſed are particular or only abſtract and general Ideas. Foraſmuch, nevertheleſs, as theſe are not ſo obvi⯑ous and familiar to vulgar minds, it happens that ſome Men may think they have no Idea at all, when they have not a particular Idea; but the truth is, you had the abſtract general Idea of Man, in the inſtance aſſigned, wherein you thought you had none. After the ſame manner, when it is ſaid, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones; or that Colour is the Object of Sight, it is evident the Words do not ſtand for this or that Triangle or Colour, but for abſtract general Ideas, excluding every thing peculiar to the Individuals, and including only the univerſal Nature common to the whole kind of Triangles or of Colours.

VI.

EUPH. Tell me, Alciphron, are thoſe abſtract general Ideas clear and diſtinct? ALC. They are above all others clear and diſtinct, being the only proper Object of Science, which is alto⯑gether converſant about Univerſals. EUPH. And do you not think it very poſſible for any Man to know, whether he has this or that clear and di⯑ſtinct Idea or no? ALC. Doubtleſs. To know this he needs only examine his own Thoughts and look into his own mind. EUPH. But upon look⯑ing [95] into my own mind, I do not find that I have or can have theſe general abſtract Ideas of a Man or a Triangle abovementioned, or of Colour preſcin⯑ded from all particular Colours ^*. Though I ſhut mine Eyes, and uſe mine utmoſt Efforts, and reflect on all that paſſeth in my own mind, I find it utterly impoſſible to form ſuch Ideas. ALC. To reflect with due Attention and turn the mind inward up⯑on it ſelf, is a difficult Task and not every one's Ta⯑lent. EUPH. Not to inſiſt on what you allowed, that every one might eaſily know for himſelf whether he has this or that Idea or no: I am tempted to think no body elſe can form thoſe Ideas any more than I can. Pray, Alciphron, which are thoſe things you wou'd call abſolutely impoſſible? ALC. Such as include a Contradiction. EUPH. Can you frame an Idea of what includes a Contradiction? ALC. I cannot. EUPH. Conſequently whatever is ab⯑ſolutely impoſſible you cannot form an Idea of. ALC. This I grant. EUPH. But can a Colour or Triangle, ſuch as you deſcribe their abſtract ge⯑neral Ideas, really exiſt? ALC. It is abſolutely impoſſible ſuch things ſhou'd exiſt in Nature. EUPH. Shou'd it not follow then that they can⯑not exiſt in your mind, or in other words that you cannot conceive or frame an Idea of them? ALC. You ſeem Euphranor not to diſtinguiſh between pure Intellect and Imagination. Abſtract general Ideas I take to be the Object of pure Intellect, which may conceive them although they cannot per⯑haps be imagined. EUPH. I do not perceive that I can by any Faculty, whether of Intellect or Ima⯑gination, conceive or frame an Idea of that which is impoſſible and includes a Contradiction. And I [96] am very much at a loſs to account for your admit⯑ting that in common Inſtances, which you wou'd make an Argument againſt Divine Faith and Myſte⯑ries.

VII.

ALC. There muſt be ſome miſtake in this. How is it poſſible there ſhou'd be general Know⯑ledge without general Propoſitions, or theſe without general Names, which cannot be without general Ideas by ſtanding for which they become general? EUPH. But may not words become general, by being made to ſtand indiſcriminately for all parti⯑cular Ideas, which from a mutual Reſemblance be⯑long to the ſame kind, without the Intervention of any abſtract general Idea? ALC. Is there then no ſuch thing as a general Idea? EUPH. May we not admit general Ideas, though we ſhou'd not admit them to be made by abſtraction, or though we ſhou'd not allow of general abſtract Ideas? To me it ſeems, a particular Idea may become general by being uſed to ſtand for or repreſent other Ideas; and that, general Knowledge is converſant about Signs or general Ideas made ſuch by their ſignifi⯑cation; and which are conſidered rather in their relative Capacity, and as ſubſtituted for others, than in their own Nature, or for their own ſake. A Black Line, for Inſtance, an Inch long, though in it ſelf particular, may yet become Univerſal, being uſed as a Sign to ſtand for any Line whatſo⯑ever. ALC. It is your Opinion then, that words become general by repreſenting an indefinite Num⯑ber of particular Ideas. EUPH. It ſeems ſo to me. ALC. Whenever therefore I hear a general Name, it muſt be ſuppoſed to excite ſome one or other particular Idea of that Species in my mind. EUPH. I cannot ſay ſo neither. Pray, Alciphron, doth it ſeem to you neceſſary, that as often as the word Man occurs in Reading or Diſcourſe, you [97] muſt form in your Mind the Idea of a particular Man? ALC. I own, it doth not: And not find⯑ing particular Ideas always ſuggeſted by the Words, I was led to think I had abſtract general Ideas ſuggeſted by them. And this is the Opini⯑on of all Thinking Men who are agreed, the only uſe of Words is to ſuggeſt Ideas. And indeed what other uſe can we aſſign them?

VIII.

EUPH. Be the uſe of Words or Names what it will, I can never think it is to do things impoſſible. Let us then inquire what it is? and ſee if we can make Senſe of our daily Practice. Words it is agreed are Signs: It may not there⯑fore be amiſs to examine the uſe of other Signs in order to know that of Words. Counters, for in⯑ſtance, at a Card-Table are uſed, not for their own ſake, but only as Signs ſubſtituted for Money as Words are for Ideas. Say now Alciphron, is it neceſſary every time theſe Counters are uſed throughout the whole Progreſs of a Game, to frame an Idea of the diſtinct Sum or Value that each repreſents? ALC. by no means: It is ſuffi⯑cient the Players at firſt agree on their reſpective Values, and at laſt ſubſtitute thoſe Values in their ſtead. EUPH. And in caſting up a Sum, where the Figures ſtand for Pounds, Shillings, and Pence, do you think it neceſſary, throughout the whole Pro⯑greſs of the Operation, in each Step to form Ideas of Pounds, Shillings, and Pence? ALC. I do not, it will ſuffice if in the Concluſion thoſe Figures direct our Actions with reſpect to Things. EUPH. From hence it ſeems to follow that Words may not be in⯑ſignificant, although they ſhou'd not, every time they are uſed, excite the Ideas they ſignify in our Minds, it being ſufficient, that we have it in our power to ſubſtitute Things or Ideas for their Signs when there is occaſion. It ſeems alſo to follow, that [98] there may be another uſe of Words, beſides that of marking and ſuggeſting diſtinct Ideas, to wit, the influencing our Conduct and Actions; which may be done either by forming Rules for us to act by, or by raiſing certain Paſſions, Diſpoſitions, and Emotions in our Minds. A Diſcourſe, there⯑fore, that directs how to act or excites to the do⯑ing or forbearance of an Action may, it ſeems, be uſeful and ſignificant, although the Words where⯑of it is compoſed ſhou'd not bring each a diſtinct Idea into our Minds. ALC. It ſeems ſo EUPH. Pray tell me, Alciphron, is not an Idea altogether inactive? ALC. It is. EUPH. An Agent there⯑fore, an active Mind, or Spirit cannot be an Idea or like an Idea. Whence it ſhou'd ſeem to follow, that thoſe Words which denote an active Principle, Soul, or Spirit do not, in a ſtrict and proper Senſe, ſtand for Ideas: And yet they are not inſignificant neither: ſince I underſtand what is ſignified by the term I, or my ſelf, or know what it means although it be no Idea, nor like an Idea, but that which thinks and wills and apprehends Ideas and operates about them. ALC. What wou'd you infer from this? EUPH. What hath been inferred already, that Words may be ſignificant although they do not ſtand for Ideas ^*. The contrary whereof hav⯑ing been preſumed ſeems to have produced the Doctrine of abſtract Ideas. ALC. Will you not allow then that the Mind can abſtract? EUPH. I do not deny it may abſtract in a certain ſenſe, inaſmuch as thoſe things that can really exiſt, or be really perceived aſunder, may be conceived a⯑ſunder, or abſtracted one from the other; for in⯑ſtance a Man's Head from his Body, Colour from Motion, Figure from Weight. But it will not [99] thence follow, that the Mind can frame abſtract general Ideas, which appear to be impoſſible. ALC. And yet it is a current Opinion, that every ſubſtantive Name marks out and exhibits to the Mind one diſtinct Idea ſeparate from all others. EUPH. Pray, Alciphron, is not the Word Num⯑ber ſuch a ſubſtantive Name? ALC. It is. EUPH. Do but try now whether you can frame an Idea of Number in abſtract excluſive of all Signs, Words and Things number'd. I profeſs, for my own part I cannot. ALC. Can it be ſo hard a matter to form a ſimple Idea of Number, the Object of a moſt evident demonſtrable Science? Hold, let me ſee, if I can't abſtract the Idea of Number, from the numeral Names and Characters, and all parti⯑cular numerable things. Upon which Alciphron pauſed a while and then ſaid; to confeſs the Truth I do not find that I can. EUPH. But though, it ſeems, neither you nor I can form diſtinct ſimple Ideas of Number, we can nevertheleſs make a very proper and ſignificant uſe of numeral Names. They direct us in the diſpoſition and management of our Affairs, and are of ſuch neceſſary uſe, that we ſhou'd not know how to do without them. And yet, if other Mens Faculties may be judged of by mine, to attain a preciſe ſimple abſtract Idea of Number, is as difficult as to comprehend any Myſtery in Religion.

IX.

But to come to your own Inſtance, let us examine what Idea we can frame of Force abſtract⯑ed from Body, Motion, and outward ſenſible Ef⯑fects. For my ſelf, I do not find that I have or can have any ſuch Idea. ALC. Surely every one knows what is meant by Force. EUPH. And yet I queſtion whether every one can form a diſtinct Idea of Force. Let me intreat you, Alciphron, be not amuſed by Terms, lay aſide the word Force, [100] and exclude every other thing from your Thoughts, and then ſee what preciſe Idea you have of Force. ALC. Force is that in Bodies which produceth Motion and other ſenſible Effects. EUPH. It is then ſomething diſtinct from thoſe Effects. ALC. It is. EUPH. Be pleaſed now to exclude the conſideration of its Subject and Effects, and con⯑template Force it ſelf in its own preciſe Idea. ALC. I profeſs I find it no ſuch eaſy matter. EUPH. Take your own Advice, and ſhut your eyes to aſſiſt your Meditation. Upon this Alci⯑phron having cloſed his eyes, and muſed a few Mi⯑nutes, declared he cou'd make nothing of it. And that, replied Euphranor, which it ſeems neither you nor I can frame an Idea of, by your own Re⯑mark of Mens Minds and Faculties being made much alike, we may ſuppoſe others have no more an Idea of than we. ALC. We may. EUPH. But, notwithſtanding all this, it is certain there are many Speculations, Reaſonings, and Diſputes, refined Subtilties and nice Diſtinctions about this ſame Force. And to explain its Nature, and di⯑ſtinguiſh the ſeveral notions or kinds of it, the Terms Gravity, Reaction, vis inertiae, vis inſita, vis impreſſa, vis mortua, vis viva, impetus, momen⯑tum, ſolicitatio, conatus, and divers other ſuch like Expreſſions have been uſed by learned Men: And no ſmall Controverſies have ariſen about the Noti⯑ons or Definitions of theſe terms. It had puzzled Men to know whether Force is ſpiritual or corpo⯑real, whether it remains after Action, how it is transferred from one Body to another. Strange Paradoxes have been framed about its Nature, Properties, and Proportions: For inſtance, that contrary Forces may at once ſubſiſt in the ſame quieſcent Body: That the Force of Percuſſion in a ſmall particle is Infinite: For which and other Curioſities of the ſame ſort, you may conſult Be⯑rellus [101] de vi percuſſionis, the Lezioni Academiche of Toricelli, the Exercitations of Hermanus, and other Writers. It is well known to the learned World, what a Controverſy hath been carried on between Mathematicians, particularly Monſieur Leibnitz and Monſieur Papin in the Leipſic Acta Eruditorum a⯑bout the Proportion of Forces, whether they be each to other in a Proportion compounded of the ſimple Proportions of the Bodies and the Celeri⯑ties, or in one compounded of the ſimple Propor⯑tion of the Bodies and the duplicate Proportion of the Celerities? A Point, it ſeems, not yet agreed; As indeed the reality of the thing it ſelf is made a Queſtion. Leibnitz diſtinguiſheth between the niſus elementaris, and the impetus, which is formed by a repetition of the niſus elementaris, and ſeems to think they do not exiſt in Nature, but are made only by an abſtraction of the Mind. The ſame Author treating of original, active Force, to il⯑luſtrate his Subject hath recourſe to the ſubſtantial Forms and Entelecheia of Ariſtotle. And the inge⯑nious Toricelli ſaith of Force and Impetus, that they are ſubtile Abſtracts and ſpiritual Quinteſſen⯑ces; and concerning the momentum and the velocity of heavy Bodies falling, he ſaith they are un certo che, and un non ſo che, that is in plain Engliſh he knows not what to make of them. Upon the whole therefore, may we not pronounce, that excluding Body, Time, Space, Motion and all its ſenſible Meaſures and Effects, we ſhall find it as difficult to form an Idea of Force as of Grace? ALC. I do not know what to think of it.

X.

EUPH. And yet, I preſume, you allow there are very evident Propoſitions or Theorems relating to Force, which contain uſeful Truths▪ for inſtance, that a Body with conjunct Forces de⯑ſcribes the Diagonal of a Parallelogram, in the [102] ſame time that it wou'd the Sides with ſeparate. Is not this a Principle of very extenſive uſe? Doth not the Doctrine of the Compoſition and Reſolu⯑tion of Forces depend upon it, and, in conſe⯑quence thereof, numberleſs Rules and Theorems directing Men how to act, and explaining Phaeno⯑mena throughout the Mechanics and mathematical Philoſophy? And if, by conſidering this Doctrine of Force, Men arrive at the Knowledge of many Inventions in Mechanics, and are taught to frame Engines, by means of which things difficult and o⯑therwiſe impoſſible may be performed, and if the ſame Doctrine which is ſo beneficial here below, ſerveth alſo as a Key to diſcover the Nature of the Celeſtial Motions, ſhall we deny that it is of uſe, either in Practice or Speculation, becauſe we have no diſtinct Idea of Force? Or that which we ad⯑mit with regard to Force, upon what pretence can we deny concerning Grace? If there are Queries, Diſputes, Perplexities, diverſity of Notions and Opinions about the one, ſo there are about the o⯑ther alſo: If we can form no preciſe diſtinct Idea of the one, ſo neither can we of the other. Ought we not therefore by a parity of Reaſon to conclude, there may be divers true and uſeful Propoſitions concerning the one as well as the other? And that Grace may be an Object of our Faith, and influence our Life and Actions, as a Principle deſtructive of evil habits and productive of good ones, although we cannot attain a diſtinct Idea of it, ſeparate or abſtracted from God the Author, from Man the Subject, and from Virtue and Piety its Effects?

XI.

Shall we not admit the ſame Method of arguing, the ſame Rules of Logic, Reaſon, and good Senſe to obtain in things Spiritual, and things Corporeal, in Faith and Science, and ſhall we not uſe the ſame Candour, and make the ſame Allow⯑ances, [103] in examining the Revelations of God and the Inventions of Men? For ought I ſee, that Phi⯑loſopher cannot be free from Bias and Prejudice, or be ſaid to weigh things in an equal Ballance who ſhall maintain the Doctrine of Force and reject that of Grace, who ſhall admit the abſtract Idea of a Triangle, and at the ſame time ridicule the Ho⯑ly Trinity. But, however partial or prejudiced other Minute Philoſophers might be, you have laid it down for a Maxim, that the ſame Logic which obtains in other Matters muſt be admitted in Religion. LYS. I think, Alciphron, it wou'd be more prudent to abide by the way of Wit and Humour, than thus to try Religion by the dry Teſt of Reaſon and Logic. ALC. Fear not: By all the Rules of right Reaſon, it is abſolutely impoſſible that any Myſtery, and leaſt of all the Trinity ſhou'd really be the Object of Man's Faith. EUPH. I do not wonder you thought ſo, as long as you maintained that no Man cou'd aſſent to a Propoſition, without perceiving or framing in his Mind diſtinct Ideas marked by the Terms of it. But although Terms are Signs, yet having granted that thoſe Signs may be ſignificant, though they ſhou'd not ſuggeſt Ideas repreſented by them, provided they ſerve to regulate and influence our Wills, Paſſions, or Conduct, you have conſequently granted, that the Mind of Man may aſſent to Pro⯑poſitions containing ſuch Terms, when it is ſo di⯑rected or affected by them, notwithſtanding it ſhou'd not perceive diſtinct Ideas marked by thoſe Terms. Whence it ſeems to follow, that a Man may be⯑lieve the Doctrine of the Trinity, if he finds it re⯑vealed in Holy Scripture, That the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghoſt are God, and that there is but one God? Although he doth not frame in his Mind, any abſtract or diſtinct Ideas of Trinity, Subſtance, or Perſonality, provided, that this [104] Doctrine of a Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier makes proper Impreſſions on his Mind, producing therein, Love, Hope, Gratitude, and Obedience, and thereby becomes a lively operative Principle influencing his Life and Actions, agreeably to that Notion of ſaving Faith which is required in a Chri⯑ſtian. This I ſay, whether right or wrong, ſeems to follow from your own Principles and Conceſſi⯑ons. But for further ſatisfaction, it may not be amiſs to inquire, whether there be any thing pa⯑rallel to this Chriſtian Faith in the Minute Philo⯑ſophy. Suppoſe, a fine Gentleman or Lady of Faſhion, who are too much employ'd to think for themſelves, and are only Free-thinkers at ſecond hand, have the advantage of being betimes initiated in the Principles of your Sect, by converſing with Men of Depth and Genius, who have often declar⯑ed it to be their Opinion, the World is governed either by Fate or by Chance, it matters not which; will you deny it poſſible for ſuch Perſons to yield their Aſſent to either of theſe Propoſitions? ALC. I will not. EUPH. And may not ſuch their Aſ⯑ſent be properly called Faith? ALC. It may. EUPH. And yet it is poſſible, thoſe Diſciples of the Minute Philoſophy may not dive ſo deep, as to be able to frame any abſtract, or preciſe, or any determinate Idea whatſoever, either of Fate or of Chance. ALC. This too I grant. EUPH. So that according to you, this ſame Gentleman or La⯑dy may be ſaid to believe or have Faith where they have not Ideas. ALC. They may. EUPH. And may not this Faith or Perſuaſion produce real Effects, and ſhew it ſelf in the Conduct and Tenor of their Lives, freeing them from the Fears of Su⯑perſtition, and giving them a true Reliſh of the World, with a noble Indolence or Indifference a⯑bout what comes after. ALC. It may. EUPH. And may not Chriſtians, with equal Reaſon, be [105] allowed to believe the Divinity of our Saviour, or that in him God and Man make one Perſon, and be verily perſuaded thereof, ſo far as for ſuch Faith or Belief to become a real Principle of Life and Conduct, inaſmuch as by Virtue of ſuch Perſuaſion they ſubmit to his Government, believe his Doc⯑trine, and practiſe his Precepts, although they frame no abſtract Idea of the Union between the Divine and Humane Nature; nor may be able to clear up the Notion of Perſon to the Contentment of a Minute Philoſopher. To me it ſeems evident, that if none but thoſe who had nicely examined, and cou'd themſelves explain, the Principle of In⯑dividuation in Man, or untie the Knots and anſwer the Objections, which may be raiſed even about Humane Perſonal Identity, wou'd require of us to explain the Divine Myſteries, we ſhou'd not be of⯑ten called upon for a clear and diſtinct Idea of Perſon in relation to the Trinity, nor wou'd the Difficul⯑ties on that Head be often objected to our Faith. ALC. Methinks, there is no ſuch Myſtery in Per⯑ſonal Identity. EUPH. Pray in what do you take it to conſiſt? ALC. In Conſciouſneſs. EUPH. Whatever is poſſible may be ſuppoſed. ALC. It may. EUPH. We will ſuppoſe now (which is poſſible in the Nature of Things, and reported to be fact) that a Perſon, through ſome violent Acci⯑dent or Diſtemper, ſhou'd fall into ſuch a total Ob⯑livion, as to loſe all Conſciouſneſs of his paſt Life, and former Ideas. I ask, is he not ſtill the ſame Perſon? ALC. He is the ſame Man, but not the ſame Perſon. Indeed you ought not to ſuppoſe that a Perſon loſeth its former Conſciouſneſs; for this is impoſſible, though a Man perhaps may; but then he becomes another Perſon. In the ſame Perſon, it muſt be owned, ſome old Ideas may be loſt, and ſome new ones got; but a total Change is inconſiſtent with Identity of Perſon. EUPH. Let [106] us then ſuppoſe that a Perſon hath Ideas, and is conſcious during a certain ſpace of Time, which we will divide into three equal Parts, whereof the later Terms are marked by the Letters A, B, C. In the firſt Part of Time, the Perſon gets a certain Number of Ideas, which are retained in A: Dur⯑ing the ſecond Part of Time, he retains one half of his old Ideas, and loſeth the other half, in place of which he acquires as many new ones: So that in B his Ideas are half old and half new. And in the third Part, we ſuppoſe him to loſe the Re⯑mainder of the Ideas acquired in the Firſt, and to get new ones in their ſtead, which are retained in C, together with thoſe acquired in the ſecond Part of Time. Is this a poſſible fair Suppoſition? ALC. It is. EUPH. Upon theſe Premiſes I am tempt⯑ed to think, one may demonſtrate, that Perſonal Identity doth not conſiſt in Conſciouſneſs. ALC. As how? EUPH. You ſhall judge; but thus it ſeems to me. The Perſons in A and B are the ſame, being conſcious of common Ideas by ſuppoſi⯑tion. The Perſon in B is (for the ſame Reaſon) one and the ſame with the Perſon in C. There⯑fore the Perſon in A, is the ſame with the Perſon in C, by that undoubted Axiom, Quae conveniunt uni tertio conveniunt inter ſe. But the Perſon in C hath no Idea in common with the Perſon in A. Therefore Perſonal Indentity doth not conſiſt in Conſciouſneſs. What do you think, Alciphron, is not this a plain Inference? ALC. I tell you what I think: You will never aſſiſt my Faith, by puz⯑zling my Knowledge.

XII.

There is, if I miſtake not, a practical Faith, or Aſſent, which ſheweth it ſelf in the Will and Actions of a Man, although his Underſtand⯑ing may not be furniſhed with thoſe abſtract, pre⯑ciſe, diſtinct Ideas, which, whatever a Philoſopher [107] may pretend, are acknowledged to be above the Talents of common Men; among whom, neverthe⯑leſs, may be ſound, even according to your own Conceſſion, many Inſtances of ſuch practical Faith, in other matters which do not concern Religion. What ſhou'd hinder therefore, but that Doctrines relating to Heavenly Myſteries, might be taught in this ſaving Senſe to vulgar Minds, which you may well think incapable of all Teaching and Faith in the Senſe you ſuppoſe. Which miſtaken Senſe, ſaid Crito, has given occaſion to much pro⯑fane and miſapplied Raillery. But all this may very juſtly be retorted on the Minute Philoſophers themſelves, who confound Scholaſticiſm with Chri⯑ſtianity, and impute to other Men thoſe Perplexi⯑ties, Chimaeras, and inconſiſtent Ideas, which are often the Workmanſhip of their own Brains, and proceed from their own wrong way of Thinking. Who doth not ſee that ſuch an ideal abſtracted Faith is never thought of by the Bulk of Chriſti⯑ans, Husbandmen, for Inſtance, Artiſans or Ser⯑vants? Or what Footſteps are there in the Holy Scripture to make us think, that the wiredrawing of abſtract Ideas was a Task injoined either Jews or Chriſtians? Is there any thing in the Law or the Prophets, the Evangeliſts or Apoſtles that looks like it? Every one whoſe Underſtanding is not perverted by Science falſly ſo called, may ſee, the ſaving Faith of Chriſtians is quite of another kind, a vital operative Principle, productive of Charity and Obedience. ALC. What are we to think then of the Diſputes and Deciſions of the famous Coun⯑cil of Nice, and ſo many ſubſequent Councils? What was the Intention of thoſe venerable Fathers the Homoouſians and the Homoiouſians? Why did they diſturb themſelves and the World with hard Words, and ſubtile Controverſies? CRI. Whate⯑ver their Intention was, it cou'd not be to beget [108] nice abſtracted Ideas of Myſteries in the Minds of common Chriſtians, this being evidently impoſſi⯑ble: Nor doth it appear that the Bulk of Chriſti⯑an Men did in thoſe Days think it any Part of their Duty, to lay aſide the Words, ſhut their Eyes, and frame thoſe abſtract Ideas; any more than Men now do of Force, Time, Number, or ſeveral other things, about which they nevertheleſs believe, know, argue and diſpute. To me it ſeems, that, whatever was the Source of theſe Controverſies, and howſoever they were managed, wherein Hu⯑mane Infirmity muſt be ſuppoſed to have had its Share, the main End was not, on either ſide, to convey preciſe poſitive Ideas to the Minds of Men, by the uſe of thoſe conteſted Terms, but rather a negative Senſe, tending to exclude Polytheiſm on the one hand, and Sabellianiſm on the other ^*. ALC. But what ſhall we ſay of ſo many learned and ingenious Divines, who from time to time have obliged the World with new Explications of Myſteries, who, having themſelves profeſſedly la⯑boured to acquire accurate Ideas, wou'd recom⯑mend their Diſcoveries and Speculations to others for Articles of Faith? CRI. To all ſuch Innovators in Religion I wou'd ſay with Jerome, ‘Why af⯑ter ſo many Centuries do you pretend to teach us what was untaught before? Why explain what neither Peter nor Paul thought neceſſary to be explained? ^†’ And it muſt be owned, that the Explication of Myſteries in Divinity, al⯑lowing the Attempt as fruitleſs as the Purſuit of the Philoſopher's Stone in Chymiſtry, or the Perpe⯑tual Motion in Mechanics, is no more than they, chargeable on the Profeſſion it ſelf, but only on the wrongheaded Profeſſors of it.

XIII.

It ſeems, that what hath been now ſaid may be applied to other Myſteries of our Religion. Original Sin, for Inſtance, a Man may find it im⯑poſſible to form an Idea of in abſtract, or of the man⯑ner of its Tranſmiſſion, and yet the Belief thereof may produce in his Mind a ſalutary Senſe of his own Unworthineſs, and the Goodneſs of his Re⯑deemer: from whence may follow good Habits, and from them good Actions, the genuine Effects of Faith, which conſidered in its true Light, is a thing neither repugnant nor incomprehenſible, as ſome Men wou'd perſuade us, but ſuited even to vulgar Capacities, placed in the Will and Affecti⯑ons rather than in the Underſtanding, and produ⯑cing holy Lives, rather than ſubtile Theories. Faith, I ſay, is not an indolent Perception but an operative Perſuaſion of Mind, which ever worketh ſome ſuitable Action, Diſpoſition or Emotion in thoſe who have it; as it were eaſy to prove and illuſtrate by innumerable Inſtances, taken from Humane Affairs. And, indeed, while the Chriſti⯑an Religion is conſidered as an Inſtitution fitted to ordinary Minds, rather than to the nicer Talents, whether improved or puzzled, of ſpeculative Men; and our Notions about Faith are accordingly taken from the Commerce of the World, and Practice of Mankind, rather than from the peculiar Syſtems of Refiners; it will, I think, be no difficult Mat⯑ter to conceive and juſtify the Meaning and Uſe of our Belief of Myſteries, againſt the moſt confident Aſſertions and Objections of the Minute Philoſo⯑phers, who are eaſily to be caught in thoſe very Snares, which they have ſpun and ſpread for others. And that Humour of Controverſy, the Mother and Nurſe of Hereſies, wou'd doubtleſs very much abate, if it was conſidered that things are to be ra⯑ted, not by the Colour, Shape, or Stamp, ſo tru⯑ly [110] as by the Weight. If the Moment of Opinions had been by ſome litigious Divines made the Mea⯑ſure of their Zeal, it might have ſpared much Trouble both to themſelves and others. Certain⯑ly one that takes his Notions of Faith, Opinion, and Aſſent from Common Senſe, and Common Uſe, and has maturely weighed the Nature of Signs and Language, will not be ſo apt to contro⯑vert the Wording of a Myſtery, or to break the Peace of the Church, for the ſake of retaining or rejecting a Term.

XIV.

ALC. It ſeems, Euphranor, and you wou'd perſuade me into an Opinion, that there is nothing ſo ſingularly abſurd as we are apt to think, in the Belief of Myſteries; and that a Man need not re⯑nounce his Reaſon to maintain his Religion. But if this were true, how comes it to paſs, that, in proportion as Men abound in Knowledge, they dwindle in Faith? EUPH. O Alciphron, I have learned from you, that there is nothing like going to the Bottom of things, and analyſing them into their firſt Principles. I ſhall therefore make an Eſſay of this Method, for clearing up the Nature of Faith: with what Succeſs, I ſhall leave you to determine; for I dare not pronounce my ſelf on my own Judgment, whether it be right or wrong: But thus it ſeems to me. The Objections made to Faith are by no means an Effect of Knowledge, but proceed rather from an Ignorance of what Knowledge is; which Ignorance may poſſibly be ſound even in thoſe who paſs for Maſters of this or that particular Branch of Knowledge. Science and Faith agree in this, that they both imply an Aſſent of the Mind: And, as the Nature of the Firſt is moſt clear and evident, it ſhou'd be firſt conſidered in order to caſt a Light on the other. To trace things from their Original, it ſeems that [111] the Humane Mind, naturally furniſhed with the Ideas of things particular and concrete, and being deſign'd, not for the bare Intuition of Ideas, but for Action or Operation about them, and purſuing her own Happineſs therein, ſtands in need of cer⯑tain general Rules or Theorems to direct her Ope⯑rations in this purſuit; the ſupplying which Want is the true, original, reaſonable End of ſtudying the Arts and Sciences. Now theſe Rules being general, it follows, that they are not to be ob⯑tained by the meer Conſideration of the original Ideas, or particular Things, but by the means of Marks or Signs, which, being ſo far forth univer⯑ſal, become the immediate Inſtruments and Mate⯑rials of Science. It is not therefore by meer Con⯑templation of particular Things, and much leſs of their abſtract general Ideas, that the Mind makes her Progreſs, but by an appoſite Choice and skil⯑ful Management of Signs: For Inſtance, Force and Number, taken in concrete with there Adjuncts, Subjects, and Signs, are what every one knows; and conſidered in abſtract, ſo as making preciſe I⯑deas of themſelves, they are what no Body can comprehend. That their abſtract Nature, there⯑fore, is not the Foundation of Science, is plain: And that barely conſidering their Ideas in concrete, is not the Method to advance in the reſpective Sciences, is what every one that reflects may ſee; nothing being more evident, than that one who can neither write nor read, in common Uſe under⯑ſtands the meaning of Numeral Words, as well as the beſt Philoſopher or Mathematician.

XV.

But here lies the Difference: the one, who underſtands the Notation of Numbers, by means thereof is able to expreſs briefly and diſtinctly all the Variety and Degrees of Number, and to per⯑form with eaſe and diſpatch ſeveral arithmetical O⯑perations, [112] by the help of general Rules. Of all which Operations as the Uſe in Humane Life is very evident, ſo it is no leſs evident, that the per⯑forming them depends on the aptneſs of the Nota⯑tion. If we ſuppoſe rude Mankind without the Uſe of Language, it may be preſumed, they wou'd be ignorant of Arithmetic: But the Uſe of Names, by the Repetition whereof in a certain Order they might expreſs endleſs Degrees of Number, wou'd be the firſt Step towards that Science. The next Step wou'd be, to deviſe proper Marks of a per⯑manent Nature, and viſible to the Eye, the Kind and Order whereof muſt be choſe with Judgment, and accommodated to the Names. Which Mark⯑ing, or Notation, wou'd, in Proportion as it was apt and regular, facilitate the Invention and Ap⯑plication of general Rules, to aſſiſt the Mind in reaſoning, and judging, in extending, recording, and communicating its Knowledge about Numbers: in which Theory and Operations, the Mind is im⯑mediately occupied about the Signs or Notes, by Mediation of which it is directed to act about Things, or Number in concrete (as the Logicians call it) without ever conſidering the ſimple, ab⯑ſtract, intellectual, general Idea of Number. I imagine one need not think much to be convinced, that the Science of Arithmetic, in its Riſe, Ope⯑rations, Rules, and Theorems, is altogether con⯑verſant about the artificial Uſe of Signs, Names, and Characters. Theſe Names and Characters are univerſal, inaſmuch as they are Signs. The Names are referred to Things, and the Characters to Names, and both to Operation. The Names be⯑ing few, and proceeding by a certain Analogy, the Characters will be more uſeful, the ſimpler they are, and the more aptly they expreſs this Analo⯑gy. Hence the old Notation by Letters was more uſeful than Words written at length: And the [113] modern Notation by Figures, expreſſing the Pro⯑greſſion or Analogy of the Names by their ſimple Places, is much preferable to that for Eaſe and Expedition, as the Invention of Algebraical Sym⯑bols is to this for extenſive and general Uſe. As Arithmetic and Algebra are Sciences of great Clear⯑neſs, Certainty, and Extent, which are immedi⯑ately converſant about Signs, upon the skilful Uſe and Management whereof they intirely depend, ſo a little Attention to them may poſſibly help us to judge of the Progreſs of the Mind in other Sci⯑ences, which, though differing in Nature, Deſign, and Object, may yet agree in the general Methods of Proof and Inquiry.

XVI.

If I miſtake not, all Sciences, ſo far as they are univerſal and demonſtrable by Humane Reaſon, will be found converſant about Signs as their immediate Object, though theſe in the Ap⯑plication are referred to Things: the Reaſon whereof is not difficult to comprehend. For as the Mind is better acquainted with ſome ſort of Objects, which are earlier ſuggeſted to it, ſtrike it more ſenſibly, or are more eaſily comprehended than others, it is naturally led to ſubtitute, thoſe Objects for ſuch as are more ſubtile, fleeting, or difficult to conceive. Nothing, I ſay, is more na⯑tural, than to make the Things we know, a Step towards thoſe we do not know; and to explain and repreſent Things leſs familiar by others which are more ſo. Now, it is certain we imagine before we reflect, and we perceive by Senſe before we i⯑magine; and of all our Senſes the Sight is the moſt clear, diſtinct, various, agreeable, and comprehen⯑ſive. Hence it is natural to aſſiſt the Intellect by the Imagination, the Imagination by Senſe, and the other Senſes by Sight. Hence, Figures, Me⯑taphors, and Types. We illuſtrate ſpiritual [114] Things by corporeal; we ſubſtitute Sounds for Thoughts, and written Letters for Sounds; Emb⯑lems, Symbols, and Hieroglyphics for Things too obſcure to ſtrike, and too various or too fleeting to be retained. We ſubſtitute Things imaginable, for Things intelligible, ſenſible Things for imagi⯑nable, ſmaller Things for thoſe that are too great to comprehend eaſily, and greater Things for ſuch as are too ſmall to be diſcerned diſtinctly, preſent Things for abſent, permanent for periſhing, and viſible for inviſible. Hence the Uſe of Models and Diagrams. Hence right Lines are ſubſtituted for Time, Velocity, and other things of very different Natures. Hence we ſpeak of Spirits in a figurative Style, expreſſing the Operations of the Mind by Alluſions and Terms, borrowed from ſenſible Things, ſuch as apprehend, conceive, reflect, diſcourſe, and ſuch like: And hence thoſe Allego⯑ries which illuſtrate Things intellectual by Viſions exhibited to the Fancy. Plato, for Inſtance, re⯑preſents the Mind preſiding in her Vehicle by the Driver of a winged Chariot, which ſometimes moults and droops: this Chariot is drawn by two Horſes, the one good and of a good Race, the o⯑ther of a contrary kind, ſymbolically expreſſing the Tendency of the Mind towards the Divinity, as ſhe ſoars or is born aloft by two Inſtincts like Wings, the one in the Intellect towards Truth, the other in the Will towards Excellence, which Inſtincts moult or are weakened by ſenſual Inclina⯑tions, expreſſing alſo her alternate Elevations and Depreſſions, the Struggles between Reaſon and Ap⯑petite, like Horſes that go an unequal Pace, or draw different Ways, embarraſſing the Soul in her Progreſs to Perfection. I am inclined to think the Doctrine of Signs a Point of great Importance, and general Extent, which, if duly conſidered, wou'd [115] caſt no ſmall light upon Things, and afford a juſt and genuine Solution of many Difficulties.

XVII.

Thus much, upon the whole, may be ſaid of all Signs: That they do not always ſuggeſt Ideas ſignified to the Mind, That when they ſug⯑geſt Ideas, they are not general abſtract Ideas: That they have other Uſes beſides barely ſtanding for and exhibiting Ideas, ſuch as raiſing proper E⯑motions, producing certain Diſpoſitions or Ha⯑bits of Mind, and directing our Actions in purſuit of that Happineſs, which is the ultimate End and Deſign, the Primary Spring and Motive, that ſets rational Agents at work: That the true End of Speech, Reaſon, Science, Faith, Aſſent in all its different Degrees, is not meerly, or principally, or always the imparting or acquiring of Ideas, but ra⯑ther ſomething of an active, operative Nature, tending to a conceived Good, which may ſome⯑times be obtained, not only although the Ideas marked are not offered to the Mind, but even al⯑though there ſhou'd be no poſſibility of offering or exhibiting any ſuch Idea to the Mind: For In⯑ſtance, the Algebraic Mark, which denotes the Root of a negative Square, hath its Uſe in Logiſtic Operations, although it be impoſſible to form an Idea of any ſuch Quantity. And what is true of Algebraic Signs, is alſo true of Words or Lan⯑guage, modern Algebra being in fact a more ſhort, appoſite, and artificial Sort of Language, and it being poſſible to expreſs by Words at length, though leſs conveniently, all the Steps of an Al⯑gebraical Proceſs. And it muſt be confeſſed, that even the Mathematical Sciences themſelves, which above all others are reckoned the moſt clear and certain, if they are conſidered, not as Inſtruments to direct our Practice, but as Speculations to em⯑ploy our Curioſity, will be found to fall ſhort in [116] many Inſtances of thoſe clear and diſtinct Ideas, which, it ſeems, the Minute Philoſophers of this Age, whether knowingly or ignorantly, expect and inſiſt upon in the Myſteries of Religion.

XVIII.

Be the Science or Subject what it will, whenſoever Men quit Particulars for Generalities, things Concrete for Abſtractions, when they for⯑ſake practical Views, and the uſeful Purpoſes of Knowledge for barren Speculation, conſidering Means and Inſtruments as ultimate Ends, and la⯑bouring to attain preciſe Ideas which they ſuppoſe indiſcriminately annexed to all Terms, they will be ſure to embarraſs themſelves with Difficulties and Diſputes. Such are thoſe which have ſprung up in Geometry about the Nature of the Angle of Contact, the Doctrine of Proportions, of Indiviſi⯑bles Infiniteſimals, and divers other Points; notwith⯑ſtanding all which, that Science is very rightly eſ⯑teemed an excellent and uſeful one, and is really ſound to be ſo in many Occaſions of Humane Life, wherein it governs and directs the Actions of Men, ſo that by the Aid or Influence thereof thoſe Ope⯑rations become juſt and accurate, which wou'd o⯑therwiſe be faulty and uncertain. And from a pa⯑rity of Reaſon, we ſhou'd not conclude any other Doctrines which govern, influence or direct the Mind of Man to be, any more than that, the leſs true or excellent, becauſe they afford matter of Controverſy and uſeleſs Speculation to curious and licentious Wits: Particularly thoſe Articles of our Chriſtian Faith, which, in proportion as they are believed, perſuade, and, as they perſuade, influ⯑ence the Lives and Actions of Men. As to the perplexity of Contradictions and abſtracted Noti⯑ons, in all parts whether of Humane Science or Divine Faith, Cavillers may equally object, and un⯑wary Perſons incur, while the judicious avoid it. [117] There is no need to depart from the received Rules of Reaſoning to juſtify the Belief of Chriſtians. And if any pious Men think otherwiſe, it may be ſuppoſed an Effect, not of Religion, or of Reaſon, but only of Humane Weakneſs. If this Age be ſingularly productive of Infidels, I ſhall not there⯑fore conclude it to be more knowing, but only more preſuming, than former Ages: And their Conceit, I doubt, is not the Effect of Conſiderati⯑on. To me it ſeems, that the more thoroughly and extenſively any Man ſhall conſider and ſcan the Principles, Objects, and Methods of proceed⯑ing in Arts and Sciences, the more he will be con⯑vinced, there is no weight in thoſe plauſible Ob⯑jections that are made againſt the Myſteries of Faith, which it will be no difficult matter for him to main⯑tain or juſtify in the received Method of arguing, on the common Principles of Logic, and by num⯑berleſs avow'd parallel Caſes, throughout the ſe⯑veral Branches of Humane Knowledge, in all which the Suppoſition of abſtract Ideas creates the ſame Difficulties.

XIX.

ALC. I will allow, Euphranor, this Reaſoning of yours to have all the Force you meant it ſhou'd have. I freely own there may be Myſteries: That we may believe, where we do not underſtand: And that Faith may be of uſe al⯑though its Object is not diſtinctly apprehended. In a word, I grant their may be Faith and Myſte⯑ries in other Things but not in Religion: And that for this plain Reaſon: Becauſe it is abſurd to ſuppoſe, there ſhou'd be any ſuch thing as Religi⯑on; and if there be no Religion it follows there cannot be Religious Faith or Myſteries. Religion, it is evident, implies the Worſhip of a God; which Worſhip ſuppoſeth Rewards and Puniſhments, which ſuppoſe Merits and Demerits, Actions good [118] and evil, and theſe ſuppoſe Humane Liberty, a thing impoſſible; and conſequently Religion a thing built thereon muſt be an unreaſonable abſurd thing. There can be no rational Hopes or Fears where there is no Guilt, nor any Guilt where there is no⯑thing done, but what unavoidably follows from the Structure of the World and the Laws of Motion. Corporeal Objects ſtrike on the Organs of Senſe, whence enſues a Vibration in the Nerves, which, being communicated to the Soul or Animal Spirit in the Brain or Root of the Nerves, produceth therein that Motion called Volition: And this pro⯑duceth a new Determination in the Spirits, cauſing them to flow into ſuch Nerves as muſt neceſſarily by the Laws of Mechaniſm produce ſuch certain Actions. This being the Caſe, it follows that thoſe things which vulgarly paſs for Humane Ac⯑tions are to be eſteemed Mechanical, and that they are falſely aſcribed to a free Principle. There is therefore no Foundation for Praiſe or Blame, Fear or Hope, Reward or Puniſhment, nor conſequently for Religion, which, as I obſerved before, is built upon and ſuppoſeth thoſe things. EUPH. You imagine, Alciphron, if I rightly underſtand you, that Man is a ſort of Organ played on by outward Objects, which according to the different ſhape and texture of the Nerves produce different Motions and Effects therein. ALC. Man may, indeed, be fitly compared to an Organ; but a Puppet is the very Thing. You muſt know, that certain Parti⯑cles iſſuing forth in right Lines from all ſenſible Objects compoſe ſo many Rays, or Filaments, which drive, draw, and actuate every part of the Soul and Body of Man, juſt as Threads or Wires do the joints of that little wooden Machine vulgar⯑ly called a Puppet: With this only difference that the latter are groſs and viſible to common eyes, whereas the former are too fine and ſubtile to be [119] diſcerned by any but a ſagacious Free-thinker. This admirably accounts for all thoſe Operations, which we have been taught to aſcribe to a think⯑ing Principle within us. EUPH. This is an inge⯑nious Thought, and muſt be of great uſe in freeing Men from all Anxiety about Moral Notions, as it transfers the Principle of Action from the Humane Soul to things outward and foreign. But I have my Scruples about it. For you ſuppoſe the Mind in a literal ſenſe to be moved and its Volitions to be meer Motions. Now if another ſhou'd affirm, as it is not impoſſible ſome or other may, that the Soul is incorporeal, and that Motion is one thing and Volition another, I wou'd fain know how you cou'd make your Point clear to ſuch a one. It muſt be owned very clear to thoſe who admit the Soul to be corporeal, and all her Acts to be but ſo many Motions. Upon this Suppoſition, indeed, the Light wherein you place Humane Nature is no leſs true, than it is fine and new. But let any one deny this Suppoſition, which is eaſily done, and the whole Superſtructure falls to the ground. If we grant the abovementiond Points, I will not deny a fatal Neceſſity muſt enſue. But I ſee no reaſon for granting them. On the contrary it ſeems plain, that Motion and Thought are two Things as really and as manifeſtly diſtinct as a Triangle and a Sound. It ſeems therefore, that in order to prove the neceſſity of Humane Actions, you ſup⯑poſe what wants Proof as much as the very Point to be proved.

XX.

ALC. But ſuppoſing the Mind incorpo⯑real, I ſhall, nevertheleſs, be able to prove my Point. Not to amuſe you with far fetched Argu⯑ments, I ſhall only deſire you to look into your own Breaſt and obſerve how things paſs there, when an Object offers it ſelf to the Mind. Firſt the Un⯑derſtanding [120] conſiders it: In the next Place the Judgment decrees about it, as a thing to be choſen or rejected, to be omitted or done, in this or that manner: And this Decree of the Judgment doth neceſſarily determine the Will, whoſe Office is meerly to execute what is ordained by another Fa⯑culty: Conſequently there is no ſuch thing as Free⯑dom of the Will: For that which is neceſſary cannot be free. In Freedom there ſhou'd be an Indiffe⯑rence to either ſide of the Queſtion, a Power to act or not to act, without perſcription or con⯑troul: And without this Indifference and this Pow⯑er, it is evident the Will cannot be free. But it is no leſs evident, that the Will is not indifferent in its Actions, being abſolutely determined and governed by the Judgment. Now whatever moves the Judgment, whether the greateſt preſent Un⯑eaſineſs, or the greateſt apparent Good, or what⯑ever elſe it be, it is all one to the Point in hand. The Will being ever concluded and controlled by the Judgment is in all Caſes alike under Neceſſity. There is, indeed, throughout the whole of Hu⯑mane Nature, nothing like a Principle of Free⯑dom, every Faculty being determined in all its Acts by ſomething foreign to it. The Underſtand⯑ing, for Inſtance, cannot alter its Idea, but muſt neceſſarily ſee it ſuch as it preſents it ſelf. The Appetites by a natural Neceſſity are carried to⯑wards their reſpective Objects. Reaſon cannot infer indifferently any thing from any thing, but is limited by the Nature and Connexion of things, and the eternal Rules of Reaſoning. And as this is confeſſedly the Caſe of all other Faculties, ſo it equally holds with reſpect to the Will it ſelf, as hath been already ſhewn. And if we may credit the Divine Characterizer of our Times, this above all others muſt be allowed the moſt ſlaviſh Faculty. ‘Appetite (ſaith that noble Writer) which is el⯑der [121] Brother to Reaſon, being the Lad of ſtrong⯑er growth, is ſure on every conteſt to take the Advantage of drawing all to his own ſide: And Will, ſo highly boaſted, is but at beſt a Foot⯑ball or Top between thoſe Youngſters who prove very unfortunately matched, till the youngeſt, inſtead of now and then a kick or laſh beſtow'd to little purpoſe, forſakes the Ball or Top it ſelf, and begins to lay about his elder Brother.’ CRI. This beautiful Parable for Style and Manner might equal thoſe of a known Engliſh Writer, in low Life renowned for Allego⯑ry, were it not a little incorrect, making the weak⯑er Lad find his account in laying about the ſtrong⯑er. ALC. This is helped by ſuppoſing the ſtronger Lad the greater Coward: But, be that as it will, ſo far as it relates to the Point in hand, this is a clear ſtate of the Caſe. The ſame Point may be alſo proved from the Preſcience of God. That which is certainly foreknown will certainly be. And what is certain is neceſſary. And neceſſa⯑ry Actions cannot be the Effect of Free-will. Thus you have this fundamental Point of our Free-thinking Philoſophy demonſtrated different ways. EUPH. Tell me, Alciphron, do you think it im⯑plies a Contradiction, that God ſhou'd make a Man Free? ALC. I do not. EUPH. It is then poſſible there may be ſuch a thing. ALC. This I do not deny. EUPH. You can therefore con⯑ceive and ſuppoſe ſuch a Free Agent. ALC. Ad⯑mitting that I can; what then? EUPH. Wou'd not ſuch an one think that he acted? ALC. He wou'd. EUPH. And condemn himſelf for ſome Actions and approve himſelf for others? ALC. This too I grant. EUPH. Wou'd he not think he deſerved Reward or Puniſhment? ALC. He wou'd. EUPH. And are not all theſe Characters actually found in Man? ALC. They are. EUPH. [122] Tell me now, what other Character of your ſup⯑poſed Free Agent may not actually be found in Man? For if there is none ſuch, we muſt conclude that Man hath all the marks of a Free Agent. ALC. Let me ſee! I was certainly overſeen in granting it poſſible, even for Almighty Power, to make ſuch a thing as a Free Humane Agent. I wonder how I came to make ſuch an abſurd Conceſſion, after what had been, as I obſerved before, demonſtrated ſo many different ways. EUPH. O Alciphron, it is vulgarly obſerved that Men judge of others by themſelves. But in judging of me by this Rule, you may be miſtaken. Many things are plain to one of your Sagacity, which are not ſo to me, who am often bewildered rather than enlightened by thoſe very Proofs, that with you paſs for clear and evi⯑dent. And, indeed, be the Inference never ſo juſt, yet ſo long as the Premiſes are not clear, I cannot be thoroughly convinced. You muſt give me leave therefore to propoſe ſome Queſtions, the Solution of which may perhaps ſhew what at preſent I am not able to diſcern. ALC. I ſhall leave what hath been ſaid with you, to conſider and ruminate up⯑on. It is now time to ſet out on our Journey; there is, therefore, no room for a long String of Queſtion and Anſwer.

XXI.

EUPH. I ſhall then only beg leave in a ſummary Manner, to make a Remark or two on what you have advanced. In the firſt place I ob⯑ſerve, you take that for granted which I cannot grant, when you aſſert whatever is certain the ſame to be neceſſary. To me, Certain and Neceſſary ſeem very different; there being nothing in the former notion that implies Conſtraint, nor conſe⯑quently which may not conſiſt with a Man's being accountable for his Actions. If it is foreſeen that ſuch an Action ſhall be done: May it not alſo be [123] foreſeen that it ſhall be an Effect of Humane Choice and Liberty? In the next place I obſerve, that you very nicely abſtract and diſtinguiſh the Actions of the Mind, Judgment, and Will: That you make uſe of ſuch Terms as Power, Faculty, Act, Deter⯑mination, Indifference, Freedom, Neceſſity, and the like, as if they ſtood for diſtinct abſtract Ideas: And that this Suppoſition ſeems to enſnare the Mind into the ſame Perplexities and Errors, which, in all other Inſtances, are obſerved to attend the Doctrine of Abſtraction. It is ſelf evident, that there is ſuch a thing as Motion; and yet there have been found Philoſophers, who, by refined Reaſoning, wou'd undertake to prove there was no ſuch thing. Walking before them was thought the proper Way to confute thoſe ingenious Men. It is no leſs evident, that Man is a free Agent: and though by abſtracted Reaſonings you ſhou'd puzzle me, and ſeem to prove the contrary, yet ſo long as I am conſcious of my own Actions, this in⯑ward Evidence of plain Fact will bear me up a⯑gainſt all your Reaſonings, however ſubtile and re⯑fined. The confuting plain Points by obſcure ones, may perhaps convince me of the Ability of your Philoſophers, but never of their Tenets. I cannot conceive why the acute Cratylus ſhou'd ſuppoſe a Power of Acting in the Appetite and Reaſon, and none at all in the Will? Allowing, I ſay, the Diſtinction of three ſuch Beings in the Mind, I do not ſee how this cou'd be true. But if I cannot ab⯑ſtract and diſtinguiſh ſo many Beings in the Soul of Man ſo accurately as you do, I do not find it ne⯑ceſſary, ſince it is evident to me in the groſs and concrete that I am a free Agent. Nor will it avail to ſay, the Will is governed by the Judgment, or determined by the Object, while, in every ſudden common Caſe, I cannot diſcern nor abſtract the Decree of the Judgment from the Command of the [124] Will; while I know the ſenſible Object to be ab⯑ſolutely inert: And laſtly, while I am conſcious that I am an active Being, who can and do deter⯑mine my ſelf. If I ſhou'd ſuppoſe things ſpiritual to be corporeal, or refine things actual and real in⯑to general abſtracted Notions, or by metaphyſical Skill ſplit things ſimple and individual into mani⯑fold Parts, I do not know what may follow: But if I take things as they are, and ask any plain un⯑tutored Man, whether he acts or is free in this or that particular Action, he readily aſſents, and I as readily believe him from what I find within. And thus, by an Induction of Particulars, I may conclude Man to be a free Agent, although I may be puzzled to define or conceive a Notion of Free⯑dom in general and abſtract. And if Man be free he is plainly accountable. But if you ſhall define, abſtract, ſuppoſe, and it ſhall follow that accord⯑ing to your Definitions, Abſtractions, and Suppo⯑ſitions, there can be no Freedom in Man, and you ſhall thence infer that he is not accountable, I ſhall make bold to depart from your metaphyſical ab⯑ſtracted Senſe, and appeal to the common Senſe of Mankind.

XXII.

If we conſider the Notions that obtain in the World of Guilt and Merit, Praiſe and Blame, Accountable and Unaccountable, we ſhall find the common Queſtion in order to applaud or cenſure, acquit or condemn a Man, is, whether he did ſuch an Action? and whether he was himſelf when he did it? which comes to the ſame thing. It ſhou'd ſeem therefore that in the ordinary Commerce of Mankind, any Perſon is eſteemed accountable ſimp⯑ly as he is an Agent. And though you ſhou'd tell me that Man is inactive, and that the ſenſible Ob⯑jects act upon him, yet my own Experience aſſures me of the contrary. I know I act, and what I [125] act I am accountable for. And if this be true, the Foundation of Religion and Morality remains un⯑ſhaken. Religion, I ſay is concerned no farther than that Man ſhou'd be Accountable: And this he is ac⯑cording to my Senſe, and the common Senſe of the World, if he acts; and that he doth act is ſelf evident. The Grounds, therefore, and Ends of Religion are ſecured; whether your philoſophic Notion of Liberty agrees with Man's Actions or no, and whether his Actions are certain or contin⯑gent, the Queſtion being not whether he did it with a Free Will, or what determined his Will? not, whether it was certain or foreknown that he wou'd do it? but only whether he did it wilfully? as what muſt entitle him to the Guilt or Merit of it. ALC. But ſtill, the Queſtion recurs, whether Man bee Free? EUPH. To determine this Queſ⯑tion, ought we not firſt to determine what is meant by the word Free? ALC. We ought. EUPH. In my Opinion, a Man is ſaid to be Free, ſo far forth as he can do what he will. Is this ſo or is it not? ALC. It ſeems ſo. EUPH. Man there⯑fore acting according to his Will, is to be account⯑ed Free. ALC. This I admit to be true in the Vulgar Senſe. But a Philoſopher goes higher, and inquires whether Man be free to will? EUPH. That is, whether he can will as he wills? I know not how Philoſophical it may be to ask this Queſti⯑on, but it ſeems very unintelligible. The Noti⯑ons of Guilt and Merit, Juſtice and Reward are in the Minds of Men, antecedent to all Metaphy⯑ſical Diſquiſitions: And according to thoſe receiv⯑ed natural Notions, it is not doubted that Man is accountable, that he acts, and is ſelf-determin⯑ed.

XXIII.

But a Minute Philoſopher ſhall, in vir⯑tue of wrong Suppoſitions, confound things moſt evidently diſtinct; Body, for Inſtance, with Spirit, Motion with Volition, Certainty with Neceſſity; and an Abſtracter or Refiner ſhall ſo analyſe the moſt ſimple inſtantaneous Act of the Mind, as to diſtinguiſh therein divers Faculties and Tendencies, Principles and Operations, Cauſes and Effects; and having abſtracted, ſuppoſed, and reaſoned upon Principles gratuitous and obſcure, ſuch a one he will conclude it is no Act at all, and Man no Agent but a Puppet, or an Organ play'd on by outward Objects, and his Will a Top or a Foot-ball. And this paſſeth for Philoſophy and Free-thinking. Perhaps this may be what it paſſeth for, but it by no means ſeems a natural or juſt way of Thinking. To me it ſeems, that if we begin from things particular and concrete, and thence proceed to general Notions and Concluſions, there will be no Difficulty in this Matter. But if we begin with Generalities, and lay our Foundation in abſtract Ideas, we ſhall find our ſelves entangled and loſt in a Labyrinth of our own making. I need not ob⯑ſerve, what every one muſt ſee, the ridicule of proving Man no Agent, and yet pleading for free Thought and Action, of ſetting up at once for Ad⯑vocates of Liberty and Neceſſity. I have haſtily thrown together theſe Hints or Remarks, on what you call a fundamental Article of the Minute Phi⯑loſophy, and your Method of proving it, which ſeems to furniſh an admirable Specimen of the So⯑phiſtry of abſtract Ideas. If in this ſummary way I have been more dogmatical than became me, you muſt excuſe what you occaſioned, by declining a joint and leiſurely Examination of the Truth. ALC. I think we have examined Matters ſuffici⯑ently. CRI. To all you have ſaid againſt Humane [127] Liberty, it is a ſufficient Anſwer to obſerve that your Arguments proceed upon an erroneous Sup⯑poſition, either of the Soul's being corporeal, or of abſtract Ideas. And on the other hand, there is not need of much Inquiry to be convinced of two Points, than which none are more evident, more obvious, and more univerſally admitted by Men of all ſorts, learned or unlearned, in all Times and Places, to wit, that Man acts and is accountable for his Actions. Whatever Abſtracters, Refiners, or Men prejudiced to a falſe Hypotheſis may pre⯑tend, it is, if I miſtake not, evident to every think⯑ing Man of common Senſe, that Humane Minds are ſo far from being Engines or Foot-balls, acted upon and bandied about by corporeal Objects, without any inward Principle of Freedom or Acti⯑on, that the only original true Notions that we have of Freedom, Agent, or Action, are obtained by reflecting on our ſelves, and the Operations of our own Minds. The Singularity and Credulity of Minute Philoſophers, who ſuffer themſelves to be abuſed by the Paralogiſms of three or four eminent Patriarchs of Infidelity in the laſt Age, is, I think, not to be matched; there being no Inſtance of bigotted Superſtition, the Ringleaders whereof have been able to ſeduce their Followers more openly and more widely from the plain Dictates of Nature and common Senſe.

XXIV.

ALC. It has been always an Objection againſt the Diſcoverers of Truth, that they depart from received Opinions. The Character of Singu⯑larity is a Tax on Free-thinking: And as ſuch we moſt willingly bear it, and glory in it. A Genuine Philoſopher is never modeſt in a falſe Senſe, to the preferring Authority before Reaſon, or an old and common Opinion before a true one. Which falſe Modeſty, as it diſcourages Men from treading in [128] untrodden Paths, or ſtriking out new Light, is a⯑bove all other Qualities the greateſt Enemy to Free-thinking. CRI. Authority in diſputable Points will have its Weight with a judicious Mind, which yet will follow Evidence wherever it leads. Without preferring we may allow it a good Second to Reaſon. Your Gentlemen, therefore, of the Minute Philoſophy, may ſpare a World of Com⯑mon Place upon Reaſon, and Light, and Diſcove⯑ries. We are not attached to Authority againſt Reaſon, nor afraid of untrodden Paths that lead to Truth, and are ready to follow a new Light when we are ſure it is no ignis fatuus. Reaſon may ob⯑lige a Man to believe againſt his Inclinations; but why ſhou'd a Man quit ſalutary Notions for others not leſs unreaſonable than pernicious? Your Schemes and Principles, and boaſted Demonſtrati⯑ons have been at large propoſed and examined. You have ſhifted your Notions, ſucceſſively retreat⯑ed from one Scheme to another, and in the End renounced them all. Your Objections have been treated in the ſame Manner, and with the ſame Event. If we except all that relates to the parti⯑cular Errors and Faults of private Perſons, and Difficulties which, from the Nature of Things, we are not obliged to explain, it is ſurpriſing to ſee, after ſuch magnificent Threats, how little remains, that can amount to a pertinent Objection againſt the Chriſtian Religion. What you have produced has been tried by the fair Teſt of Reaſon; and though you ſhou'd hope to prevail by Ridicule when you cannot by Reaſon, yet in the upſhot, I apprehend you will find it impracticable to deſtroy all Senſe of Religion. Make your Countrymen ever ſo vicious, ignorant, and profane, Men will ſtill be diſpoſed to look up to a ſupreme Being. Re⯑ligion, right or wrong, will ſubſiſt in ſome Shape or other, and ſome worſhip there will ſurely be [129] either of God or the Creature. As for your Ri⯑dicule, can any thing be more ridiculous, than to ſee the moſt unmeaning Men of the Age ſet up for Free-thinkers, Men ſo ſtrong in Aſſertion, and yet ſo weak in Argument, Advocates for Freedom introducing a Fatality, Patriots trampling on the Laws of their Country, and Pretenders to Virtue, deſtroying the Motives of it? Let any impartial Man but caſt an eye on the Opinions of the Minute Philoſophers, and then ſay if any thing can be more ridiculous, than to believe ſuch things, and at the ſame time laugh at Credulity.

XXV.

LYS. Say what you will, we have the Laughers on our ſide: And as for your Reaſoning I take it to be another Name for Sophiſtry. CRI. And I ſuppoſe by the ſame Rule you take your own Sophiſms for Arguments. To ſpeak plainly, I know no ſort of Sophiſm that is not employ'd by Minute Philoſophers againſt Religion. They are guilty of a Petitio Principii, in taking for grant⯑ed that we believe Contradictions; of non Cauſa pro Cauſa, in affirming that uncharitable Feuds and Diſcords are the Effects of Chriſtianity; of Ignora⯑tio elenchi, in expecting Demonſtration where we pretend only to Faith. If I was not afraid to of⯑fend the Delicacy of polite Ears, nothing were eaſier than to aſſign Inſtances of every kind of So⯑phiſm, which wou'd ſhew how skilful your own Philoſophers are in the practice of that Sophiſtry you impute to others. EUPH. For my own part, if Sophiſtry be the Art or Faculty of deceiv⯑ing other Men, I muſt acquit theſe Gentlemen of it. They ſeem to have led me a progreſs through Atheiſm, Libertiniſm, Enthuſiaſm, Fataliſm, not to convince me of the Truth of any of them, ſo much as to confirm me in my own way of Think⯑ing. They have expoſed their fairy Ware not to [130] cheat but divert us. As I know them to be pro⯑feſſed Maſters of Ridicule, ſo in a ſerious ſenſe I know not what to make of them. ALC. You do not know what to make of us! I ſhou'd be ſorry you did. He muſt be a ſuperficial Philoſopher that is ſoon fathomed.

XXVI.

CRI. The ambiguous Character is, it ſeems, the ſure way to Fame and Eſteem in the learned World, as it ſtands conſtituted at preſent. When the ingenious Reader is at a loſs to deter⯑mine whether his Author be Atheiſt or Deiſt or Polytheiſt, Stoic or Epicurean, Sceptic or Dog⯑matiſt, Infidel or Enthuſiaſt, in jeſt or in earneſt, he concludes him without heſitation to be aenigma⯑tical and profound. In fact, it is true of the moſt admired Writers of the Age, That no Man alive can tell what to make of them, or what they would be at. ALC. We have among us Moles that dig deep under ground, and Eagles that ſoar out of ſight. We can act all Parts and become all Opinions, putting them on or off with great free⯑dom of Wit and Humour. EUPH. It ſeems then you are a pair of inſcrutable, unfathomable, faſhi⯑onable Philoſophers. ALC. It cannot be denied. EUPH. But, I remember, you ſet out with an open dogmatical Air, and talked of plain Princi⯑ples and evident Reaſoning, promiſed to make things as clear as Noon-day, to extirpate wrong Notions and plant right in their ſtead. Soon af⯑ter, you began to recede from you firſt Notions and adopt others: you advanced one while and retreated another, yielded and retracted, ſaid and unſaid: And after having followed you through ſo many untrodden Paths and intricate Mazes I find my ſelf never the nearer. ALC. Did we not tell you the Gentlemen of our Sect are great Profi⯑cients in Raillery? EUPH. But, methinks, it is a [131] vain Attempt, for a plain Man of any ſettled Be⯑lief or Principles to engage with ſuch ſlippery, fugitive, changeable Philoſophers. If ſeems as it a Man ſhou'd ſtand ſtill in the ſame place, while his Adverſary chooſes and changes his Situation, has full range and liberty to traverſe the Field, and attack him on all ſides and in all ſhapes, from a nearer or farther diſtance, on Horſe-back or on Foot, in light or heavy Armour, in cloſe Fight or with miſſive Weapons. ALC. It muſt be owned, a Gentleman hath great Advantage over a ſtrait⯑laced Pedant or Bigot. EUPH. But after all, what am I the better for the Converſation of two ſuch knowing Gentlemen; I hoped to have un⯑learned my Errors, and to have learned Truths from you, but, to my great diſappointment, I do not find that I am either untaught or taught. ALC. To unteach Men their Prejudices is a diffi⯑cult task: And this muſt firſt be done, before we can pretend to teach them the Truth. Beſides, we have at preſent no time to prove and argue. EUPH. But ſuppoſe my Mind white Paper, and without being at any pains to extirpate my Opinions, or prove your own, only ſay what you wou'd write thereon, or what you wou'd teach me in caſe I were teacheable. Be for once in earneſt, and let me know ſome one Concluſion of yours before we part; or I ſhall intreat Crito to violate the Laws of Hoſpitality towards thoſe who have violated the Laws of Philoſophy, by hanging out falſe Lights to one benighted in Ignorance and Error. I appeal to you (ſaid he turning to Crito) whether theſe Philoſophical Knight-errants ſhou'd not be confined in this Caſtle of yours, till they make Reparation. Euphranor has Reaſon, ſaid Crito, and my Sentence is that you remain here in du⯑rance, till you have done ſomething towards ſatiſ⯑fying the Engagement I am under, having promiſed, [132] he ſhou'd know your Opinions from your ſelves, which you alſo agreed to.

XXVII.

ALC. Since it muſt be ſo, I will now reveal what I take to be the Sum and Subſtance, the grand Arcanum and ultimate Concluſion of our Sect, and that in two Words, [...]. CRI. You are then a downright Sceptic. But, Sceptic as you are, you own it, probable there is a God, certain that the Chriſtian Religion is uſe⯑ful, poſſible it may be true, certain that if it be the Minute Philoſophers are in a bad way. This being the Caſe, how can it be queſtioned what courſe a wiſe Man ſhou'd take? Whether the Prin⯑ciples of Chriſtians or Infidels are trueſt may be made a Queſtion, but which are ſafeſt can be none. Certainly if you doubt of all Opinions you muſt doubt of your own; and then, for ought you know, the Chriſtian may be true. The more doubt, the more room there is for Faith, a Sceptic of all Men having the leaſt Right to demand Evidence. But, whatever uncertainty there may be in other Points, thus much is certain: either there is or is not a God: there is or is not a Revelation: Man either is or is not an Agent: The Soul is or is not Immortal. If the Negatives are not ſure, the Af⯑firmatives are poſſible. If the Negatives are im⯑probable, the Affirmatives are probable. In Pro⯑portion, as any of your ingenious Men finds him⯑ſelf unable to prove any one of theſe Negatives, he hath grounds to ſuſpect he may be miſtaken. A Minute Philoſopher, therefore, that wou'd act a conſiſtent part, ſhou'd have the Diffidence, the Modeſty, and the Timidity, as well as the Doubts, of a Sceptic; not pretend to an Ocean of Light, and then lead us to an Abyſs of Darkneſs. If I have any Notion of Ridicule, this is moſt ridicu⯑lous. But your ridiculing what, for ought you [133] know, may be true, I can make no ſenſe of. It is neither acting as a wiſe Man with regard to your own Intereſt, nor as a good Man with regard to that of your Country.

XXVIII.

Tully ſaith ſomewhere, aut undique re⯑ligionem tolle aut uſquequaque conſerva: Either let us have no Religion at all or let it be reſpected. If any ſingle Inſtance can be ſhewn of a People that ever proſpered without ſome Religion, or if there be any Religion better than the Chriſtian, propoſe it in the grand Aſſembly of the Nation to change our Conſtitution, and either live without Religion, or introduce that new Religion. A Sceptic, as well as other Men, is Member of a Community, and can diſtinguiſh between God and Evil, Na⯑tural or Political. Be this then his Guide as a Pa⯑triot, though he be no Chriſtian. Or, if he doth not pretend even to this diſcernment, let him not pretend to correct or alter what he knows nothing of: Neither let him that only doubts behave as if he cou'd demonſtrate. Timagoras is wont to ſay, I find my Country in poſſeſſion of certain Tenets: they appear to have an uſeful Tendency, and, as ſuch, are encouraged by the Legiſlature; they make a main part of our Conſtitution: I do not find theſe Innovators can diſprove them, or ſubſtitute things more uſeful and certain in their ſtead: out of regard therefore to the Good of Mankind, and the Laws of my Country, I ſhall acquieſce in them. I do not ſay Timagoras is a Chriſtian, but I reckon him a Patriot. Not to inquire in a Point of ſo great concern is folly, but it is ſtill a higher de⯑gree of folly to condemn without inquiring. Ly⯑ſicles ſeemed heartily tired of this Converſation. It is now late, ſaid he to Alciphron, and all things are ready for our departure. Every one hath his own [134] way of Thinking; and it is as impoſſible for me to adopt another Man's, as to make his Complexion and Features mine. Alciphron pleaded that, hav⯑ing complied with Euphranor's Conditions, they were now at Liberty: And Euphranor anſwered that, all he deſired having been to know their Te⯑nets, he had nothing further to pretend.

XXIX.

The Philoſophers being gone, I obſerv⯑ed to Crito how unaccountable it was, that Men ſo eaſy to confute ſhou'd yet be ſo difficult to con⯑vince. This, ſaid Crito, is accounted for by Ari⯑ſtotle, who tells us that Arguments have not an Effect on all Men, but only on them whoſe Minds are prepared by Education and Cuſtom, as Land is for Seed ^*. Make a Point never ſo clear, it is great odds, that a Man, whoſe Habits and the Bent of whoſe Mind lie a contrary way, ſhall be unable to comprehend it. So weak a thing is Reaſon in Competition with Inclination. I replied, this an⯑ſwer might hold with reſpect to other Perſons and other Times: but when the queſtion was of inqui⯑ſitive Men, in an Age wherein Reaſon was ſo much cultivated, and Thinking ſo much in vogue, it did not ſeem ſatisfactory. I have known it remarked, ſaid Crito, by a Man of much Obſervation, that in the preſent Age Thinking is more talk'd of but leſs practiſed than in ancient times; and that ſince the Revival of Learning Men have read much and wrote much but thought little: inſomuch that with us to think cloſely and juſtly is the leaſt part of a learned Man, and none at all of a polite Man. The Free-thinkers, it muſt be owned, make great Pretenſions to Thinking, and yet they ſhew but little Exactneſs in it. A lively Man, ſaid he, and what the World calls a Man of ſenſe are often deſ⯑titute [135] of this Talent, which is not a meer gift of Nature, but muſt be improved and perfected, by much Attention and Exerciſe on very different Sub⯑jects, a thing of more pains and time than the haſty Men of parts in our Age care to take. Such were the Sentiments of a judicious Friend of mine: And, if you are not already ſufficiently convinced of theſe Truths, you need only caſt an eye on the dark and confuſed, but nevertheleſs admired, Writers of this famous Sect: And then you will be able to judge, whether thoſe who are led by Men of ſuch wrong Heads can have very good ones of their own. Such, for inſtance, was Spinoſa the great Leader of our modern Infidels, in whom are to be found ma⯑ny Schemes and Notions much admired and fol⯑lowed of late years: ſuch as undermining Religi⯑on under the pretence of vindicating and explain⯑ing it: The maintaining it not neceſſary to believe in Chriſt according to the Fleſh: The perſuading Men that Miracles are to be underſtood only in a ſpiritual and allegorical ſenſe: That Vice is not ſo bad a thing as we are apt to think: That Men are meer Machines impelled by fatal Neceſſity. I have heard, ſaid I, Spinoſa repreſented as a Man of cloſe Argument and Demonſtration. He did, replied Crito, demonſtrate; but it was after ſuch a manner, as any one may demonſtrate any thing. Allow a Man the privilege to make his own Definitions of common Words, and it will be no hard matter for him to infer Concluſions, which in one ſenſe ſhall be true and in another falſe, at once ſeeming Para⯑doxes and manifeſt Truiſms. For example, let but Spinoſa define natural Right to be natural Power, and he will eaſily demonſtrate, that whatever a Man can do he hath a right to do ^*. Nothing can be plainer than the folly of this Proceeding: but [136] our Pretenders to the lumen ſiccum are often ſo paſ⯑ſionately prejudiced againſt Religion, as to ſwal⯑low the groſſeſt Nonſenſe and Sophiſtry of weak and wicked Writers for Demonſtration.

XXX.

And ſo great a Noiſe do theſe Men make, with their thinking, reaſoning, and demon⯑ſtrating, as to prejudice ſome well-meaning Perſons againſt all Uſe and improvement of Reaſon. Ho⯑neſt Demea, having ſeen a Neighbour of his ruined by the Vices of a Free-thinking Son, contracted ſuch a Prejudice againſt Thinking, that he wou'd not ſuffer his own to read Euclid, being told it might teach him to think; till a Friend convinced him the epidemical Diſtemper was not Thinking, but only the want and affectation of it. I know an eminent Free-thinker, who never goes to bed, without a Gallon of Wine in his Belly, and is ſure to repleniſh before the Fumes are off his Brain, by which means he has not had one ſober Thought theſe ſeven Years; another, that wou'd not for the World loſe the Privilege and Reputation of Free-thinking, who games all Night, and lies in bed all Day: And as for the Outſide or Appearance of Thought in that meagre Minute Philoſopher Ibycus, it is an Effect, not of thinking, but of carking, cheating, and writing in an Office. Strange, ſaid he, that ſuch Men ſhou'd ſet up for Free-thinkers! But it is yet more ſtrange that other Men ſhou'd be out of Conceit with Thinking and Reaſoning, for the ſake of ſuch Pretenders. I anſwered, that ſome good Men conceived an Oppoſition between Reaſon and Religion, Faith and Knowledge, Na⯑ture and Grace; and that, conſequently, the way to promote Religion was, to quench the light of Nature, and diſcourage all rational Inquiry.

XXXI.

How right the Intentions of theſe Men may be, replied Crito, I ſhall not ſay; but ſurely their Notions are very wrong. Can any thing be more diſhonourable to Religion, than the repre⯑ſenting it as an unreaſonable, unnatural, ignorant Inſtitution? God is the Father of all Lights whe⯑ther natural or revealed. Natural Concupiſcence is one thing, and the Light of Nature another. You cannot therefore argue from the Former againſt the Latter: Neither can you from Science falſly ſo called, againſt real Knowledge. Whatever there⯑fore is ſaid of the one in Holy Scripture is not to be interpreted of the other. I inſiſted, that Humane Learning in the hands of Divines, had from time to time, created great Diſputes and Diviſions in the Church. As abſtracted Metaphyſics, replied Crito, have always had a Tendency to produce Diſ⯑putes among Chriſtians, as well as other Men, ſo it ſhou'd ſeem that genuine Truth and Knowledge wou'd allay this Humour, which makes Men ſacri⯑fice the undiſputed Duties of Peace and Charity to diſputable Notions. After all, ſaid I, whatever may be ſaid for Reaſon, it is plain, the Sceptics and Infidels of the Age are not to be cured by it. I will not diſpute this Point, ſaid Crito; in order to cure a Diſtemper, you ſhou'd conſider what pro⯑duced it. Had Men reaſoned themſelves into a wrong Opinion, one might hope to reaſon them out of it. But this is not the Caſe; the Infidelity of moſt Minute Philoſophers ſeeming an Effect of very different Motives from Thought and Reaſon, little Incidents, Vanity, Diſguſt, Humour, Incli⯑nation, without the leaſt aſſiſtance from Reaſon, are often known to make Infidels. Where the general Tendency of a Doctrine is diſagreeable, the Mind is prepared to reliſh and improve every thing that with the leaſt Pretence ſeems to make againſt it. [138] Hence the coarſe Manners of a Country Curate, the polite ones of a Chaplain, the Wit of a Minute Philoſopher, a Jeſt, a Song, a Tale can ſerve in⯑ſtead of a Reaſon for Infidelity. Bupalus preferred a Rake in the Church, and then made uſe of him as an Argument againſt it. Vice, Indolence, Fac⯑tion, and Faſhion produce Minute Philoſophers, and meer Petulancy not a few. Who then can ex⯑pect a thing ſo irrational and capricious ſhou'd yield to Reaſon? It may, nevertheleſs, be worth while to argue againſt ſuch Men, and expoſe their Fallacies, if not for their own ſake, yet for the ſake of others; as it may leſſen their Credit, and prevent the growth of their Sect, by removing a Prejudice in their Favour, which ſometimes inclines others as well as themſelves to think they have made a Monopoly of Humane Reaſon.

XXXII.

The moſt general Pretext which looks like Reaſon, is taken from the Variety of Opinions about Religion. This is a reſting Stone to a lazy and ſuperficial mind: But one of more Spirit and a juſter way of Thinking, makes it a Step whence he looks about, and proceeds to examine, and com⯑pare the differing Inſtitutions of Religion. He will obſerve, which of theſe is the moſt ſublime and rational in its Doctrines, moſt venerable in its Myſteries, moſt uſeful in its Precepts, moſt decent in its Worſhip? Which createth the nobleſt Hopes, and moſt worthy Views? He will conſider their Riſe and Progreſs; which oweth leaſt to Hu⯑mane Arts or Arms? Which flatters the Senſes and groſs Inclinations of Men? Which adorns and improves the moſt excellent Part of our Nature? Which hath been propagated in the moſt wonder⯑ful Manner? Which hath ſurmounted the greateſt Difficulties, or ſhew'd the moſt diſintereſted Zeal and Sincerity in its Profeſſors? He will inquire, [139] which beſt accords with Nature and Hiſtory? He will conſider, what ſavours of the World, and what looks like Wiſdom from above? He will be careful to ſeparate Humane Allay from that which is Divine; and upon the whole, form his Judg⯑ment like a reaſonable Free-thinker. But inſtead of taking ſuch a rational Courſe, one of theſe haſty Sceptics ſhall conclude without demurring, there is no Wiſdom in Politics, no Honeſty in Dealings, no Knowledge in Philoſophy, no Truth in Reli⯑gion: And all by one and the ſame ſort of Infe⯑rence, from the numerous Examples of Folly, Knavery, Ignorance, and Error, which are to be met with in the World. But, as thoſe who are unknowing in every thing elſe, imagine them⯑ſelves ſharpſighted in Religion, this learned So⯑phiſm is ofteneſt levelled againſt Chriſtianity.

XXXIII.

In my Opinion, he, that wou'd con⯑vince an Infidel who can be brought to Reaſon, ought in the firſt place clearly to convince him of the Being of a God, it ſeeming to me, that any Man who is really a Theiſt, cannot be an Enemy to the Chriſtian Religion: And that the Ignorance or Disbelief of this fundamental Point, is that which at bottom conſtitutes the Minute Philoſopher. I imagine they, who are acquainted with the great Authors in the Minute Philoſophy, need not be told of this. The being of a God is capable of clear Proof, and a proper Object of Humane Rea⯑ſon; whereas the Myſteries of his Nature, and in⯑deed whatever there is of Myſtery in Religion, to endeavour to explain, and prove by Reaſon, is a vain Attempt. It is ſufficient if we can ſhew there is nothing abſurd or repugnant in our Belief of thoſe Points, and, inſtead of framing Hypotheſes to explain them, we uſe our Reaſon only for an⯑ſwering the Objections brought againſt them. But [140] on all Occaſions, we ought to diſtinguiſh the ſeri⯑ous, modeſt, ingenuous Man of Senſe, who hath Scruples about Religion, and behaves like a pru⯑dent Man in doubt, from the Minute Philoſophers, thoſe profane and conceited Men, who muſt needs proſelyte others to their own Doubts. When one of this Stamp preſents himſelf, we ſhou'd conſider what Species he is of: Whether a firſt or a ſecond-hand Philoſopher, a Libertine, Scorner, or Scep⯑tic? Each Character requiring a peculiar Treat⯑ment. Some Men are too ignorant to be humble, without which there can be no Docility: But though a Man muſt in ſome degree have thought and conſidered to be capable of being convinced, yet it is poſſible the moſt ignorant may be laugh'd out of his Opinions. I knew a Woman of Senſe re⯑duce two Minute Philoſophers, who had long been a Nuſance to the Neighbourhood, by taking her Cue from their predominant Affectations. The one ſet up for being the moſt incredulous Man upon Earth, the other for the moſt unbounded Freedom. She obſerved to the firſt, that he who had Credu⯑lity ſufficient to truſt the moſt valuable Things, his Life and Fortune, to his Apothecary and Law⯑yer, ridiculouſly affected the Character of Incredu⯑lous, by refuſing to truſt his Soul, a Thing in his own account but a meer Trifle, to his Pariſh-Prieſt. The other, being what you call a Beau, ſhe made ſenſible how abſolute a Slave he was in point of Dreſs, to him the moſt important thing in the World, while he was earneſtly contending for a Liberty of Thinking, with which he never troub⯑led his Head; and how much more it concerned and became him to aſſert an Independency on Faſhi⯑on, and obtain Scope for his Genius, where it was beſt qualified to exert it ſelf. The Minute Philo⯑ſophers at firſt hand are very few, and conſidered in themſelves, of ſmall conſequence: But their [141] Followers, who pin their Faith upon them, are numerous, and not leſs confident than credulous; there being ſomething in the Air and Manner of theſe ſecond-hand Philoſophers, very apt to diſ⯑concert a Man of Gravity and Argument, and much more difficult to be born than the Weight of their Objections.

XXXIV.

Crito having made an end, Euphranor declared it to be his Opinion, that it wou'd much conduce to the public Benefit, if, inſtead of diſ⯑couraging Free-thinking, there was erected in the midſt of this Free Country a Dianoetic Academy, or Seminary for Free-thinkers, provided with re⯑tired Chambers, and Galleries, and ſhady Walks and Groves, where, after ſeven Years ſpent in Si⯑lence and Meditation, a Man might commence a genuine Free-thinker, and from that time forward, have Licence to think what he pleaſed, and a Badge to diſtinguiſh him from Counterfeits. In good earneſt, ſaid Crito, I imagine that Thinking is the great Deſideratum of the preſent Age; and that the real Cauſe of whatever is amiſs, may juſt⯑ly be reckoned the general Neglect of Education, in thoſe who need it moſt, the People of Faſhion. What can be expected where thoſe who have the moſt Influence, have the leaſt Senſe, and thoſe who are ſure to be followed, ſet the worſt Example? Where Youth ſo uneducated are yet ſo forward? Where Modeſty is eſteemed Pufillanimity, and a De⯑ference to Years, Knowledge, Religion, Laws, want of Senſe and Spirit? Such untimely Growth of Geni⯑us wou'd not have been valued or encouraged by the wiſe Men of Antiquity; whoſe Sentiments on this Point are ſo ill ſuited to the Genius of our Times, that it is to be feared modern Ears cou'd not bear them. But however ridiculous ſuch Maxims might ſeem to our Britiſh Youth, who are ſo capable and ſo for⯑ward [142] to try Experiments, and mend the Conſti⯑tution of their Country, I believe it will be admit⯑ted by Men of Senſe, that if the Governing part of Mankind wou'd in theſe Days, for Experiment's ſake, conſider themſelves in that old Homerical Light as Paſtors of the People, whoſe Duty it was to improve their Flock, they wou'd ſoon find that this is to be done by an Education very diffe⯑rent from the Modern, and othergueſs Maxims than thoſe of the Minute Philoſophy. If our Youth were really inur'd to Thought and Reflexion, and an Acquaintance with the excellent Writers of Antiquity, we ſhou'd ſoon ſee that licentious Humour, vulgarly called Free-thinking, baniſhed from the Preſence of Gentlemen, together with Ig⯑norance and ill Taſte; which as they are inſepara⯑ble from Vice, ſo Men follow Vice for the fake of Pleaſure, and fly from Virtue through an abhor⯑rence of Pain. Their Minds therefore betimes ſhou'd be formed and accuſtomed to receive Plea⯑ſure and Pain from proper Objects, or, which is the ſame thing, to have their Inclinations and A⯑verſions rightly placed. [...]. This according to Plato and Ariſtotle, was the [...], the right Education ^*. And thoſe who, in their own Minds, their Health, or their Fortunes, feel the curſed Effects of a wrong one, wou'd do well to conſider, they cannot better make amends for what was amiſs in themſelves, than by preventing the ſame in their Poſterity. While Crito was ſay⯑ing this, Company came in, which put an end to our Converſation.