THE Firſt Diviſion of this King⯑dom into Hundreds and Tithings was ordained by the virtuous and pa⯑triotic King Alfred, ^* who is expresſly ſaid to have therein followed the prudent Council given by Jethro to Moſes, ^† for [4]the more commodious Government of the Iſraelitiſh Commonwealth; it being, [5]indeed, an Inſtitution thoroughly con⯑ſiſtent with the moſt perfect ſtate of Li⯑berty that Human Nature is capable of [6]enjoying, and yet competent neverthe⯑leſs to fulfil all the neceſſary purpoſes of mutual Defence, the due Execution of all juſt and equal Laws, and the ſure main⯑tenance of the public peace. ‘Wonder⯑ful Fruits of Utility would this one Council of Alfred (or rather of Jethro) produce to the Common-Wealth’ (ſays the loyal Mr. Lambard) ‘if we would no longer uſe the ſhadow, but hold the ſub⯑ſtantial form of the true Tithing’ ^* In the Laws of King Edward the Confeſſor this mode of national Defence, by free popular Societies of Armed Citizens in every Diſtrict and Vicinage, is called "Summa et maxima Securitas," &c. ^† [7] ‘the Chief and greateſt Security by which all men are ſuſtained in the firmeſt State, viz. that every one’ (unuſquiſque) [8] ‘ſhould eſtabliſh himſelf under the Se⯑curity of a Covenant’ (or Suretyſhip) "which the Engliſh call Freoborhges," (i. e. free pledges,) ‘but the Yorkſhire⯑men alone call Tienmannatela, which, expreſſed in the Latin Tongue, is De⯑cem Hominum numerum,’ (the number of 10 Men.) ‘This Security was con⯑ſtituted in the following manner, viz. that ALL PERSONS’ (UNIVERSI) ‘of all the Towns of the whole Kingdom ought to be under a Decenal Surety⯑ſhip: ſo that if one of the Ten ſhould FORFEIT’ [viz. forfeit his Free⯑pledge—i. e. his Credit in that little Community as an honeſt and legal Mem⯑ber of it, probus et legalis, (ſee Magna Charta,) by which eſtimation alone his Neighbours could ſo far confide in him as to admit him into their Tithing, and had a right to expect from him a re⯑turn of mutual ſecurity] ‘the nine ſhould [9]have him to’ (trial of) "RIGHT," (or indict him,) ‘but, if he ſhould abſcond, a term in Law of 31 Days ſhould be allowed him: being ſought in the mean while and found, he ſhould be brought to the King's Judgement,’ (i. e. to Judgement or Juſtice in the King's Courts,) "and there, out of his own" (property,) ſhould make good whatever ‘damage he had done. And, if to this he had forfeited’, (or failed,) ‘Juſtice ſhould be done of his body. But if, within the aforeſaid term he could not be found, the Chief, or Head, for in every Freeborough’ (or Tithing) ‘there was one Chief whom they called Freeborough Head’, (Freoborges Heofod i. e. Head-borough or Tithingman,) ‘ſhould take 2 of the better ſort of people of his Freeborough, and alſo, out of the 3 neareſt Freeboroughs, he ſhould take of each one Chief and 2 of the better [10]ſort of people if he can have them; and ſo, the 12 being convened, he ſhall clear himſelf and his Freeborough (if he can do it) of the forfeiture and ſlight of the aforeſaid Malefactor. Which if he could not do, he with his Freeborough ſhould reſtore the loſs out of the property of the malefactor as long as any ſhould remain, failing which he ſhould complete’ (the reſtitution) ‘out of his own and that of his Free-borough, and ſhould ſatisfy Juſtice according to what ſhould be to them lawfully ad⯑judged,’ &c. Thus, all the honeſt in⯑habitants of every vicinage, being an⯑ſwerable in their own private fortunes and property for all the damages and de⯑predations of robbers, houſe-breakers, and other lawleſs ſons of violence, com⯑mitted within their own reſpective diſtricts, would, of courſe, be ſtimulated, by the urgent ſpur of private intereſt, [11]to yield up a ſmall portion of their leiſure to the neceſſary exerciſe of arms and training, for their mutual defence againſt every act of violence and injuſtice; and on this ancient proviſion of the Common Law was apparently founded the legality of levying taxes on the inhabitants of London and Middleſex, to make good the damages occaſioned by the alarming riots in the year 1780. We ought, therefore, by no means to repine at the late judgement of the Courts, whereby the Riot-Tax, to make good the damages, was deemed legal, even before the Act was made for levying it; but, on the contrary, to promote, as much as poſſible, a ſtill more effectual and complete revival of that moſt excellent inſtitution of the Common Law, that it may be conſtantly and regularly enforced (even in leſs and more ordinary caſes of robbery, houſe-breaking, &c.) for the immediate recovery of all damages [12]and loſſes by any act of violence whatſo⯑ever: the value of the damages ſhould be levyed on ten houſekeepers that are the neareſt inhabitants to the ſpot where the violence or robbery was committed: and if the 10 neareſt houſekeepers ſhould not be able to made good the damage, then 10 times 10 of the neareſt houſe-keepers, (or the hundred,) ought to be aſſeſſed, (and ſo on, if neceſſary, to the whole county, for ſuch was the an⯑cient uſage by the Common Law,) for the damage; whereby all houſekeepers would be prompted by their own private intereſt to aſſociate in arms with their reſpective neighbours to ſuppreſs every act of unjuſt violence, and to maintain the public peace.

In the various-accounts of theſe ancient Free-boroughs, or Tithings, they are ſometimes mentioned, as conſiſting only of Ten Men; at other times, as conſiſt⯑ing [13]of "ten men and their families" ^*: and therefore as all males, from 15 to 60 years of age, are required by law ‘to have arms and to be duly exerciſed therein,’ (which in a former Tract I have already proved,) the number of males in a Tithing of the latter deſcription would amount to about thirty, (the pro⯑per number for a platoon,) if the average rate of 3 males to a family might be ſup⯑poſed a juſt eſtimation, including ſons, lodgers, apprentices, journeymen, por⯑ters, and ſervants; though this muſt vary in different neighbourhoods, according to the nature of the trades and occupa⯑tions carried on therein, as ſome employ many hands, and others but very few.

[14]Archbiſhops, Biſhops, Earls, Barons, and other great men, having their own proper officers, Serjeants, Eſquires, But⯑lers, Confectioners, Bakers, &c. (ſee the 21 law of King Edward,) were ſup⯑poſed to have each a Free-borough within their own houſeholds, and were there⯑fore not included in the ordinary Tithings—‘becauſe they were a ſufficient aſſurance for themſelves and for their menial ſervants; no leſs than the ten were, one for another, in the ordinary Dozeins.’—See Cowell's Interpreter on the word Friburgh. This due ex⯑emption of the great men, from the ob⯑ligation of entering into the ordinary De⯑cenaries, I wiſh to be particularly noticed, becauſe it may prevent the oppoſition of ſome high-minded perſons who would think themſelves degraded, perhaps, by an univerſal eſtabliſhment of the Tithings. On the quotation, laſt made from Dr. [15]Cowell, it is neceſſary to remark, that the word dozeins is manifeſtly uſed for decenns, or decenna, and ſo alſo very fre⯑quently by other law writers, but I cannot find that theſe legal Societies, or Aſſociations of neighbours, ever conſiſted of dozeins or dozens, in the ordinary ſenſe of that term, though they are ſo very frequently called dozeins, merely, I pre⯑ſume, by corruption of ſpeech; ſo that the etymology of the Engliſh word dozen is not from duodecim, as one would natu⯑rally ſuppoſe from the modern applica⯑tion of the word, but from decenna and dizaine, the Latin and French appella⯑tions of the Tithings, which were regu⯑larly Decenaries, conſiſting of ten men; or rather ten men and their families, as I have before remarked. But, in the re⯑vival of Decenaries, which I wiſh to promote, the number of perſons in each Free-borough or Decenary, (whether it [16]ſhall conſiſt of ten houſekeepers with their families and ſervants, or only of ten men,) muſt be determined by the votes of the inhabitants themſelves in every neigh⯑bourhood, at their ſeveral General Meet⯑ings, Folk-motes, or Ward-motes; be⯑cauſe the ſervice muſt be perfectly vo⯑luntary; for, though the arrangement of the people into decenary companies was actually ‘ordained by the ancient laws of this realm,’ and was (and, I truſt, ſtill is) required by the common law for the whole kingdom, yet one of the moſt eminent common-law writers of his time (Mr. Wm Lambard) mentions the formation of theſe decenary companies as being the free act of the people themſelves in every neighbourhood: for, according to him, the ancient uſage was, that ‘all free borne men ſhoulde CAST THEM⯑SELVES into ſeveral companies by tenne in eche companie,’ &c. (Duties of Con⯑ſtables, [17]&c. p. 7.) and our anceſtors could not have had any more urgent in⯑ducement, to render this ſervice volun⯑tary, than what the preſent generation actually feels, viz. the neceſſity of ſelf-defence againſt rioters, thieves, robbers, and houſe-breakers; for, Mr. Lambard informs us, juſt before, in the ſame page, that ‘it was ordained for the more ſure KEEPING OF THE PEACE, and for the better repreſſing of THIEVES and ROB⯑BERS, that all free-born men ſhould CAST THEMSELVES into ſeveral com⯑panies, &c.’ ſo that the REASON of this law, on which the FORCE of it ſhould depend, does not only ſtill ſub⯑ſiſt, but is certainly as forcible and ur⯑gent as ever it was. And, though this excellent cuſtom was become almoſt ob⯑ſolete, through neglect and diſuſe, ſo long ago as the reign of Queen Elizabeth, yet, even then, it was ſtill conſidered as [18]a legal inſtitution, required by the com⯑mon law; and the renewal of it was re⯑commended as eaſy and moſt efficacious for the maintenance of the public peace: "whereof" (ſays the learned Lambard, ſpeaking of the ancient office of Borſ⯑holders, Tithingmen, &c.) ‘there is yet ſome ſhew or remnant in our LEETS, or Law Days: but if the VERY SUBSTANCE THEREOF WERE throughly performed [as I know no let’ (ſays that learned man, and ſurely ‘no let’ has ſince been ordained) ‘but that by law it may] then ſhould the peace of the land be much better maintained.’ (Duties of Conſtables, &c. p. 9.) There is no doubt but the effects would be as happy and beneficial as when the Tithings were firſt eſtabliſhed by Alfred; for, all the old Hiſtorians agree, that an entire ſtop to all robbery and violence was im⯑mediately effected by this regulation.

[19]In the Chronicon of John Brompton, we are informed, that ‘although laws in times of war are ſilent, yet King Alfred, in the midſt of the claſhing of arms, made laws, and inſtituted the Centuries, which they call Hundreds, and the Decenaries, which they call Trithings,’ (he ſhould have ſaid Tithings,) ‘maintained peace amongſt his own ſubjects, and chaſtized rob⯑bers in ſuch ſort, that he commanded golden bracelets to be hung up in the roads, divided into 4 ways, which might brave the avidity of paſſengers, whilſt there was none who durſt ſnatch them away:’ ^* and Speed alſo [20]tells us, from William of Malmſbury, that "His kingdom hee" (Alfred) ‘likewiſe divided into Shires, Hundreds, and Ti⯑things, for the better ordering and ad⯑miniſtring of Juſtice, and for the abandoning of theeves, which had for⯑merly increaſed by the meanes’ (the very cauſe which at preſent exiſts) ‘of long warres; whereby, notwithſtanding the multitude of Souldiers continually im⯑ploied, it is reported that a Virgin might travaile alone in his daies, through all his dominions, with⯑out any violence offered; and that bracelets of gold were hanged in the high waies, and no man ſo hardy as to take them away.’ P. 358.

The ten houſeholders or maſters of families, from whoſe preciſe number of ten the numerical appellations of De⯑cenaries, [21]Tithings, and Dozeins, are ma⯑nifeſtly derived, were themſelves alſo individually diſtinguiſhed by the title of Deciners, from the youths, journeymen, lodgers, and ſervants, that were in⯑cluded, and reſpectively pledged by the houſeholders in the ſeveral Decenaries.

A right underſtanding and due appli⯑cation of the term Deciner being neceſ⯑ſary, as I conceive, towards the pro⯑motion of a great national object at pre⯑ſent, the neceſſary reformation of popu⯑lar Repreſentation in Parliament; I hope my readers will not think it too tedious to attend a little to the inveſtigation of the word, that we may clear it from the indiſcriminate uſe which ſome law-wri⯑ters have made of it. ‘The Circuit thereof’ (ſays Dr. Cowel in his In⯑terpreter, ſpeaking of frank-pledge) ‘was called DECENNA, becauſe it com⯑monly conſiſted of TEN HOUSEHOLDS: [22] and every particular perſon, thus mu⯑tually bound for himſelf and his neighbours, was called DECENNIER,’ (more commonly, I believe, Decener, and afterwards by corruption Dozener,) ‘BECAUSE he was of one DECENNA or other.’—But this reaſon is not ſuffi⯑ciently accurate.—The youths, ſervants, &c. were all ‘of one DECENNA or other,’ yet were they not Decenners, though they were alſo mutually bound by oath for their good behaviour in their reſpective Decenaries; but thoſe men only were properly Deciners, who were more immediately reſponſible for all the reſt, by being the maſters of the ſeveral families, viz. only the TEN houſeholders in every TITHING, who paid ſcot and lot, and were anſwerable for the pay⯑ment of all national as well as provincial and parochial burthens: theſe only were the men, who had a judicial capacity, [23]and were called altogether by the chief Freeborg, or Headborough, on all occa⯑ſions to conſult and determine; on every queſtion, or extraordinary buſineſs, with⯑in the extent of their diviſion. All the individuals of the diviſion indeed were ſuitors in the Tithing Court, and might there be preſent, (as all courts were open,) and amenable thereto for offences; for the Decenna or Tithing Courts (how⯑ever inſignificant ſo confined a juriſdiction as a Tithing may appear) were of admi⯑rable uſe in promoting Juſtice, and de⯑ciding differences and quarrels amongſt neighbours. The learned Author of the Notes on Forteſcue, (folio edit. in 1741,) p. 106. ſpeaking of ‘the Court of the Free-borough or Tithing,’ adds, "wherein" (ſays he) ‘the Tithing-man or Headborough was the JUDGE.’ And indeed they are intituled, in the laws of the Confeſſor, JUSTICIARII, JUSTICES; [24]for ſuch was their juriſdiction and office within their Tithing. It is neceſſary, however, for the proper underſtanding of the chapter, wherein this is men⯑tioned, to be previouſly informed, that the Latin noun, Friborgus, of the maſ⯑culine gender, does not properly ſignify a Free-Borough, Tithing, or Aſſociation of ten men, but rather one indivi⯑dual Free-Borgeſs, of that Society: but, when the Society or Aſſociation it⯑ſelf is to be collectively underſtood, the word is generally, though not always, ^* expreſſed in the neuter gender,—‘Fri⯑borgum,’—as Dr. Cowel rightly ex⯑preſſes in his Interpreter, on the word, Froborgh, alias Fridburgh, &c.

[25]It is alſo manifeſt, by the explanation of titles given by the learned Lambard, that nine perſons of the Tithing were intituled FREOBORH, ^* that is Free-Sure⯑ties; "whom we" (ſays Mr. Lambard) "call frank pledges:" and that ‘the tenth man was called TEOTHUNGMON,’ that is, "DECURIO," (or Tithingman,) and that "others called him TIENHEOFOD," (head of ten,) and "others again Freo⯑borhes heofod," (Freeburgeſs-head,) ‘or Chief-Pledge.’ A compariſon of theſe terms with the terms mentioned in the old laws of St. Edward, N^o 20 and 32, and the relation theſe terms bear reſpectively to each other, will clearly [26]demonſtrate that the ‘Juſtitiarios ſuper quoſque decem Friborgos,’ therein men⯑tioned, were no other than Tithingmen, the Heads or Chiefs of each Decenary, who in Latin were called Decani or Deans—and that the ‘Decem-Fribor⯑gos,’ ^* mentioned in that ſentence, do not ſignify—ten Tithings or Boroughs in their collective capacity, (which would amount to a Hundred-Court,) but only ten individuals, the ten Houſeholders or Deceners of the Tithing, each of whom Mr. Lambard calls "Freoborh," or Free⯑burgeſs. This being underſtood, we may ſafely proceed to ſpeak of the au⯑thority of the Tithingmen in their re⯑ſpective [27]diviſions.—"Theſe" ^* (according to the Saxon laws, collected by King Edward the Confeſſor) ‘TRIED CAUSES among the villages and neighbours, and according to conviction’ (or forfeiture on trial) "took ſatisfaction," (or da⯑mages,) ‘and ſettled agreements, concern⯑ing paſtures, meadows, harveſts, as alſo litigations between neighbours, and innu⯑merable ſuch like diſputes, which infeſt the weakneſs of human nature, and con⯑tinually annoy it. But, when cauſes of [28]more conſequence occurred, they were re⯑ferred to their ſuperior JUSTICIARIES, whom the wiſe men’ (or national coun⯑cil) ‘had appointed over them, that is, over ten Deans, "(or chiefs of tens,)" whom we may call—CENTURIONS or CEN⯑TENARII,’ (hundreders,) ‘becauſe they had juriſdiction over AN HUNDRED FRIBORGS,’ i. e. an hundred Free⯑burgeſſes or Deciners).

Thus, it is manifeſt, that the Hundreders, or High Conſtables, were alſo Juſticiaries, ſo that every Hundred Houſeholders, throughout the kingdom, had a complete eſtabliſhment of Civil Officers, (i. e. a High Conſtable and ten Conſtables, all of whom were Juſticiaries within their reſpective juriſdictions,) to preſerve the peace and ſettle differences amongſt themſelves and their reſpec⯑tive families. And though each, or all of theſe officers ſat as Judges, or Preci⯑dents, [29]in their reſpective courts, yet their power was duly limited by the opinion and determination of the Houſe⯑holders, or Deciners, from whom the Juries (the real judges of the cauſes) were regularly choſen, and ſtill are, to this day, in moſt cities and trading towns, (as in London,) without regard to any other qualification than that of their be⯑ing houſekeepers of the vicinage, indif⯑ferent to the parties, of unblameable character, and ſufficient ſubſtance, not to be ſuſpected of undue bias; or, as it is expreſſed in an old form,—‘ſuch as be next neighbours, moſt ſufficient, and leaſt ſuſpicious.’ And in the act of 21 Edward I. there is an expreſs clauſe reſerving the ancient rights of Juries to cities and burghs. And, Mr. Hawkins, on mentioning this and another ſtatute, (2 Weſt.) remarks thereupon—‘that, neither by common law, nor by theſe ſta⯑tutes, [30]there was any neceſſity in proceed⯑ings before Juſtices in Eyre, &c. that PETIT JURORS ſhould be FREEHOL⯑DERS; and, if ſo,’ (ſays he,) ‘it ſeems probable that there is no greater neceſ⯑ſity that GRAND JURORS, making an enquiry before them, ſhould be FREE⯑HOLDERS; and if a GRAND JUROR before ſuch Juſtices need NOT be a FREEHOLDER, why ſhould there be a greater neceſſity that a GRAND JUROR before other Juſtices ſhould be a FREE⯑HOLDER?’ &c. Pleas of the Crown 2d book, chap. 25. p. 217. And he repeats this doctrine in chap. 43. ſect. 12. ‘That, at the common law, there was no neceſſity that JURORS ſhould have ANY FREEHOLD, as to inqueſts before Juſtices in Eyre, or in cities or burghs,’ &c. whereby the judicial capacity of the Houſekeepers or De⯑ciners, without any qualification as Land⯑holders, [31]is, I truſt, ſufficiently eſtabliſhed. We are miſled alſo in the ſenſe of the word Deciner, when it is applied (as by the learned Cowell) in a peculiar manner to the chief or head of a Tithing.—‘It ſignifieth,’ (ſays he,) ‘in the ancient monuments of the law, ſuch as were wont to have the overſight and check of TEN FRIBOURGS for the maintenance of the King's peace.’ But the Chief of the ten, as I have already ſhewn, had his proper titles of Headborough, and Ti⯑thingman; and, though each chief was al⯑ways a Deciner, as being himſelf one of the ten incorporated houſeholders, yet he had no peculiar title of Deciner, any otherwiſe than being the chief of the Deciners in his diviſion. The youths, and others, that were not houſeholders, were pledged by the Deciners, as appears by Briton, cap. 12.—‘Volons nous que treſtous ceux de xiv ans deſouthe nous facent [32]le ſerement, &c.—et velons que toutz ſoient en Dizeyne, et pleuys par Deſ⯑cyners, ſauve gentz de religion, clers et chevaliers, et leur fitz eynes, et femes.’—‘We will that all thoſe which are fourteen years old ſhall make oath to us, &c. and that all ſhall be in TITHINGS, and pledged by Deciners,’ &c. The law could not mean that all ſhould be pledged by the reſpective Head⯑boroughs alone, but, certainly, by the TEN houſeholders of each Decenary. And Dr. Cowell himſelf alſo, in the latter part of that article, ſays,—‘that DECENNIER is not now uſed for the chief man of a DOZEN, but for him that is ſworne to the King's peace;’ neither in this is he ſufficiently accurate; for the being ſworn to the King's peace did not conſti⯑tute a Decener, in the proper ſenſe of the word, though it included the perſon ſworn in the juriſdiction of a Decenary.

[33]The title of Deciner could not pro⯑perly belong to any but the ten houſe⯑holders themſelves, from whoſe number his diviſion was formerly called Tienman⯑tale, id eſt, (ſays Mr. Lambard,) ‘Decem⯑virale collegium,’—a ſociety of ten men. Nine of theſe, as Mr. Lambard declares, were called Freoborh, (Free Burgeſs,) i. e. free pledges, and the tenth was called Teothungmon, (Tithingman,) i. e. De⯑curio. Now, it ſeems the office and title of Decurio was uſed in Britain, long be⯑fore the Saxon Kings, by the Romans, as well in their civil as their military eſtabliſhments: and the learned author of the notes on the folio edition of Forteſcue's excellent tract, de Laudibus Legum Angliae, obſerves in p. 31.—‘that the ROMANS had their laws, in ſuch parts of this land, as they had their moſt civil government in; I mean,’ (ſays he,) ‘in colonies hither deduced. [34]For every colony was but an image of the mother city, with like holy rites, like courts, laws, &c. and for the moſt part with DUUMVIRI inſtead of Conſuls, and AEDILES and DECU⯑RIONES in lieu of a Senate: and it is clear’ (ſays he) ‘that divers colonies from Rome were in Britain, as at Ca⯑melodunum, now Malden in Eſſex, &c.’

The conſideration of this circumſtance enables us to propoſe a much more pro⯑bable etymology of the Engliſh word Denizen than what is generally aſſigned. Lord Coke ſuppoſes it from ‘deins nee, born within;’ and alſo from Do⯑naiſon, ‘becauſe the freedom is given by the King.’ But a learned writer (Davies) aſſerts, that ‘Denizen is a Britiſh law term, which the Saxons and Angles found here and retained.’ It could not, therefore, be derived from [35]the French tongue, before that modern language was known, or even formed.

Neither is the Welch etymology of it at all ſatisfactory, becauſe it ſeems very uncouth, and not ſufficiently ſimilar in ſound to the word. But, if we derive the word immediately from the Latin, it will appear moſt natural and eaſy, both in ſound and ſenſe; for, the word Deni, being derived à Decem pro Deceni, is a proper adjective expreſſive of its relation to the number of ten perſons in a Decenary; and, as the Romans had their Decuriones, and conſequently Decenaries alſo, a proper Latin verb to expreſs the initia⯑tion or introduction of a perſon to the privileges and franchiſes of a Decenary, is very naturally formed from the word Deni, viz. Denizo, which verb and its derivatives are frequently uſed by our law-writers, when they ſpeak of the admiſſion of Aliens to the franchiſes [36]of the native inhabitants; and, the ſaid franchiſes being maintained in ancient times by mutual frank-pledge in the ſe⯑veral Decenaries, it is obvious, that the participle "Denizatus," which frequent⯑ly occurs, and the derived noun-ſubſtan⯑tive "Denizatio," are applied in ſuch caſes in their proper Latin ſenſe; though the law-writers, who uſed them, have overlooked that moſt obvious etymology, which is confirmed by the ſound as well as the true Latin ſenſe of thoſe terms.

Lord Coke ſays ‘Denizen is taken for an alien born, that is infranchiſed, or DENIZATED by Letters Patent, where⯑by the King doth grant unto him, that in all things he ſhould be reputed, eſteem⯑ed, held, and governed, as our liege ſub⯑ject, ſprung up’ (from his anceſtors) ‘within our ſaid kingdom of England, and not otherwiſe, nor in any other manner.’ And he cites Dier, in the ſame page, 1 Inſt. lib. 2. p. 129. reſpecting this [37] ligeance of Denizens, ‘Ligentia Domino Regi debita, &c. Data (eſt) aut per denizationem, aut per naturaliza⯑tionem.’—When foreigners, therefore, were admitted to the privileges and fran⯑chiſes of Engliſhmen, they became the King's liege ſubjects,—‘eſſe ad fidem Regi Angliae,’ and were of courſe deni⯑zated, or admitted to be members of ſome Decenary, and would be ſworn to their ligeance in common with other ſub⯑jects in the court of frank-pledge; and if the denizated ſtranger rented a houſe, and payed ſcot and lot, and other rates, he became a Frioborh, or Freeburgeſs, having a right to vote for Repreſentatives in the national Council: ſo that Lord Coke was certainly right in uſing the terms infranchiſed, and denizatus, as ſynonymous: for the ‘renting of a houſe, at a certain rent, by the year,’ is the ancient legal deſcription of burgage [38]tenure. "It is called BURGH," (ſays Sir Edward Coke,) ‘becauſe it ſendeth BURGESSES to Parliament.’ And, though this is not the proper derivation of the word, it is certainly the uſage of borough, and as well as the right of all Burgeſſes.

"They that have tenements" (ſays Littleton) ‘within the Burrough (or Burgh) hold of the King their tenements, and every tenant for his tenement ought to pay to the King A CERTAIN RENT BY THE YEAR.’— 1 Inſt. lib. 2. c. 10. ſect. 162. The next ſection declares the ſame doctrine, concerning thoſe who rent of any other Lord. ‘And the ſame manner is, where another Lord ſpiritual or temporal is Lord of ſuch a BURROUGH, and the TENANTS OF THE TENEMENTS in ſuch a Borough, hold of their Lord, TO PAY EACH OF THEM YEARLY AN ANNUAL [39]RENT.’ Sect. 163. ‘And it is called TENURE IN BURGAGE,’ (ſays Little⯑ton,) ‘for that the tenements within the Burrough be HOLDEN OF THE LORD OF THE BURROUGH BY CER⯑TAINE RENT, &c. And it is, to wit, that the ancient townes, called BURROUGHES, BE THE MOST AN⯑CIENT TOWNES THAT BE IN ENG⯑LAND; for the townes, that now be CITIES OR COUNTIES, in old time were BOROUGHES, and called BOROUGHES, for of ſuch old townes, called BO⯑ROUGHES, CAME THE BURGESSES OF THE PARLIAMENT, when the King hath ſummoned his Parliament.’ Sect. 164.

Now, this deſcription of paying ‘an annual rent,’ or ‘holding tenements by certain rent by the year,’ is the pro⯑per diſtinction of a tenant in Burgage from a tenant at will, becauſe the latter [40] "hath no certain nor ſure eſtate," (ſays Littleton,) ‘for the Leſſor may put him out at what time it pleaſeth him.’ Lib. 1. c. viii. § 68. But very different is the caſe of tenants for years, (as Littleton remarks in the ſame Chapter, ^*) and thoſe perſons who agree with the owners of their houſes at a certain rent, howſoever ſmall, for any fixed time, if it be but for half a year, or even for a quarter of a year, are never⯑theleſs to be eſteemed in law as ‘tenants for years,’ (‘quod tenent ad terminum annorum.’ Lib. 1. C. 7. Sect. 67.) For they enjoy a free and certain poſſeſ⯑ſion to the end of the agreed term, ſo that their tenure is perfectly free; and they have ſometimes been intituled "Liberi Tenentes," and Freeholders, in contradiſtinction to tenants in villanage, though they are indeed freholders in a [41]very different ſenſe from the common acceptation of the term freeholder, now applied only to thoſe who are properly land owners; which would therefore be a leſs equivocal title for them; the others being alſo freeholders, or free tenants, though in a leſs durable tenure. But, their ancient indiſputable RIGHT, of ſend⯑ing Burgeſſes to Parliament, proves their freedom, as members of the community. In the Borough of Southwark, and many others to this day, the renters of tene⯑ments, or houſekeepers in general, paying ſcot and lot, are the Electors of the De⯑puties to Parliament; ſo that the doc⯑trine is unqueſtionable. And, in the City of Weſtminſter, and ſeveral other an⯑cient cities, the ſame RIGHT, by bur⯑gage tenure, of voting for Repreſentatives, prevails to this day; becauſe, all Cities were originally deemed. Boroughs, as being the habitations of freo-borges, or [42] free pledges, i. e. the aſſociated houſe⯑holders, who were mutually pledged to maintain the public peace, and defend and ſupport the due execution of the laws: and, if the right of voting were fully reſtored, throughout the kingdom, to all houſeholders, or maſters of families, who principally ſupport the burthens of the ſtate, even if the franchiſe ſhould deſcend no lower, it would be amply ſufficient, I truſt, to deſtroy the preſent deplorable corruption in the repreſenta⯑tion, or rather the miſ-repreſentation, of the Commons, and to reſtore the ancient dignity and freedom of Parliament; eſpecially if all the ſaid houſeholders were duly incorporated as Deciners or Free-Borhes, in their reſpective neighbour⯑hoods.

For then the number of Deciners or Free⯑holders in each county would be regularly known, howſoever much the numbers [43]of other males in the ſeveral Tithings might vary; and the advantage of this regularity of numbers would not only be the effecting a proportionable regularity of manners, but it would alſo greatly fa⯑cilitate the much wiſhed-for meaſure of a more equal repreſentation of the people; nay, the repreſentation may be made not only more equal, but moſt equal or per⯑fectly equal, if all Deciners in each county were allowed to vote, as unqueſ⯑tionably, in juſtice and conſtitutional right, they ought to do: for, the junction of ten equal hundreds of Deciners into one aſſociated body would form the court of the thouſand, well known in the Iſ⯑raelitiſh commonwealth; which, conſi⯑dered as a proportionable diviſion of a county, perfectly regular in numerical order, both of Officers and other Deci⯑ners, would much facilitate the conduct⯑ing and ordering of public buſineſs. [44]And two ſuch diviſions, of a thouſand Deciners each, would be a proper num⯑ber to ſend one Deputy to Parliament, according to the preſent population of the kingdom, ſo as not to exceed, but rather diminiſh, the preſent number of repreſentatives. Thus, a moſt equal repre⯑ſentation of all the families in the kingdom would be obtained; and two thouſand families (one with another) might well afford to pay ample wages to one Repre⯑ſentative; and the ſtipend might be very eaſily collected, if the Decenaries were duly formed and eſtabliſhed, and the ſeveral courts, which regularly ariſe from the Decenaries, viz. the Hundred Courts, and alſo the Courts of one Thouſand fa⯑milies each, above propoſed; and laſtly, the junction of two ſuch Courts of the Thouſand, for the election of one Repre⯑ſentative in the great Common Council of the Realm. The people, of whatever [45]parties, or ſeparate intereſts, might go up altogether with their ſeparate Tithings, or by their Hundreds, to the Poll Books, (in like manner as the ancient Romans voted by their Centuries,) by which means order would be preſerved, and no perſons would be permitted to vote, but thoſe that were known to dwell and reſide in the place, or county, where the election is made, according to an ancient rule of the conſtitution; ‘eligantur in quolibet comitatu per homines in eodem comitatu commorantes et reſidentes:’ See my Tract on Equitable Repreſentation, &c. p. 26 and 27; and alſo an Act of Parlia⯑ment there quoted, which is ſtill in force, 1 Hen. V. c. 1. It is therefore an act of groſs corruption, utterly re⯑pugnant to the ancient conſtitution of the kingdom, to bear the travelling charges of voters who dwell in diſtant places; for ſuch ought not to be permit⯑ted [46]to vote at all, except on the ſpot where they reſide, by which not only much expence would be ſaved to the Can⯑didates, but alſo much immorality, de⯑bauchery, and tumult, againſt the public peace at elections, ^* would be prevented.

[47]The number of houſes in England and Wales, in the year 1777, fell ſhort of a [48]million, as the reader may ſee by a much better authority than mine is, that [49]of the very able and ingenious calculator Dr. Price. ^* But, for the ſake of a round number, "Let it, however," ſays Dr. Price, "be ſtated at a million," (p. 14.) The number of Deciners, or Houſeholders, we may, therefore, alſo ſtate at one million: for the character of Houſeholder, without farther diſtinction, happily in⯑cludes all perſons of every rank and de⯑nomination [50]that ought, in ſtrict juſtice, and ancient preſcription of conſtitutional right, to elect and ſend their own Re⯑preſentatives to Parliament, whether as Knights, Citizens, or Burgeſſes.

The million of Houſeholders would form exactly ONE THOUSAND diviſions of one thouſand Houſeholders each, viz. 1000 Courts of the Thouſand, which I have before recommended from ancient exam⯑ple: and the junction of two ſuch Courts of the Thouſand, for the election of one Member of Parliament, as before pro⯑poſed, would form 500 Courts of two thouſand Houſeholders each, which would elect five hundred Repreſentatives for South Britain; a proportion ſufficiently near to the number 513, at preſent elected for that part of the king⯑dom; becauſe a reduction in number, would, perhaps, be more beneficial than otherwiſe; for certain it is, that the an⯑cient [51]Parliaments were not near ſo nu⯑merous as at preſent, even without reckoning the Deputies from North Britain.

This plan would indeed occaſion ſome variation in modes and forms, but no real innovation with reſpect to the national conſtitution; becauſe the right of election would ſtill be veſted where it ought, viz. in ALL the free Houſeholders, or Freo-borges, of ALL the counties; and that, in the moſt perfect proportion of equality that can be deſired; which ought ſurely to recommend the propoſal, if equal repreſentation is at all a worthy object,—if juſtice and right are to be pre⯑ferred to their oppoſite extremes, in-equity or iniquity, and tort, which have too long prevailed;—or laſtly, if we have honeſty or humanity enough left amongſt us, in the fear of God, to reject the evil and chooſe the good, i. e. to ex⯑erciſe [52]that only faculty, which materially diſtinguiſhes men from brutes!

Should we ever be ſo happy as to ſee the true diviſions of Tithings and Hundreds, re-eſtabliſhed in this realm, and the juſt reformation of Parliament (as here pro⯑poſed to be effected by them) actually take place by the eſtabliſhment of equal repreſentation, numerically exact, (which it really may be, if we have but common honeſty enough amongſt us to deſire and promote it,) there will be an admirable harmony in the ſeveral gradations and proportions of public officers, or ma⯑giſtrates, over the Commons of England and Wales, according to the preſent ſuppoſed ſtate of population: viz.

• Deciners or Houſeholders, pay⯑ing ſcot and lot, and mutu⯑ally pledging each other and their reſpective families and ſervants to the common [53]peace and common de⯑ſence 1,000,000
• Tithingmen or Captains of Tens, the elected heads of every ten Deciners, being Conſta⯑bles by the common law 100,000
• Hundreders, the elected chiefs of every ten Tithings, be⯑ing High-Conſtables, and Juſticiaries, or Juſtices, by the common law 10,000
• Chiliarchs, or Colonels, the elected Chiefs of Thouſands, being not only Civil Magiſ⯑trates, or Juſtices, but alſo the King's military Lieute⯑nants in their diſtricts 1,000
• Senators, or Repreſentatives, in Parliament elected ‘every year once, and more often if need be,’ in 500 courts of 2000 Deciners each 500

[54] But the facility of equalizing, and there⯑by reforming, the repreſentation of the people in the great national Council, is not the only benefit that might be ob⯑tained by reſtoring the ancient mode of government by Tithings, Hundreds, &c.

In all theſe various diviſions of the people, regular courts were anciently held for the maintenance of peace and right, and for adjuſting all differences amongſt neighbours, without expence; for, there was no cauſe or conteſt of ſuch magnitude and importance, for which a popular court of proportionable dignity could not be found in the larger diviſions of Wappentakes, Trithings, and Shires, to adjuſt and determine it; whereby tedious and vexatious lawſuits, and the ruinous expences attending them, were happily avoided. In like manner, the general Aſſemblies, or Congregations, [55]held in the gates of the Iſraelites, while under the theocracy, were eſteemed courts for juſtice and judgement; wherein preſided Judges and Officers, that were freely elected by the inhabitants of each city or diſtrict, as I have elſewhere ſhewn (ſee p. 3-5.); and the ſame reaſon⯑able mode of ſettling private differences, by the Congregation, (or Church,) was not unknown, even among Heathen Nations. The people of Epheſus, it ſeems, retained this ſalutary conſtitution of popular liberty, even when under the yoke of the Roman Beaſt; and had a power of holding popular aſſemblies, (called Eccleſia, or Church,) for reſol⯑ving difficult queſtions and diſputes be⯑tween individuals, beſides the ordinary Courts of Juſtice, under the Roman De⯑puties, for common offences. This ap⯑pears by the ſpeech of the Town Clerk [56]of Epheſus, (recorded in Acts xix. 37-39.) who, after he had appeaſed the tumult and confuſion of the people, that had haſtily run together, without notice or ſummons to ſpecify the cauſe of aſſem⯑bling; he ſaid—‘Ye have brought hither theſe men,’ (meaning two of Paul's companions whom they had ſeized,) ‘which are neither robbers of Churches, nor yet blaſphemers of your Goddeſs. Wherefore, if Demetrius, and the craftſ⯑men which are with him, have a matter againſt any man, THE LAW IS OPEN,’ (or rather—the court-days are held,) ‘and there are DEPUTIES: let them implead one another. But if ye enquire any thing concerning OTHER MATTERS, it ſhall be determined in a LAWFUL ASSEM⯑BLY,’ [...], in a lawful Eccleſia, i.e. in a congregation convocated, or called together, in due form and order, [57]by the proper officers; this having been neglected in the then laſt haſty and tu⯑multuous aſſembling of the people, which occaſioned the Epheſian Town-Clerk's harangue. So perfectly unexceptionable is this mode of determining private quarrels and conteſts, without expence, by a popular aſſembly, that it ſeems clear⯑ly to be pointed out for the practice of Chriſtians, in the commands even of OUR LORD HIMSELF, on the caſe of a treſ⯑paſſing brother. Mat. xviii. 15-17. ‘Go and tell him his fault’ (ſaid our Lord) ‘between thee and him alone: if he ſhall hear thee, thou haſt gained thy brother. But, if he will not hear, take with thee one or two more,’ &c.—‘And, if he ſhall neglect to hear them,’— [...], "tell unto THE CHURCH," (not unto the Prelate of the Church, as Popiſh writers contend, therein groſsly pervert⯑ing [58] ^*the divine command by their vain tra⯑ditions,) but, [...] "unto the con⯑gregation," including the Laity as well as Clergy. And the Apoſtle Paul re⯑proved the Corinthians, for carrying their conteſts about worldly matters ( [...], things pertaining to this life) before the eſtabliſhed imperial Courts of Juſtice, where unbelievers preſided; which conteſts ought to have been judged amongſt themſelves by the Congregation of Chriſtian Brethren, (1 Cor. vi. 1-6.) [59]But, after the general eſtabliſhment of Chriſtianity, in this or any other nation, the ſeveral popular Courts of the Ti⯑things, or Hundreds, or Thouſands, or Counties, duly convened, are the proper Congregations of Chriſtian Brethren for every neighbourhood: and, in ancient times, all thoſe courts, where the ſheriffs held their Tourns, (or rotulary viſita⯑tions,) took cognizance not only of [...], worldly matters, but alſo more eſpecially of Eccleſiaſtical Caſes, as being the FIRST, ^* or moſt important objects of their attention: for thus the order of caſes, falling under their cognizance, is ſtated (as Lord Coke informs us, 4 Inſt. p. 259 and 260) in ‘the Red-Book, inter Leges H. I. cap. 8. de gene⯑ralibus placitis comitatuum, i.e.’ (ſays [58] [...] [59] [...] [60]he) "as well of the TOURN" (before-mentioned) "as of the County Courts," viz.

‘Let the due laws of true Chriſtianity be FIRST diſcuſſed; ſecondly, the pleas of the King; laſtly, let the cauſes of individuals be diſpatched with ſuita⯑ble redreſs,’ (or "ſatisfactions").

The Biſhops, ^* as well as the Earls, Lord-Lieutenants, Sheriffs, Hundreders, [61]Aldermen, Mayors, Magiſtrates, &c. preſided in theſe ancient Courts of the Congregation, whereby they were enabled to enforce the ſaid "due laws of true Chriſtianity," againſt all offenders (whether Clergy or Laity,) through the united power of the Congregation, which regularly aſſembled at certain fixed places, and at [62]ſtated times; ^* the united power of many being ſufficiently effectual to reſiſt and humble the moſt audacious individuals, howſoever great and opulent: whereas, at preſent, the moſt bare-faced enormi⯑ties of immorality and irreligion are be⯑yond the reach of eccleſiaſtical correc⯑tion: the epiſcopal Authority (and more eſpecially that which ought to reſtrain the Laity) being reduced almoſt to no⯑thing, through the fallacious enervating innovations and uſurpations of the an⯑tichriſtian church of Rome, the grand [63]enemy ^* to the true limited Epiſcopacy. [64]For, the Popiſh Biſhops, by continually [65]graſping at undue power, at length ob⯑tained in England a removal of all ec⯑cleſiaſtical [66]cauſes, and religious queſtions, [67]reſpecting morality as well as doctrine, from the cognizance of our congrega⯑tional [68]courts of common law, ^* to their own conſiſtories, to be holden at ſuch [69] times, and at ſuch places, as they them⯑ſelves ſhould be pleaſed to direct; ſo that when and where were equally unlimited and uncertain! and the cauſes were then to be adjudged according to foreign Canons and Decretals unknown to the people! More effectual means could not be de⯑viſed for reducing the nation to the moſt abject ſlavery under the papal uſurpation! To accompliſh this baneful purpoſe, a [70]fictitious charter was produced, bearing the title of ‘Willielmus gratia Dei Rex Anglorum,’ &c. that it might paſs for a deed of King William, commonly called the Conqueror; but, even ſuppoſing it to have been authentic, yet, as it was nei⯑ther publiſhed nor known till near 300 years after the death of William, viz. not till the ſecond year of King Richard II. anno 1378, the invalidity of ſuch an inſtrument, to alter ‘the due proceſs of the law,’ muſt be ſufficiently obvious: at the laſt-mentioned period, however, this pretended charter of William was EN⯑ROLLED, it ſeems, FOR THE FIRST TIME, viz. in 2d Richard II. "BEING NEVER HEARD OF BEFORE;" as Lord Coke remarks; (4 Inſt. c. 83. p. 259.) and the ſame learned author has pro⯑duced ample proof from the Red Book before quoted, that ‘ECCLESIASTICAL CAUSES were handled in the TOURN,’ [71](the Sheriff's CIRCUIT, or circular viſi⯑tation of the HUNDREDS,) ‘in the reign of Henry I. LONG AFTER the ſaid ſup⯑poſed charter. And certain it is,’ (ſays he,) ‘that the Biſhops Conſiſtories were erected, and cauſes eccleſiaſtical removed from the TOURN to the Conſiſtory, AFTER the making of the ſaid Red Book: Ideo penes lectorem ſit judicium.’ It cannot, therefore, be denied, that this wicked, nay, I may juſtly call it, diabo⯑lical, encroachment of the papal power on the moſt ſacred rights of the people was effected (like moſt other innovations of the apoſtate church) by the help of an abominable LIE,—by a FORGERY, ſo groſs, and obviouſly fraudulent and falſe, that the ſucceſs of it cannot reaſonably be attributed to any other cauſes than (firſt, with reſpect to the deceived) to that kind of judicial blindneſs, which darkens the perceptions of all perſons [72]who neglect the holy ſcriptures, and "receive not the love of the truth," after being fairly warned, that, ‘for this cauſe God ſhall ſend them ſtrong deluſion that they ſhould believe A LIE:’ (2 Theſſ. ii. 11.) And (ſecondly, with reſpect to the deceivers) it may fairly be attributed to the conſequent preva⯑lence of ‘the working of SATAN, with all power, and ſigns, and LYING won⯑ders, and with ALL DECEIVABLENESS of UNRIGHTEOUSNESS, &c.’ (2 Theſſ. ii. 3 to 12.) a prevalence and ſucceſs which God permits in his juſt judgement againſt national delinquency; for ‘DE⯑CEIVABLENESS OF UNRIGHTEOUS⯑NESS’ are terms ſo clearly deſcriptive of the above-mentioned abominable cheat a⯑gainſt the RIGHTS of our congregational Courts, that "the Father of lies" may well be deemed the firſt ſuggeſter of it, as well as an active promoter: of its ſuc⯑ceſs; [73]ſo that his viſible partners in the deceit, and their church, (the power of which, in this kingdom, was then moſt eſſentially promoted by it,) muſt neceſſa⯑rily be ſtigmatized by their ſhare of labour and profit in ſo palpable a FRAUD: for as "no LIE is of the truth," (1 John ii. 21.) "the deceivableneſs of unrighteouſneſs" beforementioned, and its baneful ſucceſs, afford, as in many other inſtances, (ſome of which I have expoſed in my Decla⯑ration of the Peoples Rights, p. 127 to 135; afford, I ſay,) an unqueſtionable token of their apoſtacy from the King of righteouſneſs, ^* and of their conſequent fellowſhip with the Prince of this World, ^† [74]who "hath nothing in Chriſt!" (John xiv. 30.)

[75]By this miſerable forgery, the courts of the congregation in England were de⯑prived of the preſence and aid of their Biſhops in public judgement, ^* a preſence [76]and aid of the utmoſt importance to the [77]welfare of the people and of the whole [78] commonwealth, whilſt the people retained [79]any ſhare of their juſt and ancient right in [80]the election of Biſhops, but little to be regretted, when the Biſhops, through the total perverſion of that right, (by the gradual encroachments of monks, popes, and kings,) ceaſed to have that intimate connection with the people and their in⯑tereſt, which their predeceſſors in office were wont to acquire ſo naturally by popular elections. But the later Biſhops, choſen by the uſurpers of epiſcopal elections for very different purpoſes, and ſelected, for the moſt part, from the monaſtic or⯑ders, then falſely called regular, (inſtead of the regular parochial prieſthood,) did as naturally become the dangerous advo⯑cates for very different intereſts, the in⯑tereſts of their uſurping conſtituents, whether monkiſh or monarchical; and, more eſpecially, about the time of Rich⯑ard II. when the notorious forgery above⯑mentioned was committed.

[81]The courts of the congregation were alſo, by this deteſtable forgery, cheated of the power of excommunicating irreli⯑gious and prophane perſons from their own body or ſociety; a power moſt eſ⯑ſentially their own, but which, lodged where it is at preſent, merely with the Biſhops of a reformed Church, (who want it not for undue purpoſes like the papal prelates,) neither promotes epiſcopal dignity nor due eccleſiaſtical authority; becauſe eccle⯑ſiaſtical judgements and cenſures, by flow⯑ing in an improper channel, have excited, and ever will excite, the jealouſy of the people; and, of courſe, they have been generally thwarted and oppoſed in our courts of common law, (through a juſt jealouſy, in the courts, of the Biſhop's ſeparate conſiſtories,) and have ſometimes been reverſed and annulled with heavy coſts and damages againſt the eccleſiaſtical judge, or, perhaps, (what is worſe,) [82]againſt his executors and innocent family after his death; by which means, the neceſſary controul of vice and immorality is weakened, and eccleſiaſtical cenſures, howſoever juſt and proper in themſelves, are but too little regarded by rich and opulent offenders that can ſpare money for litigation; ſo that the public is grie⯑vouſly injured by infectious examples of depravity without any effectual means of reſtraining them. But, it would be far otherwiſe, if the congregational courts were reſtored to their ancient powers of acting by the common law, with cogni⯑zance of all cauſes, eccleſiaſtical as well as civil, which formerly they enjoyed, as I have already proved. For as law ‘was deemed the dictate of reaſon, ^*’ and "reaſon" juſtly deemed ‘a ray of the divine light, ^†’ common to all men of [83] common ſenſe, as being derived and in⯑herited from our firſt common parents, ſo it followed, of courſe, that, though many expreſs laws for particular occaſions and likewiſe various cuſtoms and uſages, proved by legal precedents, formed a part of our common law, (of which the reverend ſages of the law and regular ſtudents were, undoubtedly, the pro⯑pereſt judges, inſomuch that the buſineſs of the courts could not be carried on without their aſſiſtance,) yet by far the greateſt and moſt eſſential part of the common law conſiſted in the exerciſe of reaſon, duly to diſcern between good and evil, between right and wrong, between juſtice and injuſtice, in all caſes whatſoever, by the general principles of natural right, ^* and by thoſe alſo which may [84]be drawn from God's Revelation in the Holy Scriptures, which is declared to be the ſecond foundation of our law. ^†

And, as the members of a chriſtian community are required by the Scriptures to have their ‘ſenſes exerciſed, through HABIT ^‡’ or uſe, ‘to diſcern both good and evil,’ — ſuch aſſemblies, with the aſſiſtance of the ſages and re⯑gular ſtudents of the law, were ſurely competent to determine whether any offence complained of, or preſented to them, was really either immoral in itſelf, or a nuiſance, in any reſpect, to the com⯑munity; and, in either caſe, ‘the LAW will find a remedy, ^§’ be the particular circumſtances of the caſe ever ſo new or [85]uncommon; for juſtice ^* ought not to be foiled for the want of an expreſs ſtatute, or a precedent for proceeding, as at pre⯑ſent; ^† but the law is required to be [86] effective ^*, and all men, however great, were made to regard it by amerciaments, or mulcts, in proportion as well to the crime as to the wealth or ſubſtance of the offender; the contenement of the land owner being duly conſidered, the merchan⯑dize of the merchant, and the waynage [87]of the huſbandman. (See magna Charta, cap. 14.)

There is no poſſible caſe, either of immorality or even inconvenience, but what is within the reach and correction of the COMMON LAW; for, it is a rule therein, that "nothing which is againſt REASON is lawful; ^† and, ſurely, every thing that is immoral is "againſt reaſon;" and again, by another rule, ‘nothing that is inconvenient is lawful. ^§’ And eccleſiaſtical caſes were alſo particularly regarded by it; becauſe, whatever things related to the advancement of religion were, in law, deemed of the higheſt con⯑ſideration; ^‡ ſo that, if the congregational [88]courts were duly reformed and re-eſta⯑bliſhed, the juriſdiction and cognizance of all eccleſiaſtical caſes therein, according to ancient uſage, would not only pro⯑more morality, but alſo, by ſtrengthening eccleſiaſtical diſcipline, would really en⯑large the authority and dignity of EPIS⯑COPACY; and if, to this, the clergy and people were alſo re-inſtated in their an⯑cient right, as Chriſtians, freely to elect their own Biſhops, [duly obſerving the ſcriptural precautions againſt party divi⯑ſions and tumults, viz. Firſt, to elect two unexceptionable or blameleſs ^‖ preſbyters by the common ſuffrage of all the people ^* or congregation, (or, at [89]leaſt, of all the epiſcopal communicants in each dioceſs that ſhould demand their [90] right of ſuffrage,) and then, after ſolemn prayer, to decide BY LOT, before God and the congregation, the appointment of one [91]of the elected preſbyters, according to the authentic precedent deſcribed in Acts i. 15 to 26. the biſhops would obtain ſuch a natural connection with the people, as great popular officers, (which they would really be by a popular election, truly eccleſiaſtical, in the true ſenſe of the word eccleſia, or congregation, the ſureſt foundation for popular reſpect and autho⯑rity,) in addition to their proper dignity, as being of the higheſt order of God's miniſters in religion, that they would effectually become what the Common Law entitles them, viz. (not merely "robur eccleſiae," the ſtrength of the church, but in a more enlarged ſenſe of the word eccleſia, including our whole national community, or commonwealth, of Chriſtians,) "ROBUR REIPUBLICAE," the ſtrength of the commonwealth. ^* And, [92]though theſe antient congregational courts have unhappily fallen into diſuſe, yet the [93]law had duly provided for their continuance by eſtabliſhing an annual court, called the View of Frankpledge, wherein the aſſociation and due arrangement of the whole body of the people, in their proper decinal di⯑viſions, were intended to be completed [94]and renewed, one of the conſtant articles of enquiry being, whether the decenaries were complete. ‘Et fiant Viſus de Franco-plegio, ſic quod pax inviola⯑biliter obſervetur, et quod DECENNAE INTEGRAE SINT, ſicut tempore Hen⯑rici Regis praedicti eſſe conſueverunt.’ Fleta, lib. 2. c. 52.

Fleta in this chapter expreſly quotes Magna Charta, and gives a tran⯑ſcript of the 35th chapter of it, word for word, with very little variation, except what may enable us to correct the com⯑mon printed copies of that noble charter, wherein we frequently find the word "trithinga" inſerted inſtead of ‘tithin⯑ga,’ the proper word, which is ma⯑nifeſt from the various reading in Fleta of the ſame import, though in the plural number, viz. "decennae," i. e. tithings. The Engliſh verſion, commonly printed [95]in the Statute Books, has alſo, indeed, the word "trything" inſtead of tithing; and Sir Edward Coke, in his commentary on that chapter, calls the word three or four times "trithinga" though he has copied it right in the chapter itſelf. (See his 2d Inſt. p. 69.) ‘— et quod TI⯑THINGA teneatur integra ſicut eſſe conſuevit, &c. — and let the TI⯑THING be kept entire as it hath been accuſtomed to be.’ I have a copy of Magna Charta, printed for the Stationers Company in 1618, which has the ſame true reading ‘—et quod TITHINGA teneatur integra, &c.’ and this reading is ſtill farther proved by Sir Edward Coke's commentary upon it; ‘trithinga, or tithinga,’ (ſays he,) ‘is expound⯑ed for theothinga, which ſignifieth the Frankpledge of tenne houſeholds, &c.’ It is manifeſt therefore that the [96]maintaining the tithings entire is expreſſly ordained by Magna Charta; ſo that we have ſtatute law, (the moſt reſpectable ſtatute that was ever made,) as well as common law, to juſtify the re-eſtabliſhment of the tithings throughout the kingdom without having the leaſt need to make a new act for that purpoſe. It is already the law, and the ſheriffs and other ma⯑giſtrates, who do not inforce it, by hold⯑ing the annual view of Frankpledge for the legal purpoſe of maintaining the ti⯑things entire, as directed by Magna Charta, are certainly deficient in their duty, and ought to be duly amerced by the crown for their neglect of the moſt beneficial law, both to the king and people, that was ever made; and, the more eſpecially ought they to be amerced, if any riots or notorious robberies ſhall have happened within their reſpective juriſdictions, du⯑ring [97]the time of their being in office, becauſe theſe, in all human probability, would have been prevented, as well as the damages occaſioned by them, had the ſheriffs done their duty in completing the tithings, at an annual View of Frank⯑pledge, as the law directs. See the whole chapter concerning the View of Frank⯑pledge and other popular Courts, as in⯑ſerted in the common ſtatute books, 9. Henrici III. cap. 35. ‘No COUN⯑TY COURT from henceforth ſhall be holden, but from moneth to moneth; and where greater time hath been uſed, there ſhall be greater: nor any ſheriff or his bailiff ſhall keep his turn in the HUNDRED, but twice in the year: and no where but in due place and accuſtomed, that is to ſay, once after Eaſter, and again after the Feaſt of Saint Michael. And the View of FRANKPLEDGE ſhall be likewiſe [98]at the Feaſt of Saint Michael without occaſion. So that every man may have his liberties, which he had, or uſed to have in the time of King Henry our grandfather, or which he hath pur⯑chaſed ſince. The View of FRANK⯑PLEDGE ſhall be ſo done that our peace may be kept. And that the TRYTHING’ (for TITHING, as I have already proved) ‘may be wholly kept,’ (or, rather, be kept entire, or complete, which may eaſily be done, by means of the annual View of Frankpledge,) ‘as it hath been accuſtomed. And that the ſheriff ſeek no occaſions, and that he be content with ſo much as the ſheriff was wont to have for his view⯑making in the time of King Henry our grandfather.’ And perhaps the ſheriff's fees for this "view-making" would be the only part of the buſineſs [99]of re-eſtabliſhing the tithings that would need ſome new regulation.

The account of Frankpledge, given in Dr. Cowell's Interpreter, is worthy of being recited at length for the ſake of thoſe who cannot have recourſe to that work.

‘Frankpledge (Franciplegium) is compounded’ (ſays he) ‘of Franc, (i. e. liber,) and pleige, (i. e. fidejuſſor,) and ſignifieth, in our common law, a pledge, or ſurety, for freemen. For the ancient cuſtome of England, for the preſervation of the publike peace, was that every free-borne man, at fourteene yeeres of age, after Bracton, (religious perſons, clerkes, knights, and their eldeſt ſonnes ex⯑cepted,) ſhould find ſurety for his truth toward the king and his ſubjects, or elſe be kept in priſon, ^* whereupon [100]a certaine number of neighbors became cuſtomably bound one for another, [101]to ſee each man of their pledge forth-comming at all times, or to anſwere the tranſgreſſion committed by any bro⯑ken away. So that whoſoever offended, it was forthwith inquired in what pledge he was, and then they of that pledge either brought him forth within 31 daies to his anſwere, or ſatiſ⯑fied for his offence. This was called Frank-pledge, cauſa qua ſupra, and the circuit thereof was called decenna, becauſe it commonly conſiſted of 10 houſeholds: and every particular perſon thus mutually bound for himſelfe and his neighbours was called decennier, becauſe he was of one decenna or ano⯑ther: This cuſtome was ſo kept, that [102]the ſheriffes, at every county court, did, from time to time, take the oathes of young ones as they grew to the age of 14 years, and ſee, that he were combined in one dozen or ano⯑ther: whereupon this branch of the ſheriffe's authority was called VISUS FRANCIPLEGII, View of Frank⯑pledge. See the Statute ^* for VIEW [103]OF FRANPLEDGE, made anno 18. Ed. 2. See Decennier, ^† Leete, ^§ View [104]of Frankpledge, and Freoborghe. That this diſcipline is borrowed by us of the [105] Romane Emperours, or rather Lom⯑bards, appeareth moſt manifeſtly in [106]the 2d booke of Feuds, cap. 53, upon which, if you read Hotoman with thoſe authors that hee there recordeth, you will think your labour well beſtowed. Read more of this, viz. what ARTI⯑CLES were wont to be inquired of in this court, in Horne's Mirrour of Juſ⯑tices, lib. 1. cap. de la veneu des francs pleges, and what theſe articles were in antient times, ſee in Fleta, lib. 2. cap. 52.’

[107]The title in Horn's Mirrour is not, as Dr. Cowell has ſaid, "De la venue," &c. but "De Viewes de Franckpledge." See chap. i. ſect. xvii. This chapter con⯑tains many things worthy to be known, and which alſo relate particularly to the ſubject of this book, and therefore I think myſelf obliged to recite it for the ſake of thoſe who have not a copy of the o⯑riginal. In doing this, however, I pro⯑poſe to follow the common Engliſh tranſlation, printed in 1646, making ſuch alterations as a compariſon with the French copy, printed in 1642, may ſeem to require.

‘Of Viewes of Franck-pledge. ^* Of theſe firſt aſſemblies it was alſo ordained, [108]that every Hundred’-er ‘doe make a common meeting once in the yeere,’ and "not only of the Freeholders," (or Fief⯑tenants,) ‘but of all perſons within the Hundred, ſtrangers and denizens of the age of 12 yeeres and upwards, except of Arch-Biſhops, Biſhops, Abbots, Priors,’ and all ‘religious perſons, and all clerkes,’ (Clergy,) ‘Earls, Barons, and Knights, Feme Coverts,’ (rather married women,) "deaf" and ‘dumb, ſick, idiots, infected perſons, and thoſe who are not in any Dozien,’ (rather — ‘and thoſe who are elſewhere included in a Decenary’ — for that is the proper exception intended,) ‘to en⯑quire [109]quire of the points aforeſaid, and of the articles following, and not by villanies,’ (meaning villeins or bondmen, ^a) ‘nor by women, ^b but by the afferment’ or [110]verdict of TWELVE^c ‘Freemen at the leaſt; for a villaine’ (meaning a villein, i. e. a bondman or ſerf^d) ‘can⯑not indict a Free-man,e nor any other [111]who is not receiveable to doe ſuite in’ the ſame^f "Courts, and therefore it ‘was anciently ordained, that none ſhould re⯑main in the realm if he were not in ſome Decenny’ (or Tithing) ‘and pledge’-ed ‘of Freemen: it belongeth alſo to HUNDREDOURS’ (the chiefs of Hundreds, who are High-Conſtables) "once a year to" view^g ‘the Frank⯑pledges, and the pledg’-ed,^h ‘and there⯑fore [112]are the viewes called the View of Frankpledges;’ or rather, and for this are ſuch viewes called the Views of Frank⯑pledge.

"The Articlesⁱ are theſe."

1. ¹ ‘By the oaths you have taken, you ſhall declare whether all they, who ought, do appear or not.’ In the ſuppoſed Statute of 18th Edward II. before-mentioned, the firſt article is, — ‘You ſhall ſay unto us, by the oath that you have made, if all the JURORS that owe ſuit to this Court be come, and which not.’ In both copies the preſence of the JURY is neceſſarily to be under⯑ſtood, [113]as appears by the mention of their oaths, and of courſe we muſt ſuppoſe a previous ſummons or impannel, to be the foundation of the buſineſs, ſo that it now ſeems a very proper queſtion to begin with, as well at Views of Frank⯑pledge as at all other Court-Leets or Trithings, and, likewiſe, at Hundred⯑Courts, viz. ‘If all the JURORS be come, &c. and which not.’ — That the ab⯑ſentees may be duly amerced if they can⯑not aſſign a legal eſſoine or admiſſible excuſe.

2. ² ‘If all the Free-menk of the HUN⯑DRED, or of the Fee,’ (Fief or Ma⯑nour,) "be preſent."

[114]3. ³ "If all the Frankpledges" (or, rather, the Chief Pledges,l Tithingmen or Headboroughs) "have their Doziens" (Decenaries or Tythings) "entire," (or complete,) "and all thoſe" whom they have pledged.

4. ⁴ ‘If all thoſe of the HUNDRED, or of the fee,’ (or fief,) ‘of the age of 12 years and above, have ſworn fealty to the King;m and of the [115]receiversn of others wittingly’ or knowingly.

[116]5. ⁵ "Of all blood" feloniouſly "ſhed," [to which I will add a neceſſary article of enquiry from the imaginary ſtatute of 18th Edward II. viz. "Of" (any) "wound made" — "et de play fait" — (Edit. of 1529) — which in the common verſion is falſely rendered — ‘and of frays made’ — however, even frays, though there be no wounds in conſe⯑quence of them, may, as breaches of the peace, be puniſhed by the Common Law, which is competent to find effectual [117] remedies for all immoralities and nuiſan⯑ces,] ‘of hue and cry wrongfully leavied, or rightfully leavied, or rightfully lea⯑vied and not duly purſued, and of the names of’ thoſe who purſued; ‘of all mortal’ ſinners of all kinds; as of the principals alſo of the acceſſories.

6. ⁶ ‘Of all exiles, outlaws, waives, and baniſhed perſons returned, and WHO HAVE SINCE RECEIVED THEM, and of thoſe who have been adjudged to death or abjured the realm.’

[118]7. ⁷ "Of" Chriſtians (that are) ‘uſu⯑rers and of all their goods.’

8. ⁸ "Of treaſure trove," (i. e. found,) ‘wrecks, waifes, eſtreyes, and of every purpreſture and encroachmento upon the King,p or upon his dignity.’

[119]9. ⁹ ‘Of all wrongs done by the King's officers and others to the common people.’

10. ¹⁰ "And all purpreſtures" (or private encroachments) "in" (any) "place" (that is) "common," (or belonging to the public,) ‘in the land, or in the water, or elſewhere.’ ^q

[120]11. ¹¹ ‘Of boundaries removed to the common nuſance of the people.’

12. ¹² ‘Of every breach of the aſſiſe of bread, beer, wine, clothes, weights, meaſures, beams, buſhels, gallons, ells, and yards, and of all falſe ſeals, and of thoſe who have uſed them.’

[121]13. ¹³ ‘And of thoſe who have bought by one kind of meaſure, and ſold by another kind in deceit of merchants, or buyers.’

14. ¹⁴ ‘Of the diſturbers of framing lawfull judgements, and of the framers of wrongfull judgements, and of the abbettors, and conſenters thereunto.’

[122]15. ¹⁵ "Of every wrongful detinue" or detaining ‘of the body of a man, or other diſtreſſe,’ taking,r or arreſt, whether of body or goods.

16. ¹⁶ "Of every falſe judgement given," for the other view,^• (meaning, perhaps, a retroſpect to the preceding view,) ‘in the Hundred or Fee.’

17. ¹⁷ ‘Of every fore-ſtallment done in the common highway.’

[123]18. ¹⁸ "Of" all "wrongfull replevies;" i. e. either for regaining poſſeſſion of goods that have been duly diſtreined, or for the bayling, and ſetting at liberty, men that have been duly committed to priſon. This ſeems a very proper article of enquiry, though it is not obvious at firſt ſight how it can be deemed a tranſ⯑lation of the article as expreſſed in the French copy^t of Horn; but in the falſe [124]Statute of Frankpledge there is an expreſs article for it, viz. ‘Des gentes em⯑priſonnes, et puis leſſes ſauns garauntie.’ See N^o 32 in the Engliſh copy of 18th Edward II. ‘Of perſons impriſoned, and after let go without mainpriſe,’ i. e. without finding ſureties, either as bail for their appearance, or as ſecurities for the peace, and their future good beha⯑viour.

[125]19. ¹⁹ "Of" all "wrongful recouſſes," or reſcues.^u

20. ²⁰ ‘Of every outragious diſtreſſe in another fee,’ (or manour,) ‘or in the market for a forraign contract.’

21. ²¹ ‘Of all bridges broken, and cauſies, wayes, common bridges, and who ought for to repaire them.’

22. ²² ‘Of the makers of cloathes dwelling out of great towns in places forbidden,’ and ‘of tanners and of curriers of lea⯑ther.’ [126]This article is very different from the French original, as well as from Fleta, and the ſuppoſed Statute of Edward II. and it is not eaſy to trace from any, or all, of theſe copies what has been originally intended. Accord⯑ing to the old copy of the Myrrour it ſhould be ‘of the dreſſers (or patchers) of old cloths dwelling’ &c.^w as if the object was to prevent a ſecret vamping⯑up of old, unſaleable, or damaged, clothes in order to paſs them for new. In the articles of 18th Edward II. (N^o 30,) it is ‘of cloth-ſellers and curriers of lea⯑ther^x dwelling out of merchant-towns,’ which I ſhould ſuppoſe to reſpect rather [127]the markets, than the dwellings, of the cloth-ſellers and curriers, viz. that all wholeſale dealing in cloths and leather ſhould be at public markets, eſtabliſhed in great towns like the famous cloth-markets at Leeds and Halifax, and like the great leather-market in Leadenhall, that proper market prices may be regu⯑larly aſcertained and known for the common benefit of the manufacturers as well as merchants.

And, if this be really the intention of the article, it will enable us the better to underſtand how far a man was formerly prohibited from exerciſing two ſeveral trades, viz. not any two trades in gene⯑ral, but only ſuch trades as are ſo parti⯑cularly connected together, that the ex⯑erciſe of both by one man might, in ſome degree, affect the public markets, and (like foreſtalling) prevent the fixing of [128]regular market-prices; and even this limitation muſt be limited to ſuch trades only which may affect the neceſſary arti⯑cles of life; for ſo, I think, we may un⯑derſtand the examples recited by Fleta; "that the ſhoe-maker" (and, of courſe, all other conſumers of leather, the ſadler, the breeches-maker, the glove-maker) "ſhall not be a tanner," (for, otherwiſe, the proper market-price for leather could not be ſo eaſily aſcertained,) ‘nor the tanner a butcher,’ (which would in⯑jure the fell-market for pells and hides, and would give him an undue advantage over other tanners,) ‘nor the buſineſs of a taylor’ to be exerciſed (perhaps) by a clothier, or manufacturer of cloth, which would injure the cloth-markets; but of this laſt article I am uncertain; for I acknowledge that I do not underſtand what is meant by the abbreviated words [129]in the original, ^y and no article of enquiry ought to be formed on a doubtful queſ⯑tion.

23. ²³ "Of butchers," and thoſe ‘who ſell unwholeſome fleſh for that which is ſound.’ And tainted or "ſpoiled" (either through too long keeping or want of cleanlineſs^z) "for well-conditioned."

24. ²⁴ ‘Of all thoſe who ſell corrupt wine for ſound wine.’

[130]25. ²⁵ "And" (of thoſe who ſell) "beer" (or) ‘ale, raw, and not well brewed, for that which is good and wholſome.’

26. ²⁶ "Of ſmall larcines," or thefts, commonly called "petit larceny," when the goods ſtolen do not exceed the value of twelve-pence.

[131]27. ²⁷ "Of cutters of purſes."

28. ²⁸ ‘Of thoſe who ſuffer people to uſe any myſterie for reward or fee.’

29. ²⁹ "Of receivers of thief-boot," i. e. receivers of "ſtolen goods."

[132]30. ³⁰ ‘Of makers and haunters of falſe dice.’

31. ³¹ "Of outrageous tole-takers," i. e. thoſe who take more toll than the law directs.

32. ³² "Of all other" cheaters (or trick⯑ers) and "deceivers."

33. ³³ "Of all manner of conſpirators."

34. ³⁴ ‘And of all other articles availe⯑able for the deſtruction of offenders.’

"And the preſentments are to be ſealed" (continues the author of the Myrrour) [133] ‘with the ſeales of the jurours, ſo that none, by fraud, doe increaſe or diminiſh [134]them; and that which cannot be re⯑dreſſed there by theſe preſentments is preſentable at the ſhiriffes firſt turne; and thoſe things which the ſheriffes cannot redreſſe are to be preſented by the ſheriffes into the exchequer.’

[135] ‘All thoſe who are preſented for any offence which is mortall, and baniſhed perſons who are returned, and their receivers, and thoſe who are not in allegiance under the King, are to be ſeiſed upon, and their goods to be ſeiſed into the King's hands.’

[136] ‘And although it be ſo that the bailiffe cannot heare and determine any action AT THE LEETE,’ (in the original it is "A LA TORNEE,") ‘nevertheleſſe if any one preſent be grieved by any [137]wrong full preſentment, and complain thereof; or if the Bayliffe or Steward have a ſuſpition that the Jurours be, in ſome caſe, perjured, by concealing of any [138]offence which is preſentable, or of any offender; it is lawfull for the Bayliffes,’ (or Stewards,) ‘by twelve more diſcreet men,’ (in the original — ‘per xii. plus vaillant,’ "more courageous" [139]or "more worthy,") ‘to enquire of the truth thereof without delay; and although that the laſt Jurours’ ſhould ‘ſay that the firſt are perjured, nevertheleſſe be⯑cauſe [140]that no DECENERY’ (in the original, TESTIMONY) "or Jurour IS NOT ATTESTABLE" (in the original, N'EST ATTEINTABLE, is not attaintable) [141] ‘with leſſe than TWO JURYES, and becauſe the latter JURIE is not taken, but EX OFFICIO, of the Bayliffe, and not in the nature of an attaint, the firſt [142]Jurours are NOT to be taken ATTAINT⯑ED, but are only to be AMERCED.’

‘And if any one profer himſelfe to ſweare fealty to the King, he is firſt to [143]be PLEDGED in ſome FRANCKPLEDGE, and put into the DECENERY,’ (‘miſe en DIZEIN,’ placed in a Decenary, the French word DIZEIN, for a Decenary, [144]being manifeſtly the root of the word dozen, which now bears a very different ſenſe,) "ana" (be) ‘afterwards ſworne to the King; and then he is ſobidden to [145]offend and common’ (i. e. commune) ‘with offenders, and he is to be enjoyned to be obedient to his CHIEFE PLEDGE.’ ^*

‘And to take this oath in theſe VIEWS is none exempted who is paſt the age of 21 yeeres,’ (a tranſpoſition of theſe Figures [146] viz. 12, ^† is the number expreſſed in the original,) ‘man or woman, ^§clerke nor layman, except alliens, ſtrangers, meſſen⯑gers, or merchants, and thoſe who are in cuſtody.’

‘At theſe Views of Turnes, and Views of Frankpledges, ESSOIGNES HOLD’ ("TIEN LIEU ESSOIGNES" eſſoines take place, or are to be admitted) ‘where the abſence of thoſe who cannot be there is excuſable, and ſuch ESSOINES are ad⯑journable [147]to the next courts following, that the ESSOINERS have’ ("eyent" may have) "their WARRANTS."

Thus it is manifeſt that the law requires all perſons to attend the view of Frank⯑pledge, and renders them liable not only to the cenſure of that court, but alſo to be amerced if they neglect to attend, and have not a reaſonable excuſe, or legal eſſoin, to juſtify their abſence; ſo that, if ſheriffs and other perſons who have ju⯑riſdiction of leets were but convinced of the general utility of tithing-aſſociations, they have already ample powers to re-eſ⯑tabliſh them in their reſpective diſtricts. And if the whole body of the people, both men and women, were thus regularly and ſyſtematically arranged in their pro⯑per diviſions, all riots, mobbing, and il⯑legal obſtruction, at elections, and on other occaſions of popular concourſe, might be ^* [148]eaſily prevented, and the obſcure ſons of violence and anarchy might be moſt ef⯑fectually reſtrained, and, by the facility of diſcovery, be rendered "forth-coming," and perſonally reſponſible for all miſde⯑meanors, and even for ſuch impertinencies and immoralities as ought to be curbed: becauſe every ſingle unit of our national millions of inhabitants, together with his or her communication and manner of li⯑ving, might then be eaſily traced, as to a given point, throughout all the regular gradations of ſhires, thouſands, hundreds, fifties, tithings, and families, even to the very chamber of the ſculking delinquent. For, whether a country be more or leſs po⯑pulous, it makes no difference in the ef⯑ficacy and regularity of this ſyſtem, becauſe the propoſed numerical diviſions would ſtill bear the ſame proportions exactly, with reſpect to each other, in either caſe, viz. whether the people be few or many. [149]And the leſſer diviſions of tithings are ſo ſmall and manageable, that every indivi⯑dual, as well as every family therein, may be eaſily known and controuled by their elected Chief-Pledges, who, with their whole diviſions, are again included and controuled in ſtill larger diviſions, equally well proportioned, under ſuperior chiefs, or juſticiaries. And theſe juſticiaries in⯑veſted with ample power of law and right, are ſo limited, with reſpect to tort, wrong, or injury, that they have no authority to act contrary to common conſent, nor to pro⯑ceed againſt any man without "due proceſs of the law," though they have effectual means of information concerning the abode and general circumſtances even of the meaneſt individual throughout all the tithings by their neareſt neighbours and acquaintance. For, when the tithing are properly regula⯑ted with their ſuperior diviſions, each Ti⯑thing may truly be ſaid to be ‘as it were a [150]wheel in the middle of a wheel,’ (Ezek. i. 16.) and more eſpecially ſo when the ro⯑tation of watch and ward, and of other pub⯑lic ſervice, is duly circulated throughout all the diviſions of a whole nation; for ſuch "wheels" are indeed ‘full of eyes round about,’ (Ezek. x. 12.) eyes to convey information and complete knowledge in all popular concerns whatſoever, as I have elſewhere obſerved on the word che⯑rubim ^*, ſo that the moſt obſcure offender cannot eſcape the juſtice of the commu⯑nity, whenever he is duly indicted and ſought.

If this ancient form of popular govern⯑ment was duly eſtabliſhed, it would alſo regulate, with the utmoſt preciſion, the rights of all electors, and would com⯑pletely obviate the ſpecious objections againſt Parliamentary Reformation that have lately been publiſhed, in a little [151]tract, intituled "Thoughts on a Parlia⯑mentary Reform ^*;" for it would moſt cer⯑tainly afford the effectual means of main⯑taining perfect peace during the time of elections, and would render the polling of the electors, (be they ever ſo numerous,) not only practicable, but perfectly eaſy and free from confuſion, even if the li⯑mitations of the right of voting were drawn out to the moſt liberal extent that has yet been propoſed; even according to the [152] plan, which this author ironically de⯑clares, he "prefers to all the reſt," viz. ‘that of giving a right of voting univerſally together with annual elections.’ This is the plan, which, he ſays, ‘appears to be the moſt uniform, conſiſtent, and effectual:’ but then he quaintly adds, ‘it has, indeed, one capital defect, which is, that it is abſolutely and utterly im⯑practicable, &c.’

Now, if this was as true as it is witty, the ſtate of the nation would indeed be deſperate! for, if the "moſt effectual" plan of reformation was really impracti⯑cable, any attempt whatever to correct the enormous inequality, or in-equity, of the national repreſentation, and its conſe⯑quent ruinous venality and manifold de⯑ſtructive corruptions, would indeed be hopeleſs! and we ſhould, of courſe, be obliged to embrace this author's forlorn and diſloyal doctrine, (in p. 17.) which [153]may truly be ſaid to expreſs the ſcope and drift of all his arguments; becauſe they are, for the moſt part, deiſtically ^* found⯑ed, [154]not only on the like falſe idea of the univerſal and irremediable exiſtence and [155]prevalence of wrong in this world, but alſo (which is ſtill worſe) on the ſame [156]imaginary NECESSITY of yielding to that wrong, for the maintainance of govern⯑ment; [157]i. e. the deluſive and baneful doc⯑trine of a NECESSITY to ‘do evil, [158]that good may come,’ the common re⯑ceived notion of Deiſtical time-ſervers, [1590]who will not admit the true comfortable doctrine of God's immediate direction and [160]providence over all his works, and conſe⯑quently cannot form any idea of the NE⯑CESSITY [161] of doing right, and of being ſtrictly juſt on all occaſions, exceeds every [162]other neceſſity, and removes all difficulty from the ſoundeſt and beſt policy in the [163]government of ſtates and kingdoms;— "fiat juſtitia, ruat coelum." This gen⯑tleman's [164]abilities as a writer, his ready wit, and ſmooth agreeable ſtile, inſure a [165]ready reception of his ſarcaſms even againſt the moſt intereſting and ſerious [166] truths, I mean, with careleſs, ſuperficial readers, who delight more in wit, or [167]in elegant expreſſion, than in real infor⯑mation. But, with men of common ſenſe, [168]and common honeſty, it may be deemed a ſufficient anſwer to this gentleman's [169]ſophiſtry, to remark, that, in proving too much, he has far overſhot his mark, [170]and conſequently proves nothing that he has aimed at! becauſe his ingenious arguments, [171]againſt all honeſt endeavours to reform national abuſes, and againſt every plan [172]that has yet been propoſed for leſſening the corruptions of parliament, hold e⯑qually [173]good againſt having any parliament at all! and, when we find that this appa⯑rent [174]tendency of his arguments is not only a neceſſary concluſion to be drawn [175]from thence, (exactly what an opponent would wiſh to fix upon him,) but, alſo, that it is a concluſion expreſsly acknow⯑ledged, even in his own words, (ſee p. 17. that ‘thoſe, who cannot make ſhift with ſuch a parliament, muſt have none,’ &c.) we may fairly ſuppoſe, that he is not more ſerious in this than in moſt of his other poſitions, and, of courſe, that ‘the ſchemes preſented to the public by real and pretended patriots, that is,’ (as he ſays,) ‘by thoſe who have more honeſty than ſenſe, and thoſe who have more [176]ſenſe than honeſty,’ are not the only ob⯑jects of this ſubtle writer's irony, but that he meant equally to ridicule the whole pack of their yelping opponents, even his ſtaunch old friends, the pen⯑ſioned advocates for corruption and ‘good government,’ (as they are pleaſed to call it,) by ſetting them full cry upon falſe ſcents of untenable arguments!

But, if I am deceived in attributing to him a deeper "ſenſe," and more "honeſty" at bottom, than, perhaps, he is willing to acknowledge, yet I ſhould be ſorry to fall into the contrary extreme of imputing to him any degree of that unhappy diſpro⯑portion between "ſenſe" and "honeſty" which he himſelf, without the leaſt ſcru⯑ple, ſo quaintly and facetiouſly imputes to every other perſon that has written upon the ſubject! Common charity, therefore, obliges me to give him credit, at leaſt, for the honeſty of meaning well, howſo⯑ever [177]wide his arguments may be from truth and loyalty; and, as to his ſenſe, I have never preſumed to queſtion it, but only the uſe, or rather the abuſe, he has made of it; for, after all, my hopes of being pardoned, for the freedom of theſe remarks, muſt rely on his good ſenſe, and I ſincerely deſire to experience ſo notable an inſtance of it, though I am far from expecting the farther ſatisfaction of re⯑ceiving his thanks for my labour and pains in ſearching and propoſing an effectual re⯑medy to the "one capital defect" of his moſt eligible plan of reformation, becauſe a removal of this defect (in his opinion, it ſeems) would deprive the favoured plan of "its chief excellence," viz. its ſup⯑poſed impracticability; an excellence, how⯑ever, to be reliſhed only by profeſſed enemies to reformation and order! ‘To be convinced of the IMPRACTICABILITY of this ſcheme,’ (ſays he in p. 6.) ‘let [178]us but figure to ourſelves multitudes of all deſcriptions and denominations called out to exerciſe their right of voting, in⯑flamed by conteſt and intoxicated by li⯑quor;’ &c.

But it is more reaſonable, in the firſt place, to conſider the actual ſtate of things; "let us," therefore, rather ‘fi⯑gure to ourſelves’ (what is really the caſe at preſent) ‘multitudes of all deſcrip⯑tions and denominations’ actually ‘call⯑ed out’ (not indeed ‘to exerciſe their RIGHT of voting,’ but what is far more dangerous to the community) ‘to exerciſe’ the WRONG of preventing others from voting, by tumultuouſly ob⯑ſtructing every avenue to the poll-books, and raving with all the horrible malice that the devil and drunkenneſs can inſpire, that they may intimidate and hinder quiet electors, that really ‘have the right of voting,’ from "exerciſing their right!" [179]ſo that elections can be no longer free whilſt ſuch notorious menacing, and open violence, is ſo generally tolerated! ‘Let us,’ alſo, "figure to ourſelves" (for the horrible ſcenes have been too recently im⯑printed on our memories to be eaſily ef⯑faced) theſe ſuborned ‘multitudes of all deſcriptions,’ and beyond all deſcription, or of no deſcription at all, as much ‘in⯑flamed by conteſt and intoxicated by li⯑quor’ as they poſſibly could be, even if admitted to a "right of voting;" ‘weavers from their looms, and miners from tinneries and coal-pits; ſailors from their ſhips, and ſoldiers from their quarters; to whom we muſt add,’ (as the celebrated author has done,) ‘thou⯑ſands of thieves, ſmugglers, rogues, va⯑gabonds, and vagrants;’ and ‘we muſt add,’ alſo, ſelect troops of Iriſh chairmen from the environs of the polite gaming-houſes, and whole bands of jour⯑neymen [180]butchers, the very ſcum and offal of all the ſhambles brandiſhing their formidable cleavers! ‘I ſay, let us figure to ourſelves all theſe reſpectable’ hinder⯑ers and obſtructors of free election, ‘let looſe’ not only for "one day," but for many days together, ‘throughout every part of the kingdom, and ſuch a ſcene of confuſion, of drunkenneſs and riot, of rapine’ and even of "murder!" &c. "will preſent itſelf" (by due recollection of very recent facts, more ſtrongly than by mere imagination) "as muſt ſhock us," indeed, "with horror," and ought, there⯑fore, to convince us, that we already ex⯑perience the moſt conſummate miſchiefs and inconveniencies that can poſſibly ariſe either from the multitude or the mean⯑neſs of the perſons that uſually attend elections! What then muſt we think of the morality and patriotiſm of thoſe perſons, who regularly oppoſe every attempt to [181]reform theſe intolerable grievances and corruptions?

With reſpect to the danger which the celebrated author apprehends from all the rabble being ‘let looſe in one day throughout every part of the kingdom,’ it is a mere bugbear: are they not, at preſent, frequently ‘let looſe in one day throughout every part of the kingdom,’ even "one day" in every week? Nay, are they not at liberty any day, or every day, to be as "looſe," if they pleaſe, as thoſe haughty perſons who falſely eſteem themſelves ſo much their betters? and yet, perhaps, they are not more licencious, though certainly much leſs guilty, than their unprincipled CORRUPTORS, a great ma⯑jority of "the honourable gentlemen," as they call themſelves, who ſolicit their favour at elections, to whom all the mobs and all the miſchiefs, on thoſe occaſions, are chiefly to be attributed! for thoſe [182]men who bribe, treat, lead, and excite, theſe diſorderly multitudes, cannot ſurely be exempted, by their rank, titles, or fortunes, from being deemed a part of the mob, when they are notoriouſly the moſt guilty and vicious part of it, by being principals and movers of the rabble!

And ſuch men ſhould remember that the vile practice of opening houſes, for elec⯑tion purpoſes, is a ſpecies of bribery, not only the moſt pernicious to the people and kingdom, but alſo the moſt effectually degrading to themſelves; becauſe they are thereby abſolutely incapacitated, in law, to take their ſeats, (ſee note in p. 48.) and therefore all thoſe perſons, that may fairly be convicted of this moſt pernicious and degrading miſdemeanour, ought moſt certainly (for the honour of the houſe) to be ejected! ‘Let us alſo figure to ourſelves’ the preſent inconvenient and hopeleſs method of determining diſ⯑puted [183]and undue elections, and alſo the lamentable number of them, by which the precious time and attention of the great national council muſt be principally en⯑groſſed, to the manifeſt hindrance of na⯑tional buſineſs: whereas in ancient times, when general elections throughout the kingdom were ‘every year once and more often if need be;’ viz. previous to every ſeſſion of parliament, though the ſeſſions were held not only annually, but often twice, and ſometimes three and four times in a year, yet ‘there were not above two or three caſes of elections queſtioned, or complained of, for above 200 years!’ (ſee "the Legal Means of Political Reformation, p. 32 and 55.) ſo that a reſtoration of our ancient parlia⯑mentary rights, and a due reformation of modern abuſes and innovations, are unqueſtionably neceſſary to be demanded now that the exerciſe of our ineſtimable franchiſes are ſunk down (through the [184] enormous diſproportion of popular Repre⯑ſentation) to the very loweſt degree of poſ⯑ſible exiſtence, and that all our public circumſtances are really tainted with the moſt noxious corruption imaginable! ex⯑ceeding any ſuperlative of it that can ei⯑ther be expreſſed or even conceived! In ſhort, there is but one degree lower, in humiliation and baſeneſs, to which the na⯑tion can poſſibly deſcend! and that would be to adopt the wicked and diſloyal poſi⯑tion of this celebrated writer, viz. that ‘thoſe who cannot make ſhift with ſuch a parliament muſt have none.’ For to be contented, like him, ‘to make ſhift with ſuch a parliament’ would certainly be the loweſt degree of parliamentary corrup⯑tion; for it cannot deſcend any lower, as I have already remarked, without ac⯑tually loſing its exiſtence, and therefore the one degree lower would be to admit this gentleman's baneful alternative, the [185] having no parliament at all; which is cer⯑tainly the loweſt degree of POLITICAL SLA⯑VERY!

The neceſſity, therefore, of ‘a parlia⯑mentary reform’ is UNQUESTIONABLE, notwithſtanding this celebrated writer's "Thoughts" to the contrary; and the prac⯑ticability of it will be equally certain, if the conſtitutional remedy to the preſent national immorality and corruption is but previouſly applied, viz. a due re-eſtabliſhment of the ancient VIEW of FRANKPLEDGE, with all its juſt and legal uſages and appen⯑dages; for this is the true ſtate-antiſeptic which will ſicken the worms of undue in⯑fluence and put an effectual ſtop to their baneful progreſs on the vitals of the Eng⯑liſh conſtitution; eſpecially if ſome far⯑ther reaſonable and very neceſſary heads of enquiry be added to the articles of an⯑nual inqueſt, which I have already ſtated in pages 112 to 132, and ought to be in⯑ſerted [186]after the 33d article, (‘Of all man⯑ner of conſpirators,’) leaving the arti⯑cle, there diſtinguiſhed by the number 34, for the concluſion of the whole.

Item, (34.) Whether the ‘Elections of members to parliament have been free⯑ly and indifferently made without charge or expence,’ as required by the laws of this kingdom? See 7 and 8 W. III. c.iv. A.D. 1695. and 2 Geo. II. c. 24. A. D. 1729. What perſon or perſons have re⯑ceived bribes of any kind, or have eaten or drunk (the moſt pernicious participation of bribery) at the expence of others du⯑ring the time of an election? The penalty of receiving any "reward whatſoever" on ſuch occaſions is 500l. beſides an incapa⯑city from ever voting again: ſee ſtat. 2 Geo. II. c. 24. And meat and drink, entertain⯑ment or proviſion, are expreſsly deemed articles of reward in the previous ſtatute of king William. See note in p. 48.

[187]35. What attornies, or other perſons, have been agents in diſtributing money, or other reward of any kind, or in pro⯑miſing reward or emolument during the time of an election?

36. What public houſes have been opened (a term ſufficiently underſtood by the notorious practice of it) for the pur⯑poſe of influencing any election, after the teſte of the writ, or after the place be⯑came vacant? and who hath paid (or hath undertaken to pay, and is, directly or in⯑directly, reſponſible) for the expences incurred by ſuch public and unlawful en⯑tertainment? If the proofs on this head can be fairly traced, ſo as to criminate the perſons elected, they are thereby effectual⯑ly incapacitated from holding their un⯑juſtly-acquired ſeats in parliament, and by virtue of the above-mentioned ſtatute of 7 and 8 William III. are ‘to be deemed and taken no members in parliament, [188]and ſhall not act, ſit, or have any vote or place, &c. as if they had never been returned or elected members for the par⯑liament;’ and the act does not limit the conviction to any fixed period of time after the offence; ſo that there is ample leiſure and opportunity for reſearches on that head; which all true friends to the honour and dignity of parliament ought to promote.

37. What publican or victualler hath ſupplied ‘meat, drink, entertainment, or proviſion,’ during the time of an elec⯑tion, to any perſon or perſons whom they might juſtly have ſuſpected of not intend⯑ing to pay for the ſame at their own coſt and charge? For, in this caſe, the publican is as much a criminal agent in bribery, as the petty-fogging attorney who bribes with caſh, notes, or promiſes, and is equally liable to all the penalties of bribery.

[189]38. And what perſon hath made any diſburſements or expenditure whatſoever, either in his own behalf, or in truſt for others, or even promiſe of expenditure, or repayment, directly or indirectly, to promote ſuch diſhoneſt and baneful prac⯑tices againſt the peace and welfare of the community?

There is no doubt but that regular an⯑nual enquiries upon oath, in all parts of the kingdom, on theſe points, would put an effectual ſtop to the expences and cor⯑ruption of elections, and conſequently to the tumults and other immoralities of them, whereby the trite argument againſt the conſtitutional frequency of elections would, of courſe, be ſuperſeded; ſo that the ancient right of newly electing our repreſentatives for every ſeſſion of parlia⯑ment might again be happily reſtored, without either inconvenience to the elec⯑tors, or expence to the candidates.

[190]And laſtly, as the original intention of theſe legal diviſions of the people into tithings and hundreds was obviouſly for military, as well as civil, purpoſes, ſome other additional articles of enquiry will alſo be neceſſary to re-eſtabliſh and main⯑tain the ancient legal military duties of the people in a regular WATCH and WARD throughout the kingdom, in order to prevent every ſpecies of robbery, riot, or other violence whatſoever, by in⯑ternal enemies, as well as to be thorough⯑ly prepared, without the enormous and ruinous expence which at preſent is thought neceſſary againſt the apprehen⯑ſion of invaſions by foreign enemies.

That this was an ancient object of en⯑quiry at views of Frankpledge is manifeſt, by the article which I cited from Fleta, in p. 138. n. viz. ‘Item de vigiliis non obſer⯑vatis.’ ‘Alſo concerning watches not duly obſerved.’

[191]That the ancient and true conſtitution of the Engliſh ſtate abſolutely requires every man (the clergy and judges except⯑ed) to have arms, and to be duly trained and exerciſed in the uſe of them, I have amply proved in my ‘Tracts on the Means of National Defence;’ ſo that, from thence, it will be very eaſy to form ſuch additional articles of enquiry as may be ne⯑ceſſary to reſtore and preſerve theſe two great national objects, the general arming and training of the people to military ſer⯑vices, in WATCH and WARD; whereby the imaginary neceſſity of maintaining a numerous ſtanding army in conſtant pay (the moſt dangerous and unconſtitutional of all our modern innovations) will be effectually ſuperſeded, and, of courſe, a probable means and opportunity would thereby be laid open to a virtuous admi⯑niſtration of government (a title that will moſt certainly be due to any adminiſtra⯑tion that ſhall adopt and reſtore the juſt [192]and free conſtitution of tithings and hun⯑dreds in their ancient legal purity) of crowning their ſucceſs, in reformation, with an effectual reduction of the national debt and taxes, by means of the great annual ſavings that would ariſe from a proper gradual decreaſe ^* of the duties of our preſent military eſtabliſhments.

[193]The duties of watch and ward, or guard, were rendered light and eaſy, by [194]an equal ſervice of the whole body of the people "in rotation;" for which the modern term is "a roſter of ſervice." See "Leges Gulielmi Regis," as publiſhed in Lambard's Archionomia, (1ſt edit. 4 to 1568. fol. 125.) Statuimus, &c. ‘We or⯑dain that all the Cities, and Boroughs, and Caſtles, and Hundreds, and Wapen⯑takes, of our whole kingdom aforeſaid ſhall every night be watched and guarded IN GYRUM’ (i. e. into a circle, or [195]rather by "a ROTATION" viz. a roſ⯑ter of ſervice) ‘againſt crimes and enemies, according as the ſherifes, and aldermen, and magiſtrates, and our miniſters, ſhall beſt provide, by common council, for the welfare of the kingdom.’ And a little farther he adds, ‘ſtatuimus et firmiter praecipimus, &c.’ ‘We ordain and ſtrictly command that all earls, barons, knights, miniſters,’ (ſervientes or ſer⯑jeants,) ‘and ALL THE FREEMEN of our whole kingdom aforeſaid,’ (univerſi liberi homines totius regni noſtri praedicti,) ‘ſhall have and hold themſelves always well IN ARMS and horſes, as it is fit and right, and that they may be always ready and prepared to fulfil their ENTIRE SERVICE TO US, and effectually to act whenever there ſhall be occaſion, accord⯑ing to the duly which they ought to do of right (de jure) to us, for their lands and tenements, and according as we [196]command them by the COMMON COUN⯑CIL,’ (i. e. by the parliament) ‘of the whole kingdom aforeſaid.’ And this ENTIRE SERVICE TO THE KING, thus duly limited by the national COMMON COUNCIL of the WHOLE KINGDOM, was rendered ſtill more ſuitable to the dignity of a free people, by the ENTIRE ELECTION alſo, among themſelves, of all their of⯑ficers; not only of the tithing-men (who had the civil power of conſtables, and the military authority of ſerjeants) and of the hundreders (who had the civil authority of high-conſtables and juſticiaries, and the military rank of captains) but alſo of the viſcounts or ſherifs, and of the heretochii, the commanders or leaders of the army; "DUCTORES EXERCITUS." ‘The ſame’ (ſays the learned judge Atkins ^*) [197] ‘as in the dialect of this preſent age, may be called the lord-lieutenants, or deputy-lieutenants.’ For this the learned judge refers us to the law of K. Edward above cited ^*. This law alſo provides, in [198]terms equally ſtrong, for the general arm⯑ing of the people, as the act of K. William [199]does for "the entire ſervice of the king," ſee "cap. 35. de Greve." ‘DEBENT [200] enim UNIVERSI LIBERI HOMINES TO⯑TIUS REGNI, juxta facultates ſuas et [201]poſſeſſiones, et juxta catalla ſua, et ſecun⯑dum feodum ſuum, et ſecundum tenementa [202]ſua, ARMA HABERE, et illa ſemper prompta conſervare ad tuitionem regni,’ &c.

[203]That ‘ALL FREE-MEN OF THE WHOLE kingdom, according to their means, &c. [204]OUGHT TO HAVE ARMS, and thoſe al⯑ways to keep ready for the defence of the kingdom.’

[205]By the ſame law they were reſtrained from pawning their arms. ‘Non de⯑bent [206]illa invadiare,’ (i. e. pignori po⯑nere,) ‘nex extra regnum vendere, ſed [207]hoeredibus ſuis in extremis legare,’ &c. That ‘they ought not to pledge them, nor [208]ſell them out of the kingdom, but bequeath them to their heirs,’ &c.

And, to ſecure obedience to this law, all men, "univerſi," were obliged, one certain day every year ‘to ſhew their arms, throughout the whole kingdom, in the cities, in the boroughs, in the caſtles, in the hundreds and wapentakes of the kingdom, which ought to be done’ (ſays this law) ‘in the ſame day through⯑out the whole kingdom, leſt any perſons ſhould accommodate their friends and ac⯑quaintance, [209]with their arms, and they themſelves receive them back in return, and thereby defraud the juſtice of the king, and injure the king and kingdom ^*.’

And the ſame law alſo commanded a juſt and exact obſervance of the watch duty, which could be no otherwiſe, in thoſe ancient times, than by a regular rotation of all the people, in gyrum, as deſcribed in king William's law, and they were afterwards carefully to provide a⯑gainſt fires, when they returned home to their houſes. ‘Et ut WARDAE, (i. e. vigiliae vel cuſtodiae) juſtè et ritè obſer⯑ventur, et ut cautè deinceps incendiis [210]ſibi illic provideant, cum ad propria re⯑dibunt.’

The duty of watch and guard, by the people, was deemed ſo very important in ancient times, (and ſurely ought ſtill ſo to be,) eſpecially in towns and places of more than ordinary reſort, that the law prohibited the holding of markets and fairs in all places except thoſe that were duly encloſed and fortified, and, in which, of courſe, the inhabitants ought, accord⯑ing to the common law, to perform the duties of watch and guard, and be always prepared and trained in arms, as above deſcribed, for the entire ſervice of the king, in the true legal ſenſe of ſervice, i. e. for the preſervation of the king's peace in the effectual prevention of all tumults and riots; for aiding and aſſiſting the king's courts and their legal officers in ‘the due proceſs of the law,’ and for the effec⯑tual ſecurity of all peaceable traders and [211]their property. See Leges Gulielmi Regis. ‘Item nullum mercatum vel forum ſit, nec fieri permittatur niſi in CIVITATIBUS regni noſtri, et in BURGIS CLAUSIS, et MURO VALLATIS, et CASTELLIS, et LOCIS TUTISSIMIS, ubi conſuetudines regni noſtri, et jus noſtrum commune, et dignitates coronae noſtroe, quoe conſtitutoe ſunt a bonis praedeceſſoribus noſtris, depe⯑rire non poſſunt, nec violari, ſed omnia ritè, et per JUDICIUM, et JUSTITIAM fieri debent. Et ideo CASTELLA,’ (not private caſtles, but ſuch only as had a re⯑gular eſtabliſhment of civil magiſtrates,) ‘et burgi, et civitates ſunt et fundatoe et oedificatoe, ſcilicet, ad tuitionem gentium et populorum regni, et ad defenſionem regni, et idcirco obſervari debent cum omni libertate, et integritate, et ratione.’ ‘Alſo no MARKET or FAIR may be, nor may be permitted to be, except in the ci⯑ties of our kingdom, and in encloſed bo⯑roughs, [212]fenced with a wall, and in caſtles, and moſt ſecure places, where the uſages of our kingdom,’ (ſo that private caſtles cannot here be meant, but ſuch caſtles only as were governed by regular magiſtrates, according to the common law, as New⯑caſtle, Cheſter, Rocheſter, Colcheſter, Ci⯑renceſter, Biceſter, &c.) ‘and our com⯑mon law and the dignities of our crown, &c. may not be loſt nor defrauded, nor violated; but all things ought to be done in due form, and by JUDGEMENT and JUSTICE. And, for this cauſe, caſtles,’ (hereby manifeſtly intending ſuch caſtles only as I have deſcribed,) ‘and boroughs, and cities, are eſtabliſhed and built, viz. for the ſecurity of nations and people, and for the defence of a kingdom, and there⯑fore they ought to be maintained with all liberty, integrity, and reaſon.’ Thus every city, town, and borough, was ſup⯑poſed to contain, within itſelf, a com⯑plete [213]eſtabliſhment for maintaining the common law, and the dignities of the crown, and for doing all things in due form, and by JUDGEMENT and JUSTICE, which certainly could not, in any other way, be effected, than by theſe numerical diviſions of the people; in which the magiſtracy was always duly proportioned to the number of inhabitants, ſo that whether they were many or few, they were all equally ma⯑nageable. And the rotation of duty, by being regularly circulated amongſt all men, was reduced and rendered eaſy to all. The cities of the Iſraelites under the theocracy had the ſame proportion of magiſtrates exactly which our common law requires, and alſo regular rotations of public ſer⯑vice; but it does not appear that they had our happy conſtitution of juries, where⯑by unexceptionable and impartial perſons from among the people, that are neighbours to the parties and the facts, in every cauſe, [214]are appointed the LEGAL JUDGES of it. Had this indiſpenſable conſtitution been a part of their law, as it is of ours, it is probable they would not ſo ſoon have fallen away from juſtice and judgement: for they had no ſufficient guard againſt partiality. If a man was accuſed, he had no right to reject the magiſtrate from being his judge, even though he knew him to be his enemy, or the friend and favourer of his accuſer: whereas in Eng⯑land, a man may challenge and reject 35 jurymen, if he thinks fit, p [...]evious to the trial of a charge of treaſon, and 20 jurymen previous to trials for any other felonies, without aſſigning any reaſon againſt them, which is called peremptory challenge; and he may challenge as many more as he can produce juſt and legal exceptions againſt, which is called "challenge with cauſe." The total want of this juſt regulation laid the magiſtrates of the Iſraelitiſh cities more [215]open to the temptation of bribery than they would otherwiſe have been; and after⯑wards, under the monarchy, when theſe heads of thouſands were appointed by the king, inſtead of the people, the want of juries became ſtill more apparent; for, if the proceſs againſt any man was di⯑rected by the king's letters, or under his ſeal, as in the caſe of Naboth, the judges were tempted to preſerve only the mere outward form of the law, without the ſpirit and intention of it: they would not condemn indeed without a legal number of witneſſes were ſet up to accuſe, but then there was no jury to determine whether or not theſe accuſers were credible wit⯑neſſes, which the law equally required at that time, as it does at preſent. But in every other reſpect the government of the Iſraelitiſh cities ſeems (as I have ſaid) to have been ſimilar to what our common law requires. The Rev. Dr. Sam. Croxall, [216]formerly archdeacon of Salop, has drawn up an account of the Rulers of Cities ^* in [217]Iſrael, ready to my hand, which is ſo ſui⯑table to my preſent purpoſe, that I ſhould [218]do injuſtice to the ſubject, if I neglected to give my readers ſome extracts of it in the author's own words.

[219]The military duties of watch and guard in cities, towns, &c. which by the laws [220]of K. William I. were ordered to be per⯑formed "in gyrum," i. e. in due rotation [221]of ſervice by all the inhabitants, as I have already ſhewn, were farther regulated by [222]the ſtatute of Wincheſter, in the 13th K. Edw. I. A. D. 1285. which, without altering the former law about rotation, ſpecifies the ſtrength of the guard to be ſet in each place, and ordains (for I will cite it as abbreviated by Mr. Lambard in his "Duties of Conſtables," p. 13. which proves that he thought it ſtill in force ſo late as the reign of Q. Elizabeth in 1584.) that ‘NIGHT WATCHES ſhould be kept yearly, from the feaſt of the ASCENTION, [223] untill MICHAELMAS, by ſix men at everie gate of everie CITIE, by 12 men in everie BOROUGH towne, and in every other TOWNE by ſix men, or four men, or according to the number of inhabitants in the towne, all the night long, from ſunne ſetting to ſunne riſing: ſo that if any ſtranger did paſſe, he ſhould be ar⯑reſted till the morning, and then ſet at large, (if no ſuſpicion were found of him,) but if any ſuſpicion fel out againſt him, then he ſhould be impriſoned till he might be lawfully delivered. And of theſe WATCHES’ (ſays Mr. Lambard) ‘the officers before named have the charge within the limites (or places) of their auctorities, as the CONSTABLE in his town, the BORSHOLDER in his boroe, and the HIGH CONSTABLE within all his HUNDRED: and theſe officers ought to ſee theſe WATCHES’ (ſays Mr. Lam⯑bard, by which he plainly inſiſts on the con⯑tinued [224]force of this ſtatute, ſo that the enquiry concerning WATCH DUTY at views of Frankpledge ought to be regu⯑lated by it) ‘duly ſet and kept, and ought alſo to cauſe HUE and CRIE ^* to be rayſed after ſuch as will not obey the ARREST of ſuch watchmen.’ This power of ARRESTING ſuſpicious perſons in all towns and boroughs; ſhews the ne⯑ceſſity [225]of having in each town and bo⯑rough a proper GOAL or appointed place of confinement; eſpecially as the common law required ‘that if any man was of ſo evil credit, that he could not get him⯑ſelfe to be received into one of theſe TY⯑THINGS or BOROES, that then hee ſhould be ſhut up in PRISON, as a man un⯑worthie to live at liberty amongſt men abroad.’ (Lambard's Duties of Con⯑ſtables, p. 8.) And the expences neceſ⯑ſary for the building and maintaining ſuch proper places of confinement might be levied by the COURT LEET on the in⯑habitants of each diſtrict; for the LEET has competent power, according to the common law, to levy taxes for defraying all neceſſary public works ^*: ſo that the [226]modern uſage of applying to the great national council on ſuch occaſions is clear⯑ly [227] wrong; becauſe it not only occaſions a needleſs expence, interferes with more important buſineſs of the nation, and grievouſly prolongs the ſittings of parlia⯑ment, but alſo tends to enure the mem⯑bers to private ſolicitations in behalf of partial objects; facilitates the practice of canvaſſing them individually; and thereby lays them open to influence and tempta⯑tion in higher matters: whereas frequent but SHORT SESSIONS of newly elected parliaments, like thoſe of ancient times, would effectually cut up the roots of cor⯑ruption and undue influence.

In order the more effectually to pro⯑mote the happy ſyſtem of government, [228]which I now recommend, viz. that ‘ALL freeborne men’ (within this kingdom) "ſhoulde caſt themſelves into TITHINGS," (ſee p. 16 and 17.) for the common ſe⯑curity of ALL, it was ordained by king William I. ‘Ut OMNES habeant et teneant LEGEM REGIS EDWARDI in omnibus rebus adauctis his quae conſtituimus’ (ſays the ſtatute of William) ‘ad utilitatem Anglorum.’ ‘That ALL PERSONS ſhould have and hold THE LAW of king Edward’ (wherein the more ancient laws for maintaining the tithings and hundreds are collected and ſtated) ‘in all things, thoſe things being alſo added which we have ordained’ (ſaid William) "for the uſe of the Engliſh." And no free nation could reaſonably deſire more ſub⯑ſtantial and effectual additions for the ſe⯑curity of their own peace and liberty than thoſe additional laws of William, moſt [229]of which I have already cited ^*. To theſe I muſt now add a farther excellent clauſe of K. William's ſtatute ^†, which is ne⯑ceſſary [230]for the better enforcing and pro⯑moting K. Edward's laws, viz. that ‘every man who ſhall be willing TO BE DEEM⯑ED A FREEMAN ſhall be IN PLEDGE,’ (ſhall enter himſelf into ſome tithing of FRANKPLEDGE,) ‘that the pledge may have him to juſtice, if in any thing he ſhould offend; and if any of ſuch’ (pledg⯑ed perſons) ‘ſhould abſcond, that the pledges may pay whatſoever damages are laid,’ (or rather are proved,) ‘and may clear themſelves, that they knew’ (or were privy to) ‘no fraud in the ab⯑ſconded perſon. Let the HUNDRED’ (court) "be demanded" (or ſummoned) [231]"and the COUNTY" (court) ‘and thoſe who ought of right to attend’ (at either of theſe courts, as the context requires us to underſtand) ‘and ſhall be unwilling, let them be ſummoned ONCE; and, if to a SECOND’ (ſummons) ‘they ſhall not come, let ONE OX be taken,’ (or per⯑haps the medium value of one ox, at the current market-price, for thus the quan⯑tum of the forfeit would generally bear a due proportion, or nearly ſo, to the true value of money; as college-rents are ſometimes aſcertained by the value of certain quantities of corn,) ‘and, if to a THIRD’ (ſummons he ſhall not come, let) "another ox" (be taken,) ‘and, if to a FOURTH’ (ſummons they ſhall not come,) ‘let what is rated be paid out of the effects of this man, which is called CEAPGYLD ^*, or ORF⯑GYLD^*.’ [232]Regular ſummonſes, however, were required by law, to be made ſeven days before any of theſe courts, unleſs a legal and admiſſable excuſe could be aſ⯑ſigned for the omiſſion, (‘et ſeptem diebus antea SUMMONIRI, niſi publicum com⯑modum vel dominica regis neceſſitas ter⯑minum praeveniat,’ ſee K. Edward's law de Heretochiis, &c.) And a neglect or diſregard of a legal ſummons to a court of law might ſurely be deemed a contempt of the law, the declared penalties for which (a ſingle or double forfeiture of the man's WERE^†) may perhaps help to explain [233]the nature of the amerciaments mention⯑ed above for neglect of ſummonſes. ‘Et qui leges apoſtabit, (i. e. violarit,) ſi fuerit [234]Anglicus, vel Dacus, vel Waliſcus, vel Albanicus, vel inſulicola, WERAE ſuae reus ſit apud regem; et, ſi SECUNDO id faciat, reddat BIS WERAM SUAM; et, ſi quid addat TERTIO, reus ſit omnium quae habebit.’ ^*

To increaſe amerciaments on the repe⯑tition of offences ſeems to be both juſt and neceſſary; but, whether in ſo enlarged a proportion as that of doubling the Were for a ſecond conviction, and forfeiting all on a third, may reaſonably be queſtioned; eſpecially as there is no expreſs exception for ſecond and third offences in the limi⯑tation of americaments ordained by the 14th chapter of magna charta. Nevertheleſs, if we conſider that a frequent repetition of the ſame miſdemeanor is undoubtedly a [235] heinous aggravation of it, and that it was always ſo conſidered in the common law, and puniſhed accordingly by an aggra⯑vation of the mulct, as appears by the laws already cited, we ſhall, perhaps, be in⯑clined to believe, that the authors of the ſaid limitation of mulcts in Magna Charta, though they certainly intended to regu⯑late by it the pecuniary penalties of crimes in general, yet, (for any thing that appears,) they had not in contemplation the peculiar circumſtance of a contemptuous repetition of any crime, and may there⯑fore be juſtly ſuppoſed not to have intend⯑ed to abridge the ſalutary ſpirit of the common law, ſo neceſſary for its own pre⯑ſervation, in duly puniſhing, by gradual advances of ſeverity, any repeated contempts of its authority.

If all theſe points be duly conſidered, it muſt appear that our common law is al⯑ready veſted with ample powers to enforce a revival of the ancient conſtitution of this [236]kingdom; ſo that nothing is wanting but a general communication of its principles (the purpoſe of this tract) to engage THE WILL OF THE PUBLIC for its re-aſſumption; that the ‘SUMMA ET MAXIMA SECURI⯑TAS’ of our anceſtors (ſee p. 6.) may be once more eſtabliſhed, the happy ef⯑fects of which cannot be expreſſed in ſtronger terms than in the words of Sir Edw. Coke on this very ſubject. ‘By the due execution of this law,’ (ſays he, ſpeaking of the VIEW of FRANKPLEDGE, in his comment on Magna Charta, p. 73. 2d inſt.) ‘ſuch peace (whereof this chap⯑ter ſpeaketh) was univerſally holden within this realme, as no injuries, homi⯑cides, robberies, thefts, riots, tumults, or other offences, were committed; ſo as a man with a white wand might ſafely have ridden, before the conqueſt, with much money about him, without any wea⯑pon throughout England; and one ſaith [237]truly,^‡conjectur a eſt, eaque non levis, haud it a multis ſcatuiſſe priſca tempora ſceleribus, quippe quibus rapinae, furto, coedi ^*, plu⯑rimiſque [238]aliis ſceleribus mulctae impone⯑bantur [239]pecuniariae, cum hiis hac noſtra [240]tempeſtate,’ (as for inſtance, 15 men hanged up together upon one gallows at Newgate the very laſt execution-day!!!) ‘nos omnibus merito capitis poenam ir⯑rogamus, &c.’ 2d Inſt. p. 73.

‘Mos retinendus eſt fideliſſimae vetuſ⯑tatis.’ 4 co. 78.

TRACT, Number II.
An ABSTRACT from the preceding Account of the Hundreds and Tithings, preſented by the author to the com⯑mittee of delegates from the ſeveral counties, &c. and entituled ‘A PROPOSAL For removing the enormous diſproportion of popular repreſentation enjoyed by the corrupt and venal boroughs: which Boroughs are now veſted or monopoli⯑zed, in the hands of a few individuals, as private property; a property avowedly eſtimated by the value of the ſeats in par⯑liament, (inſtead of the only lawful pro⯑perty therein, the real rentals of the tene⯑ments,) and, at that unlawful and ex⯑orbitant eſtimation, notoriouſly bought and ſold, to the diſgrace and perverſion of parliamentary authority.’

[243] THE preſent great national evil, the notorious miſrepreſentation of the commons in parliament, cannot ſafely be remedied or altered for the purpoſe of amendment, by any other mode than that of reverting back to the firſt prin⯑ciples of the conſtitution, and by revi⯑ving the ancient rights of all denomina⯑tions or claſſes of the people; at the ſame time carefully rejecting every inno⯑vation that is not conſiſtent in principle with the ancient uſages of the realm, of which the certain effects are already known: whereas no human prudence can inſure the real tendency and final effect of an innovation in matters of ſtate, howſoever plauſible it may at firſt appear.

[244]Though all true friends to the cauſe of liberty and the natural rights of man⯑kind would wiſh that every man ſhould vote for his repreſentative in the national council, without any other deſcription of right, or qualification, than that of being a man; yet, if this has not already been the uſage of the realm, it is not, perhaps, adviſeable, at leaſt at preſent, to be adopted.—We know not what would be the effects of it; probably they would be good: but we ought to walk in a trodden path, and build on ſure founda⯑tions.

That every man, as ſuch, if he was but an inhabitant of a county, did formerly vote in the court of that county (called the plein county, or full county) at elections for the knights of the ſhire, ſeems pro⯑bable, by the deſcription of ‘very great outrageous and exceſſive number of peo⯑ple dwelling within the ſame counties, [245]&c. voting at ſuch elections,’ as men⯑tioned in the act of 8 Hen. VI. cap. 14. which reſtrained the right of voting for knights to the freeholders of 40s. per ann. lands or tenements.

But a juſt definition of terms will beſt ſhew what deſcription of perſons have an unqueſtionable right to vote for repre⯑ſentatives according to the fundamental principles of the conſtitution.

The titles of freeholder and liber-tenens are ambiguous terms, not ſufficiently de⯑ſcriptive of the rank intended to be ex⯑preſſed; for they are applied at preſent only to land-owners; that is, to thoſe who have, at leaſt, a life-intereſt in lands or houſes; which laſt, as being built on land, do equally intitle the proprietor to the rank of a land-owner: but theſe ambiguous terms, freeholders and liberi tenentes, have ſometimes been applied alſo to the free-renters of tenements by the year [246]in contradiſtinction to the tenants at will and holders in villenage; for the old Saxon freo-borges, or free-burgeſſes, (that is, the free pledges of the realm,) were equally free in their condition with thoſe perſons we now call freeholders, though the tenure of many of them was not per⯑manent; they being, (by far the greateſt part of them) only the renters of tene⯑ments by the year; though, indeed, the land-owners themſelves (thoſe that were houſekeepers, or houſeholders) muſt have been included under the ſame general deſcription of freoborges.

Sir Edward Coke defines the meaning of the word burgh to be ‘becauſe it ſend⯑eth burgeſſes to parliament;’ and, though this is not the proper derivation of the word, it is certainly the ancient uſage of all boroughs, as well as the right of all burgeſſes, or freoborges. For burghs were originally named from burgeſſes, [247]or freo-borges, i. e. free-pledges ^*, in their collective capacity, in tithings and hun⯑dreds (many of which might be included in one borough) and not vice verſa, the burgeſſes from the burghs, which at pre⯑ſent is commonly underſtood; and may, indeed, in ſome caſes of the more modern boroughs, incorporated by charters, be really the fact ^†.

In the great annual courts of Frank⯑pledge throughout the kingdom, every houſekeeper was incorporated with nine other neighbouring houſekeepers, (arch⯑biſhops, [248]biſhops, peers, and other great men, excepted, who pledged their own houſeholds, and were ſuppoſed in law to have a tithing within their own families; but all other houſeholders, or renters of houſes, per annum, were incorporated) in diſtinct legal aſſociations called tithings, or decenaries, from the incorporated num⯑ber of houſekeepers in each: and though all youths of 12 or 14 years of age, as alſo lodgers, journeymen, and male ſer⯑vants, were likewiſe obliged to attend the great annual court of frankpledge, and be there ſworn to the king's peace, and be alſo regularly included in the de⯑cenary and trained in the uſe of arms, to⯑gether with the ten houſekeepers in whoſe families they were reſpectively included and numbered, yet the ten houſekeepers only were properly freo-borges, becauſe they were the reſponſible perſons, who pledged all the reſt, and had a fixed habitation, and [249]certain intereſt in the ſtate, paying ſcot and lot, being liable to all national, as well as county and pariſh, rates.

And theſe ten Freeborgs of each tithing were ſtill farther diſtinguiſhed by the title of deciners, (i. e. decenarii,) a term very properly expreſſive of their rank and quality as fixed and permanent members of a decenary, conſiſting of ten ſuch aſſo⯑ciated members, one of which was an⯑nually elected chief of the ten, or tithing⯑man.

The term deciner has been very much miſtaken and miſrepreſented by law wri⯑ters; ſome applying it merely to the head⯑borough, or capitalis-friborgus, the ti⯑thingman, or head of each ten free-bur⯑geſſes; and others again to every man that was included in a tithing; which is a groſs abuſe of the term: for a tithing may conſiſt of many more than ten, (even 20 or 30 males,) yet the ten houſekeepers [250]who are principally reſponſible and there⯑by actually conſtitute the decenary, both in number and title, thoſe ten alone are properly the deciners of a tithing.

Again, the word denizen has ſtrangely puzzled the etymologiſts; who have ſought its derivation, ſome from the French tongue, others again from the antient Britiſh, but both equally in vain: For, though it appears, that the Britons had the term denizen in uſe amongſt them before the coming in of the Anglo-Saxons, yet, as all the Roman colonies, eſtabliſhed among the Britons, were not only divided into centuriae or hundreds, but had alſo their decuriones, and conſequently decena⯑ries alſo, (for the captain of the ten could not be without the nine whom he headed,) both in their civil and military govern⯑ment, it is clear, that the term denizen is of pure Latin original, from the nume⯑ral adjective deni, forming the Latin verb [251] denizo, to expreſs the adoption of any per⯑ſon into all the franchiſes and rights of a decenary. And our law-writers have re⯑gularly uſed the participle denizatus, and the derivative ſubſtantive denizatio, to ex⯑preſs the introduction of aliens to the fran⯑chiſes of natural-born ſubjects, and yet they have not perceived the obvious mean⯑ing of theſe words both in ſenſe and ſound.

For the alien is admitted by denization to all the rights of mutual protection en⯑joyed by the community of natives in their eſtabliſhed decenaries; and if he then becomes a houſekeeper, and one of the ten houſekeepers, who jointly conſtitute a tithing, or decinary, he is, of courſe, a deciner; and, with other deciners, is an incorporated member of the county which he inhabits; for, as the hundreds are the conſtituent parts of the county, and the tithings the conſtituent parts of each hundred, it neceſſarily follows, that the [252] deciners are ſuitors of the county-courts; which right at preſent is very improperly attributed to the freeholders, or (more pro⯑perly) to the land-owners alone; for the right of the deciners, or free burgeſſes, to the county-courts is demonſtrated by the examples which have been given of gene⯑ral elections for knights, citizens, and burgeſſes, all together promiſcuouſly in the county-courts; which I have recommend⯑ed in a former tract ^*, as one means of reducing the enormous diſproportion of repreſentation (at preſent enjoyed by ſome particular boroughs, to the effectual diſ⯑franchiſement of all the reſt!) whereby the kingdom has loſt the means of expreſ⯑ſing the ſenſe of the people in parliament; and the king has been deluded by majorities of alternate factions; factions, which, falſely calling themſelves the commons of [253]England, have plunged the nation into deſperate meaſures and enormous ex⯑pences, and thereby loaded it with a bur⯑den, which it cannot poſſibly bear and re⯑trieve without a ſpeedy reformation.

Though the repreſentatives of cities are now called citizens, yet it appears that all cities and large towns have their right of voting as being ancient boroughs; that is, they had their right of voting from the inhabitants being freo-borges, or free-pledges of each other, in their reſpective decenaries, as deciners; and their right of becoming deciners aroſe from their be⯑ing houſeholders, ‘paying certain rent per annum;’ or ‘paying each of them year⯑ly an annual rent:’ for that is the true definition of burgage-tenure, as deſcribed by Littleton; and therefore, not only houſeholders whoſe houſes are their own property, but alſo EVERY RENTER OF A HOUSE, OR TENEMENT, who is equally [254]liable to bear the burdens of the ſtate, by being rated to all public and parochial taxes, OUGHT TO BE ADMITTED TO VOTE FOR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES IN PARLIA⯑MENT; a right which they anciently enjoyed. ‘For of ſuch OLD towns, call⯑ed BOROUGHS, (ſays Littleton, p. 109. b.) come the BURGESSES of the parliament, when the king hath ſummoned his par⯑liament.’

The ancient city of Weſtminſter, and many other cities ^*, as well as the an⯑cient borough of Southwark, ſtill retain the original uſage and rights of burgage-tenure, the mere renters of houſes, or houſe⯑holders, throughout all the pariſhes reſpec⯑tively included in each, being ſtill entitled to vote by ancient preſcription, which clearly proves the original nature of bur⯑gage-tenure, though it is very much alter⯑ed [255]in ſome other places, partly through the encroachments of purchaſers of bo⯑roughs, to reduce the number of voters; and partly by granting excluſive privi⯑leges to a few people in the incorporated chartered boroughs.

The ſhorteſt and moſt eaſy mode of reſtoring, to all the houſeholders of this realm, their ancient right of voting, is, firſt, to reſtore their ancient capacity of DECINERS, by adviſing them to throw themſelves into tithings or decenaries; and to hold an⯑nual courts of Frankpledge (now too long neglected) for the renewal and continual preſervation of the tithing aſſociations.

By this means both the civil and mili⯑tary government of the people will be completely reſtored, and peace and de⯑fence will be completely ſecured, ſo that houſebreaking and robbery will no longer be known amongſt us, for ſuch was once the happy ſtate of the kingdom; and ef⯑fected [256]by the very ſame regulations here recommended. A farther advantage, by reſtoring this ancient, legal, and con⯑ſtitutional, mode of government, will be, that the exact proportions of the people in each county, who have a right to vote, will be truly aſcertained; whereby may hereafter be introduced a repreſentation of all the counties, perfectly equal, in pro⯑portion to their reſpective numbers of houſeholders: for if, in each county, divi⯑ſions were formed, conſiſting each of 200 decenaries or tithings, (including 2000 houſeholders each,) that proportion will be found, on calculation, to contain the moſt convenient and proper number to be joined in the election of one deputy for parliament, in order to obtain an equal repreſentation of all the families in the king⯑dom; and no perſons will be excluded but ſervants and others, who have no fixed habitation of their own; and, conſequently, [257]at preſent, have no permanent intereſt in the ſtate; or, at leaſt, do not bear ſo large a proportion of relief to its burdens as the houſekeepers do.

Two thouſand families might well af⯑ford to pay ample wages to one repreſen⯑tative; and the ſtipend might be very eaſily collected, if the decenaries were duly formed and eſtabliſhed, and the ſeveral courts which regularly ariſe from the de⯑cenaries, viz. the hundred courts; and thoſe which might moſt conveniently be added to ſuperintend and regulate the hundred courts, viz. the court of one thouſand families, (anſwering to thoſe of the Iſraelitiſh commonwealth, the thou⯑ſands of Ephraim, the thouſands of Judah,) and laſtly the junction of TWO ſuch courts of the thouſand, for the election of ONE re⯑preſentative. This laſt propoſed court of 2000 houſeholders would probably be [258]equal to what ſome of the old trithing courts formerly were; which are ſaid to have ſometimes included the third or fourth part of a county.

If every diviſion of 2000 families were to elect one deputy to repreſent them in the great common council of the kingdom, the whole number of repreſentatives, for South Britain, would amount (accord⯑ing to the preſent ſtate of population) to about 476 ^*; by which there would be a profitable reduction of 37 members.

This would be no innovation, becauſe the election would ſtill be veſted where it ought, viz. in all the free houſeholders, [259]or free-borges, of all the counties; and that in the moſt perfect proportion of equality: and this order of equity would not be liable to change, or to be corrupted, becauſe the number of deputies or delegates would riſe or fall in due proportion with the de⯑gree of population in each county, from time to time.

TRACT, Number III.
Being a Memorandum on a late Propoſal for a New Settlement to be made on the Coaſt of AFRICA; recommend⯑ing, to the Author of that Propoſal, ſeveral Alterations in his Plan, and more eſpecially the adoption of the an⯑cient Mode of Government by Tithings (or Decenaries) and Hundreds as being the moſt uſeful and effectual Mode of Government for all Nations and Coun⯑tries.

[263] THE propoſal for a ſettlement on the coaſt of Africa will deſerve all en⯑couragement, if the ſettlers are abſolutely prohibited from holding any kind of proper⯑ty in the perſons of men, as ſlaves, and from ſelling either man, woman, or child. Even to claim any human perſon, as a ſlave, ought to be conſidered as an affront to the whole community, and be puniſhed ac⯑cordingly.

With reſpect to the propoſal for leave to purchaſe ſlaves, the permiſſion, if grant⯑ed at all, muſt be very carefully guarded; and the price given muſt be conſidered and declared, at the time of purchaſe, to be a mere pecuniary debt for redemption, due from the perſon purchaſed to the ſociety or ſtate of the ſettlement; and by [264]no means to be tranferred to any ſingle individual, (which would introduce do⯑meſtic tyranny and traffic in the bodies of men,) but the debt to be diſcharged at leiſure, without increaſe or intereſt, whenever the redeemed, or his friends, ſhall tender the amount of the firſt price; in default of which, the price ſhould be worked out by a limited proportional ſer⯑vice to the ſtate; and the ſtate ſhould hold forth, at the ſame time, ample encou⯑ragement to engage compliance and ſub⯑miſſion: but it ſhould be an eſtabliſhed principle, that the ſtate or ſociety ought rather to loſe the value of the purchaſe than, by compulſion, to enforce involuntary ſervitude, whereby honeſt labour, that ſhould always be deemed honourable, is rendered odious and ſlaviſh.

Rules muſt alſo be laid down to prevent the monopoly of land within the bounds of the ſettlement: and a ſufficient reſerve of [265] land muſt be made for public ſervices (ſchools and religious inſtruction) in each townſhip; and for cottage land to be diſ⯑tributed in ſmall parcels to new ſettlers and redeemed captives; which parcels muſt revert to the ſtate or community, for the ſame benevolent inveſtiture to others of the like condition, as ſoon as the temporary poſſeſſors are enabled to purchaſe larger lots; for it will prevent, in ſome degree, the monopoly of land, if the cottage-lots are untenable with other land. Common land ſhould alſo be reſerved for a com⯑petent diſtance round each town and village, wherein all inhabitants, rich and poor, ſhould have an equal perſonal right: becauſe the claims of rich landholders, when made in proportion to the ſize of their bordering eſtates, is unreaſonable and unjuſt; and has occaſioned a cruel perverſion of the utility of common lands in England: for the live ſtocks of rich [266]farmers, occaſionally turned looſe upon the commons, generally deprived the cattle of the poor inhabitants of their ne⯑ceſſary ſuſtenance; and the late diviſions for encloſures, by act of parliament, ha⯑ving been, for the moſt part, inconſiderate⯑ly granted in the ſame unjuſt proportions, have at length nearly annihilated the com⯑mon lands of England: whereas, on the contrary, the large poſſeſſions of the neighbouring landholders ought, in rea⯑ſon and natural juſtice, rather to have ex⯑cluded them from the leaſt ſhare in the inheritance of the poor inhabitants; or, at moſt; their ſhare ſhould have been merely perſonal, as men, and individuals, equal to, but not exceeding, the claims of their neighbours, that the common lands might be truly in common.

The managers, entruſted with the ſo⯑ciety's property to form the ſettlement, ſhould have no ſettled dominion or au⯑thority [267]over the people as governors or judges, but ſhould be contented with that ſuperiority and influence, which their pecuniary truſt, as agents and overſeers for the ſociety, will naturally afford them; and their ſervices may be amply rewarded and encouraged after the firſt year's ſala⯑ry, by an admiſſion to a due proportion or ſhare with the members of the ſociety in the general profits of the ſettlement, and in the profits of the common or public trade of the ſociety; but no private trade whatſoever ſhould be permitted to any of the ſociety's managers and agents.

The officers for internal government, as the governor or mayor, the ſheriffs and other magiſtrates, conſtables, &c. &c. ſhould be freely elected every year by all the inhabitants, due qualifications being premiſed to render men eligible to offices of dignity and truſt.

[268]The purpoſes of the defence, legiſlation, public juſtice, government, and ſubordi⯑nation, of the ſettlers, and their union as a community, (however large and exten⯑ſive the ſettlements may hereafter become,) are points more eaſily to be accompliſhed than is generally conceived; provided the antient Anglo-Saxon government by mu⯑tual frankpledge in tithings (ordecenaries) and hundreds ^* be duly adopted; and this [269]being already conſiſtent with the common law and antient conſtitution of this king⯑dom, [270](ſtill deemed legal though not in uſe,) might be lawfully eſtabliſhed, even if the [271]ſettlement is made within the boundaries of the preſent Engliſh claims; but, in [272]that caſe, the legal proceſs in all the courts of juſtice muſt be carried on in [273]the king's name; and the ſettlers may not refuſe to admit a governor, or lieu⯑tenant, [274]of the king's appointment, with a limited delegation of authority, accord⯑ing to the conſtitution of England, when⯑ever [275]the privy council ſhall think proper to ſend one.

But, if the ſettlement be attempted in any other part of Africa, not claimed by European powers, the managers muſt firſt obtain the conſent (and aſſociation, if poſſible) of the native inhabitants, or elſe the eſtabliſhment muſt be made on an uninhabited part of the coaſt: and, as the majority of the ſettlers will probably be negroes, returned from ſlavery and op⯑preſſion to their native ſoil, there will be no neceſſity to form the plan of govern⯑ment ſtrictly by the conſtitutional model of England, any farther than reaſon and experience may ſuggeſt the adoption of ſome particular parts of it: but we may, in that caſe, aſſume the liberty of draw⯑ing a precedent for government from more antient and more perfect documents than our Saxon records, viz. from the example, or rather the original intention, of the Iſ⯑raelitiſh [276]commonwealth, purified and im⯑proved by the general precepts and maxims of the goſpel, and by the example of free congregational government amongſt the pri⯑mitive Chriſtians, who decided their own temporal litigations and differences, ( [...], "things pertaining to this life," 1 Cor. vi. 1—8.) as well as eccleſiaſtical queſtions, in their regular aſſemblies of all the people: which method was an ancient ethnic cuſtom, (derived probably from patriarchal times,) as appears by the ex⯑ample of the pagan Epheſians, recorded in Acts xix. 38, 39. whom their town-clerk referred to a lawful aſſembly ( [...], apparently diſtinct, as the context proves, from their ordinary courts of juſ⯑tice, then ſubject to the Romans) for the examination and reſolution of all extraor⯑dinary queſtions.

The Iſraelitiſh government, under the theocracy, was adminiſtered by freely-elect⯑ed [277]judges and officers (ſee my tract on the Law of Nature, p. 325 to 329.) through⯑out all the tribes and cities or gates; ex⯑cept in the extraordinary caſes of prophe⯑tical judges; though theſe were probably elected likewiſe, as ſoon as their ſuperior, or ſupernatural, abilities became gene⯑rally known.

They had a regular gradation of official power, heads of tens, of fifties, of hun⯑dreds, and of thouſands; beſides the pro⯑vincial governors, who were ancient heads of houſes or tribes: theſe altogether formed one great band of allegiance, uni⯑ting the whole community together for action and defence, as one man, with one mind, viz. by the free reſolutions of the majority; the ſmaller diviſions being re⯑gularly included and controuled in the lar⯑ger, and the individuals of all the divi⯑ſions being mutually bound to each other by the reciprocal ties, or allegiance, of [278] frankpledge, which our Saxon anceſtors, and many other, even ſavage and heathen, nations ^*, have in ſome degree maintain⯑ed, probably from the patriarchal times. For, all men (having the knowledge of good and evil) are capable of this form of go⯑vernment, if it is once properly explain⯑ed to them, and eſtabliſhed: and there is no mode of defending, reſtraining, and keeping in order, a promiſcuous body of men, ſo cheap, ſo eaſy, or ſo certainly effec⯑tual for every profitable purpoſe, as that of mutual government by the principles and maxims of right, in ſuch equal propor⯑tioned congregations; each of which is a conſtituent part, or member, of a more powerful congregation, in the great unity, [279]or commonwealth; wherein every indivi⯑dual, however violent or moroſe in him⯑ſelf, is prevented from injuring others, by having his perſon and his property render⯑ed anſwerable for all damages, which he either occaſions by his own rapacious vio⯑lence or caprice, or which he does not endeavour to prevent in others, as a mem⯑ber of the tithing wherein any violence or offence is committed: for, according to the law of frankpledge, no man is en⯑titled to liberty ^*, that is not duly pledged by his neareſt neighbours for the mutual conſervation of peace and right.

Under this form of government, all public works, as entrenchments, or earth⯑works, and fortifications, to ſecure the towns and ſtrengthen the country; ca⯑nals, and highways, for public paſſage; ſewers, and drains, for the general health [280]of the country, &c. may be formed and maintained by a rotation of ſervice; in which the value of daily attendance muſt be eſtimated, that defaulters may bear their ſhare, or rather a double ſhare, of the burden: and the expence of watch and ward, or military ſervice, muſt be defray⯑ed in the ſame manner; by which means no debt will be incurred for the defence of the ſtate. Rich funds may alſo be ob⯑tained to ſupport the credit of a public exchequer, (without laying any percepti⯑ble burden on the community,) by a ge⯑neral agreement to puniſh by fines and mulcts, in due proportion to the wealth and poſſeſſions of delinquents; increaſing likewiſe, by repetition, for all offences as well of omiſſion (or neglect of public duty) as of commiſſion; except for mur⯑der, rapes, and unnatural crimes, which, by the laws of God, are unpardonable by [281]any community. The people themſelves to be judges, people of the vicinage, un⯑exceptionably diſintereſted; liable, be⯑ſides, to the challenge of the parties, and duly ſworn (according to the known laws of Engliſh juries) to do right, in the pre⯑ſence of the ordinary judges, and officers elected to preſide and keep order in the aſſemblies.

TRACT, Number IV.
An eaſy and practicable Plan for laying out Settlements on uncultivated Lands, in e⯑qual Diviſions of ten Tithings, or 100 Families each; whereby new Colonies may be moſt advantageouſly formed and extended in regular Diſtricts of Hun⯑dreds, agreeable to the ancient legal Di⯑viſions of our Anglo-Saxon Anceſtors.

[285] SEVERAL years ago I made ſome me⯑morandums of ‘A Method of form⯑ing frontier Settlements,’ which I co⯑pied from the ſecond edition of a book firſt printed at Philadelphia, but reprinted at London in 1766, and intituled ‘An Hiſtorical Account of the Expedition againſt the Ohio Indians, in the Year 1764, under the Command of Henry Bouquet, Eſq. to which are annexed Military Papers, containing Reflections on the War with the Savages; a Method of forming frontier Settlements,’ &c. My reference for the laſt-mentioned ſub⯑ject is to p. 51 of the ſaid book; but, as I have not the book itſelf at preſent, I cannot pretend to be perfectly accurate in my quotations from it; neither do I re⯑member [286]whether the author recommend⯑ed a government by tithing and hundred courts, with their proper officers, accord⯑ing to the Anglo-Saxon model; but only that his propoſed ſettlements were (happily for my preſent purpoſe) laid out in equal diviſions of one hundred lots each, for the maintenance of one hundred families; ſo that, of courſe, the conſtitutional regu⯑lations for hundreds, recommended in the preceding tracts, will not be leſs ſuitable and beneficial to his ſcheme than his certainly is to mine.

"Let us ſuppoſe a ſettlement" (ſays he) ‘to be formed for one hundred fa⯑milies, compoſed of five perſons each upon an average.’

‘The four ſides of the ſquare mea⯑ſures 7040 yards, which gives to each [287]houſe about 70 yards in front, to ſtoc⯑kade, and the ground, allowed for building, will be 210 feet front and about 100 feet deep.’

‘An acre of ground will produce at leaſt 30 buſhels of Indian corn; there⯑fore, two acres are ſufficient to ſupply five perſons at the rate of 12 buſhels each perſon; two other acres will be for cows and ſheep, another for hay, or to be ſown with red clover; the re⯑maining half acre may be laid out for a garden.’ Thus far the author's plan may be applicable to lands even in England, eſpecially if laid out in leſs diviſions of tithings, inſtead of hundreds, preſerving the ſame due proportion of land in lots for each family. The ten fa⯑milies with their habitations would form a compact little village, under the govern⯑ment of a tithing-man, annually elected from among themſelves, whereby all [288]would be rendered mutually reſponſible for each other, for the common peace; and to make good every damage that might be occaſioned by the ill behaviour of any individual among them. An eſtate laid out in ſmall farms, with ſuch a tithing village in the centre of it, for a conſtant ſupply of labourers, might be made to maintain a much greater number of peo⯑ple than land generally does in the ordi⯑nary way of farming; and would, conſe⯑quently, be much more beneficial both to the landlords and to the nation at large. Commons and waſte foreſts or chaſes might thus be laid out and occupied by the labouring poor, to the great reduction of pariſh rates as well as of the price of labour; for, free and uſeful labourers would never be wanting, if ſuch a regular proviſion, under their own management could be found for their families. But the poſſeſſion of ſuch pariſh-lots ſhould [289]be limited to thoſe perſons, who occupy no other land; and ſhould be delivered up to the pariſh or community, for the uſe of other unprovided families, as ſoon as any poſſeſſor obtains more land, either as a farm, or in fee, (as recommended in a former Tract,) to prevent the monopoly of land, and the entire deprivation of the poor from any ſhare in it, as at preſent.

The remainder of the author's ſcheme is ſuitable only to unoccupied countries, like many parts of Africa and America, where the people are few, and the lands of ſmall value, viz. "Round the town" (ſays he) ‘are the commons of three miles ſquare, containing, excluſive of the lots above-mentioned, 5120 acres. On three ſides of the town, five other ſquares will be laid out, of three ſquare miles, containing 5760 acres each; one of which is reſerved for wood, for the uſe of the ſettlement; the other four [290]to be divided into 25 out-lots, or plan⯑tations, of about 230 acres each; ſo that in the four ſquares there will be 100 ſuch plantations, for the 100 fa⯑milies. Another townſhip may be laid out joining this, upon the [...]ame plan, and as many more as you pleaſe, upon the ſame line, without loſing any ground.’

The following is a rough Sketch of the whole.

[292]The banks of the river (as in ancient times) ſhould be deemed common or public as the river itſelf, under the conſervation of the community; and ſhould be reſerved for future improvements, (as for the ac⯑commodation, not only of fiſhermen, but alſo of manufacturers, traders, and of all induſtrious ſtrangers,) and docks, or navi⯑gable cuts (whenever the level of the country will permit) ſhould be made from the river, as far back, at leaſt, as the centre between every two townſhips.

The ſpaces between the ſquares are left for roads and common communications between the ſeveral lots; and the roads which divide two diſtinct townſhips ſhould be ſtill more ſpacious for the common uſe of all the inhabitants, the cartage of their produce and other traffic, the dri⯑ving of cattle, &c. and a ſpacious road, to be formed lengthways throughout the whole ſettlement, ought, in forming the [293]lots, to be reſerved through the centre of each townſhip: the central lots, which will thereby be diminiſhed in ſize, will find ample compenſation, in value, by their ſituation on the great central road, which I have expreſſed by a dotted line. I do not remember whether any roads, or ſpaces for them, were expreſſed in the original plan of the author.

I would likewiſe deviate from the ori⯑ginal plan of the author, with reſpect to the ſituation of the 5760 acres of wood⯑land for each townſhip; which, I con⯑ceive, had better be reſerved in one of the moſt diſtant ſquares, at an angular ſituation from each town, inſtead of being in the oppoſite ſquare, according to his propoſal: for the towns will not only be more healthy, by having the uncleared lands more diſtant from them, but alſo the inhabitants, when on watch and ward duty, will be better enabled to diſcover [294]the approach of any lurking ſavages, or other enemies in time of war.

TRACT, Number V.
A farther Declaration of the ancient po⯑pular, or congregational, Right to elect Biſhops; intended to illuſtrate, more effectually, a Maxim of the Common Law, cited in p. 91, viz. ‘Ordo Epiſ⯑coporum eſt Robur Reipublicae.’ Jenk. Cent. p. 56.

IT is an eſtabliſhed maxim of the com⯑mon law of England, that ‘The or⯑der of biſhops is the ſtrength’ (force or hability) "of the commonwealth." But, in order to render this maxim obvious and unqueſtionable, we muſt neceſſarily imply and include, in the epiſcopal func⯑tion, that very important branch of it already mentioned, viz. the preſiding as chief popular magniſtrates in the congrega⯑tional courts of common law ^*; and we muſt alſo ſuppoſe the continuance or re⯑eſtabliſhment of the primitive chriſtian freedom in epiſcopal elections; that the biſhops, by real popular elections, may be truly popular magiſtrates, worthy to [298]be entruſted with the civil as well as the eccleſiaſtical INTERESTS of the common-wealth. Mr. Sadler, in his ‘Rights of the Kingdom,’ ſpeaking of the time of K. Henry II. ſays,—‘It ſeemeth conſide⯑rable, how all hiſtorians (of that time and diſpute) do record, THE CHOICE OF BISHOPS to be in the PEOPLE: in PLEBE and in POPULO, as well as in CLERO. They mention RADULPH, or⯑dained a biſhop for the Orcades: but rejected by all, becauſe not elected by COMMON ASSENT of the PEOPLE; PLE⯑BIS, CLERO ^*, PRINCIPIS, it is every where in the old monks; and how the poor biſhop wandered up and down, as an aſſiſtant to other prelates, &c.’ See p. 235, and more inſtances alſo at p. 243. The learned author of a tract, (printed ſeveral years ago, as appears by the liſt of tracts publiſhed at the ſame time, but without a date,) intituled, ‘Lex Parlia⯑mentaria, [299]or a Treatiſe of the Law and Cuſtom of Parliament,’ &c. has cited various proofs of the people's right to elect biſhops.—"That for ſome years," (ſays he,) ‘after this new charter granted in this Engliſh parliament,’ (meaning a parliament held at London by K. Henry I.) ‘the PEOPLE were generally RESTORED to the right of electing their own magiſ⯑trates and officers, civil, military, and ECCLESIASTICAL; and this’ (ſays the learned author) ‘I take to be the grand foundation of the MAGNA CHAR⯑TA of Engliſh liberties, i.e. as it gave relaxation from Norman tyranny and ſlavery. And this may teach us, that the rights and liberties of the commons of England, are neither ſo illegally begotten as by rebellion, nor of ſuch tender years, as ſome imagine. But, if any man is not convinced from what I have before produced, touching the [300]origin of Engliſh parliaments, and the antiquity of the houſe of commons, let him peruſe the authors cited in the margin ^*, eſpecially the treatiſe writ by that learned judge Sir Robert At⯑kins, on this very ſubject.’

‘Nor was this the firſt Engliſh par⯑liament held under this king, Mat. Paris has given us a brief account ^†, (which other authors confirm and en⯑large,) that one Ranulph, biſhop of Durham, (whom Mat. &c. adorn with the ſublime titles of, Vir peſſimus, & corruptiſſimus; homo perverſus & ad omne ſcelus paratus; vir ſubacto ingenio & profunda nequitia, &c.) was impri⯑ſoned, &c. by a common-council or parliament of Engliſhmen. The whole [301]paſſage runs thus, Eo tempore rex te⯑nuit in cuſtodia Ranulphum Dunelmel⯑ſum, epiſcopum hominem perverſum & ad omne ſcelus paratum, quem frater regis i.e. rex Willielmus epiſcopum ^*fecerat Dunelm. & regni Anglorum ſubverſo⯑rem; qui cum regi jam dicto nimium eſſet familiaris, conſtituerat eum rex, procu⯑ratorem ſuum in regno, ut evelleret, de⯑ſtrueret, raperet, et diſperderet, et om⯑nia omnium bona ad fiſci commodum com⯑portaret. Sed mortuo eodim rege iniquo & Henrico coronato, de communi con⯑ſilio gentis Anglorum, poſuit rex eum in vinculis, &c.’

‘Nor was the concurrence of the com⯑mons in parliament requiſite only to the impriſonment or exauctoration of biſhops ^†, the ſame aſſent ſeems as ne⯑ceſſary, and that too in a ſuperior de⯑gree, [302]as to their election or confirma⯑tion; divers inſtances of this appear in the hiſtorians of thoſe times: I ſhall ſelect ſome to prove it then the cuſtom of England, Scotland, Wales, Ireland, France, &c.’

‘Anno 1113, Ralph, biſhop of Ro⯑cheſter ^*, was elected archbiſhop of Canterbury by the king, annuente plebe & clero ^†; this was done in communi conſilio apud Windſore ^‡, And I find, about the ſame time, that another Ralph, who had been ordained a bi⯑ſhop in Scotland, was rejected by all, becauſe not elected with the conſent of the people, &c. and, notwithſtand⯑ing his conſecration, was forced to wander about, and officiate as a coad⯑jutor to other biſhops.’

‘About the year 1120 ^‖, one David was conſecrated biſhop of Bangor, by [303]the then archbiſhop of Canterbury; but it is expreſsly ſaid, that he had been thereto elected, a principe clero & populo Walliae, i. e. by a Welch par⯑liament. And in the ſame reign one Gregory, an Iriſh abbot, was elected to the biſhopric of Dublin, a rege Hi⯑berniae & clero & populo, an Iriſh par⯑liament. So that the commons, at this time, were a conſtituent part of the Scottiſh, Welch, and Iriſh, parliaments, as well as with us in England.’

‘And in the year 1128 ^*, I find that famed ſcholar, Gilbertus Univerſalis, to be elected and conſecrated biſhop of London, annuente clero & populo. This ſeems at a parliament at London.’

‘But this right of the commons, in electing biſhops, does more clearly appear in Henry II.'s time, when all hiſtorians agree it to be a general cuſ⯑tom [304]both here and in France (and ſeems founded on divers expreſs canons of the primitive church.) Inſomuch, as Me⯑zeray, in his hiſtory, aſſerts, that un⯑til that time (i. e. the middle of the 12th century) the voice of the people in electing biſhops, was eſteemed the voice of God.’

Even the hiſtories, publiſhed by papal authority, bear ample teſtimony of the people's right, and the exerciſe of it in an⯑cient times, though it has been long uſurped by that very authority. See Italia Sacra, (the Hiſtory of the Italian Biſhops, cited in the former tract,) vol. I. p. 1284, in the account of the biſhops of Tarracina; where it is expreſsly declared, that, on the death of Avitus, biſhop of Tarra⯑cina, ‘St. Valentine was elected biſhop by the CLERGY and PEOPLE of that city ^*’ [305]St. Valentine is ſaid to have ſuffered mar⯑tyrdom about the year 362.

In the account of the archbiſhops of Florence, (vol. III. p. 12. of the ſaid work,) Zenobius, about the year 376, is ſaid to have been elected, not only by the clergy, but by ALL THE PEOPLE; which unanimity was eſteemed a divine call, not lawfully to be refuſed. ^* And, about the [306]year of Chriſt 443, Silvianus, an African, was elected biſhop of Tarracina, ‘a clero et populo,’ (tom. I. p. 1290.) But the language, reſpecting the appointment of the biſhops of Tarracina, was totally diffe⯑rent in the very next century; nay, even under their Saint Gregory, or Pope Gregory THE GREAT, the papal uſurpation, on the rights both of clergy and people, was become ſhamefully notorious! for we read of biſhops taking the charge of the church of Tarracina, ‘ex imperio MAG⯑NI GREGORII,’ ‘by the command of GREAT GREGORY!’ GREAT Gregory indeed he might well be called; for the popes having, then lately, ^* revived the imperial title of ‘PONTIFEX MAXI⯑MUS,’ [307]were become ſuitably great and imperious in their language; ſo that, notwithſtanding the counter-title of ‘ſer⯑vus ſervorum Dei’ which Gregory had hypocritically aſſumed, as a cloak of humility, to cover the pride of the for⯑mer title, yet, in his imperious language, he ſufficiently manifeſted the character of the "little horn," foretold by Daniel, (ch. vii. 8.) in which ‘were eyes, like the eyes of a man,’ (i. e. the horn was to be a biſhop, or rather a ſucceſſion of bi⯑ſhops, who are properly ſee-ers, or over⯑ſeers, viz. [...], very aptly repre⯑ſented by "the eyes of a man,") and ‘a mouth ſpeaking great things.’ And, accordingly, we read of ‘Agnellus, bi⯑ſhop of Funda,’ (or Fanda,) ‘who managed the church of Tarracina 'ex imperio,' by the command of GREAT GREGORY.’ ^* And alſo, that ‘Con⯑ſtantius, [308]biſhop of Palermo, had charge of the flock of Tarracina, 'ex imperio,' by the COMMAND of the ſame St. Gregory, the pontifex.’ ^* Thus the popes be⯑gan to elude the election of biſhops, by appointing other biſhops to take care of the vacant ſees: but they afterwards bold⯑ly took the election, even nominally, upon themſelves; which, before, they had uſurped indeed in effect, but did not ſo openly profeſs; and accordingly, in the very ſame page, we read of one Ambroſius, a MONK, being ELECTED biſhop of Tarracina, by pope Alexander II. in the year 1071; ‘ab Alexandro II. ELECTUS fuit epiſcopus, an. 1071;’ and alſo of one Gregory, another MONK, being elect⯑ed ^† biſhop of Tarracina, by pope Paſ⯑chal II.

[309]The popes obtained this abſolute do⯑minion over epiſcopal elections by various arts and wiles and by gradual encroach⯑ments, craftily made, according to the circumſtances of the people they intended to deceive from time to time; and they always advanced in their demands after the admiſſion of every unjuſt claim; which demonſtrates the danger of ſwerving, in any reſpect, from primitive uſages. The monkiſh clergy in every part of the world, in proportion as the falſe notions of the ſanctity of celibacy advanced and prevailed, were regularly the inſtruments employed in thus ſapping the rights of the clergy and people. But the fathers at the council of Laodicea (which was as early as the year of Chriſt 365, or 367; according to bi⯑ſhop Beveridge. See Dr. Cave's Hiſt. Eccleſ. p. 231.) did not proceed ſo gra⯑dually in ſapping the rights of the people, but boldly excluded them, at once, from [310]all interference at epiſcopal elections, (ſee canon XII.) and alſo from the appointment of prieſts, (ſee canon XIII.) which, how⯑ever, as the learned patriarch of Antioch, Balſamon, has remarked, affords proof that ‘not only BISHOPS were elected, in ancient times, by THE MULTITUDES,’ (or people,) "but even the PRIESTS alſo ^*."

[311]The monkiſh prelates in the ſecond council of Arles, at a much later period, (A.D. 452,) durſt not proceed ſo rapidly againſt the peoples right of election, though ſhamefully bold, at that time, in promo⯑ting "the doctrines of doemons," by pro⯑hibiting marriage, or (in the words of ſcripture) "forbidding to marry." See the ſecond, third, fourth, and 43d, 44th, 45th, and 52d, canons of that council. But with reſpect to epiſcopal elections, they ſeem to have affected an imitation (though a very deluſive one) of the ancient mode of electing two or three perſons, (as de⯑ſcribed in a note of a former tract, p. 88— 90.) and they thought themſelves obliged ſtill to acknowledge that the people were intitled to ſome ſhare in the election; which, however, they reduced to as ſmall a proportion as they could venture to do at that time, and craftily ſtated it in a moſt precarious light, to leave room for farther [312] innovation; viz. that ‘THREE PERSONS ſhould be nominated by the biſhops,’ (i. e. inſtead of the people, as before,) ‘out of which three perſons, the CLERGY, OR CITIZENS, ſhould have power to elect ONE.’ ^* The word VEL is artfully inſerted, inſtead of the copulative ET, between the words CLERICI and CIVES, that the acknowledged right of the CITI⯑ZENS, might be occaſionally ſuppreſſed, whenever the temper of the times would permit. The ſame crafty inſertion of vel for et ^† may be ſeen in the ſeventh canon [313]of the ſecond council of Orleans, (conci⯑lium Aurelianenſe ii. A.D. 533.) where it is manifeſtly intended as a preparatory ſtep to the ſuppreſſion of the people's ſhare in the election.

The like monkiſh craft appears alſo in the third canon of the third council of Orleans ^*, A.D. 538. But, though this deceitful mode of innovation could paſs at Arles and Orleans, yet it was too groſs to be admitted in the capital of France at a ſtill later period; for, even ſo late as the third council of Paris, A. D. 557. we find the right of the clergy and people to elect biſhops (expreſsly, ‘juxta antiquam conſuetudinem,’ &c.) publicly aſſerted and eſtabliſhed; and even the royal inter⯑ference, or MANDATE, moſt carefully, and in expreſs terms, PROHIBITED ^†. But [314]the grand enemy to law and right, [...], the PAPAL POWER, found means, at [315]length to diſpenſe with this juſt Pariſian law; for pope Zacharias, the ſame that abſolved Pepin from his oath of allegiance to king Childeric III. thought proper alſo, in the plenitude of his diſpenſing power, ‘to INDULGE king Pepin, that he might NOMINATE biſhops to be ordained throughout the kingdom of France, as any ſees ſhould become vacant.’ ^*

[316]The danger of regal influence, in epiſco⯑pal elections, had been early foreſeen and carefully guarded againſt, not only by the council of Paris, (laſt cited,) but alſo by the primitive church ^*, and thereby [317]the wickedneſs of this lawleſs pope, and his INDULGENCE to K. Pepin, is render⯑ed the more conſpicuous! The learned biſhop Beveridge gives a decided opinion that the 30th canon of the ancient codex, which he calls ‘codex canonum primitivae eccleſiae,’ was neceſſarily ordained, ‘leſt any perſon, by money or MEANS OF SECULAR POWERS, ſhould be promoted, but ONLY by the free election of THE CLERGY and PEOPLE.’ ^* But no com⯑ment can be more clear and decided, than the canon itſelf in guarding againſt the interference of princes, viz. ‘if any BISHOP, having availed himſelf’ (of the power or influence) ‘of WORLDLY PRINCES, ſhall through them have ob⯑tained authority over a church, let him he depoſed and ſeparated,’ (or excom⯑municated,) [318] ‘and alſo all thoſe that com⯑municate’ (or have fellowſhip) ‘with him.’ ^* The council of Paris, before cited, ſeems to have copied the ſpirit of this law. Thus the moſt jealous repub⯑licans may be convinced that epiſcopacy has no neceſſary connection with monarchy; but, on the contrary, is an inſtitution which ought to be entirely independent of it; independent, I mean, with reſpect only to NOMINATION or election to the dignity: ſo that royal mandates and letters miſſive, with the "congé d'elire," are by no means founded in right, but are only modern encroachments, promoted by popes and monks when they were unable to mo⯑nopolize the power of election to themſelves; for they would rather throw the nomina⯑tion into the power and will of arbitrary [319]princes than ſee it lawfully exerciſed by the clergy and people; provided their par⯑tial favour towards royalty were admitted as an "INDULGENCE" from their own plenitude of power! But, though king Pepin was baſe enough to avail himſelf of the preſumptuous and wicked encroachment of pope Zachary on the people's rights, yet his ſon and grandſon were more ho⯑nourable than their anceſtor, and, inſtead of baſely accepting this moſt unjuſt papal indulgence, on the contrary aſſerted the popular right to elect biſhops in the plain⯑eſt and moſt unequivocal terms, and no⯑bly and diſintereſtedly reſcued it from the uſurpations of the monkiſh clergy, which had almoſt univerſally prevailed for ſome time before. For the emperor CHARLES THE GREAT moſt nobly ordained, ‘That biſhops ſhould be choſen according to the ſtatutes of the canons, by the ELECTION OF THE CLERGY AND PEOPLE of the [320]proper dioceſe.’ ^* And the emperor Lewis the Good, or Ludovicus Pius, alſo aſſerted the ſame juſt rights of the clergy and people: ‘Let a biſhop be elected by the CLERGY and PEOPLE of the proper dioceſs, without reſpect of perſons, or bribes,’ (but) ‘on account of worthi⯑neſs of life, and gift of wiſdom.’ ^†

Theſe excellent laws would probably have continued in force much longer than they did, if they had been obſerved with the primitive precautions ſtated in a for⯑mer note, viz. to elect two, and after⯑wards to decide by lot; becauſe this an⯑cient mode of exerciſing the joint elective [321]rights of CLERGY and PEOPLE is ſo ſafe and perfectly unexceptionable, that it muſt have obviated the plauſible objection that was uſually alleged, by popes and monks, againſt POPULAR elections; i.e. the danger of exciting party animoſities and tumults. The monks, however, were not able entirely to ſet aſide theſe excellent conſtitutions of Charles and Lewis, for ſeveral years afterwards; and the influence of them ſeems to have ex⯑tended even to Rome itſelf: for the biſhops at a lateran council, not leſs than 45 years afterwards, (viz. A. D. 861.) aſſerted the rights of the clergy and people; and even the pope himſelf, (Nicolas I.) con⯑curred! the more willingly perhaps, be⯑cauſe the general purpoſe of the canons, then made, was to curb the extravagance of a rival metropolitan, John VIII. arch⯑biſhop of Ravenna, whoſe province was intituled Aemilia. The very firſt canon was to reſtrain the archbiſhop from conſe⯑crating [322]biſhops throughout (the province of) Aemilia, except after THE ELECTION OF THE CLERGY AND PEOPLE; a teſti⯑mony highly to the point in queſtion, and the more eſpecially, if we conſider that it proceeded from a quarter, the ſeat of uſurpation, that had long been inimi⯑cal to all popular rights! See ‘caput pri⯑mum,’—‘Epiſcopos per AEMILIAM non conſacres, niſi poſt electionem CLERI et POPULI,’ (Italia Sacra, tom. 2. p. 347.) This canon would have done more ho⯑nour, however, to the lateran council, and pope Nicolas, had it extended to epiſco⯑pal elections in general, inſtead of being confined to the province of Aemilia. The archbiſhop of Aemilia had probably en⯑croached on the elective rights of the clergy and people of his province; but this alone could not have been conſidered, at Rome, as a crime, (it having been the re⯑gular practice of the popes themſelves,) [323]had he not, at the ſame time, profeſſed independence of the Roman ſee: and the Pontif, though probably, like his prece⯑ceſſors, a natural enemy to the elective rights of the clergy and people, was con⯑tent, it ſeems, to acknowledge them, whilſt the reformation tended to reduce the pretenſions of his rival: and indeed he gained a complete conqueſt over him, by means of this lateran council, wherein he reduced him to the pitiful dilemma of accepting a continuance of his preferment on the moſt humiliating terms of ſubmiſ⯑ſion to the Roman See, (which was by no means due from a metropolitan biſhop,) and compelled him baſely and diſhoneſtly to yield up the juſt rights and independence of his province to the encroaching juriſ⯑diction of the papal power.

A very few years afterwards, (about the year 877,) pope John VIII. (or rather [324]John IX. as he is ſtiled by Platina ^*) openly availed himſelf of this newly ac⯑quired [325]extenſion of power, by oſtentati⯑ouſly ſubmitting the archbiſhops of Ravenna, [326](together with the archbiſhops alſo of Milan,) againſt all probability of right or ſeemlineſs, to the juriſdiction of the biſhops of Pavia, or more properly Papia; a very ominous appellation, derived, as even my popiſh author admits, (ſee Italia Sacra, tom. I. p. 1075.) from the Latin inter⯑jection PAPE! O wonderful, or O ſtrange! The Pontif, however, thought himſelf obliged to admit, at the ſame time, the elective rights of the clergy and people of PAVIA, probably the better to ſecure, from examination and oppoſition, the uſurped authority of the "privilegium," (as he called it,) whereby he exalted the biſhops of Papia, above their brethren, the independent metropolitans of Ravenna and Milan. This "privilegium" would not have been mentioned by me, had it not contained an expreſs teſtimony ^* to [327]the popular right of election. And the author of Italia Sacra, ſpeaking farther of this Pope John, and Biſhop John, re⯑lates, that the latter obtained theſe and alſo other privileges, in a council held at Papia by Pope John; but theſe, it ſeems, were the chief, as being the only privi⯑leges he has particularized; "In quo" (concilio) ‘ab eodem PONTIFICE ALIA obtinuit PRIVILIGIA, ac praecipue, ut POPULO, CLEROQUE Papienſi SUUM EPISCOPUM ELIGENDI JUS ESSET, eidemque conceſſit, ut quoties Mediolanen⯑ſem, ac Ravennatenſem archiepiſcopos cum ſuis ſuffraganeis ad ſynodum vocaret, accederent,’ &c. Italia Sacra, tom. I. p. 1087.

About ſeven or eight years before this time, viz. A. D. 869 or 870, the 36th [328]council of Conſtantinople (intituled, by the popiſh or Latin party, the eighth gene⯑ral council) wickedly declared againſt the unalienable popular right of electing Bi⯑ſhops, and formed a canon expreſsly againſt it. Pope John therefore, on the laſt-mentioned occaſion, might have (be⯑ſides his partiality to the biſhop of Papia) a ſtill farther inducement for re-eſtabliſh⯑ing the clergy and people of Papia in their juſt right of election, viz. to demonſtrate the plenitude of his power in diſpenſing with laws; becauſe, whatever tends to aggran⯑dize the papal juriſdiction may ſometimes afford an ample reaſon even for a Pontif to do right! The ſame reaſon, probably, may be aſſigned for the continuance of popular elections, even at Rome itſelf, long after the ſaid decree of the general council againſt them; for pope Adrian III. in the year 895, was "ſo bold," ("tanti animi fuit," ſays Platina,) in [329]behalf of this juſt right, that he announ⯑ced it to the ſenate and people, viz. that, ‘in creating a pope, the authority of the emperor ſhould not be waited for; and that the ſuffrages of THE CLERGY and PEOPLE ſhould be free.’ ^* And he adds, that ‘this inſtitution was rather attempt⯑ed than begun by pope Nicolas I.’ But this, however, was not the caſe; for even he himſelf relates in his accounts of pope Nicolas, on the preceding page, not only that the clergy and people did really elect without waiting for the im⯑perial will, but alſo, that letters were afterwards received from the emperor Lewis (II.) ‘in which he highly commended the Romans, that they had knowingly and [330]wholly created their own chief pontif, without waiting for the wiſh of others, who, perhaps, in that buſineſs, through the want of perſonal knowledge, might have had leſs judgement.’ ^*

It is manifeſt, therefore, that Platina was inclined to attribute the merit of pro⯑moting free popular elections, at Rome, rather to the Pope than to the Emperor, to whom it was more ſtrictly due, even according to his own evidence: for Popes and Monks could not endure a concurrent right of the people in epiſcopal elections, except when it might ſeem to aggrandize the holy ſee as a peculiar privilege; or un⯑leſs it were admitted in any particular place by papal favour and indulgence, as at Papia, for the like purpoſe of aggrandize⯑ment! But in all other caſes they were the regular profeſſed enemies to popular [331]right; ſo that to their influence, and not to the influence of imperial or royal pow⯑er, is the wicked decree againſt free elections to be attributed. And this was carried, it ſeems, on the ſtale pretence of proba⯑ble tumults, and ‘the confuſion that a mul⯑titude of electors might occaſion,’ juſt as the preſent tumults in Weſtminſter afford, to the enemies of the Engliſh con⯑ſtitution, an exulting argument againſt the ancient right of frequent elections; who, inſtead of being willing to correct the abuſe of an inſtitution, would rather de⯑ſtroy the profitable uſe of it: but ſuch perverſe reaſoners are either deplorably ignorant, or elſe ſhamefully wicked: for the ſame argument holds equally good for robbing the people of their pecuniary pro⯑perty; becauſe many of them make a very improper uſe of what little money they have to ſpare; and indeed the rob⯑bery would be much leſs diſhoneſt and ſin⯑ful [332]in the latter caſe than in the former; for, though both are rights of the people, and cannot therefore be infringed with⯑out iniquity and injuſtice, which are hate⯑ful in the ſight of God, yet the right of election (whether it be to civil or eccleſiaſ⯑tical offices) is ineſtimable, and above price; ſo that no plea of expedience, or even of "neceſſity," can juſtify the groſs diſhoneſty of infringing it. They might as well perſuade us to cut off our legs, leſt we ſhould ſtrain our ancles in walking! or abſolutely to prohibit all men from riding on horſeback, becauſe ſome men have had dangerous falls, and others have acci⯑dentally loſt their lives by it! yet ſuch arguments are not more groſsly abſurd than this pretence of tumults as a reaſon for robbing the people of their election rights; and yet this abſurdity prevailed in the 36th council of Conſtantinople, though the popular right was expreſsly allowed! ‘On a longtemps conſervé [333]aux laics LE DROIT d'aſſiſter aux élec⯑tions,’ (ſays Herycourt in his Analyſe, p. 17.) ‘et d'y donner leur ſuffrage. La CONFUSION QUE POUVOIT CAUSER LA MULTITUDE DES ELECTEURS engagea à n'y admettre plus que la clergé. On en fit un decret exprès dans la VIII. concile général.’ [For ſo he ſtiles (but very improperly) the 36th council held at Conſtantinople, in 869.] ‘Ce changement n'a point empêché que l'on ne fut obligé de demander le conſentement des SOVE⯑REIGNS.’ And this obligation, to aſk the conſent of ſovereigns, monkiſh prelates were content to endure, (notwithſtand⯑ing that the interference of all ſecular Princes in epiſcopal elections is ſtrictly forbid by the canons of the primitive church, ſee p. 317.) provided they could but prevail on the Monarchs to join them in effecting an entire excluſion of the people's right to elect. However neither the mon⯑kiſh, [334]nor the monarchical, influence could entirely overcome the popular right in England, until many years afterwards, which I have already proved by ſeveral inconteſtible examples. But it was far otherwiſe in France: for, even in the ſame century, (ninth,) the Kings of France (inſtead of maintaining equal juſtice be⯑tween the clergy and people, like their pre⯑deceſſors Charles the Great, and Lewis I. and II.) now claimed to themſelves the NO⯑MINATION of BISHOPS; of which I find a memorandum in the learned Dr. Mangey's Notitia Eccleſiaſtica, before cited, viz. "It ſeems" (ſays he) ‘that in the ninth century the kings of France claimed the NOMINATION of Biſhops.’ And, if this monarchical uſurpation of the moſt eſſen⯑tial popular right in the Chriſtian church was not actually promoted by the Roman "myſtery of iniquity," (for I have already given an inſtance of Pope Saint Zacha⯑riah's [335]plenary indulgence to ſuch diſhoneſty, ſee p. 315.) it had, at leaſtafterwards, the expreſs conſent of the Roman court, provi⯑ded that the papal ſhare of the unlawful plunder might be admitted with it: and accordingly we read of ‘THE CON⯑CORDATE’ (as formerly between the murderer Herod and Pontius Pilate, now alſo) ‘between Pope Leo X. and K. Francis: The Pope COLLATES upon the King's NOMINATION.’ This memo⯑randum I found in Dr. Mangey's Notitia Eccleſiaſtica, for which he cites Herycourt, lib. 1. c. 6. ‘Le CONCORDAT fait entre Leon X. et François I. a transferé à nos Rois tout le DROIT des électeurs.’ ‘The concordate made between Leo X. and K. Francis I. hath transferred to our Kings all the right of the electors.’ This indiſcriminate writer could not per⯑ceive (or, if he did, he muſt be charged with a much worſe fault than indiſcrimi⯑nation) [336]that the DROIT of the electors could not be transferred by thoſe who had no right in it; and, conſequently, that the kings of France do not exerciſe a DROIT, but a TORT, as long as their unjuſt uſurpation of the DROIT conti⯑nues; and I wiſh I could ſpeak more fa⯑vourably of the uſurpation of our elective rights in England!

The rights of epiſcopal elections, as well as the nature of the epiſcopal office itſelf, have, indeed, been ſubjects of much controverſy in the Chriſtian church; and the ſeveral diſſentients, that have hither⯑to publiſhed their opinions, might long ago have approached much nearer to an agreement in the happy medium of truth, had they been endued with ſufficient im⯑partiality; but this, alas! has been too much wanting on every ſide of the con⯑troverſy. The epiſcopalians, on the one hand, though they have, in general, [337]well maintained and proved the nature and efficacy of the epiſcopal function, and the exerciſe of it in every age of the church, clearly diſtinct from the office of mere preſbyters, (demonſtrating that, though every biſhop muſt be a preſbyter, yet that every preſbyter moſt certainly was not a biſhop,) nevertheleſs, on the point of epiſ⯑copal elections, they have either been to⯑tally ſilent like the learned Archbiſhop Uſher ^*, in his excellent little tract, ‘De [338]epiſcoporum et metropolitanorum origine,’ and Dr. Cave, in his learned and laborious [339] ‘Diſſertation concerning the government of the ANCIENT CHURCH by Bi⯑ſhops, [340]Metropolitans, and Patriarchs,’) or elſe have expreſſed a great degree of [341]prejudice againſt all ancient teſtimonies, which tend to juſtify any claim of popular [342]or congregational right in the choice of Bi⯑ſhops; and zealouſly oppoſing thereto a [343]multitude of precedents, wherein the im⯑perial or royal power has been exerciſed [344]in the appointment of Biſhops, and, like the indiſcriminate Herecourt before quo⯑ted, not diſcerning that the latter are pre⯑cedents only of uſurpation, not of right! Thoſe of the oppoſite party, the preſbyte⯑rians, (who attribute the dignity and func⯑tion [345]of Biſhops to their Preſbyters ^*, and alſo more particularly the Independents, [346]who, together with them, contend for the congregational or popular right to ELECT, [347]are apt to lay too much ſtreſs (perhaps) on this external circumſtance of FREE ELEC⯑TION; [348]for they generally conſider it as eſſential to the ſacerdotal function; where⯑as, [349]in fact, it is only expedient and deſira⯑ble, but not abſolutely neceſſary, being, [350]indeed, the moſt prudent mode of intro⯑duction to the conſtituting rite of conſe⯑cration, [351]but no part of the rite itſelf, which conſiſts only of ſolemn prayer, with the laying on of hands; in which latter, the laity can have no pretence to interfere ^*. [352]But this primitive rite of the church, the laying on of hands, is publicly rejected by [353]many of the Independent and Socinian miniſters. ‘The ceremony of THE IM⯑POSITION OF HANDS’ (ſays one of them, for inſtance, in reporting the cha⯑racter of an eminent Socinian Preacher) ‘he alſo refuſed to ſubmit to, becauſe he conſidered it as void of any juſt meaning, where no extraordinary gifts are, or can be, imparted.’ This opinion of ‘the impoſition of hands,’ muſt have been too haſtily taken up, becauſe it is certain⯑ly erroneous. The fact is, that this ce⯑remony, like all other outward rites, that were inſtituted by Chriſt, or his Apoſtles, may, or may not, be efficacious, according to the inward diſpoſition, or ſincerity, of the perſon to whom the outward rite is adminiſtered.

[354]Neither the adminiſtration of baptiſm, nor the participation of the Lord's Supper, [355]can impart any good effect on thoſe who receive them unworthily, without ſince⯑rity, [356]without regard to the internal and ſpiritual ^* ſignification; but merely to [357]pleaſe men by an outward conformity to the ceremonies for ſome worldly advan⯑tage, [358]or favour, as many do by way of teſt: to ſuch men "no extraordinary gifts [359]are, or can be, imparted" by theſe out⯑ward rites, which, on the contrary, ra⯑ther increaſe their condemnation. For though very worthy miniſters, who offi⯑ciate therein, or adminiſter theſe outward rites, may be deceived by the outward de⯑portment of the perſons to be baptized, or communicating, yet God's Holy Spirit is not to be mocked, as we learn by the ſad example of Ananias and Saphira, whoſe diſſimulation was puniſhed by an imme⯑diate ſtroke from God, to impreſs the in⯑fant church with a due ſenſe of the Al⯑mighty Power, and the neceſſity of ſince⯑rity in all things pertaining to God's Ser⯑vice. Such extraordinary outward mani⯑feſtations of God's Spirit are not now to [360]be expected; it is ſufficient that they con⯑tinued until authentic hiſtorical accounts of our holy religion were diſperſed, in writing, throughout the greateſt part of the known world, and the canon of the ſacred Scriptures completed, in which ample accounts of them are related; ſo that we may ſay of the New Teſtament, as our Lord ſaid of the Old Teſtament, adding, to the neceſſity of believing Moſes and the Prophets, the neceſſary belief, alſo, of the New Teſtament, that the men who believe not theſe additional teſtimo⯑nies, of Chriſt's Diſciples and witneſſes, would not believe, even if one ſhould riſe from the dead! Thus it appears, that the extraordinary outward manifeſtations of God's Spirit, in working miracles, are no longer neceſſary for the edification of the church; but we muſt not, therefore, ſay that ‘no extraordinary gifts are, or can be, imparted!’ For miracles are not the only teſt of the real inſpiration of God's [361]Holy Spirit, but love, good works, and hold⯑ing faſt the faith, which was once delivered to the Saints: Theſe are the fruits by which we are to judge of the tree; and, without theſe, even miracles are to be ſuſpected of deluſion, and are to be eſ⯑teemed rather as the lying wonders of Satan than as the works of God! The power of working miracles, therefore, is not ſuch an "extraordinary gift," as we have any right to look for, or to expect under the preſent diſpenſation of the chriſtian religion; and yet ‘the gift of God's ſpirit’ (which every true Chriſ⯑tian has a right to expect, according to the unqueſtionable promiſes of Chriſt) is certainly "an extraordinary gift," and is as certainly "imparted" to all that duly aſk it in the meritorious name of our Redeemer, if we may confide in the truth of the holy Scriptures! It is always "an extraordinary gift," (though ‘im⯑parted’ [362]according to the ordinary diſ⯑penſation of our religion,) becauſe it ſup⯑ports and endows pious and worthy men, on many occaſions, far beyond their ordi⯑nary, or natural, abilities and ſtrength. It is, I ſay, a real addition to the ordinary na⯑ture of man, and therefore always ‘an extraordinary gift;’ being nothing leſs than a real participation ‘of the DIVINE NATURE,’ of which we may, if we will, be partakers ( [...]) through the ‘exceeding great and precious promiſes’ of that divine perſon ‘that hath called us to glory and virtue.’ See 2 Pet. i. 3, 4.

If men are thus aſſured that this ‘ex⯑traordinary gift’ may be obtained by aſking, according to Chriſt's directions, they ſurely cannot doubt of its being ‘im⯑parted’ when they aſk it in a more particular manner on great and ſolemn occaſions, as at the baptiſm of adults, or [363]the confirmation of perſons that have been baptized in their infancy; and at the ſa⯑cramental commemoration of Chriſt's death, according to our Lord's own inſti⯑tution: theſe outward rites cannot impart the extraordinary gift; but the goodneſs and truth of God are abſolutely pledged (if I may uſe ſuch an expreſſion) to ful⯑fil the ‘exceeding great and precious pro⯑miſes’ in favour of prayer for that ex⯑traordinary gift: and ſuch prayer (having this the object) doth always make a part of thoſe ſolemn rites; whereby they are moſt certainly rendered efficacious, if ſincerity be not wanting in thoſe perſons to whom they are adminiſtered.

And it is exactly the ſame thing with reſpect to "the impoſition of hands," (ei⯑ther in the conſecration of Biſhops, or in the ordination of Prieſts and of Deacons,) becauſe that ancient rite of Chriſt's church is always performed with ſolemn prayer, in [364]Chriſt's name, for the Holy Spirit to guide and aſſiſt the perſons conſecrated or or⯑dained; and the prayers of the congre⯑gation are alſo deſired on their behalf; and therefore, if the perſons elected to be conſecrated for the office and dignity of Biſhops, and the candidates for Prieſts, or Deacons orders, are really ſincere them⯑ſelves in their prayers and undertakings, there is no doubt but ‘the laying on of hands,’ thus accompanied with ſuita⯑ble prayer and devotion, is truly effica⯑cious, and doth ‘impart the extraordi⯑nary gift’ abovementioned. For the action of "laying on hands" hath nothing in it indecent, immoral, or contrary to God's laws, ſuch as might be ſuppoſed to hinder the good effect of Chriſt's abſolute promiſes to them that aſk; but, on the contrary, is authenticated and ſanctified by apoſtolic uſage, declared in canonical [365]Scripture, as well as by the conſtant ſub⯑ſequent practice of all the primitive churches of Chriſt; and ought not, there⯑fore, to be laid aſide on the groundleſs pretence that ‘no extraordinary gifts are, or can be, imparted.’