PART I.

THERE is a Principle, ſuppos'd to prevail a⯑mongſt many, which is utterly incompatible with all Virtue or moral Sentiment; and as it can proceed from nothing but the moſt deprav'd Diſpo⯑ſition, ſo in its Turn it tends ſtill farther to foſter and encourage that Depravity. This Principle is, that all Benevolence is mere Hypocriſy, Friendſhip a Cheat, Public Spirit a Farce, Fidelity a Snare to procure Truſt and Confidence; and while all of us, at the Bottom, purſue only our private Intereſt, we wear theſe fair Diſguiſes, in order to put others off their Guard, and expoſe them the more to our Wiles and Machinations. What Heart one muſt be poſſeſs'd of, who profeſſes ſuch Principles, and who feels no internal Sentiment to belye ſo pernicious a Theory, 'tis eaſy to imagine: And alſo, what Degree of Af⯑fection and Benevolence he can bear to a Species, [12] whom he repreſents under ſuch odious Colours, and ſuppoſes ſo little ſuſceptible of Gratitude or any Re⯑turn of Affection. Or if we will not aſcribe theſe Principles altogether to a corrupted Heart, we muſt, at leaſt, account for them from the moſt careleſs and precipitate Examination. Superficial Reaſoners, indeed, obſerving many falſe Pretences amongſt Mankind, and feeling, perhaps, no very ſtrong Re⯑ſtraint in their own Diſpoſition, might draw a general and a haſty Concluſion, that all is equally corrupted, and that Men, different from all other Animals, and indeed from all other Species of Exiſtence, admit of no Degrees of Good or Bad, but are, in every In⯑ſtance, the ſame Creatures, under different Diſguiſes and Appearances.

THERE is another Principle, ſomewhat reſembling, the former; which has been much inſiſted on by Philoſophers, and has been the Foundation of many a fair Syſtem; that whatever Affection one may feel, or imagine he feels for others, no Paſſion is, or can be diſintereſted; that the moſt generous Friendſhip, however ſincere, is a Modification of Self-love; and, that even unknown to Ourſelves, we ſeek only our Gratification, while we appear the moſt deeply en⯑gag'd in Schemes for the Liberty and Happineſs of Mankind. By a Turn of Imagination, by a Refine⯑ment of Reflection, by an Enthuſiaſin of Paſſion, [13] we ſeem to take Part in the Intereſts of others, and imagine Ourſelves diveſted of all ſelfiſh Views and Conſiderations: But at the Bottom, the moſt generous Patriot and moſt niggardly Miſer, the braveſt Hero and moſt abject Coward, have, in every Action, an equal Regard to their own Happineſs and Welfare.

WHOEVER concludes, from the ſeeming Tendency of this Opinion, that thoſe, who make Profeſſion of it, cannot poſſibly feel the true Sentiments of Bene⯑volence, or have any Regard for genuine Virtue, will often find himſelf, in Practice, very much miſtaken. Probity and Honour were no Strangers to Epicurus and his Sect. Atticus and Horace ſeem to have en⯑joy'd from Nature, and cultivated by Reflection, as generous and friendly Diſpoſitions as any Diſciple of the auſterer Schools. And amongſt the Moderns, Hobbes and Locke, who maintain'd the ſelfiſh Syſtem of Morals, liv'd moſt irreproachable Lives; tho' the former lay not under any Reſtraints of Religion, which might ſupply the Defects of his Philoſophy.

AN Epicurean or a Hobbiſt readily allows, that there is ſuch a Thing as Friendſhip in the World, without Hypocriſy or Diſguiſe; tho' he may attempt, by a philoſophical Chymiſtry, to reſolve the Elements of this Paſſion, if I may ſo ſpeak, into thoſe of another, and explain every Affection to be Self-love, twiſted [14] and moulded into a Variety of Shapes and Appear⯑ances. But as the ſame Turn of Imagination pre⯑vails not in every Man, nor gives the ſame Direction to the original Paſſion; this is ſufficient, even ac⯑cording to the ſelfiſh Syſtem, to make the wideſt Dif⯑ference in human Characters, and denominate one Man virtuous and humane, another vicious and meanly intereſted. I eſteem the Man, whoſe Self⯑love, by whatever Means, is ſo directed as to give him a Concern for others, and render him ſerviceable to Society: As I hate or deſpiſe him, who has no Regard to any Thing beyond his own pitiful Gratifi⯑cations and Enjoyments. In vain would you ſuggeſt, that theſe Characters, tho' ſeemingly oppoſite, are, at the Bottom, the ſame, and that a very inconſider⯑able Turn of Imagination forms the whole Difference betwixt them. Each Character, notwithſtanding theſe inconſiderable Differences, appears to me, in Practice, pretty durable and untranſmutable. And I find not, in this, more than in other Subjects, that the natural Sentiments, ariſing from the general Ap⯑pearances of Things, are eaſily deſtroy'd by reſin'd Reflections concerning the minute Origin of theſe Appearances. Does not the lively, cheerful Colour of a Countenance inſpire me with Complacency and Pleaſure; even tho' I learn from Philoſophy, that all Difference of Complexion ariſes from the moſt mi⯑nute [15] Differences of Thickneſs, in the moſt minute Parts of the Skin; by which Differences one Super⯑ficies is qualify'd to reflect one of the original Colours of Light, and abſorb the others?

BUT tho' the Queſtion, concerning the univerſal or partial Selfiſhneſs of Man, be not ſo material, as is uſually imagin'd, to Morality and Practice, it is certainly of great Conſequence in the ſpeculative Science of human Nature, and is a proper Object of Curioſity and Enquiry. It may not, therefore, be improper, in this Place, to beſtow a few Reflections upon it^*.

THE moſt obvious Objection to the ſelfiſh Hypo⯑theſis, is, that being contrary to common Feeling and our moſt unprejudic'd Notions and Opinions; there [16] is requir'd the higheſt Stretch of Philoſophy to eſta⯑bliſh ſo extraordinary a Paradox. To the moſt care⯑leſs Obſerver, there appear to be ſuch Diſpoſitions as Benevolence and Generoſity; ſuch Affections as Love, Friendſhip, Compaſſion, Gratitude. Theſe Sentiments have their Cauſes, Effects, Objects, and Operations, markt by common Language and Obſer⯑vation, and plainly diſtinguiſh'd from the ſelfiſh Paſ⯑ſions. And as this is the obvious Appearance of Things, it muſt be admitted; till ſome Hypotheſis be diſcover'd, which, by penetrating deeper into human Nature, may prove the former Affections to be No⯑thing but Modifications of the latter. All Attempts of this Kind have hitherto prov'd fruitleſs, and ſeem to have proceeded entirely from that Love of Simpli⯑city, which has been the Source of much falſe Rea⯑ſoning in Philoſophy. I ſhall not here enter into any Detail on the preſent Subject. Many able Philoſo⯑phers have ſhown the Inſufficiency of theſe Syſtems. And I ſhall take for granted what, I believe, the ſmalleſt Reflection will make evident to every impar⯑tial Enquirer.

BUT the Nature of the Subject furniſhes the ſtrong⯑eſt Preſumption, that no better Syſtem will ever, for the future, be invented, to account for the Origin of the benevolent from the ſelfiſh Affections, and reduce all the various Emotions of the human Mind to a per⯑fect [17] Simplicity and Uniformity. The Caſe is not the ſame in this Species of Philoſophy as in Phyſics. Many an Hypotheſis in Nature, contrary to firſt Ap⯑pearances, has been found, on more accurate Scru⯑tiny, ſolid and ſatisfactory. Inſtances of this Kind are ſo frequent, that a judicious, as well as witty Phi⯑loſopher ^* has ventur'd to affirm, if there be more than one Way, in which any Phaenomenon may be produc'd, that there is a general Preſumption for its ariſing from the Cauſes, which are the leaſt obvious and familiar. But the Preſumption always lies on the other Side, in all Enquiries concerning the Origin of our Paſſions, and the internal Operations of the hu⯑man Mind. The ſimpleſt and moſt obvious Cauſe, that can there be aſſign'd for any Phaenomenon, is probably the true one. When a Philoſopher, in the Explication of his Syſtem, is oblig'd to have Recourſe to ſome very intricate and refin'd Reflections, and to ſuppoſe them eſſential to the Production of any Paſ⯑ſion or Emotion, we have Reaſon to be extremely on our Guard againſt ſo fallacious an Hypotheſis. The Affections are not ſuſceptible of any Impreſſion from the Refinements of Reaſon or Imagination; and 'tis always found, that a vigorous Exertion of the latter Faculties, from the narrow Capacity of the human Mind, deſtroys all Energy and Activity in the former. [18] Our predominant Motive or Intention is, indeed, frequently conceal'd from Ourſelves, when it is mingled and confounded with others, which the Mind, from Vanity or Self-conceit, is deſirous of ſuppoſing of greater Force and Influence: But there is no Inſtance, that a Concealment of this Nature has ever ariſen from the Abſtruſeneſs and Intricacy of the Motive. A Man, who has loſt a Friend and Patron, may flatter himſelf, that all his Grief ariſes from generous Sentiments, without any Mixture of narrow or intereſted Conſiderations: But a Man, who grieves for a valuable Friend, that needed his Patron⯑age and Protection; how can we ſuppoſe, that his paſſionate Tenderneſs ariſes from ſome metaphyſical Regards to a Self-intereſt, which has no Foundation or Reality? We may as well imagine, that minute Wheels and Springs, like thoſe of a Watch, give Motion to a loaded Waggon, as account for the Origin of Paſſion from ſuch abſtruſe Reflections.

ANIMALS are found ſuſceptible of Kindneſs, both to their own Species and to ours; nor is there, in this Caſe, the leaſt Suſpicion of Diſguiſe or Artifice. Shall we account for all their Sentiments too, from refin'd Deductions of Self-intereſt? Or if we ad⯑mit a diſintereſted Benevolence in the inferior Species, by what Rule of Analogy can we refuſe it in the Su⯑perior?

[19] LOVE betwixt the Sexes begets a Complacency and Good-will, very diſtinct from the Gratification of an Appetite. Tenderneſs to their Offspring, in all ſenſible Beings, is commonly able alone to counterballance the ſtrongeſt Motives of Self-love, and has no Manner of Dependance on that Affection. What Intereſt can a fond Mother have in View, who loſes her Health by aſſiduous Attendance on her ſick Child, and afterwards languiſhes, and dies for Grief, when freed, by its Death, from the Slavery of that Attendance?

Is Gratitude no Affection of the human Breaſt, or is that a Word merely, without any Meaning or Reality? Have we no Complacency or Satisfaction in one Man's Company above another's, and no Deſire of the Welfare of our Friend, even tho' Abſence or Death ſhould prevent us from all Participation in it? Or what is it commonly, that gives us any Partici⯑pation in it, even while alive and preſent, but our Affection and Regard to him?

THESE and a thouſand other Inſtances are Marks of a generous Benevolence in human Nature, where no real Intereſt binds us to the Object. And how an imaginary Intereſt, known and avow'd for ſuch, can be the Origin of any Paſſion or Emotion, ſeems dif⯑ficult [20] to explain. No ſatisfactory Hypotheſis of this Kind has yet been diſcover'd; nor is there the ſmalleſt Probability, that the future Induſtry of Men will ever be attended with more favourable Succeſs.

BUT farther, if we conſider rightly of the Matter, we ſhall find, that the Hypotheſis, which allows of a diſintereſted Benevolence, diſtinct from Self-love, has really more Simplicity in it, and is more conformable to the Analogy of Nature, than that which pretends to reſolve all Friendſhip and Humanity into this latter Principle. There are bodily Wants or Appetites, acknowledged by every one, which neceſſarily pre⯑cede all ſenſual Enjoyment, and carry us directly to ſeek Poſſeſſion of the Object. Thus, Hunger and Thirſt have eating and drinking for their End; and from the Gratification of theſe primary Appetites ariſes a Pleaſure, which may become the Object of another Species of Deſire or Inclination, that is ſe⯑condary and intereſted. In the ſame Manner, there are mental Paſſions, by which we are impell'd immediately to ſeek particular Objects, ſuch as Fame or Power or Vengeance, without any Regard to Intereſt; and when theſe Objects are attain'd, a pleaſing Enjoyment enſues, as the Conſequence of our indulg'd Affections. Nature muſt, by the internal Frame and Conſtitution of the Mind, give an origi⯑nal Propenſity to Fame, 'ere we can reap any Pleaſure [21] from it, or purſue it from Motives of Self-love, and a Deſire of Happineſs. If I have no Vanity, I take no Delight in Praiſe: If I be void of Ambition, Power gives no Enjoyment: If I be not angry, the Puniſhment of an Adverſary is totally indifferent to me. In all theſe Caſes, there is a Paſſion, which points immediately to the Object, and conſtitutes it our Good or Happineſs; as there are other ſecon⯑dary Paſſions, which afterwards ariſe, and purſue it as a Part of our Happineſs, when once it is conſti⯑tuted ſuch, by our original Affections. Were there no Appetites of any Kind, antecedent to Self-love, that Propenſity could ſcarce ever exert itſelf; becauſe we ſhould, in that Caſe, have felt few and ſlender Pains or Pleaſures, and have little Miſery or Happi⯑neſs, to avoid or to purſue.

Now where is the Difficulty of conceiving, that this may likewiſe be the Caſe with Benevolence and Friendſhip, and that, from the original Frame of our Temper, we may feel a Deſire of another's Happi⯑neſs or Good, which, by Means of that Affection, becomes our own Good, and is afterwards purſued, from the conjoin'd Motives of Benevolence and Self-enjoyment? Who ſees not that Vengeance, from the Force alone of Paſſion, may be ſo eagerly pur⯑ſued, as to make us knowingly neglect every Conſi⯑deration of Eaſe, Intereſt, or Safety; and, like [22] ſome vindictive Animals, infuſe our very Souls into the Wounds we give an Enemy^*? And what a ma⯑lignant Philoſophy muſt it be, that will not allow, to Humanity and Friendſhip, the ſame Privileges, which are indiſputably granted to the darker Paſſions of En⯑mity and Reſentment? Such a Philoſophy is more like a Satyr, than a true Delineation or De⯑ſcription, of human Nature; and may be a good Foundation for paradoxical Wit and Raillery, but is a very bad one for any ſerious Argument or Reaſon⯑ing.

PART II.

IT may be eſteem'd, perhaps, a ſuperfluous Task to prove, that the benevolent or ſofter Affections are VIRTUOUS; and wherever they appear, attract the Eſteem, Approbation, and Good-will of Mankind. The Epithets ſociable, good-natur'd, hu⯑mane, merciful, grateful, friendly, generous, beneficent, are known in all Languages, and univerſally expreſs the higheſt Merit, which human Nature is capable of attaining: Where theſe amiable Qualities are at⯑tended with Birth and Power and eminent Abilities, and diſplay themſelves in the good Government or [23] uſeful Inſtruction of Mankind, they ſeem even to raiſe the Poſſeſſors of them above the Rank of human Nature, and approach them, in ſome Meaſure, to the Divine. Exalted Capacity, undaunted Courage, proſperous Succeſs; theſe may only expoſe a Hero or Politician to the Envy and Malignity of the Pub⯑lic: But as ſoon as the Praiſes are added of humane and beneficent; when Inſtances are diſplay'd of Lenity, Tenderneſs, or Friendſhip; Envy itſelf is ſilent, or joins the general Voice of Applauſe and Acclamation.

WHEN Pericles, the great Athenian Stateſman and General, was on his Death-bed, his ſurrounding Friends, eſteeming him now inſenſible, began to indulge their Sorrow for their expiring Patron, by enumerating his great Qualities and Succeſſes, his Conqueſts and Victories, the unuſual Length of his Adminiſtration, and his nine Trophies, erected over the Enemies of the Republic. You forget, cries the dying Hero, who had heard all, you forget the moſt eminent of my Praiſes, while you dwell ſo much on thoſe vulgar Advantages, in which Fortune had a principal Share. You have not obſerv'd, that no Citizen has ever yet wore Mourning on my Account ^*.

[24] IN Men of more ordinary Talents and Capacity, the ſocial Virtues become, if poſſible, ſtill more eſ⯑ſentially requiſite; there being nothing eminent, in that Caſe, to compenſate for the Want of them, or preſerve the Perſon from our ſevereſt Hatred, as well as Contempt. A high Ambition, an elevated Cou⯑rage is apt, ſays Cicero, in leſs perfect Characters, to degenerate into a turbulent Ferocity. The more ſocial and ſofter Virtues are there chiefly to be re⯑garded. Theſe are always good and amiable^*.

THE principal Advantage, which Juvenal diſco⯑vers in the extenſive Capacity of the human Species, is, that it renders our Benevolence alſo more exten⯑ſive, and gives us larger Opportunities of ſpreading our kindly Influence than what are indulg'd to the inferior Creation^†. It muſt, indeed, be confeſt, that by doing Good only, can a Man truly enjoy the Advantages of being eminent. His exalted Station, of itſelf, but the more expoſes him to Tempeſt and Thunder. His ſole Prerogative is to afford Shelter to Inferiors, who repoſe themſelves under his Cover and Protection.

BUT I forget, that it is not my preſent Buſineſs to recommend Generoſity and Benevolence, or to paint, [25] in their true Colours, all the genuine Charms of the ſocial Virtues. Theſe, indeed, ſufficiently engage every Heart, on the firſt Apprehenſion of them; and 'tis difficult to abſtain from ſome Sally of Panegyric, as often as they occur in Diſcourſe or Reaſoning. But our Object here being more the ſpeculative, than the practical Part of Morals, 'twill ſuffice to remark, what will readily, I believe, be allow'd, that no Qualities are more entitled to the general Good-will and Approbation of Mankind, than Beneficence and Humanity, Friendſhip and Gratitude, Natural Af⯑fection and Public Spirit, or whatever proceeds from a tender Sympathy with others, and a generous Concern for our Kind and Species. Theſe, where⯑ever they appear, ſeem to transfuſe themſelves, in a Manner, into each Beholder, and to call forth, in their own Behalf, the ſame favourable and affection⯑ate Sentiments, which they exert on all around them.

PART III.

WE may obſerve, that, in diſplaying the Praiſes of any humane, beneficent Man, there is one Circumſtance, which never fails to be amply in⯑ſiſted on, viz. the Happineſs and Satisfaction, de⯑riv'd to Society from his Intercourſe and Good⯑offices. [26] To his Parents, we are apt to ſay, he en⯑dears himſelf, by his pious Attachment and duteous Care, ſtill more than by the Connexions of Nature. His Children never feel his Authority, but when em⯑ploy'd for their Advantage. With him, the Ties of Love are conſolidated by Beneficence and Friend⯑ſhip. The Ties of Friendſhip approach, in a fond Obſervance of ech obliging Office, to thoſe of Love and Inclination. His Domeſtics and Dependants have in him a ſure Reſource; and no longer dread the Power of Fortune, but ſo far as ſhe exerciſes it over him. From him, the hungry receive Food, the naked Cloathing, the ignorant and ſlothful Skill and Induſtry. Like the Sun, an inferior Miniſter of Providence, he cheers, invigorates, and ſuſtains the ſurrounding World.

Is conſin'd to private Life, the Sphere of his Ac⯑tivity is narrower; but his Influence is all benign and gentle. If exalted into a higher Station, Man⯑kind and Poſterity reap the Fruit of his Labours.

As theſe Topics of Praiſe never fail to be em⯑ploy'd, and with Succeſs, where we would inſpire Eſteem for any one; may we not thence conclude, that the UTILITY, reſulting from the ſocial Virtues, forms, at leaſt, a Part of their Merit, and [27] is one Source of that Approbation and Regard ſo uni⯑verſally pay'd them?

WHEN we recommend even an Animal or Plant as uſeful and beneficial, we give it an Applauſe and Re⯑commendation ſuited to its Nature. As on the other Hand, Reflection on the baneful Influence of any of theſe inferior Beings always inſpires us with the Sentiments of Averſion. The Eye is pleas'd with the Proſpect of Corn-fields and loaded Vine⯑yards; Horſes grazing, and Flocks paſturing: But flies the View of Bryars and Brambles, affording Shelter to Wolves and Serpents.

A Machine, a Piece of Furniture, a Garment, a Houſe, well contriv'd for Uſe and Conveniency, is ſo far beautiful, and is contemplated with Pleaſure and Approbation. An experienc'd Eye is here ſen⯑ſible to many Excellencies, which eſcape Perſons ignorant and uninſtructed.

CAN any Thing ſtronger be ſaid in Praiſe of a Profeſſion, ſuch as Merchandize or Manufactory, than to obſerve the Advantages, which it procures to Society? And is not a Monk and Inquiſitor en⯑rag'd, when we treat his Rank and Order as uſeleſs or pernicious to Mankind?

[28] THE Hiſtorian exults in diſplaying the Benefit ariſing from his Labours. The Writer of Romances alleviates or denies the bad Conſequences aſcrib'd to his Manner of Compoſition.

IN general, what Praiſe is imply'd in the ſimple Epithet, uſeful! What Reproach in the contrary!

YOUR Gods, ſays Cicero ^*, in Oppoſition to the Epicureans, cannot juſtly claim any Worſhip or Ado⯑ration, with whatever imaginary Perfections you may ſuppoſe them endow'd. They are totally uſeleſs and inactive. And even the Egyptians, whom you ſo much ridicule, never conſecrated any Animal but on Account of its Utility.

THE Sceptics aſſert^†, tho' abſurdly, that the Origin of all religious Worſhip was deriv'd from the Utility of inanimate Objects, as the Sun and Moon, to the Support and Well-being of Mankind. This is alſo the common Reaſon, aſſign'd by Hiſtorians, for the Deification of eminent Heroes and Legiſlators^‡.

To plant a Tree, to cultivate a Field, to beget Children; meritorious Acts, according to the Re⯑ligion of Zoroaſter.

[29] IN all Determinations of Morality, this Circum⯑ſtance of public Utility is ever principally in View; and wherever Diſputes ariſe, whether in Philoſophy or common Life, concerning the Bounds of Duty, the Queſtion cannot, by any Means, be decided with greater Certainty, than by aſcertaining, on any Side, the true Intereſts of Mankind. If any falſe Opinion, embrac'd from Appearances, has been found to prevail; as ſoon as farther Experience, and ſounder Reaſoning have given us juſter Notions of human Affairs; we retract our firſt Sentiments, and adjuſt a-new the Boundaries of moral Good and Evil.

ALMS to common Beggars is naturally prais'd; becauſe it ſeems to carry Relief to the diſtreſt and indigent: But when we obſerve the Encourage⯑ment thence ariſing to Idleneſs and Debauchery, we regard that Species of Charity rather as a Weakneſs than a Virtue.

Tyrannicide or the Aſſaſſination of Uſurpers and oppreſſive Princes was highly prais'd in antient Times; becauſe it both freed Mankind from many of theſe Monſters, and ſeem'd to keep the others in Awe, whom the Poinard or the Poiſon could not reach. But Hiſtory and Experience having ſince convinc'd [30] us, that this Practice encreaſes the Jealouſy and Cruelty of Princes; a Timoleon and a Brutus, tho' treated with Indulgence on Account of the Prejudices of their Times, are now conſider'd as very improper Models for Imitation.

LIBERATITY in Princes is regarded as a Mark of Beneficence: But when it occurs, that the homely Bread of the Honeſt and Induſtrious is often thereby converted into delicious Cates for the Idle and the Prodigal, we ſoon retract our heedleſs Praiſes. The Regrets of a Prince, for having loſt a Day, were noble and generous: But had he intended to have ſpent it in Acts of Generoſity to his greedy Courtiers, 'twas better loſt than miſemploy'd after that Man⯑ner.

LUXURY, or a Refinement on the Pleaſures and Conveniencies of Life, had long been ſuppos'd the Source of every Corruption and Diſorder in Go⯑vernment, and the immediate Cauſe of Faction, Sedition, civil Wars, and the total Loſs of Liberty. It was, therefore, univerſally regarded as a Vice, and was an Object of Declamation to all Satyriſts and ſevere Moraliſts. Thoſe, who prove, or at⯑tempt to prove, that ſuch Refinements rather tend to the Encreaſe of Induſtry, Civility, and Arts, regu⯑late a new our moral as well as political Sentiments, [31] and repreſent as laudable and innocent, what had formerly been regarded as pernicious and blame⯑able.

UPON the Whole, then, it ſeems undeniable, that there is ſuch a Sentiment in human Nature as diſ⯑intereſted Benevolence; that nothing can beſtow more Merit on any human Creature than the Poſ⯑ſeſſion of it in an eminent Degree; and that a Part, at leaſt, of its Merit ariſes from its Tendency to promote the Intereſts of our Species, and beſtow Happineſs on human Society. We carry our View into the ſalutary Conſequences of ſuch a Character and Diſpoſition; and whatever has ſo benign an In⯑fluence, and forwards ſo deſirable an End is beheld with Complacency and Pleaſure. The ſocial Vir⯑tues are never regarded without their beneficial Tendencies, nor view'd as barren and unfruitful. The Happineſs of Mankind, the Order of Society, the Harmony of Families, the mutual Support of Friends are always conſider'd as the Reſult of their gentle Dominion over the Breaſts of Men.

How conſiderable a Part of their Merit we ought to aſcribe to their Utility, will better appear from future Diſquiſitions^*; as well as the Reaſon, why this Circumſtance has ſuch a Command over our Eſteem and Approbation.^†.

PART I.

THAT JUSTICE is uſeful to Society, and conſequently that Part of its Merit, at leaſt, muſt ariſe from that Conſideration; 'twould be a⯑ſuperfluous Undertaking to prove. That public Utility is the ſole Origin of Juſtice, and that Re⯑flections on the beneficial Conſequences of this Vir⯑tue are the ſole Foundation of its Merit; this Pro⯑poſition, being more curious and important, will better deſerve our Examination and Enquiry.

LET us ſuppoſe, that Nature has beſtow'd on hu⯑man Race ſuch profuſe Abundance of all external Conveniencies, that, without any Uncertainty in the Event, without any Care or Induſtry on our Part, every Individual finds himſelf fully provided of [34] whatever his moſt voracious Appetites can want, or luxurious Imagination wiſh or deſire. His natural Beauty, we ſhall ſuppoſe, ſurpaſſes all acquir'd Or⯑naments: The perpetual Clemency of the Seaſons renders uſeleſs all Cloaths or Covering: The raw Herbage affords him the moſt delicious Fare; the clear Fountain, the richeſt Beverage. No laborious Occupation requir'd: No Tillage: No Navigation. Muſic, Poetry, and Contemplation form his ſole Buſineſs: Converſation, Mirth, and Friendſhip his ſole Amuſement.

IT ſeems evident, that, in ſuch a happy State, every other ſocial Virtue would flouriſh, and receive a tenfold Encreaſe; but the cautious, jealous Virtue of Juſtice would never once have been dreamt of. For what Purpoſe make a Partition of Goods, where every one has already more than enough? Why give Riſe to Property, where there cannot poſſibly be any Injury? Why call this Object mine, when, upon the Seizure of it by another, I need but ſtretch out my Hand to poſſeſs myſelf of what is equally valuable? Juſtice, in that Caſe, being totally USELESS, would be an idle Ceremonial, and could never poſſibly have Place amongſt the Cata⯑logue of Virtues.

[35] WE ſee, even in the preſent neceſſitous Condition of Mankind, that, wherever any Benefit is beſtow'd by Nature in an unlimited Abundance, we leave it always in common amongſt the whole human Race, and make no Subdiviſions of Right and Property. Water and Air, tho' the moſt neceſſary of all Ob⯑jects, are not challeng'd by Individuals; nor can any one commit Injuſtice by the moſt laviſh Uſe and Enjoyment of theſe Bleſſings. In fertile, extenſive Countries, with few Inhabitants, Land is regarded on the ſame Footing. And no Topic is ſo much in⯑ſiſted on by thoſe, who defend the Liberty of the Seas, as the unexhauſted Uſe of them in Navigation. Were the Advantages, procur'd by Navigation, as inexhauſtible, theſe Reaſoners never had had any Adverſaries to refute; nor had any Claims been ever advanc'd of a ſeparate, excluſive Dominion over the Ocean.

IT may happen in ſome Countries, at ſome Pe⯑riods, that there be eſtabliſh'd a Property in Water, none in Land^*; if the latter be in greater Abun⯑dance than can be us'd by the Inhabitants, and the former be found, with Difficulty, and in very ſmall Quantities.

[36] AGAIN; ſuppoſe, that, tho' the Neceſſities of hu⯑man Race continue the ſame as at preſent, yet the Mind is ſo enlarg'd, and ſo replete with Friendſhip and Generoſity, that every Man has the utmoſt Ten⯑derneſs for every Man, and feels no more Concern for his own Intereſt than for that of his Fellow: It ſeems evident, that the USE of Juſtice would, in this Caſe, be ſuſpended by ſuch an extenſive Bene⯑volence, nor would the Diviſions and Barriers of Property and Obligation have ever been thought of. Why ſhould I bind another, by a Deed or Promiſe, to do me any Good-office, when I know he is be⯑fore-hand prompted, by the ſtrongeſt Inclination, to ſeek my Happineſs, and would, of himſelf, per⯑form the deſir'd Service; except the Hurt, he there⯑by receives, be greater than the Benefit accruing to me: In which Caſe, he knows, that, from my in⯑nate Humanity and Friendſhip, I ſhould be the firſt to oppoſe myſelf to his imprudent Generoſity? Why raiſe Land-marks betwixt my Neighbour's Field and mine, when my Heart has made no Divi⯑ſion betwixt our Intereſts; but ſhares all his Joys and Sorrows with equal Force and Vivacity as if origi⯑nally my own? Every Man, upon this Suppoſition, being a Second-ſelf to another, would truſt all his Intereſts to the Diſcretion of every Man, without Jealouſy, without Partition, without Diſtinction. [37] And the whole Race of Mankind would form only one Family; where all lay in common, and was us'd, freely, without Regard to Property; but cau⯑tiouſly too, with as entire Regard to the Neceſſities of each Individual, as if our own Intereſts were moſt intimately concern'd.

IN the preſent Diſpoſition of the human Heart, 'twould, perhaps, be difficult to find compleat In⯑ſtances of ſuch enlarg'd Affections; but ſtill we may obſerve, that the Caſe of Families approaches to⯑wards it; and the ſtronger is the mutual Benevolence amongſt the Individuals, the nearer it approaches; till all Diſtinction of Property be, in a great Meaſure, loſt and confounded amongſt them. Be⯑twixt marry'd Perſons, the Cement of Friend⯑ſhip is by the Laws ſuppos'd ſo ſtrong as to aboliſh all Diviſion of Poſſeſſions; and has often, in Reality, the Force aſcribed to it. And 'tis obſervable, that, during the Ardour of new En⯑thuſiaſms, where every Principle is inflam'd into Extravagance, the Community of Goods has fre⯑quently been attempted; and nothing but Experience of its Inconveniencies, from the returning or diſ⯑guis'd Selfiſhneſs of Men, could make the imprudent Fanatics adopt a-new the Ideas of Juſtice and of ſe⯑parate Property. So true is it, that that Virtue de⯑rives [38] its Exiſtence altogether from its neceſſary Uſe to the Intercourſe and Society of Mankind.

To make this Truth more evident, let us reverſe the foregoing Suppoſitions; and carrying every Thing to the oppoſite Extreme, conſider what would be the Effect of theſe new Situations. Suppoſe a Society to fall into ſuch Want of all common Ne⯑ceſſaries, that the utmoſt Frugality and Induſtry can⯑not preſerve the greateſt Number from periſhing, and the whole from extreme Sufferance: It will readily, I believe, be admitted, that the ſtrict Laws of Juſtice are ſuſpended, in ſuch a preſſing Emer⯑gence, and give Place to the ſtronger Motives of Neceſſity and Self-preſervation. Is it any Crime, after a Shipwreck, to ſeize whatever Means or In⯑ſtrument of Safety one can lay hold of, without Re⯑gard to former Limitations of Property? Or if a City beſieg'd were ſtarving with Hunger; can we imagine, that Men will ſee any Means of Life be⯑fore them, and periſh, from a ſcrupulous Regard to what, in other Situations, would be the Rules of Equity and Juſtice? The USE and TENDENCY of that Virtue is to procure Happineſs and Security, by preſerving Order in Society: But where the So⯑ciety is ready to periſh from extreme Neceſſity, no greater Evil can be dreaded from Violence and In⯑ [...]uſtice; and every Man may now provide for himſelf, [39] by all Means, which Prudence can dictate, or Hu⯑manity permit. The Public, even in leſs urgent Ne⯑ceſſities, open Granaries, without the Conſent of Proprietors; as juſtly ſuppoſing, that the Authority of Magiſtracy may, conſiſtent with Equity, extend ſo far: But were any Number of Men to aſſemble, without the Tye of Laws or civil Juriſdiction; would an equal Partition of Bread in a Famine, even without the Proprietor's Conſent, be regarded as criminal or injurious?

SUPPOSE alſo, that it ſhould be a virtuous Man's Fate to fall into the Society of Ruffians, remote from the Protection of Laws and Government; what Conduct muſt he embrace in that melancholy Situation? He ſees ſuch a deſperate Rapaciouſneſs prevail; ſuch a Diſregard to Equity, ſuch Contempt of Order, ſuch ſtupid Blindneſs to future Conſe⯑quences, as muſt immediately have the moſt tragical Concluſion, and muſt terminate in Deſtruction to the greater Number, and in a total Diſſolution of Society to the reſt. He, mean while, can have no other Expedient, than to arm himſelf, to whom⯑ever the Sword he ſeizes, or the Buckler may be⯑long: Make Proviſion of all Means of Defence and Security: And his particular Regard to Juſtice being no longer of USE to his own Safety or that of others, he muſt conſult alone the Dictates of Self-preſervation, [40] without Concern for thoſe, who no longer merit his Care and Attention.

WHEN any Man, even in political Society, renders himſelf, by his Crimes, obnoxious to the Public, he is puniſh'd by the Laws in his Goods and Perſon; that is, the ordinary Rules of Juſtice are, with Re⯑gard to him, ſuſpended for a Moment, and it be⯑comes equitable to inflict on him, for the Benefit of Society, what, otherwiſe, he could not ſuffer with⯑out Wrong or Injury.

THE Rage and Violence of public War; what is it but a Suſpenſion of Juſtice amongſt the warring. Parties, who perceive, that that Virtue is now no longer of any Uſe or Advantage to them? The Laws of War, which then ſucceed to thoſe of Equity and Juſtice, are Rules calculated for the Advantage and Utility of that particular State, in which Men are now plac'd. And were a civiliz'd Nation engag'd with Barbarians, who obſerv'd no Rules even of War; the former muſt alſo ſuſpend their Obſervance of them, where they no longer ſerve to any Purpoſe; and muſt render every Action or Rencounter as bloody and pernicious as poſſible to the firſt Ag⯑greſſors.

[41] THUS the Rules of Equity or Juſtice depend en⯑tirely on the particular State and Condition, in which Men are plac'd, and owe their Origin and Exiſtence to that UTILITY, which reſults to the Public from their ſtrict and regular Obſervance. Reverſe, in any conſiderable Circumſtance, the Con⯑dition of Men: Produce extreme Abundance or extreme Neceſſity: Implant in the human Breaſt perfect Moderation and Humanity, or perfect Rapa⯑ciouſneſs and Malice: By rendering Juſtice totally uſeleſs, you thereby totally deſtroy its Eſſence, and ſuſpend its Obligation upon Mankind.

THE common Situation of Society is a Medium amidſt all theſe Extremes. We are naturally par⯑tial to Ourſelves, and to our Friends; but are ca⯑pable of learning the Advantage, reſulting from a more equal Conduct. Few Enjoyments are given us from the open and liberal Hand of Nature; but by Art, Labour, and Induſtry, we can extract them in great Abundance. Hence the Ideas of Pro⯑perty become neceſſary in all civil Society: Hence Juſtice derives its Uſefulneſs to the Public: And hence alone ariſes its Merit and moral Obligation.

THESE Concluſions are ſo natural and obvious, that they have not eſcap'd even the Poets, in their [42] Deſcriptions of the Felicity, attending the Golden Age or the Reign of Saturn. The Seaſons, in that firſt Period of Nature, were ſo temperate, if we credit theſe agreeable Fictions, that there was no Neceſſity for Men to provide themſelves with Cloaths and Houſes, as a Security againſt the Violence of Heat and Cold: The Rivers flow'd with Wine and Milk: The Oaks yielded Honey; and Nature ſpontaneouſly produc'd her greateſt Delicacies. Nor were theſe the chief Advantages of that happy Age. The Storms and Tempeſts were not alone remov'd from Nature; but thoſe more furious Tempeſts were unknown to human Breaſts, which now cauſe ſuch Uproar, and engender ſuch Confuſion. Avarice, Ambition, Cruelty, Selfiſhneſs were never heard of: Cordial Affection, Compaſſion, Sympathy were the only Movements, with which the Mind was yet ac⯑quainted. Even the punctilious Diſtinction of Mine and Thine was baniſh'd from amongſt that happy Race of Mortals, and carry'd with it the very No⯑tion of Property and Obligation, Juſtice and In⯑juſtice.

THIS poetical Fiction of the Golden Age is, in ſome Reſpects, of a Piece with the philoſophical Fiction of the State of Nature; only that the former is re⯑preſented as the moſt charming and moſt peaceable Condition, that can poſſibly be imagin'd; whereas the [43] latter is pointed out as a State of mutual War and Violence, attended with the moſt extreme Neceſſity. On the firſt Origin of Mankind, as we are told, their Ignorance and ſavage Nature were ſo prevalent, that they could give no mutual Truſt, but muſt each depend upon himſelf, and his own Force or Cunning for Protection and Security. No Law was heard of: No Rule of Juſtice known: No Diſtinction of Pro⯑perty regarded: Power was the only Meaſure of Right; and a perpetual War of All againſt All was the Reſult of their untam'd Selfiſhneſs and Barba⯑rity^*.

[44] WHETHER ſuch a Condition of human Nature could ever exiſt, or if it did, could continue ſo long as to merit the Appellation of a State, may juſtly be doubted. Men are neceſſarily born in a Family-ſociety, at leaſt; and are train'd up by their Parents to ſome Rule of Conduct and Behaviour. But this muſt be admitted, that if ſuch a State of mutual War and Violence was ever real, the Suſpenſion of all Laws of Juſtice, from their abſolute Inutility, is a neceſſary and infallible Conſequence.

THE more we vary our Views of human Life, and the newer and more unuſual the Lights are, in which we ſurvey it, the more ſhall we be convinc'd, that the Origin here aſſign'd for the Virtue of Juſtice is real and ſatisfactory.

WERE there a Species of Creatures, intermingied with Men, which, tho' rational, were poſſeſt of ſuch [45] inferior Strength, both of Body and Mind, that they were incapable of all Reſiſtance, and could never, upon the higheſt Provocation, make us feel the Effects of their Reſentment; the neceſſary Con⯑ſequence, I think, is, that we ſhould be bound, by the Laws of Humanity, to give gentle Uſage to theſe Creatures, but ſhould not, properly ſpeaking, lie under any Reſtraint of Juſtice with Regard to them, nor could they poſſeſs any Right or Property, excluſive of ſuch arbitrary Lords. Our Intercourſe with them could not be call'd Society, which ſup⯑poſes a Degree of Equality; but abſolute Command on the one Side, and ſervile Obedience on the other. Whatever we covet, they muſt inſtantly reſign: Our Permiſſion is the only Tenure, by which they hold their Poſſeſſions: Our Compaſſion and Kindneſs the only Check, by which they curb our lawleſs Will: And as no Inconvenience ever reſults from the Ex⯑erciſe of a Power, ſo firmly eſtabliſh'd in Nature, the Reſtraints of Juſtice and Property, being totally uſeleſs, would never have Place, in ſo unequal a Con⯑federacy.

THIS is plainly the Situation of Men with regard to Animals; and how far theſe may be ſaid to poſ⯑ſeſs Reaſon, I leave it to others to determine. The great Superiority of civiliz'd Europeans above bar⯑barous Indians, tempted us to imagine ourſelves on [46] the ſame Footing with regard to them, and made us throw off all Reſtraints of Juſtice, and even of Hu⯑manity, in our Treatment of them. In many Na⯑tions, the female Sex are reduc'd to like Slavery, and are render'd incapable of all Property, in Op⯑poſition to their lordly Maſters. But tho' the Males, when united, have, in all Countries, brute Force ſufficient to maintain this ſevere Tyranny; yet ſuch are the Inſinuation, Addreſs, and Charms of their fair Companions, that they are commonly able to break the Confederacy, and ſhare with the ſuperior Sex in all the Rights and Privileges of Society.

WERE the human Species ſo fram'd by Nature as that each Individual poſſeſt within himſelf every Faculty, requiſite both for his own Preſervation and for the Propagation of his Kind: Were all Society and Intercourſe cut off betwixt Man and Man, by the primary Intention of the ſupreme Creator: It ſeems evident, that ſo ſolitary a Being would be as much incapable of Juſtice, as of ſocial Diſcourſe and Converſation. Where mutual Regards and For⯑bearance ſerve no Manner of Purpoſe, they would never direct the Conduct of any reaſonable Man. The headlong Courſe of the Paſſions would be check'd by no Reflection on future Conſequences. And as each Man is here ſuppos'd to love himſelf alone, and to depend only on himſelf and his own [47] Activity for Safety and Happineſs, he would, on every Occaſion, to the utmoſt of his Power, chal⯑lenge the Preference above every other Being, to whom he is not bound by any Ties, either of Nature or of Intereſt.

BUT ſuppoſe the Conjunction of the Sexes to be eſtabliſh'd in Nature, a Family immediately ariſes; and particular Rules being found requiſite for its Subſiſtance, theſe are immediately embrac'd; tho' without comprehending the reſt of Mankind within their Preſcriptions. Suppoſe, that ſeveral Families unite together into one Society, which is totally diſ⯑join'd from all others, the Rules, which preſerve Peace and Order, enlarge themſelves to the utmoſt Extent of that Society; but, being entirely uſeleſs, loſe their Force when carry'd one Step farther. But again ſuppoſe, that ſeveral diſtinct Societies main⯑tain a Kind of Entercourſe for mutual Convenience and Advantage, the Boundaries of Juſtice ſtill grow larger and larger, in Proportion to the Largeneſs of Men's Views, and the Force of their mutual Con⯑nexions. Hiſtory, Experience, Reaſon ſufficiently inſtruct us in this natural Progreſs of human Senti⯑ments, and the gradual Encreaſe of our Regards to Property and Juſtice in Proportion as we become acquainted with the extenſive Utility of that Virtue.

PART II.

IF we examine all the particular Laws, by which Juſtice is directed, and Property determin'd; we ſhall ſtill be preſented with the ſame Concluſion. The Good of Mankind is the only Object of all theſe Laws and Regulations. Not only 'tis requiſite, for the Peace and Intereſt of Society, that Men's Poſſeſſions ſhould be ſeparated; but the Rules, which we follow in making the Separation, are ſuch as can beſt be contriv'd to ſerve farther the Intereſts of Society.

WE ſhall ſuppoſe, that a Creature, poſſeſt of Reaſon, but unacquainted with human Nature, de⯑liberates with himſelf what RULES of Juſtice or Property would beſt promote public Intereſt, and eſtabliſh Peace and Security amongſt Mankind: His moſt obvious Thought would be, to aſſign the largeſt Poſſeſſions to the moſt extenſive Virtue, and give every one the Power of doing Good, propor⯑tion'd to his Inclination. In a perfect Theocracy, where a Being, infinitely intelligent, governs by par⯑ticular Volitions, this Rule would certainly have Place, and might ſerve the wiſeſt Purpoſes: But were Mankind to execute ſuch a Law; (ſo great is the Uncertainty of Merit, both from its natural Ob⯑ſcurity, [49] and from the Self-conceit of each Indivi⯑dual) that no determinate Rule of Conduct would ever reſult from it; and the total Diſſolution of So⯑ciety muſt be the immediate Conſequence. Fanatics may ſuppoſe, that Dominion is founded in Grace, and that Saints alone inherit the Earth; but the civil Magiſtrate very juſtly puts theſe ſublime Theoriſts on the ſame Footing with common Robbers, and teaches them, by the ſevereſt Diſcipline, that a Rule, which, in Speculation, may ſeem the moſt advanta⯑geous to Society, may yet be found, in Practice, to⯑tally pernicious and deſtructive.

THAT there were religious Fanatics of this kind in England, during the civil Wars, we learn from Hiſtory; tho' 'tis probable, that the obvious Ten⯑dency of theſe Principles excited ſuch Horrour in Mankind, as ſoon oblig'd the dangerous Enthuſiaſts to renounce, or at leaſt conceal their Tenets. Per⯑haps, the Levellers, who claim'd an equal Diſtribu⯑tion of Property, were a Kind of political Fanatics, which aroſe from the religious Species, and more openly avow'd their Pretenſions, as carrying a more plauſible Appearance, of being practicable, as well as uſeful to human Society.

IT muſt, indeed, be confeſt, that Nature is ſo liberal to Mankind, that were all her Preſents equally [50] divided amongſt the Species, and improv'd by Art and Induſtry, every Individual would enjoy all the Neceſſaries, and even moſt of the Comforts of Life; nor would ever be liable to any Ills, but ſuch as might accidentally ariſe from the ſickly Frame and Conſtitution of his Body. It muſt alſo be confeſt, that, wherever we depart from this Equality, we rob the Poor of more Satisfaction than we add to the Rich, and that the ſlight Gratification of a fri⯑volous Vanity, in one Individual, frequently coſts more than Bread to many Families, and even Pro⯑vinces. It may appear withal, that the Rule of Equality, as it would be highly uſeful, is not altoge⯑ther impracticable; but has taken Place, at leaſt, in an imperfect Degree, in ſome Republics; particu⯑larly, that of Sparta; where it was attended, as 'tis ſaid, with the moſt beneficial Conſequences. Not to mention, that the Agrarian Laws, ſo frequently claim'd in Rome, and carry'd to Execution in many Greek Cities, proceeded, all of them, from a general Idea of the Utility of this Principle.

But Hiſtorians, and even common Senſe, may in⯑form us, that, however ſpecious theſe Ideas of per⯑fect Equality may ſeem, they are really, at the Bot⯑tom, impracticable; and were they not ſo, would be extremely pernicious to human Society. Render the Poſſeſſions of Men ever ſo equal, their different De⯑grees [51] of Art, Care, and Induſtry will immediately break that Equality. Or if you check theſe Virtues, you reduce Society to the extremeſt Indigence; and inſtead of preventing Want and Beggary in a few, render it unavoidable to the whole Community. The moſt rigorous Inquiſition too, is requiſite to watch every Inequality on its firſt Appearance; and the moſt ſevere Juriſdiction, to puniſh and redreſs it. But beſides, that ſo much Authority muſt ſoon de⯑generate into Tyranny, and be exerted with great Partialities; who can poſſibly be poſſeſt of it, in ſuch a Situation as is here ſuppos'd? Perfect Equa⯑lity of Poſſeſſions, deſtroying all Subordination, weakens extremely the Authority of Magiſtracy, and muſt reduce all Power nearly to a Level, as well as Property.

WE may conclude, therefore, that, in order to eſtabliſh Laws for the Regulation of Property, we muſt be acquainted with the Nature and Situation of Man, muſt reject Appearances, which may be falſe, tho' ſpecious, and muſt ſearch for thoſe Rules, which are, on the whole, moſt uſeful, and beneficial, Vulgar Senſe and ſlight Experience are ſufficient for this Purpoſe; where Men give not way to too ſelfiſh Avidity, or too extenſive Enthuſiaſm.

[52] WHO ſees not, for Inſtance, that whatever is pro⯑duc'd or improv'd by a Man's Art or Induſtry ought, for ever, to be ſecur'd to him, in order to give En⯑couragement to ſuch uſeful Habits and Accompliſh⯑ments? That the Property ought alſo to deſcend to Children and Relations, for the ſame uſeful Purpoſe? That it may be alienated by Conſent, in order to be⯑get that Commerce and Intercourſe, which is ſo be⯑neficial to human Society? And that all Contracts and Promiſes ought carefully to be fulfill'd, in order to ſecure mutual Truſt and Confidence, by which the general Intereſt of Mankind is ſo much pro⯑moted?

EXAMINE the Writers on the Laws of Nature; and you will always find, that, whatever Principles they ſet out with, they are ſure to terminate here at laſt, and to aſſign, as the ultimate Reaſon for every Rule they eſtabliſh, the Convenience and Neceſſities of Mankind. A Conceſſion thus extorted, in Op⯑poſition to Syſtems, has more Authority, than if it had been made, in Proſecution of them.

WHAT other Reaſon, indeed, could Writers ever give, why this muſt be mine and that yours; ſince uninſtructed Nature, ſurely, never made any ſuch Diſtinction? Theſe Objects are, of themſelves, [53] foreign to us; they are totally disjoin'd and ſeparate; and nothing but the general Intereſts of Society can form the Connection.

SOMETIMES, the Intereſts of Society may require a Rule of Juſtice in a particular Caſe; but may no [...] determine any particular Rule, amongſt ſeveral, which are all equally beneficial. In that Caſe, the ſlighteſt Analogies are laid hold of, in order to pre⯑vent that Indifference and Ambiguity, which would be the Source of perpetual Quarrels and Diſſentions. Thus Poſſeſſion alone, and firſt Poſſeſſion, is ſuppos'd to convey Property, where no-body elſe has any precedent Claim and Pretenſion. Many of the Reaſonings of Lawyers are of this analogical Na⯑ture, and depend on very ſlight Connexions of the Imagination.

Is it ever ſcrupled, in extraordinary Caſes, to vio⯑late all Regard to the private Property of Individuals, and ſacrifice to public Intereſt a Diſtinction, which had been eſtabliſh'd for the Sake of that Intereſt? The Safety of the People is the ſupreme Law: All other particular Laws are ſubordinate to it, and de⯑pendant on it: And if, in the common Courſe of Things, they be followed and regarded; 'tis only becauſe the public Safety and Intereſt, commonly de⯑mand ſo equal and impartial an Adminiſtration.

[54] SOMETIMES both Utility and Analogy fail, and leave the Laws of Juſtice in total Uncertainty. Thus, 'tis highly requiſite, that Preſcription or long Poſ⯑ſeſſion ſhould convey Property; but what Number of Days or Months or Years ſhould be ſufficient for that Purpoſe, 'tis impoſſible for Reaſon alone to de⯑termine. Civil Laws here ſupply the Place of the natural Code, and aſſign different Terms for Preſcrip⯑tion, according to the different Utilities, propos'd by the Legiſlator. Bills of Exchange and promiſſory Notes, by the Laws of moſt Countries, preſcribe ſooner than Bonds and Mortgages, and Contracts of a more formal Nature.

IN general we may obſerve, that all Queſtions of Property are ſubordinate to the Authority of civil Laws, which extend, reſtrain, modify, and alter the Rules of natural Juſtice, according to the par⯑ticular Convenience of each Community. The Laws have, or ought to have, a conſtant Reference to the Conſtitution of Government, the Manners, the Cli⯑mate, the Religion, the Commerce, the Situation of each Society. A late Author of great Genius, as well as extenſive Learning, has proſecuted this Sub⯑ject at large, and has eſtabliſh'd, from theſe Prin⯑ciples, the beſt Syſtem of political Knowledge, that, [55] perhaps, has ever yet been communicated to the World^*.

[56] WHAT is a Man's Property? Any Thing, which it is lawful for him and for him alone, to uſe. But what Rule have we, by which we can diſtinguiſh theſe Objects? Here we muſt have Recourſe to Statutes, Cuſtoms, Precedents, Analogies, and a hundred other Circumſtances; ſome of which are conſtant and inflexible, ſome variable and arbitrary. But the ultimate Point, in which they all profeſſedly terminate, is, the Intereſt and Happineſs of human Society. Where this enters not into Conſideration, nothing can appear more whimſical, unnatural, and even ſuperſtitious than all or moſt of the Laws of Juſtice and of Property.

THOSE, who ridicule vulgar Superſtitions, and ex⯑poſe the Folly of particular Regards to Meats, Days, Places, Poſtures, Apparel, have an eaſy Taſk; while they conſider all the Qualities and Relations of the Objects, and diſcover no adequate Cauſe for that Affection or Antipathy, Veneration or Horrour, which have ſo mighty an Influence over a con⯑ſiderable Part of Mankind. A Syrian would have ſtarv'd rather than taſte Pigeon; an Egyptian would [57] not have approach'd Bacon: But if theſe Species of Food be examin'd by the Senſes of Sight, Smell or Taſte, or ſcrutiniz'd by the Sciences of Chymiſtry, Medicine, or Phyſics; no Difference is ever found betwixt them and any other Species, nor can that preciſe Circumſtance be pitch'd on, which may afford a juſt Foundation for the religious Paſſion. A Fowl on Thurſday is lawful Food; on Friday, abominable: Eggs in this Houſe, and in this Dioceſe are per⯑mitted during Lent; a hundred Paces farther, to eat them is a damnable Sin. This Earth or Building▪ yeſterday, was prophane; to-day, by the muttering of certain Words, it has become holy and ſacred. Such Reflections, as theſe, in the Mouth of a Philo⯑ſopher, one may ſafely ſay, are too obvious to have any Influence; becauſe they muſt always, to every Man, occur at firſt Sight; and where they prevail not, of themſelves, they are ſurely obſtructed by Education, Prejudice and Paſſion, not by Ignorance or Miſtake.

IT may appear, to a careleſs View; or rather, a too abſtracted Reflection; that there enters a like Superſtition into all the Regards of Juſtice; and that, if a Man ſubjects its Objects, or what we call Pro⯑perty, to the ſame Scrutiny of Senſe and Science, he will not, by the moſt accurate Enquiry, find any Foundation for the Difference made by moral [58] Sentiment. I may lawfully nouriſh myſelf from this Tree; but the Fruit of another of the ſame Species, ten Paces off, 'tis criminal for me to touch. Had I wore this Apparel an Hour ago, I had merited the ſevereſt Puniſhment; but a Man, by pronouncing a few magical Syllables, has now render'd it fit for my Uſe and Service. Were this Houſe plac'd in the neighbouring Territory, it had been immoral for me to dwell in it; but being built on this Side the River, it is ſubject to a different municipal Law, and I incur no Blame or Cenſure. The ſame Species of Reaſon⯑ing, it may be thought, which ſo ſucceſsfully expoſes Superſtition, is alſo applicable to Juſtice; nor is it poſſible, in the one Caſe more than in the other, to point out, in the Object, that preciſe Quality or Cir⯑cumſtance, which is the Foundation of the Sentiment.

BUT there is this material Difference betwixt Superſtition and Juſtice, that the former is frivolous, uſeleſs, and burthenſome; the latter is abſolutely re⯑quiſite to the Well-being of Mankind and Exiſtence of Society. When we abſtract from this Circum⯑ſtance (for 'tis too apparent ever to be overlookt) it muſt be confeſt, that all Regards to Right and Pro⯑perty, ſeem entirely without Foundation, as much as the groſſeſt and moſt vulgar Superſtition. Were the Intereſts of Society no way concern'd, 'tis as unin⯑telligible, why another's articulating certain Sounds, [59] implying Conſent, ſhould change the Nature of my Actions with regard to a particular Object, as why the reciting of a Liturgy by a Prieſt, in a certain Habit and Poſture, ſhould dedicate a Heap of Brick and Timber, and render it, thenceforth and for ever, ſacred^*

[60] THESE Reflections are far from weakening the Ob⯑ligations of Juſtice, or diminiſhing any Thing from the moſt ſacred Attention to Property. On the con⯑trary, ſuch Sentiments muſt acquire new Force from the preſent Reaſoning. For what ſtronger Founda⯑tion can be deſir'd or conceiv'd for any Duty than to obſerve, that human Society, or even human Nature could not ſubſiſt, without the Eſtabliſhment of it, and will ſtill arrive at greater Degrees of Happineſs and Perfection, the more inviolable the Regard is, which is pay'd to that Duty?

[61] THUS we ſeem, upon the Whole, to have attain'd a Knowledge of the Force of that Principle here in⯑ſiſted on, and can determine what Degree of Eſteem or moral Approbation may reſult from Reflections on public Intereſt and Utility. The Neceſſity of Juſtice to the Support of Society is the SOLE Foundation of that Virtue; and ſince no moral Excellence is more highly eſteem'd, we may conclude, that this Circumſtance of Uſefulneſs has, in general, the ſtrongeſt Energy, and moſt entire Command over our Sentiments. It muſt, therefore, be the Source of a conſiderable Part of the Merit, aſcrib'd to Humanity, Benevolence, Friendſhip, public Spirit, and other ſocial Virtues of that Stamp; as it is the SOLE Source of the moral Approbation pay'd to Fidelity, Juſtice, Veracity, Integrity, and thoſe other eſtimable and uſeful Qualities and Principles. 'Tis entirely agreeable to the Rules of Philoſophy, and even of common Reaſon; where any Principle has been found to have a great Force and Energy in one Inſtance, to aſcribe to it a like Energy in all ſimilar Inſtances^*.

PART I.

IT ſeems ſo natural a Thought to aſcribe to their Utility the Praiſe which we beſtow on the ſocial Virtues, that one would expect to meet with this Principle every-where in moral Writers, as the chief Foundation of their Reaſoning and Inquiry. In common Life, we may obſerve, that the Circumſtance of Utility is always appeal'd to; nor is it ſuppos'd, that a greater Elogy can be given to any Man, than to diſplay his Uſefulneſs to the Public, and enumerate the Services he has perform'd to Mankind and Society. What Praiſe, even of an inanimate Form, if the Regularity and Elegance of its Parts deſtroy not its Fitneſs for any uſeful Purpoſe! And how ſatis⯑factory an Apology for any Diſproportion of ſeeming Deformity, if we can ſhow the Neceſſity of that [74] particular Conſtruction for the Uſe intended! A Ship appears infinitely more beautiful to an Artiſt, or one moderately ſkill'd in Navigation; where its Prow is wide and ſwelling beyond its Poop, than if it were fram'd with a preciſe geometrical Regularity, in Contradiction to all the Laws of Mechanics. A Building, whoſe Doors and Windows were exact Squares, would hurt the Eye by that very Proportion; as ill adapted to the human Figure, for whoſe Service the Fabric was intended What Wonder then, that a Man, whoſe Habits and Conduct are hurtful to Society, and dangerous or pernicious to every one, that has an Intercourſe with him, ſhould, on that Account, be an Object of Diſapprobation, and com⯑municate to every Spectator the ſtrongeſt Sentiments of Diſguſt and Hatred^*?

[75] BUT perhaps the Difficulty of accounting for theſe Effects of Uſefulneſs, or its contrary, has kept Philo⯑ſophers from admitting them into their Syſtems of Ethics, and has induc'd them rather to employ any other Principle, in explaining the Origin of moral Good and Evil. But 'tis no juſt Reaſon for rejecting any Principle, confirm'd by Experience, that we can give no ſatisfactory Account of its Origin, nor are able to reſolve it into other more general Principles. And if we would employ a little Thought on the preſent Subject, we need be at no Loſs to account for the Influence of Utility, and to deduce it from Prin⯑ciples, the moſt known and avow'd in human Na⯑ture.

[76] FROM the apparent Uſefulneſs of the ſocial Virtues, it has readily been inferr'd by Sceptics, both antient and modern, that all moral Diſtinctions ariſe from Education, and were, at firſt, invented, and after⯑wards encourag'd, by the Arts of Politicians, in order to render Men tractable, and ſubdue their natural Ferocity and Selfiſhneſs, which incapacitated them for Society. This Principle, indeed, of Precept and Education muſt be ſo far own'd to have a powerful Influence, that it may frequently encreaſe or dimi⯑niſh, beyond their natural Standard, the Sentiments of Approbation or Diſlike; and may even, in par⯑ticular Inſtances, create, without any natural Prin⯑ciple, a new Sentiment of this Kind; as is evident in all ſuperſtitious Practices and Obſervances: But that all moral Affection or Diſlike ariſes from this Origin will never ſurely be allow'd by any judicious Enquirer. Had Nature made no ſuch Diſtinction, founded on the original Frame and Conſtitution of the Mind, the Words, honourable and ſhameful, lovely and odious, noble and deſpicable, never had had place in any Language; nor could Politicians, had they invented theſe Terms, ever have been able to render them intelligible, or make them convey any Idea to the Audience. So that nothing can be more ſuper⯑ficial than this Paradox of the Sceptics; and 'twere well, if, in the abſtruſer Studies of Logics and Me⯑taphyſics, [77] we could as eaſily get rid of the Cavils of that Sect, as in the more practical and intelligible Sciences of Politics and Morals.

THE ſocial Virtues muſt, therefore, be allow'd to have a natural Beauty and Amiableneſs, which, at firſt, antecedent to all Precept or Education, recom⯑mends them to the Eſteem of uninſtructed Mankind, and engages their Affections. And as the Utility of theſe Virtues is the chief Circumſtance, whence they derive their Merit, it follows, that the End, which they have a Tendency to promote, muſt be ſome way agreeable to us, and take hold of ſome natural Affection. It muſt pleaſe, either from Conſiderations of Self-intereſt, or from more generous Motives and Regards.

IT has often been aſſerted, that, as every Man has a ſtrong Connexion with Society, and perceives the Impoſſibility of his ſolitary Subſiſtence, he becomes, on that Account, favourable to all thoſe Habits or Principles, which promote Order in Society, and en⯑ſure to him the quiet Poſſeſſion of ſo ineſtimable a Bleſſing. As much as we value our own Happineſs and Welfare, as much muſt we value the Practice of Juſtice and Humanity, by which alone the ſocial Confederacy can be maintain'd, and every Man reap the Fruits of mutual Protection and Aſſiſtance.

[78] THIS Deduction of Morals from Self-love or a Regard to private Intereſt, is a very obvious Thought, and has not ariſen altogether from the wanton Sallies and ſportive Aſſaults of the Sceptics. To mention no others, Polybius, one of the graveſt, and moſt judicious, as well as moſt moral Writers of Antiquity, has aſſign'd this ſelfiſh Origin to all our Sentiments of Virtue.^*. But tho' the ſolid, practical Senſe of that Author, and his Averſion to all vain Subtilties render his Authority on the preſent Subject very conſider⯑able; yet this is not an Affair to be decided by Au⯑thority; and the Voice of Nature and Experience ſeems plainly to oppoſe the ſelfiſh Theory.

WE frequently beſtow Praiſes on virtuous Actions, perform'd in very diſtant Ages and remote Countries; where the utmoſt Subtilty of Imagination would not diſcover any Appearance of Self-intereſt, or find any [79] Connexion of our preſent Happineſs and Security with Events ſo widely ſeparated from us.

A generous, a brave, a noble Deed, perform'd by an Adverſary, commands our Approbation; while in its Conſequences it may be acknowledged preju⯑dicial to our particular Intereſts.

WHERE private Advantage concurs with general Affection for Virtue, we readily perceive and avow the Mixture of theſe diſtinct Sentiments, which have a very different Feeling and Influence on the Mind. We praiſe, perhaps, with more Alacrity, where the generous, humane Action contributes to our particu⯑lar Intereſt: But the Topics of Praiſe we inſiſt on are very wide of this Circumſtance. And we may attempt to bring over others to our Sentiments, with⯑out endeavouring to convince them, that they reap any Advantage from the Actions, which we recom⯑mend to their Approbation and Applauſe.

FRAME the Model of a praiſe-worthy Character, conſiſting of all the moſt amiable moral Virtues: Give Inſtances, in which theſe diſplay themſelves, after an eminent and extraordinary Manner: You readily engage the Eſteem and Approbation of all your Audience, who never ſo much as enquir'd in what Age and Country the Perſon liv'd, who poſſeſt [80] theſe noble Qualities: A Circumſtance, however, of all others, the moſt material to Self-love, or a Concern for our own individual Happineſs.

ONCE on a Time, a Stateſmen, in the Shock and Concurrence of Parties, prevail'd ſo far as to procure, by his Eloquence, the Baniſhment of an able Adver⯑ſary; whom he ſecretly follow'd, offering him. Money for his Support during his Exile, and ſooth⯑ing him with Topics of Conſolation on his Misfor⯑tunes. Alas! cries the baniſh'd Stateſman, with what Regret muſt I leave my Friends in this City, where even Enemies are ſo generous! Virtue, tho' in an Enemy, here pleas'd him: And we alſo give it the juſt Tribute of Praiſe and Approbation; nor do we retract theſe Sentiments, when we hear, that the Action paſt at Athens, about two thouſand Years ago, and that the Perſons Names were Eſchines and De⯑moſthenes.

WHAT is that to me? There are few Occaſions, when this Queſtion is not pertinent: And had it that univerſal, infallible Influence ſuppos'd, it would turn into Ridicule every Compoſition, and almoſt every Converſation, which contain any Praiſe or Cenſure of Men and Manners.

[81] 'Tis but a weak Subterfuge, when preſs'd by theſe Facts and Arguments, to ſay, that we tranſport our⯑ſelves, by the Force of Imagination, into diſtant Ages and Countries, and conſider the Advantage, which we ſhould have reapt from theſe Characters, had we been Contemporaries, and had any Commerce with the Perſons. 'Tis not conceivable, how a real Sentiment or Paſſion can ever ariſe from a known imaginary Intereſt; eſpecially when our real Intereſt is ſtill kept in View, and is often acknowledg'd to be entirely diſtinct from the imaginary, and even ſometimes oppoſite to it.

A Man, brought to the Brink of a Precipice, cannot look down without trembling; and the Sen⯑timent of imaginary Danger actuates him, in Oppo⯑ſition to the Opinion and Belief of real Safety. But the Imagination is here aſſiſted by the Preſence of a ſtriking Object; and yet prevails not, except it be alſo aided by Novelty, and the unuſual Appearance of the Object. Cuſtom ſoon reconciles us to Heights and Precipices, and wears off theſe falſe and deluſive Terrors. The Reverſe is obſervable in the Eſtimates we form of Characters and Manners; and the more we habituate ourſelves to an accurate Scrutiny of the moral Species, the more delicate Feeling do we acquire of the moſt minute Diſtinctions betwixt Vice [82] and Virtue. Such frequent Occaſion, indeed, have we, in common Life, to pronounce all Kinds of moral Determinations, that no Object of this Kind can be new or unuſual to us; nor could any falſe Views or Prepoſſeſſions maintain their Ground againſt an Experience, ſo common and familiar. Experi⯑ence and Cuſtom being chiefly what form the Aſ⯑ſociations of Ideas, 'tis impoſſible, that any Aſſoci⯑ation could eſtabliſh and ſupport itſelf, in direct Op⯑poſition to theſe Principles.

USEFULNESS is agreeable, and engages our Ap⯑probation. This is a Matter of Fact, confirm'd by daily Obſervation. But, uſeful? For what? For ſome Body's Intereſt, ſurely. Whoſe Intereſt then? Not our own only: For our Approbation frequently extends farther. It muſt, therefore, be the Intereſt of thoſe, who are ſerv'd by the Character or Action approv'd of; and then we may conclude, however remote, are not totally indifferent to us. By open⯑ing up this Principle, we ſhall diſcover the great Secret of moral Diſtinctions.

PART II.

SELF-LOVE is a Principle in human Na⯑ture of ſuch extenſive Energy, and the Intereſt of each Individual is, in general, ſo cloſely con⯑nected with that of Community, that thoſe Philoſo⯑phers were excuſable, who fancy'd, that all our Concern for the Public might, perhaps, be reſolv'd into a Concern for our own Happineſs and Preſer⯑vation. They ſaw, every Moment, Inſtances of Ap⯑probation or Blame, Satisfaction or Diſpleaſure to⯑wards Characters and Actions; they denominated the Objects of theſe Sentiments, Virtues or Vices; they obſerv'd, that the former had a Tendency to en⯑creaſe the Happineſs, and the latter the Miſery of Society; they aſk'd, if it was poſſible we could have any general Concern for Society, or any diſintereſted Reſentment of the Welfare or Injury of others; they found it ſimpler to conſider all theſe Sentiments as Modifications of Self-love; and they diſcover'd a Pretext, at leaſt, for this Unity of Principle, in that cloſe Union of Intereſt, which is ſo obſervable betwixt the Public and each Individual.

BUT notwithſtanding this frequent Confuſion of Intereſts, 'tis eaſy to attain what natural Philoſo⯑phers, after my Lord Bacon, have affected to call [84] the Experimentum crucis, or that Experiment, which points out the Way we ſhould follow, in any Doubt or Ambiguity. We have found Inſtances, wherein private Intereſt was ſeparate from public; wherein it was even contrary: And yet we obſerv'd the moral Sentiment to continue, notwithſtanding this Disjunction of Intereſts. And wherever theſe diſtinct Intereſts ſenſibly concur'd, we always found a ſen⯑ſible Encreaſe of the Sentiment, and a more warm Affection to Virtue, and Deteſtation of Vice, or what we properly call, Gratitude and Revenge. Compell'd by theſe Inſtances, we muſt renounce the Theory, which accounts for every moral Sentiment by the Principle of Self-love. We muſt adopt a more pub⯑lic Affection, and allow, that the Intereſts of Society are not, even on their own Account, altogether indif⯑ferent to us. Uſefulneſs is only a Tendency to a cer⯑tain End; and 'tis a Contradiction in Terms, that any Thing pleaſes as Means to an End, where the End itſelf does no way affect us. If therefore Uſefulneſs be a Source of moral Sentiment, and if this Uſeful⯑neſs be not always conſider'd with a Reference to Self; it follows, that every Thing, which contri⯑butes to the Happineſs of Society, recommends it⯑ſelf directly to our Approbation and Good-will. Here is a Principle, which accounts, in great Part, for the Origin of Morality: And what need we ſeek [85] for abſtruſe and remote Syſtems, when there occurs one ſo obvious and natural^*?

HAVE we any Difficulty to comprehend the Force of Humanity and Benevolence? Or to conceive, that the very Aſpect of Happineſs, Joy, Proſperity, gives Pleaſure; that of Pain, Sufferance, Sorrow, communicates Uneaſineſs? The human Countenance, ſays Horace ^†, borrows Smiles or Tears from the human Countenance. Reduce a Perſon to Solitude, and he loſes all Enjoyment, except merely of the ſpeculative Kind; and that becauſe the Movements of his Heart are not forwarded by correſpondent [86] Movements in his Fellow-creatures. The Signs of Sorrow and Mourning, tho' arbitrary, affect us with Melancholy; but the natural Symptoms, Tears, and Cries, and Groans, never fail to infuſe Com⯑paſſion and Uneaſineſs. And if the Effects of Miſery touch us in ſo lively a Manner; can we be ſuppos'd altogether inſenſible or indifferent towards its Cauſes; when a malicious or treacherous Character and Be⯑haviour is preſented to us?

WE enter, I ſhall ſuppoſe, into a convenient, warm, well-contriv'd Apartment: We neceſſarily receive a Pleaſure from its very Survey; becauſe it preſents us with the pleaſing Ideas of Eaſe, Satis⯑faction, and Enjoyment. The hoſpitable, good⯑humour'd, humane Landlord appears. This Cir⯑ſtance ſurely muſt embelliſh the whole; nor can we eaſily forbear reflecting, with Pleaſure, on the Satis⯑faction and Enjoyment, which reſults to every one from his Intercourſe and Good-offices.

HIS whole Family, by the Freedom, Eaſe, Confidence, and calm Satisfaction, diffus'd over their Countenances, ſufficiently expreſs their Hap⯑pineſs. I have a pleaſing Sympathy in the Proſpect of ſo much Joy, and can never conſider the Source of it, without the moſt agreeable Emotions.

[87] HE tells me, that an oppreſſive and powerful Neighbour had attempted to diſpoſſeſs him of his Inheritance, and had long diſturb'd all his innocent and ſocial Enjoyments. I feel an immediate Indig⯑nation ariſe in me againſt ſuch Violence and Injury.

BUT 'tis no Wonder, he adds, that a private Wrong ſhould proceed from a Man, who had en⯑ſlav'd Provinces, depopulated Cities, and made the Field and Scaffold ſtream with human Blood. I am ſtruck with Horror at the Proſpect of ſo much Miſery and am actuated by the ſtrongeſt Antipathy againſt its Author.

IN general, 'tis certain, that wherever we go, whatever we reflect on or converſe about; every Thing ſtill preſents us with the View of human Hap⯑pineſs or Miſery, and excites in our Breaſts a ſym⯑pathetic Movement of Pleaſure or Uneaſineſs. In our ſerious Occupations, in our careleſs Amuſements, this Principle ſtill exerts its active Energy.

A MAN, who enters the Theatre, is immediately ſtruck with the View of ſo great a Multitude, par⯑ticipating of one common Amuſement; and expe⯑riences, from their very Aſpect, a ſuperior Senſibi⯑lity [88] or Diſpoſition of being affected with every Sen⯑timent, which he ſhares with his Fellow-creatures.

HE obſerves the Actors to be animated by the Appearance of a full Audience; and rais'd to a Degree of Enthuſiaſm, which they cannot command in any ſolitary or calm Moment.

EVERY Movement of the Theatre, by a ſkillful Poet, is communicated, as it were by Magic, to the Spectators, who weep, tremble, reſent, rejoice, and are enflam'd with all the Variety of Paſſions, which actuate the ſeveral Perſonages of the Drama.

WHERE any Event croſſes our Wiſhes, and inter⯑rupts the Happineſs of the favourite Perſonages, we feel a ſenſible Anxiety and Concern. But where their Sufferings proceed from the Treachery, Cruelty or Tyranny of an Enemy, our Breaſts are affected with the livelieſt Reſentment againſt the Author of theſe Calamities.

'TIS here eſteem'd contrary to the Rules of Art to repreſent any Thing cool and indifferent. A diſtant Friend, or a Confident, who has no immedi⯑ate Intereſt in the Cataſtrophe, ought, if poſſible, to be avoided by the Poet; as communicating a like [89] Indifference to the Audience, and checking the Progreſs of the Paſſions.

No Species of Poetry is more entertaining than Paſtoral; and every one is ſenſible, that the chief Source of its Pleaſure ariſes from thoſe Images of a gentle and tender Tranquillity, which it repreſents in its Perſonages, and of which it communicates a like Sentiment to the Readers. Sannazarius, who transfer'd the Scene to the Sea-ſhore, tho' he pre⯑ſented the moſt magnificent Object in Nature, is confeſt to have err'd in his Choice. The Idea of Toil, Labour, and Danger, ſuffer'd by the Fiſher⯑men, is painful, by an unavoidable Sympathy, which attends every Conception of human Happineſs or Miſery.

WHEN I was twenty, ſays a French Poet, Ovid was my Choice: Now I am forty, I declare for Horace. We enter, to be ſure, more readily into Sentiments, that reſemble thoſe we feel every Mo⯑ment: But no Paſſion, when well repreſented, can be altogether indifferent to us; becauſe there is none, of which every Man has not within him, at leaſt, the Seeds and firſt Principles. 'Tis the Buſi⯑neſs of Poetry to approach every Object by lively Imagery and Deſcription, and make it look like Truth and Reality: A certain Proof, that wherever [90] that Reality is found, our Minds are diſpos'd to be ſtrongly affected by it.

ANY recent Event or Piece of News, by which the Fortunes of States, Provinces or many Indivi⯑duals, are affected, is extremely intereſting even to thoſe whoſe Welfare is not immediately engag'd. Such Intelligence is propagated with Celerity, heard with Avidity, and enquir'd into with Attention and Concern. The Intereſts of Society appear, on this Occaſion, to be, in ſome Degree, the Intereſts of each Individual. The Imagination is ſure to be af⯑fected; tho' the Paſſions excited may not always be ſo ſtrong and ſteady as to have great Influence on the Conduct and Behaviour.

THE Peruſal of a Hiſtory ſeems a calm Entertain⯑ment; but would be no Entertainment at all, did not our Hearts beat with correſpondent Movements to thoſe deſcribed by the Hiſtorian.

Thucydides and Guicciardin ſupport with Difficulty our Attention, while the former deſcribes the trivial Rencounters of the ſmall Cities of Greece, and the latter the harmleſs Wars of Piſa. The few Perſons intereſted, and the ſmall Intereſt fill not the Imagi⯑nation, and engage not the Affections. The deep Diſtreſs of the numerous Athenian Army before Sy⯑racuſe; [91] the Danger, which ſo nearly threatens Venice; theſe excite Compaſſion; theſe move Terror and Anxiety.

THE indifferent, unintereſting Stile of Suetonius, equally with the maſterly Pencil of Tacitus, may convince us of the cruel Depravity of Nero or Ti⯑berius: But what a Difference of Sentiment! While the former coldly relates the Facts; and the latter ſets before our Eyes the venerable Figures of a Soranus and a Thraſea, intrepid in their Fate, and only mov'd by the melting Sorrows of their Friends and Kindred. What Sympathy then touches every human Heart! What Indignation againſt the in⯑human Tyrant, whoſe cauſeleſs Fear or unprovok'd Malice, gave riſe to ſuch deteſtable Barbarity!

IF we bring theſe Subjects nearer: If we remove all Suſpicion of Fiction and Deceit: What powerful Concern is excited, and how much ſuperior, in many Inſtances, to the narrow Attachments of Self-love and private Intereſt! Popular Sedition, Party Zeal, a devoted Obedience to factious Leaders; theſe are ſome of the moſt viſible, tho' leſs laudable Effects of this ſocial Sympathy in human Nature.

[92] THE Frivolouſneſs of the Subject too, we may obſerve, is not able to detach us entirely from what carries an Image of human Sentiment and Affection.

WHEN a Perſon ſtutters, and pronounces with Difficulty, we even ſympathize with this trivial Un⯑eaſineſs, and ſuffer for him. And 'tis a Rule in Criticiſm, that every Combination of Syllables or Letters, which gives Pain to the Organs of Speech in the Recital, appears alſo, from a Species of Sym⯑pathy, harſh and diſagreeable to the Ear. Nay, when we run over a Book with our Eye, we are ſenſible of ſuch unharmonious Compoſition; be⯑cauſe we ſtill imagine, that a Perſon recites it to us, and ſuffers from the Pronunciation of theſe jarring Sounds. So delicate is our Sympathy!

EASY and unconſtrain'd Poſtures and Motions are always beautiful: An Air of Health and Vigour is agreeable: Cloaths, that warm, without burthen⯑ing the Body; that cover, without impriſoning the Limbs, are well-faſhion'd. In every Judgment of Beauty, the Sentiments are Feelings of the Perſons affected enter into Conſideration, and communicate to the Spectators ſimilar Touches of Pain or Plea⯑ſure^*. [93] What Wonder, then, if we can pronounce no Sentence concerning the Characters and Con⯑duct of Men without conſidering the Tendencies of their Actions, and the Happineſs or Miſery, which thence ariſes to Society? What Aſſociation of Ideas would ever operate, were that Principle here totally inactive^†?

[94] IF any Man, from a cold Inſenſibility, or narrow Selfiſhneſs of Temper, is unaffected with the Images of human Happineſs or Miſery, he muſt be equally indifferent to the Images of Vice and Virtue: As on the other Hand, 'tis always found, that a warm Concern for the Intereſts of our Species is attended with a delicate Feeling of all moral Diſtinctions; a ſtrong Reſentment of Injury done to Men; a lively Approbation of their Welfare. In this Particular, tho' great Superiority is obſervable of one Man above another; yet none are ſo entirely indifferent to the Intereſt of their Fellow-creatures, as to per⯑ceive no Diſtinctions of moral Good and Evil, in conſequence of the different Tendencies of Actions and Principles. How, indeed, can we ſuppoſe it poſſible of any one, who wears a human Heart, that, if there be ſubjected to his Cenſure, one Cha⯑racter or Syſtem of Conduct, which is beneficial, and another, which is pernicious, to his Species or Community, he will not ſo much as give a cool Preference to the former, or aſcribe to it the ſmalleſt Merit or Regard? Let us ſuppoſe ſuch a Perſon ever ſo ſelfiſh; let private Intereſt have ingroſt ever ſo much his Attention; yet in Inſtances, where that is not concern'd, he muſt unavoidably feel ſome Propenſity to the Good of Mankind, and make it an Object of Choice, if every Thing elſe be equal. [95] Would any Man, that is walking alone, tread juſt as willingly on another's gouty Toes, whom he has no Quarrel with, as on the hard Flint and Pave⯑ment? There is here ſurely a Difference in the Caſe. We ſurely take into Conſideration the Hap⯑pineſs and Miſery of others, in weighing the ſeveral Motives of Action, and incline to the former, where no private Regards draw us to ſeek our own Pro⯑motion or Advantage by the Injury of our Fellow-Creatures. And if the Principles of Humanity are capable, in many Inſtances, of influencing our Actions, they muſt, at all Times, have ſome Autho⯑rity over our Sentiments, and give us a general Ap⯑probation of what is uſeful to Society, and Blame of what is dangerous or pernicious. The Degrees of theſe Sentiments may be the Subject of Contro⯑verſy, but the Reality of their Exiſtence, one ſhould think, muſt be admitted, in every Theory or Syſtem.

A CREATURE, abſolutely malicious and ſpiteful, were there any ſuch in Nature, muſt be worſe than indifferent to the Images of Vice and Virtue. All his Sentiments muſt be inverted, and directly oppo⯑ſite to thoſe, which prevail in the human Species. Whatever contributes to the Good of Mankind, as it croſſes the conſtant Bent of his Wiſhes and De⯑ſires, muſt produce Uneaſineſs and Diſapprobation; and on the contrary, whatever is the Source of Diſ⯑order [96] order and Miſery in Society, muſt, for the ſame Reaſon, be regarded with Pleaſure and Complacency. Timon, who probably from his affected Spleen, more than any inveterate Malice, was denominated the Man-hater, embrac'd Alcibiades, 'tis ſaid, with great Fondneſs. Go on, my Boy! cries he, Acquire the Confidence of the People: You will one Day, I fore⯑ſee, be the Cauſe of great Calamities to them ^*. Could we admit the two Principles of the Manichaeans, 'tis an infallible Conſequence, that their Sentiments of human Actions, as well as of every Thing elſe, muſt be totally oppoſite; and that every Inſtance of Juſtice and Humanity, from its neceſſary Tendency, muſt pleaſe the one Deity, and diſpleaſe the other. All Mankind ſo far reſemble the good Principle, that where Intereſt or Revenge or Envy perverts not our Diſpoſition, we are always enclin'd, from our natural Philanthropy, to give the Preference to the Happineſs of Society, and conſequently to Virtue, above its oppoſite. Abſolute, unprovok'd, diſinter⯑eſted Malice has never, perhaps, Place in any human Breaſt; or if it had, muſt there pervert all the Sen⯑timents of Morals, as well as the Feelings of Huma⯑nity. If the Cruelty of Nero be allow'd altogether voluntary, and not rather the Effect of conſtant Fear and Reſentment; 'tis evident, that Tigellinus, [97] preferably to Seneca or Burrhus, muſt have poſſeſt his ſteady and uniform Approbation.

A STATESMAN or Patriot, that ſerves our own Country, in our own Time, has always a more paſſionate Regard paid him, than one whoſe bene⯑ficial Influence operated on diſtant Ages or remote Nations; where the Good, reſulting from his gene⯑rous Humanity, being leſs connected with us, ſeems more obſcure, and affects us with a leſs lively Sym⯑pathy. We may own the Merit to be equally great, tho' our Sentiments are not rais'd to an equal Height, in both Caſes. The Judgment here cor⯑rects the Inequalities of our internal Emotions and Perceptions; in like Manner, as it preſerves us from Error, in the ſeveral Variations of Images, preſented to our external Senſes. The ſame Object, at a double Diſtance, really throws on the Eye a Picture of but half the Bulk; and yet we imagine it ap⯑pears of the ſame Size in both Situations; becauſe we know, that, on our Approach to it, its Image would expand on the Senſes, and that the Difference conſiſts not in the Object itſelf, but in our Poſition with regard to it. And, indeed, without ſuch Cor⯑rection of Appearances, both in internal and exter⯑nal Sentiment, Men could never think or talk ſteadily on any Subject; while their fluctuating Si⯑tuations produce a continual Variation on Objects, [98] and throw them into ſuch different and contrary Lights and Poſitions^*.

THE more we converſe with Mankind, and the greater ſocial Entercourſe we maintain, the more will we be familiariz'd to theſe general Preferences and Diſtinctions, without which our Converſation and Diſcourſe could ſcarcely be render'd intelligible to each other. Every Man's Intereſt is peculiar to himſelf, and the Averſions and Deſires, which re⯑ſult from it, cannot be ſuppos'd to affect others in a [99] like Degree. General Language, therefore, being form'd for general Uſe, muſt be moulded on ſome more general Views, and muſt affix the Epithets of Praiſe or Blame, in Conformity to Sentiments, which ariſe from the general Intereſts of the Com⯑munity. And if theſe Sentiments, in moſt Men, be not ſo ſtrong as thoſe, which have a Reference to private Good; yet ſtill they muſt make ſome Diſtinction, even in Perſons the moſt deprav'd and ſelfiſh; and muſt attach the Notion of Good to a beneficent Conduct, and of Evil to the contrary. Sympathy, we ſhall allow, is much fainter than our Concern for Ourſelves, and Sympathy with Perſons, remote from us, much ſainter than that with Perſons, near and contiguous; but for this very Reaſon, 'tis neceſſary for us, in our calm Judgments and Diſcourſe concerning the Characters of Men, to neglect all theſe Differences, and render our Senti⯑ments more public and ſocial. Beſides, that we Ourſelves often change our Situation in this Parti⯑cular, we every Day meet with Perſons, who are in a different Situation from us, and who could never con⯑verſe with us on any reaſonable Terms, were we to remain conſtantly in that Poſition and Point of View, which is peculiar to Ourſelf. The Entercourſe of Sentiments, therefore, in Society and Converſation makes us form ſome general, inalterable Standard, by which we may approve or diſapprove of Cha⯑racters [100] and Manners. And tho' the Heart takes not part entirely with thoſe general Notions, nor regu⯑lates all its Love and Hatred, by the univerſal, ab⯑ſtract Differences of Vice and Virtue, without re⯑gard to Self or the Perſons, with whom we are more immediately connected; yet have theſe moral Dif⯑ferences a conſiderable Influence, and being ſuffici⯑ent, at leaſt, for Diſcourſe, ſerve all our Purpoſes in Company, in the Pulpit, on the Theatre, and in the Schools^*.

THUS, in whatever Light we take this Subject, the Merit, aſcrib'd to the ſocial Virtues, appears ſtill uniform, and ariſes chiefly from that Regard, which the natural Sentiment of Benevolence engages us to pay to the Intereſts of Mankind and Society. If we conſider the Principles of the human Make; ſuch as they appear to daily Experience and Obſer⯑vation [101] we muſt, a priori, conclude it impoſſible for ſuch a Creature as Man to be totally indifferent to the Well or Ill-being of his Fellow-creatures, and not readily, of himſelf, to pronounce, where no⯑thing gives him any particular Byaſs, that what pro⯑motes their Happineſs is good, what tends to their Miſery is evil, without any farther Regard or Con⯑ſideration. Here then are the faint Rudiments, at leaſt, or Outlines, of a general Diſtinction betwixt Actions; and in Proportion as the Humanity of the Perſon is ſuppos'd to encreaſe, his Connexion to thoſe injur'd or benefited, and his lively Conception of their Miſery or Happineſs; his conſequent Cen⯑ſure or Approbation acquires proportionable Force and Vigour. There is no Neceſſity, that a generous Action, barely mention'd in an old Hiſtory or remote Gazette, ſhould communicate any ſtrong Feelings of Applauſe and Admiration. Virtue, plac'd at ſuch a Diſtance, is like a fixt Star, which, tho', to the Eye of Reaſon, it may appear as luminous as the Sun in his Meridian, is ſo infinitely remov'd, as to affect the Senſes, neither with Light nor Heat. Bring this Virtue nearer, by our Acquaintance or Connexion with the Perſons, or even by an eloquent Narration and Recital of the Caſe; our Hearts are immediately caught, our Sympathy enliven'd, and our cool Ap⯑probation converted into the warmeſt Sentiments of Friendſhip and Regard. Theſe ſeem neceſſary and [102] infallible Conſequences of the general Principles of human Nature, as diſcover'd in common Life and Practice.

AGAIN; reverſe theſe Views and Reaſonings: Conſider the Matter a poſteriori; and weighing the Conſequences, enquire, if the Merit of all ſocial Virtue is not deriv'd from the Feelings of Humanity, with which it affects the Spectators. It appears to be Matter of Fact, that the Circumſtance of Utility, in all Subjects, is a Source of Praiſe and Approba⯑tion: That it is conſtantly appeal'd to in all moral Deciſions concerning the Merit and Demerit of Actions: That it is the ſole Source of that high Re⯑gard paid to Juſtice, Fidelity, Honour, Allegiance and Chaſtity: That it is inſeperable from all the other ſocial Virtues of Humanity, Generoſity, Cha⯑rity, Affability, Lenity, Mercy and Moderation: And in a Word, that it is the Foundation of the chief Part of Morals, which has a Reference to Mankind and Society.

IT appears alſo, in our general Approbation or Judgment of Characters and Manners, that the uſe⯑ful Tendency of the ſocial Virtues moves us not by any Regards to Self-intereſt, but has an Influence much more univerſal and extenſive. It appears, that a Tendency to public Good, and to the pro⯑moting [103] of Peace, Harmony, and Concord in So⯑ciety, by affecting the benevolent Principles of our Frame, engages us on the Side of the ſocial Virtues. And it appears, as an additional Confirmation, that theſe Principles of Humanity and Sympathy enter ſo deep into all our Sentiments, and have ſo power⯑ful an Influence, as may enable them to excite the ſtrongeſt Cenſure and Applauſe. The preſent Theory is the ſimple Reſult of all theſe Inferences, each of which ſeems founded on uniform Experience and Obſervation.

WERE it doubtful, whether there was any ſuch Principle in our Nature as Humanity or a Concern for others, yet when we ſee, in numberleſs Inſtances, that, whatever has a Tendency to promote the In⯑tereſts of Society, is ſo highly approv'd of, we ought thence to learn the Force of the benevolent Principle; ſince 'tis impoſſible for any Thing to pleaſe as Means to an End, where the End itſelf is totally indifferent: On the other Hand, were it doubtful, whether there was, implanted in our Natures, any general Prin⯑ciple of moral Blame and Approbation, yet when we ſee, in numberleſs Inſtances, the Influence of Humanity, we ought thence to conclude, that 'tis impoſſible, but that every Thing, which promotes the Intereſts of Society, muſt communicate Pleaſure, and what is pernicious give Uneaſineſs. But when [104] theſe different Reflections and Obſervations concur in eſtabliſhing the ſame Concluſion, muſt they not beſtow an undiſputed Evidence upon it?

'Tis however hop'd, that the Progreſs of this Ar⯑gument will bring a farther Confirmation of the pre⯑ſent Theory, by ſhowing the Riſe of other Senti⯑ments of Eſteem and Regard from the ſame or like Principles.

PART I.

NOTHING is more uſual, than for Philoſo⯑phers to encroach upon the Province of Gram⯑marians; and to engage in Diſputes of Words, while they imagine, that they are handling Controverſies of the deepeſt Importance and Concern. Thus, were we here to aſſert or to deny, that all laudable Qualities of the Mind were to be conſider'd as Virtues or moral Attributes, many would imagine, that we had enter'd upon one of the profoundeſt Speculations of Ethics; tho' 'tis probable, all the while, that the greateſt Part of the Diſpute would be found entirely verbal. To avoid, therefore, all frivolous Subtilties and Altercations, as much as poſſible, we ſhall con⯑tent Ourſelves with obſerving, firſt, that, in common Life, the Sentiments of Cenſure or Approbation, produc'd by mental Qualities of every Kind, are [106] very ſimilar; and ſecondly, that all antient Moraliſts, (the beſt Models) in treating of them, make little or no Difference amongſt them.

FIRST. It ſeems certain, that the Sentiment of conſcious Worth, the Self-ſatisfaction, proceeding from a Review of a Man's own Conduct and Cha⯑racter; it ſeems certain, I ſay, that this Sentiment, which, tho' the moſt common of all others, has no proper Name in our Language^* ariſes from the Endowments of Courage and Capacity, Induſtry and Ingenuity, as well as from any other mental Excel⯑lencies. Who, on the other Hand, is not deeply mortify'd with reflecting on his own Folly or Diſſo⯑luteneſs, and feels not a ſecret Sting or Compunction, whenever his Memory preſents any paſt Occurence, where he behav'd with Stupidity or Ill-manners? No Time can efface the cruel Ideas of a Man's own Ill-conduct, or of Affronts, which Cowardice or Impudence have brought upon him. They ſtill [107] haunt his ſolitary Hours, damp his moſt aſpiring Thoughts, and ſhow him, even to himſelf, in the moſt contemptible and moſt odious Colours imagin⯑able.

WHAT is there too we are more anxious to conceal from others than ſuch Blunders, Infirmities, and Meanneſſes, or more dread to have expos'd by Rail⯑lery and Satyre? And is not the chief Object of Vanity, our Bravery or Learning, our Wit or Breed⯑ing, our Eloquence or Addreſs, our Taſte or Ability? Theſe we diſplay with Care, if not with Oſtentation; and commonly ſhow more Ambition of excelling in them, than even in the ſocial Virtues themſelves, which are, in Reality, of ſuch ſuperior Excellence. Good-nature and Honeſty, eſpecially the latter, are ſo indiſpenſibly requir'd, that, tho' the greateſt Cen⯑ſure attends any Violation of theſe Duties, no emi⯑nent Praiſe follows ſuch common Inſtances of them, as ſeem eſſential to the Support of human Society. And hence the Reaſon, in my Opinion, why, tho' Men often praiſe ſo liberally the Qualities of their Heart, they are ſhy of commending the Endowments of their Head; becauſe the latter Virtues, being ſup⯑pos'd more rare and extraordinary, are obſerv'd to be the more uſual Objects of Pride and Self-conceit; and when boaſted of, beget a ſtrong Suſpicion of theſe Sentiments.

[108] 'Tis hard to tell, whether you hurt a Man's Cha⯑racter moſt by calling him a Knave or a Coward, and whether a beaſily Glutton or Drunkard be not as odious and contemptible as a ſelfiſh, ungenerous Miſer. Give me my Choice; and I would rather, for my own Happineſs and Self-enjoyment, have a friendly, humane Heart than poſſeſs all the other Virtues of Demoſthenes and Philip united: But I would rather paſs with the World for one endow'd with ex⯑tenſive Genius and intrepid Courage, and ſhould thence expect ſtronger Inſtances of general Applauſe and Admiration. The Figure a Man makes in Life, the Reception he meets with in Company, the Eſteem paid him by his Acquaintance; all theſe Advantages depend as much upon his good Senſe and Judgment as upon any other Part of his Character. Had a Man the beſt Intentions in the World, and were the fartheſt remov'd from all Injuſtice and Violence, he would never be able to make himſelf be much re⯑garded, without a moderate Share, at leaſt, of Parts and Underſtanding.

WHAT is it then we can here diſpute about? If Senſe and Courage, Temperance and Induſtry, Wit and Knowledge confeſſedly form a conſiderable Part of perſonal Merit; if a Man poſſeſt of them is both better ſatisfy'd with himſelf, and better entitled [109] to the Good-will, Eſteem, and Services of others, than one entirely devoid of them; if, in ſhort, the Sentiments be ſimilar, that ariſe from theſe Endow⯑ments and from the ſocial Virtues; is there any Rea⯑ſon for being ſo extremely ſcrupulous about a Word, or doubting whether they are entitled to the Deno⯑mination of Virtue^*? It may, indeed, be pre⯑tended, that the Sentiment of Approbation, which thoſe Accompliſhments produce, beſides its being in⯑ferior, is alſo ſomewhat different from that, which attends the Virtues of Juſtice and Humanity. But this ſeems not a ſufficient Reaſon for ranking them entirely under different Claſſes and Appellations. The Character of Caeſar and that of Cato, as drawn by Saluſt, are both of them virtuous, in the ſtricteſt Senſe of the Word; but in a different Way: Nor are the Sentiments entirely the ſame, which ariſe from them. The one produces Love; the other, [110] Eſteem: The one is amiable; the other awful: We could wiſh to meet the one Character in a Friend; the other we ſhould be ambitious of in Ourſelves. In like Manner the Approbation, which attends na⯑tural Abilities or Temperance or Induſtry, may be ſomewhat different from that which is paid to the ſocial Virtues, without making them entirely of a different Species. And indeed, we may obſerve, that the natural Abilities, no more than the other Virtues, produce not, all of them, the ſame Kind of Approbation. Good Senſe and Genius beget Eſteem and Regard: Wit and Humour excite Love and Af⯑fection^*.

[111] MOST People, I believe, will naturally, without Premeditation, aſſent to the Definition of the elegant and judicious Poet.

WHAT Pretenſions has a Man to our generous Aſ⯑ſiſtance or Good-offices, who has diſſipated his Wealth in profuſe Expences, idle Vanities, chimeri⯑cal Projects, diſſolute Pleaſures, or extravagant Gaming? Theſe Vices (for we ſcruple not to call them ſuch) bring Miſery unpity'd, and Contempt on every one addicted to them.

ACHAEUS, a wiſe and prudent Prince, fell into a fatal Snare, which coſt him his Crown and Life, after having us'd every reaſonable Precaution to guard himſelf againſt it. On that Account, ſays the Hiſtorian, he is a juſt Object of Regard and Compaſſion: His Betrayers alone of Hatred and Contempt^†.

[112] THE precipitate Flight and improvident Negli⯑gence of Pompey, at the Beginning of the civil Wars, appear'd ſuch notorious Blunders to Cicero, as quite pall'd his Friendſhip towards that great Man In the ſame Manner, ſays he, as Want of Cleanlineſs, De⯑cency, or Diſcretion in a Miſtreſs are found to alienate our Affections. For ſo he expreſſes himſelf, where he talks, not in the Character of a Philoſopher, but in that of a Stateſman and Man of the World, to his Friend Atticus ^*.

BUT ſecondly, the ſame Cicero, in Imitation of all the antient Moraliſts, when he reaſons as a Philoſo⯑pher, enlarges very much his Ideas of Virtue, and comprehends every laudable Quality or Endowment of the Mind, under that honourable Appellation. The Prudence, explain'd in his Offices ^†, is that Sa⯑gacity, which leads to the Diſcovery of Truth, and preſerves us from Error and Miſtake. Magnanimity, Temperance, Decency are there alſo at large diſcours'd of. And as that eloquent Moraliſt follow'd the com⯑mon receiv'd Diviſion of the four cardinal Virtues, our ſocial Duties form but one Head, in the general Diſtribution of his Subject.

[113] WE need only peruſe the Titles of Chapters in Ariſtotle's Ethics to be convinc'd, that he ranks Cou⯑rage, Temperance, Magnificence, Magnanimity, Modeſty, Prudence, and a manly Freedom amongſt the Virtues, as well as Juſtice and Friendſhip.

To ſuſtain and to abſtain, that is, to be patient and continent, appear'd to ſome of the Antients, a ſum⯑mary Comprehenſion of all Morals.

EPICTETUS has ſcarce ever mentioned the Sentiment of Humanity and Compaſſion, but in order to put his Diſciples on their Guard againſt it. The Virtue of the Stoics ſeems to conſiſt chiefly in a firm Temper and a ſound Underſtanding. With them, as with Solomon and the Eaſtern Moraliſts, Folly and Wiſdom are equivalent to Vice and Virtue.

MEN will praiſe thee, ſays David ^*, when thou doſt well unto thyſelf. I hate a wiſe Man, ſays the Greek Poet, who is not wiſe to himſelf^†.

PLUTARCH is no more crampt by Syſtems in his Philoſophy than in his Hiſtory. Where he compares the great Men of Greece and Rome, he fairly [114] ſets in Oppoſition all their Blemiſhes and Accom⯑pliſhments of whatever Kind, and omits nothing conſiderable, that can either depreſs or exalt their Characters. His moral Diſcourſes contain the ſame free and natural Cenſure of Men and Manners.

THE Character of Hannibal, as drawn by Livy ^*, is eſteem'd partial, but allows him many eminent Virtues. Never was there a Genius, ſays the Hiſto⯑rian, more equally ſitted for thoſe oppoſite Offices of Command and Obedience; and 'twere, therefore, difficult to determine whether he render'd himſelf dearer to the General or to the Army: To none, would Haſdrubal entruſt more willingly the Conduct of any dangerous Enterprize; under none, did the Soldiers diſcover more Courage and Confidence. Great Boldneſs in affronting Danger; great Prudence in the Midſt of it. No Labour could fatigue his Body or ſubdue his Mind. Cold and Heat were in⯑different to him: Meat and Drink he ſought as Sup⯑plies to the Neceſſities of Nature, not as Gratifica⯑tions of his voluptuous Appetites: Waking or Reſt he us'd indiſcriminately, by Night or by Day—Theſe great VIRTUES were ballanc'd by great VICES: Inhuman Cruelty; Perfidy more than Punic; no Truth, no Faith, no Regard to Oaths, Promiſes or Religion.

[115] THE Character of Alexander the Sixth, to be found in Guicciardin ^*, is pretty ſimilar, but juſter; and is a Proof, that even the Moderns, where they ſpeak naturally, hold the ſame Language with the Antients. In this Pope, ſays he, there was a ſingular Capacity and Judgment: Admirable Prudence; a wonderful Talent of Perſuaſion; and in all momentuous En⯑terprizes, a Diligence and Dexterity incredible But theſe Virtues were infinitely overballanc'd by his Vices; no Faith, no Religion, inſatiable Avarice, exorbitant Ambition, and a more than barbarous Cruelty.

POLYBIUS ^†, reprehending Timaeus for his Partiality againſt Agathocles, whom he himſelf allows to be the moſt cruel and impious of all Tyrants, ſays: If he took Refuge in Syracuſe, as aſſerted by that Hiſtorian, flying the Dirt and Smoke and Toil of his former Profeſſion of a Potter; and if, pro⯑ceeding from ſuch ſlender Beginnings, he became Maſter, in a little Time, of all Sicily; brought the Carthaginian State into the utmoſt Danger; and at laſt dy'd in Old-age, and in Poſſeſſion of kingly Dignity: Muſt he not be allow'd ſomething prodi⯑gious and extraordinary, and to have poſſeſt great Talents and Capacity for Buſineſs and Action? [116] His Hiſtorian, therefore, ought not to have alone related what tended to his Reproach and Infamy; but alſo what might redound to his PRAISE and HONOUR.

IN general, we may obſerve, that the Diſtinction of voluntary or involuntary was little regarded by the Antients in their moral Reaſonings; where they frequently treated the Queſtion as very doubtful, whether Virtue could be taught or not ^*? They juſtly conſider'd, that Cowardice, Meanneſs, Levity, Anxiety, Impatience, Folly, and many other Qua⯑lities of the Mind, might appear ridiculous, and de⯑form'd, contemptible and odious, tho' independant of the Will. Nor could it be ſuppos'd, at all Times, in every Man's Power to attain every Kind of mental, more than exterior Beauty.

BUT modern Philoſophers, treating all Morals, as on a like Footing with civil Laws, guarded by the Sanctions of Reward and Puniſhment, were neceſſa⯑rily led to render this Circumſtance, of voluntary or involuntary, the Foundation of their whole Theory. Every one may employ Terms in what Senſe he pleaſes: But this, in the mean Time, muſt [117] be allow'd, that Sentiments are every Day experienc'd of Blame and Praiſe, which have Objects beyond the Dominion of the Will or Choice, and of which it behoves us, if not as Moraliſts, as ſpeculative Philoſophers at leaſt, to give ſome ſatisfactory Theory and Explication.

A BLEMISH, a Fault, a Vice, a Crime; theſe Expreſſions ſeem to denote different Degrees of Cen⯑ſure and Diſapprobation; which are, however, all of them, at the Bottom, pretty nearly the ſame Kind of Species. The Explication of one will lead us eaſily into a juſt Conception of the others.

PART II.

IT ſeems evident, that where a Quality or Habit is ſubjected to our Examination, if it appear, in any reſpect, prejudicial to the Perſon, poſſeſt of it, or ſuch as incapacitates him for Buſineſs and Action, it is inſtantly blam'd, and rank'd amongſt his Faults and Imperfections. Indolence, Negligence, Want of Order and Method, Obſtinacy, Fickleneſs, Raſh⯑neſs, Credulity; no one ever eſteem'd theſe Qua⯑lities, indifferent to a Character; much leſs, extoll'd them as Accompliſhments or Virtues. The Preju⯑dice, reſulting from them, immediately ſtrikes our [118] Eye, and gives us the Sentiment of Pain and Diſ⯑approbation.

No Qualiity, 'tis allow'd, is abſolutely either blameable or praiſe-worthy. 'Tis all according to its Degrees. A due Medium, ſay the Peripatetics, is the Characteriſtic of Virtue. But this Medium is chiefly determin'd by Utility. A proper Celerity, for Inſtance, and Diſpatch in Buſineſs is commend⯑able. When defective, no Progreſs is ever made in the Execution of any Purpoſe: When exceſſive, it engages us in precipitate, and ill-concerted Meaſures and Enterprizes. By ſuch Reaſonings as theſe we fix the proper and commendable Mediocrity in all moral and prudential Diſquiſitions; and never loſe View of the Advantages, which reſult from any Character or Habit.

Now as theſe Advantages are enjoy'd by the Per⯑ſon, poſſeſt of the Character, it can never be Self-love, which renders the Proſpect of them agreeable to us, the Spectators, and prompts our Eſteem and Approbation. No Force of Imagination can con⯑vert us into another Perſon, and make us fancy, that we being that Perſon, reap Benefit from thoſe valuable Qualities, which belong to him. Or if it did, no Celerity of Imagination could immediately tranſport us back, into ourſelves, and make us love and eſteem the Perſon, as different from us. Views [119] and Sentiments, ſo oppoſite to known Truth, and to each other, could never have place, at the ſame Time, in the ſame Perſon. All Suſpicion, therefore, of ſelfiſh Regards are here totally excluded. 'Tis a quite different Principle, which actuates our Boſom, and intereſts us in the Felicity of the Perſon we contem⯑plate. Where his natural Talents and acquir'd Abi⯑lities give us the Proſpect of Elevation, Advance⯑ment, a Figure in Life, proſperous Succeſs, a ſteady Command over Fortune, and the Execution of great or advantageous Undertakings; we are ſtruck with ſuch agreeable Images, and feel a Complacency and Regard immediately ariſe towards him. The Ideas of Happineſs, Joy, Triumph, Proſperity are con⯑nected with every Circumſtance of his Character, and diffuſe over our Minds a pleaſing Sentiment of Sympathy and Humanity^*.

[120] LET us ſuppoſe a Perſon originally ſo fram'd as to have no Manner of Concern for his Fellow crea⯑tures, but to regard the Happineſs and Miſery of all ſenſible Beings with greater Indifference even than two contiguous Shades of the ſame Colour. Let us ſuppoſe, if the Proſperity of Nations were lay'd on the one hand and their Ruin on the other, and he were deſir'd to chooſe; that he would ſtand, like the Schoolman's Aſs, irreſolute and undeter⯑min'd, betwixt equal Motives; or rather, like the ſame Aſs betwixt two Pieces of Wood or Marble, without any Inclination or Propenſity on either Side. The Conſequence, I believe, muſt be allow'd juſt, that ſuch a Perſon, being abſolutely unconcern'd, either as to the public Good of a Community or the private Utility of others, would look on every Qua⯑lity, however pernicious, or however beneficial, to Society or to its Poſſeſſor, with the ſame Indifference as on the moſt common and unintereſting Object.

BUT if, inſtead of this fancy'd Monſter, we ſup⯑poſe a Man to form a Judgment or Determination in [121] the Caſe; there is to him a plain Foundation of Preference, where every Thing elſe is equal; and however cool his Choice may be, if his Heart be ſelfiſh, or if the Perſons intereſted be remote from him; there muſt ſtill be a Choice, and a Diſtinction betwixt what is uſeful, and what is pernicious. Now this Diſtinction is the ſame in all its Parts, with the moral Diſtinction, whoſe Foundation has been ſo oſ⯑ten, and ſo much in vain, enquir'd after. The ſame Endowments of the Mind, in every Circumſtance, are agreeable to the Sentiment of Morals and to that of Humanity; the ſame Temper is ſuſceptible of high Degrees of the one Sentiment and of the other; and the ſame Alteration in the Objects, by their nearer Approach or by Connexions, enlivens the one and the other. By all the Rules of Philoſophy, therefore, we muſt conclude, that theſe Sentiments are originally the ſame; ſince, in each particular, even the moſt minute, they are govern'd by the ſame Laws, and are mov'd by the ſame Objects.

WHY do Philoſophers infer, with the greateſt Certainty, that the Moon is kept in its Orbit by the ſame Force of Gravity, which makes Bodies fall near the Surface of the Earth, but becauſe theſe Effects are, upon Computation, found ſimilar and equal? And muſt not this Argument bring equal Conviction, in moral as in natural Diſquiſitions?

[122] To prove, by any long Detail, that all the Qua⯑lities, uſeful to the Poſſeſſor, are approv'd, and the contrary cenſur'd, would be ſuperfluous. The leaſt Reflection, on what is every Day experienc'd in Life, will be ſufficient. We ſhall only mention a few In⯑ſtances, in order to remove, if poſſible, all Doubt and Heſitation.

THE Quality, the moſt neceſſary for the Execution of any uſeful Enterprize, is DISCRETION; by which we carry on a ſafe Intercourſe with others, give due Attention to our own and to their Character, weigh each Circumſtance of the Buſineſs we under⯑take, and employ the ſureſt and ſafeſt Means for the Attainment of any End or Purpoſe. To a Cromwell, perhaps, or a De Retz, Diſcretion may appear an Alderman-like Virtue, as Dr. Swift calls it; and being incompatible with thoſe vaſt Deſigns, to which their Courage and Ambition prompted them, it might really, in them, be a Fault or Imperfection. But in the Conduct of ordinary Life, no Virtue is more requiſite, not only to obtain Succeſs, but to avoid the moſt fatal Miſcarriages and Diſappoint⯑ments. The greateſt Parts without it, as obſerv'd by an elegant Writer, may be fatal to their Owner; as Polyphemus depriv'd of his Eye was only the more ex⯑pos'd, [123] on Account of his enormous Strength and Stature.

THE beſt Character, indeed, were it not rather too perfect for human Nature, is that which gives no⯑thing to Temper of any Kind; but alternately em⯑ploys Enterprize and Caution, as each is uſeful to the particular Purpoſe intended. Such is the Excellence, which St. Evremond aſcribes to Mareſchal Turenne, who diſplay'd every Campaign, as he grew older, more Temerity in his military Enterprizes; and be⯑ing now, from long Experience, perfectly acquainted with every Incident in War, he advanc'd with greater Firmneſs and Boldneſs, in a Road ſo well known to him. Fabius, ſays Machiavel, was cau⯑tious; Scipio enterprizing: And both ſucceeded, becauſe the Situation of the Roman Affars, during the Command of each, was peculiarly adapted to his Genius; but both would have fail'd, had theſe Situations been inverted. He is happy, whoſe Cir⯑cumſtances ſuit his Temper; but he is more excellent, who can ſuit his Temper to any Circumſtances.

WHAT need is there to diſplay the Praiſes of INDUSTRY, and to extol its Advantages, in the Acquiſition of Power and Riches, or in raiſing what we call a Fortune in the World? The Tortoiſe, according to the Fable, by his Aſſiduity, gain'd the [124] Race of the Hare, tho' poſſeſt of much ſuperior Swiftneſs. A Man's Time, when well huſbanded, is like a cultivated Field, of which a few Acres pro⯑duce more of what is uſeful to Life, than extenſive Provinces, even of the richeſt Soil, when over-run with Weeds and Brambles.

BUT all Proſpect of Succeſs in Life, or even of tolerable Subſiſtence, muſt fail, where a reaſonable FRUGALITY is wanting. The Heap, in⯑ſtead of encreaſing, diminiſhes daily, and leaves its Poſſeſſor ſo much more unhappy, that not having been able to confine his Expences to a larger Reve⯑nue, he will ſtill leſs be able to live contentedly on a ſmaller. The Souls of Men, according to Plato ^*, inflam'd with impure Appetites, and loſing the Body, which alone afforded Means of Satisfaction, hover about the Earth, and haunt the Places, where their Bodies are repoſited; poſſeſt with a longing Deſire to recover the loſt Organs of Senſation So may we ſee worthleſs Prodigals, having conſum'd their For⯑tunes in wild Debauches, thruſting themſelves into every plentiful Table, and every Party of Pleaſure, hated even by the vicious, and deſpis'd even by Fools.

[125] THE one Extreme of Frugality is Avarice, which, as it both deprives a Man of all Uſe of his Riches, and checks Hoſpitality and every ſocial Enjoyment, is juſtly cenſur'd on a double Account: Prodigality, the other Extreme, is commonly more hurtful to a Man himſelf; and each of theſe Extremes is blam'd above the other, according to the Temper of the Perſon who cenſures, and according to his greater or leſs Senſibility to Pleaſure, either ſocial or ſenſual.

ALL Men, 'tis allow'd, are equally deſirous of Happineſs; but all Men are not equally ſucceſsful in the Purſuit: Of which one chief Cauſe is the common Want of STRENGTH of MIND, which might enable us to reſiſt the Temptation of preſent Eaſe or Pleaſure, and carry us forward in the Search of more diſtant Profit and Enjoyment. Our Affec⯑tions, on a general Proſpect of their Objects, form certain Rules of Conduct, and certain Meaſures of Preference of one above another: And theſe De⯑ciſions, tho' really the Reſult of our calm Paſſions, and Propenſities, (for what elſe can pronounce any Object eligible or the contrary?) are yet ſaid, by a natural Abuſe of Terms, to be the Determinations of pure Reaſon and Reflection. But when ſome of theſe Objects approach nearer us, or acquire the Ad⯑vantages of favourable Lights and Poſitions, which [126] catch the Heart or Imagination; our general Reſo⯑lutions are frequently confounded, a ſmall Enjoyment preferr'd, and laſting Shame and Sorrow entail'd upon us. And however Poets may employ their Wit and Eloquence, in celebrating preſent Pleaſure, and rejecting all diſtant Views to Fame, Health, or Fortune; 'tis obvious, that this Practice is the Source of all Diſſoluteneſs and Debauchery, Repentance and Miſery. A Man of a ſtrong and determin'd Temper adheres tenaciouſly to his general Reſolu⯑tions, and is neither ſeduc'd by the Allurements of Pleaſure, nor terrify'd by the Menaces of Pain; but keeps ſtill in View thoſe diſtant Purſuits, by which he, at once, enſures his Happineſs and his Ho⯑nour.

SELF-SATISFACTION, at leaſt in ſome Degree, is an Advantage, that equally attends the FOOL and the WISE-MAN: But 'tis the only one; nor is there any other Circumſtance in the Conduct of Life, where they are upon an equal Footing. Buſineſs, Books, Converſation; for all of theſe, a Fool is totally incapacitated, and except condemn'd by his Station to the coarſeſt Drudgery, remains a uſeleſs Burthen upon the Earth. Accordingly, 'tis found, that Men are infinitely jealous of their Cha⯑racter in this Particular; and many Inſtances are ſeen of Profligacy and Treachery, the moſt avow'd, [127] and unreſerved; none of bearing patiently the Im⯑putation of Ignorance and Stupidity. Dicaearchus, the Macedonian General, who, as Polybius ^* tells us, openly erected one Altar to Impiety, and another to Injuſtice, in order to bid Defiance to Mankind; even he, I am well aſſur'd, would have ſtarted at the Epithet of Fool, and have meditated Revenge for ſo injurious an Appellation. Except the Affection of Parents, the ſtrongeſt and moſt indiſſoluble Bond in Nature, no Connexion has Strength ſufficient to ſup⯑port the Diſguſt ariſing from this Character. Love itſelf, which can ſubſiſt under Treachery, Ingrati⯑tude, Malice, and Infidelity, is immediately ex⯑tinguiſh'd by it, when perceiv'd and acknowledg'd; nor are Deformity and Old-age more fatal to the Do⯑minion of that Paſſion. So dreadful are the Ideas of an utter Incapacity for any Purpoſe or Under⯑taking, and of continu'd Error and Miſconduct in Life!

WHEN 'tis aſk'd, whether a quick or a ſlow Ap⯑prehenſion be moſt valuable? Whether one, that, at firſt View, penetrates far into a Subject, but can perform nothing upon Study; or a contrary Cha⯑racter, which muſt work out every Thing by Dint of Application? Whether a clear Head or a copious [128] Invention? Whether a profound Genius or a ſure Judgment? In ſhort, what Character, or peculiar Turn of Underſtanding is more excellent than another? 'Tis evident, we can anſwer none of theſe Queſtions, without conſidering which of thoſe Qualities capacitates a Man beſt for the World, and carries him faitheſt in any of his Undertakings.

IF refin'd Senſe and exalted Senſe be not ſo uſeful as common Senſe, their Rarity, their Novelty, and the Nobleneſs of their Objects make ſome Compen⯑ſation, and render them the Admiration of Man⯑kind: As Gold, tho' leſs ſerviceable than Iron, ac⯑quires, from its Scarcity, a Value, which is much ſuperior.

THE Deſects of Judgment can be ſupply'd by no Art or Invention; but thoſe of MEMORY fre⯑quently may, both in Buſineſs and in Study, by Method and Induſtry, and by Diligence in commit⯑ting every Thing to Paper; and we ſcarce ever hear a ſhort Memory given as a Reaſon for a Man's Want of Succeſs in any Undertaking. But in antient Times, when no Man could make a Figure without the Talent of ſpeaking, and when the Audience were too delicate to bear ſuch crude, undigeſted Harangues as our extemporary Orators offer to pub⯑lic Aſſemblies; the Faculty of Memory was then of [129] the utmoſt Conſequence, and was accordingly much more valued than at preſent. Scarce any great Genius is mention'd in Antiquity, who is not cele⯑brated for this Talent; and Cicero enumerates it amongſt the other ſublime Qualities of Caeſar him⯑ſelf^*.

PARTICULAR Cuſtoms and Manners alter the Uſe⯑fulneſs of Qualities: they alſo alter their Merit. Particular Situations and Accidents have, in ſome Degree, the ſame Influence. He will always be more eſteem'd, who profeſſes thoſe Talents and Ac⯑compliſhments, which ſuit his Station and Pro⯑feſſion, than the whom Fortune has miſplac'd in the Part ſhe has aſſign'd him. The private or ſelfiſh Virtues are, in this reſpect, more arbitrary than the public and ſocial. In other reſpects, they are, per⯑haps, leſs liable to Doubt and Controverſy.

IN this Kingdom, ſuch continu'd Oſtentation, of late Years, has been diſplay'd among Men in active Life, with regard to public Spirit, and among thoſe in ſpeculative with regard to Benevolence; and ſo many falſe Pretenſions to each have been, no doubt, detected, that Men of the World are apt, without [130] any bad Intention, to diſcover a ſullen Incredulity on the head of theſe moral Endowments, and even ſometimes abſolutely to deny their Exiſtence and Reality. In like Manner, I find, that, of old, the perpetual Cant of the Stoics and Cynics concerning Virtue, their magnificent Profeſſions and ſlender Per⯑formances, bred a Diſguſt in Mankind; and Lucian, who, tho' licentious on the Article of Pleaſure, is yet, in other reſpects, a very moral Writer, cannot, ſometimes, talk of Virtue, ſo much boaſted, with⯑out betraying Symptoms of Spleen and Irony^*. But ſurely, this peeviſh Delicacy, whence-ever it ariſes, can never be carry'd ſo far as to make us deny the Exiſtence of every Species of Virtue, and all Diſtinc⯑tion of Manners and Behaviour. Beſides Diſcretion, Caution, Enterprize, Induſtry, Aſſiduity, Fragality, OEconomy, Good-ſenſe, Prudence, Diſcernment; beſides theſe Virtues, I ſay, whoſe very Names force an Avowal of their Merit, there are many others, to which the moſt determin'd Sceptiſm cannot, for a Moment, refuſe the Tribute of Praiſe and Appro⯑bation: Temperance, Sobriety, Patience, Conſtancy, [131] Perſeverance, Forethought, Conſiderateneſs, Secrecy, Order, Inſinuation, Addreſs, Preſence of Mind, Quick⯑neſs of Conception, Facility of Expreſſion; theſe and a thouſand more of the ſame Kind, no Man will ever deny to be Excellencies and Endowments. As their Merit conſiſts in their Tendency to ſerve the Perſon, poſſeſt of them, without any magnificent Claims of public and ſocial Deſert, we are the leſs jealous of their Pretenſions, and readily admit them into the Catalogue of Virtues. We are not ſenſible, that, by this Conceſſion, we have pav'd the Way for all the other moral Excellencies, and cannot conſiſtently heſitate any longer, with regard to diſintereſted Be⯑nevolence, Patriotiſm, and Humanity.

IT ſeems, indeed, certain, that firſt Appearances are here, as uſual, extremely deceitful, and that 'tis more difficult, in a ſpeculative Way, to reſolve into Self-love the Merit we aſcribe to the ſelfiſh Virtues above-mention'd, than that even of the ſocial Virtues of Juſtice and Beneficence. For this latter Purpoſe, we need but ſay, that whatever Conduct and Beha⯑viour promotes the Good of the Community, is lov'd, prais'd, and eſteem'd by the Community, on Account of that Utility and Intereſt, of which every one partakes: And tho' this Affection and Regard be, in Reality, Gratitude, not Self-love, yet a Diſtinction, even of this obvious Nature, may not [132] readily be made by ſuperficial Reaſoners; and there is Room, at leaſt, to ſupport the Cavil and Diſpute for a Moment. But as Qualities, which tend only to the Utility of their Poſſeſſor, without any Refer⯑ence to us, or to the Community, are yet eſteem'd and valu'd; by what Theory or Syſtem can we ac⯑count for this Sentiment from Self-love, or deduce it from that favourite Origin? There ſeems here a Neceſſity of confeſſing that the Happineſs and Miſery of others are not Spectacles altogether in⯑different to us, but that the View of the former, whether in its Cauſes or Effects, like Sun-ſhine or the Proſpect of well-cultivated Plains (to carry our Pretenſions no higher) communicates a ſecret Joy and Satisfaction; the Appearance of the latter, like a lowering Cloud or barren Landſkip, throws a melancholy Damp over the Imagination. And this Conceſſion being once made, the Difficulty is over; and a natural, unforc'd Interpretation of the Phae⯑nomena of human Life will afterwards, we may hope, prevail, amongſt all ſpeculative Enquirers.

PART III.

IT may not be improper, in this Place, to exa⯑mine the Influence of bodily Endowments and of the Goods of Fortune, over our Sentiments of Re⯑gard and Eſteem, and to conſider whether theſe Phaenomena ſtrengthen or weaken the preſent Theory.

'TIS evident, that one conſiderable Source of Beauty in all Animals is the Advantage they reap from the particular Fabric or Structure of their Limbs and Members, ſuitable to the particular Manner of Life, to which they are by Nature deſtin'd. The juſt Proportions of a Horſe, deſcrib'd by Xenophon and Virgil, are the ſame, which are receiv'd at this Day by our modern Jockeys; becauſe the Founda⯑tion of them is the ſame, viz. Experience of what is detrimental or uſeful in the Animal.

BROAD Shoulders, a lank Belly, firm Joints, taper Legs; all theſe are beautiful in our Species, becauſe Signs of Force and Vigour. Ideas of Uti⯑lity and its contrary, tho' they do not altogether de⯑termine what is handſome or deform'd, are evidently [134] the Source of a conſiderable Part of Approbation or Diſlike.

IN ancient Times, bodily Strength and Dexterity, being of greater Uſe and Importance in War, was alſo much more eſteem'd and valu'd, than at preſent. Not to inſiſt on Homer and the Poets, we may ob⯑ſerve, that Hiſtorians ſcruple not to mention Force of Body among the other Accompliſhments even of Epaminondas, whom they acknowledge to be the greateſt Hero, Stateſman, and General of all the Greeks ^*. A like Praiſe is given to Pompey, one of the greateſt of the Romans ^†. This Inſtance is fimilar to what we obſerv'd above with regard to Memory.

WHAT Deriſion and Contempt, with both Sexes, attend Impotence; while the unhappy Object is re⯑garded [135] as one depriv'd of ſo capital a Pleaſure in Life, and at the ſame Time, as diſabled from com⯑municating it to others. Barrenneſs in Women, be⯑ing alſo a Species of Inutility, is a Reproach, but not in the ſame Degree: Of which the Reaſon is very obvious, according to the preſent Theory^*.

THERE is no Rule in Painting or Statuary more indiſpenſible than that of ballancing the Figures, and placing them with the greateſt Exactneſs on their proper Center of Gravity. A Figure, which is not juſtly ballanc'd is ugly; becauſe it conveys the diſ⯑agreeable Ideas of Fall, Harm and Pain^†.

[136] A DISPOSITION or Turn of Mind, which quali⯑fies a Man to riſe in the World, and advance his Fortune, is entitled to Eſteem and Regard, as has been already explain'd. It may, therefore, naturally be ſuppos'd, that the actual Poſſeſſion of Riches and Authority will have a conſiderable Influence over theſe Sentiments.

LET us examine any Hypotheſis, by which we can account for the Regard, pay'd the Rich and Power⯑ful: We ſhall find none ſatisfactory but that which derives it from the Enjoyment, communicated by the Images of Proſperity, Happineſs, Eaſe, Plenty, Command, and the Gratification of every Appetite. Self-love, for Inſtance, which ſome affect ſo much to conſider as the Source of every Sentiment, is [137] plainly inſufficient to this Purpoſe. Where no Good⯑will or Friendship appears, 'tis difficult to conceive on what we can found our Hope of Advantage from the Riches of others; tho' we naturally eſteem and reſpect the Rich, even before they diſcover any ſuch favourable Diſpoſition towards us.

WE are affected with the ſame Sentiments, when we lie ſo much out of the Sphere of their Activity, that they cannot even be ſuppos'd to poſſeſs the Power of ſerving us. A Priſoner of War, in all civiliz'd Nations, is treated with a Regard, ſuited to his Condition; and Riches, 'tis evident, go far to⯑wards fixing the Condition of any Perſon. If Birth and Quality enter for a Share, this ſtill affords us an Argument to our preſent Purpoſe. For what is it we call a Man of Birth, but one, who is deſcended from a long Succeſſion of rich and powerful An⯑ceſtors, and who acquires our Eſteem by his Con⯑n [...]ion with Perſons, whom we eſteem? His An⯑ceſtors, therefore, tho' dead, are reſpected, in ſome Meaſure, on Account of their Riches; and conſe⯑quently, without any Kind of Expectation.

BUT not to go ſo far as Priſoners of War or the Dead, to find Inſtances of this diſintereſted Regard for Riches; we may only obſerve, with a little At⯑tention, thoſe Phaenomena, that occur in common [138] Life and Converſation. A Man, who is himſelf, we ſhall ſuppoſe, of a competent Fortune, and of no Profeſſion, coming into a Company of Strangers, naturally treats them with different Degrees of Reſ⯑pect and Deference, as he is inform'd of their dif⯑ferent Fortunes and Conditions; tho' 'tis impoſſible he can ſo ſuddenly propoſe, and perhaps would not accept of, any pecuniary Advantage from them. A Traveller is always admitted into Company, and meets with Civility, in Proportion as his Train and Equipage ſpeak him a Man of great or moderate Fortune. In ſhort, the different Ranks of Man are, in a great Meaſure, regulated by Riches; and that with regard to Superiors as well as Inferiors, Strangers as well as Acquaintance.

WHAT remains, therefore, but to conclude, that as Riches are deſir'd for ourſelf only as the Means of gratifying our Appetites, either at preſent or in ſome imaginary future Period; they beget Eſteem in others merely from their having that Influence. This indeed is their very Nature or Eſſence: They have a direct Reference to the Commodities, Con⯑veniencies, and Pleaſures of Life: A Banker's Bill, who is broke, or Gold in a deſart Iſland, would otherwiſe be full as valuable. When we approach a Man, who is, as we ſay, at his Eaſe, we are pre⯑ſented with the pleaſing Ideas of Plenty, Satisfaction, [139] Cleanlineſs, Warmth; a chearful Houſe, elegant Furniture, ready Service, and whatever is deſirable in Meat, Drink, or Apparel. On the contrary, when a poor Man appears, the diſagreeable Images of Want, Penury, hard Labour, dirty Furniture, coarſe or ragged Cloaths, nauſeous Meat and diſtaſte⯑ful Liquor, immediately ſtrike our Fancy. What elſe do we mean by ſaying the one is rich, the other poor? And as Regard or Contempt is the natural Conſequence of theſe different Situations in Life; 'tis eaſily ſeen what additional Light and Evidence this throws on our preceding Theory, with Regard to all moral Diſtinctions^*.

[140] A MAN, who has cur'd himſelf of all ridiculous Prepoſſeſſions, and is fully, ſincerely, and ſteddily convinc'd, from Experience as well as Philoſophy, that the Differences of Fortune make leſs Difference in Happineſs than is vulgarly imagin'd; ſuch a one meaſures not out Degrees of Eſteem according to the Rent-rolls of his Acquaintance. He may, indeed, externally pay a ſuperior Deference to the great Lord above the Vaſſal; becauſe Riches are the moſt con⯑venient, being the moſt fixt and determinate, Source of Diſtinction: But his internal Sentiments are more regulated by the perſonal Characters of Men, than by the accidental and capricious Favours of For⯑tune.

IN moſt Countries of Europe, Family, that is, hereditary Riches, mark'd with Titles and Symbols from the Sovereign, is the chief Source of Diſtinc⯑tion In England, more Regard is paid to preſent Opulence and Plenty. Each Practice has its Ad⯑vantages and Diſadvantages. Where Birth is re⯑ſpected, unactive ſpiritleſs Minds remain in haughty Indolence, and dream of nothing but Pedigrees and Genealogies: The generous and ambitious ſeek Honour and Command and Reputation and Favour. Where Riches are the chief Idol, Corruption, Ve⯑nality, Rapine prevail: Arts, Manufactures, Com⯑merce, [141] Agriculture flouriſh. The former Prejudice, being favourable to military Virtue, is more ſuited to Monarchies. The other being the chief Spur to Induſtry, agrees better with a republican Govern⯑ment. And we accordingly find, that each of theſe Forms of Government, by varying the Utility of thoſe Cuſtoms, has commonly a proportionable Effect on the Sentiments of Mankind.

PART I.

IT may juſtly appear ſurprizing, that any Man, in ſo late an Age, ſhould find it requiſite to prove, by elaborate Reaſonings, that VIRTUE or PERSONAL MERIT conſiſts altogether in the Poſſeſſion of Qualities, uſeful or agreeable to the Perſon himſelf or to others. It might be expected that this Principle would have occur'd even to the firſt rude, unpractis'd Enquirers concerning Morals, and been receiv'd, from its own Evidence, without any Argument or Diſputation. Whatever is valuable in any Kind ſo naturally claſſes itſelf under the Di⯑viſion of uſeful or agreeable, the utile or the dulce, that 'tis not eaſy to imagine, why we ſhould ever ſeek farther, or conſider the Queſtion as a Matter of nice Reſearch or Enquiry. And as every Thing [172] uſeful or agreeable muſt poſſeſs theſe Qualities with regard either to the Perſon himſelf or to others, the compleat Delineation or Deſcription of Merit ſeems to be perform'd as naturally as a Shadow is caſt by the Sun, or an Image is reflected upon Water. If the Ground, on which the Shadow is caſt, be not broken and uneven, nor the Surface, from which the Image is reflected, diſturb'd and confus'd, a juſt Figure is immediately preſented, without any Art or Attention. And it ſeems a reaſonable Preſump⯑tion, that Syſtems and Hypotheſes have perverted our natural Underſtanding, when a Theory, ſo ſimple and obvious, could ſo long have eſcap'd the moſt elaborate Scrutiny and Examination.

BUT however the Caſe may have far'd with Phi⯑loſophy; in common Life, theſe Principles are ſtill implicitely maintain'd; nor is any other Topic of Praiſe or Blame ever recur'd to, when we employ any Panegyric or Satyre, any Applauſe or Cenſure of human Action and Behaviour. If we obſerve Men, in every Intercourſe of Buſineſs or Pleaſure, in each Conference and Converſation, we ſhall find them no where, except in the Schools, at any Loſs upon this Subject. What ſo natural, for Inſtance, as the following Dialogue? You are very happy, we ſhall ſuppoſe one to ſay, addreſſing himſelf to [173] another, that you have given your Daughter to Cle⯑anthes: He is a Man of Honour and Humanity. Every one, who has any Intercourſe with him, is ſure of fair and kind Treatment^*. I congratulate you too, ſays another, on the promiſing Expectations of this Son-in-law; whoſe aſſiduous Application to the Sudy of the Laws, whoſe quick Penetration and early Knowledge both of Men and Buſineſs, prog⯑noſticate the greateſt Honours and Advancement^†. You ſurprize me much, replies a third, when you talk of Cleanthes as a Man of Buſineſs and Appli⯑cation. I met him lately in a Circle of the gayeſt Company, and he was the very Life and Soul of our Converſation: So much Wit with Good-manners; ſo much Gallantry without Affectation; ſo much in⯑genious Knowledge ſo genteely deliver'd, I have never before obſerv'd in any one^‡. You would ad⯑mire him ſtill more, ſays a fourth, if you knew him more familiarly. That Cheerfulneſs, which you might remark in him, is not a ſudden Flaſh ſtruck out by Company: It runs thro' the whole Tenor of his Life, and preſerves a perpetual Serenity on his Countenance, and Tranquillity in his Soul. He has met with ſevere Trials, Misfortunes as well as Dangers; and by his Greatneſs of Mind, was ſtill [174] ſuperior to all of them^*. The Image, Gentlemen, you have here delineated of Cleanthes, cry I, is that of accompliſh'd Merit. Each of you has given a Stroke of the Pencil to his Figure; and you have unawares exceeded all the Pictures drawn by Gratian or Caſtiglione. A Philoſopher might ſelect this Cha⯑racter as a Model of perfect Virtue.

AND as every Quality, which is uſeful or agreeable to ourſelves or others, is, in common Life, admitted under the Denomination of Virtue or perſonal Merit; ſo no other will ever be receiv'd, where Men judge of Things by their natural, unprejudic'd Reaſon, without the deluſive Gloſſes of Superſtition and falſe Religion. Celibacy, Faſting, Penances, Mortification, Self-denial, Humility, Silence, So⯑litude and the whole Train of monkiſh Virtues; for what Reaſon are they every where rejected by Men of Senſe, but becauſe they ſerve no Manner of Purpoſe; neither advance a Man's Fortune in the World, nor render him a more valuable Member of Society; neither qualify him for the Entertainment of Company, nor encreaſe his Power of Self-en⯑joyment? We obſerve, on the contrary, that they croſs all theſe deſirable Ends; ſtupify the Under⯑ſtanding and harden the Heart, obſcure the Fancy [175] and ſower the Temper. We juſtly, therefore trans⯑fer them to the oppoſite Column, and place them in the Catalogue of Vices; nor has any Superſtition Force ſufficient, amongſt Men of the World, to pervert entirely theſe natural Sentiments. A gloomy, hair-brain'd Enthuſiaſt, after his Death, may have Place in the Calendar; but will ſcarce ever be ad⯑mitted, when alive, into Intimacy and Society, ex⯑cept by thoſe who are as delirious and diſmal as himſelf.

IT ſeems a Happineſs in the preſent Theory, that it enters not into that vulgar Diſpute concerning the Degrees of Benevolence or Self-love, which prevail in human Nature; a Diſpute, which is never likely to have any Iſſue, both becauſe Men, who have taken Party, are not eaſily convinc'd, and becauſe the Phaenomena, which can be produc'd on either Side, are ſo diſpers'd, ſo uncertain, and ſubject to ſo many Interpretations, that 'tis ſcarce poſſible accu⯑rately to compare them, or draw from them any de⯑terminate Inference or Concluſion. 'Tis ſufficient for our preſent Purpoſe, if it be allow'd, what ſurely, without the greateſt Abſurdity, cannot be diſputed, that there is ſome Benevolence, however ſmall, in⯑fus'd into our Boſom; ſome Spark of Friendſhip for human Kind; ſome Particle of the Dove, kneaded into our Frame, along with the Elements of the [176] Wolf and Serpent. Let theſe generous Sentiments be ſuppos'd ever ſo weak; let them be hardly ſuf⯑ficient to move even a Hand or Finger of our Body; they muſt ſtill direct the Determinations of our Mind, and where every Thing elſe is equal, produce a cool Preference of what is uſeful and ſerviceable to Man⯑kind, above what is pernicious and dangerous. A moral Diſtinction, therefore, immediately ariſes; a general Sentiment of Blame and Approbation; a Tendency, however faint, to the Objects of the one, and a proportionable Averſion to thoſe of the other. Nor will thoſe Reaſoners, who ſo earneſtly maintain the predominant Selfiſhneſs of human Kind, be any way ſcandaliz'd at hearing of the weak Sentiments of Virtue, implanted in our Nature. On the con⯑trary, they are found as ready to maintain the one Tenet as the other; and their Spirit of Satyre, (for ſuch it appears, rather than of Corruption) naturally gives Riſe to both Opinions; which have, indeed, a great, and almoſt indiſſoluble Connexion together.

AVARICE, Ambition, Vanity, and all Paſſions, vulgarly, tho' improperly, compriz'd under the De⯑nomination of Self-love, are here excluded from our Theory concerning the Origin of Morals, not be⯑cauſe they are too weak, but becauſe they have not a proper Direction, for that Purpoſe. The Notion of Morals implies ſome Sentiment, common to all [177] Mankind, which recommends the ſame Object to general Approbation, and makes every Man, or moſt Men, agree in the ſame Opinion or Deciſion concerning it. It alſo implies ſome Sentiment, ſo univerſal and comprehenſive as to extend to all Man⯑kind, and render the Actions and Conduct, even of Perſons the moſt remote, an Object of Cenſure or Applauſe, according as they agree or diſagree with that Rule of Right, which is eſtabliſh'd. Theſe two requiſite Circumſtances belong alone to the Senti⯑ment of Humanity here inſiſted on. The other Paſſions produce, in every Breaſt, many ſtrong Sen⯑timents of Deſire and Averſion, Affection and Hatred; but theſe neither are felt ſo much in com⯑mon, nor are ſo comprehenſive, as to be the Foun⯑dation of any general Syſtem and eſtabliſh'd Theory of Blame or Approbation.

WHEN a Man denominates another his Enemy, his Rival, his Antagoniſt, his Adverſary, he is underſtood to ſpeak the Language of Self-love, and to expreſs Sentiments, peculiar to himſelf, and ariſing from his particular Circumſtances and Situation: But when he beſtows on any Man the Epithets of vicious or odious or deprav'd, he then ſpeaks another Language, and expreſſes Sentiments, in which he expects all his Audience are to concur with him. He muſt here, therefore, depart from his private and particular [178] Situation, and muſt chooſe a Point of View, com⯑mon to him with others: He muſt move ſome uni⯑verſal Principle of the human Frame, and touch a String, to which all Mankind have an Accord and Symphony. If he means, therefore, to expreſs, that this Man poſſeſſes Qualities, whoſe Tendency is pernicious to Society, he has choſen this common Point in View, and has touch'd the Principle of Hu⯑manity, in which every Man, in ſome Degree, concurs. While the human Heart is compounded of the ſame Elements as at preſent, it will never be al⯑together indifferent to the Good of Mankind, nor entirely unaffected with the Tendencies of Characters and Manners. And tho' this Affection of Humanity may not generally be eſteem'd ſo ſtrong, as Ambition or Vanity, yet, being common to all Men, it can alone be the Foundation of Morals, or of any ge⯑neral Syſtem of Conduct and Behaviour. One Man's Ambition is not another's Ambition; nor will the ſame Event or Object ſatisfy both: But the Huma⯑nity of one Man is the Humanity of every one; and the ſame Object touches this Paſſion in all human Creatures.

BUT the Sentiments, which ariſes from Humanity, are not only the ſame in all human Creatures, and produce the ſame Approbation or Cenſure; but they alſo comprehend all human Creatures; nor is there [179] any one, whoſe Conduct and Character is not, by their Means, an Object, to every one, of Cenſure or Approbation. On the contrary thoſe other Paſ⯑ſions, commonly denominated ſelfiſh, both produce different Sentiments in each Individual, according to his particular Situation; and alſo contemplate the greateſt Part of Mankind with the utmoſt Indiffe⯑rence and Unconcern. Whoever has a high Regard and Eſteem for me flatters my Vanity; whoever expreſſes Contempt mortifies and diſpleaſes me: But as my Name is known but to a ſmall Part of Man⯑kind, there are few, that come within the Sphere of this Paſſion, or excite, on its Account, either my Affection or Diſguſt. But if you repreſent a tyran⯑nical, inſolent, or barbarous Behaviour, in any Country or in any Age of the World; I ſoon carry my Eye to the pernicious Tendency of ſuch a Con⯑duct, and feel the Sentiments of Repugnance and Diſpleaſure towards it. No Character can be ſo re⯑mote as to be, in this Light, altogether indifferent to me. What is beneficial to Society or to the Perſon himſelf muſt ſtill be prefer'd. And every Quality or Action, of every human Being, muſt, by this Means, be rank'd under ſome Claſs or Denomination, expreſſive of general Cenſure or Applauſe.

[180] WHAT more, therefore, can we aſk to diſtinguiſh the Sentiments, dependant on Humanity, from thoſe [...] any other Paſſion, or to ſatisfy us [...] the Origin of Morals, and not the [...]? Whatever Conduct gains my Approbation, by [...] Humanity, procures alſo the Ap⯑plauſe o [...] all Mankind, by affecting the ſame Prin⯑ciple in [...]. But what ſerves my Avarice or Am⯑bition pleaſes only theſe Paſſions in me, and affects not the Avarice or Ambition of the reſt of Mankind. No Conduct, in any Man. which has a beneficial Tendency, but is agreeable to my Humanity, how⯑ever remote the Perſon: But every Man, ſo far re⯑mov'd as neither to croſs nor ſerve my Avarice and Ambition, is altogether indifferent to thoſe Paſſions. The Diſtinction, therefore, betwixt thoſe different Species of Sentiment being ſo ſtrong and evident, Language muſt ſoon be moulded upon it, and muſt invent a peculiar Set of Terms to expreſs thoſe uni⯑verſal Sentiments of Cenſure or Approbation, which ariſe from Humanity or from Views of general Uſe⯑fulneſs and its contrary. VIRTUE and VICE become then known: Morals are recogniz'd: Cer⯑tain general Ideas are fram'd of human Conduct and Behaviour: Such Meaſures are expected from Men, in ſuch Situations: This Action is determin'd con⯑formable [181] to our abſtract Rule; that other, contrary. And by ſuch univerſal Principles are the particular Sentiments of Self-love frequently controul'd and limited^*.

FROM Inſtances of popular Tumults, Seditions, Factions, Panics, and all Paſſions, which are ſhar'd with a Multitude; we may learn the Influence of Society, in exciting and ſupporting any Emotion; [182] while the moſt ungovernable Diſorders are rais'd, we find, by that Means, from the ſlighteſt and moſt frivolous Occaſions. Solon was no very cruel, tho', perhaps, an unjuſt Legiſlator, who puniſh'd Neuters in civil Wars; and few, I believe, would, in ſuch Caſes, incur the Penalty, were their Affection and Diſcourſe allow'd ſufficient to abſolve them. No Selfiſhneſs, and ſcarce any Philoſophy, has there Force ſufficient to ſupport a total Coolneſs and Indif⯑ference; and he muſt be more or leſs than Man, who kindles not in the common Blaze. What Won⯑der, then, that moral Sentiments are found of ſuch Influence in Life; tho' ſpringing from Principles, which may appear, at firſt Sight, ſomewhat ſmall and delicate? But theſe Principles, we muſt remark, are ſocial and univerſal: They form, in a Manner, the Party of Human-kind againſt Vice or Diſorder, its common Enemy: And as the benevolent Concern for others is diffus'd, in a greater or leſs Degree, over all Men, and is the ſame in all, it occurs more frequently in Diſcourſe, is foſter'd by Society and Converſation, and the Blame and Approbation, conſequent on it, are thereby rouz'd from that Le⯑thargy, into which they are probably lull'd, in ſo⯑litary and uncultivated Nature. Other Paſſions, tho' perhaps originally ſtronger, yet being ſelfiſh and private, are often over-power'd by its Force, and [183] yield the Dominion of our Breaſt to thoſe ſocial and public Principles.

ANOTHER Spring of our Conſtitution, that brings great Addition of Force to moral Sentiment, is, the Love of Fame; which rules, with ſuch uncontrol'd Authority, in all generous Minds, and is often the grand Object of all their Deſigns and Undertakings. By our continual and earneſt Purſuit of a Character, a Name, a Reputation in the World, we bring our own Deportment and Conduct frequently in Review, and conſider how they appear in the Eyes of thoſe, who approach and regard us. This conſtant Habit of ſurveying ourſelf, as it were, in Reflexion, keeps alive all the Sentiments of Right and Wrong, and begets, in noble Natures, a certain Reverence for themſelves as well as others; which is the ſureſt Guardian of every Virtue. The animal Conve⯑niencies and Pleaſures ſink gradually in their Value; while every inward Beauty and moral Grace is ſtudi⯑ouſly acquir'd, and the Mind is accompliſh'd in each Perfection, that can adorn or embelliſh a rational Creature.

HERE is the moſt perfect Morality we are ac⯑quainted with: Here is diſplay'd the Force of many Sympathies. Our moral Sentiment is itſelf a Feeling chiefly of that Nature: And our Regard to a Cha⯑racter [184] with others ſeems to ariſe only from a Care of preſerving a Character with ourſelves, in order to which we find it neceſſary to prop our tottering Judgment on the correſpondent Approbation of Mankind.

BUT in order to accommodate Matters, and re⯑move, if poſſible, every Difficulty, let us allow all theſe Reaſonings to be falſe. Let us allow, that when we reſolve the Pleaſure, that ariſes from Views of Utility, into the Sentiments of Humanity and Sympathy, we have embrac'd a wrong Hypotheſis. Let us confeſs it neceſſary to find ſome other Expli⯑cation of that Applauſe, which is paid to all Ob⯑jects, whether inanimate, animate or rational, if they have a Tendency to promote the Welfare and Advantage of others. However difficult it be to conceive, that an Object is approv'd of, on Account of its Tendency to a certain End, while the End itſelf is totally indifferent; let us ſwallow this Ab⯑ſurdity, and conſider what are the Conſequences. The preceding Delineation or Definition of VIRTUE muſt ſtill retain its Evidence and Authority: It muſt ſtill be allow'd, that every Quality of the Mind, which is uſeful or agreeable to the Perſon himſelf or to others, communicates a Pleaſure to the Spectator, engages his Eſteem, and is admitted under the ho⯑nourable Denomination of Virtue or Merit. Are [185] not Juſtice, Fidelity, Honour, Veracity, Allegiance, Chaſtity eſteem'd ſolely on Account of their Ten⯑dency to promote the Good of Society? Is not that Tendency inſeperable from Humanity, Benevolence, Lenity, Generoſity, Gratitude, Moderation, Ten⯑derneſs, Friendſhip, and all the other ſocial Vir⯑tues? Can it poſſibly be doubted, that Induſtry, Diſcretion, Frugality, Secrecy, Order, Perſeverance, Forethought, Judgment, and that whole Claſs of Virtues, of which many Pages would not contain the Catalogue; can it be be doubted, I ſay, that the Tendency of theſe Virtues to promote the In⯑tereſt and Happineſs of their Poſſeſſor is the ſole Foundation of their Merit? Who can diſpute that a Mind, which ſupports a perpetual Serenity and Cheerfulneſs, a noble Dignity and undaunted Spirit, a tender Affection and Good-will to all around; as it has more Enjoyment within itſelf, is alſo a more animating and rejoicing Spectacle, than if de⯑jected with Melancholy, tormented with Anxiety, irritated with Rage, or ſunk into the moſt abject Baſeneſs and Degeneracy? And as to the Qualities, immediately agreeable to others, they ſpeak ſufficiently for themſelves; and he muſt be unhappy, indeed, either in his own Temper, or in his Situation and Circumſtances, who has never perceiv'd the Charms of a facetious Wit or flowing Affability, of a delicate [186] Modeſty or decent Genteelneſs of Addreſs and Man⯑ner.

I AM ſenſible, that nothing can be more unphilo⯑ſophical than to be poſitive or dogmatical on any Subject; and that, even if exceſſive Scepticiſm could be maintain'd, it would not be more deſtructive to all juſt Reaſoning and Enquiry. I am convinc'd, that, where Men are the muſt ſure and arrogant, they are commonly the moſt miſtaken, and have there given Reins to Paſſion, without that proper Delibera⯑tion and Suſpence, which can alone ſecure them from the groſſeſt Abſurdities. Yet I muſt confeſs, that this Enumeration puts the Matter in ſo ſtrong a Light, that I cannot, at preſent, be more aſſur'd of any Truth, which I learn from Reaſoning and Ar⯑gument, than that Virtue conſiſts altogether in the Uſefulneſs or Agreeableneſs of Qualities to the Perſon himſelf, poſſeſt of them, or to others, who have any Intercourſe with him. But when I reflect, that, tho' the Bulk and Figure of the Earth have been meaſur'd and delineated, tho' the Motions of the Tides have been accounted for, the Order and Oeconomy of the heavenly Bodies ſubjected to their proper Laws, and INFINITE itſelf reduc'd to Calculation; yet Men ſtill diſpute concerning the Foundation of their moral Duties: When I reflect on this, I ſay, I fall back into Diffidence and Scep⯑ticiſm, [187] and ſuſpect, that an Hypotheſis, ſo obvious▪ had it been a true one, would, long 'ere now, have been receiv'd, by the unanimous Suffrage and Con⯑ſent of Mankind.

PART II.

THERE remains nothing, but to conſider briefly our Obligation to Virtue, and to en⯑quire, whether every Man, who has any Regard to his own Happineſs and Welfare, will not beſt find his Account in the Practice of every moral Duty. If this can be clearly aſcertain'd from the foregoing Theory, we ſhall have the Satisfaction to reflect, that we have advanc'd Principles, which not only, 'tis hop'd, will ſtand the Teſt of Reaſoning and Enquiry, but may contribute to the Amendment of Men's Lives, and their Improvement in Morality and ſocial Virtue. And tho' the philoſophical Truth of any Propoſition by no Means depends on its Tendency to promote the Intereſt of Society; yet a Man has but a bad Grace, who delivers a Theory, however true, which, he muſt confeſs, leads to a Practice, dangerous and pernicious. Why rake into thoſe Corners of Nature, which ſpread a Nuiſance all around? Why dig up the Peſtilence from the Pit, in which it is bury'd? The Ingenuity of your [188] Reſearches may be admir'd; but your Syſtems will be deteſted: And Mankind will agree, if they can⯑not refute them, to ſink them, at leaſt, in eternal Silence and Oblivion: Truths, which are pernicious to Society, if any ſuch there be, will yield to Errors, which are ſalutary and advantageous.

BUT what philoſophical Truths can be more ad⯑vantageous to Society, than thoſe here deliver'd, which repreſent Virtue in all her genuine and moſt engaging Charms, and make us approach her with Eaſe, Familiarity and Affection? The diſmal Dreſs falls off, with which many Divines, and ſome Philo⯑ſophers had cover'd her; and nothing appears but Gentleneſs, Humanity, Beneficence, Affability; nay even, at proper Intervals, Play, Frolic, and Gaiety. She talks not of uſeleſs Auſterities and Rigors, Suf⯑ferance and Self-denial. She declares, that her ſole Purpoſe is, to make her Votaries and all Mankind, during every Inſtant of their Exiſtence, if poſſible, cheerful and happy; nor does ſhe ever willingly part with any Pleaſure but in Hopes of ample Compen⯑ſation in ſome other Period of their Lives. The ſole Trouble ſhe demands is that of juſt Calculation, and a ſteady Preference of the greater Happineſs. And if any auſtere Pretenders approach her, Enemies to Joy and Pleaſure, ſhe either rejects them as Hypo⯑crites and Deceivers, or if ſhe admits them in her [189] Train, they are rank'd, however, among the leaſt favour'd of her Votaries.

AND indeed, to drop all figurative Expreſſion, what Hopes can we ever have of engaging Mankind to a Practice, which we confeſs full of Auſterity and Rigour? Or what Morality can ever ſerve any uſe⯑ful Purpoſe, unleſs it can ſhow, by a particular Detail, that all the Duties it recommends, are alſo the true Intereſt of each Individual? And the peculiar Ad⯑vantage of the foregoing Theory, ſeems to be, that it furniſhes proper Mediums for that Purpoſe.

THAT the Virtues, which are immediately uſeful or agreeable to the Perſon, poſſeſt of them, are de⯑ſirable in a View to Self-intereſt, it would ſurely be ſuperfluous to prove. Moraliſts, indeed, may ſpare themſelves all the Pains they often take in recom⯑mending theſe Duties. To what Purpoſe collect Arguments to evince, that Temperance is advanta⯑geous, and the Exceſſes of Pleaſure hurtful? When it appears, that theſe Exceſſes are only denominated ſuch, becauſe they are hurtful; and that, if the un⯑limited Uſe of ſtrong Liquors, for Inſtance, no more impair'd Health or the Faculties of the Mind and Body than the Uſe of Air or Water, it would not be a whit more vicious or blameable.

[190] IT ſeems equally ſuperfluous to prove, that the companionable Virtues of Good-manners and Wit, Decency and Genteelneſs are more deſirable than the contrary Qualities. Vanity alone, without other Conſiderations, is a ſufficient Motive to make us wiſh the Poſſeſſion of theſe Accompliſhments. No Man was ever willingly deficient in this Particular. All our Failures here proceed from bad Education, Want of Capacity, or a perverſe and unpliable Diſ⯑poſition. Would you have your Company coveted, admir'd, follow'd; rather than hated, deſpis'd, avoided? Can any one ſeriouſly deliberate in the Caſe? As no Enjoyment is ſincere, without ſome Reference to Company and Society; ſo no Society can be agreeable or even tolerable, where a Man feels his Preſence unwelcome, and diſcovers all around him Symptoms of Averſion and Diſguſt.

BUT why, in the greater Society or Confederacy of Mankind, ſhould not the Caſe be the ſame as in particular Clubs and Companies? Why is it more doubtful, that the enlarg'd Virtues of Humanity, Generoſity, Beneficence are deſirable with a View to Happineſs and Self-intereſt, than the limited En⯑dowments of Ingenuity and Politeneſs? Are we apprehenſive, that thoſe ſocial Affections have a greater and more immediate Interference, than any [191] other Purſuits, with private Utility, and cannot be gratify'd without ſome important Sacrifices of Ho⯑nour and Advantage? If ſo, we are but ill inſtructed in the Nature of the human Paſſions, and are more influenc'd by verbal Diſtinctions than by real Dif⯑ferences.

WHATEVER Contradiction, may vulgarly be ſup⯑pos'd betwixt the ſocial and ſelfiſh Sentiments or Diſ⯑poſitions, they are really no more oppoſite than ſelfiſh and ambitious, ſelfiſh and revengeful, ſelfiſh and vain. 'Tis requiſite there be an original Pro⯑penſity of ſome Kind, in order to be a Baſis to Self-love, by giving a Reliſh to the Objects of its Pur⯑ſuit; and none more fit for this Purpoſe than Bene⯑ficence or Humanity. The Goods of Fortune are ſpent in one Gratification or other: The Miſer, who accumulates his annual Income, and lends it out at Intereſt, has really ſpent it in the Gratification of his Avarice. And 'twould be difficult to ſhow, why a Man is more a Loſer by a generous Action, than by any other Method of Expence; ſince the utmoſt he can attain, by the moſt elaborate Selfiſhneſs, is the Indulgence of ſome Affection.

NOW if Life, without Paſſion, muſt be altogether inſipid and tireſome; let a Man ſuppoſe he has full Power of modelling his own Diſpoſition, and let [192] him deliberate what Appetite or Deſire he would chooſe for the Foundation of his Happineſs and Enjoyment. Every Affection, he would obſerve, when gratify'd by Succeſs, gives a Satisfaction, pro⯑portion'd to its Force and Violence; but beſides this Advantage, common to all, the immediate Feeling of Benevolence and Friendſhip, Humanity and Kindneſs, is ſweet, ſmooth, tender, and agreeable, independent of all Fortune and Accidents. Theſe Virtues are beſides attended with a pleaſing Con⯑ſciouſneſs and Remembrance, and keep us in Hu⯑mour with ourſelves as well as others; while we re⯑tain the agreeable Reflection of having done our Part towards Mankind and Society. And tho' all Men ſhow a Jealouſy of our Succeſs in the Purſuits of Avarice or Ambition; yet are we almoſt ſure of their Good-will and Good-wiſhes, ſo long as we perſevere in the Paths of Virtue, and employ our⯑ſelves in the Execution of generous Plans and Pur⯑poſes. What other Paſſion is there, where we ſhall find ſo many Advantages united; an agreeable Sen⯑timent, a pleaſing Conſciouſneſs, a good Reputa⯑tion? But of theſe Truths, we may obſerve, Men are, of themſelves, pretty much convinc'd; nor are they deficient in their Duty to Society, becauſe they would not wiſh to be generous, friendly, and hu⯑mane; but becauſe they do not feel themſelves ſuch.

[193] TREATING Vice with the greateſt Candour, and making it all poſſible Conceſſions, we muſt acknow⯑ledge, that there is not, in any Inſtance, the ſmalleſt Pretext for giving it the Preference above Virtue, with a View to Self-intereſt; except, perhaps, in the Caſe of Juſtice, where a Man, taking Things in a certain Light, may often ſeem to be a Loſer by his Integrity. And tho' 'tis acknowledg'd, that, without a Regard to Property, no Society could ſubſiſt; yet according to the imperfect Way, in which human Affairs are conducted, a ſenſible Knave, in particular Incidents, may think, that an Act of Ini⯑quity or Infidelity will make a conſiderable Addition to his Fortune, without cauſing any conſiderable Breach in the ſocial Union and Confederacy. That Honeſty is the beſt Policy, may be a good general Rule; but is liable to many Exceptions: And he, it may, perhaps, be judg'd, conducts himſelf with moſt Wiſdom, who obſerves the general Rule, and takes Advantage of all the Exceptions.

I MUST confeſs, that if a Man thinks, that this Reaſoning much requires an Anſwer, 'twill be a little difficult to find any, that will to him appear ſatisfactory and convincing. If his Heart does not rebel againſt ſuch pernicious Maxims, if he feels no [194] Reluctance to the Thoughts of Villainy or Baſeneſs, he has indeed loſt a conſiderable Motive to Virtue; and we may expect, that his Practice will be an⯑ſwerable to his Speculation. But in all ingenuous Natures, the Antipathy to Treachery and Roguery is too ſtrong to be counter-ballanc'd by any Views of Profit or pecuniary Advantage. Inward Peace of Mind, Conſciouſneſs of Integrity, a ſatisfactory Re⯑view of our own Conduct; theſe are Circumſtances very requiſite to Happineſs, and will be cheriſh'd and cultivated by every honeſt Man, who feels the Im⯑portance of them.

SUCH a one has, beſides, the frequent Satisfaction of ſeeing Knaves, with all their pretended Cunning and Ability, betray'd by their own Maxims; and while they purpoſe to cheat only with Moderation and Secrecy, a tempting Incident occurs, Nature is frail, and they give into the Snare; whence they can never extricate themſelves, without a total Loſs of Reputation, and the Forfeiture of all future Truſt and Confidence with Mankind.

BUT were they ever ſo ſecret and ſucceſsful, the honeſt Man, if he has any Tincture of Philoſophy, or even common Obſervation and Reflection, will diſcover, that they themſelves are, in the End, the greateſt Dupes, and have ſacrific'd the invaluable [195] Enjoyment of a Character, with themſelves at leaſt, for the Acquiſition of worthleſs Toys and Gewgaws. How little is requiſite to ſupply the Neceſſities of Na⯑ture? And in the View of Pleaſure, what Compa⯑riſon betwixt the unbought Satisfactions of Conver⯑ſation, Society, Study, even Health and the common Beauties of Nature, but eſpecially the peaceful Re⯑flection on one's own Conduct: What Compariſon, I ſay, betwixt theſe, and the feveriſh, empty Amuſe⯑ments of Luxury and Expence? Theſe natural Plea⯑ſures, indeed, are really without Price; both becauſe they are below all Price in their Attainment, and above it in their Enjoyment.