ESSAY I. Of the DELICACY of TASTE and PASSION.

THERE is a certain Delicacy of Paſ⯑ſion, to which ſome People are ſubject, that makes them extreme⯑ly ſenſible to all the Accidents of Life, and gives them a lively Joy upon every proſpe⯑rous Event, as well as a piercing Grief, when they meet with Croſſes and Adverſity. Fa⯑vours and Good-offices eaſily engage their Friendſhip; while the ſmalleſt Injury pro⯑vokes their Reſentment. Any Honour or Mark of Diſtinction elevates them above Mea⯑ſure; but they are as ſenſibly touch'd with Contempt. People of this Character have, no doubt, much more lively Enjoyments, as well as more pungent Sorrows, than Men of [2] more cool and ſedate Tempers: But, I be⯑lieve, when every Thing is balanc'd, there is no one, that wou'd not rather chuſe to be of the latter Character, were he entirely Maſter of his own Diſpoſition. Good or ill Fortune is very little at our own Diſpoſal: And when a Perſon, that has this Senſibility of Temper, meets with any Misfortune, his Sorrow or Re⯑ſentment takes intire Poſſeſſion of him, and deprives him of all Reliſh in the common Oc⯑currences of Life, the right Enjoyment of which forms the greateſt Part of our Happi⯑neſs. Great Pleaſures are much leſs frequent than great Pains; ſo that a ſenſible Temper muſt meet with fewer Trials in the former Way than in the latter. Not to mention, that Men of ſuch lively paſſions are apt to be tran⯑ſported beyond all Bounds of Prudence and Diſcretion, and take falſe Steps in the Con⯑duct of Life, which are often irretrievable.

THERE is a Delicacy of Taſte obſervable in ſome Men, which very much reſembles this Delicacy of Paſſion, and produces the ſame Senſibility to Beauty and Deformity of every Kind, as that does to Proſperity and Ad⯑verſity, Obligations and Injuries. When you [3] preſent a Poem or a Picture to a Man poſſeſt of this Talent, the Delicacy of his Feeling or Sentiments makes him be touched very ſenſi⯑bly by every Part of it; nor are the maſterly Strokes perceived with a more exquiſite Re⯑liſh and Satisfaction, than the Negligences or Abſurdities with Diſguſt and Uneaſineſs. A polite and judicious Converſation affords him the higheſt Entertainment. Rudeneſs or Im⯑pertinence is as great a Puniſhment to him. In ſhort, Delicacy of Taſte has the ſame Effect as Delicacy of Paſſion: It enlarges the Sphere both of our Happineſs and Miſery, and makes us ſenſible of Pains, as well as Pleaſures, that eſcape the reſt of Mankind.

I BELIEVE, however, there is no one, who will not agree with me, that notwithſtanding this Reſemblance, a Delicacy of Taſte is as much to be deſir'd and cultivated as a Delica⯑cy of Paſſion is to be lamented, and to be remedied, if poſſible. The good or ill Acci⯑dents of Life are very little at our Diſpoſal: But we are pretty much Maſters what Books we ſhall read, what Diverſions we ſhall par⯑take of, and what Company we ſhall keep. The ancient Philoſophers endeavour'd to ren⯑der [4] Happineſs intirely independent of every Thing external. That is impoſſible to be at⯑tain'd: But every wiſe Man will endeavour to place his Happineſs on ſuch Objects as depend moſt upon himſelf: And that is not to be at⯑tain'd ſo much by any other Means as by this Delicacy of Sentiment. When a Man is poſ⯑ſeſt of that Talent, he is more happy by what pleaſes his Taſte than by what gratifies his Appetites, and receives more Enjoyment from a Poem or a Piece of Reaſoning than the moſt expenſive Luxury can afford.

HOW far the Delicacy of Taſte and that of Paſſion are connected together in the original Frame of the Mind, it is hard to determine. To me there appears to be a very conſiderable Connexion betwixt them. For we may ob⯑ſerve, that Women, who have more delicate Paſſions than Men, have alſo a more delicate Taſte of the Ornaments of Life, of Dreſs, E⯑quipage, and the ordinary Decencies of Beha⯑viour. Any Excellency in theſe hits their Taſte much ſooner than Ours; and when you pleaſe their Taſte, you ſoon engage their Affections.

[5] BUT whatever Connexion there may be ori⯑ginally betwixt theſe Diſpoſitions, I am perſua⯑ded, that nothing is ſo proper to cure us of this Delicacy of Paſſion as the cultivating of that higher and more refined Taſte, which enables us to judge of the Characters of Men, of Com⯑poſitions of Genius, and of the Productions of the nobler Arts. A greater or leſs Reliſh of thoſe obvious Beauties, that ſtrike the Senſes, depends intirely upon the greater or leſs Sen⯑ſibility of the Temper: But with regard to the Liberal Arts, a fine Taſte is really nothing but ſtrong Senſe, or at leaſt depends ſo much up⯑on it, that they are inſeparable. To judge a⯑right of a Compoſition of Genius, there are ſo many Views to be taken in, ſo many Circum⯑ſtances to be compared, and ſuch a Knowledge of human Nature requiſite, that no Man, who is not poſſeſt of the ſoundeſt Judgment, will ever make a tolerable Critic in ſuch Performan⯑ces. And this is a new Reaſon for cultivating a Reliſh in the Liberal Arts. Our Judgment will ſtrengthen by this Exerciſe: We ſhall form truer Notions of Life: Many Things, which rejoice or afflict others, will appear to us too frivolous to engage our Attention: And we [6] ſhall loſe by Degrees that Senſibility and Deli⯑cacy of Paſſion, which is ſo incommodious.

BUT perhaps I have gone too far in ſaying, that a cultivated Taſte for the Liberal Arts ex⯑tinguiſhes the Paſſions, and renders us indif⯑ferent to thoſe Objects, which are ſo fondly purſued by the reſt of Mankind. When I re⯑flect a little more, I find, that it rather im⯑proves our Senſibility for all the tender and agreeable Paſſions; at the ſame Time, that it renders the Mind incapable of the rougher and more boiſt'rous Emotions.

FOR this, I think there may be aſſigned two very natural Reaſons. In the firſt Place, no⯑thing is ſo improving to the Temper as the Study of the Beauties, either of Poetry, Elo⯑quence, Muſick, or Painting. They give a certain Elegance of Sentiment, which the reſt of Mankind are intire Strangers to. The Emo⯑tions they excite are ſoft and tender. They draw the Mind off from the Hurry of Buſineſs and Intereſt; cheriſh Reflection; diſpoſe to Tranquility; and produce an agreeable Melan⯑choly, [7] which, of all Diſpoſitions of the Mind, is the beſt ſuited to Love and Friendſhip.

IN the ſecond Place, a Delicacy of Taſte is favourable to Love and Friendſhip, by conſin⯑ing our Choice to few People, and making us indifferent to the Company and Converſation of the greateſt Part of Men. You will very ſeldom find, that mere Men of the World, whatever ſtrong Senſe they may be endowed with, are very nice in diſtinguiſhing of Cha⯑racters, or in marking thoſe inſenſible Diffe⯑rences and Gradations, which make one Man preferable to another. Any one, that has competent Senſe, is ſufficient for their Enter⯑tainment. They talk to him of their Pleaſures and Affairs, with the ſame Frankneſs as they would to any other: And finding many, that are fit to ſupply his Place, they never feel a⯑ny Vacancy or Want in his Abſence. But to make uſe of the Alluſion of a famous ^* French Author: The Judgment may be compared to a Clock or Watch, where the moſt ordinary Machine is ſufficient to tell the Hours; but [8] the moſt elaborate and artificial only can point out the Minutes and Seconds, and diſtinguiſh the ſmalleſt Differences of Time. One that has well digeſted his Knowledge both of Books and Men, has little Enjoyment but in the Com⯑pany of a few ſelect Companions. He feels too ſenſibly, how much all the reſt of Man⯑kind falls ſhort of the Notions he has entertain⯑ed. And his Affections being thus confined in a narrow Circle, no Wonder he carries them further, than if they were more gene⯑ral and undiſtinguiſhed. The Gaiety and Fro⯑lick of a Bottle-Companion improves with him into a ſolid Friendſhip: And the Ar⯑dours of a youthful Appetite become an ele⯑gant Paſſion.

ESSAY II. Of the LIBERTY of the PRESS.

THERE is nothing more apt to ſur⯑priſe a Foreigner, than the ex⯑treme Liberty we enjoy in this Country, of communicating whatever we pleaſe to the Publick, and of openly cenſur⯑ing every Meaſure which is enter'd into by the King or his Miniſters. If the Adminiſtra⯑tion reſolve upon War, 'tis affirm'd, that ei⯑ther wilfully or ignorantly they miſtake the Intereſt of the Nation, and that Peace, in the preſent Situation of Affairs, is infinitely prefe⯑rable. If the Paſſion of the Miniſters be for Peace, our Political Writers breathe nothing but War and Devaſtation, and repreſent the pacifick Conduct of the Government as mean and puſillanimous. As this Liberty is not in⯑dulg'd in any other Government, either Repu⯑blican [10] or Monarchical; in Holland and Venice, no more than in France or Spain; it may very naturally give Occaſion to theſe two Queſti⯑ons, How it happens that Great Britain enjoys ſuch a peculiar Privilege? and, Whether the unlimited Exerciſe of this Liberty be advanta⯑geous or prejudicial to the Publick?

AS to the firſt Queſtion, Why the Laws in⯑dulge us in ſuch an extraordinary Liberty? I believe the Reaſon may be deriv'd from our mixt Form of Government, which is neither wholly Monarchical, nor wholly Republican. 'Twill be found, if I miſtake not, to be a true Obſervation in Politicks, That the two Extremes in Government, of Liberty and Slave⯑ry, approach neareſt to each other; and, that as you depart from the Extremes, and mix a little of Monarchy with Liberty, the Government becomes always the more free; and, on the other Hand, when you mix a lit⯑tle of Liberty with Monarchy, the Yoke be⯑comes always the more grievous and intolera⯑ble. In a Government, ſuch as that of France, which is entirely abſolute, and where Laws, Cuſtom, and Religion, all concur to make the People fully ſatisfi'd with their Condition, the [11] Monarch cannot entertain the leaſt Jealouſy againſt his Subjects, and therefore is apt to in⯑dulge them in great Liberties both of Speech and Action. In a Government altogether Re⯑publican, ſuch as Holland, where there is no Magiſtrate ſo eminent as to give Jealouſy to the State, there is alſo no Danger in intruſt⯑ing the Magiſtrates with very large diſcretio⯑nary Powers; and tho' many Advantages re⯑ſult from ſuch Powers, in the Preſervation of Peace and Order; yet they lay a conſiderable Reſtraint on Mens Actions, and make every private Subject pay a great Reſpect to the Go⯑vernment. Thus it is evident, that the two Ex⯑tremes, of abſolute Monarchy and of a Repu⯑blic, approach very near to each other in the moſt material Circumſtances. In the firſt, the Magiſtrate has no Jealouſy of the People: In the ſecond, the People have no Jealouſy of the Magiſtrate: Which want of Jealouſy begets a mutual Confidence and Truſt in both Caſes, and produces a Species of Liberty in Monarchies, and of arbitrary Power in Re⯑publics.

To juſtify the other Part of the foregoing Propoſition, that in every Government the [12] Means are moſt wide of each other, and that the Mixtures of Monarchy and Liberty render the Yoke either more eaſy or more grievous. I muſt take Notice of a Remark of Tacitus with regard to the Romans under their Emperors, that they neither could bear total Slavery nor total Liberty, Nec totam ſervitutem nec totam libertatem pati poſſunt. This Remark a fa⯑mous Poet has tranſlated and applied to the Engliſh in his admirable Deſcription of Queen Elizabeth's Policy and happy Government.

ACCORDING to theſe Remarks, there⯑fore, we are to conſider the Roman Govern⯑ment as a Mixture of Deſpotiſm and Liberty, where the Deſpotiſm prevailed; and the En⯑gliſh Government as a Mixture of the ſame Kind, but where the Liberty predominates. The Conſequences are exactly conformable to the foregoing Obſervation; and ſuch as may be expected from thoſe mixed Forms of Govern⯑ment, which beget a mutual Watchfulneſs and Jealouſy. The Roman Emperors were, many [13] of them, the moſt frightful Tyrants that ever diſgraced Humanity; and 'tis evident their Cruelty was chiefly excited by their Jealouſy, and by their obſerving, that all the great Men of Rome bore with Impatience the Dominion of a Family, which, but a little before, was nowiſe ſuperior to their own. On the other Hand, as the Republican Part of the Govern⯑ment prevails in England, tho' with a great Mixture of Monarchy, 'tis obliged, for its own Preſervation, to maintain a watchful Jea⯑louſy over the Magiſtrates, to remove all diſ⯑cretionary Powers, and to ſecure every one's Life and Fortune by general and inflexible Laws. No Action muſt be deemed a Crime but what the Law has plainly determined to be ſuch: No Crime muſt be imputed to a Man but from a legal Proof before his Judg⯑es: And even theſe Judges muſt be his Fellow⯑ſubjects, who are obliged by their own Intereſt to have a watchful Eye over the Encroach⯑ments and Violence of the Miniſters. From theſe Cauſes it proceeds, that there is as much Liberty, and even, perhaps, Licence in Bri⯑tain, as there was formerly Slavery and Ty⯑ranny in Rome.

[14] THESE Principles account for the great Li⯑berty of the Preſs in theſe Kingdoms, beyond what is indulg'd in any other Government. 'Tis ſufficiently known, that deſpotic Power wou'd ſoon ſteal in upon us, were we not ex⯑treme watchful to prevent its Progreſs, and were there not an eaſy Method of conveying the Alarum from one End of the Kingdom to the other. The Spirit of the People muſt fre⯑quently be rouz'd to curb the Ambition of the Court; and the Dread of rouzing this Spi⯑rit muſt be employ'd to prevent that Ambiti⯑on. Nothing is ſo effectual to this Purpoſe as the Liberty of the Preſs, by which all the Learning, Wit, and Genius of the Nation may be employ'd on the Side of Liberty, and eve⯑ry one be animated to its Defence. As long, therefore, as the Republican Part of our Go⯑vernment can maintain itſelf againſt the Mo⯑narchical, it muſt be extreme jealous of the Li⯑berty of the Preſs, as of the utmoſt Impor⯑tance to its Preſervation.

SINCE therefore the Liberty of the Preſs is ſo eſſential to the Support of our mixt Go⯑vernment; this ſufficiently decides the ſecond Queſtion, Whether this Liberty be advantage⯑ous [15] or prejudicial; there being nothing of grea⯑ter Importance in every State than the Preſer⯑vation of the ancient Government, eſpecially if it be a free one. But I wou'd fain go a Step farther, and aſſert, that ſuch a Liberty is attended with ſo few Inconveniencies, that it may be claim'd as the common Right of Mankind, and ought to be indulg'd them al⯑moſt in every Government; except the Eccle⯑ſiaſtical, to which indeed it wou'd be fatal. We need not dread from this Liberty any ſuch ill Conſequences as follow'd from the Ha⯑rangues of the popular Demagogues of A⯑thens and Tribunes of Rome. A Man reads a Book or Pamphlet alone and coolly. There is none prefent from whom he can catch the Paſſion by Contagion. He is not hurry'd a⯑way by the Force and Energy of Action. And ſhou'd he be wrought up to never ſo ſeditious a Humour, there is no violent Reſolution pre⯑ſented to him, by which he can immediately vent his Paſſion. The Liberty of the Preſs, therefore, however abus'd, can ſcarce ever excite popular Tumults or Rebellion. And as to thoſe Murmurs or ſecret Diſcontents it may occaſion, 'tis better they ſhou'd get Vent in Words, that they may come to the Know⯑ledge [16] of the Magiſtrate before it be too late, in order to his providing a Remedy againſt them. Mankind, 'tis true, have always a grea⯑ter Propenſion to believe what is ſaid to the Diſadvantage of their Governors than the con⯑trary; but this Inclination is inſeparable from them, whether they have Liberty or not. A Whiſper may fly as quick, and be as pernici⯑ous as a Pamphlet. Nay it will be more per⯑nicious, where Men are not accuſtom'd to think freely, or diſtinguiſh betwixt Truth and Falſhood.

IT has alſo been found, as the Experience of Mankind increaſes, that the People are no ſuch dangerous Monſter as they have been re⯑preſented, and that 'tis in every Reſpect better to guide them, like rational Creatures, than to lead or drive them, like brute Beaſts. Be⯑fore the united Provinces ſet the Example, To⯑leration was deem'd incompatible with good Government, and 'twas thought impoſſible, that a Number of religious Sects cou'd live to⯑gether in Harmony and Peace, and have all of them an equal Affection to their common Country, and to each other. England has ſet a like Example of civil Liberty; and tho' this [17] Liberty ſeems to occaſion ſome mall Ferment at preſent, it has not as yet produced any per⯑nicious Effects, and it is to be hoped, that Men, being every Day more accuſtomed to the free Diſcuſſion of public Affairs, will im⯑prove in their Judgment of them, and be with greater Difficulty ſeduced by every idle Rumor and popular Clamour

'TIS a very comfortable Reflection to the Lovers of Liberty, that this peculiar Privilege of Britain is of a Kind that cannot eaſily be wreſted from us, and muſt laſt as long as our Government remains, in any Degree, free and independent. 'Tis ſeldom, that Liberty of any Kind is loſt all at once. Slavery has ſo frightful an Aſpect to Men accuſtom'd to Free⯑dom, that it muſt ſteal in upon them by De⯑grees, and muſt diſguiſe itſelf in a thouſand Shapes, in ordet to be received. But if the Liberty of the Preſs ever be loſt, it muſt be loſt at once. The general Laws againſt Sedi⯑tion and Libelling are at preſent as ſtrong as they poſſibly can be made. Nothing can im⯑poſe a farther Reſtraint, but either the clap⯑ping an IMPRIMATUR upon the Preſs, or the giving very large diſcretionary Powers to the [18] Court to puniſh whatever diſpleaſes them. But theſe Conceſſions would be ſuch a bare-fac'd Violation of Liberty, that they will probably be the laſt Efforts of a deſpotic Government. We may conclude, that the Liberty of Britain is gone for ever, when theſe Attempts ſhall ſucceed.

ESSAY III. Of IMPUDENCE and MODESTY.

I HAVE always been of Opinion, that the Complaints againſt Providence have been ill-grounded, and that the good or bad Qualities of Men are the Cauſes of their good or bad Fortune, more than what is generally imagined. There are, no doubt, Inſtances to the contrary, and pretty nume⯑rous ones too; but few, in Compariſon of the Inſtances we have of a right Diſtribution of Proſperity and Adverſity: Nor indeed could it be otherwiſe from the common Courſe of human Affairs. To be endowed with a bene⯑volent Diſpoſition, and to love others will al⯑moſt infallibly procure Love and Eſteem; which is the chief Circumſtance in Life, and facilitates every Enterprize and Undertak⯑ing; beſides the Satisfaction, which imme⯑diately [20] reſults from it. The Caſe is much the ſame with the other Virtues. Proſperity is naturally, tho' not neceſſarily attached to Virtue and Merit; as Adverſity is to Vice and Folly.

I MUST, however, confeſs, that this Rule admits of an Exception with regard to one moral Quality; and that Modeſty has a natu⯑ral Tendency to conceal a Man's Talents, as Impudence diſplays them to the utmoſt, and has been the only Cauſe why many have ri⯑ſen in the World, under all the Diſadvanta⯑ges of low Birth and little Merit. Such In⯑dolence and Incapacity is there in the Gene⯑rality of Mankind, that they are apt to receive a Man for whatever he has a Mind to put himſelf off for; and admits his over-bearing Airs as Proofs of that Merit, which he aſ⯑ſumes to himſelf. A decent Aſſurance ſeems to be the natural Attendant of Virtue; and few Men can diſtinguiſh Impudence from it: As, on the other Hand, Diffidence, being the natural Reſult of Vice and Folly, has drawn Diſgrace upon Modeſty, which in outward Appearance ſo nearly reſembles it.

[21] I WAS lately lamenting to a Friend of mine, who loves a Conceit, that popular Applauſe ſhould be beſtowed with ſo little Judgment, and that ſo many empty forward Coxcombs ſhould riſe up to a Figure in the World: Up⯑on which he ſaid there was nothing ſurpriſing in the Caſe. Popular Fame, ſays he, is no⯑thing but Breath or Air; and Air very na⯑turally preſſes into a Vacuum.

As Impudence, tho' really a Vice, has the ſame Effects upon a Man's Fortune, as if it were a Virtue; ſo it is remarkable that it is al⯑moſt as difficult to be attain'd, and is, in that reſpect, diſtinguiſh'd from all the other Vices, which are acquired with little Pains, and con⯑tinually encreaſe upon Indulgence: Many a Man, being ſenſible that Modeſty is extremely prejudicial to him in the making his Fortune, has reſolved to be impudent and to put a bold Face upon the Matter: But 'tis obſervable, that ſuch People have ſeldom ſucceeded in the Attempt, but have been obliged to relapſe in⯑to their primitive Modeſty. Nothing carries a Man thro' the World like a true genuine natu⯑ral Impudence. Its Counterfeit is good for nothing, nor can ever ſupport itſelf. In any [22] other Attempt, whatever Faults a Man com⯑mits and is ſenſible of, he is ſo much the near⯑er his End. But when he endeavours at Impu⯑dence, if he ever fail'd in the Attempt, the Re⯑membrance of it will make him bluſh, and will infallibly diſconcert him: After which every Bluſh is a Cauſe for new Bluſhes, 'till he be found out to be an arrant Cheat, and a vain Pretender to Impudence.

IF any thing can give a modeſt Man more Aſſurance, it muſt be ſome Advantages of For⯑tune, which Chance procures to him. Riches naturally gain a Man a favourable Reception in the World, and give Merit a double Luſtre, when a Perſon is endowed with it; and ſup⯑ply its Place, in a great Meaſure, when it is ab⯑ſent. 'Tis wonderful to obſerve what Airs of Superiority Fools and Knaves, with large Poſ⯑ſeſſions, give themſelves above Men of the greateſt Merit in Poverty. Nor do the Men of Merit make any ſtrong Oppoſition to theſe Uſurpations; or rather ſeem to favour them by the Modeſty of their Behaviour. Their Good Senſe and Experience make them diffident of their Judgment, and cauſe them to examine every thing with the greateſt Accuracy: As [23] on the other Hand, the Delicacy of their Sen⯑timents makes them timorous leſt they com⯑mit Faults, and loſe in the Practice of the World that Integrity of Virtue, of which they are ſo jealous. To make Wiſdom agree with Confidence is as difficult as to reconcile Vice to Modeſty.

THESE are the Reflections that have oc⯑cur'd to me upon this Subject of Impudence and Modeſty; and I hope the Reader will not be diſpleaſed to ſee them wrought into the following Allegory.

JUPITER, in the Beginning, joined VIR⯑TUE, WISDOM and CONFIDENCE toge⯑ther; and VICE, FOLLY, and DIFFI⯑DENCE: And in that Society ſet them upon the Earth. But though he thought he had matched them with great judgment, and ſaid that Confidence was the natural Companion of Virtue, and that Vice deſerved to be attended with Diffidence, they had not gone far before Diſſenſion aroſe among them. Wiſdom, who was the Guide of the one Company, was al⯑ways accuſtomed, before ſhe ventured upon a⯑ny Road, however beaten, to examine it care⯑fully; [24] to enquire whither it led; what Dan⯑gers, Difficulties and Hindrances might poſſibly or probably occur in it. In theſe Deliberations ſhe uſually conſum'd ſome Time; which Delay was very diſpleaſing to Confidence, who was al⯑ways inclin'd to hurry on, without much Fore⯑thought or Deliberation, in the firſt Road he met. Wiſdom and Virtue were inſeparable: But Confidence one Day, following his impetuous Nature, advanc'd a conſiderable Way before his Guides and Companions; and not feeling any Want of their Company, he never enquir'd after them, nor ever met with them more. In like Manner, the other Society, tho' join'd by Jupiter, diſagreed and ſeparated. As Fol⯑ly ſaw very little Way before her, ſhe had no⯑thing to determine concerning the Goodneſs of Roads, nor cou'd give the Preference to one above another; and this Want of Reſolu⯑tion was encreas'd by Diffidence, who with her Doubts and Scruples always retarded the Journey. This was a great Annoyance to Vice, who lov'd not to hear of Difficulties and De⯑lays, and was never ſatisfy'd without his full Career, in whatever his Inclinations led him to. Folly, he knew, tho' ſhe hearken'd to Diffidence, wou'd be eaſily manag'd when a⯑lone; [25] and therefore, as a vicious Horſe throws his Rider, he openly beat away this Control⯑ler of all his Pleaſures, and proceeded in his Journey with Folly, from whom he is inſepa⯑rable. Confidence and Diffidence being, after this Manner, both thrown looſe from their reſpective Companies, wander'd for ſome Time; till at laſt Chance led them at the ſame Time to one Village. Confidence went direc⯑tly up to the great Houſe, which belong'd to WEALTH, the Lord of the Village; and without ſtaying for a Porter, intruded himſelf immediately into the innermoſt Apartments, where he found Vice and Folly well receiv'd before him. He join'd the Train; recom⯑mended himſelf very quickly to his Landlord; and enter'd into ſuch Familiarity with Vice, that he was enliſted in the ſame Company a⯑long with Folly. They were frequent Gueſts of Wealth, and from that Moment inſepara⯑ble. Diffidence, in the mean Time, not da⯑ring to approach the Great Houſe, accepted of an Invitation from POVERTY, one of the Tenants; and entering the Cottage, found Wiſdom and Virtue, who being repuls'd by the Land-lord had retir'd thither. Virtue took Compaſſion of her, and Wiſdom found, from [26] her Temper, that ſhe wou'd eaſily improve: So they admitted her into their Society. Ac⯑cordingly, by their Means, ſhe alter'd in a little Time ſomewhat of her Manner, and be⯑coming much more amiable and engaging, was now call'd by the Name of MODESTY. As ill Company has a greater Effect than good, Confidence, tho' more refractory to Counſel and Example, degenerated ſo far by the Society of Vice and Folly, as to paſs by the Name of IMPUDENCE. Mankind, who ſaw theſe Societies as Jupiter firſt join'd them, and knew nothing of theſe mutual Deſertions, are led into ſtrange Miſtakes by thoſe Means; and wherever they ſee Impudence, make ac⯑count of Virtue and Wiſdom, and wherever they obſerve Modeſty call her Attendants Vice and Folly.

ESSAY IV. That POLITICS may be reduc'd to a SCIENCE.

IT is a great Queſtion with ſeveral, Whether there be any eſſential Difference betwixt one Form of Government and another? and, Whether every Form may not become good or bad, according as it is well or ill admini⯑ſtred^†? Were it once admitted, that all Go⯑vernments are alike, and that the only Diffe⯑rence conſiſts in the Character and Conduct of the Governors, moſt political Diſputes wou'd be at an End, and all Zeal for one Conſtituti⯑on above another muſt be eſteem'd mere Bi⯑gotry and Folly. But though I be a profeſt [28] Friend to Moderation, I cannot forbear con⯑demning this Sentiment, and ſhould be ſorry to think, that human Affairs admit of no greater Stability, than what they receive from the ca⯑ſual Humours and Characters of particular Men.

'TIS true, thoſe who maintain, that the Goodneſs of all Government conſiſts in the Goodneſs of the Adminiſtration, may cite ma⯑ny particular Inſtances in Hiſtory where the very ſame Government, in different Hands, varies ſuddenly into the two oppoſite Extremes of good and bad. Compare the French Go⯑vernment under Henry III. and under Hen⯑ry IV. Cruelty, Oppreſſion, Levity, Artifice on the Part of the Rulers; Faction, Sediti⯑on, Treachery, Rebellion, Diſloyalty on the Part of the Subjects: Theſe compoſe the Character of the former miſerable Aera. But when the Patriot and heroic Prince, who ſuc⯑ceeded, was once firmly ſeated on the Throne, the Government, the People, every Thing ſeem'd to be totally chang'd, and all from the Change of the Temper and Sentiments of one ſingle Man. An equal Difference of a contra⯑ry Kind, may be found in comparing the [29] Reigns of Eliſabeth and James, at leaſt with Regard to foreign Affairs; and Inſtances of this Kind may be multiply'd, almoſt without Number, from antient as well as modern Hi⯑ſtory.

BUT here I wou'd beg Leave to make a Di⯑ſtinction. All abſolute Governments (and ſuch the Engliſh Government was, in a great Mea⯑ſure, till the Middle of the laſt Century) muſt very much depend on the Adminiſtration; and this is one of the great Inconveniencies of that Form of Government. But a Republican and free Government wou'd be a moſt glaring Abſurdity, if the particular Checks and Con⯑trouls, provided by the Conſtitution, had real⯑ly no Influence, and made it not the Intereſt, even of bad Men, to operate for the public Good. Such is the Intention of theſe Forms of Government; and ſuch is the real Effect, where they are wiſely conſtituted: As on the other Hand, they are the Sources of all Diſor⯑der, and of the blackeſt Crimes, where either Skill or Honeſty has been wanting in their o⯑riginal Frame and Inſtitution. So great is the Force of Laws, and of particular Forms of Go⯑vernment, and ſo little Dependence have they [30] on the Humours and Temper of Men, that Conſequences as general and as certain may be deduced from them, on moſt Occaſions, as any which the Mathematical Sciences can afford us.

THE Roman Government gave the whole Legiſlative Power to the Commons, without allowing a Negative, either to the Nobility, or Conſuls. This unbounded Power the Com⯑mons poſſeſſed in a collective Body, not in a Repreſentative. The Conſequences were, When the People, by Succeſs and Conqueſt had become very numerous, and had ſpread themſelves to a great Diſtance from the Capi⯑tal, the City-Tribes, tho' the moſt contempti⯑ble, carried almoſt every Vote: They were, therefore, moſt cajol'd by every one who af⯑fected Popularity: They were ſupported in I⯑dleneſs by the general Diſtribution of Corn, and by particular Bribes, which they received from almoſt every Candidate: By this Means they became every Day more licentious, and the Campus Martius was a perpetual Scene of Tu⯑mult and Sedition: Armed Slaves were intro⯑duced among theſe raſcally Citizens; ſo that the whole Government fell into Anarchy, and the greateſt Happineſs the Romans could [31] look for, was the deſpotic Power of the Caeſars. Such are the Effects of Democracy without a Repreſentative.

A NOBILITY may poſſeſs the whole or any Part of the legiſlative Power of a State after two different Ways. Either every No⯑bleman ſhares the Power as part of the whole Body, or the whole Body enjoys the Power as compoſed of Parts; which have each a di⯑ſtinct Power and Authority. The Venetian Nobility are an Inſtance of the firſt kind of Government: The Poliſh of the ſecond. In the Venetian Government the whole Body of Nobility poſſeſſes the whole Power, and no Nobleman has any Authority, which he re⯑ceives not from the Whole. In the Poliſh Go⯑vernment every Nobleman, by Means of his Fiefs, has a peculiar hereditary Authority o⯑ver his Vaſſals, and the whole Body has no Authority but what it receives from the Con⯑currence of its Parts. The diſtinct Operations and Tendencies of theſe two Species of Go⯑vernment might be made moſt apparent even a priori. A Venetian Nobility is infinitely pre⯑ferable to a Poliſh, let the Humours and Edu⯑cation of Men be ever ſo much vary'd. A [32] Nobility, who poſſeſs their Power in com⯑mon, will preſerve Peace and Order, both among themſelves, and their Subjects; and no Member can have Authority enough to controul the Laws for a Moment. They will preſerve their Authority over the People, but without any grievous Tyranny, or any Breach of private Property; becauſe ſuch a tyranni⯑nical Government is not the Intereſt of the whole Body, however it may be the Intereſt of ſome Individuals. There will be a Diſtinc⯑tion of Rank betwixt the Nobility and People, but this will be the only Diſtinction in the State. The whole Nobility will form one Bo⯑dy, and the whole People another, without any of thoſe private Feuds and Animoſities, which ſpread Ruin and Deſolation everywhere. 'Tis eaſy to ſee the Diſadvantages of a Poliſh Nobility in every one of theſe Particulars.

'TIS poſſible ſo to conſtitute a free Govern⯑ment, as that a ſingle Perſon, call him Duke, Prince or King, ſhall poſſeſs a very large Share of the Power, and ſhall form a proper Bal⯑lance or Counterpoiſe to the other Parts of the Legiſlature. This chief Magiſtrate may be either elective or hereditary; and tho' the [33] former Inſtitution may, to a ſuperficial View, appear moſt advantageous; yet a more accu⯑rate Inſpection will diſcover in it greater In⯑conveniencies than in the latter, and ſuch as are founded on Cauſes and Principles eternal and immutable. The filling of the Throne, in ſuch a Government, is a Point of too great and too general Intereſt not to divide the whole People into Factions: From whence a Civil War, the greateſt of Ills, may be appre⯑hended, almoſt with Certainty, upon every Vacancy. The Prince elected muſt be either a Foreigner or a Native: The former will be ignorant of the People whom he is to govern; ſuſpicious of his new Subjects, and ſuſpected by them; giving his Confidence entirely to Strangers, who will have no other Thoughts but of enriching themſelves in the quickeſt Manner, while their Maſter's Favour and Au⯑thority is able to ſupport them. A Native will carry into the Throne all his private Ani⯑moſities and Friendſhips, and will never be regarded, in his Elevation, without exciting the Sentiments of Envy in thoſe who former⯑ly conſider'd him as their Equal. Not to men⯑tion, that a Crown is too high a Reward ever to be given to Merit alone, and will always [34] induce the Candidates to employ Force, or Money, or Intrigue, to procure the Votes of the Electors: So that ſuch a Choice will give no better Chance for a ſuperior Merit in the Prince, than if the State had truſted to Birth alone to determine their Sovereign.

IT may therefore be pronounced as an uni⯑verſal Axiom in Politics, That an hereditary Prince, a Nobility without Vaſſals, and a Peo⯑ple voting by their Repreſentatives, form the beſt MONARCHY, ARISTOCRACY and DEMOCRACY. But in order to prove more fully, that Politics admit of general Truths, which are invariable by the Humour or Edu⯑cation either of Subject or Sovereign, it may not be amiſs to obſerve ſome other Principles of this Science, which may ſeem to deſerve that Character.

IT may eaſily be obſerv'd, that though free Governments have been commonly the moſt happy for thoſe who partake of their Free⯑dom; yet are they the moſt ruinous and op⯑preſſive for their Provinces: And this Obſer⯑vation may, I believe, be fix'd as a Maxim of the kind we are here ſpeaking of. When a [35] Monarch extends his Dominions by Conqueſt, he ſoon learns to conſider his old and his new Subjects as on the ſame Footing; becauſe in reality all his Subjects are to him the ſame, except the few Friends and Favourites, with whom he is perſonally acquainted. He does not, therefore, make any Diſtinction be⯑twixt them in his general Laws; and at the ſame Time is no leſs careful to prevent all par⯑ticular Acts of Oppreſſion in the one as in the other. But a free State neceſſarily makes a great Diſtinction, and muſt always do ſo, 'till Men learn to love their Neighbours as well as themſelves. The Conquerors, in ſuch a Government, are all Legiſlators, and will be ſure ſo to contrive Matters, by Reſtrictions of Trade and by Taxes, as to draw ſome private, as well as public, Advantage from their Conqueſts. Provincial Governors have alſo a better Chance in a Republick, to e⯑ſcape with their Plunder, by means of Bri⯑bery or Intereſt; and their Fellow-Citizens, who find their own State to be inriched by the Spoils of their Subject-Provinces, will be the more inclined to tolerate ſuch Abuſes. Not to mention, that 'tis a neceſſary Precau⯑tion in a free State to change the Governors [36] frequently; which obliges theſe temporary Tyrants to be more expeditious and rapacious, that they may accumulate ſufficient Wealth be⯑fore they give place to their Succeſſors. What cruel Tyrants were the Romans over the World during the Time of their Common-wealth! 'Tis true, they had Laws to prevent Oppreſ⯑ſion in their Provincial Magiſtrates; but Ci⯑cero informs us, that the Romans could not better conſult the Intereſt of the Provinces than by repealing theſe very Laws. For, ſays he, in that Caſe our Magiſtrates, having en⯑tire Impunity, would plunder no more than would ſatisfy their own Rapaciouſneſs: Where⯑as, at preſent, they muſt alſo ſatisfy that of their Judges, and of all the great Men of Rome, whoſe Protection they ſtand in need of. Who can read of the Cruelties and Op⯑preſſions of Verres without Horror and Aſto⯑niſhment? And, who is not touched with In⯑dignation to hear, that after Cicero had ex⯑hauſted on that abandoned Criminal all the Thunders of the moſt divine Eloquence, and had prevailed ſo far as to get him condemned to the utmoſt Extent of the Laws; yet that cruel Tyrant lived peaceably to old Age, in O⯑pulence and Eaſe, and, thirty Years afterward, [37] was put into the Proſcription by Mark Anthony, upon account of his exorbitant Wealth, where he fell, along with Cicero himſelf, and all the moſt virtuous Men of Rome? After the Diſſo⯑lution of the Common-wealth, the Roman Yoke became eaſier upon the Provinces, as Tacitus informs us; and it may be obſerved, that ma⯑ny of the worſt Emperors, Domitian, for in⯑ſtance, were very careful to prevent all Op⯑preſſion of the Provinces. In Veſpaſian's Time, Gaul was eſteemed richer than Italy itſelf: Nor do I find, during the whole Time of the Roman Monarchy, that the Empire be⯑came leſs rich or populous in any of its Pro⯑vinces; though indeed its Valour and military Diſcipline were always upon the Decline. If we paſs from antient to modern Times, we ſhall find the ſame Obſervation to hold true. The Provinces of obſolute Monarchies are al⯑ways better treated than thoſe of free States. Compare the Pais conquis of France with Ire⯑land, and you'll be convinced of this Truth; though this latter Kingdom, being almoſt en⯑tirely peopled from England, poſſeſſes ſo many Rights and Privileges as ſhould naturally make it challenge better Treatment than that of a [38] conquered Province. Corſica is alſo an obvi⯑ous Inſtance to the ſame Purpoſe.

THERE is an Obſervation of Machiavel, with regard to the Conqueſts of Alexander the Great, which, I think, may be regarded as one of thoſe eternal political Truths, which no Time or Accidents can vary. It may ſeem ſtrange, ſays that Politician, that ſuch ſudden Conqueſts as thoſe of Alexander, ſhou'd be poſſeſt ſo peaceably by his Succeſſors, and that the Perſians, during all the Confuſions and civil Wars of the Greeks, never made the ſmal⯑leſt Effort towards the Recovery of their for⯑mer independent Government. To ſatisfy us concerning the Cauſe of this remarkable E⯑vent, we may conſider, that a Monarch may govern his Subjects after two different Ways. He may either follow the Maxims of the Ea⯑ſtern Princes, and ſtretch his Power ſo far as to leave no Diſtinction of Ranks among his Subjects, but what proceeds immediately from himſelf; no Advantages of Birth; no heredi⯑tary Honours and Poſſeſſions: And, in a Word, no Credit among the People, except from his Commiſſion alone. Or a Monarch may exert his Power in a milder Manner, like our Euro⯑pean [39] Princes; and leave other Sources of Ho⯑nour, beſide his Smile and Favour: Birth, Titles, Poſſeſſions, Valour, Integrity, Know⯑ledge, or brave and fortunate Atchievements. In the former Species of Government, after a Conqueſt, 'tis impoſſible ever to ſhake off the Yoke; ſince no one poſſeſſes among the People ſo much perſonal Credit and Autho⯑rity as to begin ſuch an Enterprize: Whereas in the latter Species of Government, the leaſt Misfortune or Diſcord of the Victors, will en⯑courage the Vanquiſh'd to take Arms, who have Leaders ready to prompt and conduct them in every Undertaking.

SUCH is the Reaſoning of Machiavel, which ſeems to me very ſolid and concluſive; tho' I wiſh he had not mixt Falſhood with Truth, in aſſerting that Monarchies govern'd according to the Eaſtern Policy, tho' more eaſily kept when once they are ſubdued, yet are the moſt difficult to be ſubdued; ſince they cannot contain any powerful Subject, whoſe Diſcontent and Faction may facilitate the En⯑terprizes of an Enemy. For beſides, that ſuch a tyrannical Government enervates the Cou⯑rage of Men, and renders them indifferent [40] concerning the Fortunes of their Sovereign; beſides this, I ſay, we find by Experience, that even the temporary and delegated Autho⯑rity of the Generals and Magiſtrates, being al⯑ways, in ſuch Governments, as abſolute within its Sphere as that of the Prince himſelf, is a⯑ble, with Barbarians, accuſtom'd to a blind Submiſſion, to produce the moſt dangerous and fatal Revolutions. So that, in every Re⯑ſpect, a gentle Government is preferable, and gives the greateſt Security to the Sovereign as well as to the Subject.

LEGISLATORS, therefore, ſhou'd not truſt the future Government of a State entire⯑ly to Chance, but ought to provide a Syſtem of Laws to regulate the Adminiſtration of pub⯑lic Affairs to the lateſt Poſterity. Effects will always correſpond to Cauſes; and wiſe Regu⯑lations in any Common-wealth are the moſt valuable Legacy, which can be left to future Ages. In the ſmalleſt Court or Office, the ſtated Forms and Methods, by which Buſineſs muſt be conducted, are found to be a conſi⯑derable Check on the natural Depravity of Mankind. Why ſhou'd not the Caſe be the ſame in public Affairs? Can we aſcribe the [41] Stability and Wiſdom of the Venetian Govern⯑ment, thro' ſo many Ages, to any Thing but their Form of Government? And is it not ea⯑ſy to point out thoſe Defects in the original Conſtitution, which produc'd the tumultuous Governments of Athens and Rome, and ended at laſt in the Ruin of theſe two famous Repub⯑lics? And ſo little Dependence has this Affair on the Humours and Education of particular Men, that one Part of the ſame Republic may be wiſely conducted, and another weakly, by the very ſame Men, merely by Reaſon of the Difference of the Forms and Inſtitutions, by which theſe Parts are regulated. Hiſtorians inform us, that this was actually the Caſe with Genoa. For while the State was always full of Sedition, and Tumult, and Diſorder, the Bank of St. George, which had become a con⯑ſiderable Part of the People, was conducted for ſeveral Ages with the utmoſt Integrity and Wiſdom^†.

[42] HERE then is a ſufficient Inducement to maintain, with the utmoſt ZEAL, in every free State, thoſe Forms and Inſtitutions, by which Liberty is ſecured, the Publick Good con⯑ſulted, and the Avarice or Ambition of pri⯑vate Men reſtrained and puniſhed. Nothing does more Honour to human Nature, than to ſee it ſuſceptible of ſo noble a Paſſion; as no⯑thing can be a greater Indication of Meanneſs of Heart in any Man, than to ſee him devoid of it. A Man who loves only himſelf, with⯑out Regard to Friendſhip or Merit, is a dete⯑ſtable Monſter; and a Man, who is only ſu⯑ſceptible of Friendſhip, without publick Spi⯑rit, or a Regard to the Community, is defi⯑cient in the moſt material Part of Virtue.

BUT this is a Subject that need not be longer inſiſted on at preſent. There are enough of Zealots on both Sides to kindle up the Paſſi⯑ons of their Partizans, and under the Pre⯑tence of publick Good, purſue the Intereſts [43] and Ends of their particular Faction. For my Part, I ſhall always be more fond of promo⯑ting Moderation than Zeal; though perhaps the ſureſt Way of producing Moderation in every Party is to encreaſe our Zeal for the Public. Let us, therefore, try, if it be poſſi⯑ble, from the foregoing Doctrine, to draw a Leſſon of Moderation, with regard to the Par⯑ties, in which our Country is at preſent di⯑vided; at the ſame Time that we allow not this Moderation to abate the Induſtry and Paſ⯑ſion with which every Individual is bound to purſue the Good of his Country.

THOSE who either attack or defend a Mi⯑niſter in ſuch a Government as ours, where the utmoſt Liberty is allowed, always carry Matters to Extremes, and exaggerate his Me⯑rit or Demerit with regard to the Publick. His Enemies are ſure to charge him with the greateſt Enormities, both in domeſtic and fo⯑reign Management; and there is no Meanneſs or Crime, of which, in their Account, he is not capable. Unneceſſary Wars, ſcandalous Treaties, Profuſion of public Treaſure, op⯑preſſive Taxes, every kind of Male-adminiſtra⯑tion is aſcribed to him. To aggravate the [44] Charge, his pernicious Conduct, it is ſaid, will extend its baneful Influence even to Po⯑ſterity, by undermining the beſt Conſtitution in the World, and diſordering that wiſe Sy⯑ſtem of Laws, Inſtitutions and Cuſtoms, by which our Anceſtors, for ſo many Centuries, have been ſo happily governed. He is not only a wicked Miniſter in himſelf, but has re⯑moved every Security provided againſt wic⯑ked Miniſters for the future.

ON the other Hand, the Partizans of the Miniſter make his Panegyric run as high as the Accuſation againſt him, and celebrate his wiſe, ſteady, and moderate Conduct in every Part of his Adminiſtration. The Honour and Intereſt of the Nation ſupported abroad, pub⯑lic Credit maintain'd at home, Perſecution reſtrain'd, Faction ſubdu'd; the Merit of all theſe Bleſſings is aſcrib'd ſolely to the Mini⯑ſter. At the ſame Time, he crowns all his o⯑ther Merits, by a religious Care of the beſt Conſtitution in the World, which he has pre⯑ſerv'd inviolate in all its Parts, and has tranſ⯑mitted entire, to be the Happineſs and Securi⯑ty of the lateſt Poſterity.

[45] WHEN this Accuſation and Panegyric are receiv'd by the Partizans of each Party, no Wonder they engender a moſt extraordinary Ferment on both Sides, and fill the whole Nation with the moſt violent Animoſities. But I wou'd fain perſwade theſe Party-Zealots, that there is a flat Contradiction both in the Accuſation and Panegyric, and that it were impoſſible for either of them to run ſo high, were it not for this Contradiction; if our Conſtitution be really ^† that noble Fabric, the pride of Britain, the Envy of our Neighbours, rais'd by the Labour of ſo many Centuries, re⯑pair'd at the Expence of ſo many Millions, and cemented by ſuch a Profuſion of Blood; I ſay, if our Conſtitution does in any Degree deſerve theſe Elogiums, it wou'd never have endur'd a wicked and a weak Miniſter to govern trium⯑phantly for a Courſe of Twenty Years, when oppos'd by the greateſt Geniuſes of the Nati⯑on, who exercis'd the utmoſt Liberty of Tongue and Pen, in Parliament, and in their frequent Appeals to the People. But if the Miniſter be wicked and weak, to the Degree ſo ſtrenuouſly inſiſted on, the Conſtitution [46] muſt be faulty in its original Principles, and the Miniſter cannot conſiſtently be charg'd with undermining the beſt Conſtitution of the World. A Conſtitution is only ſo far good, as it provides a Remedy againſt Male-admini⯑ſtration; and if the Britiſh Conſtitution, when in its greateſt Vigour, and repair'd by two ſuch remarkable Events, as the Revolution and Acceſſion, by which our antient Royal Family was ſacrificed to it; if our Conſtitution, I ſay, with ſo great Advantages, does not, in Fact, provide any ſuch Remedy againſt Male-admini⯑ſtration, we are rather beholden to any Mini⯑ſter, that undermines it, and affords us an Op⯑portunity of erecting a better Conſtitution in its Place.

I WOU'D make Uſe of the ſame Topics to moderate the Zeal of thoſe who defend the Miniſter. If our Conſtitution be ſo excellent, a Change of Miniſtry can be no ſuch dread⯑ful Event; ſince 'tis eſſential to ſuch a Conſti⯑tution, in every Miniſtry, both to preſerve it⯑ſelf from Violation, and to prevent all Enor⯑mities in the Adminiſtration. If our Conſti⯑tution be bad, ſo extraordinary a Jealouſy and Apprehenſion, on Account of Changes, is ill⯑plac'd; [47] and a Man ſhou'd no more be anxi⯑ous in this Caſe, than a Husband, who had marry'd a Woman from the Stews, ſhou'd be watchful to prevent her Infidelity. Public Affairs, in ſuch a Conſtitution, muſt neceſſa⯑rily go to Confuſion by whatever Hands they are conducted; and the Zeal of Patriots is much leſs requiſite in that Caſe than the Pati⯑ence and Submiſſion of Philoſophers. The Virtue and good Intentions of Cato and Bru⯑tus are highly laudable; But to what Purpoſe did their Zeal ſerve? To nothing, but to ha⯑ſten the fatal Period of the Roman Govern⯑ment, and render its Convulſions and dying Agonies more violent and painful.

I WOU'D not be underſtood to mean, that public Affairs deſerve no Care and Attention at all. Wou'd Men be moderate and conſi⯑ſtent, their Claims might be admitted; at leaſt, might be examin'd. The Country Par⯑ty might ſtill aſſert, that our Conſtitution, tho' excellent, will admit of Male-adminiſtration to a certain Degree; and therefore, if the Mini⯑ſter be bad, 'tis proper to oppoſe him with a ſuitable Degree of Zeal. And on the other Side, the Court-Party may be allow'd, upon [48] the Suppoſition, that the Miniſter were good, to defend, and with ſome Zeal too, his Ad⯑miniſtration. I wou'd only perſwade Men not to contend, as if they were fighting pro aris & focis, and change a good Conſtitution into a bad one, by the Violence of their Fac⯑tions.

I HAVE not here conſider'd any Thing that is perſonal in the preſent Controverſy. In the beſt Conſtitution of the World, where every Man is reſtrain'd by the moſt rigid Laws; 'tis eaſy to diſcover either the good or bad Inten⯑tions of a Miniſter, and to judge, whether his perſonal Character deſerves Love or Ha⯑tred. But ſuch Queſtions are of little Impor⯑tance to the Public, and ly under a juſt Su⯑ſpicion either of Malevolence or Flattery in thoſe who employ their Pens upon them.

ESSAY V. Of the firſt PRINCIPLES of GOVERNMENT.

NOTHING is more ſurpriſing to thoſe, who conſider human Affairs with a Philoſophical Eye; than to ſee the Eaſineſs with which the many are governed by the few, and to obſerve the implicite Submiſ⯑ſion with which Men reſign their own Senti⯑ments and Paſſions to thoſe of their Rulers. When we enquire by what Means this Wonder is brought about, we ſhall find, that as FORCE is always on the Side of the Governed, the Governors have nothing to ſupport them but OPINION. 'Tis therefore, on Opinion only that Government is founded; and this Maxim extends to the moſt deſpotick and moſt milita⯑ry Governments, as well as to the moſt free and moſt popular. The Soldan of Aegypt, or [50] the Emperor of Rome, might drive his harm⯑leſs Subjects, like brute Beaſts, againſt their Sentiments and Inclination: But he muſt, at leaſt, have led his Mamalukes, or Praetorian Bands, like Men, by their Opinion.

OPINION is of two Kinds, viz. Opinion of INTEREST, and Opinion of RIGHT. By Opinion of Intereſt, I chiefly underſtand the Senſe of the public Advantage which is reapt from Government; along with the Perſwaſi⯑on, that the particular Government, which is eſtabliſh'd, is equally advantageous with any other that cou'd eaſily be ſettled. When this Opinion prevails among the Generality of a State, or among thoſe who have the Force in their Hands, it gives great Security to any Government.

RIGHT is of two Kinds, Right to POWER, and Right to PROPERTY. What Prevalence Opinion of the firſt Kind has over Mankind, may eaſily be underſtood by obſerving the At⯑tachment, which all Nations have to their an⯑tient Government, and even to thoſe Names, which have had the Sanction of Antiquity. Antiquity always begets the Opinion of Right; [51] and whatever diſadvantageous Sentiment we may entertain of Mankind, they are always found to be prodigal both of Blood and Trea⯑ſure, in the Maintenance of public Right. This Paſſion we may denominate Enthuſiaſm, or may give it what Appellation we pleaſe; but a Politician, who wou'd overlook its Influence on human Affairs, wou'd prove himſelf to have but a very limited Underſtanding.

'TIS ſufficiently underſtood, that the Opi⯑nion of Right to Property is of the greateſt Moment in all Matters of Government. A noted Author has made Property the Founda⯑tion of all Government; and moſt of our po⯑litical Writers ſeem inclin'd to follow him in that Particular. This is carrying the Matter too far; but ſtill it muſt be own'd, that the Opinion of Right to Property has a great In⯑fluence in this Subject.

UPON theſe three Opinions, therefore, of Intereſt, of Right to Power, and of Right to Property, are all Governments founded, and all Authority of the few over the many. There are indeed other Principles, which add Force to theſe, and determine, limit, or alter their [52] Operation; ſuch as Self-Intereſt, Fear, and Affection: But ſtill I aſſert, that theſe other Principles can have no Influence alone, but ſuppoſe the antecedent Influence of thoſe Opi⯑nions above-mention'd. They are, therefore, to be eſteem'd the ſecondary, not the origi⯑nal Principles of Government.

FOR firſt, as to Self-Intereſt, by which I mean the Expectation of particular Rewards, diſtinct from the general Protection which we receive from Government; 'tis evident, that the Magiſtrate's Authority muſt be an⯑tecedently eſtabliſh'd, or at leaſt be hop'd for, in order to produce this Expectation. The Expectation of Reward may augment the Authority with regard to ſome particular Per⯑ſons; but can never give Birth to it with re⯑gard to the Public. Men naturally look for the greateſt Favours from their Friends and Acquaintance; and therefore, the Hopes of any conſiderable Number of the State, wou'd ne⯑ver center in any particular Set of Men, if theſe Men had no other Title to Magiſtracy, and had no Influence over the Opinions of Man⯑kind. The ſame Obſervation may be extend⯑ed to the other two Principles of Fear and [53] Affection. No Man wou'd have any Reaſon to fear the Fury of a Tyrant, if he had no Authority over any but from Fear; ſince, as a ſingle Man, his bodily Force can reach but a ſmall Way, and whatever Power he has be⯑yond, muſt be founded either on our own Opinion, or on the preſum'd Opinion of o⯑thers. And tho' Affection to Wiſdom and Vir⯑tue in a Sovereign extends very far, and has great Influence; yet he muſt be antecedently ſuppos'd to be inveſted with a publick Charac⯑ter, otherwiſe the public Eſteem will ſerve him in no Stead, nor will his Virtue have any Influence beyond his private Sphere.

A GOVERNMENT may endure for ſeve⯑ral Ages, though the Ballance of Power, and the Ballance of Property do not agree. This chiefly happens, where any Member of the State has acquired a large Share of the Pro⯑perty; but from the original Conſtitution of the Government has no Share of the Power. Under what Pretext would any Individual of that Order pretend to intermeddle in public Affairs? As Men are commonly much attacht to their antient Government, it is not to be expected, that the Public would ever favour [54] ſuch Uſurpations. But where the original Conſtitution allows any Share of the Power, though ſmall, to an Order of Men, that poſ⯑ſeſſes a large Share of Property, 'tis eaſy for them gradually to ſtretch their Authority, and bring the Ballance of Power to coincide with that of Property. This has been the Caſe with the Houſe of Commons in England.

MOST Writers, that have treated of the Bri⯑tiſh Government, have ſuppoſed, that as the Houſe of Commons repreſents all the Com⯑mons of Great-Britain; ſo its Weight in the Scale is proportioned to the Property and Power of all whom they repreſent. But this Principle muſt not be received as abſolutely true. For though the People are apt to at⯑tach themſelves more to the Houſe of Com⯑mons than to any other Member of the Con⯑ſtitution, that Houſe being choſen by them as their Repreſentatives, and as the public Guardians of their Liberty; yet are there In⯑ſtances where the Houſe, even when in Op⯑poſition to the Crown, has not been follow'd by the People; as we may particularly ob⯑ſerve in the Tory Houſe of Commons in the Reign of King William. Were the Members [55] of the Houſe obliged to receive Inſtructions from their Conſtituents, like the Dutch Depu⯑ties, this would entirely alter the Caſe; and if ſuch immenſe Power and Riches, as thoſe of the whole Commons of Britain, were brought into the Scale, 'tis not eaſy to con⯑ceive, that the Crown could either influence that Multitude of People, or withſtand that Over-ballance of Property. 'Tis true, the Crown has great Influence over the collective Body of Britain in the Elections of Members; but were this Influence, which at preſent is only exerted once in ſeven Years, to be em⯑ploy'd in bringing over the People to every Vote, it would ſoon be waſted; and no Skill, Popularity or Revenue could ſupport it. I muſt, therefore, be of Opinion, that an Al⯑teration in this particular would introduce a total Alteration in our Government, and would ſoon reduce it to a pure Republic; and per⯑haps, to a Republic of no inconvenient Form. For though the People collected in a Body, like the Roman Tribes, be quite unfit for Go⯑vernment, yet when diſperſed in ſmall Bodies, they are more ſuſceptible both of Reaſon and Order; the Force of popular Currents and Tides is, in ſome Meaſure, broke; and the [56] public Intereſt may be purſued with Method and Conſtancy. But 'tis needleſs to reaſon a⯑ny farther concerning a Form of Government, which is never likely to have place in Britain, and which ſeems not to be the Aim of any Party amongſt us. Let us cheriſh and improve our antient Government as much as poſſible, without encouraging a Paſſion for ſuch dan⯑gerous Novelties.

I SHALL conclude this Subject with obſer⯑ving, that the preſent political Controverſy, with regard to Inſtructions, is a very frivo⯑lous one, and can never be brought to any Deciſion, as it is managed by both Parties. The Country-Party do not pretend, that a Member is abſolutely bound to follow ſuch Inſtructions, as an Ambaſſador or General is confined by his Orders, and that his Vote is not to be received in the Houſe but ſo far as it is conformable to them. The Court-Party, again, do not pretend, that the Sentiments of the People ought to have no Weight with every Member; much leſs that he ought to deſpiſe the Sentiments of thoſe whom he re⯑preſents, and with whom he is more particu⯑larly connected. And if their Sentiments be [57] of Weight, why ought they not to expreſs theſe Sentiments? The Queſtion, then, is on⯑ly concerning the Degrees of Weight, which ought to be plac'd on Inſtructions. But ſuch is the Nature of Language, that 'tis impoſſi⯑ble for it to expreſs diſtinctly theſe different Degrees; and if Men will carry on a Contro⯑verſy on this Head, it may well happen, that they may differ in their Language, and yet a⯑gree in their Sentiments; and differ in their Sentiments, and yet agree in their Language. Beſides, how is it poſſible to fix theſe De⯑grees, conſidering the Variety of Affairs that come before the Houſe, and the Variety of Places, which Members repreſent? Ought the Inſtructions of Totneſs to have the ſame Weight as thoſe of London? Or Inſtructions, with re⯑gard to the Convention, which reſpected fo⯑reign Politics, to have the ſame Weight as thoſe with regard to the Exciſe, which re⯑ſpected only our domeſtic Affairs?

ESSAY VI. Of LOVE and MARRIAGE.

I Know not whence it proceeds, that Wo⯑men are ſo apt to take amiſs every Thing that is ſaid in Diſparagement of the married State; and always conſider a Satyr upon Matrimony as a Satyr upon themſelves. Do they mean by this, that they are the Par⯑ties principally concerned, and that if a Back⯑wardneſs to enter into that State ſhould pre⯑vail in the World, they would be the greateſt Sufferers? Or, are they ſenſible, that the Miſ⯑fortunes and Miſcarriages of the married State are owing more to their Sex than to ours? I hope they do not intend to confeſs either of theſe two Particulars, or to give ſuch an Ad⯑vantage to their Adverſaries, the Men, as e⯑ven to allow them to ſuſpect it.

[60] I HAVE often had Thoughts of complying with this Humour of the Fair Sex, and of writ⯑ing a Panegyric upon Marriage: But, in look⯑ing around for Materials, they ſeem'd to be of ſo mix'd a Nature, that at the Concluſion of my Reflections, I found I was as much diſ⯑pos'd to write a Satyr, which might be plac'd on the oppoſite Pages of my Panegyrick: And I am afraid, that as Satyr is, on moſt Occaſi⯑ons, thought to have more Truth in it than Panegyric, I ſhou'd have done their Cauſe more Harm than Good by this Expedient. To miſrepreſent Facts is what, I know, they will not require of me. I muſt be more a Friend to Truth, than even to them, where their In⯑tereſts are oppoſite.

I SHALL tell the Women what it is our Sex complains of moſt in the married State; and if they be diſpoſed to ſatisfy us in this Particular, all the other Differences will be eaſily accomodated. If I be not miſtaken, 'tis their Love of Dominion which is the Ground of the Quarrel; though 'tis very likely, that they will think it an unreaſonable Love of it in us, which makes us inſiſt ſo much upon that Point. However this may be, no Paſ⯑ſion [61] ſeems to have more Influence on female Minds than this for Power; and there is a remarkable Inſtance in Hiſtory of its pre⯑vailing above another Paſſion, which is the only one that can be ſuppoſed a proper Counter-poiſe for it. We are told, that all the Women in Scythia once conſpired a⯑gainſt the Men, and kept the Secret ſo well, that they executed their Deſign before they were ſuſpected. They ſurpriſed the Men in Drink, or aſleep, bound them all faſt in Chains, and having called a ſolemn Council of the whole Sex, it was debated what Expe⯑dient ſhould be uſed to improve the preſent Advantage, and prevent their falling again in⯑to Slavery. To kill all the Men did not ſeem to the Reliſh of any Part of the Aſſembly, notwithſtanding the Injuries formerly receiv'd; and they were afterwards pleaſed to make a great Merit of this Lenity of theirs. It was, therefore, agreed to put out the Eyes of the whole male Sex, and thereby reſign for ever after all the Vanity they could draw from their Beauty, in order to ſecure their Autho⯑rity. We muſt no longer pretend to dreſs and Show, ſay they; but then we ſhall be free from Slavery. We ſhall hear no more tender [62] Sighs; but in return we ſhall hear no more imperious Commands. Love muſt for ever leave us; but he will carry Subjection along with him.

'TIS regarded by ſome as an unlucky Cir⯑cumſtance, ſince the Women were reſolved to main the Men, and deprive them of ſome of their Senſes, in order to render them hum⯑ble and dependent, that the Senſe of hearing could not ſerve their Purpoſe, ſince 'tis pro⯑bable the Females would rather have attack'd that than the Sight: And I think it is agreed among the Learned, that, in a married State, 'tis not near ſo great an Inconvenience to loſe the former Senſe as the latter. However this may be, we are told by modern Anecdotes, that ſome of the Scythian Women did ſecretly ſpare their Husbands Eyes; preſuming, I ſup⯑poſe, that they could govern them as well by means of that Senſe as without it. But ſo in⯑corrigible and intractable were theſe Men, that their Wives were all obliged in a few Years, as their Youth and Beauty decay'd, to imitate the Example of their Siſters; which it was no difficult Matter to do in a State where the female Sex had once got the Superiority.

[63] I KNOW not if our Scotiſh Ladies derive any Thing of this Humour from their Scythian An⯑ceſtors; but I muſt confeſs, that I have often been ſurpriz'd to ſee a Woman very well pleas'd to take a Fool for her Mate, that ſhe might govern with the leſs Controul; and cou'd not but think her Sentiments, in this Reſpect, ſtill more barbarous than thoſe of the Scythian Women above-mention'd, as much, as the Eyes of the Underſtanding are more valuable than thoſe of the Body.

BUT to be juſt, and to lay the Blame more equally, I am afraid it is the Fault of our Sex, if the Women be ſo fond of Rule, and that if we did not abuſe our Authority, they wou'd never think it worth while to diſpute it. Ty⯑rants, we know, produce Rebels; and all Hi⯑ſtory informs us, that Rebels, when they pre⯑vail, are apt to become Tyrants in their Turn. For this Reaſon, I cou'd wiſh there were no Pretenſions to Authority on either Side; but that every Thing was carry'd on with perfect Equality, as betwixt two equal Members of the ſame Body. And to induce both Parties to embrace thoſe amicable Sentiments, I ſhall [64] deliver to them Plato's Account of the Origin of Love and Marriage.

MANKIND, according to that fanciful Phi⯑loſopher, were not, in their Original, divided into Male and Female, as at preſent; but each individual Perſon was a Compound of both Sexes, and was in himſelf both Husband and Wife, melted down into one living Creature. This Union, no Doubt, was very entire, and the Parts very well adjuſted together, ſince there reſulted a perfect Harmony betwixt the Male and Female, altho' they were oblig'd to be inſeparable Companions. And ſo great was the Harmony and Happineſs flowing from it, that the ANDROGYNES (for ſo Plato calls them) or MEN-WOMEN, became inſolent upon their Proſperity, and rebell'd againſt the Gods. To puniſh them for this Temerity, Jupiter cou'd contrive no better Expedient, than to divorce the Male-Part from the Female, and make two imperfect Beings of the Compound, which was before ſo perfect. Hence the O⯑rigin of Men and Women, as diſtinct Crea⯑tures. But notwithſtanding this Diviſion, ſo lively is our Remembrance of the Happineſs we enjoy'd in our primaeval State, that we [65] are never at Reſt in this Situation; but each of theſe Halves is continually ſearching thro' the whole Species to find the other Half, which was broken from it: And when they meet, they join again with the greateſt Fond⯑neſs and Sympathy. But it often happens, that they are miſtaken in this Particular; that they take for their Half what no Way correſ⯑ponds to them; and that the Parts do not meet nor join in with each other, as is uſual in Frac⯑tures. In this Caſe the Union is ſoon diſ⯑ſolv'd, and each Part is ſet looſe again to hunt for its loſt Half, joining itſelf to every one it meets by Way of Trial, and enjoying no Reſt, till its perfect Sympathy with its Partner ſhews that it has at laſt been ſucceſsful in its Endea⯑vours.

WERE I diſpos'd to carry on this Fiction of Plato, which accounts for the mutual Love betwixt the Sexes in ſo agreeable a Manner, I wou'd do it by the following Allegory.

WHEN Jupiter had ſeparated the Male from the Female, and had quell'd their Pride and Ambition by ſo ſevere an Operation, he cou'd not but repent him of the Cruelty of his Ven⯑geance, [66] and take Compaſſion on poor Mortals, who were now become incapable of any Re⯑poſe or Tranquility. Such Cravings, ſuch An⯑xieties, ſuch Neceſſities aroſe, as made them curſe their Creation, and think Exiſtence it⯑ſelf a Puniſhment. In vain had they Recourſe to every other Occupation and Amuſement. In vain did they ſeek after every Pleaſure of Senſe, and every Refinement of Reaſon. No⯑thing cou'd fill that Void, which they felt in their Hearts, or ſupply the Loſs of their Part⯑ner, who was ſo fatally ſeparated from them. To remedy this Diſorder, and to beſtow ſome Comfort, at leaſt, on human Race in their forelorn Situation, Jupiter ſent down LOVE and HYMEN to collect the broken Halves of human Kind, and piece them together, in the beſt Manner poſſible. Theſe two Deities found ſuch a prompt Diſpoſition in Mankind to unite again in their primitive State, that they pro⯑ceeded on their Work with wonderful Succeſs for ſome Time; till at laſt, from many unluc⯑ky Accidents, Diſſenſion aroſe betwixt them. The chief Counſellor and Favourite of Hymen was CARE, who was continually filling his Patron's Head with Proſpects of Futurity; a Settlement, Family, Children, Servants; ſo [67] that little elſe was regarded in all the Matches they made. On the other Hand, Love had choſen PLEASURE for his Favourite, who was as pernicious a Counſellor as the other, and wou'd never allow Love to look beyond the preſent momentary Gratification, or the ſatiſ⯑fying of the prevailing Inclination. Theſe two Favourites became, in a little Time, ir⯑reconcilable Enemies, and made it their chief Buſineſs to undermine each other in all their Undertakings. No ſooner had Love fixt upon two Halves, which he was cementing toge⯑ther, and forming to a cloſe Union, but Care inſinuates himſelf, and bringing Hymen along with him, diſſolves the Union produc'd by Love, and joins each Half to ſome other Half, which he had provided for it. To be re⯑veng'd of this, Pleaſure creeps in upon a Pair already join'd by Hymen; and calling Love to his Aſſiſtance, they Under-hand contrive to join each Half, by ſecret Links, to Halves, which Hymen was wholly unacquainted with. It was not long before this Quarrel was felt in its pernicious Conſequences; and ſuch Com⯑plaints aroſe before the Throne of Jupiter, that he was oblig'd to ſummon the offending Parties to appear before him, in order to give [68] an Account of their Proceedings. After hea⯑ring the Pleadings on both Sides, he order'd an immediate Reconcilement betwixt Love and Hymen, as the only Expedient for giving Hap⯑pineſs to Mankind: And that he might be ſure this Reconcilement ſhou'd be durable, he laid his ſtrict Injunctions on them never to join any Halves without conſulting their Fa⯑vourites, Care and Pleaſure, and obtaining the Conſent of both to the Conjunction. Where this Order is ſtrictly obſerv'd, the Androgyne is perfectly reſtor'd, and human Race enjoy the ſame Happineſs as in their pri⯑maeval State. The Seam is ſcarce perceiv'd, that joins the two Beings together; but both of them combine to form one perfect and happy Creature.

ESSAY VII. Of the STUDY of HISTORY.

THERE is nothing I would recom⯑mend more earneſtly to my female Readers than the Study of Hiſtory, as an Occupation, of all others, the beſt ſuited both to their Sex and Education; much more inſtructive than their ordinary Books of Amuſement, and more entertaining than thoſe ſerious Compoſitions, which are uſually to be found in their Cloſets. Among other impor⯑tant Truths, which they may learn from Hi⯑ſtory, they may be informed of two Particu⯑lars, the Knowledge of which may contribute very much to their Quiet and Repoſe; That our Sex, as well as theirs, are far from being ſuch perfect Creatures as they are apt to ima⯑gine, and, That Love is not the only Paſſion, that governs the Male-World, but is often o⯑vercome [70] by Avarice, Ambition, Vanity, and a thouſand other Paſſions. Whether they be the falſe Repreſentations of Mankind in thoſe two Particulars, that endear Romances and Novels ſo much to the fair Sex, I know not; but muſt confeſs I am ſorry to ſee them have ſuch an Averſion to Matter of Fact, and ſuch an Appetite for Falſhood. I remember I was once deſired by a young Beauty, for whom I had ſome Paſſion, to ſend her ſome Novels and Romances for her Amuſement in the Coun⯑try; but was not ſo ungenerous as to take the Advantage, which ſuch a Courſe of Read⯑ing might have given me, being reſolved not to make Uſe of poiſoned Arms againſt her. I therefore ſent her Plutarch's Lives, aſſuring her at the ſame Time, that there was not a Word of Truth in them from Beginning to End. She peruſed them very attentively, 'till ſhe came to the Lives of Alexander and Caeſar, whoſe Names ſhe had heard of by Accident: and then returned me the Book, with many Reproaches for deceiving her.

I MAY indeed be told, that the fair Sex have no ſuch Averſion to Hiſtory, as I have repreſented, provided it be ſecret Hiſtory, and [71] contain ſome memorable Tranſaction proper to excite their Curioſity. But as I do not find that Truth, which is the Baſis of Hiſtory, is at all regarded in thoſe Anecdotes, I cannot ad⯑mit of this as a Proof of their Paſſion for that Study. However this may be, I ſee not why the ſame Curioſity might not receive a more proper Direction, and lead them to deſire Ac⯑counts of thoſe who lived in paſt Ages as well as of their Contemporaries. What is it to Cleora, whether Fulvia entertains a ſecret Commerce of Love with Philander or not? Has ſhe not equal Reaſon to be pleaſed, when ſhe is informed, (what is whiſpered about a⯑mong Hiſtorians) that Cato's Siſter had an Intrigue with Caeſar, and palmed her Son, Marcus Brutus, upon her Husband for his own, though in Reality he was her Gallant's? And are not the Loves of Meſſalina or Julia as proper Subjects of Diſcourſe as any Intrigue, that this City has produced of late Years.

BUT I know not whence it comes, that I have been thus ſeduced into a kind of Raillery againſt the Ladies: Unleſs, perhaps, it pro⯑ceed from the ſame Cauſe, that makes the Perſon, who is the Favourite of the Com⯑pany, [72] be often the Object of their good-natur'd Jeſts and Pleaſantries. We are pleaſed to ad⯑dreſs our ſelves after any manner to a Perſon that is agreeable to us; and at the ſame Time preſume, that nothing will be taken amiſs by one who is ſecure of the good Opinion and Affections of every one preſent. I ſhall now proceed to handle my Subject more ſeriouſly, and ſhall point out the many Advantages, that flow from the Study of Hiſtory, and ſhow how well ſuited it is to every one, but particularly to thoſe who are debarred the ſeverer Studies by the Tenderneſs of their Complexion and the Weakneſs of their Education. The Advan⯑tages found in Hiſtory ſeem to be of three kinds, as it amuſes the Fancy, as it improves the Underſtanding, and as it ſtrengthens Vir⯑tue.

IN reality, what more agreeable Entertain⯑ment to the Mind, than to be tranſported in⯑to the remoteſt Ages of the World, and to ob⯑ſerve human Society in its Infancy, making the firſt faint Eſſays towards the Arts and Sci⯑ences: To ſee the Policy of Government, and the Civility of Converſation refining by De⯑grees, and every thing that is ornamental to [73] human Life advancing towards its Perfection. To remark the Riſe, Progreſs, Declenſion and final Extinction of the moſt flouriſhing Empires: The Virtues, which contributed to their Great⯑neſs; and the Vices, which drew on their Ruin. In ſhort, to ſee all human Race, from the Be⯑ginning of Time, paſs, as it were, in Review before us, appearing in their true Colours, without any of thoſe Diſguiſes, which, dur⯑ing their Life-time, ſo much perplexed the Judgments of the Beholders. What Spectacle can be imagined ſo magnificent, ſo various, ſo intereſting? What Amuſement, either of the Senſes or Imagination, can be compared with it? Shall thoſe trifling Paſtimes, which engroſs ſo much of our Time, be preferr'd as more ſatisfactory, and more fit to engage our Attention? How perverſe muſt that Taſte be, which is capable of ſo wrong a Choice of Plea⯑ſures?

BUT Hiſtory is a moſt improving Part of Knowledge, as well as an agreeable Amuſe⯑ment; and indeed, a great Part of what we commonly call Erudition, and value ſo highly, is nothing but an Acquaintance with hiſtori⯑cal Facts. An extenſive Knowledge of this [74] kind belongs to Men of Letters; but I muſt think it an unpardonable Ignorance in Perſons of whatever Sex or Condition, not to be ac⯑quainted with the Hiſtory of their own Coun⯑try, along with the Hiſtories of antient Greece and Rome. A Woman may behave herſelf with good Manners, and have even ſome Vi⯑vacity in her Turn of Wit; but where her Mind is ſo unfurniſh'd, 'tis impoſſible her Con⯑verſation can afford any Entertainment to Men of Senſe and Reflection.

I MUST add, that Hiſtory is not only a va⯑luable Part of Knowledge, but opens the Door to many other Parts of Knowledge, and af⯑fords Materials to moſt of the Sciences. And indeed, if we conſider the Shortneſs of hu⯑man Life, and our limited Knowledge even of what paſſes in our own Time, we muſt be ſenſible, that we ſhould be for ever Children in Underſtanding, were it not for this In⯑vention, which extends our Experience to all paſt Ages, and to the moſt diſtant Nations; making them contribute as much to our Im⯑provement in Wiſdom, as if they had actual⯑ly lain under our Obſervation. A Man ac⯑quainted with Hiſtory may, in ſome reſpect, [75] be ſaid to have lived from the Beginning of the World, and to have been making continu⯑al Additions to his Stock of Knowledge in e⯑very Century.

THERE is alſo an Advantage in that Know⯑ledge, which is acquired by Hiſtory, above what is learned by the Practice of the World, that it brings us acquainted with human Af⯑fairs, without diminiſhing in the leaſt from the moſt delicate Sentiments of Virtue. And to tell the Truth, I know not any Study or Occupation ſo unexceptionable as Hiſtory in this particular. Poets can paint Virtue in the moſt charming Colours; but as they addreſs themſelves entirely to the Paſſions, they often become Advocates for Vice. Even Philoſo⯑phers are apt to bewilder themſelves in the Subtilty of their Speculations; and we have ſeen ſome go ſo far as to deny the Reality of all moral Diſtinctions. But I think it a Re⯑mark worthy the Attention of the ſpeculative Reader, that the Hiſtorians have been, almoſt without Exception, the true Friends of Virtue, and have always repreſented it in its proper Colours, however they may have erred in their Judgments of particular Perſons. Machiavel [76] himſelf diſcovers a true Sentiment of Virtue in his Hiſtory of Florence. When he talks as a Politician, he conſiders Poiſoning, Aſſaſſi⯑nation and Perjury as lawful Arts of Power; but when he ſpeaks as an Hiſtorian, he ſhows ſo keen an indignation againſt Vice, and ſo warm an Approbation of Virtue in many Paſ⯑ſages, that I could not forbear applying to him that Remark of Horace, That if you chace away Nature, though with never ſo great In⯑dignity, ſhe will always return upon you. Nor is this Combination of Hiſtorians in fa⯑vour of Virtue at all difficult to be accounted for. When a Man of Buſineſs enters into Life and Action, he is more apt to conſider the Characters of Men, as they have Relation to his Intereſt, than as they ſtand in themſelves; and has his Judgment warped on every Occa⯑ſion by the Violence of his Paſſion. When a Philoſopher contemplates Characters and Man⯑ners in his Cloſet, the general abſtract View of the Objects leaves the Mind ſo cold and unmoved, that the Sentiments of Nature have no Room to play, and he ſcarce feels the Dif⯑ference betwixt Vice and Virtue. Hiſtory keeps in a juſt Medium betwixt theſe Ex⯑tremes, and places the Objects in their true [77] Point of View. The Writers of Hiſtory, as well as the Readers, are ſufficiently intereſted in the Characters and Events, to have a lively Sentiment of Blame or Praiſe; and at the ſame Time have no particular Intereſt or Concern to pervert their Judgment.

Verae voces tum demum pectore ab imo Eliciuntur.

ESSAY VIII. Of the INDEPENDENCY of PARLIAMENT.

I HAVE frequently obſerv'd, in comparing the Conduct of the Court and Country Party, that the former are commonly leſs aſſuming and dogmatical in Converſation, more apt to make Conceſſions, and tho' not, perhaps, more ſuſceptible of Conviction; yet more able to bear Contradiction than the lat⯑ter; who are apt to fly out upon any Oppoſi⯑tion, and to regard one as a mercenary de⯑ſigning Fellow, if he argues with any Cool⯑neſs and Impartiality, or makes any Conceſ⯑ſions to their Adverſaries. This is a Fact, which, I believe, every one may have ob⯑ſerv'd, who has been much in Companies, where political Queſtions have been diſcuſs'd; tho', were one to ask the Reaſon of this Dif⯑ference, [80] every Party wou'd be apt to aſſign a different Reaſon. Gentlemen in the Oppoſition will aſcribe it to the very Nature of their Par⯑ty, which, being founded on public Spirit, and a Zeal for the Conſtitution, cannot eaſily endure ſuch Doctrines, as are of pernicious Conſequence to Liberty. The Courtiers, on the other Hand, will be apt to put us in Mind of the Clown mention'd by Lord Shaftsbury. ‘"A Clown, ſays that ^‡excellent Author, once took a Fancy to hear the Latin Diſ⯑putes of Doctors at an Univerſity. He was askt what Pleaſure he cou'd take in view⯑ing ſuch Combatants, when he cou'd ne⯑ver know ſo much, as which of the Par⯑ties had the better."’ For that Matter, re⯑ply'd the Clown, ‘"I a'n't ſuch a Fool nei⯑ther, but I can ſee who's the firſt that puts to'other into a paſſion. Nature herſelf dic⯑tated this Leſſon to the Clown, that he who had the better of the Argument wou'd be eaſy and well-humour'd: But he who was unable to ſupport his Cauſe by Reaſon, wou'd naturally loſe his Temper, and grow violent."’

[81] To which of theſe Reaſons ſhall we adhere? To neither of them, in my Opinion: Unleſs we have a-mind to inliſt ourſelves, and be⯑come Zealots in either Party. I believe I can aſſign the Reaſon of this different Conduct of the two Parties, without offending either. The Country-Party are plainly moſt popular at preſent, and perhaps have been ſo in moſt Adminiſtrations: So that, being accuſtom'd to prevail in Company, they cannot endure to hear their Opinions controverted, but are as confident on the publick Favour, as if they were ſupported in all their Sentiments by the moſt infallible Demonſtration. The Courtiers, on the other Hand, are commonly ſo run down by your popular Talkers, that if you ſpeak to them with any Moderation, or make them the ſmalleſt Conceſſions, they think themſelves extremely oblig'd to you, and are apt to return the Favour by a like Moderation and Facility on their Part. To be furious and paſſionate, they know, wou'd only gain them the Character of ſhameleſs Mercenaries; not that of zealous Patriots, which is the Charac⯑ter that ſuch a warm Behaviour is apt to ac⯑quire to the other Party.

[82] IN all Controverſies, we find, without re⯑garding the Truth or Falſhood on either Side, that thoſe who defend the eſtabliſht and po⯑pular Opinions are always moſt dogmatical and imperious in their Stile: While their Ad⯑verſaries affect a moſt extraordinary Gentle⯑neſs and Moderation, in order to ſoften, as much as poſſible, any Prejudices, that may ly againſt them. Conſider the Behaviour of our Free-thinkers of all Denominations, whe⯑ther they be ſuch as decry all Revelation, or only oppoſe the exorbitant Power of the Clergy; Collins, Tindal, Foſter, Hoadley. Compare their Moderation and Good-man⯑ners with the furious Zeal and Scurrility of their Adverſaries, and you will be convinc'd of the Truth of my Obſervation. A like Dif⯑ference may be obſerv'd in the Conduct of thoſe French Writers, who maintain'd the Controverſy with regard to antient and mo⯑dern Learning. Boileau, Monſieur & Madame Dacier, l'Abbe de Bos, who defended the Par⯑ty of the Antients, mixt their Reaſonings with Satyre and Invective: While Fontenelle, la Motte, Charpentier, and even Perrault never tranſgreſs'd the Bounds of Moderation and [83] Good-breeding; tho' provok'd by the moſt injurious Treatment of their Adverſaries.

I MUST, however, obſerve, that this Re⯑mark, with regard to the ſeeming Moderation of the Court Party, is entirely confin'd to Con⯑verſation, and to Gentlemen, who have been engag'd by Intereſt or Inclination in that Par⯑ty. For as to the Court-Writers, being com⯑monly hir'd Scriblers, they are altogether as ſcurrilous as the Mercenaries of the other Par⯑ty, nor has the Gazeteer any Advantage, in this Reſpect, above Common Senſe. A Man of Education will, in any Party, diſcover him⯑ſelf to be ſuch, by his Good-breeding and De⯑cency; as a Scoundrel will always betray the oppoſite Qualities. The falſe Accuſers ac⯑cus'd, &c. is very ſcurrillous; tho' that Side of the Queſtion, being leaſt popular, ſhou'd be defended with moſt Moderation. When L—d B—e, L—d M—t, Mr. L—n take the Pen in Hand, tho' they write with Warmth, they preſume not upon their Popularity ſo far as to tranſgreſs the Bounds of Decency.

I AM led into this Train of Reflection, by conſidering ſome Papers wrote upon that [84] grand Topic of Court-Influence, and Parlia⯑mentary Dependence, where, in my humble Opinion, the Country-Party ſhow too rigid an Inflexibility, and too great a Jealouſy of making Conceſſions to their Adverſaries. Their Reaſonings loſe their Force, by being carry'd too far; and the Popularity of their Opinions has ſeduc'd them to neglect, in ſome Meaſure, their Juſtneſs and Solidity. The following Reaſoning will, I hope, ſerve to juſtify me in this Opinion.

POLITICAL Writers have eſtabliſh'd it as a Maxim, That in contriving any Syſtem of Government, and fixing the ſeveral Checks and Controuls of the Conſtitution, every Man ought to be ſuppos'd a Knave, and to have no other End, in all his Actions, but private Intereſt. By this Intereſt we muſt govern him, and by Means of it, make him co-ope⯑rate to public Good, notwithſtanding his in⯑ſatiable Avarice and Ambition. Without this, ſay they, we ſhall in vain boaſt of the Advan⯑tages of any Conſtitution, and ſhall find, in the End, that we have no Security for our Li⯑berties or Poſſeſſions, except the Good-will [85] of our Rulers; that is, we ſhall have no Secu⯑rity at all.

'TIS therefore a juſt political Maxim, That every Man muſt be ſuppoſed a Knave: Tho' at the ſame Time, I muſt own it appears ſome⯑what ſtrange, that a Maxim ſhould be true in Politics, which is falſe in Fact. But to ſatisfy us on this Head, we may conſider, that Men are generally more honeſt in their private than in their public Character, and will go greater Lengths to ſerve a Party than where their own private Intereſt is alone concerned. Ho⯑nour is a great Check upon Mankind: But where a conſiderable Body of Men act toge⯑ther, this Check is, in a great meaſure, re⯑moved; ſince a Man is ſure to be approved of by his own Party for what promotes the common Intereſt, and ſoon learns to deſpiſe the Clamours of his Adverſaries. To which we may add, that every Court or Senate is determined by the Majority; ſo that if Self-Intereſt influences only the Majority (as it will always do in the preſent depraved State of Mankind) the whole Senate follows the Allurements of this ſeparate Intereſt, and acts [86] as if it contained not one Member, who had any Regard to public Intereſt and Liberty.

WHEN, therefore, there offers to my Cen⯑ſure and Examination any Plan of Govern⯑ment, real or imaginary, where the Power is diſtributed among ſeveral Courts, and ſeveral Orders of Men, I always conſider the private Intereſt of each Court, and each Order; and if I find, that, by the artful Diviſion of the Power, the private Intereſt muſt neceſſarily, in its Operation, concur with the public, I pronounce that Government to be wiſe and happy. If, on the contrary, the private In⯑tereſt of each Order be not check'd, and be not directed to publick Intereſt, I ſhall look for nothing but Faction, Diſorder, and Tyran⯑ny from ſuch a Government. In this Opi⯑nion I am juſtified by Experience, as well as by the Authority of all Philoſophers and Poli⯑ticians, both antient and modern.

HOW much, therefore, would it have ſurpriſed ſuch a Genius, as Cicero, or Ta⯑citus, to have been told, that in a future Age there ſhould ariſe a very regular Syſtem of mixt Government, where the Power was [87] ſo diſtributed, that one Rank, whenever it pleaſed, might ſwallow up all the reſt, and engroſs the whole Power of the Conſtitution. Such a Government, they would have been apt to ſay, will not be a mixt Government. For ſo great is the natural Ambition of Men, that they are never ſatisfied with Power; and if one Order of Men, by purſuing the Inte⯑reſt of their Order, can uſurp upon every o⯑ther Order, it will certainly do ſo, and ren⯑der itſelf, as far as poſſible, abſolute and un⯑controulable.

BUT in this Opinion, Experience ſhows they would have been miſtaken. For this is actually the Caſe with the Britiſh Conſtitu⯑tion. The Share of Power allotted by our Conſtitution to the Houſe of Commons is ſo great, that it abſolutely commands all the o⯑ther Parts of our Government. The King's le⯑giſlative Power is plainly no proper Check to it. For though the King has a Negative in the paſſing of all Laws; yet this, in Fact, is eſteemed of ſo little Moment, that whatever paſſes the two Houſes is always ſure to be paſs'd into a Law, and the Royal Aſſent is lit⯑tle beter than a mere Form. The principal [88] Weight of the Crown lies in the executive Power: But beſides that the executive Power, in every Government, is altogether ſubordi⯑nate to the legiſlative; beſides this, I ſay, the Exerciſe of this Power requires an immenſe Expence, and the Commons have aſſumed to themſelves the ſole Power of diſpoſing of pub⯑lic Money: How eaſy, therefore, would it be for that Houſe to wreſt from the Crown all theſe Powers, one after another, by mak⯑ing every Grant of Money conditional, and chooſing their Time ſo well, that their Re⯑fuſal of Subſidies ſhould only diſtreſs the Go⯑vernment, without giving foreign Powers a⯑ny Advantage over us? Did the Houſe of Commons depend in the ſame manner on the King, and had none of the Members any Pro⯑perty but from his Gift, would not he com⯑mand all their Reſolutions, and be from that Moment abſolute? As to the Houſe of Lords, they are a very powerful Support to the Crown as long as they are, in their Turn, ſupported by it; but both Experience and Reaſon ſhow us, that they have no Force nor Authority ſufficient to maintain themſelves alone, with⯑out any ſuch Support.

[89] How, therefore, ſhall we ſolve this Para⯑dox? And by what Means is this Member of our Conſtitution confin'd within its proper Limits; ſince, from our very Conſtitution, it muſt neceſſarily have as much Power as it de⯑mands, and can only be confin'd by itſelf? How is this conſiſtent with our conſtant Ex⯑perience of human Nature? I anſwer, that the Intereſt of the Body is here reſtrain'd by the Intereſt of the Individuals, and that the Houſe of Commons ſtretches not its Power, becauſe ſuch an Uſurpation would be contra⯑ry to the Intereſt of the Majority of its Mem⯑bers. The Crown has ſo many Offices at its Diſpoſal, that when aſſiſted by the honeſt and diſintereſted Part of the Houſe, it will always command the Reſolutions of the whole; ſo far at leaſt, as to preſerve the antient Conſti⯑tution from Danger. We may, therefore, give to this Influence what Name we pleaſe; we may call it by the invidious Appellations of Corruption and Dependence; but ſome Degree and ſome Kind of it are inſeparable from the very Nature of the Conſtitution, and neceſſa⯑ry to the Preſervation of our mixt Govern⯑ment.

[90] INSTEAD then of aſſerting ^* abſolutely, that the Dependence of Parliament, in every De⯑gree, is an Infringement of Britiſh Liberty, the Country-Party would have done better to have made ſome Conceſſions to their Adverſa⯑ries, and have only examined what was the pro⯑per Degree of this Dependence, beyond which it became dangerous to Liberty. But ſuch a Moderation is not to be expected of Party⯑men of any kind. After a Conceſſion of this Nature, all Declamation muſt be abandoned; and a ſerious calm Enquiry into the proper De⯑grees of Court-Influence, and Parliamentary Dependence would have been expected by the Readers. And tho' the Advantage, in ſuch a Controverſy, might poſſibly remain to the Country-Party; yet the Victory would not have been ſo compleat as they wiſh for, nor would a true Patriot have given an entire Looſe to his Zeal, for fear of running Matters into a contrary Extreme, by diminiſhing too ^† far the Influence of the Crown. 'Twas, there⯑fore, [91] thought beſt to deny, that this Extreme could ever be dangerous to the Conſtitution, or that the Crown could ever have too little Influence over Members of Parliament.

ALL Queſtions concerning the proper Me⯑dium betwixt any two Extremes are very dif⯑ficult to be decided; both becauſe it is diffi⯑cult to find Words proper to fix this Medium, and becauſe the Good and Ill, in ſuch Caſes, run ſo gradually into each other, as even to render our Sentiments doubtful and uncertain. But there is a peculiar Difficulty in the preſent Caſe, which would embarraſs the moſt know⯑ing and moſt impartial Examiner. The Power of the Crown is always lodged in a ſingle Per⯑ſon, either King or Miniſter; and as this Per⯑ſon may have either a greater or leſs Degree of Ambition, Capacity, Courage, Popularity or Fortune, the Power, which is too great in one Hand, may become too little in another. [92] In pure Republics, where the Power is diſtri⯑buted among ſeveral Aſſemblies or Senates, the Checks and Controuls are more regular in their Operation; becauſe the Members of ſuch numerous Aſſemblies may be preſumed to be always nearly equal in Capacity and Vir⯑tue; and 'tis only their Number, Riches, or Authority, that enter into Conſideration. But a limited Monarchy admits not of any ſuch Stability; nor is it poſſible to aſſign to the Crown ſuch a determinate Degree of Power, as will, in every Hand, form a proper Coun⯑ter-ballance to the other Parts of the Conſti⯑tution. This is an unavoidable Diſadvantage, among the many Advantages attending that Species of Government.

ESSAY IX. Whether the BRITISH GOVERN⯑MENT inclines more to ABSO⯑LUTE MONARCHY, or to a RE⯑PUBLIC.

IT affords a violent Prejudice againſt al⯑moſt every Art and Science, that no pru⯑dent Man, however ſure of his Principles, dare propheſy concerning any Event, or foretell the remote Conſequences of Things. No Phyſician will venture to pronounce con⯑cerning the Condition of his Patient a Fort⯑night or Month after: And ſtill leſs dare a Politician foretell the Situation of public Affairs a few Years hence. Harrington thought him⯑ſelf ſo ſure of his general Principle, That the Ballance of Power depends on that of Property, that he ventured to pronounce it impoſſible ever to re-eſtabliſh Monarchy in England. [94] But his Book was ſcarce publiſhed when the King was reſtored; and we ſee that Monarchy has ever ſince ſubſiſted upon the ſame Foot⯑ing as before. Notwithſtanding of this un⯑lucky Example, I will venture to examine a very important Queſtion, viz. Whether the Britiſh Government inclines more to Abſolute Monarchy, or to a Republic? and in which of theſe two Species of Government it will moſt probably terminate? As there ſeems not to be any great Danger of a ſudden Revolution ei⯑ther Way, I ſhall at leaſt eſcape the Shame at⯑tending my Temerity, if I ſhould be found to have been miſtaken.

THOSE who aſſert, that the Ballance of our Government inclines towards Abſolute Monarchy may ſupport their Opinion by the following Reaſons. That Property has a great Influence on Power cannot poſſibly be de⯑nied; but yet the general Maxim, That the Ballance of the one depends upon the Ballance of the other, muſt be received with ſeveral Limi⯑tations. 'Tis evident, that much leſs Property in a ſingle Hand will be able to counter-bal⯑lance a greater Property in ſeveral Hands; not only becauſe it is difficult to make many [95] Perſons combine in the ſame Views and Mea⯑ſures; but alſo becauſe Property, when uni⯑ted, cauſes much greater Dependence, than the ſame Property, when diſperſed. An hundred Perſons of 1000 a Year apiece, can conſume all their Income, and no Body ſhall ever be the better for them, except their Ser⯑vants and Tradeſmen, who juſtly regard their Profits as the Product of their own Labour. But a Man poſſeſt of 100,000 a Year, if he has either any Generoſity, or any Cunning, may create a great Dependence by Obligations, and ſtill a greater by Expectations. Hence we find, that in all free Governments any Subject exor⯑bitantly rich has always created Jealouſy, even tho' his Riches bore no manner of Proportion to the Riches of the State. Craſſus's Fortune, if I remember well, amounted only to ^*Three Thouſand Talents a Year; and yet we find, that though his Genius was nothing extraor⯑dinary, he was able, by Means of his Riches alone, to counter-ballance, during his Life⯑time, the Power of Caeſar, who afterwards became Maſter of the World. The Wealth of [96] the Medicis made them Maſters of Florence; tho', 'tis probable, it was very inconſiderable, compared to the united Property of that opu⯑lent Republic.

THESE Conſiderations are apt to make one entertain a very magnificent Idea of the Bri⯑tiſh Spirit and Love of Liberty; ſince we cou'd maintain our free Government, during ſo many Centuries, againſt our Sovereigns, who, beſides the Power and Dignity and Ma⯑jeſty of the Crown, have always been poſſeſt of much more Property, than any Subject has ever enjoy'd in any Common-wealth. But it may be ſaid, that this Spirit, however great, will never be able to ſupport itſelf againſt that immenſe Property, which is now lodg'd in the King, and which is ſtill increaſing. Upon a moderate Computation, there are near three Millions at the Diſpoſal of the Crown. The civil Liſt amounts to near a Million. The Collection of all Taxes to another Million. And the Employments in the Army and Navy, along with Eccleſiaſtical Preferments above a third Million; a monſtruous Sum, and what may fairly be computed to be more than a thirtieth Part of the whole Income and La⯑bour [97] of the Kingdom. When we add to this immenſe Property, the increaſing Luxury of the Nation, our Proneneſs to Corruption, a⯑long with the great Power and Prerogatives of the Crown, and the Command of ſuch nu⯑merous military Forces, there is no one but muſt deſpair, without extraordinary Efforts, of being able to ſupport our free Government much longer under all theſe Diſadvantages.

ON the other Hand, thoſe who maintain, that the Byaſs of the Britiſh Government leans towards a Republic, may ſupport their Opi⯑nion by very ſpecious Arguments. It may be ſaid, that though this immenſe Property in the Crown, be join'd to the Dignity of firſt Magiſtrate, and to many other legal Powers and Prerogatives, which ſhould naturally give it a greater Influence; yet it really becomes leſs dangerous to Liberty upon that very Ac⯑count. Were Britain a Republic, and were any private Man poſſeſs'd of a Revenue, a third, or even a tenth Part as large as that of the Crown, he would very juſtly excite Jea⯑louſy; becauſe he would infallibly have great Authority in the Government: And ſuch an irregular Authority, not avowed by the Laws, [98] is always more dangerous than a much greater Authority, which is derived from them. A ^*Man poſſeſs'd of uſurp'd Authority can ſet no Bounds to his Pretenſions: His Partizans have Liberty to hope for every thing in his Favours: His Enemies provoke his Ambition, along with his Fears, by the Violence of their Oppoſition: And the Government being thrown into a Fer⯑ment, every corrupted Humour in the State naturally gathers to him. On the contrary, a legal Authority, though very great, has al⯑ways ſome Bounds, which terminate both the Hopes and Pretenſions of the Perſons poſſeſs'd of it: The Laws muſt have provided a Reme⯑dy againſt its Exceſſes: Such an eminent Ma⯑giſtrate has much to fear, and little to hope from his Uſurpations: And as his legal Au⯑thority is quietly ſubmitted to, he has little Temptation and little Opportunity of extend⯑ing it farther. Beſides, it happens, with regard to ambitious Aims and Projects, what may be obſerved with regard to Sects of Philoſophy and Religion. A new Sect excites ſuch a Fer⯑ment, [99] and is both oppoſed and defended with ſuch Vehemence, that it ſpreads always faſter, and multiplies its Partizans with greater Ra⯑pidity, than any old eſtabliſhed Opinion, re⯑commended by the Sanction of the Laws and of Antiquity. Such is the Nature of Novelty, that where any thing pleaſes, it becomes dou⯑bly agreeable, if new, but, if it diſpleaſes, it is doubly diſpleaſing, upon that very Account. And, in moſt Caſes, the Violence of Enemies is favourable to ambitious Projects, as well as the Zeal of Partizans.

IT may farther be ſaid, That tho' Men be very much govern'd by Intereſt; yet even In⯑tereſt itſelf, and all human Affairs are merely govern'd by Opinion. Now, there has been a very ſudden and a very ſenſible Change in the Opinions of Men within theſe laſt Fifty Years, by the Progreſs of Learning and of Liberty. Moſt People, in this Iſland, have diveſted them⯑ſelves of all ſuperſtitious Reverence to Names and Authority: The Clergy have entirely loſt their Credit: Their Pretenſions and Doctrines have been ridicul'd; and even Religion can ſcarce ſupport itſelf in the World. The mere Name of King commands little Reſpect; and [100] to talk of him as GOD's Vicegerent upon Earth, or to give him any of thoſe magnifi⯑cent Titles, which formerly dazl'd Mankind, wou'd but excite Laughter in every one. Tho' the Crown, by Means of its large Revenue, may maintain its Authority in Times of Tran⯑quility, upon private Intereſt and Influence; yet, as the leaſt Shock or Convulſion muſt break all theſe Intereſts to Pieces, the kingly Power, being no longer ſupported by the ſet⯑tled Principles and Opinions of Men, will im⯑mediately diſſolve. Had Men been in the ſame Diſpoſition at the Revolution, as they are at preſent, Monarchy wou'd have run a great Riſque of being entirely loſt in this Iſland.

DURST I venture to deliver my own Sen⯑timents amidſt theſe oppoſite Arguments, I wou'd aſſert, that unleſs there happen ſome extraordinary Convulſion, the Power of the Crown, by Means of its large Revenue, is ra⯑ther upon the Increaſe; tho', at the ſame Time, I own, that its Progreſs ſeems to me very ſlow and almoſt inſenſible. The Tide has run long, and with ſome Rapidity, to [101] the Side of popular Government, and is juſt beginning to turn towards Monarchy.

'TIS well known, that every Government muſt come to a Period, and that Death is un⯑avoidable to the political as well as to the ani⯑mal Body. But, as one Kind of Death may be preferable to another, it may be enquir'd, Whether it be more diſirable for the Britiſh Conſtitution to terminate in a popular Govern⯑ment, or in abſolute Monarchy? Here I wou'd declare frankly, that tho' Liberty be infinitely preferable to Slavery, in almoſt every Caſe; yet I wou'd much rather wiſh to ſee an abſo⯑lute Monarch than a Republic in this Iſland: For, let us conſider, what Kind of Republic we have Reaſon to expect. The Queſtion is not concerning any fine imaginary Republic, which a Man may form a Plan of in his Clo⯑ſet. There is no Doubt, but a popular Go⯑vernment may be imagin'd more perfect than abſolute Monarchy, or even than our preſent Conſtitution: But what Reaſon have we to expect that any ſuch Government will ever be eſtabliſh'd in Britain, upon the Diſſolution of our Monarchy? If any ſingle Perſon acquire Power enough to take our Conſtitution to Pie⯑ces, [102] and put it up anew, he is really an abſo⯑lute Monarch; and we have had already an Inſtance of this Kind, ſufficient to convince us, that ſuch a Perſon will never reſign his Power, or eſtabliſh any free Government. Matters, therefore, muſt be truſted to their natural Progreſs and Operation; and the Houſe of Commons, according to its preſent Conſti⯑tution, muſt-be the only Legiſlature in ſuch a popular Government. The Inconveniencies, attending ſuch a Situation of Affairs, preſent themſelves by Thouſands. If the Houſe of Commons, in ſuch a Caſe, ever diſſolves it⯑ſelf, which is not to be expected, we may look for a Civil War every Election. If it continues itſelf, we ſhall ſuffer all the Tyran⯑ny of a Faction, ſub-divided into new Facti⯑ons: And as ſuch a violent Government can⯑not long ſubſiſt, we ſhall, at laſt, after infinite Convulſions and Civil Wars, find Repoſe in abſolute Monarchy, which it wou'd have been happier for us to have eſtabliſh'd peace⯑ably from the Beginning. Abſolute Monar⯑chy, therefore, is the eaſieſt Death, the true Euthanaſia of the Britiſh Conſtitution.

[103] THUS, if we have Reaſon to be more jea⯑lous of Monarchy, becauſe the Danger is more imminent from that Quarter; we have alſo Reaſon to be more jealous of popular Go⯑vernment, becauſe that Danger is more terri⯑ble. This may teach us a Leſſon of Modera⯑tion in all our political Controverſies.

ESSAY X. Of PARTIES in general.

OF all Men, that diſtinguiſh them⯑ſelves by memorable Atchievements, the firſt Place of Honour, in my Opinion, is due to LEGISLATORS, and Founders of States, who tranſmit a Sy⯑ſtem of Laws and Inſtitutions to ſecure the Peace, Happineſs and Liberty of future Gene⯑rations. The Influence of uſeful Inventions in the Arts and Sciences may, perhaps, ex⯑tend farther than thoſe of wiſe Laws, whoſe Effects are limited both in Time and Place; but the Benefit ariſing from the former is not ſo ſenſible as that which proceeds from the latter. Speculative Sciences, do, indeed, im⯑prove the Mind; but this Advantage reaches only to a few Perſons, who have Leiſure to apply themſelves to them. And as to practi⯑cal [106] Arts, which encreaſe the Commodities and Enjoyments of Life; 'tis well known, that Men's Happineſs conſiſts not ſo much in an Abundance of theſe, as in the Peace and Secu⯑rity with which they poſſeſs them: And theſe Bleſſings can only be derived from good Go⯑vernment. Not to mention, that general Vir⯑tue and good Morals in a State, which are ſo requiſite to Happineſs, can never ariſe from the moſt refined Precepts of Philoſophy, or even the ſevereſt Injunctions of Religion; but muſt proceed entirely from a virtuous Educa⯑tion, the Effect of wiſe Laws and Inſtitutions. I muſt, therefore, be of a different Opinion from my Lord BACON in this Particular, and muſt regard Antiquity as ſomewhat unjuſt in in its Diſtribution of Honour, when it made Gods of all the Inventors of uſeful Arts, ſuch as Ceres, Bacchus, Aeſculapius; and dignified Legiſlators, ſuch as Romulus and Theſeus, on⯑ly with the Appellation of Demi-Gods and Heroes.

As much as Legiſlators and Founders of States ought to be honoured and reſpected among Men, as much ought the Founders of Sects and Factions to be deteſted and hated; be⯑cauſe [107] the Influence of Factions is directly contrary to that of Laws. Factions ſubvert Government; render Laws impotent, and be⯑get the fierceſt Animoſities among Men of the ſame Nation, who ought to give mutual Aſ⯑ſiſtance and Protection to each other. And what ſhou'd render the Founders of Factions more odious is the Difficulty of extirpating Factions, when once they have taken riſe in any State. They naturally propagate themſelves for many Centuries, and ſeldom end but by the total Diſſolution of that Government, in which they are planted. They are, beſides, Seeds, which grow moſt plentifully in the richeſt Soils; and though deſpotic Govern⯑ments be not entirely free from them, it muſt be confeſs'd, that they riſe more eaſily, and propagate themſelves faſter in free Govern⯑ments, where they always infect the Legiſla⯑ture itſelf, which alone cou'd be able, by the ſteady Application of Rewards and Puniſh⯑ments, to eradicate them.

FACTIONS or Parties may be divided into PERSONAL and REAL; that is, into Fac⯑tions founded on perſonal Friendſhip or Ani⯑moſity among thoſe who compoſe the Fac⯑tions, [108] and into thoſe founded on ſome real Dif⯑ference of Sentiment or Intereſt. The Reaſon of this Diſtinction is obvious; though I muſt acknowledge, that Parties are ſeldom found pure and unmixt, either of the one kind or the other. 'Tis not often ſeen, that a Go⯑vernment divides into Factions, where there is no Difference in the Views of theſe Factions, either real or apparent, trivial or material: And in thoſe Factions, which are founded on the moſt real and moſt material Difference, there is always found to be a great deal of perſonal Animoſity or Affection. But not⯑withſtanding of this Mixture, a Party may be denominated either perſonal or real, accord⯑ing to that Principle which is predominant, and is obſerved to have the greateſt Influence.

PERSONAL Factions ariſe moſt eaſily in ſmall Republics. Every domeſtic Quarrel be⯑comes an Affair of State. Love, Vanity, E⯑mulation, any Paſſion begets public Diviſion, as well as Ambition and Reſentment. The Neri and Bianchi of Florence, the Fregoſi and Adorni of Genoa, the Colonneſi and Orſini of modern Rome, were Parties of this kind.

[109] MEN have ſuch a Propenſity to divide into perſonal Factions, that the ſmalleſt Appear⯑ance of real Difference will beget them. What can be imagined more trivial than the Diffe⯑rence betwixt one Colour of Livery and ano⯑ther in Horſe-Races? And yet this Difference begot two moſt inveterate Factions in the Greek Empire, the Praſini and Veneti, who never ſuſpended their Animoſities, 'till they ruined that unhappy Government.

NOTHING is more uſual than to ſee Par⯑ties, which have begun upon a real Difference, continue even after that Difference is loſt. When Men are once inliſted on different Sides, they contract an Affection to the Perſons with whom they are united, and an Animo⯑ſity againſt their Antagoniſts: And theſe Paſ⯑ſions they often tranſmit to their Poſterity. The real Difference betwixt Guelf and Ghib⯑belline was long loſt in Italy, before theſe Fac⯑tions were extinguiſhed. The Guelfs adher'd to the Pope, the Ghibbellines to the Emperor; and yet the Family of Sforſa, who were in Al⯑liance with the Emperor, though they were Guelfs, being expelled Milan by the King^* of [110] France, aſſiſted by Jacomo Trivulzio and the Ghibbellines, the Pope concurred with them, and they form'd Leagues with the Pope againſt the Emperor.

THE Civil Wars lately ariſen in Morocco be⯑twixt the Blacks and Whites, merely on ac⯑count of their Complexion, are founded on a very pleaſant Difference. We laugh at them; but I believe, were Things rightly examin'd, we afford much more Occaſion of Ridicule to the Moors. For pray, what are all the Wars of Religion, which have prevail'd in this po⯑lite and knowing Part of the World? They are, in my Opinion, more abſurd than the Mooriſh Civil Wars. The Difference of Com⯑plexion is a ſenſible and a real Difference: But the Difference about an Article of Faith, which is utterly abſurd and unintelligible, is not a real Difference of Sentiments, but only a Difference of a few Phraſes and Expreſſions, which one Party accepts of, without under⯑ſtanding them; and the other refuſes, in the ſame Manner. Beſides, I do not find, that the Whites in Morocco ever impos'd on the Blacks any Neceſſity of altering their Com⯑plexion, or threaten'd them with Inquiſitions [111] and penal Laws in caſe of Obſtinacy: Nor have the Blacks been more unreaſonable in this Particular. But is a Man's Opinion, where he is able to form a real Opinion, more at his Diſpoſal than his Complexion? And can one be induc'd by Force or Fear to do more than paint and Diſguiſe in the one Caſe as well as in the other?

REAL Factions may be divided into Fac⯑tions from Intereſt, from Principle, and from Affection. Of all Factions, thoſe from Inte⯑reſt are the moſt reaſonable and the moſt ex⯑cuſable. Where two Orders of Men, ſuch as the Nobles and People, have a diſtinct Au⯑thority in a Government, which is not very accurately ballanc'd and modell'd, they natu⯑rally follow a diſtinct Intereſt; nor can we reaſonably expect a different Conduct from that Degree of Selfiſhneſs, which is implanted in human Nature. It requires very great Skill in a Legiſlator to prevent ſuch Factions; and many Philoſophers are of Opinion, that this Secret, like the Grand Elixir, or Perpetual Mo⯑tion, may amuſe Men in Theory, but can ne⯑ver poſſibly be reduc'd to Practice. In deſ⯑potick Governments, indeed, Factions often [112] do not appear; but they are never the leſs real; or rather, they are more real and more pernicious, upon that very Account. The di⯑ſtinct Orders of Men, Nobles and People, Soldiers and Merchants, have all a diſtinct Intereſt; but the more Powerful oppreſſes the Weaker with Impunity, and without Re⯑ſiſtance; which begets a ſeeming Tranquillity in ſuch Governments.

THERE has been an Attempt to divide the landed and trading Intereſt in England; but without Succeſs. The Intereſt of theſe two Bodies is not really diſtinct, and never will be ſo, till our public Debts increaſe to ſuch a Degree, as to become altogether oppreſſive and intolerable.

PARTIES from Principles, eſpecially ab⯑ſtract ſpeculative Principles, are known only to modern Times, and are, perhaps, the moſt extraordinary and unaccountable Phaenomena, that have ever yet appear'd in human Affairs. Where different Principles beget a Contrari⯑ety of Conduct, as all different political Prin⯑ciples do, the Matter may be more eaſily ex⯑plain'd. A Man, who eſteems the true Right [113] of Government to ly in one Man, or one Fa⯑mily, cannot eaſily agree with his Fellow-Citizen, who thinks, that another Man or Family is poſſeſt of this Right. Each natural⯑ly wiſhes that Right may take Place, accor⯑ding to his own Notions of it. But where the Difference of Principles begets no Contra⯑riety of Action, but each may follow his own Way, without interfering with his Neigh⯑bour, as happens in all religious Controver⯑ſies; what Madneſs, what Fury can beget ſuch unhappy and ſuch fatal Diviſions?

TWO Men, travelling on the High-way, of whom one goes Eaſt, the other Weſt, can eaſily paſs each other, if the Way be broad enough: But two Men, reaſoning upon op⯑poſite Principles of Religion, cannot ſo eaſily paſs, without ſhocking; tho' one ſhou'd think, that the Way were alſo, in that Caſe, ſuffici⯑ently broad, and that each might proceed, without Interruption, in his own Way. But ſuch is the Nature of the human Mind, that it always takes hold of every Mind that ap⯑proaches it; and as it is wonderfully ſtrength⯑en'd and corroborated by an Unanimity of Sentiments, ſo it is ſhock'd and diſturb'd by [114] any Contrariety. Hence the Eagerneſs, which moſt People diſcover in a Diſpute; hence their Impatience of Oppoſition, even in the moſt ſpeculative and indifferent Opinions.

THIS Principle, however frivolous it may appear, ſeems to have been the Origin of all religious Wars and Diviſions. But, as this Principle is univerſal in human Nature, its Effects wou'd not have been confin'd to one Age, and to one Sect of Religion, did it not there concur with other more accidental Cau⯑ſes, which raiſe it to ſuch a Height, as to cauſe the higheſt Miſery and Devaſtation. Moſt Religions of the antient World aroſe in the unknown Ages of Government, when Men were as yet barbarous and uninſtructed, and the Prince, as well as Peaſant, were diſ⯑pos'd to receive, with implicite Faith, every pious Tale or Fiction that was offer'd them. The Magiſtrate embrac'd the Religion of the People, and entering cordially into the Care of ſacred Matters, naturally acquir'd an Au⯑thority in them, and united the Eccleſiaſtical with the Civil Power. But the Chriſtian Reli⯑gion ariſing, while Principles directly oppoſite to it were firmly eſtabliſh'd in the polite Part [115] of the World, who deſpis'd the Nation that firſt broach'd this Novelty; no Wonder, that Chriſtianity, in ſuch Circumſtances, was but little countenanc'd by the Civil Magiſtrate, and that the Chriſtian Prieſthood were allow⯑ed to engroſs all the Authority in the new Sect. So bad a Uſe did they make of this Power, even in thoſe early Times, that the Perfecutions of Chriſtianity may, perhaps, in Part, be aſcrib'd to the Violence inſtill'd by them into their Followers. And the ſame Principles of Prieſtly Government continuing, after Chriſtianity became the eſtabliſh'd Re⯑ligion, they have engender'd a Spirit of Per⯑ſecution, which has ever ſince been the Poi⯑ſon of human Society, and the Source of the moſt inveterate Factions in every Government. Such Factions, therefore, on the Part of the poor People, may juſtly be eſteem'd Factions of Principle; but on the Part of the Prieſts, who are the prime Movers, they are really Factions of Intereſt.

THERE is another Cauſe (beſide the Au⯑thority of the Prieſts, and the Separation of the Eccleſiaſtical and Civil Powers) that has contributed to render Chriſtendom the Scene [116] of religious Wars and Diviſions. Religions, that ariſe in Ages totally ignorant and barba⯑rous, conſiſt moſtly of traditional Tales and Fictions, which may be very different in eve⯑ry Sect, without being contrary to each o⯑ther; and even when they are contrary, eve⯑ry one adheres to the Tradition of his own Sect, without much Reaſoning or Diſputation. But as Philoſophy was widely ſpread over the World, at the Time that Chriſtianity aroſe, the Teachers of the new Sect were oblig'd to form a Syſtem of ſpeculative Opinions; to di⯑vide, with ſome Accuracy, their Articles of Faith; and to explain, comment, confute, and confirm with all the Subtility of Argu⯑ment and Science. From hence naturally a⯑roſe Keenneſs in Diſpute, when Chriſtianity came to be ſplit into new Diviſions and Here⯑ſies: And this Keenneſs aſſiſted the Prieſts in their pernicious Policy, of begetting a mutual Hatred and Antipathy among their deluded Followers. Sects of Philoſophy, in the an⯑tient World, were more zealous than Parties of Religion; but, in modern Times, Parties of Religion are more furious and enrag'd than the moſt cruel Factions, that ever aroſe from Intereſt and Ambition.

[117] I HAVE mention'd Parties from Affection as a kind of real Parties, beſide thoſe from Intereſt and Principle. By Parties from Affection, I underſtand thoſe which are founded on the different Affections of Men towards particu⯑lar Families and Perſons, whom they deſire to rule over them. Theſe Parties are often very violent, though I muſt own it is ſome⯑what unaccountable, that Men ſhou'd attach themſelves ſo ſtrongly to Perſons, whom they are no way acquainted with, whom perhaps they never ſaw, and from whom they never received nor can ever hope for any Favour. Yet this we find often to be the Caſe, and e⯑ven with Men, who, on other Occaſions, diſ⯑cover no great Generoſity of Spirit, nor are found to be eaſily tranſported by Friendſhip beyond their own Intereſt. We are apt, I know not how, to think the Relation betwixt us and our Sovereign very cloſe and intimate. The Splendor of Majeſty and Power beſtows an Importance on the Fortunes even of a ſin⯑gle Perſon. And when a Man's Good-nature does not give him this imaginary Intereſt, his Ill-nature will do it, from Spite and Oppoſi⯑tion to Perſons, whoſe Sentiments are diffe⯑rent from his own.

ESSAY XI. Of the PARTIES of GREAT-BRITAIN.

WERE the Britiſh Government pro⯑poſed as a Subject of Speculation to a ſtudious Man, he wou'd im⯑mediately perceive in it a Source of Diviſion and Party, which it wou'd be al⯑moſt impoſſible for it, in any Adminiſtration, to avoid. The juſt Ballance betwixt the Re⯑publican and Monarchical Part of our Conſti⯑tution is really, in itſelf, ſo extreme delicate and uncertain, that when join'd to Men's Paſ⯑ſions and Prejudices, 'tis impoſſible but diffe⯑rent Opinions muſt ariſe concerning it, even among Perſons of the beſt Underſtanding. Thoſe of mild Tempers, who love Peace and Order, and deteſt Sedition and Civil Wars, will always entertain more favourable Senti⯑ments [120] of Monarchy, than Men of bold Spirits, who are paſſionate Lovers of Liberty, and think no Evil comparable to Subjection and Sla⯑very. And though all reaſonable Men agree in general to preſerve our mixt Government; yet when they come to Particulars, ſome will incline to truſt larger Powers to the Crown, to beſtow on it more Influence, and to guard againſt its Encroachments with leſs Caution, than others who are terrified at the moſt di⯑ſtant Approaches of Tyranny and deſpotic Power. Thus there are Parties of PRINCIPLE involved in the very Nature of our Conſti⯑tution, which may properly enough be deno⯑minated ^*COURT and COUNTRY Parties. The [121] Strength and Violence of each of theſe Parties will much depend upon the particular Admi⯑niſtration. An Adminiſtration may be ſo bad as to throw a great Majority into the Coun⯑try Party; as a good Adminiſtration will re⯑concile to the Court many of the moſt paſſio⯑nate Lovers of Liberty. But, however the Nation may fluctuate betwixt theſe two Par⯑ties, the Parties will always ſubſiſt, as long as we are govern'd by a limited Monarchy.

BUT, beſides this Difference of Principle, thoſe Parties are very much fomented by a Difference of INTEREST, without which they cou'd ſcarce ever be dangerous or violent. The Crown will naturally beſtow all its Truſt and Power upon thoſe, whoſe Principles, real or pretended, are moſt favourable to Monar⯑chical Government; and this Temptation will naturally engage them to go greater Lengths than their Principles wou'd otherwiſe carry them. Their Antagoniſts, who are diſappoin⯑ted in their ambitious Aims, throw themſelves into the Party, whoſe Principles incline them to be moſt jealous of Royal Power, and natu⯑rally carry thoſe Principles to a greater Length than ſound Politics will juſtify. Thus, the [122] Court and Country Parties, which are the ge⯑nuine Factions of the Britiſh Government, are a kind of mixt Parties, and are influenced part⯑ly by Principle, partly by Intereſt. The Heads of the Parties are commonly moſt governed by the latter Motive; the inferior Members of them, by the former. I muſt be under⯑ſtood to mean this of Perſons who have any Mo⯑tive for taking Party on any Side. For, to tell the Truth, the greateſt Part are common⯑ly Men who aſſociate themſelves they know not why; from Example, from Paſſion, from Idleneſs. But ſtill it is requiſite there be ſome Source of Diviſion, either in Principle or In⯑tereſt; otherwiſe ſuch Perſons wou'd not find Parties, to which they cou'd aſſociate them⯑ſelves.

AS to Eccleſiaſtical Parties; we may ob⯑ſerve, that, in all Ages of the World, Prieſts have been Enemies to Liberty; and 'tis cer⯑tain, that this ſteady Conduct of theirs muſt have been founded on fixt Reaſons of Intereſt and Ambition. Liberty of thinking, and of expreſſing our Thoughts, is always fatal to Prieſtly Power, and to thoſe pious Frauds, on which it is commonly founded; and by [123] an infallible Connexion, which is found among every Species of Liberty, this Privilege can never be enjoy'd, at leaſt, has never yet been enjoy'd, but in a free Government. Hence it muſt happen, in ſuch a Government as Bri⯑tain, that the eſtabliſh'd Clergy will always be of the Court-Party; as, on the contrary, Diſſenters of all kinds will be of the Country-Party; ſince they can never hope for that To⯑leration they ſtand in need of, but by Means of our free Government. All Princes, that have aimed at deſpotic Power, have known this important Intereſt of gaining the eſta⯑bliſh'd Clergy: As the Clergy, on their Side, have ſhewn a great Facility of entering into the Views of ſuch Princes. Guſtavus Vaza was, perhaps, the only ambitious Monarch, that ever depreſs'd the Church, at the ſame Time, that he diſcouraged Liberty. But the exorbitant Power of the Biſhops in Sweden, who at that Time overtop'd the Crown, along with their Attachment to a foreign Family, was the Reaſon of his embracing ſuch an un⯑uſual Piece of Politics.

THIS Obſervation concerning the Propen⯑ſity of Clergymen to deſpotic Power, and to [124] the Government of a ſingle Perſon, is not true with regard to one Sect only: The Presbyte⯑rian and Calviniſtic Clergy in Holland were always profeſs'd Friends to the Power of the Family of Orange; as the Arminians, who were eſteem'd Heretics, were always of the Loveſtein Faction, and zealous for Liberty. But if a Prince has the Choice of both, 'tis eaſy to ſee, that he will prefer the Epiſcopal to the Presbyterian Form of Government; both becauſe of the greater Affinity betwixt Monarchy and Epiſcopacy, and becauſe of the Facility which a Prince finds in ſuch a Govern⯑ment, of ruling the Clergy, by Means of their Eccleſiaſtical Superiors.

IF we conſider the firſt Riſe of Parties in England, during the Civil Wars, we ſhall find, that they were exactly conformable to this general Theory, and that the Species of the Government gave Birth to them, by a regu⯑lar and infallible Operation. The Engliſh Con⯑ſtitution, before that Time, had lain in a Kind of Confuſion; yet ſo, as that the Subjects poſ⯑ſeſs'd many noble Privileges, which, though not, perhaps, exactly bounded and ſecur'd by Law, were univerſally deem'd, from long [125] Poſſeſſion, to belong to them as their Birth-Right. An ambitious, or rather an ignorant, Prince aroſe, who eſteem'd all theſe Privi⯑leges to be Conceſſions of his Predeceſſors, revocable at Pleaſure; and in Proſecution of this Principle, he openly acted in Violation of Liberty, during the Courſe of ſeveral Years. Neceſſity, at laſt, conſtrain'd him to call a Parliament: The Spirit of Liberty aroſe: The Prince, being without any Support, was obli⯑ged to grant every Thing requir'd of him: And his Enemies, jealous and implacable, ſet no Bounds to their Pretenſions. Here then begun thoſe Conteſts, in which it was no Wonder, that Men of that Age were divided into different Parties; ſince, even at this Day, the Impartial are at a Loſs to decide concern⯑ing the Juſtice of the Quarrel. The Pretenſi⯑ons of the Parliament, if yielded to, broke the Ballance of our Conſtitution, by rende⯑ring the Government almoſt entirely Republi⯑can. If not yielded to, we were, perhaps, ſtill in Danger of deſpotic Power, from the ſettled Principles and inveterate Habits of the King, which had plainly appear'd in every Conceſſion, that he had been conſtrain'd to make to his People. In this Queſtion, ſo de⯑licate [126] and uncertain, Men naturally fell to the Side, which was moſt conformable to their uſual Principles; and thoſe, who were the moſt paſſionate Favourers of Monarchy, de⯑clar'd for the King; as the zealous Friends of Liberty ſided with the Parliament. The Hopes of Succeſs being nearly equal on both Sides, Intereſt had little Influence in this Conteſt: So that ROUND-HEAD and CAVALIER were merely Parties of Principle; neither of which diſown'd either Monarchy or Liberty; but the former Party inclin'd moſt to the Republi⯑can Part of our Government, and the latter to the Monarchial. In which reſpect they may be conſider'd as Court and Country-Par⯑ty enflam'd into a Civil War, by an unhappy Concurrence of Circumſtances, and by the turbulent Spirit of the Age. The Common⯑wealth's-Men, and the Partizans of deſpotic Power, lay conceal'd in both Parties, and form'd but an inconſiderable Part of them.

THE Clergy had concurr'd, in a ſhameleſs Manner, with the King's arbitrary Deſigns, according to their uſual Maxims in ſuch Ca⯑ſes: And, in Return, were allow'd to perſecute their Adverſaries, whom they call'd Heretics [127] and Schiſmatics. The eſtabliſh'd Clergy was Epiſcopal; the Non-conformiſts Presbyteri⯑ans: So that all Things concurr'd to throw the former, without Reſerve, into the King's Party; and the latter into that of the Parlia⯑ment. The Cavaliers being the Court-Party, and the Round-heads the Country-Party, the Union was infallible betwixt the former and the eſtabliſh'd Prelacy, and betwixt the latter and Presbyterian Non-conformiſts. This U⯑nion is ſo natural, according to the general Principles of Politics, that it requires ſome very extraordinary Concurrence of Circum⯑ſtances to break it.

EVERY one knows the Event of this Quar⯑rel; fatal to the King firſt, and to the Parlia⯑ment afterwards. After many Confuſions and Revolutions, the Royal Family was at laſt re⯑ſtor'd, and the Government eſtabliſh'd on the ſame Footing as before. Charles II. was not made wiſer by the dreadful Example of his Fa⯑ther; but proſecuted the ſame Meaſures, tho' with more Secrecy and Caution. New Par⯑ties aroſe, under the Appellations [...] WHIG and TORY, which have continued ever ſince to confound and diſtract our Government. [128] What the Nature is of theſe Parties, is, per⯑haps, one of the moſt difficult Queſtions that can be met with, and is a Proof, that Hiſtory may contain Problems, as uncertain as any that are to be found in the moſt abſtract Sci⯑ences. We have ſeen the Conduct of theſe two Parties, during the Courſe of Seventy Years, in a vaſt Variety of Circumſtances, poſſeſs'd of Power, and depriv'd of it, during Peace and during War: We meet with Per⯑ſons, who profeſs themſelves of one Side or t'other, every Hour, in Company, in our Pleaſures, in our ſerious Occupations: We ourſelves are conſtrain'd, in a Manner, to take Party; and living in a Country of the higheſt Liberty, every one may openly declare all his Sentiments and Opinions: And yet we are at a Loſs to tell the Nature, Pretenſions, and Principles of the two Parties. The Queſtion is, perhaps, in itſelf, ſomewhat difficult; but has been render'd more ſo, by the Prejudices and Violence of Party.

WHEN we compare the Parties of Whig and Tory, to thoſe of Round-head and Cava⯑lier, the moſt obvious Difference, that ap⯑pears betwixt them, conſiſts in the Doctrines [129] of paſſive Obedience and indefeaſible Right, which were but little heard of among the Ca⯑valiers, but became the univerſal Doctrine, and was the true Characteriſtic, of a Tory. Were theſe Principles puſh'd into their moſt obvious Conſequences, they imply a formal Renunciation of all our Liberties, and an A⯑vowal of abſolute Monarchy; ſince nothing can be a greater Abſurdity than a limited Power, which muſt not be reſiſted, even when it exceeds its Limitations. But as the moſt rational Principles are often but a weak Counterpoiſe to Paſſion; 'tis no Wonder, that theſe abſurd Principles, ſufficient, accor⯑ding to a juſtly celebrated ^*Author, to ſhock the common Senſe of a HOTTENTOT or SAMOI⯑EDE, were found too weak for that Effect. The Tories, as Men, were Enemies to Oppreſ⯑ſion; and alſo, as Engliſhmen, they were E⯑nemies to deſpotick Power. Their Zeal for Liberty, was, perhaps, leſs fervent than that of their Antagoniſts; but was ſufficient to make them forget all their general Principles, when they ſaw themſelves openly threaten'd with a Subverſion of the antient Government. [130] From theſe Sentiments aroſe the Revolution; an Event of mighty Conſequence, and the firmeſt Foundation of Britiſh Liberty. The Conduct of the Tories, during that Event, and after it, will afford us a true Inſight into the Nature of that Party.

IN the firſt Place, They appear to have had the Sentiments of true Britons in their Affec⯑tion to Liberty, and their determin'd Reſolu⯑tion not to ſacrifice it to any abſtract Princi⯑ples whatſoever, or to any imaginary Rights of Princes. This Part of their Character might juſtly have been doubted of before the Revo⯑lution, from the obvious Tendency of their avow'd Principles, and from their almoſt un⯑bounded Compliances with a Court, that made little Secret of its arbitrary Deſigns. The Revolution ſhow'd them to have been, in this Reſpect, nothing but a genuine Court-Party, ſuch as might be expected in a Britiſh Government: That is, Lovers of Liberty, but greater Lovers of Monarchy. It muſt, how⯑ever, be confeſt, that they carry'd their mo⯑narchical Principles further, even in Practice, [131] but more ſo in Theory, than was, in any De⯑gree, conſiſtent with a limited Government.

Secondly. NEITHER their Principles nor Af⯑fections concurr'd with the Settlement made at the Revolution, or with that which has ſince taken Place. This Part of their Charac⯑ter may ſeem contradictory to the former; ſince any other Settlement, in thoſe Circum⯑ſtances of the Nation, muſt have been dange⯑rous, if not fatal to Liberty. But the Heart of Man is made to reconcile the moſt glaring Contradictions; and this Contradiction above⯑mention'd is not greater than that betwixt Paſſive Obedience, and the Reſiſtance employ'd at the Revolution. A Tory, therefore, ſince the Revolution, may be defin'd in a few Words to be a Lover of Monarchy, tho' without a⯑bandoning Liberty; and a Partizan of the Fa⯑mily of STUART. As a Whig may be defin'd to be a Lover of Liberty, tho' without renoun⯑cing Monarchy; and a Friend to the Settle⯑ment in the Proteſtant Line.

THE celebrated Writer above cited, has aſ⯑ſerted, that the REAL Diſtinction betwixt Whig and Tory was loſt at the Revolution, and that [132] ever ſince they have continued to be mere per⯑ſonal Parties, like the Guelfs and Ghibbellines, after the Emperors had loſt all Authority in Italy. Such an Opinion, were it received, wou'd turn our whole Hiſtory into an Aenig⯑ma; and is, indeed, ſo contrary to the ſtrongeſt Evidence, that a Man muſt have a great Opi⯑nion of his own Eloquence to attempt the pro⯑ving of it.

I SHALL firſt mention, as an irreſiſtible Proof of a real Diſtinction betwixt theſe Par⯑ties, what every one may have obſerv'd or heard concerning the Conduct and Converſation of all his Friends and Acquaintance on both Sides. Have not the Tories always bore an avowed Affection to the Family of Stuart, and have not their Adverſaries always oppoſed with Vi⯑gour the Succeſſion of that Family?

THE Tory Principles are confeſſedly the moſt favourable to Monarchy. Yet the Tories have almoſt always oppoſed the Court theſe fifty Years; nor were they cordial Friends to King William, even when employ'd by him. Their Quarrel, therefore, cannot be ſuppoſed [133] to have lain with the Throne, but with the Perſon, who ſat on it.

THEY concurr'd heartily with the Court during the four laſt Years of Queen Anne. But is any one at a loſs to find the Reaſon?

'TIS monſtrous to ſee an eſtabliſh'd Epiſco⯑pal Clergy in declar'd Oppoſition to the Court, and a Nonconformiſt Presbyterian Clergy in Conjunction with it. What can produce ſuch an unnatural Conduct in both? Nothing but that the former have eſpouſed Monarchical Principles too high for the preſent Settlement, which is founded on Principles of Liberty: And the latter, being afraid of the Prevalence of thoſe high Principles, adhere to that Par⯑ty, from whom they have Reaſon to expect Liberty and Toleration.

THE different Conduct of the two Parties, with regard to foreign Politics, is alſo a Proof to the ſame Purpoſe. Holland has always been moſt favour'd by one, and France by the other. In ſhort, the Proofs of this kind are ſo palpa⯑ble and evident, that one is almoſt aſham'd to collect them.

[134] A Tory is a Lover of Monarchy, though without abandoning Liberty; and a Partizan of the Family of STUART. A Whig is a Lover of Liberty, though without renouncing Monar⯑chy; and a Friend to the Settlement in the Pro⯑teſtant Line. Theſe different Views, with re⯑gard to the Settlement of the Crown, are ac⯑cidental, but natural Additions to the Princi⯑ples of the Court and Country Parties, which are the genuine Parties of the Britiſh Govern⯑ment. A paſſionate Lover of Monarchy is apt to be diſpleaſed at any Change of this Succeſ⯑ſion; as ſavouring too much of a Common⯑wealth: A paſſionate Lover of Liberty is apt to think that every Part of the Government ought to be ſubordinate to the Intereſts of Li⯑berty. 'Tis however remarkable, that though the Principles of Whig and Tory be both of them of a compound Nature; yet the Ingre⯑dients, which predominated in both, were not correſpondent to each other. A Tory loved Monarchy, and bore an Affection to the Fa⯑mily of Stuart; but the latter Affection was the predominant Inclination of the Party. A Whig loved Liberty, and was a Friend to the Settlement in the Poteſtant Line; but the Love of Liberty was profeſſedly his predominant In⯑clination. [135] The Tories have frequently acted as Republicans, where either Policy or Revenge has engag'd them to that Conduct; and there was none of that Party, who, upon the Suppoſi⯑tion, that they were to be diſappointed in their Views with regard to the Succeſſion, would not have deſired to impoſe the ſtricteſt Limi⯑tations on the Crown, and to bring our Form of Government as near Republican as poſſible, in order to depreſs the Family, that, accord⯑ing to their Apprehenſion, ſucceeded without any juſt Title. The Whigs, 'tis true, have al⯑ſo taken Steps dangerous to Liberty, under Pretext of ſecuring the Succeſſion and Settle⯑ment of the Crown, according to their Views: But as the Body of the Party had no Paſſion for that Succeſſion, otherwiſe than as the Means of ſecuring Liberty, they have been betray'd into theſe Steps by Ignorance or Frail⯑ty, or the Intereſt of their Leaders. The Suc⯑ceſſion of the Crown was, therefore, the chief Point with the Tories: The Security of our Liberties with the Whigs.

'Tis Difficult to penetrate into the Thoughts and Sentiments of any particular Man; but 'tis almoſt impoſſible to diſtinguiſh thoſe of a [136] whole Party, where it often happens, that no two Perſons agree preciſely in the ſame Way of thinking. Yet I will venture to affirm, that it was not ſo much PRINCIPLE, or an Opinion of indefeazible Right, that attach'd the Tories to the antient Royal Family, as AF⯑FECTION, or a certain Love and Eſteem for their Perſons. The ſame Cauſe divided Eng⯑land formerly betwixt the Houſes of York and Lancaſter, and Scotland, betwixt the Families of Bruce and Baliol; in an Age, when politi⯑cal Diſputes were but little in Faſhion, and when political Principles muſt of Courſe have had but little Influence on Mankind. The Doctrine of paſſive Obedience is ſo abſurd in itſelf, and ſo oppoſite to our Liberties, that it ſeems to have been chiefly left to Pulpit De⯑claimers, and to their deluded Followers a⯑mong the Mob. Men of better Senſe were guided by Affection; and as to the Leaders of this Party, it's probable, that Intereſt was their ſole Motive, and that they acted more contra⯑ry to their private Sentiments, than the Lea⯑ders of the oppoſite Party.

SOME, who will not venture to aſſert, that the real Difference betwixt Whig and Tory was [137] loſt at the Revolution, ſeem inclin'd to think, that the Difference is now aboliſh'd, and that Affairs are ſo far return'd to their natural State, that there are at preſent no other Par⯑ties amongſt us but Court and Country; that is, Men, who by Intereſt or Principle are at⯑tach'd either to Monarchy or to Liberty. It muſt, indeed, be confeſt, that the Tory Party has, of late, decay'd much in their Numbers; ſtill more in their Zeal; and I may venture to ſay, ſtill more in their Credit and Autho⯑rity. There is no Man of Knowledge or Learning, who wou'd not be aſham'd to be thought of that Party; and in almoſt all Com⯑panies the Name of OLD WHIG is mention'd as an unconteſtable Appellation of Honour and Dignity. Accordingly, the Enemies of the Miniſtry, as a Reproach, call the Courti⯑ers, the true Tories; and as an Honour, de⯑nominate the Gentlemen in the Oppoſition the true Whigs. The Tories have been ſo long o⯑blig'd to talk in the Republican Stile, that they ſeem to have made Converts of themſelves by their Hypocriſy, and to have embrac'd the Sentiments, as well as Language of their Ad⯑verſaries. There are, however, very conſi⯑derable Remains of that Party in England, [138] with all their old Prejudices; and a demon⯑ſtrative Proof, that Court and Country are not our only Parties, is, that almoſt all the Diſſenters ſide with the Court, and the lower Clergy, at leaſt, of the Church of England, with the Oppoſition.

ISHALL conclude this Subject with obſer⯑ving, that we never had any Tories in Scot⯑land, according to the proper Signification of the Word, and that the Diviſion of Parties in this Country was really into Whigs and Ja⯑cobites. A Jacobite ſeems to be a Tory, who has no Regard to the Conſtitution, but is ei⯑ther a zealous Partizan of abſolute Monarchy, or at leaſt willing to ſacrifice our Liberties to the obtaining the Succeſſion in that Family, to which he is attach'd. The Reaſon of the Difference betwixt England and Scotland I take to be this. Our political and our religi⯑ous Diviſions in this Country, have been, ſince the Revolution, regularly correſpondent to each other. The Presbyterians were all Whigs without Exception: The Epiſcopalians, of the oppoſite Party. And as the Clergy of the latter Sect were turn'd out of their Churches at the Revolution, they had no Mo⯑tive [139] to make any Compliances with the Go⯑vernment in their Oaths or Forms of Prayer, but openly avow'd the higheſt Principles of their Party; which is the Cauſe, why their Followers have been more bare-fac'd and vio⯑lent than their Brethren of the Tory Party in England. As violent Things have not com⯑monly ſo long a Duration as moderate, we actually find, that the Jacobite Party is almoſt entirely vaniſh'd from among us, and that the Diſtinction of Court and Country, which is but creeping in at London, is the only one that is ever mention'd in this Kingdom. Be⯑ſide the Violence and Openneſs of the Jaco⯑bite Party, another Reaſon has, perhaps, con⯑tributed to produce ſo ſudden and ſo viſible an Alteration in this Part of Britain. There are only two Ranks of Men among us; Gentlemen, who have ſome Fortune and Edu⯑cation, and the meaneſt ſlaving Poor; with⯑out any conſiderable Number of that middling Rank of Men, which abounds more in Eng⯑land, both in Cities and in the Country, than in any other Part of the World. The ſlaving Poor are incapable of any Principles: Gentle⯑men may be converted to true Principles, by Time and Experience: The middling Rank of [140] Men have Curioſity and Knowledge enough to form Principles, but not enough to form true Ones, or correct any Prejudices that they may have imbib'd: And 'tis among the middling Rank of People, that Tory Princi⯑ples do at preſent prevail moſt in England.

ESSAY XII. Of SUPERSTITION and EN⯑THUSIASM.

THAT the Corruption of the beſt Things produces the worſt, is grown into a Maxim, and is verify'd, among other Inſtances, by the pernicious Effects of Super⯑ſtition and Enthuſiaſm, the Corruptions of true Religion.

THESE two Species of falſe Religion, tho' both pernicious, yet are of a very different, and even of a contrary Nature. The Mind of Man is ſubject to certain unaccountable Ter⯑rors and Apprehenſions, proceeding either from the unhappy Situation of private or pu⯑blic Affairs, from ill Health, from a gloomy and melancholy Diſpoſition, or from the Con⯑currence of all theſe Circumſtances. In ſuch [142] a State of Mind, infinite unknown Evils are dreaded from unknown Agents; and where real Objects of Terror are wanting, the Soul, active to its own Prejudice, and foſtering its predominant Inclination, finds imaginary Ones, to whoſe Power and Malevolence it ſets no Limits. As theſe Enemies are inviſi⯑ble and unknown, the Methods taken to ap⯑peaſe them are as unaccountable, and conſiſt in Ceremonies, Obſervances, Mortifications, Sacrifices, Preſents, or in any Practice, how⯑ever abſurd and frivolous, which either Folly or Knavery recommends to a blind and terri⯑fy'd Credulity. Weakneſs, Fear, Melancholy, along with Ignorance, are, therefore, the true Sources of SUPERSTITION.

BUT the Mind of Man is alſo ſubject to an unaccountable Elevation and Preſumption, proceeding from proſperous Succeſs, from luxuriant Health, from ſtrong Spirits, and from a bold and confident Diſpoſition. In ſuch a State of Mind, the Imagination ſwells with great, but confus'd Conceptions, to which no ſublunary Beauties or Enjoyments can correſpond. Every Thing mortal and periſhable vaniſhes as unworthy of Attention. [143] And a full Range is given to the Fancy in the inviſible Regions or World of Spirits, where the Soul is at Liberty to indulge itſelf in every Imagination, that may beſt ſuit its preſent Taſte and Diſpoſition. Hence ariſe Raptures, Tranſports, and ſurprizing Flights of Fancy; and Confidence and Preſumption ſtill increa⯑ſing, theſe Raptures, being altogether unac⯑countable, and ſeeming quite beyond the Reach of our ordinary Faculties, are attribu⯑ted to the immediate Inſpiration of that Di⯑vine Being, who is the Object of Devotion. In a little Time, the inſpir'd Perſon comes to regard himſelf as the chief Favourite of the Divinity; and when this Frenzy once takes Place, which is the Summit of Enthuſiaſm, every Whimſy is conſecrated: Human Rea⯑ſon, and even Morality are rejected as falla⯑cious Guides: And the fanatic Madman deli⯑vers himſelf over, blindly and without Re⯑ſerve, to the ſuppos'd Illapſes of the Spirit, and to Inſpirations from above. Hope, Pride, Preſumption, warm Imagination along with Ignorance, are, therefore, the true Sources of ENTHUSIASM.

[144] THESE two Species of falſe Religion might afford Occaſion to many Speculations; but I ſhall confine my ſelf at preſent to a few Re⯑flections concerning their different Influence on Government and Society.

MY firſt Reflection is, that Religions, which partake of Enthuſiaſm are, on their firſt Riſe, much more furious and violent than theſe which partake of Superſtition; but in a little Time become much more gentle and moderate. The violence of this Species of Religion, when excited by Novelty, and animated by Oppoſi⯑tion, appears from numberleſs Inſtances; of the Anabaptiſts in Germany, the Camiſars in France, the Levellers and other Fanatics in England, and the Covenanters in Scotland. As Enthuſiaſm is founded on ſtrong Spirits, and a preſumptuous Boldneſs of Character, it naturally begets the moſt extreme Reſolutions; eſpecially after it riſes to that Height as to in⯑ſpire the deluded Fanatics with the Opinion of Divine Illuminations, and with a Contempt of the common Rules of Reaſon, Morality and Prudence.

[145] 'TIS thus Enthuſiaſm produces the moſt cruel Deſolation in human Society: But its Fury is like that of Thunder and Tempeſt, which ex⯑hauſt themſelves in a little Time, and leave the Air more calm and ſerene than before. The Reaſon of this will appear evidently by comparing Enthuſiaſm to Superſtition, the o⯑ther Species of falſe Religion; and tracing the natural Conſequences of each. As Superſti⯑tion is founded on Fear, Sorrow, and a Depreſ⯑ſion of Spirits, it repreſents the Perſon to him⯑ſelf in ſuch deſpicable Colours, that he appears unworthy in his own Eyes of approaching the Divine Preſence, and naturally has Recourſe to any other Perſon, whoſe Sanctity of Life, or, perhaps, Impudence and Cunning, have made him be ſuppoſed to be more favoured by the Divinity. To him they entruſt their Devotions: To his Care they recommend their Prayers, Petitions, and Sacrifices: And by his Means hope to render their Addreſſes accep⯑table to their incenſed Deity. Hence the O⯑rigin of ^*PRIESTS, who may juſtly be regarded [146] as proceeding from one of the groſſeſt Inven⯑tions of a timorous and abject Superſtition, which, ever diffident of itſelf, dares not offer up its own Devotions, but ignorantly thinks to recommend itſelf to the Divinity by the Medi⯑ation of his ſuppoſed Friends and Servants. As Superſtition is a conſiderable Ingredient of almoſt all Religions, even the moſt fanatical; there being nothing but Philoſophy able to conquer entirely theſe unaccountable Terrors; hence it proceeds, that in almoſt every Sect of Religion there are Prieſts to be found: But the ſtronger Mixture there is of Superſtition, the higher is the Authority of the Prieſthood. Modern Judaiſm and Popery, eſpecially the latter, being the moſt barbarous and abſurd Superſtitions, that have yet been known in the World, are the moſt enſlav'd by their Prieſts. As the Church of England has a ſtrong Mix⯑ture of Popiſh Superſtition, it partakes alſo, in its original Conſtitution, of a Propenſity to Prieſtly Power and Dominion; particularly in [147] the Reſpect it exacts to the Prieſt. And tho', according to the Sentiments of that Church, the Prayers of the Prieſt muſt be accompanied with thoſe of the Laity; yet is he the Mouth of the Congregation, his Perſon is ſacred, and without his Preſence few wou'd think their public Devotions, or the Sacraments and o⯑ther Rites, acceptable to the Divinity.

ON the other hand, it may be obſerved, that all Enthuſiaſts have been free from the Yoke of Eccleſiaſtics, and have expreſt a great Independence in their Devotion; with a Con⯑tempt of Forms, Traditions and Authorities. The Quakers are the moſt egregious, tho' at the ſame Time the moſt innocent, Enthuſiaſts that have been yet known; and are, perhaps, the only Sect, that have never admitted Prieſts amongſt them: The Independents, of all the Engliſh Sectaries, approach neareſt to the Qua⯑kers in Fanaticiſm, and in their Freedom from Prieſtly Bondage. The Presbyterians follow after, at an equal Diſtance in both theſe Parti⯑culars. In ſhort, this Obſervation is founded on the moſt certain Experience; and will alſo appear to be founded on Reaſon, if we conſi⯑der that as Enthuſiaſm ariſes from a preſump⯑tuous [148] Pride and Confidence, it thinks itſelf ſufficiently qualified to approach the Divinity, without any human Mediator. Its rapturous Devotions are ſo ſervent, that it even ima⯑gines itſelf actually to approach him, by the Way of Contemplation and inward Converſe; which makes it neglect all thoſe outward Ce⯑remonies and Obſervances, to which the Aſ⯑ſiſtance of the Prieſt appears ſo requiſite in the Eyes of their ſuperſtitious Votaries. The Fanatic conſecrates himſelf, and beſtows on his own Perſon a ſacred Character, much ſu⯑perior to what Forms and Ceremonious Inſti⯑tions can confer on any other.

'TIS therefore an infallible Rule, that Su⯑perſtition is favourable to Prieſtly Power, and Enthuſiaſm as much, or rather more, contrary to it than ſound Reaſon and Philoſophy. The Conſequences are evident. When the firſt Fire of Enthuſiaſm is ſpent, Men naturally, in ſuch fanatical Sects, ſink into the greateſt Remiſsneſs and Coolneſs in Sacred Matters; there being no Body of Men amongſt them, endow'd with ſufficient Authority, whoſe In⯑tereſt is concern'd to ſupport the religious Spirit. Superſtition, on the contrary, ſteals [149] in gradually and inſenſibly; renders Men tame and ſubmiſſive; is acceptable to the Magi⯑ſtrate, and ſeems inoffenſive to the People: Till at laſt the Prieſt, having firmly eſtabliſh'd his Authority, becomes the Tyrant and Di⯑ſturber of human Society, by his endleſs Con⯑tentions, Perſecutions, and religious Wars. How ſmoothly did the Romiſh Church ad⯑vance in their Acquiſition of Power? But in⯑to what diſmal Convulſions did they throw all Europe, in order to maintain it? On the other Hand, our Sectaries, who were former⯑ly ſuch dangerous Bigots, are now become our greateſt Free-thinkers; and the Quakers are, perhaps, the only regular Body of Deiſts in the Univerſe, except the Literati or Diſci⯑ples of Confucius in China.

MY ſecond Obſervation, with regard to theſe Species of falſe Religion, is, That Su⯑perſtition is an Enemy to Civil Liberty, and Enthuſiaſm a Friend to it. As Superſtition groans under the Dominion of the Prieſts, and Enthuſiaſm is an Enemy to all Eccleſiaſti⯑cal Power, this ſufficiently accounts for the preſent Obſervation. Not to mention, that Enthuſiaſm, being the Infirmity of bold and [150] ambitious Tempers, is naturally accompanied with a Spirit of Liberty; as Superſtition, on the contrary, renders Men tame and abject, and fits them for Slavery. We learn from the Engliſh Hiſtory, that, during the Civil Wars, the Independents and Deiſts, tho' the moſt op⯑poſite in their religious Principles; yet were united in their political Ones, and were alike paſſionate for a Commonwealth. And ſince the Origin of Whig and Tory, the Leaders of the VVhigs have either been Deiſts or profeſt Latudinarians in their Principles; that is, Friends to Toleration, and indifferent to any particular Sect of Chriſtians: While the Sec⯑taries, who have all a ſtrong Tincture of En⯑thuſiaſm, have always, without Exception, concurr'd with that Party, in the Defence of Civil Liberty. The Reſemblance in their Su⯑perſtitions long united the High-Church Tories and the Roman Catholics, in the Support of Prerogative and Kingly Power; tho' Experi⯑ence of the tolerating Spirit of the VVhigs ſeems of late to have reconcil'd the Catholics to that Party.

THE Moliniſts and Janſeniſts in France have a Thouſand unintelligible Diſputes, which are [151] not worthy the Attention of a Man of Senſe: But what principally diſtinguiſhes theſe two Sects, and alone merits our Attention, is the different Spirit of their Religion. The Moli⯑niſts, conducted by the Jeſuites, are great Friends to Superſtition, rigid Obſervers of external Forms and Ceremonies, and devoted to the Authority of the Prieſts, and to Tradi⯑tion. The Janſeniſts are Enthuſiaſts, and zea⯑lous Promoters of the paſſionate Devotion, and of the inward Life; little influenc'd by Authority; and in a Word, but Half Catho⯑lics. The Conſequences are exactly conform⯑able to the foregoing Reaſoning. The Jeſu⯑ites are the Tyrants and the Slaves of the Court: And the Janſeniſts preſerve alive the ſmall Sparks of the Love of Liberty, which are to be found in the French Nation.

ESSAY XIII. Of AVARICE.

'TIS eaſy to obſerve, That Comic Wri⯑ters exaggerate every Character, and draw their Fop or Coward, with ſtronger Features than are a⯑ny where to be met with in Nature. This moral kind of Painting for the Stage has been often compar'd to the Painting for Cupolas and Ceilings, where the Colours are over⯑charg'd, and every Part is drawn exceſſively large, and beyond Nature. The Figures ſeem monſtrous and diſproportion'd, when ſeen too nigh; but become natural and regular, when ſet at a Diſtance, and placed in that Point of View, in which they are intended to be ſur⯑vey'd. After the ſame manner, when Cha⯑racters are exhibited in theatrical Repreſenta⯑tions, the Want of Reality ſets the Perſonages at a Diſtance from us; and rendering them [154] more cold and unentertaining, makes it ne⯑ceſſary to compenſate, by the Force of Colour⯑ing, what they want in Subſtance. Thus, we find in common Life, That when a Man once allows himſelf to depart from Truth in his Narrations, he never can keep within the Bounds of Probability; but adds ſtill ſome new Circumſtance to render his Stories more marvellous, and ſatisfy his Imagination. Two Men in Buckram Suits became eleven to Sir John Falſtaff before the End of his Story.

THERE is only one Vice, which may be found in Life with as ſtrong Features, and as high a Colouring, as need be employ'd by a⯑ny Satyriſt or Comic Poet; and that is AVA⯑RICE. Every Day we meet with Men of im⯑menſe Fortunes, without Heirs, and on the very Brink of the Grave, who refuſe them⯑ſelves the moſt common Neceſſaries of Life, and go on heaping Poſſeſſions on Poſſeſſions, under all the real Preſſures of the ſevereſt Po⯑verty. An old Uſurer, ſays the Story, lying in his laſt Agonies, was preſented by the Prieſt with the Crucifix to worſhip. He o⯑pens his Eyes a Moment before he expires, conſiders the Crucifix, and cries, Theſe Jewels [155] are not true; I can only lend ten Piſtoles upon ſuch a Pledge. This was probably the Inven⯑tion of ſome Epigrammatiſt; and yet every one, from his own Experience, may be able to recollect almoſt as ſtrong Inſtances of Per⯑ſeverance in Avarice. 'Tis commonly repor⯑ted of a famous Miſer in this City, that find⯑ing himſelf near Death, he ſent for ſome of the Magiſtrates, and gave them a Bill of an hundred Pounds, payable after his Deceaſe; which Sum he intended ſhould be diſpoſed of in charitable Uſes; but ſcarce were they gone, when he orders them to be called back, and offers them ready Money, if they would abate five Pounds of the Sum. Another noted Mi⯑ſer in the North, intending to defraud his Heirs, and leave his Fortune to the Building an Hoſpital, protracted the drawing of his Will from Day to Day; and 'tis thought, that if thoſe intereſted in it had not paid for the Drawing of it, he would have died in⯑teſtate. In ſhort, none of the moſt furious Exceſſes of Love and Ambition are in any re⯑ſpect to be compared to the Extremes of A⯑varice.

[156] THE beſt Excuſe that can be made for A⯑varice is, That it generally prevails in old Men, or in Men of cold Tempers, where all the other Affections are extinct; and the Mind being incapable of remaining without ſome Paſſion or Purſuit, at laſt finds out this mon⯑ſtrous unreaſonable one, which ſuits the Cold⯑neſs and Inactivity of its Temper. At the ſame Time, it ſeems very extraordinary, that ſo froſty ſpiritleſs a Paſſion ſhou'd be able to car⯑ry us farther than all the Warmth of Youth and Pleaſure. But if we look more narrowly into the Matter, we ſhall find, that this very Circumſtance renders the Explication of the Caſe more eaſy. When the Temper is warm, and full of Vigour, it naturally ſhoots out more Ways than one, and produces inferior Paſſions to counter-balance, in ſome Degree, its predominant Inclination. 'Tis impoſſible for a Perſon of that Temper, however bent on any Purſuit, to be depriv'd of all Senſe of Shame, or Regard to the Sentiments of Man⯑kind. His Friends muſt have ſome Influence over him: And other Conſiderations are apt to have their Weight. All this ſerves to re⯑ſtrain him within ſome Bounds. But 'tis no Wonder the avaritious Man being, from the [157] Coldneſs of his Temper, without regard to Reputation, to Friendſhip, or to Pleaſure, ſhou'd be carried ſo far by his prevailing In⯑clination, and ſhou'd diſplay his Paſſion in ſuch ſurprizing Inſtances.

ACCORDINGLY we find no Vice ſo irre⯑claimable as Avarice: And tho' there ſcarcely has been a Moraliſt or Philoſopher, from the Beginning of the World to this Day, who has not levell'd a Stroke at it, we hardly find a ſingle Inſtance of any Perſon's being cur'd of it. For this Reaſon, I am more apt to ap⯑prove of thoſe, who attack it with Wit and Humour, than of thoſe who treat it in a ſe⯑rious Manner. There being ſo little Hopes of doing Good to the People infected with this Vice, I would have the reſt of Mankind, at leaſt, diverted by our Manner of expoſing it: As indeed there is no Kind of Diverſion, of which they ſeem ſo willing to partake.

AMONG the Fables of Monſieur de la Motte, there is one levell'd againſt Avarice, which ſeems to me more natural and eaſy, than moſt of the Fables of that ingenious Author. A Miſer, ſays he, being dead, and fairly inter⯑red, [158] came to the Banks of the Styx, deſiring to be ferry'd over along with the other Ghoſts. Charon demands his Fare, and is ſurpriz'd to ſee the Miſer, rather than pay it, throw him⯑ſelf into the River, and ſwim over to the o⯑ther Side, notwithſtanding all the Clamour and Oppoſition that cou'd be made to him. All Hell was in an Uproar; and each of the Judges was meditating ſome Puniſhment, ſui⯑table to a Crime of ſuch dangerous Conſe⯑quence to the infernal Revenues. Shall he be chain'd to the Rock along with Prometheus? Or tremble below the Precipice in Company with the Danaïdes? Oraſſiſt Siſyphus in rolling his Stone? No, ſays Minos, None of theſe. We muſt invent ſome ſeverer Puniſhment. Let him be ſent back to the Earth, to ſee the Uſe his Heirs are making of his Riches.

I HOPE it will not be interpreted as a De⯑ſign of ſetting myſelf in Oppoſition to this fa⯑mous Author, if I proceed to deliver a Fable of my own, which is intended to expoſe the ſame Vice of Avarice. The Hint of it was taken from theſe Lines of Mr. Pope,

[159] OUR old Mother EARTH once laid an Indictment againſt AVARICE before the Courts of Heaven, for her wicked and malicious Counſel and Advice, in tempting, inducing, perſwading, and traiterouſly ſeducing the Chil⯑dren of the Plaintiff to commit the deteſtable Crime of Parricide upon her, and mangling her Body, in ranſacking her very Bowels for hid⯑den Treaſure. The Indictment was very long and verboſe; but we muſt omit a great Part of the Repetitions and Synonimous Terms. Not to tire our Reader too much with our Tale; Avarice, being call'd before Jupiter, to anſwer to this Charge, had not much to ſay in her own Defence. The Injury was clearly prov'd upon her. The Fact, indeed, was notorious, and the Injury had been fre⯑quently repeated. When therefore the Plain⯑tiff demanded Juſtice, Jupiter very readily gave Sentence in her Favour; and his Decree was to this Purpoſe, That ſince Dame Ava⯑rice, the Defendant, had thus grievouſly in⯑jur'd Dame Earth, the Plaintiff, ſhe was here⯑by order'd to take that Treaſure, of which ſhe had feloniouſly robb'd the ſaid Plaintiff, by ranſacking her Boſom, and in the ſame Manner, as before, opening her Boſom, re⯑ſtore [160] it back to her, without Diminution or Retention. From this Sentence, it ſhall fol⯑low, ſays Jupiter to the By-ſtanders, That in all future Ages, the Retainers of Avarice ſhall bury and conceal their Riches, and thereby reſtore to the Earth what they took from her.

ESSAY XIV. Of the DIGNITY of HUMAN NATURE.

THERE are certain Sects, which ſe⯑cretly form themſelves in the lear⯑ned World, as well as in the poli⯑tical; and tho' ſometimes they come not to an open Rupture, yet they give a different Turn to the Ways of thinking of thoſe who have taken Party on either Side. The moſt remark⯑able of this Kind are the Sects, that are found⯑ed on the different Sentiments, with regard to the Dignity of human Nature; which is a Point, that ſeems to have divided Philoſophers and Poets, as well as Divines, from the Be⯑ginning of the World to this Day. Some ex⯑alt our Species to the Skies, and repreſent Man as a Kind of human Demi-God, that de⯑rives his Origin from Heaven, and retains e⯑vident [162] Marks of his Lineage and Deſcent. O⯑thers inſiſt upon the blind Sides of human Na⯑ture, and can diſcover nothing, except Vani⯑ty, in which Man ſurpaſſes the other Animals, whom he affects ſo much to deſpiſe. If an Author poſſeſſes the Talent of Rhetoric, and Declamation, he commonly takes Party with the former: If his Turn lies towards Irony and Ridicule, he naturally throws himſelf into the other Extreme.

I AM far from thinking, that all thoſe, who have depreciated Human Nature, have been Enemies to Virtue, and have expoſed the Frail⯑ties of their Fellow-Creatures with any bad Intention. On the contrary, I am ſenſible, that a very delicate Senſe of Virtue, eſpecially when attended with ſomewhat of the Miſan⯑thrope, is apt to give a Man a Diſguſt of the World, and to make him conſider the com⯑mon Courſe of Human Affairs with too much Spleen and Indignation. I muſt, however, be of Opinion, that the Sentiments of thoſe, who are inclined to think favourably of Man⯑kind, are much more advantageous to Virtue, than the contrary Principles, which give us a mean Opinion of our Nature. When a Man [163] is poſſeſs'd of a high Notion of his Rank and Character in the Creation, he will naturally endeavour to act up to it, and will ſcorn to do a baſe or vicious Action, which might ſink him below that Figure, which he makes in his own Imagination. Accordingly we find, That all our polite and faſhionable Moraliſts in⯑ſiſt upon this Topic, and endeavour to repre⯑ſent Vice as unworthy of Man, as well as o⯑dious in itſelf.

WOMEN are generally much more flatter'd in their Youth than Men; which may proceed from this Reaſon, among others, that their chief Point of Honour is conſider'd as much more difficult than ours, and requires to be ſupported by all that decent Pride, which can be inſtill'd into them.

WE find very few Diſputes, that are not founded on ſome Ambiguity in the Expreſſion; and I am perſwaded, that the preſent Diſpute concerning the Dignity of Human Nature is not more exempt from it than any other. It may, therefore, be worth while to conſider, what is real, and what is only verbal, in this Controverſy.

[164] THAT there is a natural Difference betwixt Merit and Demerit, Virtue and Vice, Wiſdom and Folly, no reaſonable Man will deny: But yet 'tis evident, that in affirming the Term, which denotes either our Approbation or Blame, we are commonly more influenced by Compariſon than by any fixt unalterable Stan⯑dard in the Nature of Things. In like man⯑ner, Quantity, and Extenſion, and Bulk, are by every one acknowledg'd to be real Things: But when we call any Animal great or little, we always form a ſecret Compariſon betwixt that Animal and others of the ſame Species; and 'tis that Compariſon which regulates our Judgment concerning its Greatneſs. A Dog and a Horſe may be of the very ſame Size, while the one is admir'd for the Greatneſs of its Bulk, and the other for the Smallneſs. When I am preſent, therefore, at any Diſpute, I al⯑ways conſider with myſelf, whether or not it be a Queſtion merely of Compariſon, that is the Subject of the Diſpute; and if it be, whether the Diſputants compare the ſame Objects toge⯑ther, or talk of Things, that are widely diffe⯑rent. As this is commonly the Caſe, I have long ſince learnt to neglect ſuch Diſputes as [165] manifeſt Abuſes of Leiſure, the moſt valuable Preſent that cou'd be made to Mortals.

IN forming our Notions of Human Nature, we are very apt to make a Compariſon be⯑twixt Men and Animals, which are the only Creatures endowed with Thought that fall under our Senſes. Certainly this Compariſon is very favourable to Mankind. On the one hand we ſee a Creature, whoſe Thoughts are not limited by any narrow Bounds either of Place or Time; who carries his Reſearches into the moſt diſtant Regions of this Globe, and be⯑yond this Globe, to the Planets and Heavenly Bodies; looks backward to conſider the firſt O⯑rigin of Human Race; caſts his Eyes forward to ſee the Influence of his Actions upon Poſterity, and the Judgments, that will be form'd of his Character a thouſand Years hence. A Crea⯑ture, that traces Cauſes and Effects to a great Length and Intricacy; extracts general Prin⯑ciples from particular Appearances; improves upon his Diſcoveries; corrects his Miſtakes; and makes his very Errors profitable. On the other hand, we are preſented with a Creature the very reverſe of this; limited in its Obſer⯑vations and Reaſonings to a few ſenſible Ob⯑jects [166] that ſurround it; without Curioſity, without Foreſight; blindly conducted by In⯑ſtinct, and arriving in a very ſhort Time at its utmoſt Perfection, beyond which it is never able to advance a ſingle Step. What a wide Difference is there betwixt theſe Creatures! And how exalted a Notion muſt we entertain of the former, in Compariſon of the latter!

THERE are two Means commonly employ'd to deſtroy this Concluſion: Firſt, By making an unfair Repreſentation of the Caſe, and in⯑ſiſting only upon the Weakneſſes of Human Nature. And ſecondly, By forming a new and ſecret Compariſon betwixt Man and Beings of the moſt perfect Wiſdom. Among the other Excellencies of Man, there is this remarkable, that he can form a Notion of Perfections much beyond what he has Experience of in himſelf; and is not limited in his Conception of Wiſ⯑dom and Virtue. He can eaſily exalt his No⯑tions, and conceive a Degree of Wiſdom, which, when compar'd to his own, will make the latter appear very contemptible, and will cauſe the Difference betwixt that and the Sa⯑gacity of Animals, in a manner, to diſappear and vaniſh. Now this being a Point, in which [167] all the World is agreed, that Human Under⯑ſtanding falls infinitely ſhort of perfect Wiſ⯑dom, 'tis proper we ſhould know when this Compariſon takes Place, that we may not diſ⯑pute where there is no real Difference in our Sentiments. Man falls much more ſhort of perfect Wiſdom, and even of his own Ideas of perfect Wiſdom, than Animals do of Man; but yet the latter Difference is ſo conſide⯑rable, that nothing but a Compariſon with the former, can make it appear of little Mo⯑ment.

'TIS alſo very uſual to compare one Man with another; and finding very few, that we can call wiſe or virtuous, we are apt to enter⯑tain a contemptible Notion of our Species in general. That we may be ſenſible of the Fal⯑lacy of this Way of Reaſoning, we may ob⯑ſerve, that the Honourable Appellations of wiſe and virtuous, are not annex'd to any par⯑ticular Degree of thoſe Qualities of Wiſdom and Virtue; but ariſe altogether from the Compariſon we make betwixt one Man and another. When we find a Man, who arrives at ſuch a Pitch of Wiſdom as is very uncom⯑mon, we pronounce him a wiſe Man: So that [168] to ſay, there are few wiſe Men in the World, is really to ſay nothing; ſince 'tis only by their Scarcity that they merit that Appellati⯑on. Were the loweſt of our Species as wiſe as Tully, or my Lord Bacon, we ſhould ſtill have Reaſon to ſay, that there are few wiſe Men. For in that Caſe we ſhould exalt our Notions of Wiſdom, and wou'd not pay a ſingular Honour to any one, that was not ſin⯑gularly diſtinguiſh'd by his Talents. In like Manner, I have heard it obſerv'd by thought⯑leſs People, that there are few Women poſ⯑ſeſt of Beauty, in Compariſon of thoſe who want it; not conſidering, that we beſtow the Epithet of Beautiful only on ſuch as poſſeſs a Degree of Beauty, that is common to them with a few. The ſame Degree of Beauty in a Woman is call'd Deformity, which is trea⯑ted as real Beauty in one of our Sex.

AS 'tis uſual, in forming a Notion of our Species, to compare it with the other Species above or below it, or to compare the Indivi⯑duals of the Species among themſelves; ſo we often compare together the different Motives or actuating Principles of Human Nature, in order to regulate our Judgment concerning [169] it. And indeed, this is the only Kind of Compariſon, that is worth our Attention, or decides any Thing in the preſent Queſtion. Were the ſelfiſh and vicious Principles of Hu⯑man Nature ſo much predominant above the Social and Virtuous, as is aſſerted by ſome Philoſophers, we ought undoubtedly to enter⯑tain a contemptible Notion of Human Na⯑ture. I may, perhaps, treat more fully of this Subject in ſome future Speculation. In the mean Time, I ſhall obſerve, what has been prov'd beyond Queſtion by ſeveral great Moraliſts of the preſent Age, that the ſocial Paſſions are by far the moſt powerful of any, and that even all the other Paſſions receive their Force and Influence from them. Who⯑ever deſires to ſee this Queſtion treated at large, with the greateſt Force of Argument and Eloquence, may conſult my Lord Shafts⯑bury's Enquiry concerning Virtue.

IN my Opinion, there are two Things, which have led aſtray thoſe Philoſophers, that have inſiſted ſo much on the Selfiſhneſs of Man. In the Firſt Place, they found, that e⯑very Act of Virtue or Friendſhip was attended with a ſecret Pleaſure: From whence they [170] concluded, that Friendſhip and Virtue could not be diſintereſted. But the Fallacy of this is obvious. The virtuous Sentiment or Paſ⯑ſion produces the Pleaſure, and does not ariſe from it. I feel a Pleaſure in doing good to my Friend, becauſe I love him; but do not love him for the ſake of that Pleaſure.

IN the ſecond Place, it has always been found, that virtuous Men are far from being indiffe⯑rent to Praiſe; and therefore they have been repreſented as a Set of vain-glorious Men, that had nothing in View but the Applauſes of o⯑thers. But this alſo is a Fallacy. 'Tis very unjuſt in the World, when they find any Tincture of Vanity in a laudable Action, to depreciate it upon that Account, or aſcribe it entirely to that Motive. The Caſe is not the ſame with Vanity, as with other Paſſions. Where Avarice or Revenge enters into any ſeemingly virtuous Action, 'tis difficult for us to determine how far it enters, and 'tis natu⯑ral to ſuppoſe it the ſole actuating Principle. But Vanity is ſo nearly ally'd to Virtue, and to love the Fame of virtuous Actions approaches ſo near the Love of virtuous Actions for their own ſake, that theſe Paſſions are more capa⯑ble [171] of Mixture, than any other kinds of Paſ⯑ſion; and 'tis almoſt impoſſible to have the latter without ſome Degree of the former. Accordingly we find, that this Paſſion for Glory is always warp'd and varied according to the particular Taſte or Sentiment of the Mind on which it falls. Nero had the ſame Vanity in driving a Chariot, that Trajan had in governing the Empire with Juſtice and A⯑bility. To love the Glory of virtuous Acti⯑ons is a ſure Proof of the Love of virtuous Actions.

ESSAY XV. Of LIBERTY and DESPOTISM.

THOSE who employ their Pens on political Subjects, free from Party-Rage, and Party-Prejudices, culti⯑vate a Science, which, of all others, contri⯑butes moſt both to public Utility, and to the private Satisfaction of thoſe who addict them⯑ſelves to the Study of it. I am apt, however, to entertain a Suſpicion, that the World is ſtill too young to fix any general ſtable Truths in Politics, which will remain true to the lateſt Poſterity. We have not as yet had Experi⯑ence of above three thouſand Years; ſo that not only the Art of Reaſoning is ſtill defective in this Science, as well as in all others, but we even want ſufficient Materials, upon which we can reaſon. 'Tis not ſufficiently known, what Degrees of Refinement, either in Virtue [174] or Vice, human Nature is ſuſceptible of; nor what may be expected of Mankind from any great Revolution in their Education, Cuſtoms, or Principles. Machiavel was certainly a great Genius; but having confin'd his Study to the furious Tyranny of antient Sovereigns, or the little diſorderly Principalities of Ita⯑ly, his Reaſonings, eſpecially upon Monar⯑chical Government, have been found ex⯑tremely defective; and there ſcarce is any Maxim in his Prince, which ſubſequent Expe⯑rience has not entirely refuted. A weak So⯑vereign, ſays he, is incapable of receiving good Counſel; for if he conſult with ſeveral, he will not be able to chooſe among their different Coun⯑ſels. If he abandon himſelf to one, that Mi⯑niſter may, perhaps, have Capacity; but he will not be long a Miniſter: He will be ſure to diſpoſſeſs his Maſter, and place himſelf and his own Family upon the Throne. I mention this, among innumerable Inſtances, of the Er⯑rors of that Politician, proceeding from his having liv'd in too early an Age of the World, to be a good Judge of political Truth. Al⯑moſt all the Princes of Europe are at preſent go⯑verned by their Miniſters, and have been ſo for near two Centuries; and yet no ſuch Event [175] has ever happen'd, or can poſſibly happen. Sejanus might project the dethroning the Cae⯑ſars; but Fleury, though ever ſo vicious, could not, while in his Senſes, entertain the leaſt Hopes of diſpoſſeſſing the Bourbons.

TRADE was never eſteem'd an Affair of State, 'till within this laſt Century; nor is there any antient Writer on Politics, who has made mention of it. Even the Italians have kept a profound Silence with regard to it; though it has now excited the chief Attention, as well of Miniſters of State, as of ſpecula⯑tive Reaſoners. The great Opulence, Gran⯑deur, and military Archievements of the two Maritime Powers, ſeem firſt to have inſtructed Mankind in the vaſt Importance of an exten⯑ſive Commerce.

HAVING, therefore, intended in this Eſſay to have made a full Compariſon of Liberty and Deſpotiſm, and have ſhown the Advantages and Diſadvantages of each, I began to entertain a Suſpicion, that no Man in this Age was ſuffi⯑ciently qualified for ſuch an Undertaking, and that whatever he ſhould advance on that Head would, in all Probability, be refuted by fur⯑ther [176] Experience, and be rejected by Poſterity. Such mighty Revolutions have happened in human Affairs, and ſo many Events have ariſen contrary to the Expectation of the antients, as are ſufficient to beget the Suſpicion of ſtill far⯑ther Changes.

IT had been obſerv'd by the Antients, that all the Arts and Sciences aroſe among free Na⯑tions, and that the Perſians and Egyptians, notwithſtanding all their Eaſe, Opulence and Luxury, made but faint Efforts towards a Re⯑liſh in thoſe finer Pleaſures, which were car⯑ried to ſuch Perfection by the Greeks, amidſt continual Wars, attended with Poverty, and the greateſt Simplicity of Life and Manners. It had alſo been obſerv'd, that as ſoon as the Greeks loſt their Liberty, tho' they encreaſed mightily in Riches, by Means of the Con⯑queſts of Alexander; yet the Arts, from that Moment, declin'd among them, and have ne⯑ver ſince been able to raiſe their Head in that Climate. Learning was tranſplanted to Rome, the only free Nation at that Time in the Uni⯑verſe; and having met with ſo favourable a Soil, it made prodigious Shoots for above a Century; till the Decay of Liberty produced [177] alſo the Decay of Letters, and ſpread a total Barbarity over the World. From theſe two Experiments, of which each was double in its Kind, and ſhow'd the Fall of Learning in De⯑ſpotic Governments, as well as its Riſe in po⯑pular Ones, Longinus thought himſelf ſuffici⯑ently juſtified, in aſſerting, That the Arts and Sciences could never flouriſh, but in a free Government: And in this Opinion, he has been followed by ſeveral eminent Writers^* in our own Country, who either confin'd their View merely to antient Facts, or enter⯑tain'd too great a Partiality in Favour of that Form of Government, which is eſtabliſh'd a⯑mongſt us.

BUT what would theſe Writers have ſaid, to the Inſtance of modern Rome and Florence; of which the former carried to Perfection all the finer Arts of Sculpture, Painting and Mu⯑ſic, as well as Poetry, tho' they groah'd un⯑der Slavery, and under the Slavery of Prieſts: While the latter never made any Efforts to⯑wards the Arts and Sciences, till they began to loſe their Liberty by the Uſurpations of the [178] Family of the Medicis? Arioſto, Taſſo, Gali⯑laeo, no more than Raphael, or Michael Angelo, were not born in Republics. And tho' the Lombard School was famous as well as the Roman, yet the Venetians have had the ſmal⯑leſt Share in its Honours, and ſeem rather inferior to the other Italians, in their Genius for the Sciences. Rubens eſtabliſh'd his School at Antwerp, not at Amſterdam. Dreſden, not Hamburg, is the Centre of Politeneſs in Germany.

BUT the moſt eminent Inſtance of the flou⯑riſhing of Learning in deſpotic Governments, is that of FRANCE, which never enjoy'd any Shadow of Liberty, and yet has carried the Arts and Sciences nearer Perfection than any other Nationa of the Univerſe. The Engliſh are, perhaps, better Philoſophers; the Itali⯑ans better Painters and Muſicians; the Romans were better Orators: But the French are the only People, except the Greeks, who have been at once Philoſophers, Poets, Orators, Hiſtorians, Painters, Architects, Sculptors and Muſicians. With regard to the Stage, they have far excell'd the Greeks: And in com⯑mon Life, have, in a great Meaſure, perfec⯑ted [179] that Art, the moſt uſeful and agreeable of any, l'Art de Vivre, the Art of Society and Converſation.

IF we conſider the State of the Sciences and polite Arts in our own Country, Horace's Obſervation, with regard to the Romans, may, in a great Meaſure, be applied to the Britiſh.

THE Elegance and Propriety of Stile have been very much neglected among us. We have no Dictionary of our Language, and ſcarce a tolerable Grammar. The firſt polite Proſe we have, was wrote by a Man^* who is ſtill alive. As to Sprat, Temple and Locke, they knew too little of the Rules of Art to be eſteem'd elegant Writers. The Proſe of Bacon, Harrington and Milton, is altogether ſtiff and pedantic; tho' their Senſe be excel⯑lent. Men, in this Country, have been ſo much occupied in the Grand Diſputes of Reli⯑gion, Politics and Philoſophy, that they had [180] no Reliſh for the minute Obſervations of Grammar and Criticiſm. And tho' this Turn of Thinking muſt have conſiderably improv'd our Senſe and Talent of Reaſoning beyond that of other Nations; yet it muſt be confeſt, that even in theſe Sciences, we have not any Standard-Book, which we can tranſmit to Po⯑ſterity: And the utmoſt we have to boaſt of, are a few faint Efforts towards a more juſt Philoſophy; which, indeed, promiſe very much, but have not, as yet, reach'd any De⯑gree of Perfection.

IT has become an eſtabliſh'd Opinion, That Commerce can never flouriſh but in a free Go⯑vernment; and this Opinion ſeems to have been founded on a longer and larger Experi⯑ence than the foregoing, with Regard to the Arts and Sciences. If we trace Commerce in its Progreſs thro' Tyre, Athens, Syracuſe, Carthage, Venice, Florence, Genoa, Antwerp, Holland, England, &c. we ſhall always find it to have fixt its Seat in free Governments. The three greateſt trading Towns now in the World, are London, Amſterdam, and Ham⯑burgh; all free Cities, and Proteſtant Cities; that is, enjoying a double Liberty. It muſt, [181] however, be obſerv'd, that the great Jealouſy entertain'd of late, with regard to the Com⯑merce of France, ſeems to prove, that this Maxim is no more certain and infallible, than the foregoing, and that the Subjects of abſo⯑lute Princes may become our Rivals in Com⯑merce, as well as in Learning.

DURST I deliver my Opinion in an Affair of ſo much Uncertainty, I would aſſert, That, notwithſtanding the Efforts of the French, there is ſomething pernicious to Commerce inherent in the very Nature of abſolute Go⯑vernment, and inſeparable from it: Tho' the Reaſon I would aſſign for this Opinion, is ſomewhat different from that which is com⯑monly inſiſted on. Private Property ſeems to me fully as ſecure in a civiliz'd Europaean Monarchy, as in a Republic; nor is any Dan⯑ger ever apprehended, in ſuch a Government, from the Violence of the Sovereign; no more than we commonly apprehend Danger from Thunder, or Earthquakes, or any Accident the moſt unuſual and extraordinary. Ava⯑rice, the Spur of Induſtry, is ſo obſtinate a Paſſion, and works its Way thro' ſo many real Dangers and Difficulties, that 'tis not like⯑ly [182] it will be ſcarr'd by an imaginary Danger, which is ſo ſmall, that it ſcarce admits of Cal⯑culation. Commerce, therefore, in my Opi⯑nion, is apt to decay in abſolute Govern⯑ments, not becauſe it is there leſs ſecure, but becauſe it is leſs honourable. A Subordinati⯑on of Ranks is abſolutely neceſſary to the Sup⯑port of Monarchy. Birth, Titles, and Place, muſt be honour'd above Induſtry and Riches. And while theſe Notions prevail, all the con⯑ſiderable Traders will be tempted to throw up their Commerce, in order to purchaſe ſome of theſe Employments, to which Privi⯑leges and Honours are annex'd.

SINCE I am upon this Head of the Altera⯑tions that Time has produc'd, or may pro⯑duce in Politics, I muſt obſerve, That all Kinds of Government, free and deſpotic, ſeem to have undergone, in modern Times, a great Change to the better, with regard both to fo⯑reign and domeſtic Management. The Ba⯑lance of Power is a Secret in Politics known only to the preſent Age; and I muſt add, That the internal POLICE of the State has alſo receiv'd great Improvements within this laſt Century. We are inform'd by Salluſt, That [183] Cataline's Army was much augmented by the Acceſſion of the Highway-men about Rome; tho' I believe, that all of that Profeſſion, who are at preſent diſpers'd over Europe, would not amount to a Regiment. In Cicero's Plead⯑ings for Milo, I find this Argument, among others, made Uſe of to prove, that his Client had not aſſaſſinated Clodius. Had Milo, ſays he, intended to have kill'd Clodius, he had not attack'd him in the Day-time, and at ſuch a Diſtance from the City: He had Way-laid him at Night, near the Suburbs, where it might have been pretended, that he was kill'd by Robbers; and the Frequency of the Acci⯑dent would have favour'd the Deceit. This is a ſurprizing Proof of the looſe Police of Rome, and of the Number and Force of theſe Robbers; ſince Clodius, as we learn from the ſame Oration, was at that Time attended with Sixty Slaves, who were compleatly arm'd, and, by the Roman Laws, anſwerable, upon their own Lives, for the Life of their Maſter.

BUT tho' all Kinds of Government be much improv'd in modern Times, yet Monarchical Government ſeems to have receiv'd the moſt conſiderable Improvements. It may now be [284] affirm'd of civiliz'd Monarchies, what was formerly ſaid in Praiſe of Republics alone, that they are a Government of Laws, not of Men. They are found ſuſceptible of Order, Method, and Conſtancy, to a ſurprizing De⯑gree. Property is ſecure; Induſtry encou⯑rag'd; the Arts flouriſh; and the Prince lives ſecure among his Subjects, like a Father a⯑mong his Children. It muſt, however, be confeſt, that tho' Monarchical Governments have approach'd nearer to popular Ones, in Gentleneſs and Stability; yet they are ſtill much inferior. Our modern Education and Cuſtoms inſtil more Humanity and Modera⯑tion than the antient; but have not as yet been able to overcome entirely the Diſadvan⯑tages of that Form of Government.

BUT here I muſt beg leave to advance a Con⯑jecture, which ſeems to me very probable, but which Poſterity alone can fully judge of. I am apt to think, that in Monarchical Go⯑vernments there is a Source of Improvement, and in Popular Governments a Source of De⯑generacy, which in Time will bring theſe Spe⯑cies of Government ſtill nearer an Equality. The greateſt Abuſes, which ariſe in France, [185] the moſt perfect Model of pure Monarchy, proceed not from the Number or Weight of the Taxes, beyond what are to be met with in free Countries; but from the Expenſive, unequal, arbitrary, and intricate Method of levying them, by which the Induſtry of the Poor, eſpecially of the Peaſants and Farmers, is, in a great Meaſure, diſcourag'd, and Agri⯑culture render'd a beggarly and a ſlaviſh Em⯑ployment. But to whoſe Advantage do theſe Abuſes ſerve? If to that of the Nobility, they might be eſteem'd inherent in that Form of Government; ſince the Nobility are the true Supports of Monarchy; and 'tis natural their Intereſt ſhould be more conſulted, in ſuch a Conſtitution, than that of the People. But the Nobility are, in reality, the principal Loſers by this Oppreſſion; ſince it ruins their Eſtates, and beggars their Tenants. The only Gainers by it are the Finançiers, a Race of Men de⯑ſpiſed and hated by the Nobility and the whole Kingdom. If a Prince or Miniſter, therefore, ſhould ariſe, endow'd with ſufficient Diſcern⯑ment to know his own and the public Inte⯑reſt, and of ſufficient Force of Mind to break thro' antient Cuſtoms, we may expect to ſee theſe Abuſes remedied; in which Caſe, the [186] Difference betwixt their abſolute Government and our free one, would be more nominal than real.

The Source of Degeneracy, that may be re⯑mark'd in free Governments, conſiſts in the Practice of contracting Debt, and mortaging the public Revenues, by which Taxes may, in Time, become altogether intolerable, and all the Property of the State be brought into the Hands of the Public. This Practice is of modern Date. The Athenians, though a Re⯑public, paid Twenty per Cent. for Money, as we learn from Xenophon. Among the Mo⯑derns, the Dutch firſt introduced the Practice of borrowing great Sums at low Intereſt, and have well nigh ruined themſelves by it. Ab⯑ſolute Princes have alſo contracted Debt; but as an Abſolute Prince may play the Bankrupt when he pleaſes, his People can never be op⯑preſt by his Debts. In popular Governments, the People, and chiefly thoſe who have the higheſt Offices, being always the public Cre⯑ditors, 'tis impoſſible the State can ever make uſe of this Remedy, which, however it may be ſometimes neceſſary, is always cruel and barbarous. This, therefore, ſeems to be an [187] Inconvenience, that nearly threatens all free Governments, eſpecially our own, at the pre⯑ſent Juncture of Affairs. And what a ſtrong Motive is this, to encreaſe our Frugality of the public Money; left, for want of it we be re⯑duced, by the Multiplicity of Taxes, to curſe our free Government, and wiſh ourſelves in the ſame State of Servitude with all the Na⯑tions that ſurround us.