THE OLD WHIG.
On the State of the PEERAGE; with REMARKS upon the PLEBEIAN.

I Find that Men, who have turn'd their Thoughts to what is now the great Sub⯑ject, not only of our Parliamentary De⯑bates, but of our private Converſation, are apt to complain, it is a Matter of ſuch a perplext Nature, and admits of ſo many Arguments on either Side, that they are rather bewilder'd than inſtru⯑cted, by what they have heard in Diſcourſe, or ſeen in Print, upon this Occaſion. But as, I think, this Per⯑plexity does not ariſe in Men's Minds from the Nature of the Thing it ſelf, ſo much as from the way of handling it; I ſhall endeavour to draw out the whole State of this Af⯑fair with ſuch Brevity and Method, as may neither tire nor puzzle the Reader; but carry his Thoughts through a Series of Obſervations and Arguments, that will regu⯑larly grow out of one another, and ſet this Matter in its full Light.

1. Thoſe who are thought the beſt Writers upon Govern⯑ment, both Ancients and Moderns, have unanimouſly a⯑greed in Opinion, that the moſt perfect and reaſonable Form is a mixt Government, in oppoſition to that of any ſingle Perſon, or any ſingle Order of Men. For whether the Supreme, that is, the Legiſlative Power be [2] lodg'd entirely in a Prince, or in an Ariſtocracy, or in a Democracy, it is ſtill looked upon as Tyrannical, and not properly calculated for the Happineſs of the whole Com⯑munity.

2. It is alſo eſtabliſh'd as a Maxim among Political Writers, that the Diviſion of the Supreme or Legiſlative Power is moſt perfect, when it is diſtributed into three Branches. If it all centers in one Man, or in a Body of Men of the ſame Quality, it is that Form of Govern⯑ment which is call'd Tyrannical. If it be thrown into two Branches, it wants a caſting Power, and is under ſuch a divided Authority as wou'd often draw two different Ways, and produce ſome time or other ſuch a Diſcord as wou'd expoſe the Weaker to that which had moſt Strength in it, and by degrees end in a ſingle Authority. If it conſiſt of four Branches, it wants likewiſe a caſt⯑ing Power, and is liable to the ſame Inconveniences, as when it is compoſed of Two. And if it be divided into Five, or more Parts, it neceſſarily runs into Confuſion, and will not long retain either the Form, or the Name of Government. For this Reaſon, three Branches in a Le⯑giſlature have been always fixed upon, as the proper Number; becauſe it affords a caſting Power, and may moderate any Heats in any two contending Branches, and overpower the Third in caſe it ſhould prove unreaſonable, or refuſe to come into Meaſures apparently neceſſary for the Good and Preſervation of the Community.

3. The moſt natural and equitable Diviſion of theſe Three Branches of the Legiſlature, is the Regal, the Noble, and the Plebeian: Becauſe the whole Communi⯑ty is caſt under theſe ſeveral Heads, and has not in it a ſingle Member who is without his Repreſentative in the Legiſlature of ſuch a Conſitution.

[3] 4. In the next place it is neceſſary that theſe Three Branches ſhould be entirely ſeparate and diſtinct from each other, ſo that no one of them may lie too much under the Influence and Controul of either of the col⯑lateral Branches. For if one part of the Legiſlature may any ways be inveſted with a Power to force either of the other Two to concur with it, the Legiſlative Power is in Reality, whatever it may pretend to, divided into no more than Two Branches.

5. It is the uſual Boaſt of Engliſhmen, that our Go⯑vernment is fixed upon this triple Baſis, which has been allowed even in Speculation, and that by Perſons who could have no Eye to our Conſtitution, a Form the moſt accommodated to the Happineſs of a Commu⯑nity, and the moſt likely to ſtand ſecure in its own Strength. But if upon Examination one Branch of its Legiſlature is liable on any Occaſion to be entirely ma⯑ſter'd and control'd by one of the other, it is certain that nothing can be more deſirable than ſuch an Improve⯑ment in our Conſtitution as may remove out of it this viſible Imperfection. If a King has Power, when he plea⯑ſes, to add what Number he ſhall think fit to a Body of Nobles, who have a Vote in the Legiſlature, it is plain he may ſecure his Point in that Branch of the Legiſlature, and by that Means command two Votes out of Three. This has made many aſſert, and I wiſh I could hear a ſatisfactory Anſwer to it, that there are not properly more than Two Branches in our Legiſlature, notwithſtanding we flatter our ſelves that they are Three.

6. In this Caſe, a precarious Power of Nobles, ſo far ſubject to the Regal Power in their Legiſlative Capacity, might ſometimes be more pernicious to the Publick than if the Power of both the Branches were confeſſedly united [4] in the Soveraign: Becauſe we might well ſuppoſe a bad King would ſcarce venture upon ſome Things, were the whole Odium of them to turn upon himſelf; whereas a Body of Peerage, ſhould they only be created in an Emergency to carry any unjuſtifiable Deſign, would ſerve to divert or ſilence the Murmurs of the Publick.

7. It is a known Saying of a late Britiſh King, That if his Friends cou'd gain him a Houſe of Commons, he wou'd throw his Troop of Guards into the Houſe of Lords, rather than miſcarry in his Meaſures. And whe⯑ther it is impoſſible for a Court to gain a Houſe of Com⯑mons of what Complection they pleaſe, and what wou'd be the Conſequences at ſome time or other of their Suc⯑ceſs in ſuch an Attempt, whilſt the Crown is poſſeſt of a certain Means, by Vertue of its Prerogative, of filling the Houſe of Lords with its own Creatures, are Points too evident in themſelves to be inſiſted upon.

8. The foregoing Reflections are like firſt Principles that have ſcarce been ever called into Diſpute, and have not only been the avowed Maxims of thoſe who have been diſtinguiſhed by the Names of Whigs, but have fur⯑niſhed Matter of Complaint to every Party in its Turn. This Power of the Prerogative has always occaſion'd Murmurs, when either Side has found it exerted to their Prejudice. We have often wiſhed for a Redreſs of it, and have now an Opportunity of coming at it, which if we do not lay hold of is not likely to offer it ſelf again ſo long as we are a People.

9. It is propos'd, to prevent thoſe many Inconveniences which may ariſe from an Arbitrary Creation of Peers, in what Proportion, and at what Time the Sovereign ſhall pleaſe, to reſtrain the Peers to a certain Number. It is evi⯑dent that ſuch a Law wou'd remedy thoſe many Evils that [5] may proceed from ſuch ſudden and numerous Additions which have been made to the Houſe of Lords in the moſt critical Conjunctures. But I find there are Objections made to this Expedient, from the Conſequences it wou'd have upon the Crown.

10. It is repreſented, That it will be the cutting off a Branch from the Prerogative. But if this be only the cut⯑ting off a Branch which is pernicious to the Publick, it is certainly a very good Argument for doing it, when we can: And that this Power is of ſuch a Nature can ſcarce admit of a Diſpute. Beſides, that the Crown, far from be⯑ing leſſen'd by it, will receive a greater Luſtre, by par⯑ting with a Prerogative that has ſo often given Offence, and may ſome Time turn to the Deſtruction of the Subject.

11. The Crown, as a Branch of the Legiſlature, cannot deſire a greater Prerogative than that of a Negative in the paſſing of a Law; and as it ought not to influence either Houſe in their Debates, what can a good King deſire more than the Power of approving or rejecting any ſuch Bill, as cannot paſs into a Law without the Royal Aſſent?

12. The Crown will have ſtill all the Power in it of doing Good to the People, in which the Prerogative of our Britiſh Kings will be ſtill unlimited. In ſhort, it nei⯑ther touches the Executive nor the Legiſlative Power of the Crown, nor takes away the Prerogative of creating Peers, but only of doing it in ſuch a Manner as ſeems repugnant to Reaſon and Juſtice. The Britiſh King will ſtill be the Source of Nobility, and hold in himſelf the Prin⯑ciple of Peerage, though it is not to be laviſh'd away on Multitudes, or given occaſionally to the Detriment of the Publick.

[6] 13. Beſides, What do's the Crown do more in parting with a Branch of its Prerogative, than what the two other Parts of the Legiſlature have frequently done, with Re⯑gard to their reſpective Bodies, when they have found a⯑ny of their Rights or Privileges prejudicial to the Com⯑munity? All ſuch ſelf-denying Acts are of a popular Na⯑ture, and have been paſſed with the Good-liking and Ap⯑plauſe of their Fellow-Subjects. Nay the Crown has ne⯑ver more recommended it ſelf to the Affection of the People, than when it has retrench'd it ſelf in any exorbi⯑tance of Power that did not ſeem conſiſtent with their Liberty; as in paſſing the Bill of Habeas Corpus, and that for eſtabliſhing Triennial Parliaments.

14. Indeed were this a Point extorted from the Crown in its Neceſſities, it might be generous at ſuch a Juncture to appear in the Defence of the Prerogative; but this is not our Caſe, we are only diſputing whether we ſhall ac⯑cept of a voluntary Conceſſion made by the Sovereign himſelf, who out of his unparallel'd Goodneſs has ſhown, by this Inſtance, that he places the true Dignity of a Bri⯑tiſh Monarch, where it always ought to be plac'd, in the Liberty of his People.

15. Having conſidered this Alteration propoſed to be made in our Conſtitution with relation to the Crown, let us now conſider it with regard firſt to the Houſe of Com⯑mons, and in the next place to the whole Body of the Engliſh Commonalty; and if we find that it will prove advantageous in its Conſequences under both theſe Views, it is undoubtedly an Alteration very much to be wiſh'd for.

16. The Number of Peers is in a few Reigns increaſed from 59 to near 220, and there is no queſtion but that in as few [7] ſucceeding Reigns their preſent Number will be doubled; nor will Poſterity be able to ſee an End of them, unleſs it be timely prevented. Nay, we have all the Reaſon in the World to apprehend that their Number will hereafter ſwell in greater Proportions than it has done hitherto. It is a general Remark, that ſince the Act has paſſed for Triennial Elections, Commoners of great Eſtates are more deſirous than ever of gaining a Place in the Upper Houſe, which will exempt them from ſuch a conſtant De⯑pendance on their Electors, and the frequent Returns of Trouble and Expence in their Elections. At leaſt it is natural to ſuppoſe that every King will make ſuch Addi⯑tions as will give his Friends a Majority; nay, if we may conclude from Experience, every Miniſter who differs in his Politicks from his Predeceſſor, will bring to his Aſſi⯑ſtance a ſufficient Number to turn the Ballance in his Fa⯑vour. And it is obvious to every one how quick is the Succeſſion of Miniſters in this Country.

17. The firſt good Conſequence therefore of the propo⯑ſed Alteration to the Houſe of Commons will be this, That it will fill that Houſe with Men of the largeſt For⯑tunes, and the greateſt Abilities; for we may well ſup⯑poſe that ſuch Men will ſet themſelves forward to be e⯑lected into ſuch a Seat, when it is the higheſt Honour they can have immediately in their View. By this Means, thoſe will be the Repreſentatives of the People, who have the greateſt Stake among them. Thoſe will have the giving of Money in their Power, who have the moſt of it in their Poſſeſſion. But above all, the Influence of the Houſe of Commons, and conſequently of all the Commons of England, will preſerve its ſelf in its due Strength; for, of all Maxims, none is more unconteſted than that Power follows Property. But what additional Strength wou'd this give the Houſe of Lords, if the rich⯑eſt Members of the Houſe of Commons may be draught⯑ed [8] out of it in ſuch Numbers as the preſent Frame of our Conſtitution permits? Nor wou'd the Inconvenience be leſs with reſpect to Men of great Parliamentary Abilities, if inſtead of continuing to add Weight and Authority to the Lower Houſe, they may be called up at any time to employ the ſame Abilities in aggrandizing the Figure of another Houſe.

18. And as the propoſed Alteration will be a proper Means to give a Figure to the Houſe of Commons, ſo will it likewiſe be an Expedient to preſerve their Inte⯑grity, as it will take off one Method, and indeed the moſt effectual Method, of bribing Men of over-grown Fortunes. When a Peerage dangles before the Eyes of the moſt wealthy Commoner, it may have Charms in it to one, who would have a Contempt for any Offers of a⯑nother kind. A Man's Ambition is as ſuſceptible of Bribes as his Avarice, and it ſhould be the Care of a Legiſ⯑lature to cut off all Temptations to Corruption, in the one as well as the other. It is true, the Alteration pro⯑poſed would not utterly remove the Influence of ſuch a Motive, but it would certainly very much weaken it, and render it infinitely more ineffectual, than what it is at preſent.

19. If this Method reſtrains Men of the greateſt Figure of the Lower Houſe from making their way ſo eaſily to the Upper, it will evidently tend to the bringing a great⯑er Number of Places of the higheſt Truſt, Honour or Profit into the Hands of the moſt able and wealthy Com⯑moners. Men ſo accompliſh'd will have a diffuſive Influence both in their own Houſe, and in their reſpective Coun⯑tries, and it will be neceſſary for all Governments to find out proper Rewards and Gratifications for ſuch Men; and Gratifications of this kind no Commoner will envy them, ſince they enable them to be beneficial to the Body [9] of People whom they Repreſent, and do not in their Na⯑ture deprive us of their Strength and Aſſiſtance in that Branch of the Legiſlature to which we belong.

20. However, the propoſed Reſtraint on the Number of Peers, is far from being an Excluſion of ſuch Com⯑moners, who are recommended by their Fortunes, or their Abilities. According to the Calculation generally receiv'd, there may happen two Extinctions or Va⯑cancies, taking one Year with another, in the Body of Peers, as fix'd and aſcertain'd by the new Scheme, in caſe it ſhould obtain. And ſurely the Commons of England will think it ſufficient to loſe annually two of their moſt conſiderable Members, whatever may be the Opinion of particular Perſons, who are in haſte to leave their Com⯑pany.

21. A Reſtraint upon the Number of the Lords will neceſſarily reſtrain the Influence of that Body in the E⯑lection of Members to ſerve in the Lower Houſe. It is very well known, that few Members of the Houſe of Commons are advanc'd to Peerage, who have not one or more Corporations under their Direction: Nay, that very often, this is one Reaſon for their Promotion. If, there⯑fore, this perpetually increaſing Body of Lords conti⯑nues on the Foot it is now, in Proportion as their Num⯑ber is augmented, their Influence in Elections will grow more general, till at length, as the Upper Houſe are the Creature of the Crown, the Lower Houſe may be in a great Meaſure the Creature of the Lords: And it is worth while to conſider, whether in Proceſs of Time, unleſs ſeaſonably prevented, the Houſe of Commons may not be filled with the Stewards and Bayliffs of our Peers.

22. In the next Place, let us ſee what would be the Conſequences from ſuch an Alteration, upon the whole [10] Bulk of the Engliſh Commonalty, which ſhou'd always find the firſt Place in the Thoughts of their Repreſentatives. If they ſhould gain only this ſingle Advantage, I think it is a very conſiderable One, that it will hinder the Nati⯑on from being over-run with Lords. We know that in the Sale of an Eſtate, it is no ſmall Recommendation to the Buyer, that there is no Lord within ſo many Miles of it, and the Diſtance of ſuch a Borderer is often look'd upon as an Equivalent to a Year's Purchaſe. But who can be ſecure from ſuch a Neighbour, whilſt the Species is ſo apt to increaſe and multiply? I ſhall not inſiſt upon paying of Debts, which is look'd upon as a moral Duty among Commoners, who cannot but be ſorry to ſee any Additions to an Order of Men, that are ſhelter'd by Pri⯑vileges from the Demands of their honeſt and induſtrious Creditors. To which many Conſiderations of the like Nature might be added, were they not obvious to the private Reflection of every Reader.

23. But the great Point, and which ought to carry the chief Weight with us in this Caſe is, that the Alteration now propoſed will give ſuch a mighty Power to the Bulk of the Engliſh Commons, as can be never counter⯑ballanc'd by the Body of the Nobility. Should we ſup⯑poſe 235 Peers poſſeſt, one with another, of 5000 l. per Annum, this would amount to no more than 1175000 l. per Annum; and what is ſuch a Property, and the Pow⯑er ariſing out of it, compar'd with the Power ariſing out of the Property of thoſe many Millions poſſeſt by the Com⯑mons? Beſides, that the great Acceſſions of Wealth yearly made in the Body of the Commons, would give it con⯑tinually an Increaſe of Property and Power, which wou'd accrue to the Body of the Nobles, in caſe their Door was always open to Men of overflowing Fortunes, who might find no great Difficulty in procuring an Entrance.

[11] 24. I ſhall now offer Two fair Queſtions to any Man, who impartially weighs theſe Matters.

Firſt, If two Schemes of Government were propos'd to him, in both of which the Legiſlature ſhou'd conſiſt of three Branches, whether he wou'd prefer that Scheme, in which one of the Branches might be increas'd at Plea⯑ſure by another of them, or that Scheme in which every Branch ſhould be limited to a certain ſtated Number: Nay, if the two Schemes were placed in Parallel with one another, and conſider'd in their reſpective Conſequences, whether the firſt would not appear a moſt wild and indi⯑geſted Project?

In the ſecond Place I wou'd propoſe this Queſtion; If the Lords had been limited to a certain Number by our Conſtitution, whether it would not have been thought unpardonable in any one who ſhould have pro⯑pos'd to have taken off that Limitation, and left it to the Pleaſure of the Crown arbitrarily to add to them any Number at any Time?

No body can be at a loſs to determine himſelf in theſe Queſtions, who conſiders this Subject by thoſe plain Lights, which are already exhibited in this Diſcourſe, and which may be ſtrengthen'd by many other Conſide⯑rations.

25. This Subject naturally engages me in one Task more, which is, to examine the Objections that have been ſtarted againſt this Alteration propos'd to be made in the Conſtitution of the Houſe of Peers. And here I cannot diſcover any Inconvenience which can be ſaid to follow from ſuch an Alteration, that do's not now ſubſiſt, or is not anſwer'd by ſome much greater Inconvenience [12] in the preſent State of the Peerage. But, that I may not follow the Example of thoſe who have appear'd in Print on the other ſide of this Debate, in putting weak Arguments into the Mouth of their Antagoniſts, I ſhall anſwer ſuch Objections as have been the moſt ap⯑proved by thoſe who declare themſelves againſt this Bill, as they are laid together in a Pamphlet, intitled The Plebeian.

26. As for the Introduction, the Digreſſion upon the E⯑phori, and the concluding Paragraph, they are only Ar⯑guments ad conflandam invidiam, and ſuch as are not to be anſwer'd by Reaſon, but by the ſame angry Strain in which they are Written, and which wou'd diſcredit a Cauſe that is able to ſupport it ſelf without ſuch an Aſ⯑ſiſtance.

27. At firſt Sight, ſays the Plebeian, this Propoſal muſt appear very Shocking. P. 3. It carries with it too great an Alte⯑ration of the Conſtitution. This is the firſt general Ob⯑jection, and I wiſh it had been purſued regularly; but becauſe it is dropt and reſumed in the following Part of the Diſcourſe, I muſt be forced to collect thoſe ſcatter'd Paſſages on this Head, as I find them in different Parts of the Book. This great Objection will be ſufficiently an⯑ſwer'd, if this Alteration of the Conſtitution is from Worſe to Better; which I think has been fully proved. As every thing is formed into Perfection by Degrees, the Wiſdom of all Legiſlatures has embraced every Opportunity of making ſuch Changes in their Government, as have been advantageous to thoſe who live under it. This Author him⯑ſelf gives us an eminent Inſtance of a great Alteration of our Conſtitution in the Lower Houſe, under the Reign of Queen Elizabeth, P. 9. when the Crown erected ſeveral new Corporations, and relieved ſeveral ancient and decayed ones from ſending any Members at all. I do not make uſe of this Increaſe in the Number of [13] the Commons, as an Argument for an Increaſe of the Number of the Lords, which the Author produces as the Reaſoning of ſome People who are for the Bill. Such People, if any there are, muſt talk inconſiſtently with themſelves, ſince it is the Purport of the Bill to prevent the Houſe of Lords from growing too Numerous. But it is an unanſwerable Argument to ſhew, that there has been as great an Alteration in one Branch of our Legiſla⯑ture, as is now propoſed to be made in Another, and that ſuch an Alteration ſhould be introduc'd into our Form of Government, when there are good Reaſons for it; on which Account our Author himſelf juſtifies the above⯑mention'd Alteration in the Houſe of Commons. Our Au⯑thor furniſhes us with another very good Argument in this Particular againſt himſelf. P. 6. Whiggiſm, ſays he, if I under⯑ſtand it aright, is a Deſire of Liberty, and a Spirit of Op⯑poſition to all exorbitant Power in any part of the Con⯑ſtitution. Formerly the Danger on this Account was from the Crown; but ſince the Habeas Corpus Act, and the many Reſtraints laid upon the Crown in King William's Time, and the great and numerous Limitations of the Suc⯑ceſſion Acts, the Prerogative of the Crown is reduced ſo low, that it is not at all dangerous to the Commons. As we have the Author's Confeſſion in the aforemention'd Inſtance of an Alteration in the Plebeian, he has here given us an Account of as remarkable Changes in the Re⯑gal Branch of our Government. The Prerogative was re⯑trenched in thoſe ſeveral Inſtances, becauſe without ſuch Retrenchment the Power of it appeared exorbitant and dangerous to the Commons. If therefore there ſtill in⯑heres in the Crown a Power that is exorbitant and dan⯑gerous to the Commons, there is the ſame Reaſon why the Commons ſhould lay hold of the preſent Opportuni⯑ty to retrench it. This is the Matter in Debate betwixt us; but be that as it will, the Argument which the Au⯑thor [14] here makes uſe of, againſt the Bill in Queſtion, that it carries in it too great an Alteration of the Conſtitution, would have been as good an Argument againſt the Ha⯑beas Corpus Act, or any other of thoſe above-mentioned. What is further ſaid upon this Subject in P. 14. wou'd make a handſome Sentence in a popular Speech, but will never ſtand the Teſt of a ſtrict Examination in a Diſcourſe addreſt to the Reaſons and not the Paſſions of Men. In ſhort it has been for our ancient Conſtitution, ſays the Au⯑thor, that we have ſtruggled with ſo much Vigour for many Years together: 'Tis for that we have pour'd out a River of Engliſh Blood, and a Treaſure unheard of in a⯑ny former Age. This Conſtitution may have its Imper⯑fections; but faulty as it is, our Anceſtors have convey'd down Liberty to us thro' that Channel: And we ought to continue it on, as well as we can, to our Poſterity, and not give way to the new-modelling Schemes of every ex⯑traordinary Genius. This is not Arguing but Declaiming. Our Anceſtors remedied ſeveral Imperfections from time to time, and we are obliged to them for having convey⯑ed Liberty down to us through the Channel which they had ſo often alter'd and reform'd. And will not our Po⯑ſterity be as thankful to us, if we tranſmit to them their Liberty through the ſame Channel, when it ſhall be only alter'd for the better Conveyance of it?

28. Having taken off the Force of this main Objection, I ſhall follow others as the Author leads me. He tells us that P. 4. the ſhutting up the Door of the Houſe of Lords in the manner talked of, cannot but prove a great Diſcou⯑ragement to virtuous Actions, to Learning and Induſtry, and very detrimental to the Houſe of Peers it ſelf, by preventing ſuch frequent Supplies from going into it as the Nature of ſuch a Body requires; for want of which, it may in time become corrupt and offenſive like a ſtagna⯑ted [15] Pool, which hitherto has been preſerved wholeſome and pure by the freſh Streams that paſs continually into it. This Conſideration, if it has any Force, cuts down all the other Arguments drawn from the new Acceſſions of Figure and Power, which he ſuppoſes wou'd accrue to the Houſe of Lords by the paſſing of the Bill ſo much talked of. Can it be detrimental to the Houſe of Lords, and at the ſame time throw into their Hands all the Places and Honours that the Crown can conſer upon them? Will that Body of Men, which wou'd become mean and deſpicable and offenſive as a ſtagnated Pool by the Means of this Alteration, be raiſed by the ſame Means to be the moſt formidable, and the moſt honoured Part in our Conſtitution? Or could the ſame Body degenerate into a publick Nuiſance, as our Author repreſents it, and at the ſame time be able to over-awe both King and Peo⯑ple? Can two fuch contrary Effects be produced from one and the ſame Cauſe? But could we ſuppoſe that this Body of Men might thus degenerate; Wou'd they be a⯑ble, without numerous Recruits of Wealth, Learning and Induſtry, to oppoſe any thing for the Good of the Com⯑munity, in Contradiction to the King and People? But more of this hereafter.

29. Our Author adds, I am not unaware it will be ſaid that the frequent Extinctions of noble Families will ſalve this Inconvenience, and make room for the rewarding of Merit. But, ſays he, this Expedient, I fear, is not much to be depended on; for the Ʋncertainty of the Time when the Crown will have any ſuch Power, will make it much the ſame, as if it were never to have it at all; which is as much as to ſay, That unleſs the Crown has Power of making what Number of Lords it pleaſes, and at what Time it pleaſes, and to ſerve what Turn it pleaſes, it had as good have no Power at all of making Peers, which the Author ſuppoſes is the only adequate Power it has of rewarding Merit. Not to [16] ask the Author whether it be generally virtuous Actions, Learning, or Induſtry, that recommend Commoners to the Peerage, or of what other kind the Merit is, which has been often thus rewarded; I ſhall only ask him, Whether any Man has ſo crying a Merit as immediately requires a Peerage for its Reward? Or whether the Ex⯑tinction of Two Titles in a Year will not leave room e⯑nough for the Crown to reward thoſe extraordinary Per⯑ſons, whoſe Merits give them ſuch a Demand upon it? As for another Argument which the Author puts into the Mouth of thoſe whom he calls Patrons of the Bill pro⯑poſed, P. 4. that it will eaſe the Crown of Importunities, as I think it has no great Weight in it, I am not concerned to urge any thing in its Defence againſt the Plebeian's Anſwer to it.

30. We come now to the moſt conſiderable Paragraph of the whole Book, which I ſhall therefore tranſcribe at length. P. 5 and 6. But another Conſequence of a much higher Na⯑ture, attending the Limitation of the Number of Peers, is the Danger there will be of changing the Conſtitution by this means into an Ariſtocracy: And this may at any time in ſuch caſe be effected by the Confederacy of two or three Great Families, which would form ſuch a Body in the Houſe of Lords, as the Crown would not be able to controul. That this kind of Government is one of the worſt Sorts of Knavery, is too well known to be diſputed. In a Democracy, a great many different Perſons may come to have a Share of Power by ſeveral Incidents, but in the other caſe it is Birth only that intitles to Su⯑periority: And the Milk ſuch Nobles are nurſed up with is Hatred and Contempt for every human Crea⯑ture, but thoſe of their own imaginary Dignity. The Queſtion to be ſtated here is, Whether the Houſe of Lords under their preſent Conſtitution is not as likely to run into an Ariſtocracy, as it would be in [17] caſe their Number ſhould be limited. It appears very plain to me, that a Body of Peers perpetually Increa⯑ſing, and capable of Additions, has in it a natural Ten⯑dency to an Ariſtocracy. Suppoſing that the Houſe of Lords from 60 Members is now ſwell'd to 200: Theſe, if increaſed by the ſame Proportion, wou'd in the ſame Number of Years amount to 666, to which we may preſume there wou'd be ſtill the like proportionable Ad⯑ditions. By this Means they would in time receive ſuch vaſt Acceſſions of Property, as might Encourage them not only to entertain ſo ambitious a Deſign, but in a great Meaſure to render it effectual; eſpecially when any Men could be admitted into their own Order, with their great Abilities in Parliament, or their great Influ⯑ence among the People, who might be moſt capable of oppoſing their Incroachments upon the Commons. I do allow that ſuch Additions would be prejudicial to the Crown; but, this is no Reaſon, why they would not be made, as it has not prevented the Additions that have been made in our own Memory. For tho' the Crown in general would be a Sufferer by this Method; yet it would naturally have Recourſe to it, as it has formerly, when it labours under any preſent Exigency, that can only be re⯑moved by ſuch an Expedient. This Danger of an Ari⯑ſtocracy, every one muſt confeſs would be very much a⯑bated, and, I think, utterly removed, by the Limitation of the Lords to ſuch a Number, as is now propoſed. In ſuch a Caſe, their Property would be ſo very inconſide⯑rable, when compared with that of the Commons (as I have before ſhew'd to a Demonſtration) that it would render ſuch a Deſign in them the moſt Chimerical, and the moſt Impracticable. And ſince it is impoſſible, that the whole Body of Lords in their United Strength could be able to eſtabliſh themſelves into an Ariſtocracy, the Author's Imagination vaniſhes, that P. 5. this may at any Time, in ſuch a Caſe, be effected by the Confederacy of two or [18] three great Families, which would form ſuch a Body among the Lords, as the Crown would not be able to controul. If the Author means in this Place by the Crown not being able to controul the Lords, that it would be reſtrained from pouring in ſuch a Number as would al⯑ways ſway them to its Inclinations, it is what ought to be wiſhed for. If he means, that this want of Power in the Crown would enable them to erect an Ariſtocracy, it is certainly a wrong Conſequence: Becauſe not only the Crown, but the People would have a Superior Power in them to the Body of Nobles, and are equally concern'd to preſerve their Stations in the Government. The Author after this brings an Argument to prove, that an Ariſto⯑cracy is a bad Form of Government, and that a Demo⯑cracy is preferable to it, in which I entirely agree with him; but muſt add, that a mixt Government made out of Ariſtocracy, Democracy and Monarchy, is better than either of them. The Author ſubjoins, that P. 6. the Milk which Nobles are nurſt up with is Hatred and Contempt of every Humane Creature, but thoſe of their own imagi⯑nary Dignity. If ſo, the fewer of them the better. What Commoner wou'd not deſire to put a ſtop to the Increaſe of them?

31. The next Objection I meet with is from the great Pri⯑vileges the Lords are already poſſeſs'd of, with relation to P. 7. Actions de Scandalis Magnatum, &c. which is likewiſe a very good Reaſon why we ſhou'd hinder the Increaſe of Perſons inveſted with theſe Privileges; and as for the Ju⯑dicial Power, with that of Impriſoning, they are ſuch as ſubſiſt in their Body as it is now conſtituted, and there⯑fore cannot be objected to the propos'd Alteration, which wou'd only leave them as they are.

32. P. 7. The encreaſing the Number of Peers, ſays the Author, is always to be wiſh'd for by the Commons: We have ſeen [19] ſufficient Reaſons why it ſhou'd not. Becauſe the greater their Number, the leſs conſiderable they become; the con⯑trary of which has been evidently proved; and the leſs within the Influence of Court Favours: What! when by this very Power of encreaſing them at Will, it can ſecure any Point among them that it pleaſes? By which means alone Miniſters are kept in awe, and remain in a Situation of being called to Account for their Actions. Were it o⯑therwiſe they wou'd be out of the reach of any Accuſation: They wou'd know exactly by whom they were to be tried, and their Judges might be their Accomplices. And ſhou'd this once come to be the Caſe, what might they not attempt with Impunity? Is this Inconvenience better prevented in a Houſe of Peers on the bottom it now ſtands? Can any who has been a good Miniſter be ſecure, if the Crown ſhou'd add a ſufficient number of his Enemies to thoſe who ſit in Judgment upon him? Or is a bad Miniſter in any Danger, when he may be ſhelter'd by the Addition of a ſufficient number of his Friends?

33. I muſt not paſs over another remarkable Paragraph of the Author upon the ſame Argument for increaſing the Lords at Pleaſure. P. 9. The great Advantage, ſays he, that the Number of their Body cannot be increas'd, is at pre⯑ſent the moſt valuable Privilege of the Houſe of Commons, and the only thing that makes them conſiderable. This is indeed a very poor Advantage, to found upon it the Gran⯑deur of a Houſe of Commons. Is not the Power of gi⯑ving Money and raiſing Taxes confin'd to that Body, and which can never fail to give them the greateſt Weight in the Legiſlature? Will not this be always the moſt valua⯑ble Privilege of the Commons, and what other Privilege can make them more conſiderable? He goes on, The Lords are poſſeſt of many great Privileges that they will not permit the Commons to ſhare with them; and therefore the Commons wou'd be highly wanting to themſelves, if [20] they ſhou'd add this Advantage likewiſe to the Lords, which is the only one that they can enjoy diſtinct from them. Our Author, as it may turn to his Account, ſometimes con⯑ſiders the Lords in their perſonal Privileges as they are Individuals, and ſometimes as they are a Body of Men in the Legiſlature. If he here means their Privileges in the former View, I do allow they are very great ones, and therefore certainly every Commoner cannot deſire an Encreaſe of ſuch Individuals. But if he here means their Privileges as a Legiſlative Body, it is certain that all their Privileges together are not equal to that One, of com⯑manding the Purſe of the Community. So that it is wonderful how he cou'd advance, that the Number of the Houſe of Commons not being ſubject to an Increaſe, is the only Advantage that they enjoy diſtinct from the Houſe of Lords.

34. Our Author next proceeds to ſpeak of the pro⯑portion of Property between the two Houſes of Lords and Commons, which is a Point already ſo fully diſ⯑cuſſed, that I ſhall not trouble the Reader with any Re⯑petitions; but cannot omit what the Author aſſerts as an indiſputable Point, and which in it ſelf is the greateſt Pa⯑radox I ever heard advanced. His Words are P. 10. indeed if a reſtraining Bill ſhou'd paſs, I do not doubt but it wou'd be ſoon follow'd with a Bill to prevent Lords from alie⯑nating their Eſtates, for which many plauſible Reaſons are to be produc'd: And then without all Diſpute the Bal⯑lance of Property will be ſoon turn'd on the ſide of their Lordſhips: Which is as much as to ſay, in plain Engliſh, that the Lords will have as much Wealth amongſt 'em as the whole Body of the Britiſh Commons, or that one Million will be a Balance againſt a hundred Millions. Indeed the Houſe of Lords in their preſent Conſtitution may be always approaching to a Balance in Property with the Commons, from whence they are continually re⯑ceiving [21] into their Body ſuch large Supplies; but if their Number be once limited, you cut off their Recruits, and lay them under an Impoſſibility of ever rivalling the other Branch of the Legiſlature in this Particular.

35. Our Author's Argument, that a new Power wou'd a⯑riſe to the Houſe of Lords from the Alteration ſo much talked of, is founded upon a Fact which every one denies at firſt ſight. His Words are theſe: P. 10, 11. For as to what is commonly ſaid that the Lords wou'd get nothing, no new Power wou'd be added to them by this Means; I beg leave to ſtate this Matter in a proper Light. Suppoſe the Bal⯑lance to be now even betwixt the Lords and the Crown, as it certainly is, or elſe the Conſtitution wou'd not ſub⯑ſiſt in quiet: Is it not plain to the moſt common Capacity, that when two Scales are upon an equal Poiſe, if you take any Weight out of one of them, you give the Advantage to the other without putting any Thing into it. The Au⯑thor here ſuppoſes that the Ballance between theſe two Parts of the Legiſlature ſhould be even, and ſo far I con⯑cur with him, that being the chief End which this Alte⯑ration has in view. But I can by no Means ſuppoſe with him that they are even, becauſe it is contrary to Matter of Fact. For we plainly ſee that the Sovereign has it always in his Power to make what Diviſion of Party or Opinion he pleaſes prevail in that Houſe. As for the Reaſon of their preſent ſuppoſed Equality, that other⯑wiſe they cou'd not ſubſiſt in quiet, it has no Force in it, becauſe we ſee very ill-conſtituted Governments will ſubſiſt in quiet for many Ages, not that they are pre⯑ſerved by a rightly temper'd Conſtitution, which wou'd give them the greateſt Strength, but by other accidental Cauſes. The ill Conſequences of ſuch an Inequality may be frequently felt and complained of, though they may not ſhake the Tranquillity of the Publick.

[22] 36. I have now gone through every Thing that carries the Face of an Argument for the Conſtitution of the Houſe of Lords, as it now ſtands, or of an Objection againſt the Alteration propoſed to be made, having only avoid⯑ed ſaying any thing in this Caſe as it affects the Scotiſh Nobility, becauſe I have here conſider'd it only as an Engliſh Commoner, and becauſe I have Thoughts of pro⯑ſecuting the Subject, as it relates to Scotland, in another Pamphlet, being unwilling to ſwell this to a greater Bulk.

37. Since the writing of the foregoing Diſcourſe, I have peruſed a Pamphlet, intituled, The Thoughts of a Mem⯑ber of the Lower Houſe, &c. in which the Author firſt approves our Conſtitution as divided into its Three Branches, and through the whole Courſe of his Book con⯑tends in Effect, that it ſhou'd conſiſt of no more than Two; for he ſuppoſes the Houſe of Lords inſtituted only as Guar⯑dians, and Ornaments to the Throne, and to be augmen⯑ted by the Crown in ſuch a Proportion, as may ſtrengthen it in Oppoſition to the Houſe of Commons. The Reader may ſee his Scheme in the following Words. P. 9. There is not, ſays this Writer, a more certain Maxim in Politicks, than that a Monarchy muſt ſubſiſt by an Army, or Nobility. The firſt makes it Deſpotic, and the latter a free Govern⯑ment. I preſume none of thoſe noble Perſonages them⯑ſelves, who have the Honour to make up that Illuſtri⯑ous Body, do believe they are ſo diſtinguiſh'd and advanc'd above their Fellow-Subjects for their own Sakes: They know they are intended the Guardians, as well as Ornaments of the Monarchy, an eſſential Prerogative of which it muſt be to add to and augment their Number in ſuch Pro⯑portion, as to render them a proper Balance againſt the Democratical Part of our Conſtitution, without being for⯑midable to the Monarchy it ſelf, the Support of which is [23] the Reaſon of their Inſtitution. This is a moſt extraor⯑dinary Notion of Government, that one Branch of a Legi⯑ſlature ſhou'd be inſtituted, only to be ſubſervient to the Strength and Support of another, but it is on this Bottom that he founds his whole Diſcourſe; and as for his Obje⯑ctions to the propoſed Alteration, I find they are ſuch as I have already obviated in the Courſe of this Pamphlet. If any thing remains in them unanſwer'd, it will fall under the laſt Objection againſt the Matter in Debate, which I ſhou'd not take Notice of, did not I find that it makes an Impreſſion upon ſome People's Minds.

38. Suppoſe, ſays the Objection, there ſhould be an inflex⯑ible Obſtinacy in a Houſe of Peers, what Method would there be left to bring them to a Concurrence with the two other Branches of the Legiſlature, when it will not be in the Power of the King to bring them over to Rea⯑ſon, by flinging in ſufficient Numbers among them? To this I anſwer, That if the Lords are obſtinate in a Point, that is Reaſonable and Beneficial to the Community, it will be happy for their Country that they ſhould be in⯑veſted with the proper Power of a Legiſlative Branch, not to be over-ruled to wrong Meaſures. This may ſome⯑times be of great Advantage to the Publick, if we can poſſibly ſuppoſe, that the two other Branches may con⯑cur in any thing that is not conſiſtent with Juſtice, or the National Intereſt. If the Peers are thus inflexibly ob⯑ſtinate in any Methods that are Diſhonourable, Ʋn⯑juſt or Pernicions to their Country; can we imagine, they could not be influenced into a Compliance, by the Authority of the two ſharing Branches in the Legiſla⯑ture? Or, can we think, they would perſiſt in Meaſures which would draw upon them the Diſpleaſure of the Crown, and the Reſentments of the whole Commons of Great Britain? Every Body of Men takes as much Care as poſſible to preſerve their Credit, and to render [24] themſelves Popular; and we cannot think that any Branch of a Legiſlature would be made up of Madmen, or pur⯑ſue ſuch Meaſures as muſt neceſſarily end in their Infamy, or their Deſtruction; eſpecially, when they are infinitely weaker than either of the other con⯑ſtituent Parts of our Legiſlature. Could any Perſon ap⯑prehend ſuch a Behaviour from them, I am ſure the ſame Perſon cannot in his Heart apprehend their growing up into an Ariſtocracy. The Peers are ſo little a Match for the Crown in Power, or the Commons in Property, much leſs able to cope with the united Force of Both; that it is Wildneſs to ſuppoſe them Guilty of ſuch an unjuſt and unreaſonable Obſtinacy, as they know might en⯑danger their very Being in the Britiſh Conſtitution. And now, I ſhall only propoſe it to every ones Thoughts, whether an Expedient, which will remedy the greateſt Inconvenience that may ariſe to us, from one of the Branches of the Legiſlature, and of which we have had Experience, as has been already ſufficiently explained, ſhould prevail with us to lay it aſide, out of a groundleſs Fear, that it ſhould expoſe us to an Inconvenience from another Branch of the Legiſlature, which muſt ſuppoſe 'em deſtitute of common Senſe, void of Honour and E⯑quity, and regardleſs of Self-preſervation, before it can poſſibly befall us. To this I ſhall only add, that whatever Objections are made againſt this Alteration in the Con⯑ſtitution may be made againſt every Form of Govern⯑ment, in which the Legiſlature conſiſts of Three diſtinct Branches, and that is, againſt ſuch a Form as has been pronounced the moſt perfect, by thoſe who have been the moſt skilful Politicians, and the moſt famous for their Obſervations on the Nature of Government.