OBSERVATIONS ON THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE CLERGY, WHO ASSEMBLED AT CHESTER, FEB. 15TH. 1790, FOR THE PURPOSE OF SUPPORTING THE Corporation and Teſt Acts.

IT is allowed that every State has an inherent right to require evidence that thoſe whom it employs in offices of truſt and power, are friendly to its conſtitution; becauſe it is [...] to be ſuppoſed that any State would purſue meaſures deſtructive of itſelf, which the admiſſion [...] thoſe who are hoſtile to it, to civil offices, would undoubtedly be. It therefore follows di⯑ [...]ly that ſome ſecurity ſhould be given of the allegiance of thoſe who are ſo employed. But [...] queſtion is, what ſecurity? It cannot be ſuppoſed that the State has a right to any and every ^* [2] kind of ſecurity. For inſtance, it cannot claim a right to ſuch ſecurity, as would make the puniſhment of diſaffection more than adequate to the crime. Nor can it claim a right to ſuch a dominion over conſcience, as would lead to perſecution for religious ſentiments, conſidered merely as ſentiments. The ſame obſervation will hold with reſpect to all opinions which have not an imme⯑diate connection with the welfare of the State itſelf. Otherwiſe, in deducing conſequences from opinions, which are ſuppoſed to have a more remote relation to the State, it will be impoſſible to know where to ſtop, there being ſcarcely one principle of a political, moral, or religious nature, but may be repreſented by its enemies as inconſiſtent with the eſtabliſhed government. And as various governments are guided by various principles, thoſe which are conſiſtent with one government, may be inconſiſtent with another; on which ſuppoſition, the opinions which, in one State, may be regarded as juſt, and neceſſary to the ſupport of the community, may in another be conſidered as deſtructive of all order and due ſubordination. The conſequence of which would be, that there could be no ſuch thing as political truth or rectitude exiſting.

But, let us ſuppoſe the government to be well calculated to advance the general intereſts of the community: let the opinions of which it requires a ſecurity, be juſt opinions; yet, if they are ſuch as have not clearly and immediately this connection, the State can have no right to claim any evidence of their being admitted by thoſe whom it employs in civil offices. So that both in this and in the former caſe, theſe opinions will be found to include, in reality, nothing more than what is implied in the common oaths of allegiance and fid [...]lity; and a claim of ſecu⯑rity as to ſuch opinions as theſe, is what no one would object to complying with—though even this is more than can be juſtly pretended to. For the very ſuppoſition of a claim to ſecurity in opinions, is in itſelf abſurd. Indeed, what does it, at the utmoſt, amount to. Merely this: that thoſe from whom ſuch a ſecurity is required, ſhould declare their belief [...] ſuch opinions. But will any State pretend to judge of the ſincerity of ſuch a declaration? When proſpects of intereſt are placed before him who makes it, can it be poſitively known that theſe have no influence to bias his mind, and lead him to concealments and reſervations? I do not pretend to ſay that this is always, or generally, the fact; but the very poſſibility is a clear proof how inadequate Go⯑vernment is to ſuch a claim, and conſequently that the ſecurity it ſhould require is of a different kind—a ſecurity of conduct. This is the only teſt on which the community can reaſonably depend: and on this it may depend; eſpecially if perſonal intereſt be connected with ſuch con⯑duct, which it certainly is, when the meaſures of government are generally uſeful to the com⯑munity. Every other evidence is deluſive; and therefore this only ought to be required.

In determining, alſo, the extent of this ſecurity, it is a queſtion of eſſential importance, what is meant by the conſtitution to which it is referred. For this may either be conſidered as the whole ſyſtem of laws which make up the Government, at the time of giving the ſecurity, or the ge⯑neral ſpirit and deſign of the Government, without reference to any particular laws whatever. Now, for the ſupport of the former, no one can be expected to engage; becauſe on this prin⯑ciple no grievances can be redreſſed, nor even can a ſingle ſtatute be ever abrogated. It muſt be the latter only, then, to which thoſe who are employed in civil offices may be expected to give evidence of attachment. It therefore by no means follows, that they may not endeavour the repeal of any ſtatutes which appear to them inconſiſtent with the ſpirit of the government, though of ever ſo long a ſtanding, and ever ſo uniformly acquieſced in. And whenever ſuch expreſſions are uſed with reſpect to the executive part of Government, as convey the idea of obligation on thoſe who are employed in it, to preſerve the conſtitution, the whole meaning is, that the ge⯑neral ſpirit of the government ſhall be uniformly ſupported, and the laws enacted from time to time ſhall be put in execution agreeably to the letter and deſign of them. The utmoſt ſecurity, therefore, that can be given, is, that this delegation ſhall be faithfully executed; which it [3] certainly may by all, what ſentiments ſoever they may entertain as to matters of religion or phi⯑loſophy.

The principle alſo on which this ſecurity is ſaid to be claimed, that of ſelf-preſervation, is an additional proof that this claim can be extended no farther. For this principle is to be reſtricted, in ſocieties as well as individuals, by reaſon and juſtice. Now neither of theſe can warrant the claim of more ſecurity than is neceſſary in this caſe. If, therefore, a ſolemn engagement on the part of a perſon appointed to civil offices, that he will diſcharge theſe offices truly and faithfully, be juſt and complete, no other ought to be required. For the claims of ſociety and government are not to be regarded as indefinite; but are to be regulated by the ſame principles of morality as thoſe of individuals; and whenever they are exorbitant, ought to be remonſtrated againſt, and oppoſed.

On theſe accounts, the principle which makes the firſt of the reſolutions of the Cheſter Clergy, ought to have been expreſſed in this manner:—‘"Every State, though it has an inherent right to a ſecurity from thoſe whom it may employ in offices of truſt and power, that they will not purſue meaſures hoſtile to the conſtitution which it has eſtabliſhed, has only that right which it is competent to the exertion of; namely, the engaging its officers by a ſolemn promiſe, that that they will not act inconſiſtently with the intereſts of the State. This right ariſes from the nature of the ſociety itſelf, and from the principle of ſelf-preſervation. But as to opinions, theſe being out of the reach of human knowledge, muſt therefore be beyond the extent of human power; and in theſe the State cannot, from the nature of the things, have any concern."’ Hence, therefore,

^† II. No ſtate has a right to any Teſt which has for its object opinions only, or to one of which opinions make a part.

I cannot help, under this head, remarking the palpable abſurdity of the ſecond reſolution of the Cheſter clergy. ‘"Every ſtate hath a right to DECLARE what ſhall be DEEMED ^a a ſufficient PROOF or TEST, whether ſuch opinions are or are not friendly to its eſtabliſh⯑ments."’ I ſhall not take notice of the artful introduction of the plural eſtabliſhments, inſtead of the ſingular number, which is the only idea expreſſed in the firſt reſolution, and which is referable to the civil eſtabliſhment only; nor ſhall I ſay any thing of the tendency of ſuch an alteration to confound the church and ſtate together, and apply the arguments which relate merely to the latter, to both of theſe collectively taken!—I will only aſk the learned divines who compoſed that aſſembly, on what logical principles this aſſertion is founded; the plain mean⯑ing of which is preciſely this; ‘"that the friendly or unfriendly nature of any opinions as to the eſta⯑bliſhments of civil government, is to be judged of, not by the intrinſic nature of theſe opinions, but by the m [...]re DECLARATION of the STATE itſelf; and that this declaration is to be admitted as a ſuffi⯑cient PROOF or TEST, whatſoever be the nature of the opinions themſelves."’

^‡ III. Since therefore no ſtate has a right to a teſt of opinions in any caſe, it can have no right [4] to a declaration of conformity to the church of England, as a qualification for offices. Conſe⯑quently, though ſome pledge or ſecurity may be juſtly required that thoſe who are employed by the ſtate, will not attempt any thing hoſtile to it, this pledge or ſecurity, muſt be of a civil na⯑ture only, and can have no reference to the eſtabliſhed church. Therefore religious teſts of all kinds are unlawful. And whether they are intended as reſtraints to prevent an evil, or inſtitu⯑tions to preſerve the public peace, they cannot have place in any civil view. Of conſequence, though they were even ſuch as contained true and acknowledged principles only, and conſequently did not compel a ſingle perſon to declare a belief of what he was not already perſuaded of, they would, nevertheleſs, be a grievance even on this ſuppoſition, as being the application of a ſanction to which no ſtate can plead a right in any caſe whatever.

If it be urged, that the church alſo is concerned in this; and that this religious teſt has alſo a tendency to preſerve the eccleſiaſtical conſtitution; the right to ſuch teſt in this reſpect, muſt depend upon one or more of theſe principles;—that an excluſive religious eſtabliſhment is a right ariſing from the nature of ſociety in general; or from the nature of a particular ſociety; or from the nature of the Britiſh government. But on the firſt principles, ſince the rights of con⯑ſcience are equal, religious opinions, as to their claims, muſt be equal, and conſequently there cannot be a predominant eſtabliſhed church conſiſtently with the deſign of ſociety, and the un⯑alienable rights of conſcience; nor can it ariſe from the nature of a particular ſociety; becauſe either every religious eſtabliſhment is a good one; or ſome one is better than all the others. The former of which ſuppoſitions, as it totally deſtroys the idea of the importance of religious truth, will be admitted by none, but thoſe who diſregard religion altogether: And the latter, though true, involves this queſtion; which (of all the religio [...]s in the world, that claim a right to eſta⯑bliſhment), is the only true one, and the only one calculated to advance the intereſts of ſociety and juſt government?—When this queſtion is ſatisfactorily anſwered, ſo as to convince all mankind, (for leſs than this cannot eſtabliſh the right pleaded for) then the right of excluſive eſtabliſhments may poſſibly deſerve ſome attention.

This is preciſely the caſe as to the Church eſtabliſhment in England. Beſides the obligation which lies upon its advocates to prove that its claims as an eſtabliſhment are not incompatible with the equal and unalienable rights of conſcience; it ought to be ſhewn by them, that the nature of the Church itſelf is the beſt formed to preſerve and ſupport the ſpirit of the Government, to eſtabliſh the rights of the people, and to promote thoſe principles of juſtice, ſobriety, and due ſubordination, without which no ſociety can exiſt or flouriſh. ^b

Now, without detracting from the merits of the Church in this reſpect; I may venture to aſſert, that all theſe principles are equally taught by every party of the Diſſenters alſo; and applied with at leaſt as much conſiſtence and force to the very ſame purpoſes. All theſe ſectaries, therefore, have an equal right to excluſive eſtabliſhent with the Church of England. But equal and con⯑tradictory rights are ſelf deſtructive. Therefore none of them, not even the Church itſelf has a [5] right to an excluſive eſtabliſhment. If it be ſaid, in reply to this, that their claims cannot be equal, becauſe the Members of the Church compoſe the majority of the nation; it is a point which calls for all the proof which the Clergy can produce, that the rights of conſcience in the majority of a nation are neceſſarily and juſtly of ſuch a kind, as to infer a dominion over the rights of conſcience in the reſt of the nation.

But theſe things the Diſſenters do not contend for. They are willing to contribute to the ſup⯑port even of the miniſters of a Church which they diſapprove, provided they be not held up as bad ſubjects to the civil government in their principles or conduct. And this they certainly are, even on the ſuppoſition that the teſts of conformity, with which they cannot conſcientiouſly comply, are uſed as reſtraints only to prevent an evil apprehended from them, and inſtitutions to pre⯑ſerve the public peace, which, if they were admitted to civil offices, would be in danger of being diſturbed.

The principles of the Diſſenters, as far as they relate to civil government, are perfectly agree⯑able to the principles of the Britiſh conſtitution: a conſtitution which they have always ſupported, and which indeed, in a great meaſure, owes its preſent perfection to their ſervices: This is acknowledged by Mr. Hume himſelf, who though far from being friendly to the Diſſenters, bears this honourable teſtimony to them, (Hiſt. v. 5. p. 189.) that ‘"the precious ſpark of liberty was kindled and preſerved by the Puritans alone; and it was to this ſect (from whom the preſent Diſſenters derive their origin) that the Engliſh owe the whole freedom of their conſtitution."’

Their religious principles, at leaſt thoſe in which they all agree, are reducible to theſe: That as men and members of a religious community, all mankind have equal rights of conſcience; that perſecution of every kind, even to the loweſt degree of civil reſtraint, on account of religious ſentiments, is unjuſt and unlawful; and that, therefore, as Chriſtians, all have an equal right to ſtudy the Scriptures, and apply them as the only rule of faith and manners. And theſe are the only principles on which the ſeparation of the Church of England from that of Rome, is, or can be vindicated.

When the friends of the Church can make it appear that theſe ſentiments are dangerous to any well-governed State, and particularly to that of Great Britain, I will then acknowledge (how inconſiſtent ſoever this may be with the principles juſt laid down) that it is high time, not only to lay reſtraint upon the profeſſors of them, but totally to proſcribe and baniſh them from the com⯑munity. But if, on the contrary, they are eſſential to the well-being of every State, to lay the ſmalleſt reſtraint on them is really a grievance, and indeed a common evil, ſince it operates as a diſcouragement to the only foundations of good government and true religion; and ought, there⯑fore, on every principle on which theſe depend, to be abſolutely and totally abrogated.

^* IV. It is certainly a completely valid objection, that theſe religious teſts are made ſubſervient to civil purpoſes. For this ſuppoſes a right in the magiſtrate to interfere in the regulation of the opinions on which theſe teſts are founded; the contrary to which was proved under the 1ſt. Article. And the argument which is drawn in favour of them from the religious nature of an oath, the application of which to civil purpoſes is admitted on all hands, is an argument drawn from what is totally diſſimilar, and inapplicable to the teſts in queſtion. For from the ſanction of [6] an oath, the utmoſt which can be argued, is, that the perſon who takes it believes the truth of the Chriſtian Religion, ^c which does not conclude at all againſt the Diſſenters, who univerſally ad⯑mit the Chriſtian Religion;—but the teſts with which an oath is here compared, imply the belief of a particular ſet of principles, deduced by men only from this religion, and which, being liable to diſpute, cannot have an authority equal to that of the Goſpel itſelf. The admiſſion, indeed, of the ſanction of the former, as it implies divine authority in that from which it is derived, by no means infers, indeed it rejects the ſanction of the latter, which is founded on human authority only. And it may be juſtly inquired, why, when an oath is completely ſufficient to ſecure a due allegiance to civil government, any other ſanction ſhould be called for? And whether one, who is capable of breaking through obligations derived from a religion acknowledged by him to be divine, will not be likely to break through thoſe which ariſe from only one particular ſyſtem of that religion; many of the principles of which ſyſtem are, at beſt, of very dubious authority?

This proceeds on the ſuppoſition that the teſts themſelves are unambiguous declarations of at⯑tachment to the Church which impoſes them; and therefore if the arguments againſt ſuch teſts are complete and concluſive, they muſt be ſtill more ſo againſt the ſacramental teſt required in the Church of England, which is capable of, and naturally leads to prevarication and deceit in thoſe who ſubmit to it; and has been, and is perpetually applied to purpoſes the moſt directly contrary to the very deſign with which it was inſtituted. Before, therefore, the leaſt plea can be advanced in favour of ſuch a teſt, it lies upon its advocates to ſhew clearly, that the receiving of the Lord's Supper, for the purpoſe of taking up a commiſſion in the army, a place in the cuſtoms, the occupation of an exciſeman, or indeed any worldly and lucrative employment, is perfectly conſiſtent with the end for which Chriſt appointed it, which was the religious remembrance of his life, ſuf⯑ferings and death?

^* V. It is a ſufficient proof of the abſurdity of the fifth reſolution, that it confounds together two totally contrary ideas, and makes that to be the cauſe which is the effect, and the effect to be the cauſe: Civil rights, inſtead of being the conſequence of the laws of ſociety, are in reality the cauſes of the laws;—which are expreſsly appointed for their protection. They are, therefore, antecedent in their very nature to theſe laws. The enjoyment and peaceable poſſeſſion of civil rights is indeed ſecured by the laws, but the rights themſelves ſtand upon the original foundation of nature: and to talk of rights being conveyed by the laws, is not only to make the laws the creators of theſe rights, but to take it alſo for granted, that the laws of every community, as laws, muſt be univerſally founded on juſtice—the abſurdity of which is evident, not only from the applications which are made for the repeal of laws deemed oppreſſive, but from the very acknowledgment that there are governments exiſting which are ſupported by [...]juſt laws.

If, therefore, there are civil rights antecedent to law, there muſt be natural claims to civil offi⯑ces; for the latter is included in the former. Every member of a community has a natural claim to a ſhare in the direction of the affairs of that community; otherwiſe he is ſuppoſed to ſurrender all, at leaſt ſome of his deareſt rights, on entering into it. As it is impoſſible to ſuppoſe this, the juſtice of his claim is in this caſe plainly eſtabliſhed: and conſequently (which is indeed the ſame thing) his natural right to civil offices is equally eſtabliſhed.

[7] I cannot, however, diſmiſs this article, without expreſſing my utter aſtoniſhment at a declara⯑tion of this ſort. That men have from nature no civil rights, but that th [...]ſe depend merely on the laws and regulations which are made by Government, is a principle which tends ſo directly to the eſtabliſhment of the moſt exorbitant tyranny on the ſide of the Governors, and the moſt abject and Slaviſh paſſive obedience on that of ſubjects, as cannot be thought of without abhorrence and deteſtation.

^* VI. This reſolution conſiſts ſo much of palpable miſrepreſentation, that it ſcarcely de⯑ſerves any thing better than a plain and poſitive denial. That the diffenters do not ſuffer, or even alledge they ſuffer any reſtraint on their religious liberties, is with reſpect to the latter part of the aſſertion particularly, ſo glaringly falſe, as even their preſent efforts for the repeal of acts which they account oppreſſive on their religious liberties, are of themſelves ſufficient to ſhew. Will the author of theſe reſolutions deny this, and ſay that civil reſtraints merely on account of reli⯑gious ſentiments are no reſtraints on religious liberty? Is there any eſſential difference between laying a man under fines and penalties on this account, and preventing him from obtaining the natural right of citizens? If the former is, [...] all muſt allow, perſecution in a high degree, is not the other perſecution in a degree ſomewhat lower? In ſome reſpects it may not be in a lower degree. For reſtraint from civil offices may, to thoſe men who are peculiarly fitted for doing honour to them, be a means of preventing them from reaping the higheſt emolu⯑ments and advantages during their whole lives; whereas a fine is temporary, and may have an influence only for a moment.

In this view, therefore, the Diſſenters, inſtead of contending for power, are really contend⯑ing for the proper rights of human nature: and their efforts reflect honour upon themſelves, and have a tendency, and, it is to be hoped, will have an efficacy to produce the general li⯑berty and happineſs of the Society to which they belong.

But this is not the only reſtraint they ſuffer on their religious liberties. Though as men and Chriſtians, they have a right to vindicate their religious principles, and as Diſſenters, they cannot in vindicating them, avoid reflecting on thoſe tenets which differ from theirs; yet this very cir⯑cumſtance may be conſtrued into a reviling and derogation of the Liturgy; in which caſe, they are liable to the penalty of fines and perpetual impriſonment. This is an oppreſſion on all Diſſenters without exception;—and in the caſe of thoſe among them who cannot admit the doc⯑trine of the Trinity, (which is indeed a ſtumbling-block to many of the beſt and wiſeſt among the Epiſcopalians themſelves) the puniſhment is no leſs than a total loſs of legal rights, and three years impriſonment without bail. It is happy for Diſſenters that hereſy is left unde⯑fined in the Engliſh law, elſe the puniſhment of this, which is the ſame with that which is annexed to the denial of the Trinity, would have hung like a dreadful [...] over the heads of innocent Nonconformiſts.

Let the Cheſter Clergy, after finding theſe to be facts, ſay, if they can, that the Diffenters ſuffer no reſtraint on their religious liberties.

[8] If this ſtate of the caſe be juſt (and no one can deny it) would it not have been better, and indeed more conſiſtent with truth, to have aſcribed the preſent conteſt (as it is called) of the Diſſenters, to a reaſonable and laudable principle of recovering their natural rights, rather than to have ſtigmatized it by the appellation of a conteſt for the poſſeſſion of the offices of the State? A conteſt it is (if you pleaſe to uſe that name) and a conteſt for power in one ſenſe. But it is a conteſt, like that at the Reformation, or at the Revolution, for the nobleſt privileges of humanity; a conteſt which, whether ſucceſsful or not, will enroll their names among the glorious defenders of civil and religious liberty, and make them ſhine with the brighteſt ſplendour, to ages yet unborn.

I would not be improperly warm, even on the ſubject of religious liberty. I ſhall therefore quit this topic, with only propoſing to the Cheſter Clergy theſe queries:—Is a conteſt for civil offices unlawful in itſelf? Is a conteſt for civil rights unlawful in itſelf? Do not civil rights imply a right to civil offices? And if this conteſt is not in itſelf unlawful. I call upon them to tell the world in the moſt plain and unambiguous manner, what is there in the prin⯑ciples, the conduct, or the character of the Proteſtant Diſſenters, which does not render them in every reſpect capable of being employed in the executive (as they are already in the moſt important branch, the legiſlative) department of a good, and well-regulated Government?

After this, there is ſcarcely any neceſſity to remark on the next paſſage. Civil offices are truſts for the benefit of the State—So ſay the Diſſenters too; and I will add (as to all thoſe who conduct themſelves agreeably to the diſſenting principles) ſo act they alſo. They, there⯑fore are among the beſt, if not actually the beſt ſubjects, in this free and well-governed State; and as ſuch, have a correſponding right to its emoluments and offices. As, therefore, I agree perfectly with the Cheſter Clergy, that theſe emoluments and offices ought not to be entruſted to thoſe who teſtify their diſaffection to the State; the concluſion I draw is, that the Diſſenters, not only on account of their natural rights as men, but alſo on account both of their princi⯑ciples and conduct as citizens, have an equal right with all the other members of the State, to a proportional ſhare in its offices, emoluments, and honours.

In the laſt clauſe of this reſolution, averſion to the eſtabliſhments of the State, is mentioned as a reaſon for excluding Diſſenters from civil offices. What is the meaning of this word Eſta⯑bliſhments? Is it eſtabliſhed laws? If ſo, an averſion to ſome of them is by no means a reaſon for excluding Diſſenters only, but all who wiſh for and endeavour after the abroga⯑tion of oppreſſive ſtatutes, are unfit for offices. But this idea is too abſurd to be dwelt upon. Is it the eſtabliſhment of the Church of England? In truth Diſſenters give themſelves little trouble about it. Provided they can ſecure thoſe juſt rights of a civil and religious nature which have been already ſtated, they willingly leave the honours and emoluments of the Church to remain as they are.

^* VII. This reſolution is certainly a moſt curious one. In proportion to the ſincerity of diſ⯑ſenters [9] is the danger of the Church. It would be a ſufficient reply to ſay, In proportion to the ſincerity of the members of the Church of England is the danger of diſſenters. As both theſe propoſitions are equally true (for neither of them is ſo) let me ſuggeſt the following antidote to the poiſon which is apprehended to the church from the part of the diſſenters. Let the church ſhew the truth of its principles: let it confute the pretenſions of the diſſenters: let its teachers, in life, in converſation, in preaching, and in doctrine, ſurpaſs thoſe of the Sectariſts; and I will engage that the Church will never be in danger as to its honours or emoluments. But if this either cannot or will not be done; I can only ſay, that I believe there is not even one religious Epiſcopalian but will join with me, in wiſhing well to that profeſſion in which the intereſts of religion are beſt ſupported, and in endeavouring after a complete refor⯑mation of thoſe things in which they happen to be wilfully and criminally neglected.

^* VIII. For theſe reaſons and conſiderations (may the diſſenters ſay) as we are always ready to return our grateful thanks to thoſe who wiſh us well; ſo we do it ſincerely and heartily to our Brethren the Cheſter Clergy, who though they do not appear to us to enter⯑tain ſufficiently enlarged ideas of Chriſtian liberty, yet expreſs an earneſt deſire, that we ſhould enjoy a complete toleration in the offices of religion: At the ſame time we beg them to conſider the foregoing arguments, before they draw the haſty concluſion, that on account of our loyalty, our ſincerity, and our love of liberty we ſhould be excluded from the civil offices of the ſtate; for it is our firm and decided opinion that a wiſe and good government cannot grant us too much liberty. And we call, in this public manner upon thoſe who have ſtood forth as our enemies, to prove what we are perſuaded they falſely aſſert, that we cannot be truſted with too LITTLE POWER.