LONDON: Printed for T. WILCOX, oppoſite the New-Church, in the Strand, M.DCCLIX.
THE ground work of the following Epiſtles being the fruit of a private correſpondence, it was found neceſſary, in preparing them for the preſs; to adapt them to more general uſe and a⯑muſement. It may not, therefore, be improper to obſerve that, whatever theological ſubjects have fallen in the author's way, he hath purpoſely avoid⯑ed taking part with divines of any ſect or party: leaving it to the ingenuous, of every perſuaſion, to determine how far their particular ſentiments may be ſupported by authorities, ſuperior to com⯑mon-ſenſe and ſimple demonſtration. — As to his poetry; having no reputation to loſe, he is little anxious about what he may acquire. Indeed, it muſt be confeſs'd that perſpicuity and argument have been frequently conſulted, at the expence both of the dignity and harmony of his numbers, Elegance, however, would have been more at⯑tended [xxii] to, had the author's leiſure permitted; or, had his deſign been to diſtinguiſh himſelf as a poet; a character he is much leſs ambitious of than that of a philoſopher. —
EPISTLE THE FIRST.
Of truth in general. —Its criterion. —Its relation to opinion. —The uncertainty of the latter. — Neceſſary that both ſhould concur in Science.
UNiverſal belief being, in fact, an undiſputed criterion of truth, and all mankind neceſſarily believing thoſe poſi⯑tions which they conceive demonſtrable; ſcience, or demonſtra⯑tive knowledge, is ſuppoſed to be the leaſt exceptionable teſt of what is true or falſe, in general. —The abſtract certitude of the ſchools is, therefore, exploded. But, as particular opinions are not always the effect of knowledge, nor are ſyſtems con⯑ſtantly founded on ſcientifick principles, it is inquired if there be no other criterion, ſufficiently obvious to relieve the doubts and reconcile the oppoſite ſentiments of mankind. —The diſpen⯑ſations of providence, as well as the dictates of revelation, ap⯑pear inadequate to the purpoſe; theologiſts being found too un⯑ſucceeſsful, in clearing up the ſacred page, and phiſiologiſts too ignorant of the ſyſtem of nature, for either to form opinions, equally adapted to the credulity of individuals. —Divines and philoſophers are cenſured, indeed, rather as, mercenary wrang⯑lers, or bigots to particular ſyſtems, than fair inquirers after, or teachers of, the truth. —A fair and ingenuous inquirer characteriz'd. —Such not frequently to be found; few being capacitated for ſo arduous a taſk. —Fortitude and moderation the grand requiſites: the ſcarcity of which in the minds of men, in general, ſerves to account for their want of ſucceſs in the attempt; as well as for their promptitude either to embrace [4] ſkepticiſm, as an antidote to errour, or conformity, to avoid the trouble of thinking. —Dogmatiſts and Skepticks cenſured: The former on account of their abſurd dependance on tradition and futile authorities: the latter for ſuperciliouſly rejecting, on the other hand, all authority and tradition, without diſ⯑tinction. —In our inquiries after truth, however, our belief is to be ſuſpended in regard to points beyond our knowledge. —In ſcientifick reſearches, alſo, the ſubtilty of metaphyſical argu⯑ments ſhould be with caution truſted, as inſenſibly leading us into errour and perplexity.
EPISTLE THE SECOND.
On Science, as our guide to truth—The criterion beſt adapted to the opinion of individuals— The abſurdity of perſecution—Our preten⯑ſions to divine, and the bounds of human knowledge.
SCience, though admitted as the rule of faith in matters re⯑lating to the inveſtigation of truth, is neither excluſive nor univerſal, affecting only our opinion in ſpeculative points. For, however refin'd are our credenda, we inſenſibly join, in our practical notions, with the reſt of mankind. —Whatever objection, therefore, ſcientifick inquirers may make to the ſyſtems of others, none can be made to their fixing the criterion of truth on knowledge: the certainty of which is, by implication, ad⯑mitted in the general pretenſions of mankind to common-ſenſe. —This is the privilege of ev'ry mind, without diſtinction; e⯑nabling us equally to draw like concluſions from like premiſes. —All actual diſpute, therefore, ariſes from ſome miſunder⯑ſtanding, or different acceptation, of the matter in queſtion: as the moſt ignorant peaſant is equally certain of the proofs he comprehends with the greateſt philoſopher. —For the ſame rea⯑ſon, nevertheleſs, thoſe would be engag'd in a deſperate under⯑taking, who ſhould attempt to reconcile mankind to any one ſyſtem of opinion; the capacity and credulity of individuals being ſo very different, in conſequence of their diverſity of temperament, education and experience. —It is injurious and ridiculous, therefore, to inſult others, for thinking in the manner we ourſelves ſhould have done, under the ſame circum⯑ſtances. —It is ſtill more abſurd to reprobate the reſt of man⯑kind for not believing what we ourſelves do not, nor can poſ⯑ſibly [46] be made to, believe: as is the caſe when we would im⯑poſe tenets, that either contradict themſelves, or are, in fact, downright nonſenſe—For it is impoſſible to believe apparent falſhood, or to be convinc'd of any thing, by a ſet of words, that convey no determinate meaning—Myſterious or unin⯑telligible propoſitions cannot, therefore, be believ'd—If the truth of revelation, in general, be admitted, as what is re⯑veal'd from Heaven muſt undoubtedly be true, the difficulty of knowing what is particularly ſo, or who are the truly in⯑ſpir'd, is yet inexplicably great. —Tho' the power of working miracles alſo be allow'd a proof of inſpiration, in the agent; the fallacy of pretended ones, and the ſuppos'd inſpiration of im⯑poſtors, are almoſt invincible obſtacles to our diſcovery of the truth. —The ſuppoſition, alſo, that real miracles are tranſ⯑greſſions of the laws of nature is not at all neceſſary to ſup⯑port their veracity; but argues the contrary; and implies an in⯑jurious reflection on the omnipotence and preſcience of the Deity. —Whatever reaſonable objections, however, we may have a⯑gainſt putting implicit faith in either pretended miracles or re⯑velation; yet as the utmoſt extent of ſcientifick diſcovery falls ſo infinitely ſhort of a perfect knowledge of the deſigns and opera⯑tions of Nature; we cannot philoſophically deny that God ſometimes produces effects, for ends beſt known to himſelf, by means wholly unknown to us. —To proceed, nevertheleſs, in our inquiries on the moſt certain grounds, the criterion of Science is to be neglected only in points indiſputably and intelligibly re⯑veal'd.
EPISTLE THE THIRD.
On the infatuation of mankind, reſpecting pa⯑radox and myſteries. —The effects and cau⯑ſes of ſuch infatuation. —The abſurdity of ſuppoſing ignorance and folly the means to promote the cauſe of truth; or that the free⯑dom of ſcientifick enquiry is incompatible with the political welfare of ſociety.
IT is remarkable that, notwithſtanding the univerſality of thoſe truths which are founded on common-ſenſe, man⯑kind have ever been ſo infatuated as to reject this general and obvious criterion, for the more particular dogmas and myſ⯑terious paradoxes of pretended revelation. —The moral effects of this infatuation exemplified in our ſuperficial attachment to religion, our indolent ſecurity in time of proſperity, and our tranſitory aſtoniſhment and penitence under the immediate weight of misfortune. —An abſurd ſcheme of education the grand cauſe of that cowardice and imbecility of mind, which render us ſo ridiculous in ſpeculation and inconſiſtent in prac⯑tice. —The miſapplication of their talents, therefore, who think by encreaſing ſuch weakneſs to promote the cauſe of truth, or the intereſt of religion and morality, is plac'd in a ridiculous light; as the juſt object of cenſure. —The ſuppoſition, alſo, that ignorance and implicit ſubjection to authority are neceſſa⯑ry to the well-being of ſociety, or the political happineſs of mankind, is exploded; and ſhown to be exemplarily falſe and abſurd: polity in general, as well as religion and private vir⯑tue in particulars, being founded on truth and nature, and not dependant on the chimerical productions of fancy, the low ar⯑tifices of faction, or the knaviſh cunning of deſigning falſe⯑hood.
EPISTLE THE FOURTH.
On the weakneſs of the human underſtanding. —The abſtract exiſtence of the Deity. —The incomprehenſibility of the divine nature, and the incongruity of pretended atheiſm.
AS it is neceſſary to our ſucceſs in ſcientifick reſear⯑ches that the mind ſhould be diveſted of its prejudices, in favour of tradition and cuſtom; ſo, however extenſive be the freedom of enquiry, it is equally neceſſary that the object of inveſtigation be adapted to the limits of the under⯑ſtanding: mankind always falling into errour and confuſion, in their attempts to diſcover the knowledge of things beyond their capacity. However true, therefore, may be many of our diſ⯑coveries in the ſyſtem of Nature; God, the authour of that ſyſtem, is abſtracted from it and above our comprehenſion. — Hence our pretenſions to deſcribe, or define, the Deity, are palpably abſurd and ridiculous. For, tho' a created Being may aſcribe to its creator the moſt reſpectable of all known perfections, yet, as all its ideas of perfection are relative to itſelf, the attributes human beings aſcribe to God are neceſſa⯑rily the ſuperior qualities of humanity. —Notwithſtanding, however, the Deity is ſo far removed from our enquiries, and thereby confeſſedly no object of philoſophical knowledge, yet the actual diſbelief of the exiſtence of a God is denied: the argu⯑ments for and againſt atheiſts compoſing, in fact, a very ridiculous diſpute: as the impoſſibility of denying the being of a firſt cauſe is evident; and the reſt of the controverſy a mere cavil about words, of no determinate meaning.
EPISTLE THE FIFTH.
On happineſs. —The apparent incapacity of mankind for its enjoyment. —The compara⯑tive pain and pleaſure of human ſenſations; and their relation to our phyſical and moral conſtitution.
NEXT to the abſurdity of puzzling ourſelves in the in⯑veſtigation of matters beyond our capacity, and equally an obſtacle to our inquiries after truth, is the folly of our con⯑ſtant purſuit, and in ſpite of as conſtant diſappointments, our expectations of happineſs—The term is certainly left vague and ill-defin'd even by thoſe philoſophers who, pretending it to be attainable, affect to teach us how happineſs may be acquir'd—Its meaning is, nevertheleſs, obvious; and is determined from the tenour of its acceptation with the generality of man⯑kind. In which ſenſe, it is ſhown to be hitherto unattain'd; and that, not only from the impoſſibility of externals to confer happineſs, but, from the evident incapacity of human beings to be made happy—It is hence, alſo, declar'd unattainable; and even the moſt laudable means whereby it is purſued, as thoſe of knowledge, religion, and virtue are experimentally, and logically, ſhown to be incapable of conferring happineſs. —In fact, ev'ry ſtate, age and condition of life having its ſeve⯑ral diſtinct anxieties and conſolations, it appears that a conti⯑nued ſenſe of either happineſs or miſery is incompatible with our nature; as well as with the very eſſence of pleaſure and pain in general: our ſenſations of both which are merely compara⯑tive and reciprocally neceſſary to that of each other. Whence happineſs and miſery are evidently relative to, and dependant on, the conſtitution of the human frame; with which abſtract pain and pleaſure are totally inconſiſtent.
EPISTLE THE SIXTH.
On abſtract good and evil—The phyſical per⯑fection of the material univerſe, and the mo⯑ral harmony obſervable in the diſpenſations of Providience.
THE inquiries, of philoſophers into the abſtract cauſe of e⯑vil have hitherto been attended with little ſucceſs. In⯑deed, no ſuch abſtract evil exiſts. For, whatever calamities human life be ſubject to, their evil depends merely on our own s;enſibility. Even phyſical evils, which are the leaſt contro⯑vertible, are evidently relative to their effects on the ſuffer⯑ings, or enjoyments, of mankind. Whence they muſt not be accounted abſtract evils, or real defects in the general ſyſtem of things: of which we have at preſent but a partial view; and therefore cannot tell how far apparent imperfections may conduce to the perfection of the whole. That human life is ſubject, nevertheleſs, to palpable evils cannot be denied: but it ſhould be conſider'd that, as ſuch evils are but temporary, and are evil but in proportion to the pleaſure, or good, by which they are contraſted, we are not ſenſible of any abſtracted evil, unleſs a ſtate of humanity, on the whole, be attended with a greater portion, of pain than pleaſure. This is aſſerted by many; but is experimentally falſe. Indeed, on a fair and im⯑partial eſtimate, our ſufferings and enjoyments ſeem to ſtand on an equal ballance. Hence, alſo, if there be no abſtract phy⯑ſical evil in the univerſe, there is as little reaſon for us to hold [206] the exiſtence of phyſical good; or to maintain that happineſs is the privilege of human life. That "whatever is is right," with reſpect to the whole, is allow'd; but that it is therefore good is another conſideration: goodneſs being a term relative to the happineſs of mankind, and not applicable to that general ſyſtem. The famous principle of the BEST is therefore futile and frivolous—As to moral good and evil: we owe a ſenſe of them purely to phyſical: for had mankind felt neither pain nor pleaſure, they would never, from the light of nature, have ac⯑quir'd the ideas of moral good or ill. Thoſe actions, therefore, are morally good which give riſe to more pleaſure than pain; and morally bad, vice verſa: Innocence being, ſtrictly ſpeaking, neither good nor evil; and indeed inconſiſtent with a ſtate of action. Moral evil appears, hence, to be, alſo, merely rela⯑tive to man; and can by no means be conſider'd as a defect in the deſigns of Providence; unleſs we can be ſo abſurd as to ſup⯑poſe it in the power of created beings to counterwork the in⯑tentions of their ſupreme creator. On the other hand, moral good is equally relative, and can have no effect on the happi⯑neſs of the firſt cauſe, or plead any abſtract merit with the Deity. Moral good and evil, however, in the agent, is ne⯑ceſſarily attended with temporary happineſs and miſery; in the [207] diſtribution of which, alſo, agreeable to relative merit, it is not improbable that impartial juſtice is done, even in this life, in the perfect diſpenſations of Providence. Our hopes or ap⯑prehenſions, nevertheleſs, of a future ſtate are not hereby cut off. On the contrary, this life may only be preparatory to a future; where the virtuous and vicious may be very diffe⯑rently diſpos'd of in the ſcale of exiſtence. But, whatever be our lot hereafter, it reſts on the good pleaſure of our creator: into whoſe hands philoſophy calmly reſigns the hidden concerns of futurity.
EPISTLE THE SEVENTH.
On moral principles—The reſpective influence of reaſon and the paſſions—The immorality of ignorance and the indiſpenſable duty of ſeeking knowledge.
THE doctrine, by which virtue and vice are confeſſedly limited to this life, will doubtleſs excite the clamour of thoſe who pride themſelves, or ground their expectations of fu⯑ture happineſs, on their own merit. It may alſo be aſk'd, "To what purpoſe is it that mankind ſhould purſue virtue rather than vice, if all our pains and pleaſures depend recipro⯑cally on each other, and our bad deeds neither actually offend, nor our good ones have any real merit with, the Deity." It is anſwer'd, that, as the merits and demerits of virtue and vice are partial and relative, ſo alſo muſt be conceiv'd their reſpec⯑tive rewards and puniſhments. So that, whatever diſtinction may be made between the virtuous and vicious in a future ſtate, it muſt be purely owing to the good pleaſure of our crea⯑tor, and not to the influence of our merit over his final deter⯑minations. —It muſt not be conceiv'd, however, that this doctrine countenances immorality. On the contrary, it proves, that (as we are led to vice ſolely by the motives of pleaſure, apparently attending the gratification of our deſires) were a conviction always preſent to the mind, that ſuch pleaſure muſt neceſſarily be attended with an equal degree of pain, ſuch con⯑viction might prove an antidote to vice, and preſerve us, at leaſt, in innocence; the motive to action being thereby remov'd. As to actual virtue, indecd, it is not pretended that any ra⯑tional [260] conviction whatever is, of itſe'f, a ſufficient motive to virtue: the uſe of reaſon being only to determine what is true or falſe, juſt or unjuſt; and not to excite us to embrace either. This is the buſineſs of the paſſions; which are, however, in themſelves, neither good nor evil: thoſe diſpoſitions of mind which are generally term'd virtuous being the frequent occa⯑ſion of our falling into vices, which oppoſite ones, tho' general⯑ly diſapprov'd or deteſted, would have ſecur'd us from. Thus compaſſion, benevolence and candour are the fertile ſources of vice; while hardneſs-of-heart, ſelfiſhneſs, and diſtruſt are as frequently the means of preſerving innocence. Nay the fierce, harden'd and turbulent paſſions enter ſometimes into the moſt virtuous characters; and a heart unaffccted by the preſent ſuff'rings of humanity is, not unfrequently, neceſſary to pre⯑ſerve the rights and liberties of mankind. —In fact we are much deceiv'd, in the motives as well as in the practice of virtue; it being not only neceſſary that we ſhould mean to do good and take the beſt way our reaſon may direct us to effect it; but that we ſhould previouſly take thoſe meaſures which are in our power, to acquire the knowledge of the means of doing ſuch good. Wilful ignorance is declar'd therefore intentionally vi⯑cious; not having, tho' innocent in fact, the leaſt claim to merit; to which ev'n virtue itſelf hath but relative pretenſions. Indeed, as phyſical good in the conſequence is the meaſure of moral good in the action, the very appearance of merit in the agent in a great degree vaniſtes; our power of doing good de⯑pending [261] frequently on accident, and, not very ſeldom on downright knavery. On all which conſiderations knowledge is laid dow [...] as a fundamental and indiſpenſible moral principle; and, hence, the employment of our leiſure hours in inquiries after tru [...] is preſum'd to be not merely entertaining but morally virtuous.
EPISTLE THE EIGHTH.
On the immortality of the ſoul; and the argu⯑ments for, and againſt, a future ſtate.
THE immortality of the ſoul, or doctrine of a future ſtate, is propos'd as the ſubject of inquiry. A doctrine, which, however true or falſe in itſelf, is both weakly attack'd and lamely ſupported by the philoſophical arguments generally made uſe of, for, or againſt, it. Compariſons drawn from the vegetable creation, however ſtriking, are partial and prove nothing. Moral arguments prove as little, unleſs we could firſt be made certain that vice and virtue are not duly puniſh'd and rewarded in this life; or, unleſs we could entertain ade⯑quate ideas of divine juſtice. With theſe, the metaphyſical re⯑finements, concerning the ſoul's immateriality, are ſhown to be equally inconcluſive. Our natural deſire of exiſtence is expos'd, alſo, as a weak argument for the juſtice of our claim to immortality. On the other hand, that intimate connection between body and mind, and their apparent dependance on each other, are ſhown to afford rather a ſpecious plea in favour of the immortality of the ſoul, than, as frequently made to do, any argument againſt it—Setting, however, moral and me⯑taphyſical ſpeculations aſide, man is conſider'd merely in the light of an animal. In which ſtate of humiliation, his pre⯑tenſions to a future ſtate are, notwithſtanding, evidently juſti⯑fied on the plain and reaſonable ſuppoſition that, the Creator hath given to all animals ſuch pow'rs and faculties as were neceſſary to the ſtate of being appointed them.—Now the evi⯑dent purſuits of other animals tend ſolely to the gratification' of [302] themſelves or the mere preſervation of their kind. They have no intellectual ſyſtem that extends beyond the life of the indivi⯑dual; nor doth their experience ſerve to the improvement of their ſpecies. With man it is otherwiſe: The preſervation and gratification of the individual, however powerful their motives, are in him made ſubſervient to more general views: his caſe, health and life being conſtantly ſacrific'd to purſuits, that are of no uſe to him merely as an animal; but, on the contrary, ſerve to promote the intellectual perfection of his ſpecies; hence apparently intended for the enjoyment of a ſtate of exiſtence, to which thoſe faculties are adapted. In the powers of imagination and genius may alſo be trac'd that faint image of the Deity, in which man was confeſſedly made. So that philoſophy alone affords us ſufficient reaſon to believe the certainty of a future ſtate, without our having recourſe to con⯑teſted authorities, the chimerical ſuppoſitions of errour, or the abſurdities of ignorance.