The QUESTION As it ſtood in MARCH 1798.

FOR all the uſeful and honourable purpoſes of national power, many circumſtances contri⯑buted to give us the lead of Europe, while the French revolution was depending. In the year 1792, we might have dictated a pacification to the contending parties; or, if that failed, a well-ordered and a well-armed neutrality would have kept us in peace. The riches of the world would have flowed into this iſland, not only from the ſources of its own commerce, improving and undiſturbed, but even from the calamities of other nations. The peculiar advantages of that fortunate ſituation were too obvious to be miſtaken. In departing from it, the miniſter could have no juſtification, but direct and irreſiſtible neceſſity. To preſerve ſuch advan⯑tages, punctilios and formalities ſhould have been diſregarded, and every diſpoſition, to explain and accommodate any ſerious cauſe of offence, ſhould have been accepted and encouraged. The guilt of the war, if it was voluntary, is to be meaſured, as all criminal actions are, by its effects. When things are well, it is the buſineſs and duty of the executive government to keep them ſo. Great and certain poſſeſſion is not to be hazarded for preca⯑rious acquiſition; much leſs are ſafety and happi⯑neſs to be a ſubject of experiment. The actual ſtate [2] of England is the reſult of other maxims. The dif⯑ficulties of the country have evidently grown with its exertions; and now we are called upon for efforts and contributions, which indicate a criſis of immi⯑nent danger, to be averted by the wiſdom, or repel⯑led by the vigour of the preſent Adminiſtration. Whether the conduct and ſucceſſes of the war furniſh a rational ground of confidence in their abilities, is a queſtion open to the underſtanding of all men. That which touches their integrity, is not ſo eaſily deter⯑mined, nor by the ſame ſort of evidence. But it is, if poſſible, more important, and cannot be reviewed too often, or canvaſſed too minutely. Under any ad⯑miniſtration, the ſpirit of the people is ſufficient to repel and defeat a direct attack. If it were poſſible for the enemy to land in force, a great deal of tran⯑ſitory miſchief would enſue; but, ſooner or later, they muſt periſh in the attempt. This is not by any means the moſt diſcouraging view of our ſitu⯑ation. A war prolonged without action or enter⯑priſe, an invaſion threatened and ſuſpended, and the expectation of it continually hanging over us, are the ſureſt, and, for the enemy themſelves, the ſafeſt inſtruments to accompliſh the ruin of England. In the nature of things, this plan, if they adhere to it, cannot fail. To talk of expecting moderation and candour from a government provoked by in⯑jury and incenſed by inſults, to call them traitors and aſſaſſins, and in the ſame breath to reproach them with arrogance and treachery, as if the cha⯑racter and the qualities were incompatible, is mere folly and impertinence. The ſerious queſtion is, not whether theſe people are good or bad, but by what means we are ever to be at peace with them. Then comes the importance of an inquiry into the principles and proceedings of our own government, as far as that of France has been affected by them. If the reſult of it ſhould lead to a concluſion, mo⯑rally [3] certain, that the Directory will never treat with them but as with rancorous enemies, and as the wilful authors of all the calamities of France, it follows of neceſſity that other men ought to be tried; unleſs it be contended, that the removal of ſuch perſons is too great a price to pay for the ſalvation of the country.

His Majeſty's miniſters affirm, that, in 1793, the war was juſt and neceſſary on the part of Great Bri⯑tain; and that, in 1796 and 1797, their endeavours to make peace, and to renew the intercourſe with France, were ſerious and ſincere. On the other ſide it is aſſerted, that both theſe propoſitions may be falſe, but that both of them cannot be true, unleſs it can be proved that, in 1796, the character of the war was altered by events, which made the conti⯑nuance of it, on its original principles, unjuſt and unneceſſary. The iſſue to be tried is, whether the miniſtry did all they could at firſt to avoid the war, and, at laſt, to put an end to it.

On the 18th of June 1792, Monſieur Chauvelin, in the name of Louis the Sixteenth, invited his Majeſty to ‘find ſome means to put a ſtop to the progreſs of a confederacy againſt France, which threatened the peace, the liberty, and the hap⯑pineſs of Europe.’ In return to this amicable appeal to his Majeſty's wiſdom, friendſhip, and good faith, he was informed that ‘His Majeſty thought that, in the exiſting circumſtances of the war then begun the interpoſition of his councils, or of his good offices, could be of no uſe, unleſs it was deſired by all the parties con⯑cerned.’ The pretence is weak and inſufficient; but it proves the diſpoſition. When all the parties in a war agree to deſire the interpoſition of a neu⯑tral power, no friendly offices are wanted to bring them back to a pacific temper.—Peace is almoſt as good as made, when all the contending parties are [4] diſpoſed to deſire it. The obvious duty of a com⯑mon friend, the true policy of a generous, or even of a prudent government, is to employ its good offices, and to exert its influence with thoſe powers, which may be leſs inclined to views of moderation, to encourage and promote a pacific diſpoſition, and to favour that party, which ſeems the readieſt to liſten to reaſonable overtures, and to make conceſ⯑ſions for the benefit of general accommodation. Such were the wiſe and honourable duties of England, when his Majeſty's mediation was ſolicited and re⯑fuſed.

On the 27th of December 1792, Lord Grenville charged the French Convention with having paſſed a decree calculated to encourage diſcord and revolt in every country. The French miniſtry denied and diſ⯑claimed the ſenſe attributed to the decree, and, in the ſtrongeſt terms, diſavowed any intention, on the part of France, to act on the principles imputed to that government. When no act has been done, and when nothing but a ſuppoſed principle, or general diſpoſition, is complained of, an expreſs diſavowal of ſuch principle and denial of ſuch intention ought to be accepted; becauſe it is all that the caſe admits of. A miniſter, who had ſeriouſly meant to preſerve peace, would have allowed them to know their own meaning, even tho' he had diſtruſted their ſincerity. Inſtead of that, he ſays drily, ‘I cannot conceal from you, that I have found nothing ſatisfactory in the reſult of your note, and we ſhall continue our preparations.’

On the 31ſt December 1792, he tells Monſieur Chauvelin, who had taken the ſtyle of Miniſter Ple⯑nipotentiary of France, ‘that his letters of credence were from the Moſt Chriſtian King, and that he could not be admitted to treat with the King's Mi⯑niſters in the quality he had aſſumed.’

On the 7th of January 1793, Monſieur Chauvelin [5] appears to have addreſſed two memorials to Lord Grenville. In the firſt he complains, and demon⯑ſtrates beyond all poſſibility of reply, that the Alien Bill, moved by His Majeſty's Miniſters and depen⯑ding in Parliament, and not making any exception in favour of France, was a direct violation of the Commercial treaty concluded in 1786, by which it was ſtipulated ‘that the ſubjects and inhabitants of the two countries ſhould have liberty to paſs and repaſs freely and ſecurely, without licence or paſſ⯑port,’ &c. and that this propoſed law, under a ge⯑neral term of deſignation, was principally directed againſt the French.

In the ſecond he repreſents that ſhips, freighted with corn for France, were ſtopt by order of Govern⯑ment, and that, when the prohibition was taken off generally, as far as regarded foreign wheat, it was ſtill enforced againſt France, and againſt France alone. Theſe complaints were ſupported by argu⯑ments in detail, which it would have been difficult to anſwer in the ſame form: but that, which can⯑not eaſily be anſwered, may very eaſily be ſlighted. Lord Grenville returns the firſt of theſe memorials, in a note of ſix lines, as totally inadmiſſible. Why? Becauſe Monſieur Chauvelin aſſumes a character, which is not acknowledged. To the ſubſtance of the ſecond memorial he returns no anſwer at all. Why? Firſt, ‘becauſe it had been thought pre⯑ferable in France to bring forward difficulties of form.’ Secondly, ‘becauſe he did not know in what character Monſieur Chauvelin addreſſed him.’ An objection to a diplomatic character, when there is no doubt of the authority, is a diffi⯑culty of form, and nothing elſe, and very unfit to be inſiſted on in ſo great and grave a queſtion as that of involving two nations in the miſeries of war. The language of power may be laconic, and they, who cannot reſiſt, muſt ſubmit to it. But ſuch [6] anſwers between equals are not to be endured. The noble Lord has been taught to lengthen his mono⯑ſyllables. The proviſions of the Alien Bill are in direct and evident contradiction to the Commercial Treaty. Do His Majeſty's Miniſters mean to ſay that a treaty, concluded by the Crown, may be an⯑nulled by a ſubſequent Act of Parliament? If it may, in the firſt place, no foreign power is ſafe in treating with the Crown; and then what right have we to deny that the French Directory may be reſtrained by a previous act of their conſtitution from making particular conceſſions, or to affirm, as we have done, ‘that there exiſted a droit public in Europe paramount to any droit public they might think proper to eſtabliſh in their own domi⯑nions^*’

On the 20th of January 1793, Lord Grenville poſitively refuſed to receive his new credentials from the Republic, and on the 24th, ſent him an order to quit the kingdom.

Very early in that year the French were humbled by a variety of reverſes and diſaſters, and ready to ſubmit to any terms for an accommodation with England. On the 28th of February, another Miniſ⯑ter Plenipotentiary (Monſieur Maret) arrived in England. It is not certain that his offers and ſub⯑miſſions were liſtened to at all; but it was ſaid that they were rejected as incompatible with the honour and dignity of the Engliſh nation to accept; and, on the 4th of March, he was ordered to quit the kingdom in three days. In the beginning of April, Monſieur le Brun, Miniſter for Foreign Affairs, wrote to Lord Grenville, to deſire a paſſport for a perſon veſted with full powers to terminate all dif⯑ferences with Great Britain. Of this requeſt no ſort of notice was taken. Short-ſighted pride makes no [7] proviſion for the returning days of humiliation and repentance. When pacific offers and ſolicitations are neglected, or anſwered only with formalities, you may be ſure that the cavillers have taken their reſolution. The motives and the arguments follow the inclination.

In December 1792, the French, having got poſ⯑ſeſſion of the greater part of Flanders, reſolved to ſend ſome of their veſſels up the Scheldt to attack Antwerp. How this act was received by the Britiſh Government is freſh in the memory of all men. If the French had ſent a fleet into the Thames, the outcry raiſed againſt them could not have been more violent. Nobody could endure it, but the Dutch themſelves, who ſhowed no ſign of life, and were very unwilling that we ſhould meddle with their affairs. They had no anxiety about the navigation of the Scheldt. What they really dreaded was our interpoſition and aſſiſtance. We forced it upon them, we drove them into the war, and we accompliſhed their deſtruction.

But it was ſaid that the real ſources of the war lay deeper than in any offences or provocation of this ſort; that other cauſes of difference might have been accommodated, but that French principles were never to be tolerated or forgiven, much leſs to be admitted amongſt us. While all manner of topics and pretences were taken in aid of the main argu⯑ment, the avowed predominant purpoſe of the war was to reſiſt the propagation of principles deſtructive of all order and ſociety, and, above all things, to pre⯑vent then introduction into England. On this ground, the war was uniformly maintained to be what Miniſters called juſt and neceſſary—a common technical character, equally and invariably given, by all parties, to all wars of their own making. War is not to be undertaken or defended on general prin⯑ciples of juſtice, much leſs of expediency. One [8] nation has no juriſdiction over another. In making war, neceſſity, and nothing elſe, conſtitutes juſtice. The opprobrious language, with which this policy was enforced, is neither poſſible to be forgotten, nor very likely to be forgiven, by the French. Even to this hour it is not abandoned. In the ſpeeches of the King's principal Miniſters, and of all their adherents, the French Government, under every change it has experienced, was and is a collection of robbers, traitors, and aſſaſſins, incapable of main⯑taining the relations of peace and amity with their neighbours, and therefore properly the objects of vengeance and extermination, rather than of legiti⯑mate war. Such language, though it were true, would do no credit to the wiſdom of thoſe who uſe it. A prudent Miniſter, a ſtateſman, with any ex⯑perience of the uncertainty of human affairs, ſhould have ſuppoſed the poſſibility of a reverſe, and not have ſhut the door againſt future reconciliation. Neither is it honourable, or even ſafe, for a great nation, to treat at all with impious robbers, parri⯑cides, and aſſaſſins. But, while Miniſters gave way to this imprudent paſſion, and indulged themſelves in ſuch raſh and uſeleſs invectives, is it quite clear that they were in earneſt? Did they then, do they now, believe that the ſame Government, to which they have repeatedly offered a project of ‘perpetual peace, of ſincere and conſtant friendſhip, of reci⯑procal amity and intercourſe,’ was nothing but a faithleſs band of traitors and murderers? Has there been any change in the principles of theſe people? Is it true that they have aſked pardon of God and man for their manifold offences? If not, why are their principles leſs dangerous now, when they are crowned and confirmed by ſucceſs, when even we acknowledge that they have at laſt produced a Government fit for the King of Great Britain to treat with, than they were in 1793? The parties [9] and the principles were the ſame. Lord Malmeſbury was not inſtructed to object to the one, or to proteſt againſt the other. Both the negotiations broke off on queſtions of profit and loſs, not on principles. In all the diſpatches of the two embaſſies, there is not a ſingle word about morality or religion, nor even of that obnoxious doctrine which was to occaſion re⯑volt and diſorder in every country. If the French would have relinquiſhed Flanders in 1796, or the Cape and Ceylon in 1797, we ſhould have he [...]rd no more of their morals or their crimes. By offering to compound with ſuch principles, and to unite with ſuch parties, the Miniſter confeſſes that their crimes and their principles had little or no concern in the real motives and objects of the war. In fact, it ſoon appeared, that the purpoſe of the alliance was to diſ⯑member France, while the Allies talked of nothing but morality and religion.

The laſt, and not the leaſt inſiſted on among the charges againſt the French, was, that they declared war firſt. With a willing audience, any nonſenſe is as good as any argument. A declaration of war is not an act of aggreſſion. It rather ſuppoſes an antecedent injury received, and ſatisfaction de⯑manded, and refuſed. Whether well founded or not, it aſſumes the character of frankneſs and mag⯑nanimity, by announcing the hoſtility it intends, and putting the enemy on his defence. If our ground was good, if the war on our ſide was juſt at any time, it was ſo before February 1793, and our declaration ſhould have preceded theirs. In the conduct of great affairs, the advantages of cunning are very inconſiderable. By provoking a challenge, or driving your opponent to break the peace, you may poſſibly have the law on your ſide in a private quarrel. Between nations this is not policy, but deceit: and a poor deceit too, that deceives nobody. [10] The real aggreſſor is he who refuſes ſatisfaction, and forces his adverſary to aſſault him.

On theſe grounds, the King's Miniſters affirmed, and continue to affirm, that the war was juſt and neceſſary. They do not contend that the character of the French Government is improved, or that the war was leſs juſt and neceſſary in 1796 or 1797, than it was originally. Nevertheleſs they have offered to negotiate, and, as they ſay, with a ſincere intention to make peace. We are then to conſider what mea⯑ſures they took to inſure ſucceſs to the negotiation, and for what oſtenſible reaſons they broke it off. The validity of the ſecond will throw a light on the ſincerity of the firſt. The propoſition to be believed is, that the object, which they had moſt at heart in 1796 and 1797, was to eſtabliſh a ſincere and conſtant friendſhip and a reciprocal intercourſe (in the terms of Lord Grenville's project) with an abandoned crew, with the ſame individual junto of aſſaſſins ^*, who were and are incapable of maintaining the relations of peace and amity with any body. It would be uſe⯑leſs now to look back to the particulars of Lord Malmeſbury's firſt embaſſy, except to obſerve that, by yielding Belgium, of which the French were in poſſ [...]ſſion, and which it was impoſſible for us to wreſt out of their hands, we might have had a tolerable peace in December 1796, and ſaved the ſuperfluous expence and diſtreſs of two campaigns at leaſt, with all their poſſible conſequences. The language of our Government, on that ſubject, is never to be forgotten. On the 17th of December 1796, Lord Malmeſbury ſays to Monſieur de la Croix, ‘I ſhould not deal fairly with you if I heſitated to declare, in the outſet of our negotiation, that, on this point, you muſt entertain no expectation that his Ma⯑jeſty [11] will relax, or ever conſent to ſee the Nether⯑lands remain a part of France.’ If the Miniſter's diſpoſition to peace had been ſincere, he would not have made Belgium an inſurmountable objection to it. He knew the reſolution of the French by their poſitive anſwer to Mr. Wickham ſome months be⯑fore. He knew that, without giving up Flanders, it was in vain to negotiate, and that peace was not to be had. He knew alſo, or he ought to have known, that Auſtria would not ſupport him in his pretenſion to carry this point. In December 1796, Lord Malmeſ⯑bury was inſtructed to make the ceſſion of Belgium an indiſpenſable condition of any treaty with France. In April the preliminaries were ſigned at Leoben, and Belgium relinquiſhed by the Emperor. For this pre⯑tended object, however, Mr. Pitt continues the war, and then he alſo gives it up with all poſſible indif⯑ference. How is any principle or profeſſion of Go⯑vernment to be depended on, when, after ſo ſolemn a declaration in the King's name, we ſee another ne⯑gotiation ſolicited in leſs than ſix months, and not a word ſaid of this famous ſine quâ non, from which his Majeſty would never relax? The intervening paci⯑fication, between France and the Emperor, will not account for ſo rapid a change in the fundamental ſyſ⯑tem profeſſed by our Cabinet. The queſtion was, whether Belgium ſhould remain a part of France, not whether it ſhould be reſtored to the Emperor. By their peace with him the French acquired a great ac⯑ceſſion of ſtrength, as well as liberty of action; and the political objection, on our ſide, to leaving Belgium in their hands, was infinitely ſtronger, after that peace than before it. Neceſſity may be pleaded to juſtify any thing; but where was the wiſdom or neceſſity of committing his Majeſty's honour by ſuch a peremp⯑tory declaration? A wiſe Miniſter takes his ground deliberately, and then he maintains it firmly.

On the 30th of December 1796, Mr. Pitt in⯑formed [12] the Houſe of Commons that the King's Ambaſſador had been diſmiſſed with every mark of ignominy and inſult; that a ſtudied inſult, refined and matured by the French Directory, had been offered to his Britannic Majeſty; and then he aſked whether, ‘after the King's Miniſter had been ordered, in the moſt inſulting manner, to leave the terri⯑tories of France, after our propoſitions had been ſlighted, and our Ambaſſador inſulted, were we, by ſending couriers to Paris, to proſtrate our⯑ſelves at the feet of a ſtubborn and ſupercilious Government, to do what they require, and to ſubmit to whatever they may impoſe? I hope there is not a hand in his Majeſty's councils which would ſign the propoſal; that there is not a heart in this Houſe, who would ſanction the meaſure; and that there is not an individual in the Britiſh dominions, who would act as the courier.’ Such language, whether true or not, may ſerve to inflame a popular aſſembly, but is not prudent or juſtifiable in a Miniſter of State. How can he adhere to it without perpetual war? How can he retract it without everlaſting infamy? The French made no apology. They offered no repa⯑ration. Yet, in leſs than ſix months, when the Miniſter himſelf had ſo degraded the office that no gentleman ought to have accepted it, the ſame hand was found to ſign, the ſame heart to ſanction, and the ſame courier to carry the meſſage, exactly to the ſame parties. Whether this miſerable ſtep in⯑dicated any thing but a ſudden panic, muſt be de⯑termined by the circumſtances that preceded, and the conduct that followed it. The hearts of men are not ſo eaſily changed. The French peace with the Empero [...], the inſolvency of the Bank, and the mu [...]inies in the Fleet, were enough to frighten Mi⯑niſters, as they did the nation. But fear is not the parent of honour and ſincerity. Without opening [13] the negotiation again, Mr. Pitt could not have kept his place. Now a mere offer to put an end to hoſ⯑tilities, while all the cauſes and all the effects of a rooted hatred remain, can impoſe on no man. There muſt be a real diſpoſition to peace, and this muſt be manifeſted by a temperate, if not amicable language, and by all the acts of kindneſs and conciliation, which a ſtate of war will admit of; otherwiſe the forms of a negotiation avail nothing. Prudent and temperate proceedings, not haſty ſubmiſſions, pre⯑pare the way and diſpoſe the minds of hoſtile powers to treat with moderation and good faith. On any other footing, a mere pacification, if it could be ob⯑tained, would be nothing but a malignant truce, in which the hoſtile mind would remain, and the pre⯑paration for hoſtility continue. If, while you offer peace in terms, your actions and diſcourſes indicate nothing but ſuſpicion, hatred, and revenge, you may poſſibly purchaſe a ceſſation of arms by conceſſions and ſacrifices; but you leave the enmity entire, and ſtrengthen it againſt you by the price you pay for a temporary ſuſpenſion of its effects. To make peace without friendſhip, unleſs you could dictate the terms inſtead of receiving them, is not merely uſeleſs, but extremely dangerous; eſpecially with an enemy, who owe you nothing but hatred, who know that you aim at their utter deſtruction, and who never can believe that the preſent Miniſtry can be in earneſt in their pacific profeſſions, unleſs they are the falſeſt and vileſt of mankind, or unleſs they are reduced to the laſt extremity. While the negoti⯑ation laſted, invectives and abuſe againſt the French Directory went on as uſual, or with very lit [...]le in⯑terruption, in the newſpapers paid and inſtructed by our Government. Every man in London knows that theſe papers ſpeak the language of Miniſters, and that they are kept in conſtant pay, on purpoſe to prepare the public to adopt the ſentiments and [14] views of Government. The French know it as well as we do; and this knowledge governs their opinion of our ſincerity much more than the formal declarations and diplomatic phraſes in uſe among Miniſters.

The ſecond appointment of Lord Malmeſbury, in himſelf unexceptionable, was not calculated to in⯑ſpire the French with confidence, or to conciliate their good will. With or without a reaſon, they ſuſpected and diſtruſted him. The Directory ſaid, that ‘another choice would have augured more fa⯑vourably for the ſpeedy concluſion of a peace.’ Lord Grenville ſaid, ‘that this remark of the Di⯑rectory was certainly not of a nature to require any anſwer.’ The ſtrict right of our Government to chooſe their Ambaſſador is not denied, nor was it diſ⯑puted by the French. But, in human dealing, ſtrict right is very often more offenſive than injury, becauſe it furniſhes no regular cauſe of complaint, eſpecially if it be of no real or important uſe to the party that aſſerts it; and ſtill more, if it be harſhly or ſuper⯑ciliouſly maintained.

To juſtify the Miniſter in breaking off the negoti⯑ation, he is bound to prove, not only that the de⯑mands of the French were unjuſt and unreaſonable, for ſuch they might be in articles of no conſequence, but that they could not be granted without ſuch danger, as exceeded the riſk, and outweighed the conſequences of continuing the war.

1. The French Plenipotentiaries objected to the title of King of France aſſumed by His Majeſty. They ſaid it was eſſential to the full acknowledge⯑ment of their Republic, that this regal title ſhould not exiſt any where. Lord Malmeſbury endeavoured to make them feel, but without ſucceſs, that it was cavil⯑ling for a mere word!

2. Their ſecond demand was for a reſtitution of the ſhips taken and deſtroyed at Toulon, or an equi⯑valent [15] for them. No ſubject was more talked of in England, or more likely to be introduced, if not in⯑ſiſted on by the French. Yet Lord Malmeſbury ſaid it came upon him unexpectedly. The argument of the French ſtands thus: ‘Lord Hood was admitted into Toulon, and took poſſeſſion of the ſhips, &c. on the following condition, viz. that, when peace ſhall be re-eſtabliſhed in France, the ſhips and forts, which ſhall have been put into the hands of the Engliſh, ſhall be reſtored to the French nation, in the ſame ſtate they were in, when the inventory was delivered. By treating with the Republic, you acknowledge the exiſtence of a competent government, to which every reſtitution, due to the French nation, ought to be made. Yon cannot pretend that you hold the ſhips taken at Toulon as a depoſit in truſt for Louis XVIII. when, by making a perpetual peace with the Republic, you are yourſelves parties to an act which annihilates the pretenſions of that perſon. Neither could even he have any claim to the reſtitution, unleſs he were in poſſeſſion of the Throne. Ships of war, magazines, &c. are national property, not within the perſonal ownerſhip of princes, much leſs removable with their perſons. They are the fixtures of the State, which even the Sovereign in poſſeſſion cannot alienate from the defence or ſervice of the country. We demand the reſtitu⯑tion as repreſentatives of the French nation, which you acknowledge us to be, and preciſely in the terms of your own engagement.’ Lord Malmeſ⯑bury, without attempting to anſwer the argument, rejects the claim. He ſays ‘it was ſo perfectly un⯑looked for, that it was impoſſible for him to be pro⯑vided for it in his inſtructions, and that they could not have deviſed a ſtep more likely to de⯑feat the great end of his miſſion.’ Lord Gren⯑ville ſays, that theſe demands were received here [16] with great ſurpriſe. Now does any man believe that they were ſo entirely unexpected, or is it any an⯑ſwer to an argument to ſay, that you are extremely ſurpriſed at it? In His Majeſty's declaration of the 25th of October, theſe demands are called frivolous and offenſive, without any ſolid advantages to France. It is nor quite clear that the objection to His Majesty's re⯑taining the t [...]tle of King of their country, is on their part, a mere cavil about a word, whatever it may be on ours. But that the recovery of their ſhips ſhould not be a ſolid advantage to them is, to ſay the leaſt of it, [...]n extravagant propoſition.

Theſe, however, were not the difficulties that put an end to the negotiation; it was not quire deſpe⯑rate until the French Plenipotentiaries called on Lord Malmeſbury to declare, ‘whether he had or had not ſufficient powers to treat on the principle of a general reſtitution of every poſſeſſion belonging to them and their allies, which remained in His Majeſty's hands.’ This demand was accompa⯑nied with a ſpecific explanation, which cannot fairly be ſeparated from it, viz. ‘That an inquiry into the nature of the diſcretionary authority confided in a Miniſter by no means implied an intention of requiring him to act up to it, to its utmoſt limits.’ The demand and the explanation muſt be taken together, and conſidered as one propoſi⯑tion. To any other Ambaſſador, the French pro⯑bably would not have thought it neceſſary to put ſuch a queſtion. They had not forgotten that, in his former embaſſy, at every communication, he was in want of the advice of his Court ^*. Whether this was their motive or not, it is evident that, if they had meant by this ſtep to put an end to the nego⯑tiation, they would have inſiſted on the queſtion ſimply, without the explanation. Lord Malmeſbury [17] ſays, that ‘their queſtion went not to the extent of his full powers, but to require of him to declare the nature of his inſtructions.’ In the firſt place, he anſwers their queſtion in a ſenſe materi⯑ally different from that which they attached to it; he then affirms, that the extent of his powers, and the nature of his inſtructions, are one and the ſame thing. But for this he aſſigns no reaſon; nor does he at all ſpecify or intimate what the inconvenience or diſadvantage would have been, if he had given them a direct anſwer in the affirmative, which he might have done in the terms of Lord Grenville's official note of the 17th of June, viz. ‘That his full powers included every caſe, and gave him the moſt unlimited authority to conclude any articles, trea⯑ties,’ &c., or in the very terms of their own de⯑mand, underſtood according to the explanation with which it was accompanied. They knew as well as he, that, in the exerciſe and application of his powers, he muſt be governed by his inſtructions, and that he might be as effectually reſtrained, by his inſtructions, from making particular reſtitutions, as he could be by any limitation in his powers. If he had ſaid Yes, the negotiation muſt have proceeded, and poſſibly might have ended with ſucceſs. What were the avowed objects that ſtood in the way of it? The Cape and Ceylon. In our declaration of the 25th of October 1797, it is aſſerted, ‘that France has inſiſted that His Majeſty ſhould give up, without compenſation, and into the hands of his enemies, the neceſſary defences of his poſſeſſions, and the future ſafeguards of his empire.’ Now of this Declaration the two firſt articles are palpably untrue. The queſtion was, not whether Lord Malmeſbury ſhould actually conſent to the reſtitution of all our conqueſts, but whether he had powers to treat to that extent. Such reſtitution is never made [18] until peace is concluded; of courſe it cannot be made to an enemy. Theſe places, viz. the Cape and Ceylon, are qualified as the neceſſary defences of His Majeſty's poſſeſſions, and the future ſafeguards of his empire. Does the Miniſter mean to affirm, in the plain and direct ſenſe of the Declaration, that our poſſeſſions in India could not be defended, that our Indian empire was not ſafe, without the Cape and the Dutch ſettlements in Ceylon? The fact is, that while France and Holland had a marine ſufficient to cope with us in the Indian ſeas, and while the French held a powerful eſtabliſhment in the Carna⯑tic, the Britiſh empire was not only defencible and ſafe, but grew and increaſed beyond the limits of true policy and prudence, and that its danger, if any, aroſe from its unbounded frontier and unma⯑nageable extent. How the acquiſition of the Cape and Ceylon could be a ſecurity againſt that ſort of danger, or why our other poſſeſſions ſhould be de⯑fenceleſs without them at any time, and particularly now, when the power of France and Holland is an⯑nihilated in India, are queſtions, which the writer of the Declaration has not thought fit to meddle with. Nor is it poſſible to conceive a rational argument, by which the affirmative on either of them can be made out. But, if the aſſertion were in any degree true, and if theſe acquiſitions were ever ſo valuable, ſtill you muſt conſider the price you are to pay for them. Are they worth the coſt and charge of a ſingle campaign? Do they pay the expence of their eſtabliſhments, or any part of it? Do we really want theſe places for defence and ſecurity? Are we never to make peace without them? Or is it only a pre⯑tence ſet up for the real purpoſe of continuing the war? The Miniſter is bound to ſtate his reaſons for affirming, that the Cape and Ceylon are the neceſ⯑ſary defences of his Majeſty's poſſeſſions, and the ſafe⯑guard [19] of his empire; or to tell us diſtinctly, what he means by that declaration. A naked aſſertion is ſuf⯑ficiently anſwered by a contradiction.

If this ſtate of the facts be true, and if theſe con⯑ſiderations are valid, the concluſion from them may be quaſhed by power, or denied by prejudice, but cannot be reſiſted in argument;—that the Miniſter has voluntarily plunged the nation into this diſaſtrous war, not only without juſtice or neceſſity, but with⯑out a provocation, and in the face of ſubmiſſions little ſhort of ſupplication; that, in offering to treat with impious regicides, robbers, and aſſaſſins, he has abandoned what he called the moral principle of the war; that, in offering to renew the intercourſe be⯑tween England and France, conſidering how France iſt conſtituted, he has abandoned what he called the fundamental policy of the war; that theſe ſteps were taken not ſeriouſly for their pretended object, but to anſwer other purpoſes; that, if he had been ſincere in deſiring it, he might have had peace long ago on tolerable terms; that the Directory now will never make peace with him, becauſe they cannot truſt him; and that, as long as the war is continued, they will riſe in their demands. The Miniſter will ſay that he is proud of their enmity, and that the diſtruſt of ſuch a foe gives him an additional claim to the confidence of his country, The French object to him not becauſe he is hoſtile to them, but becauſe they think his conduct has been treacherous. Durante bello, he ought to be their enemy; but he ought not to offer peace with one hand, while, with the other, he foments plots and conſpiracies to overturn their government. Admitting however the merit of this hoſtile character, and forgetting that, as long as it prevails on his own principles, there can be no peace with France or ſet⯑tlement of Ireland, has he, after all▪ a real claim to it? At firſt he denounces immortal hatred to the French, [20] to their principles, to their government, to their exiſtence, ‘Littora littoribus contraria, fluctibus, undas.’ He then makes them a cordial offer of perpetual peace, ſincere friendſhip, and mutual intercourſe. When that fails, he goes back to his enmity. He then makes them a ſecond tender of his moſt ſincere amity; and now he reverts to his enmity again. Bellum, pax rurſum. He reviles and courts the ſame parties alternately, and Parliament vibrates with him.

In what condition this juſt and neceſſary war, if ever it can be ended, will leave us at laſt, may ap⯑pear doubtful to thoſe, who are not ſtruck with the actual reſult of it. They, who thrive by the preſent diſtreſs, are not likely to be alarmed by future dan⯑gers. The vermin feed, and the animal dies. In the laſt five years, the Miniſter has waſted above two hundred millions of money borrowed, beſides all the growing income of the country, and an immenſe ar⯑rear of debt anaccounted and unprovided for. He ſet out with an aſſociation of the principal powers of Europe, whom he paid, and of the inferior ſtates, whom he forced to join in the confederacy; and now we have but one friend left, who, if not actually nego⯑tiating with France, makes no contribution to the war, and muſt ſink, if ſhe is not ſupported by the protection of Great Britain. Is there another power in Europe, that would not gladly promote the down⯑fall of England? They ſee us ſtand aloof, com⯑manding the ſea, and apparently in ſafety, encourag⯑ing, bribing, or bullying other nations to perſecute and deſtroy one another. On the Continent, the Eng⯑liſh Government, and not the French, with all their enormities, are conſidered as the original incendiaries and common enemy of mankind. The French, [21] they ſay, plunder the houſe, but the Engliſh ſet it on fire.

The kingdom of Ireland, conſtituting a third of the empire, inſtead of contributing to the common cauſe, is proclaimed to be in a ſtate of open rebel⯑lion, and with difficulty kept down by a great army, paid by England, which ought to have been em⯑ployed againſt France, but which is now in ſuch a ſtate, as to be formidable to every one, but the enemy. Specific evidence is unneceſſary. The condition of the army is ſufficient to prove what the condition of the country muſt be, where ſoldiers range at large, not only without civil authority, but without diſci⯑pline. But the groans of Ireland are too diſtant to be heard. Her ſorrows are not ſeen. The dreſſes of the opera are corrected, and all the duties of Chriſ⯑tianity are performed.

In England and Scotland the general diſpoſition of the people may be fairly judged of by the means, which are ſaid to be neceſſary to counteract it; an immenſe ſtanding army, barracks in every part of the country, the Bill of Rights ſuſpended, and in effect a military government.

Since the year 1793, the property of the public creditor has loſt about half its marketable value, which the enormous increaſe of the maſs makes it im⯑poſſible it ſhould ever recover. The whole effect of a ſinking fund of four millions, augmented by the fall of public credit, and acting on a capital ſo de⯑preciated, is to keep the 3 per cents. at a fluctuating price between 48 and 50. With that prodigious engine of financial power in his hands, the Miniſter has been fearful of encountering another loan; and now he con⯑feſſes, that, under the meaſures of his adminiſtration, public credit has been ſo much impaired, that it has become abſolutely neceſſary to give additional ſup⯑port and ſecurity ſo the national funds, by making [22] the land-tax perpetual, and putting it up to auction in Change Alley.

A few months before payment was ſtopped at the Bank, any man, who had predicted that event, would have been pitied as a madman, or proſcribed as a traitor. The Bank is identified with Government, and, with their connivance, may iſſue its paper to any unknown amount. An act of Parliament is always ready to ſhelter them from the demands of their law⯑ful creditors. The only effectual ſecurity to the public, againſt an exorbitant emiſſion of Bank paper, is to be obliged to pay in ſpecie on demand. Take away that reſtraint, and then what is the Bank, or what may it be, but an inſtrument of enormous power and fraud in the hands of the Miniſter?

The final fate of the Funds is involved not only in the inſtant exigencies of the war, but in the ne⯑ceſſities which the war will entail on the peace. To provide for the eſtabliſhments, and to pay the intereſt of the debt, out of any fund, that does not invade the ſources of production, is palpably impoſſible. But a nation, that ſupplies its income out of its capital, lives on the ſeed, and then the queſtion is, not whe⯑ther a great emergency may not demand and juſtify a great exertion, but how long the ordinary ſtrength can ſupport the extraordinary effort. The demand, that exceeds the ability, is ſure to leſſen it; that is, the inability increases with the demand.

Againſt an invaſion, all hearts and hands muſt be united; but why ſhould the French run the riſque of an attempt ſo deſperate, if not impracticable, when it is plain that th [...]y can effectually ruin us without it? Their purpoſe is ſufficiently anſwered by the menace; while, on this ſide, the alarm is encouraged as a ſpur to contribution.

The ſuperior ſkill and courage of our officers and ſeamen have been attended, as I truſt they ever will be, with ſucceſſes that illuſtrate and adorn the naval [23] character of the nation. But the uſe and the luſtre of theſe great events are by no means equal. Unleſs they are wiſely applied to the purpoſes of peace, they may dazzle and miſlead us. What muſt be the reſpective condition of France and England, taken together, and comprehending all circumſtances, when ſuch victories make no impreſſion on the courage and determination, nor even on the prudence of the enemy, and when even the Engliſh are not elated by them? We are maſters of the ocean, while almoſt all the ports of Europe, from the Texel to Venice, are ſhut againſt us. Our fleets may keep the ſea un⯑til the ſhips are worn out, while the French pre⯑dominate on ſhore, and may, if they will, engroſs the trade of the Continent.

This country is now at the utmoſt ſtrain of all its remaining reſources, not for the purpoſe of attempt⯑ing any vigorous operation againſt a vulnerable enemy, which, if it ſucceeded, might reduce them to reaſonable terms, but, if poſſible, to defend the two iſlands againſt an invaſion, which the enemy may continue to hold over us, with very little effort on their part, or much inconvenience to their affairs, until the nerves and ſinews of England are broken by exertions, unavailing while they laſt for any pur⯑poſe of attack, and impoſſible to be continued. With all the means of ſucceſs, and weapons of vic⯑tory in his hands, Mr. Pitt has made the French Republic what it is. We have it from an authority, which ſome men ſhould reſpect, that while the armies and navies of England have been given him without re⯑ſtriction, and its treaſures poured out at his feet, his un⯑proſperous prudence has produced all the effects of the blindeſt temerity, and finally left this country nothing, but her own naked force, to oppoſe the imminent danger of falling under the dominion of France ^*.

[24]This iſland, untouched by an enemy, is ſhaken and waſted by its ungenerous efforts to cruſh a diſ⯑tracted, falling nation; while France, in the midſt of horrible convulſions, extends her baſis, and lifts, her head above the world. Yet the ſame councils are continued, and the ſame courſes are purſued. Ex⯑pectation is maintained againſt experience, and confi⯑dence nouriſhed by diſappointment.