HOUSE OF COMMONS. FRIDAY, JULY 16, 1784.
Mr. FRANCIS.

I am ſorry that I muſt be obliged to oppoſe your leaving the chair. My opinion of the bill will not allow me to conſent to its going to a Committee; for I not only think it materially de⯑fective [2] in the detail, but liable to fundamental and eſſential objections. Particular proviſions might be added, improved, or omitted; but objections, that go to the foundation and eſſence of the bill, are not to be removed by any alterations, that would not make it compleatly a new one. I have atten⯑tively conſidered the ſubject; and I mean, if the Houſe will permit me, to ſubmit to you my opinion of it, more at large than I ſhould venture to do any other. I mean to examine the principles as well as the proviſions of the bill;—a taſk, I fear, not to be performed without a long and a tedious diſcuſſion. To me the taſk is particularly heavy, but I am bound to undertake it by many obliga⯑tions. The labour we are engaged in does not offer me the ſame hopes, which it may have ſug⯑geſted to others: I am not encouraged to engage in it by a ſanguine expectation of ſucceſs. I very much fear, that the object of our preſent delibera⯑tion is dead. You have neglected it too long. You have ſuffered it to fall into a ſtate of ruin from which, I fear, no remedy within the reach of human wiſdom can recover it. But a great authority, un⯑der which I had the honour and good fortune to be bred, has taught me, that duty may ſurvive hope.—On this principle alone, I am ſtill ready to take my ſhare in the duty, though I cannot partake in any hope of its ſucceſs.

The views and principles of the bill may natu⯑rally and properly be divided into three diſtinct ge⯑neral heads.—Firſt, the new arrangement and diſ⯑tribution [3] of power at home, with all its probable effects and influence on our domeſtic government.—On this part of the ſubject I ſhall confine myſelf ſtrictly to the fact, which I think will be eaſily eſtabliſhed, that there is a compleat and abſolute transfer of the whole power and patronage of the Eaſt-India Company into the hands of the Crown. Of the effects of this transfer of power, of its pro⯑bable influence on our own Government, and of the danger with which it may threaten the Conſti⯑tution of England, I do not mean to offer an opinion. If thoſe topics have not already been ſuf⯑ficiently diſcuſſed, they properly belong to the de⯑partment, and ſhould be reſerved for the employ⯑ment of the greateſt abilities in this country. A right honourable gentleman near me will do juſtice to the ſubject.

The ſecond diviſion of the bill includes the ar⯑rangements and regulations intended for the Go⯑vernments abroad; and on this I ſhall hope to be permitted to enlarge. Without pretending to ſu⯑perior qualifications, or preſuming to dictate to the wiſdom of the Houſe, I am perſuaded you will liſten to information, which only profeſſes to be de⯑rived from experience.

The third diviſion regards the new plan of cri⯑minal judicature propoſed to be introduced into England, for trying offences committed in India. On this laſt point my opinion will not be delivered in many words, but the words that I make uſe of ſhall be the ſtrongeſt I can find.

[4] Sir, There are two preliminary obſervations, which ariſe on a general view of the bill, and which I wiſh the Houſe to carry along with them, through the diſcuſſion of all the parts of it. Firſt, that the whole bill on the face of it is remedial; that it is a remedy of a new and violent nature, neceſſary perhaps, but neceſſary only on the ſuppoſition of ſome great and inveterate diſorders, both at home and abroad, which, though conſtantly implied, are no where ſtated.

Secondly, Sir, admitting ſuch diſorders to exiſt, I think it will appear, through the whole plan of the bill, that the remedy applied is in every inſtance directly the reverſe of what the diſorder requires. With reſpect to the Governments abroad, the ac⯑knowledged grievance is, that the powers, hitherto intruſted, have been groſſly and notoriouſly abuſed. But you will find that, in the contemplation of this bill, the true and natural remedy for an abuſe of power is to increaſe it. With reſpect to the Com⯑pany's Government at home, the conſtant complaint of the Directors has been, that their power over their ſervants was too feeble to enforce obedience, that their authority was diſregarded, and their orders avowedly and conſtantly diſobeyed. You have facts in abundance, reported to you by your Committees, to ſatisfy the Houſe that theſe complaints of the Directors are perfectly well founded. Now, Sir, in the contemplation of this bill, the remedy for diſobedience of orders is to ſtrengthen the power that diſobeys; and when inſulted authority calls for [5] ſupport, either, in effect to reduce it to nothing, or, what is ſtill worſe, to ſuffer it to exiſt and to make it contemptible. The pretended power, left in the hands of the Directors, is a mockery of the degraded ſtate of thoſe unfortunate gentlemen. It is worſe than uſeleſs; for ſince, in fact, they are only to be the channel of the operations of a ſuperior power, you diminiſh even that power, which un⯑queſtionably the bill propoſes to eſtabliſh, and ex⯑poſe it to ſhare in the contempt attached to the medium, through which it is to act. In theſe ob⯑ſervations I mean only to ſtate the general reſult and impreſſion of the bill, without immediately re⯑ferring to the ſpecific evidence, from which they are deduced. The ſhorteſt and cleareſt way to eſtabliſh the truth of them is to enter at once into the detail of the bill, and to follow it as it goes.

Sir, the very outſet of the bill is eſſentially de⯑fective. When an act of legiſlative power is applied to the total alteration of an exiſting Government, it muſt of neceſſity be ſuppoſed that ſuch Govern⯑ment is either radically corrupt, or unfaithfully ad⯑miniſtered. No man, I preſume, will diſpute that ſuch is the fact in the general government of the Eaſt-India Company's affairs. The preſent bill, through every part of it, ſuppoſes what it no where avows, that nothing leſs than a vigorous interpoſition of the Legiſlature can ſave the object. For aught that appears in the preamble of this act, where the general grounds of it ſhould naturally be ſet forth, the territorial poſſeſſions, for whoſe better govern⯑ment [6] we are going to provide, may be perfectly well governed at preſent. For want of this eſſential preliminary, the whole body of the bill is in ef⯑fect a concluſion without premiſes, a remedy without a diſeaſe, a penalty without a crime. The omiſſion of ſuch a preamble to ſuch a bill as this will appear extraordinary as well as improper, to thoſe who re⯑collect with how much force and energy the Chan⯑cellor of the Exchequer, in opening the plan and principles of the bill, inſiſted on the magnitude of thoſe crimes and abuſes, which demanded and juſ⯑tified a proportionate effort of power to puniſh or correct them. He was not very reſerved in his de⯑ſcription of the offenders, or of their offences, but painted them both in the blackeſt colours. It is much to be regretted, that the ſubſtance, at leaſt, of his opinion of Indian delinquency ſhould be no where recorded for the benefit of his friends.

The new Board of Commiſſioners for the affairs of India is to conſiſt of certain Members of His Majeſty's Privy Council, and they are to be inveſted with the ſuperintendence and control over all the Britiſh territorial poſſeſſions in the Eaſt Indies, and over the affairs of the United Company of Merchants trading thereto. The powers, conveyed by the latter part of this clauſe, evidently and expreſſly include the Company's commerce. The affairs of a Com⯑pany of Merchants trading to India can only be commercial. Let the Court of Directors look to it. I am perfectly aware, that in a ſubſequent clauſe it is provided, that if the Commiſſioners ſend any or⯑ders [7] to the Court of Directors, which, in their opi⯑nion, ſhall relate to points not connected with the territorial government or revenues, they may apply to the King in Council for redreſs; that is, if they are diſſatisfied with the judgement of His Ma⯑jeſty's Miniſters at one Board, they may appeal to His Majeſty's Miniſters at another. The power given is unlimited. The appeal againſt the exer⯑ciſe of it is nugatory.

The Court of Directors are to be governed and bound by the orders they receive from the Com⯑miſſioners; and are not to ſend diſpatches of any kind to India, without their previous approbation.

The Commiſſioners may ſend their own orders originally to the Directors, who are obliged to in⯑ſert ſuch orders in their diſpatches, purſuant to the tenor thereof; that is, in the ſame words.

If the Commiſſioners ſhould be of opinion that the caſe requires ſecrecy, they may ſend their own orders directly to the Governments in India, with⯑out any communication with the Court of Directors, who are not to be truſted even with the knowledge of meaſures, in which the moſt eſſential intereſts, the ſafety, and, perhaps, the exiſtence of the India Company may be involved. In the ſame clauſe, the Commiſſioners may not only ſend their orders to the Governments abroad without the knowledge of the Directors, but, what is much more extraordi⯑nary, and much more alarming, they may ſend ſe⯑cret inſtructions to the Commanders in Chief in In⯑dia, independent of the Civil Government on the [8] ſpot. If there be no miſtake in the conſtruction of this clauſe; if it be ſeriouſly intended to give this power to the Miniſters of the Crown, there is no clauſe in the bill that more urgently demands the attention of the Houſe. By another clauſe, the no⯑mination and appointment of all the Commanders in Chief in India, and of perſons to ſucceed to the command in caſe of vacancy, are directly veſted in the Crown; and theſe officers are required to obey whatever orders they receive from the King's Mi⯑niſters, not only independent of the Directors at home, but of the Civil Government of the Preſi⯑dency to which they belong. I ſtate the facts as I find them, and ſhall leave them without comment to the judgement of the Houſe.

The general patronage of the Company is pro⯑feſſedly left with the Court of Directors, but with exceptions and reſtrictions which really reduce it to nothing. The Commanders in Chief and their im⯑mediate ſucceſſors, at all the Preſidencies, are to be under the immediate appointment of the Crown. By this proviſion the military is ſeparated from the civil power of the Company's government. The Court of Directors, who pay the army, and whoſe general authority over it is apparently continued, can neither appoint, nor remove the perſons who command it.

With reſpect to the offices of Governor General, Preſidents, and Members of the ſeveral Councils in India, the Directors, it is true, may nominate and appoint: but it deſerves to be conſidered, that they [9] who appoint are not permitted to remove; that power is excluſively veſted in the Crown; and even the pretended power of appointing to theſe offices is ineffectual. Their nomination is to be ſubject to his Majeſty's approbation. If the King diſapproves, the Directors muſt proceed to another nomination; and ſo on, toties quoties, until perſons ſhall be ap⯑pointed who ſhall be approved by His Majeſty. This is the way, in which the patronage of all the princi⯑pal offices in India is diſpoſed of. All other promo⯑tions, civil and military, are to be made according to ſeniority of appointment in a regular progreſſive ſucceſſion; and the Directors are prohibited from ſending out any new ſervants, civil or military, un⯑til certain eſtabliſhments ſhall be completed, and then, only to fill up the vacancies that may happen therein. I do not mean to blame theſe laſt regula⯑tions: but, if all the preceding exceptions and li⯑mitations are combined, it is evident, that no real patronage will be left with the Directors, or, at the utmoſt, a patronage to operate upon trifles. Not ſo the powers given to the Commiſſioners. In every department of the Company's affairs, their direct authority, or their indirect influence, is real and ef⯑fective. On the real principles of this bill, whether acknowledged or not, the Court of Directors ought to be aboliſhed. To leave a ſhadow of power after the ſubſtance of it is gone, is to eſtabliſh a contra⯑diction, which can only do miſchief. Whenever the conſtitution of any government is eſſentially al⯑tered, the forms ſhould not be allowed to ſurvive [10] the eſſence. Under the ſhelter of theſe forms, things will be done, or duties will be neglected, for which no man will be reſponſible. No deſpotiſm was ever ſo ſevere as that, which exiſted in the form of a republic. In whatever degree the powers re⯑ſerved to the Directors are effective, they can only be productive of miſchievous effects. They can only claſh with, and retard the operations of the ſu⯑perior Board, and furniſh them both with pretences for accuſing each other of whatever may happen amiſs.

Now, Sir, I ſubmit it to the Houſe, to deter⯑mine whether my firſt propoſition be not ſufficiently eſtabliſhed, that in every ſenſe in which power can be ſuſpicious, in which power can be miſchievous to the thing ſubject to it, or dangerous to objects not immediately connected with it, there is by this bill a complete and abſolute transfer of power from the India Company to the Crown. I conſider it only as it affects the Government of India, and ſhall purſue the remaining clauſes in the order in which they ſtand.

I have already taken the liberty of obſerving to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that the bill makes no proviſion for the ſituation of a Comman⯑der in Chief of all the Company's forces in India. The office exiſts, though it be not actually filled up, and it ought to be provided for. That officer has always had a ſeat in the Supreme Council; of courſe, there muſt be a miſtake in the ſeventeenth clauſe, which gives voice and precedence in Council [11] to the Commander in Chief of the Preſidency of Fort William, as if he had a ſeat there, which, in fact, he never had. The miſtake muſt be cor⯑rected.

From the terms of the nineteenth clauſe, I con⯑clude that Lord Macartney is to be removed from the Government of Fort St. George; that is, that he is to be ſacrificed to the views and reſentments of the Government of Bengal. I have not the ho⯑nour of knowing Lord Macartney, nor have I a connection with him of any kind: but, in order to be convinced that the noble Lord has done his duty, it is ſufficient for me to know who the perſons are, and what the combination is, that are united againſt him. By a different courſe of conduct, their enmity is not to be incurred. The moment I knew the fact, I drew the concluſion—I foreſaw the conſe⯑quence, and foretold it to his friends: This man is doing his duty, and aſſuredly he'll be recalled for it. Comparing this clauſe with another that relates to Fort William, the Houſe will obſerve, that in Ben⯑gal, which is the ſeat of power, and where, if miſ⯑chief has been done in India, the ſource of it muſt exiſt, there is to be no change of hands; but, in the ſubordinate ſettlements, there is to be an univerſal ſweep.

The wiſdom and neceſſity of the thirtieth clauſe, by which the General Court of Proprietors are re⯑ſtrained from interfering with any act, order, reſolu⯑tion, matter, or proceeding of the Court of Directors, will, in this Houſe at leaſt, be generally acknow⯑ledged. [12] All parties, I believe, are agreed on the neceſſity of putting an end to the cabals of that aſ⯑ſembly. Every bill, from every quarter, that has hitherto been propoſed for the better regulation of the Company's affairs, makes ſpecial proviſion for this favourite object. I therefore give the clauſe my entire and hearty approbation. At the ſame time, Sir, I cannot help obſerving, that the prin⯑ciple and object of this proviſion is not to be recon⯑ciled to the language, or rather to the cry, by which a bill that paſſed the Houſe of Commons laſt year was run down, and the honourable perſon who moved it, for a moment diſpoſſeſſed of his popu⯑larity, and driven from his ſtation. If the rights conveyed by an excluſive charter be in their nature ſacred, they can no more be invaded in part, than they can be wholly reſumed. If the charter itſelf be ſacred, it ought to be inviolable; or, if any part of it be more eſſentially ſacred than the reſt, it muſt be that, which ſecures to the Proprietors the con⯑trol and direction of their own affairs. In this re⯑ſpect, the preſent bill adopts the very ſame princi⯑ple, by which a much better was defeated. It aſ⯑ſumes a diſcretion, where, on the profeſſed princi⯑ples of thoſe who defend it, there ſhould be none. It takes or leaves juſt as much of the Company's charter, as ſuits the purpoſes of the preſent Admi⯑niſtration.

The object of the thirty-ſecond clauſe is proper. The ſubordinate Preſidencies ſhould either be de⯑pendent on the ſuperintendence and control of the [13] Governor General and Council in all caſes, or to⯑tally exempt from it. We know by experience, that an attempt to ſubject them to a partial control is not likely to ſucceed. We know that it has hi⯑therto produced no good effect. On the other hand, it is evidently abſurd and hazardous, that the mem⯑bers of one ſtate, and the parts of one ſyſtem, ſhould not be united under one power, whenever they are to act, and not move together under a ſingle direc⯑tion. There is no alternative, therefore, but to eſtabliſh a general authority at Fort William, and to inſiſt on a general ſubmiſſion to it: but, at the ſame time, let care be taken to unite the powers, and ſtrengthen the authority at home in the ſame proportion.

The thirty-third clauſe is ſo very incorrect and obſcure, that, I confeſs, I ſhould be glad to ſee it tranſlated into common ſenſe. It is ſaid, that the rules, ordinances, and regulations, which the Go⯑vernor General and Council are empowered to iſſue, ſhall extend to all rules, ordinances, and regulations made by the ſaid Governor General and Council. If this be not poſitively nonſenſe, it is, at leaſt, an extraordinary way of removing all former queſtions and doubts upon the ſubject. Whoever drew up the clauſe evidently knew nothing of the matter. So far from explaining the queſtions, or removing the doubts to which he alludes, he does not even know what they were, nor what they referred to. The only queſtion that ever aroſe in Bengal, con⯑cerning the power granted by the act of 1773 to the [14] Governor General and Council, to make rules and ordinances for the ſettlement of Fort William, was, to what things, to what ſubject matter, and not to what perſons or places, the power extended; and this, indeed, is a doubt which it would be proper to clear up. If it be intended to give a general le⯑giſlative power, the terms you make uſe of muſt be much more comprehenſive and much more explicit.

The thirty-ſeventh clauſe declares, that to purſue ſchemes of conqueſt, and extenſion of dominion in India, are meaſures repugnant to the wiſh, the honour, and policy of this nation. Sir, I wiſh to ſee a propoſition ſo full of truth and wiſdom, not only acknowledged, but enforced. In this moſt eſſential view, the plan of the bill is moſt eſſentially defective. It alludes to facts and offences which are not ſtated, and to criminals whom, ſo far from attempting to puniſh, it does not even venture to deſcribe. If ſuch facts and criminals do not exiſt, the whole bill is a ſu⯑perfluity built upon a falſehood. It ſuppoſes ima⯑ginary diſorders, for the imaginary merit of correct⯑ing them. But if they really exiſt, it is in vain to expect that they will be checked or prevented by the empty threats of a Legiſlature, that contents it⯑ſelf with piling up laws upon laws, and regulations on regulations—of a Legiſlature, that never has hitherto been obeyed, yet always looks forward to future obedience. Reward and puniſhment are the right and left hand of Government. It is the office of the head to frame and denounce the law, but it is the hand that muſt enforce it. In another point [15] of view, the bill is unjuſt as well as impotent. It makes no diſtinction between thoſe perſons, who have uniformly acted on the principles you approve, and others, who have uniformly acted on the principles you condemn. In not ſtating any to be innocent, it ſuppoſes all to be guilty. Now, Sir, I ſhall do what the mover of the bill has not had courage to do. I attach reſponſibility to power, and I affirm, that, at the end of the year 1777, the whole political power of the Britiſh empire in India, nominally veſted in the Governor General and Council, was really and ſub⯑ſtantially veſted in Mr. Haſtings. If Mr. Haſtings, ſupported by one Member of the Supreme Council againſt the other two, be not excluſively reſponſible for the war which was undertaken at that period, for the avowed purpoſe of conqueſt and extenſion of dominion, which carried deſolation with it wherever it extended, and which has ended in the ruin of the Eaſt-India Company, it is fit that Parliament and the nation ſhould know, nay, it is the duty of Par⯑liament to inquire, who was the author of the war, and who is to be anſwerable for it. Facts, it will be ſaid, may be very differently repreſented, and variouſly accounted for, eſpecially at ſo great a diſ⯑tance as from India to England. Sir, I well know the facility, with which facts at ſuch a diſtance may be ſtated to advantage. But principles formally de⯑clared, and deliberately avowed, are not to be diſ⯑guiſed or retracted. They ſtand for public judge⯑ment, and they demand it. If the Houſe have any doubt about the fact, let them look to the acknow⯑ledged [16] principles of the perſon, to whom the fact is imputed. Does Mr. Haſtings himſelf deny, that conqueſt and extent of dominion were his object in the purſuit of the Maratta war? No, Sir; he avows it. Let him anſwer for himſelf. I will not run the riſque of doing him an injuſtice.

‘"If the Britiſh arms and influence have ſuffered a ſevere check in the Weſtern world, it is the more incumbent on thoſe who are charged with the intereſts of Great Britain in the Eaſt, to exert themſelves for the retrieval of the national loſs; that we have the means in our power; and that, with ſuch ſuperior advantages as we poſſeſs over every power which can oppoſe us, we ſhould not act merely on the defenſive ^*."’

In theſe explicit words you have all the policy and all the juſtice of the Maratta war: If we have ſuffered loſſes in the Weſt, let us repair them in the Eaſt; wherever we are powerful, it is our buſineſs to attack. Surely, Sir, if no other evidence exiſted, it would not be very unreaſonable to preſume, that Mr. Haſtings's meaſures have been formed on the principles he profeſſes.

I am ready to admit that the clauſe in queſtion does all that can be done, by mere legiſlative prohi⯑bition, to put a ſtop to ſuch meaſures in future. Yet I very much fear that the general rule will be defeated by the exception that attends it. The Governor General and Council are not to make war, or to commence hoſtilities againſt any of the coun⯑try [17] powers, unleſs ſuch powers ſhall be actually making preparations for the commencement of hoſtilities againſt us or our allies. I beg leave to aſſure the Houſe, that whenever the Governor General and Council are diſpoſed to make war upon their neighbours, they can at all times fabricate a caſe to ſuit their purpoſe, and ſend home a maſs of incontrovertible evidence to ſupport it.—The exception in the next clauſe, by which a ſimilar latitude is given to Fort St. George and Bombay, is not ſo dangerous, be⯑cauſe thoſe Preſidencies are nearer to a power that may control them. They cannot make war, if the Governor General and Council be ſeriouſly deter⯑mined againſt it. But again I tell you, that one example is worth a hundred laws.

I am not very converſant with the affairs of the coaſt of Coromandel, and therefore ſhall offer but a ſingle obſervation on the ſeveral clauſes that relate to the liquidation of the debts due to Britiſh ſub⯑jects from the Nabob of Arcot, the Rajah of Tan⯑jore, and any other of the native protected princes in India. The labour of inquiring into and liqui⯑dating theſe debts, which the bill impoſes on the Governor General and Council, in addition to their own immediate duties, will be very heavy, and, I believe, equally uſeleſs. They may adjuſt the ac⯑count; but I have no conception how the debts are to be paid out of an exhauſted revenue, and a ruin⯑ed country. I believe it to be impoſſible, unleſs a preference is to be given to the private debts before [18] thoſe of the Company, which, I preſume, is not intended.

The final ſettlement of the preſent indeterminate rights and poſſeſſions of the Nabob of Arcot and the Rajah of Tanjore, with reſpect to each other, is a juſt, a neceſſary, and an attainable object. The principles, on which the ſettlement is to be made, appear to me to be the beſt that could be adopted. But I moſt ſtrongly object to, and proteſt againſt the idea of leaving the execution of the meaſure to the Governor General and Council. The power, which predominates in that Government, is noto⯑riouſly partial to the Nabob of Arcot, and hoſtile to the Rajah of Tanjore. The tribunal, to which you refer the parties, is prejudiced in favour of the ſtronger of the two, and, if its intentions were over ſo upright, ſhould not be truſted with the power of judging between them. Neither is it ne⯑ceſſary. There is no queſtion of right between the contending parties, which may not be decided as properly and as effectually in England as it can be in Bengal. The Court of Directors have all the materials before them: they may determine the points in diſpure, and ſend their orders directly to the Preſident and Council of Fort St. George, to carry their deciſion into effect. If they can do it, they ought to do it.

On a ſimilar principle of reaſon and juſtice, I ob⯑ject to the mode adopted in the next clauſe, for the profeſſed purpoſe of reinſtating certain Rajahs, Ze⯑mindars, Polygars, and other landholders, who [19] have been diſpoſſeſſed of their lands. The claims of the parties are to be referred to the reſpective Preſidencies, who are to inquire into, and determine upon them: that is, if injuſtice has been done, the perſons, who have done it, are to repair it at their diſcretion. Is there any colour of propriety, is there any prudence in ſuch a delegation of power? or do you think it would be effectual? For exam⯑ple, do you believe that any orders from the Court of Directors, or even from the higheſt power in this country, could engage Mr. Haſtings to liſten to the claims of the Rajah of Benares? Can he be reaſonably deemed an impartial judge of ſuch claims? He has told the Directors^*, that ‘"if they ſhould proceed to order the reſtoration of Rajah Cheyt Sing, and, if the Council ſhould re⯑ſolve to execute the order, he would inſtantly give up his ſtation and the ſervice."’ He ſuppoſes it will be a queſtion in the Council, whether the order of the Directors ſhall be executed or not; and he fairly appriſes them of his own reſolution to oppoſe it. For my own part, I am perſuaded that he would hazard his life rather than ſubmit to carry the order into execution himſelf. Yet, if ever there was a caſe that called upon the national honour and huma⯑nity for juſtice and protection, aſſuredly it is that of the Rajah of Benares.

The next clauſe is material indeed. The well-being, if not the exiſtence of the natives of all [20] your Eaſtern Dominions, depends on a firm eſtabliſh⯑ment of that principle of taxation, which appears to be the object of the clauſe. Ever ſince I have known any thing of the ſubject, or had an oppor⯑tunity of offering an opinion about it, it has been the labour and effort of my life to inculcate and eſtabliſh the truth of this propoſition—that the tri⯑bute, rent, ſervice, or payment to be paid by the ſeveral landholders, of whatever denomination, ſhould be fixed and unalterable. The profeſſed object of this clauſe is the real object, and reſult of every concluſion, that my underſtanding is capable of deducing from ex⯑perience and reflection. The means, taken to accom⯑pliſh it, are the very worſt that could be thought of. After twenty years poſſeſſion of the Dewanny, after twenty years collection of the revenues, the fixation of the rents is ſtill to be a queſtion for future inveſ⯑tigation.—Good God! Sir, are theſe inquiſitions into the property of our Indian ſubjects—are theſe ſcrutinies into the value of their eſtates never to have an end! Are the natives of India never to have a quietus under an Engliſh Government!—In the year 1784 you order the Governments abroad to de⯑viſe ſuch methods as ſhall to them ſeem moſt fitting and convenient to eſtabliſh a fixed and unalterable tribute! The language held by the Directors, ſeven years ago, on a ſimilar occaſion, is wiſer and more hu⯑mane than yours, and ought to be a leſſon to you. In July, 1777, ſpeaking of a new mode of inquiſi⯑tion propoſed and eſtabliſhed by Mr. Haſtings, they ſaid, ‘"In the preſent ſtate of the buſineſs, our ſur⯑priſe [21] and concern were great on finding, by our Governor General's minute of the firſt of No⯑vember, 1776, that, after more than ſeven years inveſtigation, information is ſtill ſo incomplete, as to render another innovation, ſtill more extra⯑ordinary than any of the former, abſolutely ne⯑ceſſary to the formation of a new ſettlement."’

But the preſent courſe, it ſeems, is taken, in or⯑der to prevent any corrupt or oppreſſive practices.—Sir, the Court of Directors are in poſſeſſion of an⯑nual accounts of the revenues of Bengal ſince the year 1766. They have an account before them of the demand, receipt, and balance of every reſpec⯑tive year. In ſhort, Sir, they poſſeſs every poſſible light and information on the ſubject, which the Government of Bengal ought to look for, or would be able to obtain. They may take the collections of any one year for a ſtandard, or, what is much better, they may take an average of the collections of ſeveral years, and determine at once, and for ever, what all the principal diſtricts ſhall invariably pay. Perhaps it may be neceſſary, though I do not think it will, to leave ſome parts of the minuter diſtribution to the power upon the ſpot. The leſs you leave to it the better. The only danger of the mode I propoſe, or of any mode of fixation that can be propoſed, is this—that, take what period or what average you will, conſidering the daily and rapid decline of the country, the amount of reve⯑nue, ſo taken, will prove too much. The ſtate of the country, and of the people, calls as loudly for [22] abatement, as the neceſſities of the Company call for increaſe of revenue.

This, Sir, is the true way to prevent corrupt or oppreſſive practices. If you refer it to the ſervants abroad to deviſe the methods, and then to tranſmit their proceedings and determination to the Court of Directors for their final orders and directions:—in the firſt place, the delay of itſelf is a new, or, ra⯑ther, a continued act of oppreſſion to the natives; but what is much worſe, your meaſures are oppoſed to your experience:—you unneceſſarily give powers, which you know, or ought to know, have been con⯑ſtantly abuſed. One example, if there were no other, ought to deter you from replacing a ſimilar truſt in ſimilar hands. I have a right to aſſert, though not from my own knowledge, that the five-years ſettlement of the revenues of Bengal, made in the year 1772, was ſold by the Committee of Circuit. The fact is notorious in India; but it is on the authority of the Court of Directors that I affirm it to be true. In their letter of the 4th of March, 1778, they ordered the Governor General and Council forthwith to commence a proſecution in the Supreme Court of Judicature againſt the perſons who compoſed the Committee of Circuit, or their repre⯑ſentatives ^*.

I do not doubt that the ſubſequent clauſe, for ſe⯑curing the penſions allotted to ſome of the Zemin⯑dars [23] in lieu of their lands, was drawn up with a be⯑nevolent intention; but I believe the fact it refers to is miſunderſtood. The firſt and leading effort of national juſtice ſhould be to reinſtate the proprie⯑tors, of every denomination, in the poſſeſſion of their property. The very meaſure, that forced theſe penſions on the Zemindars, was an act of the moſt deſpotic oppreſſion. The rents demanded of them, for this very purpoſe, were ſo high, that, rather than be anſwerable for ſums which they knew their lands could not afford, they accepted of penſions, and ſurrendered the poſſeſſion and management of their eſtates to ſtrangers, to farmers, to adventurers, to the banyans of the Preſident and Council of Fort William. Is it otherwiſe to be believed, that any man in his ſenſes would give up his landed eſtate for a penſion, to be held at the pleaſure of an arbitrary Government?—Do juſtice to theſe people, and there will be no foundation for this clauſe.

It is proper and neceſſary that the Court of Di⯑rectors ſhould be reſtrained from ſending any new ſervant, civil or military, to India, until the eſta⯑bliſhments are fixed; and, when they are fixed, it is equally proper that the Directors ſhould be re⯑ſtrained from ſending out writers, cadets, or others, beyond the number neceſſary to fill up vacancies as they happen. The ſervice is overloaded with uſe⯑leſs ſervants: they are a burthen to the Government, and they conſtitute a tax of the worſt ſort upon the country.

[24] There ſeems to be no occaſion for a law to con⯑firm an exiſting rule of the Company's ſervioe. It is, and always has been, eſtabliſhed, that promo⯑tions ſhould be made according to ſeniority. The latitude given in the exception is perfectly unneceſ⯑ſary, as well as incorrectly worded^*. The Go⯑vernments abroad are ready enough to find urgent occaſion to deviate from the general rule. The vote in Council is the very act of deviation, not the me⯑dium through which they ſee cauſe for it.

The next clauſe may properly be combined with another, which ſtands at a diſtance from it; I mean to conſider the ſixty-ſeventh and eighty-ninth clauſes together. By the former no perſon, beyond a cer⯑tain age, is to be ſent to India as a cadet or writer; but no reaſon for the limitation is aſſigned. By the latter, no perſon whatſoever, who ſhall have been employed, in any capacity whatſoever, in the Eaſt Indies, ſhall be capable of being appointed to any ſtation or office in India, after he, having returned to this kingdom, ſhall have reſided at home a cer⯑tain time, unleſs it be proved that ſuch reſidence was neceſſary for his health: ſo that the worſt man in the ſervice is capable of being reinſtated, provi⯑ded he reſigned it on account of his health; whereas an able and meritorious ſervant, who may have been obliged to come to England, and to reſide here longer than the limited period, for the moſt urgent [25] and juſtifiable reaſons, though not for ill health, is utterly prohibited from returning to a ſervice, to which he may have devoted his life, and for which he may have relinquiſhed all other proſpects and purſuits. I ſee no reaſon for the diſtinction. There is no poſitive merit in ſickneſs, though it has a na⯑tural claim to indulgence. One would think that the executive power of the Company, if the Court of Directors are equal to any of their duties, might ſafely be truſted with ſuch details as theſe. It is not an object that apparently requires the interpoſition of the Legiſlature: but if it did, the proper and uſeful regulation would be, not ab⯑ſolutely to prohibit abſentees from returning to the ſervice, but to prevent their gaining rank in their abſence over thoſe, who continued to do their duty on the ſpot. Whoever ſtayed in England, beyond the limit of a reaſonable leave of abſence, ſhould return preciſely to the rank he held when he left India.

Taking the operation of the two clauſes together, the reſult ſeems to be, that, in the firſt inſtance, no man, who ſhall have acquired knowledge or expe⯑rience in England, ſhall be permitted to go India; and that no man, who may have acquired know⯑ledge and experience in India, ſhall be permitted to return, unleſs his faculties have been ſufficiently impaired by his infirmities, to qualify him for re⯑ſuming the duties of his ſtation. The favourite idea ſeems to be, that youth and inexperience ſhould govern Bengal. An old maxim of policy attaches [26] experience to years, and wiſdom to experience; and though I know there is a brilliant exception to this maxim, I wiſh it to be left where it ſtands—a bril⯑liant exception to a general principle, and not, that the exception ſhould be converted into a rule.

Nothing can be objected to the principle and purpoſe of that clauſe, which makes all offences committed by Britiſh ſubjects in every other part of India, or under pretence of the order of any native protected Prince, amenable to the ſame laws, and liable to the ſame penalties, as if they had been com⯑mitted within the territories directly ſubject to the Bri⯑tiſh Government. At the ſame time, there will be a legal difficulty in the proceeding, which gentlemen of the profeſſion would do well to conſider. The proceſs of our courts of juſtice does not run beyond the limits of our own provinces; ſo that, although the party accuſed may be in your power, the wit⯑neſſes neceſſary to convict or acquit him cannot, in any regular courſe of proceeding, be compelled to appear. If this difficulty be not provided for, there can be no trial of the offences in queſtion.

On the ſubject of preſents, my opinion, perhaps, may be thought particular. Forms and appearances, I know, are againſt it. Undoubtedly the Governor General and Council, the Judges, and any others who have great eſtabliſhed ſalaries, ſhould derive no other advantage from their ſtation. With reſpect to them, the prohibition of preſents is proper; but it ought to be complete. I can aſſure the Houſe, that the exception in favour of preſents of cere⯑mony [27] on ſolemn occaſions, is founded on ideas which I know to be fallacious. The acceptance of ceremo⯑nial preſents is no way neceſſary for ſupporting the dignity of men in power, nor has the refuſal of them ever given offence. General Clavering, Colonel Monſon, and I, conſtantly refuſed them. We told the natives, it was againſt the law of England, the very law by which we were appointed, and they were ſatisfied. Mr. Haſtings declared, that he ſhould continue to receive nuzzers, and carry them to the Company's account. Our other honourable colleague, who is now a Member of the Houſe, en⯑tirely approved of the honourable Preſident's conduct in the receipt of complimentary nuzzers: but he did not equally approve of accounting for them to the Com⯑pany. His words are; ‘"I might here make a ten⯑der to the Public of the trivial nuzzers, to the acceptance of which my ſtation has impelled me. But what is proper for the Governor General, would in me, I apprehend, appear rather in the light of a conſequential, inſignificant diſplay of rigidneſs in exceſs!"’ In Mr. Haſtings's letters you have ſeen ſome ſplendid examples of the ſub⯑lime. The honourable gentleman, whoſe words I have juſt repeated, ſucceeds better in the profound. It is his forte. Theſe trivial preſents accumulate very faſt. If I had laid myſelf out for the receipt of them, I have no doubt, that whlie I was in Bengal I might have realiſed eight or nine thouſand pounds from this petty ſource of profit. To men in high ſtation, the prohibition ſhould be abſolute. [28] In all ſtations, it ſhould be highly penal to receive money for corrupt purpoſes, or to extort it. In the ordinary tranſaction of buſineſs, I am inclined to think that preſents are not dangerous, and I know that they are uſeful. The Government of Bengal, through all its gradations, is a Government of favour, not of juſtice. Nothing would ever be done for the natives, if they did not gratify the perſons who forwarded their affairs. Whenever there ſhall be a Government of ſtrict juſtice in Bengal, and when⯑ever proviſion ſhall be made for the various offices under it, proportioned to their reſpective rank and power, you may totally aboliſh preſents. Till then, you neither can, nor ought to do it—till then, the oaths you preſcribe to the collectors of the revenue will bind none but men of honour. Men of a dif⯑ferent character will either totally diſregard the pro⯑hibition, or ſatisfy their ſcruples, if they have any, by accommodating the exception to all caſes, or all caſes to the exception. For the purpoſe of re⯑ceiving preſents of ceremony, all occaſions will be found ſufficiently ſolemn.

By the ſixty-ninth clauſe, the whole gift or pre⯑ſent is to be forfeited to the King: by the ſeven⯑tieth, the court of juſtice may order the gift to be reſtored to the party who gave it. Can the ſame preſent, ſuppoſing it were a diamond, be forfeited to the Crown and reſtored to the owner; or is it meant that the offender ſhall forfeit double the value in every inſtance?—The two clauſes ſeem to me to contradict one another.

[29] The ſeventy-firſt makes an exception in favour of counſellors at law, phyſicians, ſurgeons, or chap⯑lains; but it takes no notice of attornies, who are much more in the receipt of fees than any of the others.

With reſpect to the wilful diſobeying, or the wil⯑fully omitting to execute the Company's orders, if there be no material inſtances of the diſobedience alluded to, the law that propoſes to puniſh it hereafter is ſu⯑perfluous and unjuſt. The Legiſlature interpoſes be⯑fore it is called upon:—it ſuppoſes offences, which are not ſtated, and, by ſuppoſing them to exiſt ge⯑nerally, it confounds the innocent with the guilty. If they do exiſt, to a degree, that warrants and de⯑mands the interpoſition of the Legiſlature, they ought to be puniſhed as well as forbidden; at leaſt the offenders ought to be removed from their places. When the laws prohibit on one fide, and perfect im⯑punity encourages on the other, is it reaſonable to expect that the prohibition ſhould be regarded?—The minds of men will be determined by what you do, not by what you ſay; and the more you threaten, the more you will be deſpiſed.

The two next clauſes give a moſt exorbitant and formidable power to the Governor General and Council, and to the ſubordinate Preſidencies; even to Bencoolen!—All perſons ſuſpected of carrying on any illicit commerce or correſpondence with any body; may be ſeized, impriſoned, and detained in cuſtody by the Governor's warrant, until the Governor and Council ſhall think fit to bring them to trial, or ſend [30] them to England. No fact is ſtated, or even allu⯑ded to, that might require the delegation of ſo dan⯑gerous a truſt. I declare, that while I was in India, there never was an inſtance fit to be named as the foundation of ſuch a law as this; nor have I heard of any ſince. Correſpondence with the enemies of the State is high treaſon; and treaſon may be pu⯑niſhed without a new law. But what do you mean by illicit commerce? What tranſaction is there in life which an arbitrary Government may not inter⯑pret into an illicit commerce? Do you mean to deny the parties the benefit of the Habeas Corpus? Do you mean to leave it to the diſcretion of the Go⯑vernor and Council at what time the party ſhall be tried, or to their option whether he ſhall be tried on the ſpot, or ſent a priſoner to England? No, Sir; I know perfectly well what is meant. The liberty of every individual in India is to be held at the mercy of the Governor General. The clauſe has no real object, but to increaſe his perſonal power, and to make it irreſiſtible.

I have now gone through the ſecond diviſion of the bill. Before I proceed to the third, I have an appeal to make to the honour and to the juſtice of the Houſe. It is of a nature ſo perſonal, that it will probaby excite their curioſity; but it is alſo connected with the public ſervice. It has a natu⯑ral and a neceſſary relation to the general object of the preſent bill, and therefore deſerves their atten⯑tion. It concerns the ſervice of the public in fu⯑ture, that the character of men, who have faith⯑fully [31] and honourably diſcharged the duties of a high ſtation, ſhould be protected from reproach. The inſults, offered to the memory of ſuch men, contribute to deter others from following their ex⯑ample, are injurious to the community, and ought to be reſented with univerſal indignation. It is not of myſelf I ſpeak;—that ſpirit of preſumption does not belong to me. I am proud of the fortune, that connected my name and united my labours with thoſe of Clavering and Monſon, and it is all the diſtinction I pretend to.

When I ſought to obtain a ſeat in the Houſe of Commons, it was not merely for the honour of ſit⯑ting here, nor for any delight I take in your de⯑bates. With reſpect to India affairs, my firſt view was, not to ſerve England or the India Company; but the natives of India if I could. To them I am bound by every obligation of juſtice, gratitude, and compaſſion. From them I received the ſalary, which gave me a fortune. But, even if the ſervice of Eng⯑land had been my only object, this is the courſe I ſhould have taken to purſue it. I will not appeal to your virtues, or ſuppoſe that you have any. If you have common ſenſe, if, as intereſted men, you underſtand your own intereſt, you will treat the creatures, ſubject to your power, with lenity and juſtice. If wealth be your object, you will protect the induſtry, you will nurſe and cheriſh the eſtate, by which you expect to be enriched.

My ſecond reaſon for obtaining a ſeat in Parlia⯑ment was to have an opportunity of explaining my [32] own conduct, if it ſhould be queſtioned, or de⯑fending it, if it ſhould be attacked. The laſt, and not the leaſt urgent reaſon was, that I might be ready to defend the character of my colleagues, not againſt ſpecific charges, which I am ſure will never be produced; but againſt the language of calumny, which endeavours to aſperſe, without daring to accuſe. It is well known that a groſs and public inſult has been offered to the memory of General Clavering and Colonel Monſon, by a per⯑ſon of high rank in this country. I was happy when I heard, that my name was included in it with theirs. So highly do I reſpect the character of thoſe men, that I deem it an honour to ſhare in the injuſtice it has ſuffered.—It is in compliance with the forms of the Houſe, and not to ſhelter myſelf, or out of tenderneſs to the party, that I forbear to name him. I mean to deſcribe him ſo exactly, that he cannot be miſtaken. He declared in his place in a great aſſembly, and in the courſe of a grave deliberation, ‘"that it would have been happy for this country, if General Clavering, Colonel Monſon, and Mr. Francis, had been drowned in their paſſage to India."’—If this poor and ſpiteful invective had been uttered by a man of no conſequence or repute, by any light, trifling, inconſiderate perſon, by a Lord of the Bedchamber for example, or any of the other ſilken Barons of modern days, I ſhould have heard it with indifference. But when it is ſeriouſly urged and deli⯑berately inſiſted on by a grave Lord of Parliament— [33] by a Judge,—by a man of ability and eminence in his profeſſion, whoſe perſonal diſpoſition is ſerious, who carries gravity to ſterneſs, and ſterneſs to fe⯑rocity, it cannot be received with indifference, or anſwered without reſentment. Such a man will be thought to have inquired before he pronounced. From his mouth, a reproach is a ſentence, an invec⯑tive is a judgement.—The accidents of life, and not any original diſtinction that I know of, have placed him too high, and me at too great a diſtance from him, to admit of any other anſwer from me, than a public defiance, for General Clavering, for Colonel Monſon, and for myſelf. This is not a party queſtion, nor ſhould it be left to ſo feeble an advocate as I am to ſupport it.—The friends and fellow ſoldiers of General Clavering and Colonel Monſon will aſſiſt me in defending their memory. I demand and expect the ſupport of every man of honour in this Houſe, and in the kingdom. What character is ſafe, if ſlander be permitted to attack the reputation of two of the moſt honourable and virtuous men that ever were employed, or ever pe⯑riſhed in the ſervice of their country?—I know that the authority of this man is not without weight; but I have an infinitely higher authority to oppoſe to it. I had the happineſs of hearing the merits of General Clavering and Colonel Monſon acknowledged and applauded in terms, to which I am not at liberty to do more than to allude. They were rapid and expreſſive. I muſt not venture to repeat leaſt I ſhould do them injuſtice, or violate [34] the forms of reſpect, where eſſentially I owe and feel the moſt. But I am ſufficiently underſtood. The generous ſenſations, that animate the Royal mind, are eaſily diſtinguiſhed from thoſe, which rankle in the heart of that perſon, who is ſuppoſed to be the keeper of the Royal conſcience.

The third diviſion of the bill includes the inſti⯑tution of a new judicature, avowedly repugnant to all the principles of the criminal juriſprudence of this country, and of which there is no example, but the Star Chamber, in the hiſtory of England. My ſurpriſe and diſappointment, when I heard this part of the bill recommended and inſiſted on by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, are not to be expreſ⯑ſed. Yet I might have been in ſome degree pre⯑pared for the event. This is not the firſt inſtance, in which I have obſerved that the right honourable gentleman is never more urgent, is never more elo⯑quent in eſtabliſhing the truth of a general propo⯑ſition, or in exaiting the virtues of a general princi⯑ple, than at the moment he is going to introduce an exception to it.—No man, who heard him, can have forgotten, how earneſtly and how vehemently he recommended it to the Houſe, not to let their anxiety for the better government of India, how⯑ever laudable, engage them to do any thing incon⯑ſiſtent with the ſecurity of our own domeſtic eſta⯑bliſhment, or that might directly or indirectly in⯑trench on our own conſtitution. From this general caution, he proceeded to a warm and animated pa⯑negyric of the trial by jury. I declare moſt ſo⯑lemnly [35] that I thought he was going to new model the Supreme Court of Judicature at Calcutta, and to reſtore the Britiſh ſubjects in India to their birth⯑right, of which they were deprived by the charter of that Court, for no good purpoſe that I can diſ⯑cover, but certainly without any good effect. When the right honourable gentleman had thus eſtabliſh⯑ed his premiſes, by an appeal to conſtitutional to⯑pics, which always gain upon an Engliſh audience, he turned ſhort to a concluſion, which I imagine muſt have diſappointed and aſtoniſhed every man, who was not immediately in the ſecret—‘"That the beſt general rules were ſubject to exceptions, that neceſſity created a law of its own, and that ſuch a neceſſity exiſted at preſent. That the puniſh⯑ment of Indian delinquents could not be obtain⯑ed by proceedings in Parliament, nor by proſe⯑cution in the courts of common law,—of courſe that there was no alternative, but to create a ſpe⯑cial judicature, with ſummary proceedings, and without the intervention of a Jury, for the trial of offences committed in India."’—In the firſt place, Sir, I deny the ſuppoſition, on which the inference is founded. I have no doubt that delinquency of every kind may be effectually tried and puniſhed by the judicatures that exiſt. But if I thought other⯑wiſe,—if I were perfectly convinced that Indian delinquents could no way be puniſhed but by a vio⯑lent innovation in the criminal law of the kingdom, I would not purchaſe their puniſhment at ſo ruinous an expence. I would not, for the ſake of that ob⯑ject, [36] though I think it important, conſent to a breach of any kind in the principal barrier of the freedom of England. When the precedent is eſtabliſhed, I know not what farther innovations may be gradually grafted upon it, or how rapidly it may advance to the deſtruction of thoſe principles, which it begins with invading. We are not yet however reduced to that conſideration. Let us try whether, in effect, the right honourable gentleman is warranted in af⯑firming that there is no alternative. If there be, the principles we both profeſs oblige him to prefer it.—I am but little of a lawyer, and I am very de⯑ſirous to be inſtructed. If I ſhould be miſtaken in my facts, ſome of the learned gentlemen oppoſite to me will have the goodneſs to correct me.

Suppoſing it to be admitted, that taking the law as it now ſtands, the formality of pleading, and the difficulty of aſcertaining, according to the ſtrict rules of evidence, facts which have ariſen beyond ſea, are ſuch as will create a failure of juſtice, it does not follow, that it is at all neceſſary to deprive perſons accuſed of offences in India of trial by Jury. The Court of King's Bench has already the power of trying miſdemeanors committed in India, under the 13th of Geo. III. cap. 63. with the aſſiſtance of a Jury. If the forms of pleading and the rules of evidence ſtand in the way of juſtice, let the law be altered:—with reſpect to ſpecial pleading and evi⯑dence, let the King's Bench be governed by the ſame rules that are laid down to govern the prac⯑tice of this new Court; and then it will be as com⯑petent [37] as this can be, to take cognizance of, and puniſh offences committed in India, and ſtill the par⯑ty accuſed will, in every inſtance, have the privi⯑lege of being tried by his peers. When the act of 1774 was made, it was thought neceſſary to alter the law with regard to evidence: and it was accord⯑ingly enacted, that depoſitions, taken under a com⯑miſſion in India, ſhould be admitted as evidence in the King's Bench; but trial by jury ſtill remained. The Legiſlature did nothing to affect that mode of trial. Before that act, a miſdemeanor committed in India could not have been tried upon an informa⯑tion in the King's Bench, ſo that here was a new juriſdiction given to that Court; its juriſdiction was at leaſt extended to offences in India, which were before not cognizable in that Court, either by information or indictment. At common law, trea⯑fons committed out of the realm were not puniſh⯑able in England. To remedy this defect, various acts were made in the reign of Henry VIII.: but even in the arbitrary reign of that Monarch, no at⯑tempt was made to deprive the ſubject of trial by jury. At common law, murders committed in fo⯑reign parts could not be inquired into in England; but by the 33d Henry VIII. cap. 23. they might be inquired of, and tried by the King's ſpecial commiſ⯑ſion in England. By that act a new tribunal was erected; but ſtill no attempt was made to aboliſh trial by jury. Even in that commiſſion court, the party had the privilege of being tried by his peers. If it be true, that a new ſpecies of criminality makes [38] a new courſe of proceeding unavoidable, the ground of the diſtinction muſt be fairly and clearly eſta⯑bliſhed. The anſwer I expect muſt not be techni⯑cal, but plain enough to ſatisfy the underſtanding of men, who are not learned. When the common intereſt is at ſtake, the common ſenſe of the nation ſhould be conſulted.

A word or two more on the general ſituation of the country, and I have done. We have it from the authority of a noble Lord^*, or rather of a no⯑ble convert, whoſe opinions very properly bend to his experience, that, at a former period, he had oppoſed the preſent Adminiſtration, becauſe he diſ⯑approved of the courſes, by which they had poſ⯑ſeſſed themſelves of power;—that the caſe was now completely altered; that the ſenſe of the nation had been unanimouſly declared, and that the united voice of the nation could not be reſiſted;—that the Miniſter had now come into power, at the front door of the Houſe, and on the ſhoulders of the People. I do not mean to diſpute the truth of theſe propoſitions, much leſs the propriety of any change of opinion, that may be founded upon them. Take the fact as it is ſtated, and compare it with the conſequences, which it has immediately produced. Wherever ſenſation exiſts, the compariſon will be felt; and, if men are ſtill capable of reflection, it will force them to reflect. The very firſt act of this popular Ad⯑miniſtration, of a Miniſter, who comes into power on the ſhoulders of the People, attacks the Democracy [39] of the country, and annihilates the firſt of all the popular powers of the Conſtitution. The deciſion of the queſtion upon the Weſtminſter election, how⯑ever it may be turned, or in whatever colours it may be dreſſed, carries you finally and inevitably to this concluſion; that the People of Great Britain may be governed by laws, to which they have not con⯑ſented, and may be taxed by a Houſe of Commons, in which they are not repreſented. If this be the fact of Weſtminſter to-day, why not of London to⯑morrow,—of Middleſex the next? On the face of the precedent, I ſee nothing to confine it.

The ſecond meaſure of this popular Adminiſtra⯑tion attacks the trial by jury, and threatens to abo⯑liſh it. Such are the inſtant operations of that very power, which pretends to be derived from the confi⯑dence of the People.—But if the People of Eng⯑land are not mad as well as blind, if they have not loſt their underſtanding as well as their feelings, they will ſoon ſee how unwiſely they have beſtowed their confidence, and repent of their deluſion, when re⯑pentance is too late.

HOUSE OF COMMONS. MONDAY, July 27, 1784.
Mr. FRANCIS.

My objections to the bill, as it now ſtands, are in ſome reſpects changed; but they are very little di⯑miniſhed. It is not to be denied, that the bill has been materially altered, and, in ſome inſtances, im⯑proved in the Committee. Inſtead of profeſſing candour, which too often is affectation, I ſhall [41] ſpeak of the preſent merits of the bill, with ſin⯑cerity. I allow that ſeveral clauſes have been prudently corrected, and others very properly omitted; but I do not mean to admit, that parti⯑cular improvements, grafted on falſe principles, can eſſentially mend the meaſure. It is poſſible that a thing, which is wrong in one extreme, may be equally wrong in another. In acknowledging the improvements that have been made, I hope at leaſt to eſtabliſh a claim to credit, when I return to my objections.

No orders are now to be ſent to India by the Commiſſioners without the knowledge of the Di⯑rectors, or to the Commanders in Chief in India, without the knowledge of the reſpective Preſiden⯑cies. Orders of every kind are now to be conveyed through the proper conſtitutional channels. While you ſuffer the Court of Directors to exiſt, their au⯑thority belongs to the conſtitution of the Company. To paſs by the firſt is to deſtroy the ſecond. The abſurdity of that idea is acknowledged and corrected. The clauſes, by which the appointment of the ſeve⯑ral Commanders in Chief, and of perſons to ſucceed to the command in caſe of vacancy, was to be given to His Majeſty, are omitted. Undoubtedly, nothing could be more extravagant than the idea of ſeparating the military from the civil power of the Company's Government. The alteration was indiſpenſably ne⯑ceſſary. At the ſame time, I have no conception how it can poſſibly be reconciled to a political principle, which a right honourable gentleman, in opening the [42] original plan of the bill, laid down as fundamental. He urged and inſiſted on the truth of this propoſi⯑tion, and aſſerted it to be inherent in the Engliſh conſtitution, that the armies of any one State, how⯑ever they might be divided, or wherever they might be employed, belonged to the department of the executive power, and that therefore the appointment to the ſeveral commands of the Company's forces ſhould unqueſtionably be veſted in the Crown. He had then forgotten, what he poſſibly may ſince have recollected, that the Court of Directors are in fact the executive power of the State in queſtion. But I need not combat a propoſition, which he himſelf has ſo completely abandoned. The right honoura⯑ble gentleman, I ſee, is not obſtinately tenacious of his principles, or his complaiſance to his friends muſt be unbounded.

The ſeveral clauſes in the original bill, which re⯑late to the private debts of the Nabob of Arcot and the Rajah of Tanjore;—the reſpective claims or undetermined rights and pretenſions of thoſe princes;—the reinſtatement of diſpoſſeſſed Rajahs, Zemindars, and other landholders;—the fixation of the rents or tributes to be paid in future;—the re⯑duction of expences, and the final limitation of eſta⯑bliſhments, offices, and emoluments;—are all com⯑pletely relinquiſhed,—I will not preſume to ſay, in compliance with my opinion, but a good deal in conformity to it.—The principle I recommended ſeems to be generally adopted, that whatever can be done, immediately by the Directors at home, ſhould [43] not be referred to the ſervants abroad. Yet I am ſorry to ſee that, in this general ſweep, the very beſt clauſe of the firſt bill is included. I mean the one marked 58, by which it was provided ‘"that it ſhould not be lawful for the Governor General and Council of Fort William, or the Governor and Council of any of the other Preſidencies, or any ſervant or agent of the ſaid United Com⯑pany, of what deſcription or denomination ſoever, to alter ſuch tribute, rent, ſervice, or payment as the ſaid Court of Directors ſhould have finally confirmed, upon any pretence whatſoever, or to exact from or impoſe upon any native Prince, or his heirs, or perſons claiming under them, any greater or different tribute, rent, ſervice, or pay⯑ment, than ſuch as ſhould have been confirmed by the Court of Directors."’

I moſt earneſtly recommend it to the right ho⯑nourable gentleman to reinſtate this clauſe, or to revive the ſpirit of it, in terms accommodated to the new principle which appears to be aſſumed. The tribute once fixed, I would not leave it in the power even of the Directors to alter it.

The clauſe, reſpecting preſents, is properly amended. Wherever the prohibition is right, it ought to ſtand without exception. Admitting that preſents were really and purely ceremonial, in my mind they degrade the dignity of a high ſtation inſtead of exalting it. What in fact, and even in appearance, can be more diſgraceful, than for a Britiſh Governor to hold out his hand to receive a [44] few gold mohrs or rupees from every native, who comes to viſit him, and frequently from perſons, who are unable to afford it. The true dignity of power is to be acceſſible to its ſubjects, without ex⯑pecting them to pay for it. With reſpect to the ſubordinate ranks of the ſervice, I ſtill have my doubts. I am perfectly ſatisfied, that in the pre⯑ſent ſtate of the ſervice, no law can prevent the practice, and I am not ſure that you ought to at⯑tempt it. I have no expectation that ſuch a direct proviſion will ever be made for the Company's ſer⯑vants, as will even afford them a ſubſiſtence; much leſs an exceeding, out of which an independence can be gradually accumulated, by any efforts of oeconomy. People in England have no idea of the expence of living in Bengal. There is no ſuch thing as commerce. The few, who have engaged in enterpriſes of internal induſtry, have either to⯑tally failed, or been obliged to abandon them:—and the falaries, given by the Company, below the Board of Trade and the Colonels of Brigades, are very inconfiderable. Yet no man ſhould be cut off from the hopes of a reaſonable and moderate inde⯑pendence, in proportion to his ſtation.—Human inſtitutions ſhould conſult human nature.

I believe, Sir, I have now taken notice of every material amendment, that deſerves commendation. The other branches of the ſubject are more nume⯑rous and productive.

In comparing the preſent bill with the firſt, there is one general preliminary obſervation to be made [45] upon them both; that the two bills draw two con⯑cluſions equally falſe, though perfectly different, from one and the ſame falſe principle of policy. The principle, common to them both, is, that, where power is really wanted, where power ought to be ſtrengthened, the ſureſt way to ſtrengthen it will be to divide it. On this foundation, the firſt bill, inſtead of uniting the executive powers of the Company in any one Board, divided them between the Commiſſioners and the Directors, with ſo great a preponderance in favour of the former, that the latter in reality were reduced to nothing and ought to have been aboliſhed. On the ſame foundation, the preſent bill continues to divide a power, which ought to be united, but diſtributes it differently. The Crown and the Commiſſioners ſurrender almoſt eve⯑ry thing they had taken, and the Directors are re⯑inveſted with a power, which evidently ſuppoſes them fit to be highly truſted. But the truſt, as it ſtands, is incompatible with the control. The firſt bill, placing no confidence in the Directors, diveſted them of all power. The amended bill continues a check, in which the ſame want of confidence is implied, yet reſtores them to a power, which ought never to be given to men who are diſtruſted.—With reſpect to the governments abroad, the means taken to accompliſh the profeſſed object of both the bills are nearly the ſame. In order to make the power at home more capable of governing, they divide it. But, in order to make the power in In⯑dia more governable, they ſtrengthen and unite it. [46] This is the ſenſe, in which the old maxim, divide et impera, is now underſtood. This is the way, in which ancient maxims of policy are interpreted and applied by modern politicians.

The amended bill reduces the Preſidency of Fort William to a Governor General and three Coun⯑ſellors, for the immediate purpoſe, expreſsly avow⯑ed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, of giving effect to the caſting voice, in order to increaſe and ſtrengthen the power of the Governor General. This, I believe, is the firſt example of ſuch a uſe and application of the effect of a caſting voice. In all deliberative councils and aſſemblies whatever, the true and natural principle of deciſion is by a real majority of votes. But numbers, who debate, may diſagree; and, if the whole number happens to be even, they may poſſibly divide into equal parts. In that caſe only, the operation of the caſting voice is made uſe of to create a fictitious majority, not for the purpoſe of giving power, but merely to obtain a deciſion.—Hitherto the caſting voice has been conſidered as a neceſſary proviſion againſt a poſſible inconvenience. The preſent bill creates the incon⯑venience, not merely for the purpoſe of correcting it, but to convey a power, which, if proper to be given at all, ought to be given by a direct courſe, and ſecured againſt accidents. On the principle of the clauſes in queſtion, the Governor General ought to be a diſtinct perſon, and veſted with powers in⯑dependent of the Council.—As long as a Council of four is full, the whole power, that belongs to it, [47] will certainly veſt in the Preſident, provided he has ſkill enough to ſecure the blind and devoted ſupport of any one of the other three; and this, I know, may be done. But, ſuppoſe his complaiſant friend ſhould die or depart, and the other two ſhould con⯑tinue obſtinate;—the declared object of the bill is defeated.—The Preſident is reduced to a ſtate, in which he can do nothing but perplex or embarraſs the others, and in that ſtate he muſt remain, until his intereſt and influence at home ſhall have accom⯑pliſhed another appointment. A year and a half at leaſt muſt elapſe, before his new colleague can come to his aſſiſtance.—If therefore the power be proper, the bill ſhould take care to provide for its being held and exerciſed without interruption.—Sir, I am not ſuppoſing imaginary caſes. The oppoſition to Mr. Haſtings has not been conſined to General Clavering, Colonel Monſon, and myſelf. His preſent col⯑leagues, Mr. Wheler, Mr. Macpherſon, and Mr. Stables, have exactly the ſame opinion, that we had, of him and of his meaſures. Their oppoſition is as vigorous as they can make it, and, I believe, more deeply reſented by Mr. Haſtings, than ours.—From our oppoſition, however it might diſtreſs him, he felt no degradation. Of his preſent colleagues I know he has written home to this effect, that he ſhould have quitted the Government long ago, if he could have ventured to leave it in ſuch hands as theirs!

But perhaps it may be ſuſpected that the Chan⯑cellor of the Exchequer, in ſorming this arrange⯑ment, [48] has been guided by experience, and that he has facts of importance to appeal to in ſupport of it.—I will tell the Houſe how the facts ſtand, and leave it to their judgement to compare them with the arrangement. Some of the Directors are pre⯑ſent, and I call upon them to ſupport me if I am right, or to contradict me if I am wrong.

Before the death of Colonel Monſon, the Council conſiſted of five perſons. I do not mean at preſent to inquire into the reſpective merits of the two par⯑ties, into which it was divided, or to exalt one at the expence of the other. For the immediate purpoſe of the preſent argument, it is ſufficient for me to ſay, what every man in India and in the direction knows to be true, that, while the Government of Bengal was in the hands of five perſons, the Com⯑pany's affairs were prudently conducted, and proſ⯑pered accordingly. The ſyſtem, laid down in their general inſtructions, was obſerved;—their orders were obeyed;—their debts were diſcharged;—their treaſury was filled;—and great inveſtments were provided by ſavings out of the revenue. Above all the reſt, we fixed our attention to the preſervation of peace throughout India. We maintained it our⯑ſelves, and, when it was violated by the Preſidency of Bombay, we reſtored it by a direct interpoſition of the authority of our Government. When the death of Colonel Monſon had reduced the Council to four, which it ſeems is now the favourite number, the miſchiefs, which have ſince deſolated India and ruined the India Company, began to operate. The [49] ſecond war with the Marattas was planned at Bombay the moment they heard of the death of General Clavering, and received, embraced, and promoted by the Governor General and Council, the moment the plan was communicated to us. In leſs than five months after the death of General Clavering, the reſolution was taken at Fort William to break the definitive treaty of peace concluded but a year be⯑fore at Poorundur, and to ſend an army acroſs India to invade the Peſhwa's dominions. The General's place was ſoon ſupplied by Mr. Wheler, ſo that, from Colonel Monſon's death in October 1776, to the arrival of Sir Eyre Coote in March 1779, the Council conſiſted of four perſons, excepting an in⯑terval of three or four months, in which I ſtood alone againſt Mr. Haſtings and Mr. Barwell; and in that period, I affirm that all the miſchiefs, with which you are now oppreſſed, took their birth, and grew into effects, which by this time, I fear, are not to be retrieved.—Your treaſuries are empty;—your debts are inſupportable;—your inveſtment, when you have any, is paid for by bills on the Com⯑pany, and two thirds of India have been laid waſte. With theſe facts before you, is it poſſible for the Legiſlature to reject the number, under which the Company's affairs were wiſely and happily conduc⯑ted in India, and voluntarily prefer that, under which every thing has been done, which this very law profeſſes to condemn, and moſt ſtrongly pro⯑hibits?

[50] By the ſeventeenth and eighteenth clauſes of the a nended bill, the ſituation of a Commander in Chief of all the Company's forces in India is now provi⯑ded for. At laſt it has been diſcovered, that ſuch an office exiſts. I have no objection to the voice and precedence given him in the Supreme Council, or at the ſubordinate Councils of Fort St. George and Bombay, when he ſhall happen to be at either of them.—But I ſtrongly object to the ſituation, in which his arrival there will place the reſpective Commanders in Chief at thoſe two Preſidencies. He not only ſuperſedes them in rank, but reduces them to ſilence. During his ſtay, they are only to have a ſeat, but no voice, in the Council. The Houſe will obſerve that this is a civil office, not a military command; but, even on the ſtricteſt mili⯑tary ideas, the proviſion is abſurd. The arrival of a ſuperior officer diſpoſſeſſes the inferior, but does not annihilate him; he ſtill continues ſecond in command, with a real and effective, though not with an equal authority. For what reaſon he is inſtant⯑ly to be converted into a mute, I cannot conceive. Naturally he ought to be better informed than a ſtranger concerning the affairs of the Preſidency, where he has commanded. But the object of the clauſe is to filence the perſon, who, having the beſt information, ought to be ſpecially conſulted. It ought to be conſidered too, whether gentlemen of high rank in the army, whether a general officer in the King's ſervice, who may happen to command upon the coaſt, be likely to ſubmit to this ſort of [51] treatment, or how far it may wound the honourable feelings and ſpirit of the profeſſion?

Sir, I ſhall leave the remaining regulations of the bill to other gentlemen, who I believe have conſi⯑dered them with proper attention, and go at once to that article, which, I confeſs, is to me more im⯑portant than all the reſt. I mean the new judica⯑ture, which the bill introduces into the criminal law of this country. I perceive that, in the appre⯑henſion of ſome gentlemen, this part of the bill has been conſiderably corrected and improved by the amendments made in the Committee, and that ſome gentlemen, who objected to it at firſt, are now ſatis⯑fied. I am truly ſorry for it; becauſe I wiſh that the principle of every meaſure, which I deem to be dangerous to the conſtitution, ſhould appear at once to the public view, undiſguiſed, in its real ſhape, and in the colours that belong to it. They deceive themſelves groſſly who imagine that that, which is eſſentially wrong, can ever be formally right. It cannot be corrected or improved, becauſe the defect is in the eſſence, not in the form. And why ſhould you lay aſide the trial by jury in the caſe of Indian delinquents? I have yet heard no one affirmative reaſon aſſigned for it. Is it ſuſpected that a Jury will not do juſtice? You have no ground for the ſuſpicion; on the contrary, in the only caſe in point, in the only caſe of Indian delinquency that has been proſecuted in a court of common law, the Jury did their duty. I do not mean to enter into the merits of the proſecution of Mr. Stratton and Mr. Brooke for [52] diſpoſſeſſing and impriſoning Lord Pigot; it is ſuf⯑ficient for my preſent purpoſe to ſay, that the pub⯑lic in general thought that thoſe perſons deſerved to be ſeverely puniſhed, and expected that they would be ſo. Why were they not? The Jury did their part in finding them guilty. If they were not ſufficiently puniſhed, it was the fault of the Bench. Now, ob⯑ſerve the conſequence: You lay aſide the Jury, who, in the only inſtance in point, did every thing that depended on them to bring the criminals to condign puniſhment, and you think you are ſure of juſtice, in uniting the incompatible offices of Judge and Jury in the ſame perſons, who, the only time they were tried, have totally diſappointed the public ex⯑pectation of public juſtice. But all reaſon and ar⯑gument are uſeleſs againſt power. If a Britiſh Houſe of Commons can, on any terms, conſent, in any in⯑ſtance, to aboliſh the trial by Jury, and if the peo⯑ple at large are inſenſible of the danger of ſuch a precedent, individuals, who have done their duty, muſt ſubmit to their ſhare in the miſchief, which they could not prevent. I fear the temper and cha⯑racter of the nation are changed. Though I am not an old man, I can remember a time, when an attempt of this nature would have thrown the whole king⯑dom into a flame. Had it [...]een made when a great man^*, who is now no more, had a ſeat in this Houſe, he would have ſtarted from the bed of ſickneſs, he would have ſolicited ſome friendly hand to depoſit [53] him on this floor, and from this ſtation, with a mo⯑narch's voice, would have called the kingdom to arms to oppoſe it. But he is dead, and has left nothing in this world, that reſembles him. He is dead, and the ſenſe, and honour, and character, and underſtanding of the nation are dead with him. But it ſeems there is a neceſſity, that ſuperſedes all objections. Juſtice muſt be done, and criminals muſt be puniſhed. Sir, it requires ſome fortitude; it requires patience, long exerciſed, to endure ſo groſs a mockery. The bill, that threatens future puniſhment to future crimes, gives you a ſpecial earneſt of its ſincerity, in ſheltering every offence, and protecting every offender who has hitherto exiſted, or who does exiſt at this hour. The pre⯑ſent law opens its boſom to receive them, and there they are ſafe: nay, it carries its precaution farther; it provides for the ſecurity of crimes in eſſe, that are actually unfiniſhed, and allows a ſuf⯑ficient time, in which they may be compleated. When theſe honourable ſervices are accompliſhed, ſtrict Juſtice is then to take her ſeat. From that moment we are never to ſee any thing but her ſword. When the whole harveſt has been plundered, when the field itſelf has been trampled into duſt, you denounce racks and gibbets to the petty larceny, that hereafter may glean a few ears of corn. I have done my part to the utmoſt of my little judge⯑ment and ability. From thoſe, to whom more has been given, more will be expected. What I have ſaid will not be uſeleſs, if it ſuggeſts the materials [54] of reflection to others, and furniſhes employment for greater abilities.

The other regulations of the bill may be thought to require immediate diſpatch. If they are proper to be executed at all, they cannot be carried too ſoon into effect. But no argument of that kind can be applied to the clauſes, that regard the Judicature. The bill, on the face of it, expreſſes no particular hurry to puniſh any body.—For what poſſible rea⯑ſon then, ſhould this part of the bill be ſo urgently preſſed forward to keep pace with the reſt?—The preſent Adminiſtration, we are told, poſſeſſes the confidence, and are at all times ready to appeal to the judgement of the People. Let us ſee whether they are ready to act up to their profeſſions. Sure⯑ly, Sir, there never can be an occaſion more proper for an appeal to the ſenſe of the nation, than when Government is going to introduce a new mode of trial into the law of this land, which, in the firſt inſtance, deprives a part of the people of their com⯑mon right, and which, on ſimilar pretences, may be extended to the whole kingdom. If the nation acquieſces, you loſe nothing by the delay. If not, you are bound by your principles to relinquiſh the attempt.

Allow me a word at parting to an honourable^*, and a learned^† gentleman: to one of whom I am much indebted, and to the other, ſpecially engaged. The honourable gentleman aſſures the Houſe, that [55] he is not the repreſentative of Mr. Haſtings, though a conſiderable part of his life be employed in attack⯑ing, defending, and reſenting for that gentleman. I obſerve it to his credit, that, although he is not a principal in theſe queſtions, he takes part in them with no leſs activity and zeal, than if the cauſe were directly and eſſentially his own. Between the ho⯑nourable gentleman and me there is not, nor ever has been, any perſonal ſubject of offence. In one ſenſe therefore, I may be permitted to conſider him as the repreſentative of Mr. Haſtings, ſince every man of honour is properly the repreſentative of an ab⯑ſent friend. This, I preſume, was the principle, on which the honourable gentleman muſt have acted, when he very lately created an opportunity of reci⯑ting to the Houſe ſome tedious paſſages from a let⯑ter of ten years ſtanding, which, pronouncing it to be extremely dull, he naturally, and I cannot ſay unwarrantably, concluded to be mine. But his ea⯑gerneſs to puniſh the guilty, made him forget that the Houſe was innocent. The honourable gentle⯑man had no mercy upon either. Not confining himſelf to my ſuppoſed writings, he thought it a good opportunity to produce ſome ſerious charges againſt my conduct. To theſe laſt, my anſwer upon the inſtant, I believe was thought ſufficient. My own feelings aſſured me, that I carried the ſenſe of the Houſe along with me. To his aſſertion, that we went to India pre-determined to declare war with Mr. Haſtings at the moment of our arrival, I ſaid, that the moment of our arrival gave us an [56] inſight into his conduct, which made it impoſſi⯑ble for us, as honeſt men, to unite with him. Contrary to all his own repeated declarations and profeſſions reſpecting a pacific ſyſtem, we found the Company's army engaged by him in the extir⯑pation of the Rohilla nation, with whom we had lately been in alliance, and with whom the Engliſh had no quarrel whatever, for the ſole and acknow⯑ledged purpoſe of gaining a ſum of money. We found he had ſold the extirpation of a whole people, who had never offended us, for forty lacks of rupees; not a rupee of which had been paid, though the ſervice was compleated. We found a third part of the whole military force of Bengal had marched to places, ſo remote from our own territory, that none of the ordinary maps of Hindoſtan went far enough north to include their ſituation. I ſubmit to judgement, whether theſe facts alone did not oblige us to alter our opinion, not only of Mr. Haſtings's political conduct, but of his perſonal character. The prejudices we carried with us to India were paſſionately and almoſt ab⯑ſurdly in his favour. I need not enter farther into the merits of a queſtion, on which every tribunal, that was competent to examine it, has formally pro⯑nounced condemnation againſt him. On the 28th of November, 1775, the Court of Directors unani⯑mouſly reſolved, ‘"That the agreement made with Sujah Dowlah, and the then Governor, (Mr. Haſtings) for the hire of a part of the Compa⯑ny's troops for the reduction of the Rohilla coun⯑try, [57] and the ſubſequent ſteps taken for the car⯑rying on that war, were founded on wrong poli⯑cy, were contrary to the general orders of the Company, for keeping the troops within the bounds of the provinces, and for not extending their conqueſts; and were alſo contrary to thoſe general principles of juſtice, which the Company wiſh ſhould be ſupported."’

Even his ſpecial friends the Proprietors, on this occaſion concurred with the Directors. Except that he had intereſt enough in that quarter to get the re⯑ference to juſtice omitted, the whole body of the Proprietors, unâ voce, condemned him. On the 6th of December, 1775, they reſolved unanimouſly, ‘"That notwithſtanding this Court hath the higheſt opinion of the ſervices and integrity of Warren Haſtings, Eſq. and cannot admit a ſuſpicion of corrupt motives operating on his conduct with⯑out proof; yet they are of opinion, with their Court of Directors, that the agreement made with Sujah Dowlah for the hire of a part of the Company's troops for the reduction of the Ro⯑hilla country, and the ſubſequent ſteps taken for carrying on that war, were founded on wrong policy, were contrary to the general orders of the Company frequently repeated, for keeping their troops within the bounds of the provinces, and for not extending their territories; and were alſo contrary to thoſe general principles, which the Company wiſh ſhould be ſupported."’

[58] The honourable gentleman was then pleaſed to charge me with having oppoſed General Clavering on a particular occaſion, but with ſo much appa⯑rent reluctance, and in terms of ſo much doubt and apprehenſion, as evidently betrayed the dependence of my ſituation. A difference of opinion ſeems a ſtrange proof of dependance. He concluded how⯑ever that I was bound by ſome ſecret inſtructions to follow the dictates of General Clavering, and that, when I refuſed to be guided by him, I hazarded my employment. This, indeed, if it were true, would be a ſerious charge not only againſt me, but againſt Ge⯑neral Clavering himſelf, whoſe memory the honour⯑able gentleman profeſſes to reſpect, and againſt the noble LordLord North. in the blue ribband, by whom alone ſuch inſtructions could have been given. The ho⯑nourable gentleman, however, has in ſome degree an⯑ſwered his own charge. Forgetting every thing that he had ſaid of my ſuppoſed dependence on my col⯑leagues, he almoſt in the ſame breath aſſured the Houſe, that, with reſpect to General Clavering and Colonel Monſon, I was primus inter pares, and that being at the head of a majority, I had in effect the whole government in my hands. If that be true, my colleagues were no more than cyphers at my diſpoſal. But in reality, the charge and the defence are equally trifling. I differed with General Cla⯑vering, not once but often, as the honourable gen⯑tleman will find, if he will look over our proceed⯑ings. [59] Men of real honour, though generally united, and acting together on the ſame general principles, will often diſagree, and when they diſagree, will be ready to declare it. Men of a different character, uniting on a different principle, will never diſagree in particulars, as long as their general engagement to each other ſubſiſts. It is perfectly true that I felt and expreſſed the utmoſt anxiety at differing from General Clavering on a queſtion of impor⯑tance; but not for the reaſon ſuſpected by the ho⯑nourable gentleman. I dreaded the conſtruction, which ignorance and malignity would be ready enough to give to my concurring with Mr. Haſ⯑tings. I knew my ſituation. When I oppoſed him, it was faction. When I concurred with him, it was corruption. The honourable gentleman, how⯑ever, has omitted a material part of the ſtory. He has inadvertently neglected to inform the Houſe that the Court of Directors, in their letter of the 5th of February 1777, intirely agreed with me on the point in queſtion.

The honourable gentleman ſays that we ſhould have acted wiſely for the public ſervice, if, inſtead of looking back to the errors of former times, we had drawn a veil over every thing that was paſt, and directed our efforts to future improvement. Sir, I am not of that opinion. I have no idea that ſuch a plan would have been practicable, and I am ſure it would have been unjuſt. Injuſtice is not valid be⯑cauſe it has been done. We could not abſolutely ſhut our ears to complaints. We could not ſay, [60] that no man, who had been injured, ſhould ever be redreſſed. The Supreme Court of Judicature look⯑ed very far back indeed, when it was their object to make an example, and to hold it out to the natives. But if the contrary had been true;—if the honou⯑rable gentleman's abſtract opinion were ever judi⯑cious, he forgets that we had no choice. He forgets that the Court of Directors preſcribed to us the very conduct we obſerved, and applauded us highly for purſuing it.

The only point, on which I could not inſtant⯑ly recollect enough of the ſubject to give the honourable gentleman an immediate anſwer, re⯑garded the repreſentation, which he ſays, I drew up in December 1774, of the condition of Bengal at that time. He charges me with a wild exag⯑geration in ſaying, that Bengal, even then, was reduced to the hazard of beggary and ruin. Sir, a mere queſtion of perſonal debate between the ho⯑nourable gentleman and me, would be of too little moment, even to ourſelves, to be obtruded on the Houſe, if it did not lead to information imme⯑diately connected with the general ſubject-matter of our preſent deliberation. You are going to make a law for the better government of Bengal. It is therefore proper you ſhould inquire, what the ſtate of Bengal was ten years ago, when the Legiſ⯑lature firſt interpoſed for the ſame purpoſe. The Houſe ſhould next endeavour to poſſeſs itſelf of the events, which have happened in the interval, and [61] then you will be able to determine, what is proba⯑bly the actual ſtate of the object, concerning which you are going to exerciſe your legiſlative power.

The Houſe, I imagine, will hear with ſurpriſe, that the firſt intimation I received of the diſtreſs of the Government of Fort William, was in a private converſation with Mr. Haſtings himſelf. On evi⯑dence of this kind, I certainly ſhould think it im⯑proper to inſiſt, if it had not concurred with many recorded declarations made by Mr. Haſtings to the ſame effect. The fundamental argument conſtantly uſed by him in defence of the Rohilla war, was, the diſtreſs of the Company's affairs both at home and abroad. In his minute of the 3d December, 1774, he ſays,

‘"All our advices, both public and private, re⯑preſented the diſtreſſes of the Company at home, as extreme. At the ſame time, ſuch was the ſtate of affairs in this Government, that for many years paſt, the income of the year was found in⯑adequate to its expence, to defray which, a hea⯑vy bond debt, amounting at one time to a hun⯑dred and twenty-five lacks of rupees, had accu⯑mulated. By allowing the Vizier the military aid, which he required, a ſaving of near one third of our military expences would be effected during the period of ſuch a ſervice, and the ſti⯑pulation of forty lacks would afford an ample ſupply to our treaſury, and to the currency of the country."’

[62] On this declaration, our firſt obſervation was, that urgent diſtreſs was implied in the violent nature of the remedy.

The maxims of policy invented by Mr. Haſtings to ſupport the fact, accommodate themſelves per⯑fectly to the motives on which he acted.

30th Nov. 1774. ‘"If the internal reſources of a ſtate fail it, or are not equal to its occaſional wants, whence can it obtain immediate relief, but from external means?"’

30th Nov. 1774. ‘"I ſhall be always ready to profeſs, that I do reckon the probable acquiſition of wealth among my reaſons for taking up arms againſt my neigh⯑bours."’

Obſerve, Sir, that one of Mr. Haſtings's motives for taking up arms againſt his neighbours, not againſt his enemies, is plainly and explicitly to get poſſeſſion of their wealth.

With reſpect to the actual diſtreſs of the Govern⯑ment and country of Bengal, I deſire nothing to be believed on my own aſſertion. On the 17th of Oc⯑tober, 1774, a day or two before our arrival at Cal⯑cutta, Mr. Haſtings and his Council drew up a let⯑ter to the Court of Directors in defence of the Ro⯑hilla war, which they principally reſted on ‘"the acquifition of forty lacks of rupees to the Com⯑pany, and of ſo much ſpecie added to the ex⯑hauſted curreacy of theſe provinces:"’ not a rupee [63] of which, however, was received until ſome time after our arrival.

With reſpect to the internal ſtate of the provinces, I preſume that the evidence of the late Mr. Samuel Middleton, one of the oldeſt and moſt experienced of the Company's ſervants in Bengal, will be al⯑lowed to be concluſive. If it were not, I could ſupport it by a maſs of other evidence of equal au⯑thority. In his letter of the 5th of February 1775, near five months after our arrival, he ſays, ‘"When a very conſiderable portion, ſuppoſed even a third of the whole inhabitants, had periſhed, the re⯑maining two thirds were obliged to pay for the lands now left without cultivators. The country has languiſhed ever ſince, and the evil continues enhancing every day."’ Now, Sir, I think it will be admitted, that no deſcription of national or po⯑litical diſtreſs can eaſily be exaggerated, which is founded on evidence and authorities ſuch as theſe. But has any thing happened, ſince that time, to im⯑prove the ſtate of the country?—Excepting the ſhort interval, in which General Clavering's prin⯑ciples and authority prevailed, have you heard of any thing but war in all parts of India?—But the oppreſſion and rebellion of Princes ſubject to your power?—Mutinies among the native troops for want of pay?—Extraction of ſpecie from Bengal for the ſupport of the other Preſidencies, the enor⯑mous amount of which is ſtated as the merit of Mr. Haſtings?—Inveſtments bought with paper—and draughts on the Directors, and debts accumulating [64] without end? Put the facts together, and then the Houſe will be able to determine, whether the la⯑bour they have at laſt undertaken of correcting ſo many diſorders, and recovering our Indian poſſeſ⯑ſeſſions from ſo many diſtreſſes, be a taſk of common magnitude, or likely to be accompliſhed by common men?

Now, Sir, having diſmiſſed the ſerious part of the honourable gentleman's charge, I hope he will allow me to make a few obſervations on the manner and time, in which it was produced. Suppoſing him for a moment to be the repreſentative of Mr. Haſ⯑tings, and to feel for that gentleman as ſenfibly as he could do for himſelf, I beg leave to obſerve to him, that his ſeverity to me is not juſtified on any principle of retaliation. I never ſought for Mr. Haſtings's letters. The honourable gentleman him⯑ſelf brought them before the Houſe, and trium⯑phantly referred the contents of them to an atten⯑tive examination. But, if it had been otherwiſe, I cannot admit, that an inoffenſive pleaſantry, which wounds no man, and ſometimes enlivens the gravity of debate, is equitably retorted by a ſerious de⯑liberate attack upon the moral conduct or character of an opponent. It is not likely that I ſhould ever have occaſion to make a ſimilar reflection on that of the honourable gentleman. His actions are too well guarded, and my diſpoſition to him is too ami⯑cable, to allow me to ſuppoſe the probability of ſuch a caſe. Admitting it nevertheleſs to happen, I cer⯑tainly ſhould not follow the example he has ſet me. [65] I would not endeavour to take him by ſurpriſe. I ſhould not expect him to carry letters or tranſac⯑tions of ten years ſtanding, correctly in his me⯑mory. If I thought myſelf obliged to bring a charge of any kind againſt him, I ſhould think my⯑ſelf much more bound, in honour and in juſtice, to give him previous notice of my intention, and warn him to prepare for his defence.

I am now to reply to the learned gentleman op⯑poſite to me, and with that I ſhall conclude. A challenge from him undoubtedly does me honour, for it ſuppoſes, in his mind at leaſt, an idea, which does not exiſt in mine, and could not have occurred to any other, that, on the ſubject in queſtion, there is ſome approach to equality from me to him. Not being converſant in the forms of the Houſe, I did not know, until ſome ſome hours later in the ſame evening, that I was at liberty to write down the words of gentlemen, uttered perhaps haſtily in de⯑bate^*, for the purpoſe of anſwering them at a fu⯑ture occaſion.—In a day or two after, I endeavour⯑ed to recollect the learned gentleman's words, and I believe I have taken them very exactly. If not, I hope he will do me the favour to correct them. He ſaid, ‘"That gentlemen had talked in a looſe general way of diſobedience of orders, without coming to particulars;—that if they would point out inſtances, he ſhould know where to grapple [66] with them.—With reſpect to the Maratta war, he affirmed that Mr. Haſtings was not guilty of diſobedience of orders;—that the Directors themſelves were to blame, in forming and en⯑couraging a plan of conqueſt on the Malabar coaſt, and that Mr. Haſtings, in commencing and purſuing the Maratta war, had not diſobey⯑ed orders, but had conformed to the views of the Directors.—That Mr. Haſtings nevertheleſs was greatly to blame for violating the treaty of Poorunder. On the truth of theſe aſſertions, the learned gentleman challenged me, and de⯑clared himſelf ready to meet me at any time and on any ground^*."’

I muſt confeſs, Sir, that this language, eſpecial⯑ly from the learned gentleman, appeared to me very extraordinary. I hardly ever heard any thing with greater ſurpriſe. He has employed himſelf, near two years together, with infinite induſtry and toil, in an inquiry into the abuſes that prevail in the India Company's ſervice.—He has publiſhed the reſult of his laborious inveſtigations in many folio volumes, which, I verily believe, no man in the kingdom has read but myſelf.—The preſent bill, of which the learned gentleman is prochein ami ^†, if not parent, ſuppoſes wilful diſobedience in every de⯑partment of the ſervice;—the conſtant complaint [67] of the Directors has been that their orders are not obeyed; and finally the right honourable gentle⯑man, who propoſes the bill, particularly urged and inſiſted on the neceſſity of conquering a ſpirit of re⯑ſiſtance, univerſally prevailing among the Compa⯑ny's ſervants in India. On any other preſumption, the clauſe would be ſuperfluous. In the face of all this evidence and authority, the learned gentleman gravely aſſures the Houſe, that there have been no examples of diſobedience, or that the inſtances, if any, have not been material. He calls upon his opponents to come to particulars, and then he ſhall know where to grapple with them. Sir, I will not weary the Houſe with a multitude of quotations from the Company's records. They are filled with the very proofs and examples, which the learned gentleman calls for. Setting aſide orders indifferent to the ſervants abroad, and which of courſe they had no motive to diſobey, and ſetting aſide orders, which were capable of being converted to ſome pur⯑poſe of their own,—for theſe they have obeyed not only with exactneſs but oſtentation, I affirm that, ſo far from its being difficult to find inſtances of diſobedience, the difficulty would be to point out an order of the Directors, that ever was regard⯑ed. The India Company little know, in what ſort of eſtimation their Directors are held in India. But it is proper I ſhould encounter the learned gentle⯑man on his own ground. Let him aſk the Direc⯑tors, what they think of the following examples. They are not mere facts, for which excuſes or pre⯑tences [68] might be invented, but formal acts of diſo⯑bedience, deliberately avowed and defended on principle.

The firſt is the well-known caſe of Mr. John Briſtow, who had been recalled by Mr. Haſtings from his ſtation at Lucknow, without any charge whatever againſt his conduct, and whom the Direc⯑tors repeatedly ordered to be re-inſtated. Your Se⯑lect Committee ^* have reported to you, in what manner thoſe orders were regarded. The general ground taken and avowed by Mr. Haſtings was, that the orders in queſtion invaded his prerogative, and he ſhould be degraded by obeying them.

The ſecond is the caſe of Mr. Francis Fowke, which has alſo been fully reported to you by your Select Committee. This gentleman was recalled from Benares by Mr. Haſtings, who declared that there was no charge nor the ſlighteſt imputation of a charge againſt him. The Directors repeatedly ordered him to be re-inſtated, but to no purpoſe. In their letter of the 27th of May, 1779, they ſay, ‘"We have read, with aſtoniſhment, your formal reſolution, to ſuſpend the execution of our orders relative to Mr. Francis Fowke; your proceed⯑ings at large are now before us; we ſhall take ſuch meaſures as appear neceſſary for preſerving the authority of the Court of Directors, and for preventing ſuch inſtances of direct and wilful diſ⯑obedience in our ſervants in time to come."’ On [69] this occaſion, the principle maintained by Mr. Bar⯑well was, that ‘"he muſt decline an acquieſcence in any order, which had a tendency to bring the Government into diſrepute."’

If the learned gentleman ſays, that theſe are in⯑ſtances of no great moment, I ſhall leave him to ſettle that queſtion with the Directors. Inſtead of combating his opinion, I ſhall take the liberty of aſking him, whether he ſeriouſly means to refer it to the Company's ſervants to determine, whether the orders they receive are material or not. If he does, I can venture to aſſure him, that the latitude he allows is ſufficient to anſwer all their purpoſes, and that they are not ſo unreaſonable, as to deſire any greater.

The buſineſs of contracts alone has opened a wide and fertile field of diſobedience. The fundamental principle laid down by the Company was, that all contracts ſhould be annual; that the Government ſhould advertiſe for propoſals, and always give a preference to the loweſt bidders. Theſe rules, I preſume, would be deemed unexceptionable, if they did not limit the patronage of men in power in In⯑dia, or the profits of their friends. Mr. Haſtings and Mr. Barwell gave all the contracts, to perſons of their own choice, on their own terms, for five years inſtead of one, and without advertiſing for propoſals. I beg the learned gentleman will attend to what the Directors themſelves have ſaid upon the ſubject. In their letter of the 23d of December, 1778, among many other obſervations, they ſay,

[70] Par. 59. ‘"This waſte of our property cannot be permitted. You ^† have diſregarded our autho⯑rity, and diſobeyed our orders, in not taking the loweſt offers."’

77. ‘"In order to prevent the Company's money from being thus given away in future, we poſi⯑tively direct," &c. &c.’

99. ‘"With theſe materials before you, the queſ⯑tion is put, whether the contractor's terms, or the propoſals of Mr. Johnſon, ſhall be accepted: Mr. Francis, in ſtrict conformity with the Com⯑pany's orders, and according to eſtabliſhed uſage, was of opinion, that the contract ſhould be ad⯑vertiſed. Mr. Barwell thought the preſent con⯑tractor had, the preceding year, by making low propoſals (to uſe his own phraſe) ejected Mr. Johnſon, in hopes of obtaining future indulgence, and therefore he could not heſitate to give his vote for Mr. Johnſon."’

100. ‘"However ſtrange Mr. Barwell's motive, for giving his vote for Mr. Johnſon, may appear to us, we muſt confeſs, the Governor General's reaſons for concurring therein were ſtill more extraordinary. His words are, I diſapprove of publiſhing for propoſals; this contract is reduced too low already, and will require a vigilant attention to it on the part of the commanding officer of the corps of the army, that it will be duly performed; to which he adds, that according to the beſt informa⯑tion [71] he had been able to obtain, little profit would be made by the contractor, if he did his duty."’

101. ‘"But although the Governor General has thought proper to expreſs ſo direct and pointed a diſapprobation of the mode adopted and poſitive⯑ly enjoined by the Company, for conducting ſo great a branch of their affairs, as that of the army contract, we nevertheleſs adhere to the propriety of the Court's orders," &c.’

If this part of the ſubject ſhould be thought to require any farther proof or explanation, the Re⯑cords of the India Houſe will furniſh it in abun⯑dance. If the learned gentleman be ſtill diſſatisfied, if he ſtill has any paſſion for combat, I ſhall leave him to grapple with the Court of Directors.

I do not perfectly underſtand the learned gentle⯑man, when he ſays, in the ſame breath, that Mr. Haſtings is not anſwerable for the ſecond Maratta war, though he was greatly to blame for violating the treaty of Poorundur. The breach of the treaty and the war are one and the ſame act. When he broke the treaty, he created the war. But it ſeems, he did it in compliance with inſtructions from the Court of Directors. Had that been the fact, it would have redounded to the credit of Mr. Haſ⯑tings, if, in that inſtance, he had treated their or⯑ders with the ſame diſregard, which he did in every other. He would then have had the real merit of ſupporting the permanent fundamental principles, the wiſe pacific policy of the India Company againſt an incidental order from a fluctuating Direction. [72] But it is not ſo. Sir, I am not a profeſſed advocate of the Court of Directors, and they are very well able to defend themſelves. In this inſtance, how⯑ever, it is but juſtice to them to ſay, that they have not been juſtly accuſed. Firſt of all, let us conſider what the Company's acknowledged ſyſtem is. If I am not very ill informed, the learned gentleman himſelf has heretofore declared, that their written inſtructions would compoſe a perfect code of poli⯑tical wiſdom.

In the very firſt article of their general inſtruc⯑tions to Bengal, dated the 29th of March, 1774, they ſay, ‘"We direct, that you fix your attention to the preſervation of peace throughout India, and to the ſecurity of the poſſeſſions and revenues of the Company."’

In their letter of the 15th of December, 1775, they ſay,

Par. 4. ‘"We diſapprove all ſuch diſtant ex⯑peditions, as may eventually carry our forces to any ſituation, too remote to admit of their ſafe and ſpeedy return to the protection of our pro⯑vinces, in caſes of emergency."’

5. ‘"We alſo utterly diſapprove and condemn of⯑fenſive wars; diſtinguiſhing, however, between offenſive meaſures unneceſſarily undertaken with a view to pecuniary advantages, and thoſe, which the preſervation of our honour, or the protection or ſafety of our poſſeſſions, may render abſolutely neceſſary."’

[73] 6. ‘"The attention paid by the majority ^* to the tenor and ſpirit of our orders on this ſubject, is highly agreeable to us; and it is our moſt poſi⯑tive direction, that no deviation from thoſe or⯑ders he permitted, but upon the moſt urgent and abſolute neceſſity; as that alone can juſtify a de⯑parture from them; for the proſpect of any ad⯑vantages, however alluring, can in no wiſe be adequate to the pernicious conſequences which muſt reſult from examples of diſobedience to our orders."’

7. ‘"The ſentiments expreſſed by the majority ^†, in the thirty-ſixth paragraph of their addreſs, coincide exactly with our own; their determina⯑tion to endeavour to maintain peace in India, and vigorouſly to defend our poſſeſſions and allies, cannot be too much applauded: we therefore ſtrictly enjoin every member of our Council, to concur heartily in ſuch meaſures as may be ne⯑ceſſary for accompliſhing theſe deſirable pur⯑poſes."’

8. ‘"We have already, in our letter of the 3d of March, 1775, expreſſed our extreme concern, in finding that our arms had been employed in con⯑quering the Rohilla country for Sujah Dowlah, and diſapproved the meaſure; and we have no reaſon to alter our ſentiments reſpecting that tranſaction."’

[74] In their general inſtructions to the Commiſſioners appointed in the year 1769, they ſay, ‘"In all your treaties with the country powers you are to take care, that they be ſo framed, as neither imme⯑diately nor eventually to engage the Company in any diſputes between thoſe powers,"’

Theſe documents, out of a multitude, are ſuffi⯑cient to eſtabliſh the general views and principles of the Court of Directors. With reſpect to the par⯑ticular point in queſtion, it happens that they gave a particular injunction. In a letter of the 4th of July, 1777, they ſay, ‘"Though the treaty (of Poorundur) is not, on the whole, ſo agreeable to us, as we could wiſh, ſtill we are reſolved ſtrict⯑ly to adhere to it on our parts."’ If the Direc⯑tors could have been mad enough to ſend out or⯑ders to ſet aſide thoſe, which I have recited to the Houſe, deprivation of power would be but a ſmall portion of the puniſhment their conduct would de⯑ſerve.

A word or two of perſonal application to the learned gentleman, and I have done. I have ob⯑ſerved with concern, that his mind is not ſo perfect⯑ly free, as it ought to be, from uneaſy ſenſations. He is conſcious that, amidſt contending parties, he has done his duty impartially;—that, in ſpeaking of Mr. Haſtings, his language had been exactly ba⯑lanced between condemnation and applauſe;—that he never ſaid that Mr. Haſtings was either a very good man or a very bad man; meaning, as we all do, the political principles of the governor, not the [75] moral character of the man; and that having pur⯑ſued this middle, even courſe, without the ſmalleſt inclination to either ſide, he had not had the good fortune to ſatisfy any body. This indeed is too often the lot of moderate men in violent times. But I have great pleaſure in being able to aſſure the learned gentleman, that his lot is directly the re⯑verſe of what he thinks it. Inſtead of pleaſing no⯑body, he has had the wiſdom to obſerve a conduct, by which every individual of every party has been gratified in his turn. I ſhall contribute to the pub⯑lic ſervice, if I can aſſiſt in relieving him from this ill-founded apprehenſion. He cannot be diſturbed in his application to buſineſs, without injury to the public. To remove one half of his apprehenſions I need only read to him ſome of his own reſolutions regarding Mr. Haſtings, which I dare ſay he has totally forgotten.

This, Sir, I conceive, is not the language of a man very much undecided in his opinion, or who heſitates between the extremes of cenſure and ap⯑probation. [78] If it be, I ſhould be glad to know, in what terms the learned gentleman would expreſs himſelf, when he ſeriouſly intended to condemn. I can truly aſſure him that I am not acquainted with any man, ſo hoſtile to Mr. Haſtings, as not to be contented with this deſcription of his conduct. So peremptory and decided is the condemnation ex⯑preſſed in theſe Reſolutions, that ſeveral of my friends in India concluded they had been drawn up by me. Knowing nothing of the ſtate of men and things in this country, they drew their concluſion from the knowledge they had of my opinions, and from that very character of deciſion, which is ſtamped on the face of the Reſolutions, and which the learned gentleman thinks it prudent to diſclaim. The fondneſs and applauſe, with which he has lately ſpoken of Mr. Haſtings, have compleatly reconciled him to that gentleman's friends. All parties now have been ſatisfied in ſucceſſion; and in this ſenſe, I confeſs the learned gentleman has been impartial. His cenſure and applauſe are diſtributed with an equal hand, and ſo the account is balanced.

I told my Indian friends, in return to their let⯑ters, that I indeed had no concern in the matter; but that the buſineſs was happily undertaken by a man of great induſtry, of eminent ability, and un⯑exampled perſeverance, who, I was ſure, would carry it through. Of his induſtry and ability, my opinion is the ſame;—but I am forced to acknow⯑ledge, that perſeverance, ſuch as his, is not without [79] example.—Other men are obliged to employ their talents in one line, and direct their efforts to one ob⯑ject; and, even with this limitation, it is well if they ſucceed.—The learned gentleman's abilities are not ſo narrowly confined. He carries the appli⯑cation of them to every extreme, and equally ſuc⯑ceeds in exerting them in every direction.