SPEECH OF PHILIP FRANCIS, Eſq. &c. &c.
HOUSE OF COMMONS, Friday, 26th February, 1796.

Mr. FRANCIS ſaid that, altho' he was but little prepared and not at all inclined to enter far into the debate, and tho' he was full of impatience and curioſity to know what the Chancellor of the Exchequer had to ſay for himſelf, or whether he would be content to reſt his defence on the ground taken, and truſt it to the argu⯑ments uſed by the learned gentleman, nevertheleſs there were ſome paſſages in that gentleman's ſpeech, of which he thought himſelf bound not only as a Member of Parliament, but eſpecially as a di⯑ligent if not very active Member of the Committee, to take ſome notice. On thoſe particulars I ſhall firſt endeavour to ſet the Houſe right, and to prevent their being miſled. Not that the facts, miſtated by the learned gentleman, are very material in them⯑ſelves, but becauſe ſome ſerious concluſions have been fallaciouſly drawn from them. I ſhall then endeavour to ſhew that the learned gentleman, in the general drift and tendency of his ſpeech, has laboured to divert the attention of the Houſe from the real object of the inquiry, and to fix it on others, not immedi⯑ately in queſtion, or not eſſential to the point in iſſue, namely, whether the Chancellor of the Exchequer has or has not made a provident bargain for the Public; and, if he has not, to what motives his miſconduct may fairly and rationally be imputed. The firſt may poſſibly be proved; the ſecond can only be matter of moral inference or unavoidable concluſion, and never the ſub⯑ject, or very rarely, of direct evidence. No man accuſed has [4] a right, in the firſt inſtance, to plead character againſt conduct, or expect us to conclude that he has acted faithfully, becauſe the worſt motives poſſible are not to be proved by witneſſes againſt him. Almoſt the whole of the learned gentleman's ſpeech has been a digreſſion from the queſtion. He has inceſſantly travelled out of the record; but I flatter myſelf that, before I ſit down, I ſhall be able to bring him back to it.

The learned gentleman has thought fit to open his defence of this tranſaction by a triumphant appeal to the opinion of the Commit⯑tee, declared in the outſet and ſtated in the front of their report, viz. ‘"that, on the inſpection of the liſts, as well as from the ex⯑amination of the parties, your Committee ſee no ground to ſup⯑poſe, that any interference took place, on the part of any per⯑ſons connected with Government, in the diſtribution of any partof the loan."’ And this declaration, he ſays, was made with the unanimous concurrence of the Committee, and expreſsly of the Chairman and his colleagues; a deſcription of a part of the Com⯑mittee not very parliamentary in point of form, and perfectly unjuſt in its application. The word colleague, applied in that manner, would have no meaning, if it were not intended to intimate that the Committee was banded into parties, one of which was determined to cenſure and to condemn; and that the opinion, if agreed to by two or three of us, who might be ſuppoſed to attend on the part of oppoſition, muſt be unqueſtionably true in itſelf, and in all its con⯑ſequences. Now, Sir, I can affirm for one, and I believe it will not be denied by any, that, altho' I attended the Committee conſtantly 'till the laſt two or three days, when I conceived the bu⯑ſineſs was in effect over, and that nothing remained to cloſe the proceedings but a repetition of the ſame formal queſtion to the ſeveral ſubſcribers, I took but little part, certainly not an eager part, in the inquiry. I aſked ſome of the witneſſes a very few queſtions, and left it to the honourable gentlemen on the other ſide, whoſe ſuperior numbers, generally ten to one, gave them an abſo⯑lute command of the inquiry, to conduct it as they pleaſed. I was not preſent, when the preamble to the Report was voted. I had neither notice nor ſuſpicion, that it was intended to introduce ſuch a declaration into a Report of Evidence. Otherwiſe, aſſuredly I ſhould have attended on purpoſe to oppoſe it. In this ſenſe then, and with this explanation, the reſolution of the Committee was not unanimous. In any other, the unanimity, in which the learned gentleman triumphs, proves nothing. It was properly and exclu⯑ſively the act of himſelf and his friends. I now object to it as not only untrue in the available meaning and effect of unanimity, which [5] amounts to nothing unleſs it includes the opinion of your opponent, but as utterly irregular, and in every point of view inconcluſive. In the firſt place, I affirm that the declaration, whether true or not, ought not to have been forced into the Report. The Com⯑mittee was appointed to ‘"inquire into the circumſtances of the negociation of the late loan, and were impowered only to report the evidence, as it ſhould appear to them, to the Houſe."’ On the reſult or effect of that evidence or any part of it, they had no authority to report an opinion. Nor could they have it otherwiſe than by expreſs terms in the reſolution of the Houſe. But, waving this objection, which in limine is deciſive, let us conſider a little what the declaration in itſelf amounts to, and, taken with all its circumſtances, what weight ſhould be allowed to it. The Com⯑mittee ſay, that, on inſpection of the liſts, &c., they ſee no ground to ſuppoſe that any interference has taken place, &c. Be it ſo.—Is that enough? Does the contrary appear from the evidence? If it does not, the negative propoſition leaves its own queſtion untouched. I know very well that the liſts, produced to the Committee, with reſpect to the interference in queſtion, prove nothing; and that the publication of them was ſaid to be withheld for fear of injuring bankers and other perſons in buſineſs, who were great ſubſcribers, and who might be ſuſpected of not dividing fairly with their cuſ⯑tomers. But, if you look into the Report, you will find that ſums little ſhort of millions are ſtill covered by ſingle names, the diſtri⯑bution of which was never known to the Committee.

For one example out of many.

Queſtion to Mr. Goldſmid.

Is the whole of the remainder, amounting to 3,492,000l. for yourſelf only?

A. No.

Q. Will you ſtate to the Committee how much of that ſum is for yourſelf, and the names of the perſons, among whom the re⯑mainder is diſtributed?

A. 482,000l. is for my brother and myſelf. As to the re⯑maining 3,010,000l. I can't give up a liſt, as I was in honour bound not to do ſo.

With a number of ſuch facts before us, is it poſſible to contend that any affirmative proof ariſes, from an inſpection of the liſts or any other part of the evidence, that no interference did take place, on the part of any perſons connected with Government, in the diſ⯑tribution of any part of the loan? But, unleſs that propoſition be maintained, the opinion of the Committee is not only irregular, but uſeleſs and unavailing to the purpoſe, for which it was produced and [6] inſiſted on by the learned gentleman. Theſe objections, in my judgement, are fatal to the opinion in itſelf. Let us ſee what im⯑portance it derives from the perſons, who concurred in it. I am not ſpeaking of the formal conſtitution of the Committee, but of the materials, of which it was in fact compoſed. Individually without doubt the Members, who attended moſt diligently, and who had an entire command of the proceedings, are entitled to all manner of conſideration and reſpect. They are all honourable men, and, in proportion to their ſenſe of honour, moſt likely to be influenced in favour of their benefactor. I ſhall deſcribe them by their ſta⯑tions only; and, that I may do even that without a riſk of offence, I ſhall ſtate the caſe in another form, ſufficient for my own pur⯑poſe, and not liable to an invidious conſtruction. Suppoſe my right honourable friend near me had been Chancellor of the Exchequer, and that a queſtion had ariſen concerning the integrity of his conduct in ſome tranſaction of his office. I aſk this Houſe, I aſk every man of common ſenſe, who hears me, whether the unanimous opinion of two Secretaries of the Treaſury, of two Paymaſters General, and of twenty members of the Boards of Admiralty, Treaſury and Controul, all appointed by himſelf, would have the weight of a feather to ſatisfy the world, that his conduct had been pure and irreproachable? On this part of the ſubject I ſhall only add, that my right honourable friend, whether guilty or innocent, has too much diſcernment and knowledge of the world, to rely on ſuch miſerable evidence for his acquittal. I ſhall dwell but little on the other parts of the learned gentleman's ſpeech, be⯑cauſe it appears to me that the whole of it runs in a falſe direction, and that, if his particular obſervations were ever ſo true, they would not lead the Houſe to a juſt concluſion on the body and ſubſtance of the tranſaction before us. In defence or behalf of the propoſed re⯑ſolutions, it would be in vain for me to addreſs myſelf to the learned gentleman. He has loudly declared that, whether true or falſe, he was determined to reject them all. Againſt ſo vigorous and in⯑trepid an effort of reſolution, I know it would be in vain to apply any arguments of mine; ſo I ſhall leave him undiſturbed in the poſ⯑ſeſſion of it. He has ſaid a great deal with great aſperity, and I think with no little injuſtice, againſt the credibility of Mr. Morgan's evidence, grounded on the extreme intereſt, which he ſuppoſes Mr. Morgan to have had to miſrepreſent ſuch parts of the Miniſter's conduct as affected himſelf, and to ſtate them in his own favour. He has alſo taken pains to prove that Mr. Morgan was not injured, and had no reaſon to complain. Well, Sir, I, at leaſt have no perſonal intereſt in defending Mr. Morgan. I never ſaw him be⯑fore [7] the day when he firſt attended the Committee, and then I muſt confeſs that, in his temper and deportment, I ſaw no indications of deep deſign, of cool, thoughtful, guarded cunning. To judge of him by appearances, there never was a man ſo little qualified by nature for the part of an impoſtor. He muſt be an ideot indeed, who could be impoſed upon by Mr. Morgan. I gave him credit for what he ſaid, becauſe he ſaid nothing but what was probable. On the other hand, if, with the moſt unimpeached character, he had ſtated things utterly improbable, his character alone would not have ſecured his evidence from ſuſpicion. In by much the greateſt part of it, he was ſupported by the concurring teſtimony of all the other witneſſes. On that aſſertion, on which the learned gentleman denies that any credit is due to Mr. Morgan, and which, as he affirms, muſt have been a mere after-thought and ſubſequent invention, when he knew the terms on which the loan was actu⯑ally ſettled with Mr. Boyd, viz. ‘"that on the 25th of November, if he had been called upon on that day he would have offered thoſe terms for the loan, which he ſtated to the Committee, and by which, if they had been accepted, an advantage of 499,500l. would have accrued to the Public,"’ I, for one, declare moſt ſo⯑lemnly that I give Mr. Morgan entire credit. Becauſe I know that, on thoſe terms, the loan would ſtill have been extremely profitable to the ſubſcribers, and becauſe I have good reaſon to believe, from particular inquiry, that men of the firſt property in the city would have been glad to have gone halves with Mr. Morgan in that bar⯑gain. I do not mean now, and with their preſent knowledge, but on the 25th of November and with all the circumſtances in their view, by which tranſactions of this ſort are commonly governed, as they actually ſtood on that day. As to motives of a great intereſt, which might influence the teſtimony, and leſſen the credit of Mr. Morgan, let it be remembered that all the competitors had an in⯑tereſt of the ſame kind, and full as conſiderable as he had. To believe by ſelection is mere partiality, and indicates an intereſt in the examiner juſt as much as in the witneſs. But what is all this to the purpoſe? What have we to do with Mr. Morgan's intereſt, or with the injury, which, in his own opinion or any other, he is ſuppoſed to have ſuffered? The learned gentleman travels out of the record. In the reſolutions now propoſed to you by the Chair⯑man of the Committee, there is not a ſingle word on either of thoſe points. The true and only object of inquiry both here and in the Committee is, whether the intereſt of the Public was or was not faithfully guarded by their repreſentative and truſtee, the Chancellor of the Exchequer; whether the Public has or has not been eſſen⯑tially [8] injured by any act or omiſſion of his in the ſettlement of that loan, which he had at his ſole diſpoſal.

But it ſeems Mr. Morgan is not to be credited, becauſe he ſuſ⯑pected the Chancellor of the Exchequer of colluſion with Mr. Boyd? Was he the only perſon, to whom that ſuſpicion ocurred?—Look at the evidence of Mr. Melliſh. That gentleman's character at leaſt is unſuſpected. ‘"When Mr. Boyd and Mr. Robarts were called out of the room at Mr. Pitt's, (on the 25th of November,) I had a ſuſpicion that it would not be by competition, and ſaid, hey day! a Secret Committee!"’ I believe, Sir, I ſhall be able to make it appear that what then was ſuſpicion to Mr. Melliſh, ſhould now be conviction to this Houſe. The learned gentleman objects, with all poſſible vehemence and indignation, to the two laſt Reſolutions, as if they contained propoſitions palpably falſe or monſtrouſly abſurd. The former aſſerts, and to that part of it I confine myſelf at preſent, that the loan was a gift to Mr. Boyd. The evidence proves that the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who had uniformly profeſſed and held up the principle of free and open com⯑petition, and who had invited the competitors to his houſe to bid for the loan, did, on the 25th of November for the firſt time, and after a ſeparate conference with one of the parties, propoſe to the other competitors another principle of what is called a qualified com⯑petition, which they inſtantly refuſed, and which the Governor of the Bank tells you, that in their place, he would not have accepted. Mr. Boyd ſays, ‘"We were very willing to leave the fixing of the price of the loan to the Chancellor of the Exchequer."’ The Governor of the Bank ſays, ‘"Their anſwer was, that they would truſt to Mr. Pitt's candour, and take it on his own terms."’ And, in a few minutes, the loan was theirs. If this be not a gift, in all its effects, I ſhould be curious to hear the learned gentleman's defi⯑nition of that word, and, ſuppoſing it a gift, in what terms he would deſcribe it. The learned gentleman does not deny the previous conference, alluded to in the third Reſolution, but he objects to cal⯑ling it ſeparate. The epithet, it ſeems, is invidious, and calculated to convey a falſe idea of the conference, as if it had been ſecret, whereas it was held in preſence of the Governor and Deputy Go⯑vernor of the Bank.—True, it was ſo. Still the conference was ſe⯑parate, in the terms and meaning of the Reſolution. It was held with one of the parties, while the other two were excluded. The competitors were aſſembled, by appointment from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to bid for the loan, as they thought, on equal terms. The Governor of the Bank ſays, that on the 23d of November, ‘"I aſked him pointedly the queſtion, Whether it was to be by compe⯑tition? [9] and he told me, certainly it would, and that I might tell the gentlemen;—and then my ſuſpicions were done away."’ When the parties meet, the firſt thing that happens, is a ſeparate conference with one of them; the next, a propoſal to the other two to bid for the loan on terms incompatible with the principle of free and open competition.

The laſt of the Reſolutions is that, which fills the learned gentle⯑man with particular indignation, which he can no way endure, and which he will not only negative, but ſubſtitute another of his own in the room of it. Now, Sir, let this propoſed Reſolution be ever ſo defective, or ever ſo falſe and unjuſt, he ought at all events to ſtate it fairly. He aſks, whether it be poſſible to advance a propoſition more extravagant and abſurd, than that two millions and a half have been given to the contractors for the loan, and loſt to the public. The learned gentleman is not very exact in ſtating large ſums. For ſhortneſs I ſuppoſe, or to ſave time, or to ſpeak in round numbers, he always calls it two millions and a half, when the Reſolutions ſpecify two millions one hundred and ſixty thou⯑ſand pounds. At this preciſe ſum the Reſolutions eſtimate the profits to the contributors at the expence of the nation; but do not ſay that it was given to the contractors, or that the whole of it was loſt to the nation. Undoubtedly a fair and reaſonable profit to the con⯑tributors ought to be allowed and deducted. The remainder is evidently given away. But the whole premium is truly ſtated as a profit to the contributor. There is no other way of deſcribing it. At 12 per cent. on eighteen millions it amounts to 2,160,000l. I know that at one period the premium on the loan roſe to twelve and an half per cent., and that ſome of the principal holders of omnium did not ſell at that price or near it, as they might have done, becauſe they expected it to riſe to fifteen or ſixteen; and ſo it would without doubt, if the expectations, fallaciouſly held out by the King's meſſage of the 8th of December, had not been de⯑feated by the ſubſequent conduct of Government. What the real intention of the meſſage was, I know not; but I know that it was calculated to anſwer a purpoſe, that it had a conſiderable effect, and that, ſince that time, the contents of it have been diſcarded and forgotten.

I ſhall now endeavour, Sir, to ſtate to the Houſe, as briefly and diſtinctly as I can, what in my judgment, are not, and then what are the true eſſential points in iſſue, between thoſe who applaud, and thoſe who condemn the conduct of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in this tranſaction, and which alone deſerve the attention of the Houſe. Every attempt to ſhift the queſtion or the charge [10] from its real ground is, in ſome degree, an admiſſion. Men of experience and ability, who know the conſequence, would not reſort to bad logic, or to falſe ground, if they felt themſelves ſtrong, in fair and honourable argument, on the real merits of the ſubject. The line of examination, which the right honourable gentleman's friends inceſſantly purſued in the Committee, tended to prove ſome propoſitions, which were not in diſpute. The honourable Secretary of the Treaſury, I am ſure, will remember my having ſaid expreſsly that the reſult, though ever ſo favourable to him, would be ſuperfluous, that it was a defence without a charge, and that I cautioned him againſt the natural inference that muſt be drawn from that mode of proceeding. They adhered to it in the Com⯑mittee, and they rely upon it in the debate. We ſhall ſee with what effect. I aſſert then that, admitting the learned gentleman to have proved, to his own entire ſatisfaction, that there is no ground to ſuſpect the Chancellor of the Exchequer of having turned the loan to his own account, or even of having diſtributed any portion of it among his friends in either Houſe of Parliament, to reward or cor⯑rupt them, which for the preſent I neither affirm nor deny, he has proved nothing to the purpoſe. He has reſiſted vigorouſly where there was no attack, and exhibited great courage, where there was no danger. He knows very well how difficult if not impoſſible it is, even in the groſſeſt tranſactions, to obtain direct proof of cor⯑ruption between Miniſters and Members of Parliament. He knows, or ought to know that, in the preſent caſe, that ſort of charge was never attempted. My honourable friend, who moved the in⯑quiry, not only did not lay proſtitution or corruption to the charge of the Miniſter, in the ſenſe taken by the learned gentleman, but did expreſsly and repeatedly diſclaim it. So did I and others in the Committee. Not that the contrary has by any means been made out in evidence. Of ſuch propoſitions, the negative is full as difficult to prove, as the affirmative. We ſaid, and we adhere to it, that it appeared to us that a moſt improvident bargain had been made for the public. We ſay now, and we have proved it, that, in every part of the tranſaction of the late loan, the public intereſt has been ſacrificed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. If I am aſked, what could be his motives, my anſwer is that I cannot penetrate into the hearts of men, or judge of their intentions otherwiſe than by facts and circumſtances, and by a compariſon between conduct and profeſ⯑ſions; but that in this caſe, in my opinion, ſufficient ground is laid for all the concluſions drawn by the Reſolutions. That point ſhall be conſidered in its place. If I am aſked, whether I ſuſpect the right ho⯑nourable gentleman of perſonal corruption in this buſineſs? I anſwer [11] frankly and without reſerve, No. I ſcorn to inſinuate what I do not believe. Neither do I pretend to have ground to believe that the loan was diſtributed among the Members of this Houſe, and therefore, I ſay nothing on that head. The diſtribution, in the city of London, ſpeaks for itſelf. In that quarter undoubtedly, I ſuſpect that corrup⯑tion was intended, becauſe I ſee the effect. I ſee an exorbitant profit given, and a correſponding conduct in thoſe, who received it. But the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in his own perſon, is immaculate! You may prove any thing elſe; but, ſince you cannot prove that he kept a ſhare in the loan for his own uſe, your objections and your charges ſignify no⯑thing. That is, we have proved nothing, becauſe we have not proved what we did not alledge. But after all, Sir, is it much to ſay, for a man in his elevated ſituation, for a man of his under⯑ſtanding, that he is not vile enough and fool enough to take money in his office! Could he do it, without the aſſiſtance of a middle man, of an agent? Muſt he not employ a banyan; and if he truſted himſelf to a third perſon in a buſineſs ſo full of danger and difficulty, muſt he not be at once in the power of that perſon, and his ſlave for ever? In all theſe tranſactions, there is undoubt⯑edly a clear, available profit to the Miniſter. But who is it ſuſ⯑pects him of taking it in ſpecie? The thing is morally impoſſible. I acquit him on his underſtanding.

In all the preceding obſervations, Sir, I have intended little more than to clear the ground, and open my way to the body of the queſtion. I ſhall ſtate it now in the only form in which I think it ought to be ſtated to a popular aſſembly, and in which I can hope to make myſelf underſtood. Minute cal⯑culations of pounds or pence would not be attended to, nor would they be intelligible, at leaſt with any explanations of mine. I may not ſucceed in aſcertaining the preciſe motives, on which the Chancellor of the Exchequer has acted. But that he has acted on motives inconſiſtent with his duty, and that he has wilfully ſa⯑crificed the public intereſt, (in ſuch a man I cannot attribute any thing to ignorance or ſurpriſe,) of which he was the appointed guardian, the ſpecial truſtee,—theſe propoſitions, I am ſure I can make out. By what evidence? By a concurrence of undiſputed facts and of circumſtances, which cannot lie, and all of them meet⯑ing in one central point, the profit of the contractors. I ſhall bring them together as cloſely, and compare them as accurately as I can; and then let it be ſeen whether, ſo collected and ſo compared, they do not amount to a moral proof, whether they do not force you to a concluſion, which, whatever you may ſay, the human mind is not made to reſiſt. Judgment is not yet at the command of voli⯑tion. [12] If it were, the right honourable gentleman undoubtedly would be as ſecure of the eſteem, as he is of the partiality of this Houſe. On the preſent queſtion, it is not within the limits of poſſibi⯑lity, that their inclination and their judgment ſhould really go toge⯑ther. Now, Sir, I requeſt the Houſe, in obſerving the facts, to be attentive to the dates. I need not ſtop to prove that, to aſcer⯑tain the quality of human actions, the date is very often an eſſential part of the fact. I ſhall ſtate nothing, in point of fact, but what is proved and admitted. Firſt, Till the 23d of November 1795 it appears that the Chancellor of the Exchequer adhered to the prin⯑ciple, which he had uniformly profeſſed, of free and open com⯑petition, and that, until the 25th of November, he did never expreſs an intention of departing from that principle. Second, By the evidence, on which the eleventh Reſolution is founded, it appears that Mr. Boyd's ſuppoſed right to object to the negociation of a new loan, was ſtated to the Chancellor of the Exche⯑quer ſome time in October, and that he promiſed to ſend to Mr. Boyd and his party, to hear what they had to ſay, before any com⯑petition ſhould take place, but that, at that time, he ſeemed poſitively determined not to admit of their claim. He never ſent for Mr. Boyd. On the 23d of November he ſtill adhered to his plan of free and open competition, and invited the competi⯑tors to meet him on the 25th, in order to bid on that princi⯑ple. The Houſe will obſerve that I ſpeak of facts, as they appear on the ſurface of the evidence, not as I think they really were. After being reminded of his engagement to Mr. Boyd, firſt in a con⯑verſation, and then by a letter of the 24th of November; he ſays, on the 25th, that the circumſtances had come, but recently, to his knowledge, and that he did not admit any obligation to exiſt. He ſeems to have forgotten not only his original engagement to Mr. Boyd, but the revival of it in October; and indeed, not to have been very much ſtruck with the force of it, when it was again de⯑tailed to him on the 24th of November. Let us conſider a little what this right and claim is, which appears to have made ſo very ſlight an impreſſion on the memory and judgment of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, but to which at laſt he ſubmits without reſiſtance, as if he were ſuddenly overpowered by a torrent of conviction. In this place, Sir, it may be proper for me to premiſe, that whatever I ſay on theſe points is meant to be excluſively applied to the Miniſter. I have the pleaſure of knowing Mr. Boyd, and ſhall always ſpeak of him as I think, with the greateſt conſideration.—Firſt of all I find, from Mr. Boyd's letter, ‘"that the contract, for the loan of laſt year, was entered into under the condition, that no [13] other public loan for this country ſhould be made until the period, fixed for the laſt payment of the loan then contracted for, ſhould have elapſed."’ Here the claim begins with a poſitive condition, which, if it could be proved, would make all general arguments ſuperfluous. Mr. Boyd allows that it was not reduced to a ſpecific form, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer has no recollection of it. In a queſtion of mere fact, between him and Mr. Boyd, tho' rather too material to be readily forgotten, I am willing to allow him the full benefit of a feeble memory. But obſerve what the nature and qualities of this right are, and then believe it, if you can, that a right, ſo founded and ſo qualified, ſhould have eſcaped the at⯑tention of ſuch a man as the Chancellor of the Exchequer, or that, when it was revived and brought back to his view, it ſhould have made ſo very ſlight an impreſſion on his mind. Mr. Boyd ſays, ‘"it is a right founded in juſtice."’ You may not remember an engage⯑ment; but juſtice, though often violated, is not quite ſo eaſily for⯑gotten. This right is alſo founded in the nature of things. A curi⯑ous deſcription certainly of a claim to lend money, from a con⯑tractor to a Chancellor of the Exchequer. Or is it one of the rights of man newly imported from Paris? But it alſo par⯑takes of the quality of a metaphyſical right. Mr. Boyd con⯑tends, that it was inherent and inalienable in him as contractor; that, in that character, he could not ſeparate himſelf from it, and that, as ſuch, his right and he were indiſſolubly attached to one another, and would have continued ſo, though he ſhould have parted with all his ſhare in the loan, or even tho' he never ſhould have held any part of it, but only have acted as agent for the other contributors; and tho' he himſelf admits, that the contractors for the loan of 1795, could not ſuffer any pecuniary loſs by the intro⯑duction of a new loan, otherwiſe than as holders of ſcrip. His own words are, ‘"But I do not underſtand that, while I ſell or alienate a part of the loan, I transfer any of the inalienable and inherent right, which belongs excluſively to me as a contractor."’ This to me, I confeſs, Sir, is a new ſpeculation, and therefore it is poſſible that I may not be a proper judge of it. But this I know, that all the witneſſes concur in a very different opinion, viz. that as there could be no pecuniary loſs but to the holders of ſcrip, all the contributors to the loan of 1795 had as good a claim, as the contractors, to a preference for the ſucceeding loan, in proportion to the amount of the ſhares in the loan of 1795, then held by them reſpectively, and that not one of them, on that principle at leaſt, appears to have been conſidered in the preſent loan.

But leaving this problem to ſhift for itſelf, you will find [14] that the right, ſo claimed by the contractor, has been recogniſed by conſtant practice and public opinion. Here comes a queſtion of fact. Has it been the conſtant practice? If it has, you have a cuſtom without an inſtance. No ſimilar caſe has been ſtated. No example has been alledged to make good the affirmative. The truth is, that there never was a precedent in point. The Governor of the Bank ſays, ‘"he does not recollect any loan made for the receipts to come out before the others were totally extinct, and that Mr. Newland had looked back a great way, but, ſince the eſtabliſh⯑ment of the Bank, no new loan has been made, when two pay⯑ments of the preceding one were not fulfilled, as in the preſent caſe."’ The aſſerted right of the contractor is therefore clearly not founded on conſtant practice. But it would be treating ſuch a propoſition too gently, if I contented myſelf with ſaying, that it has not been proved. There is a deciſive fact on the other ſide of the queſtion, which annihilates the allegation of practice. Allow me to ſtate this point diſtinctly. The moment you underſtand it, you muſt be convinced by it. The contractors ſay they cannot re⯑linquiſh their right, without evident loſs. How are they to loſe? As holders of ſcrip belonging to the former loan, by the introduction of eighteen millions more into the market. But if you look to the evidence, you will find there is one opinion, in which all the wit⯑neſſes agree, viz, to ſpeak in the terms of the fourteenth Reſolu⯑tion, ‘"That the value of the exiſting funds is affected in a far greater degree by the negociation for a new loan, and the ſettle⯑ment of the terms thereof, than by the making the depoſit on ſuch loan after it is ſettled."’ Mr. Boyd himſelf expreſsly objects to the negociation of a new loan, while payments on the former loan were depending; becauſe undoubtedly, if injury be done to the holders of ſcrip, it muſt be by the negociation and terms, not by the depoſit. Now, Sir, ſuppoſing this to be the truth, as it certainly is, it appears by the evidence, in oppoſition to that conſtant practice and opi⯑nion, alledged by Mr. Boyd, that, before all the payments were completed on the loan for 1794, a new loan for 1795 was negoci⯑ated with Mr. Boyd, while conſiderable ſums of the preceding loan were outſtanding; yet the contributors to that loan did not object to ſuch negociation, or make any complaint on account of it. You will find the fact more preciſely ſtated in the 15th Reſolution. I am not arguing now about the validity of Mr. Boyd's pretentions to a preference; but, ſuppoſing them to be good, in the ſenſe and to the effect ſtated; is it poſſible they could be forgotten? Or, if they were not valid, why did they prevail? It would not be difficult to aſſign a probable motive for the Miniſter's conduct; but, as it [15] would be ſaid to amount to nothing but ſuſpicion or conjecture, I ſhall leave it to every man, who obſerves the facts, to conclude for himſelf. There are ſtill ſome material circumſtances in this tran⯑ſaction, very well worthy of your attention. Mr. Boyd obtains the preference, if not, as we call it, a gift of the loan. What follows? He truſts to the candour of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and agrees to take it on his own terms. What precedes?—A ſin⯑gular fact. In the beginning of November, for the firſt time, the Commiſſioners appointed to buy up the public debt, began to make purchaſes in the 4 per cent. ſtock. The bargain for the loan was fixed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer himſelf in the 3 per cents only. That is, he did every thing, that depended on him, to lower the value of that commodity which he meant to diſpoſe of. The 4 per cents roſe of courſe, by this new and unexpected inveſt⯑ment of more than half a million in ready money. Whatever that advantage amounted to, ought to have been given to the 3 per cents, in which the bargain for the loan was concluded. The learned gentleman ſays that, in November 1795, the purchaſes by the commiſſioners could not be made in the 3 per cent annuities; be⯑cauſe, in that month the books of thoſe annuities were ſhut. So they were in 1794. So they were in every preceding year. The times, at which the ſeveral books are ſhut, in all the funds reſ⯑pectively, never vary. Did that difficulty occur in 1794 or 1793? Did the Commiſſioners ever purchaſe in the 4 per cents, before November laſt? Never. Again I ſay, what follows the ſettle⯑ment of the loan? Another fact, moſt ſingular in its appearance, moſt important in its effect. The Chancellor of the Exchequer makes the bargain on the 25th of November, but does not bring forward the budget till the 7th of December. On the length of that interval and its conſequences, I ſhall obſerve preſently. But here comes the queſtionable point of all. The very day after the budget, the Miniſter delivers a meſſage from His Majeſty, from which all men concluded, that a negociation for peace was on foot or very likely to take place The value of the loan immediately roſe above 5 per cent, or 900,000l. on the capital, which we affirm was to all intents and purpoſes a voluntary, determined, and premeditated gift to the contractors at the expence of the public. If the Chancellor of the Exchequer ſhould alledge that this effect of the meſſage was not to be foreſeen, or that in fact he did not foreſee it, I ſhall leave the firſt of thoſe allegations to the judgment of the Houſe, and of the world; the ſecond I ſhall not contradict. They, who take him at his word, muſt defend his integrity at the expence of his ſagacity, on a point that could not eſcape the meaneſt under⯑ſtanding. [16] In ſo groſs a miſtake, it is not poſſible that common ſenſe and common honeſty ſhould have acted together. Of the effect at leaſt, there can be no doubt. No man will deny that, if he had timed and graduated theſe ſeveral acts as he ought to have done, I mean the loan, the budget, and the meſſage; the public might have had the benefit of that advance in the funds, which was produced by the meſſage.

The 29th Reſolution ſtates, in moderate terms, that the interval of twelve days, between the ſettlement and the budget, is unuſual, and not likely to be productive of any advantage to the Public. The fact is that, by any delay of the budget after the bargain, the Public cannot poſſibly gain, but may poſſibly loſe. With reſpect to the contractors, the direct reverſe is the caſe. If, in that protracted interval, political events of a favourable na⯑ture ſhould happen, by which the price of ſtocks ſhould be con⯑ſiderably advanced, the contractor has the whole benefit of the riſe. Whereas, if the contrary ſhould happen, whether by misfortunes abroad, or any other ſiniſter event; and if, in conſequence, the loan, inſtead of bearing a premium of ten or twelve per cent, ſhould fall conſiderably under par, what remedy has the Public againſt the contractors? or would they, if they could, enforce the contract to the ruin of the parties? No, Sir, we all know that it would not be attempted. The learned gentleman admits, with truth and candour, that Parliament, in ſuch a caſe of pure mis⯑fortune, would relieve the contractor. I ſay they would, becauſe they ought to do ſo. For reaſons of this nature, it was formerly the conſtant rule not to conclude the bargain 'till the day before the budget. Even in later times, the interval has ſeldom exceeded two days. Suppoſing that, in a political view, it might have been ad⯑viſable to conclude the bargain for the loan at ſo very early a period of the ſeſſion, why did not the budget immediately follow? If otherwiſe, why might not the bargain have waited for the budget? On this point, one argument only has been urged, with a great deal of pomp and emphaſis, namely, that it was good policy to take the earlieſt moment poſſible, after the meeting of Parliament, to exhibit to the enemy the extent of our reſources, and the faci⯑lity, with which the enormous capital of eighteen millions ſterling could ſtill be raiſed in this country. It does not yet appear that this eager exhibition of our extravagance has made any material impreſſion on the enemy. As far as I can diſcover, they have not yet been much appalled by it. But, be it ſo. Allow the policy to be good, whether in this inſtance it ſucceeded or not. How will the right honourable gentleman anſwer this queſtion? If the po⯑licy [17] was good in November 1795, it may be ſo equally in No⯑vember 1796. Then why have you now, for the firſt time, in⯑troduced into the contract for the preſent loan a ſpecific ſtipulation, that no payment on any new loan ſhall be made 'till after the laſt pay⯑ment on this loan, that is, till after the 15th of December 1796? How do you know that, before that day, it may not be indiſpen⯑ſably neceſſary to raiſe another loan for the public ſervice? On your own principles, you have diſarmed your Government of a powerful weapon, or at leaſt of an inſtrument of terror, from which, as you contend, a great effect might be expected. Let the caſe be ever ſo preſſing, let the opportunity be ever ſo favourable, your hands are tied. You cannot reſort to your own remedy with⯑out aſking leave of the preſent contractors; that is, you muſt buy their conſent by the gift of another loan, which they in their turn will truſt to the Miniſter's candour, and take it on his own terms.

On the curious tranſaction of the Hamburgh bills, which, I be⯑lieve, will furniſh a clue to unravel the myſteries of the loan, I purpoſely reſtrain myſelf at preſent, an honourable gentleman near me having engaged to make it the object of a particular inquiry, as it richly deſerves. One obſervation only is too preſſing to be omitted. The learned gentleman inſiſts on the clear and unqueſtionable fair⯑neſs of the meaſure, though unuſual in the mode. Now, I aſk him whether, when theſe bills were brought into circulation, the true nature of them was avowed? Was the diſcounter inform⯑ed, that the place and date were fictitious; that they were drawn in London in September, though dated from Hamburgh in Auguſt? If not, the diſcounter was impoſed upon. I do not ſay that the intention was to defraud, but it certainly was to deceive him. If the truth had been declared, would any banker have riſqued the credit of his Houſe by diſcounting ſuch bills? It does not appear that they were ever offered to the Bank of England.

Now, Sir, I call upon the Houſe to put together the facts, the circumſtances, the conſequences and pretences of the Miniſter's conduct in this extraordinary tranſaction, and, leaving out of their conſideration the colluſion that appears, or the motives that may be ſuſpected, to pronounce their verdict, on the ſimple iſſue of fact, ‘"Has he or has he not made a moſt improvident bargain for the Public?"’ If the fact be found, the moral inference is obvious and unavoidable. It need not be argued, for it cannot be reſiſted. Nevertheleſs, Sir, ſpeaking now for myſelf alone, I declare that I am ready to wave every one of the objections I have ſtated, and even to join with his friends in a vote of acquittal, if the Miniſter can and will give me a fair, direct, and ſatisfactory anſwer to one [18] remaining queſtion. When Melliſh and Morgan refuſed to bid on the plan of a qualified competition propoſed to them on the 25th of November, for what reaſon did he inſtantly conclude with Mr. Boyd? He was not preſſed for time, ſince Friday the 27th was the day, fixed by himſelf, for the final ſettlement. He was not preſſed for money, ſince the firſt payment on the new loan was not required before the 10th of December. For any thing that appears to the contrary, he might have taken a week, but certainly two days, without any poſſible inconvenience, to try at leaſt, whe⯑ther ſome other competitors might not offer, and by that means give the Public a poſſible chance of the benefit of a competition on his own plan. Then why did he not immediately ſend to the Bank, and deſire the Governor to give public notice of the alteration, and of his being open, for a certain number of days, to receive pro⯑poſals on that principle? I preſume he will not ſay that he knew it to be ſuch, as no man of credit would offer to bid upon. Yet what elſe he can ſay, to cover ſo groſs and palpable a breach of his duty to the Public—I confeſs my imbecillity—I have taxed my imagination—but I am not able to conceive it.

The laſt appeal I ſhall make is to the prudence of the Houſe. We are truſtees for the nation, and accountable for the truſt re⯑poſed in us. If we acted only for ourſelves, or if the queſtion ended with a few ſpeeches, a ſhort queſtion, and a vigorous reſo⯑lution, the Chancellor of the Exchequer might poſſibly be as ſafe in the opinion of his country, as he is in this Houſe. But let it be remembered, before we decide, that the evidence is before the Public, who will compare it with the verdict and judge of us ac⯑cordingly. We may acquit the Miniſter by a vote; but, if that vote ſhould not appear to be warranted by the evidence, it will avail him nothing in point of reputation. The country have it in their power to try us as well as him. The Miniſter may eſcape; but, in the judgement of mankind, this Houſe will not be acquitted.

[19]The two following reſolutions, as founded on the evidence, were propoſed by Mr. Sylveſter Douglas, and carried without a diviſion.

Reſolved, ‘""That it appears to this Houſe, that the terms of the loan were fixed with a due regard to the magnitude of the ſums borrowed and provided for, as well as to the market price of the funds and the ſituation of public affairs at the time the bargain was concluded.’

Reſolved, ‘""That it appears to this Houſe that, in every part of the tranſaction of the late loan, the conduct of the Chancellor of the Exchequer was actuated by a view to the public intereſt, and that there is no ground to ſuppoſe that any interference took place on the part of any perſons connected with Government in the diſtribution of any part of the ſaid loan.’