PART I. Some Remarks on the Caſe of the City of London with reſpect to the Encroach⯑ments on the River Thames near Durham-Yard, and the Bill now depending in Parliament to eſtabliſh the ſaid Treſpaſſes.

IT cannot be denied, notwithſtanding all the deluſive Sophiſtry that hath been uſed upon this occaſion, that the City of London hath ever enjoyed and exerciſed on the River Thames a Right of Conſervancy, as well of the Width or Avenue, (by occaſionally inſpecting and regulating the Boundaries) as of the [4]Fiſhery, with power and authority to remove all nuiſances; ſo that this Franchiſe, or Liberty, is abſolutely veſted in the City by Preſcription and Ancient Uſage, beſides many poſitive Grants and Confirmations;—And what Freeholder will be able to produce a more authentic Title to his Eſtate and Property! For a long proceſs of time, and a long Uſe, Poſſeſſion, or Cuſtom, which exceeds the Memory of Man, is ſufficient to conſtitute a Right, or juſt Title. ‘Longum Tempus et longus Uſus, qui excedit memoriam homi⯑num, ſufficit pro jure.’ Principia Legis et AEquitatis, p. 55. See alſo Co. Lit. 115. There is, beſides, an expreſs Article in Magna Charta to ſecure to the City of London all her Ancient Liberties and Cuſtoms (‘Civitas Londini habeat omnes libertates ſuas antiquas et [5]conſuetudines ſuas.’ (Cap. 9.) a⯑mongſt which, undoubtedly, this Right and Cuſtom of Conſervancy is to be reckoned as one of the moſt material Franchiſes, becauſe the very exiſtence of this great Trading City depends upon it; ſo that the City's Title to the Con⯑ſervancy is founded on a natural as well as legal Right.

The pretended conſent of the Col⯑legiate Church of Weſtminſter cannot palliate the Treſpaſs, or leſſen the in⯑jury to the City of London. The Grant of King James, on which the Claim of that Church is ſaid to be founded, could not convey a power to embank and fill up the River, nor a Right to confirm ſuch a Treſpaſs when committed, becauſe the King himſelf had no ſuch power, and conſequently [6]had no right to Grant it; ſo that the Juriſdiction ſaid to extend ‘infra finem aquoe to the middle of the Stream,’ muſt be conſtrued in ſome other ſenſe, or it will, otherwiſe, render the whole Grant null and void; becauſe the River Thames is a Public Avenue or Paſſage to the City; ſo that, in this reſpect, it is to be conſidered as the King's high⯑way, and it is eſteemed the King's high⯑way no otherwiſe than in Truſt for the Public: ſo that the King has no power to diſpenſe with an Encroachment on the highway; for though ‘he may par⯑don Nuſances that are tranſient and not continuing,’—Yet ‘a Nuſance in the highway, which ſtill continues, and is not ended, until removed; can⯑not be pardoned;’ (Judge Vaughan's Reports, 333.) becauſe the ſame is to be eſteemed evil and iniquitous, in its very [7]nature, a "Malum in ſe, Bad in itſelf," which is further proved by the ſame Learned Author in P. 337. ‘I may conclude (ſays he) thoſe things to be mala in ſe, which can never be made lawful.’ He then cites the Year-Book of 11 Henry 7. viz. ‘But Malum in ſe, the King nor any other can diſpenſe.’ And inſtanceth, ‘Si come, Si le Roy, voyloit pardon de occider un homme, ou de faire nuſance in le haut chemin, ceo eſt void, ^* —and upon the ſame reaſon (ſays he) a licenſe to impriſon a Man, to take his Land, his Horſe, or any thing [8]that is his from him, is void. For in Life, Liberty, and Eſtate, every Man, who hath not forfeited them, hath a Property and Right which the Law allows him to defend; and if it is violated, it gives an Action to re⯑dreſs the Wrong, and to Puniſh the Wrong-doer—Therefore a Diſpen⯑ſation, that is, to make lawful the taking from a Man any thing which he may lawfully defend from being taken, or lawfully puniſh if it be, muſt be void. For it is a contradic⯑tion to make it lawful, to take what may be lawfully hindered from be⯑ing taken, or lawfully Puniſhed if it be. And that were to make two Men have ſeveral Plenary Rights in the ſame thing at the ſame time, which NO LAW CAN EFFECT: Therefore TO DO a thing which NO LAW can [9]make LAWFUL, muſt be—MALUM IN SE.’

This Argument clearly proves the Impropriety of pretending a Right or Power in the Crown, or in the Church of Weſtminſter, to give their conſent for the eſtabliſhment of the Treſpaſs in the River at Durham-Yard.

The Right of Conſervancy has been inveſted in the City of London from the moſt ancient Times, ſo that the King cannot reſume that Power if he would; for it is a maxim in Law, that a quiet and uninterrupted Poſſeſſion for 60 Years creates a juſt Title. ‘Poſſeſſio pacifica pour Anns 60 facit Jus:’ (See Judge Jenkins to the ſame effect Cent. 26.) and, the Kings Order, Command, or Letters Patent have [10]no legal Weight, or Effect againſt ſuch a Right, for ‘reſcriptum prin⯑cipis contra jus non valet.’ On the other hand, the Right of the Church of Weſtminſter to the River (even ſuppoſing that it had been law⯑ful for King James the firſt to grant ſuch a Right) is nevertheleſs forfeited for want of being claimed and put in uſe ſince that time; whereas the Right of the Citizens of London is ſufficiently eſtabliſhed (according to the Maxims before cited) by the exerciſe and en⯑joyment of a continual and undiſputed Juriſdiction upon the River, as being their undoubted Right and Property, ſurely for more than 60 Years laſt paſt. —And a Right or Property, thus acquired, is as valid, even againſt the Pretenſions of the Crown, as againſt thoſe of the Church of Weſtminſter, or, even, as [11]againſt thoſe of a Private Man,—for the Nullum Tempus Doctrine cannot juſtify the King's Claim to the Soil of the Thames, becauſe the Right of the Crown in Manors, Lands, Tene⯑ments, &c. is exactly upon the ſame footing with reſpect TO TIME as Private Freeholds; For Bracton informs us that in all ſuch things— ‘currit tem⯑pus contra Regem, ſicut contra quam libet privatam perſonam.’ (Bracton de legibus et conſuetudinibus Angliae, 2d B. c. 5. P. 14.) I have thoroughly examined the Doctrine of ‘Nullum Tempus occurrit regi,’ in a little Tract expreſsly upon that Subject, and there⯑fore need not enlarge upon it here.

Now as the City of London has ac⯑quired ſo firm a Title to her Juriſdiction by a quiet Poſſeſſion for 60 Years, ac⯑cording [12]to the Maxim before quoted, how unjuſt is it, at this time, to call her Right in Queſtion, when it is noto⯑rious, that the ſame may as eaſily be traced back more than 10^* times 60 Years! For ex diuturnitate temporis omnia praeſumuntur Solenniter eſſe acta.

[13]We are taught alſo by the unqueſtion⯑able ^* Maxims of the Common Law that Men cannot be obliged to part with their Right and Property without their own free conſent: ‘Iniquum eſt ingenuis hominibus non eſſe Liberam re⯑rum ſuarum alienationem;’—And ‘Rerum ſuarum quilibet eſt moderator et arbiter.’—And again, ‘Regulariter non valet pactum de re mea non alie⯑nanda’ [14](Co. Lit. 223.) For no Man may be compelled to ſell what is his own, even for the full value of it. ‘Nemo cogitur rem ſuam vendere, etiam juſto pretio.’ 4 Inſt. 275.—And again, That which is my own, cannot be taken from me without my conſent; ‘Quod meum eſt, a me, ſine me, auferri non poteſt.’ Jenk. Cent. 251.

There is, indeed, an Exception to theſe general Maxims, and that is, when the Public Benefit requires ſuch an Alienation, as for the making of Public Roads, Canals,^* &c. or Build⯑ing [15]Fortifications for the Public ſafe⯑ty: In all ſuch caſes, Private Advan⯑tage muſt give way to the Public Good, "Privatum commodum Publico cedit," and "Privatum incommodum Publico Bono penſatur. (Jenk. Cent. 223 & 85.) But when the Public Property, veſted in a Body Corporate in Truſt for the Pub⯑lic Advantage, is clandeſtinely taken away BY ENCROACHMENT, and an at⯑tempt [16]is made to eſtabliſh the Treſpaſs, and veſt that Public Property in Private Hands, for Private Advantage, without the Conſent of the Ancient and Legal Truſtees, it is to reverſe the very fun⯑damental Principles of Natural Equity, and to turn the once firm Pyramid of the Law upon its Point, inſtead of its Baſis, ſo as to threaten ruin and de⯑ſtruction to all things within the reach of its fall.—The Pretence, that the Public will be benefited in proportion to the advantage ariſing to the Treſpaſſers, is frivolous, and ought not, by any means, to be admitted. It ſavours of partiality, to view a Public Benefit, through the medium of a private Ad⯑vantage, becauſe the public Utility, (uſually alledged in ſuch caſes) proves, 9 times in 10, a mere pretence; and no⯑thing illegal ought to be admitted, even [17]though the pretence for it is Lawful; ‘Pretextu liciti non debet admitti illi⯑citum.’ (10. Co. 88.)—There are alſo ſome other things alledged as rea⯑ſons for ſhewing favour to this Treſ⯑paſs, viz. the Taſte and Skill of the Architects, and the Public Ornament of their Edifices, &c. But all ſuch Pretences are equally frivolous with the firſt, when they interfere with Public Right and Franchiſe, for the Law does not favour the Elegant and Sumptuous; ‘Lex non favet delicato⯑rum votis.’ (9 Co. 58.)

Yet the City paid a proper Atten⯑tion (it is manifeſt) to the merit of the Architects, and the Appearance of their Buildings, by diſcovering an In⯑clination (which I have elſewhere mentioned more at large) to allow [18]them ſufficient room to make a conve⯑nient Wharf, that the Purpoſes of their noble Vaults might not be in⯑jured; but, as more than this would be ſuperfluous, the Citizens could not have been juſtified, had they not re⯑jected the unconſcionable requeſt of the Treſpaſſers, eſpecially as it was thought, that the addition of a large Timber-Yard for the private Uſe and Advantage of the Builders, would not, (accord⯑ing to the Taſte of the Citizens at leaſt) contribute much to public Orna⯑ment and Elegance. The other pre⯑tence of public Utility was as little ap⯑parent to the Citizens in general as this laſt; for it is ſtill doubtful, and re⯑mains to be proved; (as I have ſhewn in another Paper;) whereas there is NO DOUBT of the illegality of the Treſpaſs; for the ſame was notorious, as well [19]with reſpect to the Encroachment it⯑ſelf, as the manner of making it, by throwing ſo many Thouſand Cart-loads of Rubbiſh into the River, without a Fence to retain it, which muſt, cer⯑tainly, prejudice the River by leſſening the Depth.—This was an apparent in⯑jury, and, ‘an Injury is contrary to Law: Tort a le ley eſt contrary.’ (Co. Lit. 158.) No Man ought to be enriched to the inconvenience or diſ⯑advantage of another.— ‘Nemo de⯑bet locupletari ex alterius incommodo.’ Jenk. Cent. 4. No Man ought to be allowed to receive benefit or take ad⯑vantage from his own fraud or Treſ⯑paſs. ‘Nemo ex dolo ſuo proprio releve⯑tur, aut auxilium capiat.’ (Jur. Civ.) And ſhall the Parliament of England then endeavour to eſtabliſh a Wrong, to the total ſubverſion of theſe indiſ⯑putable [20]Precepts? The Example is dangerous! The Precedent threatens Ruin and Diſſolution to all the legal ties of Security for the quiet Poſſeſſion of Lands and Inheritances in this Kingdom.—For if we depart from the Law, there can be no Security to any Man in any thing, but all things will be rendered uncertain and precarious. ‘Si a jure diſcedas vagus eris, et erunt omnia omnibus incerta.’ Co. Lit. 227. The Public Good requires, that bad Actions ſhould not remain unpuniſhed. ‘Intereſt Reipublicae ne maleficia rema⯑neant impunita.’ Jenk. Cent. p. 31. for when a Judge (and much more the whole Legiſlature) favours an unwor⯑thy Man, does it not encourage all Men to fall away from their integrity? and does it not promote an univerſal contagion (as it were) of a Licenciouſ⯑neſs? [21] ‘Cum indulget Judex indigno, nonne ad Prolapſionis contagium pro⯑vocat univerſos.’ (Fleta. Cap. 17. S. 11,) Becauſe the Admiſſion of one Abſurdity, or Injuſtice, makes way for Ten Thouſand more,— ‘Uno abſurdo dato infinita ſequuntur,’ 1 Co. 102. and thoſe Crimes and Treſpaſſes which are often excuſed and defended, will, ſurely, be often committed. ‘Videbis ea ſaepe committi, quae ſaepe vindican⯑tur.’ 3 Inſt. Epilogue.

If all theſe Points are carefully con⯑ſidered, the Bill muſt, manifeſtly, ap⯑pear inconſiſtent with the Spirit and Principles of the Common Law. Nay! it is ſo notoriouſly unjuſt, that it af⯑fords us ſome comfort, even by the exceſs of its Illegality!

[22]For I have already ſhewn it to be a "malum per ſe," and contrary to na⯑tural Right, and therefore I truſt that it will be null and void of itſelf, even if it ſhould gain the Aſſent of all the Three Branches of the Legiſlature; for no Law can eſtabliſh what Nature (or natural Right) prohibits: ‘Quae rerum natura prohibentur nulla lege confirmata ſunt:’ (Finch 74.) and whatſoever is done contrary to Law, may be eſteemed as undone, a mere nul⯑lity: ‘Quod contra legem fit, pro in⯑fecto habetur.’ 4 Co. 31.—But, above all, let it be remembered, that the Old Liberties and Cuſtoms of the City of London (amongſt which the Conſervancy of the River Thames, Medway, and Lee, is perhaps the moſt eſſential to her Welfare and very Ex⯑iſtence) [23] are ſecured to her by an Ex⯑preſs Article of Magna Charta (Chap. 9.) which I have already remarked in the beginning of this little Tract; and therefore it behoves the Learned in the Law to demonſtrate, that this Bill is not in any Point derogatory to the ſaid 9th Chapter of Magna Charta; but, if this cannot be done, the joint Authority of King, Lords, and Com⯑mons, is not ſufficient to paſs it into a Law, (I mean, a Valid and Conſtitu⯑tional Law, ſuch as can be maintained without Corruption and Arbitrary Power) becauſe it is "Aſſented, and accorded," by an Act of the 42d Year of King Edward III. Chap. 1. (which is ſtill in force, and muſt ever remain ſo,) ‘that the Great Charter, and Charter of the Forreſt, be holden and kept [24] in all Points, and if any Statute be made to the contrary, that ſhall be holden for NONE.’

REMARKS CONCERNING THE ENCROACHMENTS ON THE RIVER THAMES NEAR DURHAM-YARD. PART II.
[27] PART II. Some further Remarks concerning the Injury done to the City of London by the Encroachments on the River Thames near Durham-Yard.

THE extraordinary Favour ſhewn in Parliament to the Treſpaſſes lately committed by ſeveral Perſons, in the enormous Encroachment on the River Thames near Durham-Yard, is liable to affect the Security of Property in general; becauſe an Encouragement to commit Treſpaſſes, and a Precedent to eſtabliſh and confirm the ſame, when committed, do certainly tend to the [28]Total Subverſion of Juſtice; for in every point of view the ſame are repugnant to the fundamental Principles of Law and Equity.

Actions were commenced in the Court of King's Bench againſt the En⯑croachments, before the Treſpaſſers brought their Bill into Parliament; ſo that the Concurrence of Parliament with the Authors of the Injury, is a groſs inſult upon the Laws, by ſtopping the regular Courſe of Juſtice in a mat⯑ter of Right, which came properly be⯑fore the King's Courts; for, as it is eſteemed unjuſt to puniſh a Man by the force of an ex poſt facto Law, it, certainly, is equally unjuſt by an ex poſt facto Law to confirm, and eſtabliſh a manifeſt Treſpaſs, which was previ⯑ouſly referred to a proper Court for [29]Redreſs; and the Application to Par⯑liament is of itſelf a ſufficient Proof, that the Right and Claim of the City of London are juſt; and ſuch as muſt neceſſarily have found a Remedy in Law, according to the uſual Proceedings of the King's Courts, otherwiſe the ex poſt facto Law had been needleſs.

It ought to be remembered, alſo, that the City of London, for the ſake of Peace, and to avoid a Conteſt in Parliament, was inclined to allow ſome of the Treſpaſſers, (who are eminent Builders) as much ground in the Front of their Buildings, as would be ſuffi⯑cient to make a Wharf, wide enough for Carts to come down, and to turn, and load, &c. as at other Quays in the City, ſo that the uſe and intention of the noble underground Paſſages might [30]not be loſt, or in the leaſt injured; and a private intimation of this Lenity and Favour, to which the City ſeemed diſpoſed, was given to a Friend of the Builders, that they might be adviſed to Petition the City for Room to make ſuch a Wharf; and they were told, that the ſame would probably be granted in conſideration of their great Expences, and the Grandeur of their Buildings.

But inſtead of ſuch a Petition, the Builders preſented a Memorial (they did not deign to call it a Petition) deſiring more than 3 or 4 Times as much room as was neceſſary for the ſaid purpoſe; becauſe, it ſeems, a Wharf alone would not content them; but, as Builders, they muſt be indulged alſo with room enough, out of the Width of the Ri⯑ver, to make (likewiſe for a Public [31]Ornament, I ſuppoſe) even a Timber Yard beſides!—They did not, indeed, men⯑tion the Timber Yard in their Memorial, but the deſign plainly appears by a Clauſe in the Bill to regulate the Height of the Piles of Timber, &c.

They did not fail, however, to demand of the City, as much Space as they thought neceſſary for their intended Tim⯑ber Yard; and they were pleaſed at the ſame time to deſire the Concurrence of the City (as Conſervators of the River) to their Petition in Parliament! An Inſult this to the Citizens of London, as groſs and enormous, as the Encroachment itſelf;—for, in effect, it was to deſire the Citizens to join in a Petition to Parlia⯑ment againſt themſelves; that is, in Fa⯑vour of, and to eſtabliſh and confirm a notorious Treſpaſs committed in De⯑fiance [32]of their own repeated Prohibi⯑tions and Preſentments.

The Memorial, however, was rejected with a proper Diſdain. But this was no hindrance to the Adventurers; they were already ſufficiently aware, that they might affront the City with Impunity.—They knew their Party Intereſt in Parliament, and the Partiality has, hitherto, been proved by the Succeſs.

Two great Law Lords ſtrenuouſly en⯑deavoured to palliate the Offence, and to ſet forth the Public Utility of the Em⯑bankment: One of them admitted that, ‘the preſent Scheme was intended for the private Emolument of Meſſ. A⯑dams, but then, (ſaid he) that Emolu⯑ment could only increaſe in Proportion to the Convenience, and Public Uti⯑lity [33]of the Embankment; if it was found inconvenient; the intended uſe would be loſt; conſequently their Profit would go with it; it was, therefore, in every point, a great Public Good ariſing from a Private Advantage.’ However plauſible this Argument may ſeem, yet I muſt ob⯑ſerve, that it ill becomes any Gentle⯑man at the head of the Law, to view a Public Good through the medium of a Private Advantage, eſpecially as that private advantage had been ſought by a manifeſt Public Injury and Treſpaſs; for when the Encroachment firſt be⯑gan, the Right of the City of London was ſo far from being diſputed, that the Treſpaſſers themſelves acknow⯑ledged it, by Petitioning for Leave; and though they could not obtain Leave from thoſe who had a Right to [34]give it, yet they continued to enlarge their enormous Treſpaſs, as confident⯑ly as if the whole River was indiſpu⯑tably their own. But even if the ima⯑ginary Public Good, (ſuppoſed by the learned Chief Juſtice) be admitted, yet his Lordſhip knows, that ‘That which is otherwiſe Good and Juſt in itſelf, becomes Wicked and Unjuſt, if it is ſought or obtained by Force or Fraud. Quod alias bonum & juſtum eſt, ſi per vim vel fraudem petatur, malum et injuſtum efficitur.’ (3 C. 78.) and his Lordſhip will not (I appre⯑hend) deny, that an enormous Treſpaſs has been committed; and therefore, thoſe that are robbed and injured ought, before all things, to be reinſtated, and have their Rights reſtored. ‘Spo⯑liatus debet ante omnia reſtitui.’ 2 Iuſt. 714. Law, Juſtice, and Equity, [35]cannot ſhew the leaſt favour or conſi⯑deration for the Delinquents in ſuch a Caſe, becauſe "Iniquity Bars Equity," —and, ‘no Man can take advantage from his own Treſpaſs or Injury. Nullus commodum capere poteſt de in⯑juria ſua propria.’ Co. Lit. 148.

‘The Public Good requires that bad Actions ſhould not remain un⯑puniſhed. Intereſt Reipublicae ne ma⯑leficia remaneant impunita.’ Jenk. Cent. p. 31.

But if, on the contrary, the Legiſla⯑ture will favour and confirm an appa⯑rent Treſpaſs, no Man's Property can be ſafe from ſuch Adventurers. If I had as much Party Intereſt, and paid as little regard to the difference between MEUM and TUUM as they have done [36]in the preſent Caſe, or their Advocates, I would procure an elegant Plan for raiſing ſuch a Building, as ſhould not only be a Public Ornament in its ſtruc⯑ture, but a Public Convenience in its Accommodations within and without; in ſhort, I would build a noble Inn, open to all Men, (for MY OWN and the public advantage) upon the Inheritance of Lord A, Lord B, or of any other Noble Freeholder whatſoever, whoſe Property, in point of Situation, might ſeem to promiſe the moſt advantage to my undertaking.

Or a good Plan for raiſing an Elegant and outwardly Ornamental Edifice, inwardly adapted to the purpoſes of Grinding Corn, Slitting Iron, making Gunpowder, or any other Articles neceſſary for the ſuſte⯑nance, [37]convenience, or protection of the Public, would equally anſwer my private Advantage: and a good Mill would be a good Inheritance, let me tell you, if I could make it my own Freehold wherever I pleaſed to Build one, with or without the Conſent of the Lord of the Manor, or the lawful Proprietor of the Ground.

The ſame Doctrine may be extended even to the Building of whole Towns upon other Mens Ground, without Leave; becauſe the Towns would be for the ac⯑commodation of Gentlemen, of Tradeſ⯑men, of Manufacturers, Artificers, &c. &c. &c. whereby the Public would manifeſtly be benefited as well as the Builder, in proportion to the Succeſs of each Undertaking in the Increaſe of Inhabitants.

[38]If the lawful Proprietor of the Ground, on which I treſpaſſed, would be pleaſed to give me his Conſent, it would be well; and if he refuſed it, my Pretenſions would ſtill be as good as the much favoured Cauſe of the Treſpaſſers at Durham-Yord; for, even though I ſhould be obliged to allow that my preſent Scheme ‘was intended for the Private Emolument of,’ myſelf—yet I could alledge the Opinion of a Chief Juſtice, that ‘this Emolument could only increaſe in proportion to the Con⯑venience and Public Utility of,’ my Inn, my Mill, or my Town, ‘If it was found inconvenient, the intended Uſe would be loſt, conſequently," my Profit would go with it; it would therefore’ (according to this Opinion of my Lord Chief Juſtice) ‘be in [39]every point a great PUBLIC GOOD, ari⯑ſing from a PRIVATE ADVANTAGE.’

I might alledge, alſo, that this pri⯑vate Advantage of mine, ought to be much more favoured than that of the Encroachers on the River Thames, becauſe, if I ſhould raiſe my Prices for Proviſions, for Grinding, for Rent, &c. upon the Public, there would ſtill be Room ſufficient in the Neighbour⯑hood, (as the Conſent of Proprietors is at preſent eſteemed unneceſſary) for other People, alſo, to Treſpaſs and Build more Inns, more Mills, or more Towns for THEIR OWN and the Public Advantage, as near to my advantageous Situation as they ſhould think proper; ſo that the Public, when impoſed upon by me, might be enabled to give the pre⯑ſerence to cheaper and leſs uncon⯑ſcionable Treſpaſſers.

[40]But in the other Caſe, the local Ad⯑vantages are more limited and confined to a particular Situation; and the En⯑croachments are already ſo great, that there is ſcarcely Room for more within any advantageous Diſtance; be⯑cauſe the Advantage of Situation for Wharfs is confined within the extent of the Trading Part of the Town, now fully occupied; and the Port or Baſon of the River, within theſe Bounds, is already too much contracted to admit of more Encroachments, without encum⯑bering or ſtopping up the Paſſage of the River with Craft and Veſſels, which even at preſent are greatly endangered for want of commodious and proper Mooring-Places out of the Stream and Tide-way.—During the Froſty Wea⯑ther this laſt Winter, 3 or 4 Ships were wrecked, and many others damaged, [41] even in the Port of London, for want of ſuch proper Accommodations; and a very conſiderable number of Barges, Lighters, &c. were forced away from their Moorings by the Ice, and loſt, both above and below London Bridge; ſo that it is manifeſt, that Water-room is of much more conſequence to the Port of London than any Land gained from it can poſſibly be; and that there cannot, therefore, be any Room to ſpare, for making more Wharfs out of the Bed of the River, without an ap⯑parent Injury to the Harbour; ſo that if the new Wharfs ſhould become ab⯑ſolutely neceſſary by an Increaſe of Trade, the Public Utility muſt ſubmit to the Exactions of the Private Poſſeſ⯑ſor, whoſe Tenure is founded in Pub⯑lic Injury and Injuſtice; and the Trade of this great City, on which its very [42]Exiſtence depends, muſt be Loaded and Clogged with the much favoured Pri⯑vate Advantage of each Treſpaſſer; ſo that we may fairly meaſure, by the Enormity of the preſent Encroach⯑ments, how conſcientiouſly Treſpaſſers in general would deign to conſider the Trade and Rights of the Public, when their own Private Intereſt is in View.