CHAP. I.

THE original plan of this work propoſed no more than, that each volume ſhould contain a narra⯑tive of thoſe events which diſtinguiſh its own Year. But, becauſe we have entered upon our undertaking in the heat of an almoſt general and very im⯑portant war, I thought it would not be unneceſſary or diſagreeable to look a little farther back. It would be difficult, perfectly to underſtand the operations of the ſeveral powers at war, without reviewing the tran⯑ſactions of the preceding years; nor would it be eaſy [2] to enter into the ſpirit of theſe, without examining the cauſes which more nearly or remotely operated to produce thoſe troubles that have involved ſo many parts of the world in one common diſtraction.

The war in which all parties and intereſts ſeem now to be ſo perfectly blended, aroſe from cauſes which originally had not the leaſt connection: the uncertain limits of the Engliſh and French territories in America; and the mutual claims of the Houſes of Auſtria and Brandenbourg on the dutchy of Sileſia. It is no wonder that the two former powers ſeizing on a country in which they conſidered the right of the natural Inhabitants as nothing, ſhould find it a very difficult matter to ſettle their own. For a long time neither of theſe powers were ſufficiently acquainted with the geography of America, to enable them to aſcertain the limits of their ſeveral pretenſions with any tolerable exact⯑neſs; nor, indeed, were theſe matters deemed of ſuffici⯑ent moment to call for a very laborious diſcuſſion. At the treaty of Utrecht, whilſt ſo many more important Intereſts, or what then ſeemed more important, were diſcuſſed, the limits of Nova Scotia, then called Acadia, were expreſſed only in general terms, and left to be put on a more certain footing by ſubſequent negotiations. Theſe negotiations purſued with no vigour, and drawn out into an exceſſive length, ſeemed only to increaſe the former confuſion. After the acceſſion of the preſent Royal Family, a French connection, perhaps neceſſary from the circumſtances of the time, and afterwards a certain negligence of all affairs but thoſe of our domeſtic polity, ſuffered this important point to vaniſh almoſt wholly out of our conſi⯑deration. During this interval, our colonies on the con⯑tinent of North Amerca, extended themſelves on every ſide. Whilſt agriculture and the maritime commerce flou⯑riſhed on their coaſts, the Indian trade drew ſeveral of our wandering dealers far into the inland country, and beyond the great mountains. Here they found themſelves in a de⯑lightful climate, in a ſoil abundantly fruitful, and watered with many fair and navigable rivers. Theſe advantages, joined to thoſe of the Indian trade, appeared to compenſate for its remoteneſs from the ſea. It was judged, that as the firſt ſettlers on the coaſt, we had a good right to the inland country; and, if ſo, to the navigation of the Miſſiſippi, which opened another door to the ocean. With theſe [3] views, a company of merchants and planters, obtained a charter for a conſiderable tract of land near the river Ohio, on the weſtern ſide of the Alleganey mountains, but within the province of Virginia; and the adventurers be⯑gan to ſettle purſuant to the terms of their patent.

Now began to ſhoot forth the ſeeds of another diſpute, which had long lain unobſerved, but which proved alto⯑gether as thorny and intricate as that concerning the limits of Acadia. The French pretending to have firſt diſco⯑vered the mouths of the Miſſiſippi, claimed the whole adjacent country, towards New Mexico on the eaſt, quite to the Apalachian or Alleganey mountains on the weſt. They drove off the new ſettlers, and built a new fort called du Queſne, on the forks of the River Monongahela, a ſituation which commanded the entrance into all the coun⯑try on the Ohio and Miſſiſippi.

The reader will obſerve, that I do not pretend to decide concerning the right of either nation in this conteſt. It is evident enough, that the conſideration of the right had much leſs influence on both parties, than the conſideration of conveniency. Should the French be able to unite Ca⯑nada to their colonies at the mouth of the Miſſiſippi by a poſſeſſion of all that vaſt country which lies between them, the Engliſh colonies muſt loſe all ſhare in the Indian trade in time of peace; and in time of war be expoſed to conti⯑nual dangers, or to the ruinouſly chargeable defence of a frontier more than 1500 miles in length. If on the con⯑trary, the French ſhould fail to make good theſe claims on the Ohio, and thoſe on Nova Scotia, their two colo⯑nies entirely diſunited, and the entrance into one ſhut up for the winter ſeaſon by froſt, and the entrance into the other difficult in all ſeaſons by the banks at the mouth of the Miſſiſppi, muſt certainly loſe all their value to France, and in their fall involve much of the fortune of their great ſettlements in the Weſt Indies.

Both nations being fully perſuaded of this, no longer looked on the affair of the Ohio as a matter of indifference. They prepared to cut the gordian knot of the long and in⯑tricate negotiation by the ſword. Ships were fitted out, and ſome troops ſilently ſent off from Breſt. General Braddock ſailed to Virginia with about 1500 regular troops; 24 men of war under the Admirals Boſ⯑cawen and Moſtyn were ordered to America, to in⯑tercept the French ſupplies. Orders were ſent to our [4] colonies to arm; and three operations were actually under⯑taken, one againſt Fort du Queſne under Braddock; the other two againſt the French forts in Nova Scotia, and the fort of Crown Point on the Frontiers of New York. The two courts in the mean time breathed nothing but peace, and exchanged reciprocal profeſſions of friendſhip, and good will, which deceived neither party.

They who are of opinion that the paſſions and characters of the ruling men influence all public concerns as much as the public intereſts themſelves, thought they ſaw other cauſes operating to haſten this breach. On the death of a great Miniſter, which happened ſome time before, the adminiſtration was new moulded. Some perſons then taken in, were conſidered as belonging to a party not perfectly united with the remains of the old adminiſtration. It was thought, that the leading man of this party propoſed to work out the old Servants of the crown, in order to make way for a more uniform ſyſtem. As long as peace ſubſiſts, government is ſupported by itſelf; and any change is dif⯑ficult. But the conduct of a war, is a thing critical to a miniſtry. The leader of this party therefore, conſcious of his own talents, which all men acknowledged to be con⯑ſpicuous, and of his connections which were conſiderable, warmly puſhed on a war, ſeconded by the fairneſs of the public motives, and the general voice of the people. In this war his friends relied, that things muſt neceſſarily be ſo embarraſſed, that the old party would find themſelves obliged to retire, and to leave the ſtage clear for them to ſerve their country according to their own plans, and on their own terms. This deſign was believed to be puſhed forward by another great man of that party, who had play⯑ed a game nearly of the ſame kind before, and in whom an advanced age had not abated any thing of his natural fire and love of violent councils.

Things came to a criſis by the taking of two French men of war by the Admirals Boſcawen and Moſ⯑tyn. The operations by land were carried on with vigour; but whether conducted with equal judg⯑ment, we ſtand too near the time to decide. However, the French fort at Beauſejour was taken, and ſoon after thoſe on St. John's river were abandoned; by which we remained maſters of all Nova Scotia. The principal expedition was that againſt Fort du Queſne,

[5] under General Braddock. That General abounding too much in his own ſenſe for the degree of military knowledge he poſſeſſed, commanding in a country which he did not know, and carrying on a ſpecies of war in which he had no experience, ſuffered himſelf, when he had advanced within 10 miles of Fort du Queſne, to be ſurpriſed by an ambuſ⯑cade of French and Indians. His army was ſeiz⯑ed with a panic from the unuſual appearance, and horried cries of the ſavages; they fled in confu⯑ſion; they were totally defeated with a conſiderable ſlaugh⯑ter, eſpecially of their officers. The General himſelf, after having five horſes killed under him, was mortally wounded; wiping away all the errors of his conduct by an honourable death for his country.

The nation was ſomething conſoled for this loſs in the ſignal advantage gained by General Johnſon, who com⯑manded the expedition deſigned againſt Crown Point. He was attacked in his intrenchments by the French General Dieſkau, but the aſſailants wanting cannon, and firing from too great a diſtance, were totally defeated, and Dieſkau himſelf was made priſoner. This victory, tho' very honourable for Mr. Johnſon and the provincial troops under his command, yet as it was gained late in the ſeaſon, and as the army was in no very good condition, it had no conſequences. On the whole, we ſeemed, after allowing for this victory, and for the diſ⯑lodgment of the French from Nova Scotia, to have had the worſt part in the campaign; conſidering the ſanguine ex⯑pectations which had been formed, and the great ſuperiori⯑ty of ſtrength which we exerted, or were able to have ex⯑erted, in that part of the world.

During this ſummer, our court took a reſolution not to wait the precarious operation of our arms in America for redreſs of the grievances complained of, but to ſtrike ſuch a blow as would at once put a ſecurity into our hands, for the evacuating the places the enemy had fortified in our territories, and diſable them in the two moſt material points, the reſources of their trade, and their ſeamen. Their merchant ſhips were every where attacked, as if war had been actually declared, and vaſt numbers brought into our ports. The French made all Europe reſound with com⯑plaints of what they called a proceeding ſo unjuſt, and a violation of the law of nations ſo flagrant and unprecedent⯑ed. [6] But, whether it was that they were really in no con⯑dition to act, or that they intended to influence the other courts in their favour, by a ſhew of extraordinary modera⯑tion, they contented themſelves with this, and neither de⯑clared war, nor made any ſort of repriſal for ſeveral months after. At lenght they began to act; ſeveral bodies of troops moved to the coaſts of Picardy, Nor⯑mandy and Britany; and all things threatened an invaſion on ſome part of this kingdom. Under the ſhadow of this ſtratagem, they got ready in the harbour of Toulon a fleet of twelve men of war of the line, with the utmoſt expedition, which convoyed an army of about 11,000 men, under command of the Duke de Richlieu to the iſland of Minorca. In a few days they opened the trenches before St. Philip's fort.

This was done whilſt the nation trembled under a ſhame⯑ful panic, too public to be concealed, too fatal in its con⯑ſequences to be ever forgotten. The real invaſion did not leſſen our fears of the imaginary one; it threw us into a confuſion that ſuffered us to be ſenſible of nothing but our own weakneſs. We did not look upon ourſelves ſufficiently ſecured by the arrival of the Hanoverian and Heſſian troops, which the ſame weakneſs had induced us to call to our aſſiſt⯑ance. The miniſtry ſeemed to have been infected with the common terror; for though they had very early notice or the French deſigns, ſuch was the apprehenſion of the invaſion, or ſuch the ill-contrived diſpoſition of our navy, that Admiral Byng was not diſpatched to the Mediterranean before the 5th of April, and then with a ſquadron of no more than 10 ſhips of the line.

The engagement with the French fleet under M. Ga⯑liſſoniere; the retreat of Byng by which the gar⯑riſon of fort St. Philip was cut off from all hopes of relief; the ſurrender of that garriſon after nine weeks open trenches; the ſentiments of the court and the public, on the different merits of the governor and the admiral; the oppoſition of ſome, who thought the one too highly honoured, and the other too ſeverely cenſured; and the meaſures which rather indigna⯑tion at our loſſes and diſgraces, than a cool ſenſe of things obliged us to take, are known to all the world. Our affairs were in ſuch a Condition that we were driven to the expe⯑dient [7] of a court martial to revive the Britiſh ſpirit, and to the unfortunate neceſſity of ſhedding the blood of an Admiral, a perſon of a noble family, as a ſa⯑crifice to the diſcipline of our navy.

From this melancholy picture, let us turn our eyes ano⯑ther way, and review the ſteps by which this war came to involve the reſt of the contending powers. The French, amongſt the other plans they formed for diſtreſſing our affairs, made no ſecret of their deſign of attacking his Majeſty's German dominions. Theſe countries evi⯑dently had no ſort of connexion with the matters which gave riſe to the war. But being under a Sovereign ſo remarkably affectionate to his native country; they judged he might be terrified into a relaxation of his rights in America, to preſerve Hanover from the calamities with which it [...] threatened. Their politics, however, in this inſtance proved as unſucceſsful as they were unjuſt. No motion was made towards an abatement in our claims with regard to America; his Majeſty took other methods for the preſervation of the peace of Germany. His Britiſh ſub⯑jects by their repreſentatives, not more generouſly than rea⯑ſonably, reſolved to defend the Hanoverians if attacked in their quarrel. To anſwer this purpoſe, the miniſtry enter⯑ed into a ſubſidy treaty with the Empreſs of Ruſſia, in virtue of which ſhe was to hold 55,000 men in readineſs to be ſent on a requiſition wherever the Britiſh ſervice re⯑quired.

The alliance with Ruſſia was choſen for reaſons which were then ſufficiently plauſible; though it is to be hoped they can never ſubſiſt again. The long ill underſtanding between the King of Pruſſia and our court, and his cloſe connexion with that of Verſailles, raiſed no ill-grounded apprehenſions that he might be induced to act a dangerous part on this occaſion. Ruſſia was therefore a proper ally, who had both a political and perſonal enmity to this mo⯑narch, and who would be ſure to employ a great power with great vigour in ſuch a cauſe. But this ſyſtem was in a ſhort time totally reverſed. The King of Pruſſia had been too well appriſed of the cloſe conjunction of the courts of Peterſburg and Vienna, and of the real motive to that conjunction, to have the leaſt deſign of embroiling himſelf with England. Matters were therefore very ſoon explain⯑ed, and the treaty between his Pruſſian majeſty and this [8] court, to keep all foreigners out of the Empire, was ſigned at London in January 1756. Theſe treaties were cenſured as inconſiſtent with each other; but in reality they were conſiſtent enough, aiming preciſely at the ſame object, to oppoſe the ſchemes meditated by France for diſturbing the affairs of Germany.

If reflecting on the ſentiments of theſe courts, there was ſomething unexpected in the alliance between great Bri⯑tain and Pruſſia; it was ſoon followed by another alliance of a nature infinitely more ſurpriſing. The Empreſs Queen of Hungary, finding England in no diſpoſition to co-operate in her deſigns, had recourſe to other meaſures. The houſe of Auſtria, which had formerly united Europe to preſerve her from the power of France, now entered herſelf into the moſt intimate union with that power. By this extraordinary revolution the whole political ſyſtem of Europe aſſumed a new face; it was indeed a revolution ſo extraordinary, that we ſhall be juſtified if we interrupt the courſe of this narrative, to look back at the cauſes which produced it.

The houſe of Brandenbourg, a little more than two cen⯑turies ago, was in a very humble condition. But by the part ſhe took in the reformation, which put into her hands the eſtates of the Teutonic order; by a marriage from which ſhe acquired the duchy of Cleves; and by an un⯑common ſucceſſion of able princes who carefully improved every turn in the affairs of Germany to their advantage, ſhe raiſed herſelf by degrees to a conſiderable ſtate, to an electorate, and at laſt to a royalty, not only in name but in power. The late King of Pruſſia, in order to ſtrengthen this power, though he paſt almoſt his whole reign in the moſt profound peace, gave his whole attention to his army; frugal in all other reſpects, in this alone he was expenſive; it was his buſineſs, and what was perhaps of greater mo⯑ment, it was his only diverſion. Thus in a reign apparently inactive, there was always kept up an army of near 100,000 men, in as much exerciſe as they could have in war, and formed with the moſt perfect diſcipline.

When his preſent Majeſty came to the throne, he imme⯑diately ſhewed a diſpoſition of employing effectually that military force, which his father had ſpent his life only in forming and training. He managed his diſpute with the Biſhop of Liege by the ſummary method of force; and ſeemed diſpoſed to carry all things with ſo high an hand, as [9] made him indeed much reſpected, but much dreaded too by the Princes of the Empire, who ſaw that there was another power to be feared in Germany, beſides that of Auſtria. But theſe were ſmall matters, rather ſigns of the diſpoſition of this Prince, than exertions of it. He medi⯑tated much greater things; and only waited an opportu⯑nity to make good the antient claims of his family on the moſt conſiderable part of the dutchy of Sileſia. The right to that dutchy had been a very intricate affair; but the houſe of Auſtria availing herſelf of the greatneſs of her power, and of a diſſention between the Elector Frederick II. and his ſon, prevailed with the Elector to give up that right for an equivalent; then ſhe perſuaded his ſon to con⯑firm the treaty; and at the ſame time for a trivial conſi⯑deration to give up the equivalent itſelf. The King of Pruſſia, not thinking himſelf bound by theſe acts, though confirmed be a long poſſeſſion, took advantage of his own power, and the embarraſſed circumſtances of the houſe of Auſtria, to reſume what their power and the embarraſſed circumſtances of his family had formerly deprived him of. For immediately on the death of Charles the 6th, when the Auſtrian greatneſs ſeemed irrecoverably loſt, he entered into Sileſia, and made himſelf maſter of the whole country with little oppoſition. Then uniting with the French and Bavarians, he ſecured his conqueſts by two deciſive victories, and by a trea⯑ty which yielded him the greateſt part of Sileſia and the whole county of Glatz. But the cauſe of the Emperor which the King of Pruſſia had embraced, ſoon cauſed a renewal of hoſtilities; the Queen of Hungary ſaw herſelf defeated in three pitched battles; her new ally the King of Poland, driven from his German dominions, and the King of Pruſſia entering Dreſden in triumph, where he gave the law in a treaty, by which Sileſia was once more ſolemnly confirmed to him: in return to which he guarantied to the Queen of Hungary the reſt of her dominions.

The Queen of Hungary could not eaſily loſe the me⯑mory of the wound ſhe had received in the loſs of one of the fineſt and richeſt parts of all her dominions. Sileſia, which ſhe had juſt yielded, extended in length 200 miles along the courſe of the large and navigable river Oder. [10] A country of the moſt exquiſite fertility and higheſt cultiva⯑tion; abounding with men, abounding with valuable manu⯑factures, and yielding a clear yearly revenue of 800,000 pounds ſterling. The peace was hardly concluded by which ſhe reſigned this valuable territory, than ſhe ſet on foot practices for recovering it. She entered into a treaty with the court of Peterſbourg, of an innocent and ſimply defen⯑ſive nature, ſo far as appeared to the public; but ſix ſecret and ſeparate articles were added to it; one of which provides, that in caſe his Pruſſian majeſty ſhould attack her majeſty the Empreſs Queen, or the Empreſs of Ruſſia, or even the republic of Poland, that this attack ſhould be conſidered as a breach of the treaty of Dreſden; that the right of the Empreſs Queen to Sileſia ceded by that treaty ſhould revive; and that the contracting powers ſhould mutually furniſh an army of 60,000 men to re-inveſt the Empreſs Queen with that dutchy.

To this ſo extraordinary a treaty, the King of Poland was invited to accede; and he did ſo far accede to it, as to ſhew he perfectly agreed in his ſentiments with theſe courts. But his ſituation in the jaws of a formidable enemy, and the experience of paſſed misfortunes, had rendered him ſo weary, that he declined ſigning the treaty; but ſtill, with the conſent of the parties concerned, whom he fully con⯑vinced of his reſolution to co-operate in all their meaſures. He deſired and they agreed, that in the ſucceſs of their arms he ſhould have a ſhare in the ſpoil, on the footing of a treaty for the eventual portion, of the King of Pruſſia's dominions made in the laſt war. On theſe conditions the King of Poland without actu⯑ally ſigning, was underſtood, and received as a party to the treaty of Peterſbourg.

In conſequence of theſe meaſures, all ſort of means were employed to embroil the King of Pruſſia's affairs in the North, and particularly to render him perſonally odious to the Czarina. When their machinations had taken full ef⯑fect, and Ruſſia was fixed in an unalterable enmity to that monarch, preparations of magazines and armies were made in Bohemia and Moravia; and the King of Poland, under pretence of a military amuſement, drew together about 16000 men, with which he occupied the ſtrong and im⯑portant Poſt of Pirna. The Queen of Hungary ſaw that ſhe [11] ſtood in need of yet ſtronger ſupports than theſe in the arduous buſineſs ſhe had undertaken. She found that Great Britain, which had often done ſo much for her diſtreſs, would do little for her ambition: ſhe therefore had recourſe to France, who joyfully accepted an alliance, that promiſed to confound the whole Germanic body, concluded a treaty with the Empreſs at Verſailles the 1ſt of May 1756, a re⯑markable aera in the political hiſtory of Europe.

The ſecret articles of the treaty of Peterſbourg, the fountain of the preſent troubles, and the ſteps taken to put that treaty in execution, though formed and carried on with as much ſecrecy as earneſtneſs, could not eſcape the vigilance of his Pruſſian majeſty, who watched all their mo⯑tions, and had perfect intelligence of their moſt hidden de⯑ſigns. When, therefore, he perceived that by the breach between England and France, the Empreſs Queen would take advantage of theſe troubles to avail herſelf of her al⯑liances and her armament; he ordered his miniſter at Vienna to demand a clear explication, and proper aſſurances con⯑cerning the preparations he ſaw making: and receiving only a dry and equivocal anſwer, that the Empreſs had taken meaſures for her own ſecurity and that of her allies and friends, the King believed himſelf no longer bound to pre⯑ſerve any terms; a dangerous war was to be kept out of his own territories at any rate; and being always in perfect rea⯑dineſs for action, he fell upon Saxony with a conſiderable army.

At firſt the King of Pruſſia ſeemed only to demand a free paſſage for his troops, and an obſervance of the neutrality profeſſed by the King of Poland; but as he had very good reaſon to diſtruſt ſuch a neutrality, he demanded as a ſecurity, that the Saxon troops ſhould quit the ſtrong poſt they occupied, and diſ⯑perſe themſelve immediately. This demand was refuſed, and the King of Pruſſia in conſequence of that refuſal, immediately formed a ſort of blockade about the Saxon camp at Pirna, with a view to reduce it by famine, ſince its inacceſſible ſituation rendered an attack unadviſeable. There were in Bohemia two Auſtrian armies under M. Brown and M. Picolomini; to keep them in awe, M. Schwerin had entered Bohemia from the county of Glatz; and M. Keith had penetrated into that kingdom on the ſide of Miſnia. But the King of Pruſſia, not entirely confiding in theſe diſpoſitions? and ſtill apprehenſive that M. Brown [12] might be able to convey ſome relief to the Saxons, reſolv⯑ed to bring him to action, to the ſucceſs of which he knew his own preſence would greatly contribute. He therefore left the blockade of the Saxon army, joined his forces under Keith, and engaged the Auſtrians at Lowoſitz. Here he obtained a victory, which though it was not undiſputed with regard to the field of battle, yet with regard to the conſequences it was as deciſive as could be wiſhed. M. Brown found it impracticable to re⯑lieve the Saxons, notwithſtanding the judicious efforts he made for that purpoſe; and that Army, after a vain attempt to retire from their difficult poſt, which had one fault, that it was as difficult to leave it as to force it, were obliged to ſurrender priſoners of war. The King of Poland quitted his German dominions; and the Pruſſians took up their winter quarters in Saxony, ſeized upon the revenues, levied exorbitant contributions, and obliged the country to furniſh recruits. This unhappy people ſaw their country exhauſt⯑ed, and forced to bear the burthen of a war againſt itſelf. It was then that the King of Pruſſia conſulting the rules of policy more than thoſe of politeneſs, made himſelf maſ⯑ter of the archieves at Dreſden, in doing which ſome rough⯑neſs was uſed towards the Queen; but he made himſelf amends for the clamour induſtriouſly raiſed on this pretence, by acquiring the originals of theſe pieces, which evinced to the world the reality of the deſign againſt him, and which therefore in a great meaſure juſtified the means he had taken to come at them, as well as the extraordinary ſeverities he uſed towards the unfortunate Saxons.

CHAP. II.

WHILST the King of Pruſſia paſſed the winter in the moſt vigorous preparations for carrying on the war, his ally Great Britain preſented a very different face of things. The loſs of Minorca plunged the people into the utmoſt grief mixed with ſhame, for ſuch a blot on the national honour, and with indignation not only [13] againſt thoſe who had acted weakly, but thoſe who had proved inſufficiently for the loſs of that important poſſeſſion. The public reſentment which at firſt ſeemed to have no other object than Byng, was ſoon turned againſt the miniſtry. The clamour in parliament was great; without doors it was exceſſive. Addreſſes praying a ſtrict enquiry into the cauſe of our misfortunes, were preſented from all parts of the kingdom. The miniſtry, notwithſtanding this general diſcontent, had a real ſtrength; and they might have ſtood, had they agreed amongſt themſelves. The commons could not be brought to any angry votes; and the reſult of the enquiry into the loſs of Minorca, was as favourable as they could have wiſhed. But Mr. F—x thought it not adviſeable to bear a large proportion of the odium cauſed by counſels, in which he had little ſhare. Perhaps he thought this embarraſſment, a ſituation not unfavourable to the arrangement he had always aimed at? he therefore ſuddenly threw up an em⯑ployment, which he hoped to reſume augmented with greater power.

On the removal of this principal prop, the whole ſtruc⯑ture of the miniſtry fell to pieces. The D. of N. the Ld. Ch. the firſt lord of the admiralty reſigned; and the chiefs of the party by whoſe manoeuvres they were diſplaced, naturally ſucceeded to the ma⯑nagement of affairs. They who had reſigned gave them no apparent oppoſition in parliament; but whether it was, that the new miniſtry were them⯑ſelves too freſh from oppoſition, and ſome of them too full of the popular manners that introduced them to court to be perfectly agreeable in the cloſet, or that they had made their bottom too narrow, after holding their em⯑ployments for ſome months, to the great concern of the public, they in their turn were obliged to quit their poſts. Thus was the helm of government a ſecond time abandoned. The caſe of the King and the nation was at that juncture truly deplorable. We were without any ally who could do us the leaſt ſervice, engaged in a war hitherto unſucceſsful, with the moſt formidable power in Europe; we almoſt deſpaired of our military virtue; public ſpirit appeared utterly extinguiſhed, whilſt the rage of faction burned with the utmoſt violence; our operations were totally ſuſpend⯑ed: [14] and having no miniſtry eſtabliſhed, we had no plan to follow.

Three factions divided the ruling men of the nation, for the groſs of the people ſeemed to have no further views than a redreſs of their grievances, by whatever means that could be brought about; the firſt of theſe factions was compoſed of thoſe who had grown to place and power, or had formed their connexions under the old miniſtry. They were ſome of the moſt reſpectable perſons in the nation, and had undoubtedly the greateſt parliamentary intereſt. They had at the ſame time another intereſt hardly leſs conſiderable, that of the monied people; but in ſome points, and thoſe material too, they were weak. They were not at all popular; a matter of great conſi⯑deration in a government like ours; and they were ſup⯑poſed by the groſs of the people, not to be under the direction of great political abilities.

The ſecond faction, though not ſuſpected of the want of ſufficient ability, was yet more unpopular than the former; they had not attempted to preſerve even the ap⯑pearances eſſential to popularity; and to them the more eſſential, as their parliamentary ſtrength was, however reſpectable, much inferior to the firſt. If their influence at one court was able to ballance that of the old miniſtry, by means of a then powerful connexion, that very con⯑nection made them far worſe at another court, and worſe with the generality of the people, who entertained or pre⯑tended at leaſt to entertain, ſuſpicions of a nature the more dangerous, as they were only dropped in hints and whiſ⯑pers, and never could come to a full and open explana⯑tion.

The third party, had little parliamentary and leſs court influence; but they had a prodigious popularity, which ſupplied every other defect. The abilities of their leader were of the moſt ſhining kind; his application equal to his abilities; his diſintereſtedneſs was confeſſed by his ene⯑mies; and though it would have ſhined in the days of he⯑roiſm, was now the more valued, and ſet off to the greater advantage by the general ſelfiſhneſs which prevailed among the men of buſineſs. The nation repoſed the moſt perfect confidence in his integrity and love to his country. This party, conſcious where its ſtrength lay, cultivated with great care the popularity which was the baſis of their [15] power; even perhaps ſo as to impair on ſome occaſion the dignity of government.

Theſe three factions differed from each other extremely with regard to power, the grand object of all factions. But in the general ſcheme of their politics, the two firſt were pretty much agreed. Looking on France as the moſt con⯑ſtant and moſt dangerous enemy of Great Britain, they dreaded the increaſe of her power and influence among the neighbouring nations as the greateſt of all evils. To pre⯑vent ſo dangerous an aggrandiſement, they thought it abſolutely neceſſary to preſerve a conſtant attention to the ballance of power, and to ſeek our particular ſafety and liberty in the general ſafety and liberty of Europe. A cloſe connection was therefore to be kept up with the powers of the continent, not only by continual negotiati⯑ons, but by large ſubſidies, and even by aſſiſting them with our troops if the occaſion ſhould require ſuch aſſiſtance. For this purpoſe, as well as to ſecure the more effectually our preſent happy eſtabliſhment, a conſiderable regular land force ought to be conſtantly maintained. Our navy, they thought, ought by no means to be neglected; but it was only to be cultivated and employed ſubſerviently to the more comprehenſive continental ſyſtem. Theſe parties were far from being friends to arbitrary power, or in any ſort averſe to parliaments; they loved the conſti⯑tution; but they were for preſerving the authority of go⯑vernment entire, and in its utmoſt lawful force. To make government more eaſy, knowing that many would diſturb it, from diſaffection or diſguſt, or miſtaken notions of liberty, they thought it juſt to rule men by their intereſts, if they could not by their virtues, and they had long been in the practice of procuring a majority in parliament, by the diſtribution of the numerous lucrative places and employments which our conſtitution leaves in the diſpoſal of the Crown. Several believed that no other method was practicable, conſidering the nature of mankind, and our particular form of government.

But the third and popular party, was influenced by different principles. They looked indeed on the power of France in the ſame light with the two former, and were of the ſame opinion concerning the neceſſity of ſetting bounds to it. In the means of attaining this end they differed. Our ſituation they thought dictated a narrower, [16] but a more natural, a ſafer, and a leſs expenſive plan of politics, than that which had been adopted by the other party. We ought never to forget, ſaid they, that we are an iſland: and that this circumſtance, ſo favourable both to our political and to our civil liberty, preſcribes to us a conduct very different from that of any other nation. Our natural ſtrength is a maritime ſtrength, as trade is our natural employment; theſe muſt always go hand in hand, and they mutually ſupport each other. But, if turning our back to our real intereſts, and abandoning our natural element, we enter that inextricable labyrinth of continental politics; if we make ourſelves parties in every controverſy; if we exhauſt our wealth in purchaſing the uſeleſs and precarious friendſhip of every petty prince or ſtate; if we waſte the blood of our people in all the quarrels that may ariſe on the continent; ſo far from go⯑ing in the right way to reduce France, that we attack her on the ſtrong ſide, and only deſtroy ourſelves by our ill judg⯑ed efforts againſt the enemy. That we can have nothing to fear from the ſuperiority of France on the continent, whilſt we preſerve our ſuperiority at ſea; that we can always cut the ſinews of the enemy's ſtrength by deſtroying their traffic; that to fear an invaſion from a power weak in its marine, is the idleſt of all fears; that in caſe an invaſion were poſſible, a well trained national militia, ſupplying by their zeal the defects of their diſcipline, would prove our beſt protection; that a ſtanding army is in whatever ſhape dangerous to freedom; and that a government like ours, connected by its very eſſence with the liberty of the ſub⯑ject, can never be in want of the ſupports of deſpotic power, As little is parliamentary influence neceſſary. A govern⯑ment pleaſing to the people, as every good government muſt be, can never be generally oppoſed; and men need no bribes to perſuade them to their duty.

Theſe notions, ſo oppoſite in their extreams, might be reconciled in a medium, and uſed to temper each other. For as, on one hand, it would be very abſurd to make no ſort of advantage of our inſular ſituation, but to engage in all the buſineſs of the continent without reſerve, and to plunge ourſelves into real evils out of a dread of poſſible miſchiefs; ſo on the other hand, to think ourſelves wholly unconcerned in the fortunes of our neighbours on the continent, or to think of aiding them in any caſe, only [17] by the way of diverſion with our fleets, would be a way of proceeding, ſtill more extravagant than the former. If ſuch notions were reduced to practice, we might ſoon loſe all thoſe advantages derived from a ſituation which we abuſed.

The reaſonableneſs of ſuch a temperament, could not be perceived during the ferment of that time, in which theſe topics were bandied to and fro with infinite heat. The reſignation, or rather deprivation, of the popular mi⯑niſtry, only increaſed their popularity, and the general diſcontent; the people could not believe that good mea⯑ſures could be purſued, when thoſe, in whom alone they confided, were not employed; almoſt all the corporations of the kingdom preſented the deprived miniſters with their freedom, and addreſſed them in the warmeſt manner, teſti⯑fying the moſt intire approbation of their conduct, and the ſincereſt concern to ſee them out of employment.

This conflict between an old eſtabliſhed intereſt, and the torrent of popularity, continued for a long time, and the nation was almoſt ruined by it. It is not eaſy, nor perhaps quite proper, to attempt to trace the ſteps by which ſo hap⯑py a coalition, as we have ſeen take place, was brought about. But it was formed in ſuch manner, has held to⯑gether with ſuch ſolidity, and produced ſuch excellent effects, as I believe the moſt ſanguine could not have hoped for at that time. Mr. P. was again reſtored to the office of ſecretary of ſtate, the D. of N. was placed at the head of the treaſury, Mr. F. was appointed paymaſter of the forces. This ar⯑rangement, which gave very general ſatisfaction, was how⯑ever diſliked by thoſe, whom their violent attachment to their party had inſpired with a narrow and excluſive ſpirit. It was the beſt meaſure, becauſe it was an healing mea⯑ſure; and it was little leſs than impoſſible for any parti⯑cular party to carry on public buſineſs on its ſingle bot⯑tom.

It was high time that our domeſtic diſſentions ſhould be compoſed at laſt. From every quarter of the world, in which we had any concern, we heard of nothing but loſſes and calamities. In America we loſt the Fort of Oſwego. That fort, ſitua⯑ted at the mouth of the Onondaga river, commanded a commodious harbour on the Lake Ontario. It was built [18] by General Shirley, and deſigned to cover the country of the Five Nations; to ſecure the Indian trade; to interrupt the communication between the French northern and ſouthern eſtabliſhments; and to open a way to our arms to attack the forts of Frontenac and Niagara. For theſe purpoſes, ſome frigates had been fitted out for cruizing, and a number of boats prepared for the tranſportation of troops; but they all fell to the enemy with the fort, where 100 pieces of cannon were, and a conſiderable quantity of proviſion. 1600 men were made priſoners of war. The place made but a trifling reſiſtance, ſcarce holding out three days; the attempts to relieve it were too late. The French demoliſhed the fort.

Our loſſes were not confined to America. The E. India company received a blow, which would have ſhaken an eſtabliſhment of leſs ſtrength to its foundations. The news of the war between France and England had not yet reach⯑ed India, but a new and very formidable enemy was raiſed up in that quarter. The Nabob of Bengal (the Nabobs are a ſpecies of viceroys to the Grand Mogul, grown almoſt independent in their ſeveral provinces,) irritated at the protection given to one of his ſubjects in the Engliſh fort of Calcutta, and, as it is ſaid, at the refuſal of ſome duties to which he claimed a right, levied a great army, and laid ſiege to that place. The Governor, terrified by the numbers of the enemy, abandoned the fort with ſeve⯑ral of the principal perſons in the ſettlement, who ſaved themſelves with their moſt valuable effects on board the ſhips.

Thus deſerted. Mr. Hollwel, the ſecond in command, bravely held the place to the laſt extremity, with a few gallant friends, and the remains of a feeble garriſon. A very noble defence was inſufficient to keep an untenable place, or to affect an ungenerous enemy. The fort was taken, and the garriſon being made priſoners, were thruſt into a narrow dungeon. Hollwel, with a few others, came out alive, to paint a ſcene of the moſt cruel diſtreſs which perhaps human nature ever ſuffered. The Eaſt India company loſt their principal ſettlement in Bengal, and a fort, which ſecured to them the moſt valuable part of their trade.

In the ſpace of this unfortunate year, we were ſtripped of Minorca and Oſwego; we apprehended an invaſion [19] of Great Britain itſelf: our councils were torn to pieces by factions; and our military force was every where in contempt. Amidſt theſe loſſes, we conſidered as ſome advantage, the reduction of the principal fort of Angria, a piratical prince, who had been many years troubleſome to the Engliſh trade in the Eaſt Indies. This ſervice was performed by Admiral Watſon in the beginning of the year.

CHAP. III.

WHAT turn the Engliſh politics were like to take in the year 1759, ſeemed for ſome time uncertain. The new miniſtry did not ſeem well eſtabliſhed; nor was it well known, whether they would purſue the plans and preſerve the connections of the old. Abroad, every thing was prepared for opening the campaign with the utmoſt eclat. All Europe was in motion.

France, in order to demonſtrate to the Queen of Hun⯑gary, the advantageous choice ſhe had made in connecting herſelf with the houſe of Bourbon, formed two great ar⯑mies. The firſt was compoſed of near 80,000 men, the flower of the French troops, attended with a vaſt artillery and commanded by M. d'Etrees, a General of the beſt eſtabliſhed reputation ſhe had in her ſervice. Under him ſerved M. de Contades, M. Chevert, and the Count de St. Germain, all officers of high character, and all fit to com⯑mand in chief, if M. d'Etrees had not been appointed to that eminence. This formidable army paſſed the Rhine, and marched by Weſtphalia, in order to invade the King of Pruſſia's dominions in quality of allies to the Empreſs Queen, and guardians of the liberties of the Empire, and to no other intent, as it was pretended; but in reality, with a view to reduce Hanover alſo. They judged that their operations againſt the King of Pruſſia might be executed, and their ſcheme to drive the King of England into ſome conceſſions with regard to America, might be compleated by one and the ſame blow. The ſecond army was com⯑manded [18] [...] [19] [...] [20] by the Prince de Soubiſe; it conſiſted of about 25,000 men. This army was deſtined to ſtrengthen the Imperial army of execution; but before it had paſſed the Rhine, it made itſelf maſter of Cleves, Meurs and Gueldres, whilſt a detachment from d'Etrees's army ſeized upon the town of Emden, and whatever elſe belonged to Pruſſia in Eaſt Frieſland.

As ſoon as the King of Pruſſia had entered Saxony in the beginning of the preceding ſummer, proceſs was com⯑menced againſt him in the Emperor's Aulic council, and before the diet of the Empire. It is not difficult to con⯑ceive how the affair muſt have been decided; when thoſe who feared the King of Pruſſia, believed they had a fair opportunity to reduce him: and when thoſe who feared the houſe of Auſtria, were, by that very fear, obliged to ſup⯑port the power they dreaded: accuſtomed as they were to the influence of a family in which the Empire had ſo long been in a manner hereditary; and over-awed by the appearance of a confederacy, the moſt formidable the world had ever yet ſeen. Accordingly the King of Pruſſia was condemned for contumacy: and the Fiſcal had orders to notify to him that he was put under the ban of the Empire, and adjudged fallen from all the dignities and poſ⯑ſeſſions which he held under it. The circles of the Em⯑pire were ordered to furniſh their contingents of men and money to put this ſentence in execution; but the contin⯑gents were collected ſlowly, the troops were badly compo⯑ſed, and probably this army had never been able to act, if it had not been for the Aſſiſtance offered under the Prince de Soubiſe.

The Auſtrians, who were principals in the quarrel, were not behind their auxiliaries in the greatneſs of their pre⯑parations; they made the moſt ſtrenuous efforts, by which they aſſembled a body of upwards of 100,000 men in Bohemia, and committed the command to Prince Charles of Lorrain, aſſiſted by M. Brown. In the north all things threatened the King of Pruſſia. The Czarina true to her reſentments and her engagements, had ſent a body of 60,000 men commanded by M. Apraxin, who were in full march to invade the Ducal Pruſſia, whilſt a ſtrong fleet was equip⯑ped in the Baltick, to co-operate with that army. Altho' the King of Sweden was allied in blood and inclination to his Pruſſian majeſty, yet the jealouſy which the Senate en⯑tertained [21] of their ſovereign; the hope of recovering their antient poſſeſſions in Pomerania by means of the preſent troubles, and in fine their old attachment to France, newly cemented by intrigues and ſubſidies, made their ill in⯑clinations to the cauſe of Pruſſia more than ſuſpicious. Hitherto indeed nothing more than the tendency of their councils was fully known. The Duke of Mecklenbourg took the ſame party, and agreed to join the Swediſh army when it ſhould be aſſembled, with 6000 men; a proceed⯑ing which he has ſince had reaſon to repent bitterly. Thus were the forces of five mighty ſtates ^* , each of which had in their turn been a terror to all Europe, united to reduce the heir of the Marquiſſes of Brandenbourg; and in ſuch a point of danger and glory, had the great and formidable abilities of his Pruſſian majeſty placed him, with little, in compariſon, that could enable him to ſuſtain the violence of ſo many ſhocks, except what thoſe abilities ſupplied. But his aſtoniſhing oeconomy, the incomparable order of his finances, the diſcipline of his armies beyond all praiſe, a ſagacity that foreſaw every thing, a vigilance that attended every thing, a conſtancy that no labour could ſubdue, a courage that no danger could diſmay, an intuitive glance that catches the deciſive moment, all theſe ſeemed to form a ſort of ballance to the vaſt weight againſt him, turned the wiſhes of his friends into hopes, and made them depend upon reſources that are not within the power of calcu⯑lation.

The only army that appeared in his favour was a body of between 30 and 40,000 Hanoverians and Heſſians, who with ſome reinforcements of his own troops, formed an army of obſervation, commanded by his Royal Highneſs the Duke of Cumberland; this army was poſted on the Weſer, to watch the motions of M. d'Etrees. The vaſt and unwieldy body of the French, encumbered as the French armies always are by an immenſe baggage, and an innumerable multitude of mouths without hands, made a very ſlow progreſs through the rough and barren country that lies between the Rhine and the Weſer. All the abili⯑ties of the French general were employed in finding ſubſiſ⯑tence for his troops. His Royal Highneſs on the other hand, diſplayed great abilities in throwing all poſſible im⯑pediments in his way. But when theſe impediments were removed by the ſuperiority of numbers, the Hanoverian [22] army gradually gave way, yielding to that ſuperiority, and the French troops paſſed the Weſer without oppo⯑ſition.

In the mean time, his Pruſſian majeſty being determined according to his maxim, to lay the cloth as from home as poſſible; made his diſpoſitions for carrying the war into Bohemia as ſpeedily as the ſeaſon would admit. Three great bodies of his troops entered into that kingdom by three very different ways, but nearly at the ſame time. M. Schwerin penetrated into it from Sileſia. The Prince of Bevern entered with the corps under his command from Luſatia, and defeated as a preliminary to a more deciſive victory, a body of 28,000 Auſtrians who oppo⯑ſed him. The King himſelf prepared to enter Bohemia at a great diſtance from the corps com⯑manded by theſe Generals; and as he ſeemed diſpoſed to march towards Egra, the enemy imagined he intended to execute ſome deſign diſtinct from the object of his other armies. With this idea they detached a body of 20,000 men, to obſerve his motions. The King of Pruſſia find⯑ing that this feint had all its effect, made a ſudden and maſterly movement to his left, by which he cut off all communication between that detachment and the main army of the Auſtrians. Spirited with this advantage, he puſhed onwards with the utmoſt rapidity to Prague, where he joined the corps under the prince of Bevern and M. Schwerin, who had advanced with inconceivable diligence to meet him. Never were operations executed with more judgment, celerity and ſucceſs.

The Auſtrian army was little ſhort of 100,000 men, and the ſituation of their camp, fortified by every ad⯑vantage of nature, and every contrivance of art, ſuch as on common occaſions might juſtly be conſidered as impregnable; but the Pruſſians, being near⯑ly as numerous as the enemy, inſpired by a ſociety of dan⯑ger with their King, and filled with that noble enthuſiaſm, which, whilſt it urges to daring enterpriſes, almoſt enſures their ſucceſs, paſſed moraſſes, climed precipices, faced batteries, and after a bloody and obſtinate reſiſtance, totally defeated the Auſtrians. They took their camp, military cheſt, cannon, all the trophies of a complete victory. The loſs on the ſide of the victors, as well as the vanquiſhed, was very great; but both ſides had yet a greater loſs in [23] the death of two of the beſt generals in Europe. M. Schwe⯑rin was killed at the age of eighty-two, with the colo⯑nels ſtandard in his hand at the head of his regiment. M. Brown received a wound, which, from the chagrin he ſuffered rather than from its own nature, proved mortal.

About 40,000 of the Auſtrian army took refuge in Prague. The reſt fled different ways. The King of Pruſſia loſt no time to inveſt the place, and to cut off all ſuccours. If on one hand ſuch an immenſe garriſon made an attack unadviſeable, on the other that formidable number itſelf ſeemed to make the reduction of the place by famine the more certain. The King of Pruſſia not relying ſolely on this, prepared to bombard the town. On the 29th of May, at midnight, after a moſt dreadful ſtorm of rain and thunder, as if it were to diſplay how much more ruinous the malice of men may be, than the greateſt terrors of na⯑ture, on the ſignal of a rocket, four batteries, which diſ⯑charged every twenty-four hours two hundred and eighty-eight bombs, beſides a vaſt multitude of red hot balls, be⯑gan to pour deſtruction on that unfortunate city, which was ſoon in flames in every part. The garriſon made a vigo⯑rous defence, and one well conducted and deſperate ſally: but they were repulſed with great loſs. The principal magiſtrates, burgeſſes, and clergy, ſeeing their city on the point of being reduced to an heap of rubbiſh, made the moſt moving ſupplications to the commander to liſten to terms. The commander was deaf to their prayers. Twelve thouſand of the moſt uſeleſs mouths were driven out of the city. The Pruſſians forced them in again. The affairs of the empreſs ſeemed verging to inevitable deſtruction; a whole army was upon the point of ſurrendering priſoners of war; the capital of Bohemia on the point of being ta⯑ken, and with it all the reſt of that flouriſhing kingdom. The ſanguine friends to the King of Pruſſia began to com⯑pute the diſtance of Vienna.

In this deſperate ſituation of affairs, Leopold Count Daun entered on the ſtage, and began to turn the fortune of the war. This General never had commanded in chief before; but he was formed, by a long courſe of experience in various parts of Europe, under the greateſt Generals, and in the moſt illuſtrious ſcenes of actions. Though of a very noble family, he had, without the leaſt aſſiſtance from court favour, riſen inſenſibly by the ſlow gradation of mere [24] merit, with much eſteem and without any noiſe. This General arrived within a few miles of Prague, the day after the great battle. He collected the fugitive parties of the Auſtrian army, and retired to a poſt of great ſtrength, from whence he fed the troops in Prague with hopes of re⯑lief. But as no man better underſtood the ſuperiority of the Pruſſian troops, and as he was ſenſible of the impreſſion which the late defeat had left upon his men, he carefully avoided to precipitate matters by an haſty action. He knew that the ſituation he had choſen would embarraſs the Pruſſians; that a large party of their army muſt be always employed to watch him; that this would weaken their ef⯑forts againſt the great body ſhut up in Prague, whilſt his own forces gained time to recover their ſpirits, and to in⯑creaſe in ſtrength by the daily ſuccours, which his court exerted all their powers to ſend him: with theſe ideas he waited in his entrenched camp at Colin, to act as events ſhould direct.

The King of Pruſſia was not leſs ſenſible than Count Daun of the effects of this conduct. He determined at all adventures to diſlodge him from the poſt he held; but whether it was that the King feared to weaken his army, which had actually an army to beſiege, or whether he was blinded by a train of uniform ſucceſs, which made him believe his arms irreſiſtable under every diſadvantage, or whatever were his motives or neceſſities, the whole army employed in this undertaking, including the Prince of Bevern's corps, did not exceed 32,000 men, cavalry and infantry; and with theſe he was to attack 60,000 men, in one of the ſtrongeſt ſituations which could be choſen, and defended by a vaſt train of artillery. Whatever the moſt impetuous and well regula⯑ted courage, whatever an ardor inſpired by the remem⯑brance of ſo many victories could do towards overcoming every kind of diſadvantage, was done by the Pruſſians on this occaſion. They returned to the attack ſeven times: in none of their victorious battles had their bravery been more conſpicuous. Both the King's brothers were in the field; and they did every thing that could be expected from the King of Pruſſia's brothers. The King himſelf at the head of his cavalry, made one furious and concluding charge. Every thing was tried, and every thing was un⯑ſucceſsful. The want of a ſufficiently numerous infantry, [25] in a ground where his cavalry could not ſupport them, the want of an equal artillery, the advantageous ſituation of the enemy, their numbers, their bravery, their General, obli⯑ged the King of Pruſſia to quit the field. What his loſs was is not ſo certain; it wa s undoubtedly great in the ac⯑tion, but ſtill greater by deſertions, and the innumerable ill conſequences that follow a defeat.

Though the King of Pruſſia was defeated in this battle, and though he brought on his defeat in a great meaſure, by ſome errors of his own, yet whatever ſmall blemiſh his military ſkill might have ſuffered, his reputation was raiſed higher than ever, in the opinion of all judicious men, by the noble and candid manner in which he acknowledged his miſtake, by the firmneſs with which he bore his miſ⯑fortune, and by thoſe aſtoniſhing ſtrokes of genius and heroiſm, by which he retrived his loſs. The ſmiles of fortune make conquerors; it is her malice which diſcovers heroes.

CHAP. IV.

NEVER was the old obſervation, une bataille perdue a un mauvais [...]u, more verified than in the conſe⯑quences of the unfortunate battle of Colin. Though the King retired unpurſued by his enemies, he was obliged to rejoin his own army before Prague without delay, and to raiſe the blockade of that place. The impriſoned Auſtrians with joy received Count Daun their deliverer, and their united forces became greatly ſuperior to the Pruſſians. The King was in a ſhort time obliged to evacuate Bohemia, and take refuge in Saxony. The Auſtrians haraſſed him as much as poſſible; but their armies, notwithſtanding their great ſuperiority, were not in a condition from their late ſufferings to make any deciſive attempt upon him, as the [26] frontiers of Saxony abound with ſituations eaſily de⯑fended.

The King of Pruſſia's misfortunes now poured in upon him at once, and from every quarter. The army com⯑manded by the Duke of Cumberland, who continually re⯑tired before the French, after they had paſſed the Weſer, came however to a reſolution to make a ſtand at Haſten⯑beck, within a few Miles of Hammelen, where it was judged that the ſuperior numbers of the enemy might be the leaſt prejudicial; but notwithſtanding the advantages of the ſituation, the bravery of the Hanoverians, and the conduct of the Duke, the allied army was driven from the field of battle, and retreated towards Stade. By taking this route his Royal Highneſs was driven into a ſort of cul de ſac. Unable by his ſituation to retire, or by his ſtrength to advance, he was compelled to ſign the remarkable capitulation of Cloſter-ſeven, by which 38,000 Hanoverians laid down their arms, and were diſperſed into different quarters of cantonment. The French army had a little before this changed its commander. D'Etrees, the favourite of all the military men, was removed from the command, which was conferred on the Duke de Rich⯑lieu, who excelled him and all mankind in the profeſſion of a courtier. The Hanoverians were now quite ſubdued, and all the French force, let looſe by this treaty, was ready to fall in upon the King of Pruſſia's dominions.

An enterprize was concerted in England againſt the coaſt of France, to make a diverſion in his favour, by drawing a part of the French army to the defence of their own country. England propoſed to compaſs another great de⯑ſign, and which ſhe had equally at heart, by the expedi⯑tion, which was to give an effectual blow to the marine of France. The deſtination of this armament was kept a pro⯑found ſecret, and whilſt it excerciſed the penetration of all the politicians of Europe, it filled France with the moſt ſerious alarms. The Engliſh Fleet at laſt appeared before Rochfort. Some time was ſpent before it could be reſolved what plan was to be followed in the attack; at laſt it was reſolved to ſecure the ſmall iſle of Aix, from whence ſome obſtruction was apprehended to their landing. The iſland was ſoon reduced; but as a good deal of time was conſumed in theſe deliberations and [27] actions, the militia of the country had time to gather, and there was an appearance of two camps on the ſhore. The commanders now took into conſideration the badneſs of the coaſt, the danger of landing, the time the enemy had to put the place in ſuch a poſture of defence, as might make any ſudden attempt, or coup de main, unſucceſsful: in conſequence of theſe deliberations, they unanimouſly re⯑ſolved to return without making any attempt. The diſappointment of the nation was equal to the ſanguine hopes we had conceived; nothing could exceed the general diſcontent. The military men blamed the plan of the expedition. The Miniſters, and with them the public voice, exclaimed at the execution. A court of enquiry, of officers of reputation, cenſured the commander; a court martial, of officers of reputation, acquitted him. The expedition ſerved only in England to increaſe and imbitter our diſſentions, and to turn our at⯑tention to vain diſputes. It did nothing towards relieving the King of Pruſſia.

The Ruſſians, who had made for a long time a dilatory march and ſeemed uncertain of their own reſolution, all at once haſtened their motions. They entered the Ducal Pruſſia under M. Apraxin and General Fermer, and marked their progreſs by a thouſand inhuman cruelties. A large body of Auſtrians entered Sileſia, and penetrated as far as Breſlau. Then they made a turn backwards, and laid ſiege to the important fortreſs of Schweidnitz, juſtly conſidered as the key of that dutchy, which was the cauſe of the war. Another body entered Luſatia, and made themſelves maſ⯑ters of Zittau. Twenty-two thouſand Swedes pierced into the Pruſſian Pomerania, took the towns of Anclam and Demmein, and laid the whole country under contributions. Richlieu, freed from all oppoſition on the ſide of Hanover, made his way into Halberſtad, and the old marche of Brandenburgh, firſt exacting contributions, and then plun⯑dering the towns. The army of the Empire, reinforced by that of the Prince de Soubiſe, after many delays, was at laſt on full march to enter Saxony; this left the Auſtrians at liberty to turn the greateſt part of their forces to the reduc⯑tion of Sileſia. General Haddick pierced through Luſatia, paſſed by the Pruſſian armies, and, ſuddenly preſenting himſelf before the gates of Berlin, laid the King of Pruſſia's capital under contribution; and though he retired on the [28] approach of a body of Pruſſians, yet he ſtill kept poſſeſſion of his former poſt, in order to interrupt the communica⯑tion of the King with Sileſia. The fate which ſeemed to have threatened the Empreſs ſome months ago, was now looked upon as the certain lot of her antagoniſt. All his endeavours to retrieve his affairs had hitherto been equally brave and unſucceſsful. General Lehwald had orders at any hazard to engage the Ruſſians: with thirty thouſand he attacked double that number ſtrongly entrenched, at a place called Norkitten; but after ſeveral of thoſe wonderful efforts, which the Pruſſians alone knew how to make, he was compelled to retire; but he retired in excellent order, without being purſued, having killed five times more of the enemy, than he had loſt of his own men, and more formidable after his defeat, than the Ruſſians after their victory. The King of Pruſſia exerted himſelf upon every ſide; his enemies almoſt always fled before him; but whilſt he purſued one body, another gained in ſome other part upon him, and the winter came on faſt, as his ſtrength decayed, and his adverſaries multi⯑plied from every quarter. The following letter which ap⯑peared in the public papers about this time, paints the con⯑dition of that diſtreſſed monarch, in ſo full a manner, that I ſhall attempt no other deſcription of it.

"Many perſons, who ſaw the King of Pruſſia, when he paſſed lately through Leipſic, cannot expreſs how much he is altered. They ſay he is ſo much worn away, that they ſcarce knew him. This, indeed, is not to be won⯑dered at; he hath not a body of iron, like Charles XII. and he endures as great fatigues as he did. He is as much on horſeback as Charles was, and often lies upon the ground. His inward ſufferings cannot be leſs than his out⯑ward: let us caſt our eyes on a map of the Pruſſian domi⯑nions; and meaſure what he hath left of the many fair poſ⯑ſeſſions he had in the month of April laſt, of which a ſpace of ſeven months hath ſtript him. Whence can he have men? he is ſhut out from the Empire; and from whence can he draw money? the dutchy of Guelders, the dutchy of Cleves, the principality of Moers, the county of Lin⯑gen, the county of Lipſtadt, the principality of Minden, Eaſt-Frieſland, Embden, and its infant company, part of the archbiſhoprick of Magdeburgh, ſome other parts of the marche, Ducal Pomerania, a great part of Sileſia, a [29] great part of the kingdom of Pruſſia, Berlin itſelf, almoſt all his dominions, in ſhort, are either taken from him, or laid under contribution, and poſſeſſed by his enemies, who collect the public revenues, fatten on the contributions, and with the money which they draw from the electorate of Hanover, and other conqueſts defray the expences of the war. This picture certainly differs greatly from that which the King of Pruſſia might have ſketched out, the day he took arms to enter Saxony. Add to this the Duke of Cum⯑berland's convention, which deprived him of all his allies, and left him without any aſſiſtance whatever, excepting four or five hundred thouſand pounds ſterling, which the Britiſh parliament may give him. Add likewiſe ſome do⯑meſtic uneaſineſſes."

CHAP. V.

THIS was the King of Pruſſia's ſituation, when the will of Providence, and his own wonderful abilities, as wonderfully changed the ſcene. His majeſty deferred to bring on a deciſive action, diſtreſſed as his affairs were, until the approach of winter; had he marched to attack the Imperial army, whilſt it was at a conſiderable diſtance, he muſt either have left Saxony expoſed to the inſults of the Auſtrian parties, or have greatly weakened his own forces employed in the principal action. He therefore ſuf⯑fered the army of the Empire to advance to the frontiers of Miſnia, and even to threaten the ſiege of Leipſic, be⯑fore he began to act againſt them: he however moved to⯑wards them, leaving an army in Luſatia to obſerve the Auſtrians. On his firſt motions, the enemy retired with precipitation. But when they had reinforced themſelves with numbers and courage ſufficient to perſuade them to advance, the King of Pruſſia in his turn retired. His re⯑ſolution ſeemed to have been to fight as near Miſnia as poſ⯑ſible, and as deep in the winter, as he conveniently might, for if he ſhould have the good fortune to ſucceed againſt [30] the Imperial army, ſuch a blow, at ſuch a ſeaſon, would effectually diſable them from acting any thing to his preju⯑dice, for that year at leaſt; but if, on the contrary, he ſhould fail, Saxony was at hand, in which it would prove difficult for the enemy to make any impreſſion whilſt the winter continued. As for the time to be loſt by following this plan, and the advantage it would afford the Auſtrians in their deſigns on Sileſia, they were not to be compared with the advantages which the King received from it. He knew that Schweidnitz was ſtrong, and excellently provi⯑ded; the prince of Bevern was ſtrongly poſted near it to obſtruct the enemy's operations; the winter would lean heavier on the beſiegers; and on the whole, he had reaſon to truſt that his troops, animated by his own preſence and example, would prove far ſuperior to the enemy, in endu⯑ring all the hardſhips of a winter campaign.

After ſome time ſpent in various movements, between the allied army of the Imperialiſts and French on one ſide, and the Pruſſians on the other, the King reſolved to give battle to his enemies, who were now advanced to the con⯑fines of Miſnia. On the 24th of October, the King had taken his reſolution; at that time his army happened to be divided into ſeveral corps, ſome of them at a diſtance of no leſs than twenty leagues aſunder; yet ſuch were the ſpirit and excellent diſpoſitions of the Pruſſians, that the junction of all theſe corps were fully effected on the 27th, and the King advanced towards the enemy. The enemy fell back at his approach, and repaſſed the Sala; they were followed cloſe. The two armies met near the village of Roſbach.

The united army, commanded by the prince of Saxe Hilburghauſen and the prince of Soubiſe, was 50,000 men compleat. But the troops of the Circles were new raiſed, and many of them not well affected to the ſervice, nor to their French allies. The Pruſſians did not amount to 25,000; but then they were Pruſſians, and led on by the King of Pruſſia. As ſoon as the armies were formed, and the battle going to begin, which was to decide the fate of ſo many nations, and to determine between force and virtue, the King of Pruſſia addreſſed his troops nearly in the fol⯑lowing words.

‘My dear friends, the hour is come, in which all that is, and all that ought to be dear to us, depends upon [31] the ſwords which are now drawn for the battle. Time permits me to ſay but little; nor is there occaſion to ſay much. You know that there is no labour, no hun⯑ger, no cold, no watching, no danger that I have not ſhared with you hitherto; and you now ſee me ready to lay down my life with you, and for you. All I aſk, is the ſame pledge of fidelity and affection that I give. And let me add, not as an incitement to your courage, but as a teſtimony of my own gratitude, that from this hour, until you go into quarters, your pay ſhall be double. Acquit yourſelves like men, and put your con⯑fidence in God.’ The effect of this ſpeech was ſuch as cannot be deſcribed. The general emotion burſt in an uni⯑verſal ſhout, and the looks and demeanor of the men were animated to a ſort of heroic phrenſy. In this diſpoſition, which prognoſticated the ſucceſs, engagement began.

In the beginning of the action, the French cavalry came on with great ſpirit, but they were repulſed; ſome regi⯑ments having gained an eminence, defended themſelves bravely, but in the end they were totally routed. The in⯑fantry, both French and Imperialiſts, made but a faint re⯑ſiſtance. The King of Pruſſia in perſon, expoſed to the hotteſt fire, led on his troops; the enemy gave way in every part; they were ſeized with a panic, and fled in the utmoſt diſorder. They left 3000 men dead on the field of battle; 63 pieces of cannon, and many colours. Eight French generals, 250 officers of different ranks, and 6000 private men were taken. Night alone ſaved from total deſtruction the ſcattered remains of an army that in the morning was ſo numerous and ſo formidable.

I have not undertaken on this, nor ſhall I undertake upon any other occaſion, in theſe preliminary chapters, to enter into the detail of all the various manoeuvres of every battle; they are matters little underſtood by, and little intereſting to, the generality of readers. Beſides, the accounts are ſometimes inaccurate, and ſeldom or never conſiſtent with each other.

The glorious ſucceſs of the battle of Roſbach, was ſuch as hardly wanted to be improved; the enemy was left to⯑tally incapable of action. The King was ſet free on that ſide; but it was a freedom which gave him no reſpite from his labours; it only gave him an opportunity of undergo⯑ing [32] new labours in another part. The Auſtrians had a vaſt force, and had now begun to make a proportionable progreſs in Sileſia. The dependance which the King had upon the fidelity of his Generals there, ſeemed ſhaken by ſomething which then appeared, and ſtill ſeems ambiguous in their conduct. The Auſtrians after a ſiege from the 27th of October to the 11th of November, carried on under infinite difficulties and with a prodigious loſs, had reduced Schweidnitz, and obliged the Pruſſian garriſon of 4000 men to ſurrender priſoners of war. Soon after, as they had intelligence of the victory of Roſbach, and knew that the king of Pruſſia was on full march to the relief of Sileſia, the Auſtrians reſolved to loſe no time to attack the prince of Bevern in his ſtrong camp under the walls of Breſlau. A treble ſuperiority incited them to this attempt. They attacked the prince's army with great reſo⯑lution, and their attack was ſuſtained with amaz⯑ing intrepidity. The ſlaughter of the Auſtrians was prodigious. A great part of their army had retired from the field of battle, and the reſt were preparing to retire; when all at once the Pruſſian Generals unexpect⯑edly took the ſame reſolution. A part of their army had ſuffered a great deal in the engagement. They became apprehenſive of a total defeat, in caſe their intrenchments ſhould be forced in any part, With theſe ideas they re⯑treated from the ſtrong poſt they occupied, and retired be⯑hind the Oder.. The Auſtrians returning, with aſtoniſh⯑ment ſaw themſelves maſters of the field of battle, which they had but juſt been obliged to relinquiſh. What is re⯑markable, and what gave riſe to many conjectures, the Prince of Bevern going to reconnoitre without eſcort, and attended only by a groom, was taken two days after the battle by an advanced party of Croats, a ſmall body of whom had croſſed the Oder.

This advantage, though dearly bought, was immediately followed with many others. Breſlau, the capital of Sileſia, immediately ſurrendered, where, as well as at Schweidnitz, they found vaſt ſtores of proviſion, ammunition and money. All Sileſia was on the point of falling into their hands. Fortune ſeems every where to have thrown the King of Pruſſia's affairs into diſtraction, in order to raiſe, and as it were, to round his glory in eſta⯑bliſhing them; and to have been even ſo jealous of his ho⯑nour [33] as not to permit his own excellent generals and incom⯑parable troops to triumph any where but in his own pre⯑ſence.

The King immediately after the battle of Roſbach, with thoſe troops which he had a few days before collected from places an hundred miles diſtant from each other, began a march of upwards of two hundred more, and led them from engaging one ſuperior army, to engage another ſtill more ſuperior; from danger to hardſhip, and from hard⯑ſhip to renewed danger. In the moſt rapid march he paſſed through Thuringia, through Miſnia, through Luſatia, in ſpite of the efforts of the Generals Haddick and Marſhal, who were poſted in Luſatia to obſtruct him; and entering Sileſia arrived the 2d of December at Parchwitz upon the Oder. Here he was joined by the Prince of Bevern's corps who croſſed that river to meet him.

About this time an incident happened which was very remarkable; one of theſe agreeable adventures that relieve the mind amidſt the perpetual horror that attends a narra⯑tive of battles and bloodſhed. The garriſon of Schweid⯑nitz had ſeen, with the greateſt reluctance, the capitulation which bound their hands from the Service of their King and Country. Whilſt the Auſtrians were conducting them to priſon, on their route they chanced to hear of the victory their maſter had gained at Roſbach; animated with this news, they unanimouſly roſe upon the eſcorte which con⯑ducted them, and which happened not to be very ſtrong, and entirely diſperſed it. Thus freed, they marched on not very certain of their way, in hope to rejoin ſome corps of the Pruſſian troops. The ſame fortune which freed them, led them directly to the army commanded by the King himſelf, which was haſtening to their relief. Great was the joy on both ſides at this unexpected meeting, for the priſoners had heard nothing of his Majeſty's march. This little incident, whilſt it added a conſiderable ſtrength to the army, added likewiſe to its ſpirit, and ſeemed an happy omen of ſucceſs in the future engagement.

As his Pruſſian majeſty approached to Breſlau, the Auſ⯑trians confiding in their ſuperiority, abandoned their ſtrong camp (the ſame which had been occupied by the Prince of Bevern) and reſolved to give the King battle. He was marching with the utmoſt diligence not to diſap⯑point them; and they met near the village of [34] Leuthen. The ground which the Auſtrians occupied was very advantageous, and every advantage of the ſituation was improved to the utmoſt, by the diligence and ſkill of Count Daun; who remembring that he was the only Ge⯑neral who had ever carried the field from the King of Pruſ⯑ſia, knew better than any body how difficult it was to ob⯑tain ſuch a victory. All the diſpoſitions were made ac⯑cordingly; the ground they occupied was a plain, except that in ſome part it had ſmall eminences; theſe they ſur⯑rounded with artillery; the ground was alſo interſperſed with thickets, which they ſought to turn to their advantage. On their right and left were hills on which they planted batteries of cannon. The ground in their front was inter⯑ſected by many cauſeways; and to make the whole more impracticable, the Auſtrians had felled a vaſt many trees, and ſcattered them in the way. The King of Pruſſia was not terrified with this ſituation, nor with the conſciouſneſs that above 70,000 excellent troops, commanded by Count Daun, were ſo poſted. The Pruſſians, who did not ex⯑ceed, as it is ſaid, 36,000 men, attacked them with their uſual reſolution. It was almoſt impoſſible, at the begin⯑ning of the engagement, for the Pruſſian horſe to act, on account of the impediments we have juſt mentioned, but a moſt judicious diſpoſition of the King himſelf overcame that diſadvantage; he had in his firſt diſpoſitions placed four batallions behind the cavalry of his right wing, fore⯑ſeeing that General Nadaſti, who was placed with a corps de reſerve on the enemies left, deſigned to take him in flank. It happened as he had foreſeen; that General's horſe attacked the King's right wing with great fury; but he was received with ſo ſevere a fire from the four battali⯑ons, that he was obliged to retire in diſorder. Then the King's flank well covered and ſupported, was enabled to act with ſuch order and vigour, that the enemy's right was obliged to give way. The Pruſſian artillery, which was incomparably ſerved, and ſilenced that of the enemy, con⯑curring to maintain the King's infantry, and to enable them to act in grounds where their horſe could give them but little aſſiſtance. The Auſtrians made a gallant reſiſtance during the whole battle. The panic of the enemy did not here, as at Roſbach, do half the buſineſs; every foot of ground was well diſputed. The Auſtrians rallied all their forces about Leuthen, which was defended upon all ſides [35] with intrenchments and redoubts. After reiterated attacks made with the utmoſt impetuoſity, and ſuſtained with great firmneſs, the Pruſſians maſtered the poſt; then the Auſtri⯑ans fled on all parts; they were entirely routed. The King purſued them to Liſſa. 6000 of the Auſtrians were ſlain, 15,000 were made priſoners; and an immenſe artil⯑lery, upwards of 200 pieces of cannon were taken.

This great and deciſive action was fought on the very ſame day of the next month after the no leſs important and deciſive battle of Roſbach. The conſequences that follow⯑ed the action of Leuthen, declared the entireneſs of the victory. Notwithſtanding the rigour of the ſeaſon, the ſiege of Breſlau was immediately undertaken, and proſecuted with ſuch ſpirit, that by the 29th of December it ſurrendered; and with it ſurrendered the garriſon of 13,000 men priſo⯑ners of war; the blockade of Schweidnitz was formed as cloſely as the inclemency of the winter would permit; whilſt the Pruſſian parties not only re-poſſesſed thoſe parts of Sileſia which belonged to the King, but penetrating into the Auſtrian diviſion, reduced Jagerndorf, Troppau, and Tetſchen, and left to the Empreſs Queen, except a forlorn garriſon in Schweidnitz, no ſort of footing in that country, in which a few days before ſhe reckoned her dominion per⯑fectly eſtabliſhed.

CHAP. VI.

AS the misfortunes of his Pruſſian Majeſty, after the battle of Colin, came on him all at once, ſo his ſuc⯑ceſſes, after his victories at Roſbach and Liſſa, flowed upon him all at once likewiſe, and in a full tide. The Ruſſians, though they had repulſed General Lehwald, ſuffered ſo much in that action, and their barbarous method of mak⯑ing war had ſo deſtroyed the country, that they ſeemed to themſelves to have no way of ſafety left but in retiring out of the Pruſſian territories. This extraordinary retreat of ſo great an army, and ſo lately victorious, and ſtill poſſeſſed of a good ſea-port in the country, could ſcarcely be ac⯑counted [36] for on thoſe motives we have aſſigned, and aſtoniſhed all Europe, whilſt it left Gen. Lehwald at liberty to turn his arms into Pomerania againſt the Swedes. The Swedes on this occaſion did nothing worthy of their ancient military fame; but every where retiring, left the Pruſſians an eaſy conqueſt, not only of the Pruſſian but of every part of the Swediſh Pomerania, excepting the port of Stralſund; they left their allies of Mecklenbourg quite expoſed to all the re⯑ſentment of the King of Pruſſia, who chaſtiſed them with the moſt ſevere contributions and levies. The French, who had been ravaging the old marche of Brandenburg, evacuated that country immediately after the battle of Roſ⯑bach. But one of the greateſt revolutions of fortune in the war, and one of the moſt glorious and important conſe⯑quences of that victory, was, that the Hanoverian troops were enabled to reſume their arms.

From the moment the capitulation of Cloſter-ſeven was ſigned, the Duke the Richlieu, who came to the command only to reap the advantages, and ſully the honour of an⯑other's conqueſt, ſeemed to think of nothing but how to re⯑pair, from the plunder of the unhappy Hanoverians, the fortune which he had ſhattered by a thouſand vices. The moſt exorbitant contributions were levied with the moſt in⯑flexible ſeverity; every exaction, which was ſubmitted to, only produced a new one ſtill more extravagant; and all the orderly methods of plunder did not exempt them from the pillage, licenciouſneſs, and inſolence of the French ſol⯑diery. However, in juſtice to merit, we muſt exempt from this general charge the conduct of the duke de Randan, Governor of Hanover for the French; who ſaved the ca⯑pital of the Electorate from utter ruin by the ſtrictneſs of his diſcipline, by the prudence, the juſtice and moderation of all his conduct; a conduct which does more real honour to his name, than the moſt ſplendid victories.

The Duke de Richlieu's rapaciouſneſs and oppreſſion, whilſt they leaned ſo heavily on the conquered people, did the conquering army no kind of ſervice. Intent only on plunder, which he did not confine to the enemy, he relaxed every part of military diſcipline; and that numerous army which M. d'Etrees had ſuſtained, and brought in health and ſpirits through the diſmal deſarts of Weſtphalia, under all the oppoſition of a ſkilful adverſary, were now, in full peace, in the quiet poſſeſſion of a conquered and plentiful country, [37] reduced in their numbers, decayed in their health, and their ſpirits, without cloaths, without ſubſiſtance, without order, without arms. In this condition they began at laſt to per⯑ceive that the Hanoverians, with the yoke of the capitula⯑tion about their necks, were ſtill formidable. As they had broke almoſt every article of that treaty, they made no ſcru⯑ple to add another breach in order to ſecure them in all the reſt. They attempted actually to take their arms from the Hanoverian and Heſſian troops. Theſe gallant troops, who had with a ſilent grief and indignation ſeen the diſtreſſes of their ruined country, were raviſhed to find that the victory at Roſbach encouraged their ſovereign to reſent at laſt this and all the other indignities they had ſuffered. They began to collect and to act, and under the command of the gallant Prince Ferdinand of Brunſwick, reinforced with a body of Pruſſian troops, they broke from their confinement. They reduced the town of Harburg, and laid cloſe ſiege to the caſtle, which it muſt be owned was defended very bravely. In all other reſpects the French did not ſeem in a condition to maintain their ground any where. Thoſe troops, which a few months before had ſo ſubmitted as to make it neceſ⯑ſary to declare that they were not priſoners of war, in order to explain their condition, were now on the point of puſh⯑ing their adverſaries to almoſt the ſame ſtreights. Such was the force of French military diſcipline, and ſuch the triumphs of Voltaire's hero.

The King of Pruſſia now ſaw the full effect of his coun⯑ſels and his labours. His dominions were freed; his allies were enabled to aſſiſt him; and his enemies defeated, broken, and flying every where before him. In what light poſterity will view theſe things is uncertain; we, under whoſe eyes, as we may ſay, they were atchieved, ſcarcely believed what we had ſeen. And perhaps in all the records of time, the compaſs of a ſingle year, on the ſcene of a ſingle country, never contained ſo many ſtriking events, never diſplayed ſo many revolutions of fortune; revolutiens not only beyond what might have been expected, but far beyond what the moſt ſagacious foreſight, reaſoning from experience, and the nature of things, could poſſibly have imagined. The King of Pruſſia at firſt triumphant: the whole power of the Au⯑ſtrians totally defeated; their hopes utterly ruined: then their affairs ſuddenly re-eſtabliſhed, their armies victorious, and the King of Pruſſia in his turn hurled down; defeated; [38] abandoned by his allies; ſurrounded by his enemies; on the very edge of deſpair: then all at once raiſed beyond all hope, he ſees the united Auſtrian, Imperial, and French power levelled with the ground; 40,000 Hanoverians, a whole army, ſubmit to 80,000 French, and are only not pri⯑ſoners of war. The French are peacable maſters of all the country between the Weſer and the Elbe: anon, theſe ſub⯑dued Hanoverians reſume their arms; they recover their country, and the French in a little time think themſelves not ſecure to the eaſtward of the Rhine. 500,000 men in action. Six pitched battles fought. Three great armies annihilated. The French army reduced and vanquiſhed without fighting. The Ruſſians victorious, and flying as if they had been vanquiſhed. A confederacy, not of ſamller potentates to humble one great power, but of five the greateſt powers on earth to reduce one ſmall potentate; all the force of theſe powers exerted and baffled. It happened as we have related; and it is not the hiſtory of a century, but of a ſingle campaign.

CHAP. VII.

WITH regard to the part we had in the tranſactions of this year, though it was not ſo full of ſtriking events, nor does it afford ſuch a ſplendid ſubject for narra⯑tive, yet it is as interreſting to an Engliſh reader, and may perhaps prove more inſtructive; as it ſhews us in ſo ſtrong a light, the miſerable conſequences of our political diviſions, which produced a general unſteadineſs in all out purſuits, and infuſed a langour and inactivity into all our military ope⯑rations. For, whilſt our commanders abroad knew not who were to reward their ſervices or puniſh their neglects, and were not aſſured in what light even the beſt of their actions would be conſidered, (having reaſon to apprehend that they might not be judged of as they were in themſelves, but as their appearances might anſwer the end of ſome ruling fac⯑tion;) [39] they naturally wanted that firmneſs and that enter⯑prizing reſolution, without which the beſt capacity, and in⯑tentions the moſt honeſt, can do nothing in war. The at⯑tachment of moſt men to their parties, weakened their af⯑fection to their country. It has been imagined that mini⯑ſters did not always wiſh ſucceſs even to their own ſchemes leſt obnoxious men ſhould acquire credit by the execution of them; as it was ſuſpected that officers even at the ex⯑pence of their own reputation, did not exert their faculties to the utmoſt, leſt a diſagreeable miniſterial ſyſtem ſhould eſtabliſh the credit of its counſels by the vigour of their operations. For my part, I think that theſe refinements, in which there is often as much malice diſcovered as penetra⯑tion, have carried the matter infinitely too far. But certain it is, that the ſpirit of perſonal parties and attachments, ne⯑ver carried to greater lengths than at that time, proved of very bad conſequences, if it had no other effect than to raiſe and to give a colour to ſuch ſuſpicions as we have firſt mentioned. Whatever was the cauſe, it is moſt certain, that our ſucceſs in America this year, no more anſwered to the greatneſs of our preparations and our hopes than it did in the two preceding.

The attack upon Crown Point, which had been a princi⯑pal object of our attention in the beginning, ſeemed at this time to be laid aſide; and an expedition to Louiſbourg, un⯑doubtedly a more conſiderable object in itſelf, ſupplied its place. Lord Loudoun was to command the land forces in this expedition; Admiral Holborn the navy. The former left New York with a body of 6000 men, and ſailed to Halifax, where he was joined by the latter, who had ſailed from Corke on the 7th of May with a conſiderable fleet, and much the ſame number of land forces, which his Lordſhip had brought from New York. When the united armies and fleets were on the point of de⯑parting for Louiſbourg, news arrived at Halifax, that the Breſt fleet conſiſting of ſeventeen ſhips of the line beſides frigates, with great ſupplies of military ſtores, proviſions, and men, were arrived at the harbour which they were pre⯑paring to attack. This news immediately ſuſpended their preparations. Councils of war were held one after another. The reſult of the whole was, that as the place was ſo well reinforced, the fleet of the French rather ſuperior to our navy, and the ſeaſon ſo far advanced, it was the more pru⯑dent [40] courſe to defer the enterpriſe to a more favourable op⯑portunity. This reſolution ſeems to have been moſt eligible in their circumſtances, becauſe the council of war was almoſt unanimous in it.

Lord Loudoun returned to New York, and the Admiral now freed from the care of the tranſports ſet ſail for Louiſ⯑bourg, in hopes as it was ſaid, of drawing the French fleet to an engagement. But upon what grounds this hope was conceived, I confeſs I cannot ſee; as it could not be ima⯑gined, that the French fleet having no ſort of occaſion to fight in order to protect Louiſbourg, would chuſe out of a bravado to bring on an unneceſſary battle. However it was, the Engliſh ſquadron continued to cruize off that har⯑bour until the 25th of September, when they were overtaken by a terrible ſtorm, in which one of our ſhips was loſt, eleven diſmaſted, and the reſt returned to England in a very ſhat⯑tered condition. This was the end of the expedition to Louiſbourg from which ſo much was expected. But it was not the worſt conſequences which attended it.

Since Oſwego had been taken, the French remained en⯑tirely maſters of all the lakes, and we could do nothing to obſtruct their collecting the Indians from all parts, and obliging them to act in their favour. But our apprehenſions, (or what ſhall they be called?) did more in favour of the French than their conqueſts. Not ſatified with the loſs of that important fortreſs, we ourſelves abandoned to the mer⯑cy of the enemy all the country of the Five Nations, the only body of Indians who preſerved even the appearance of friendſhip to us. The forts we had at the Great carrying Place were demoliſhed; Wood Creek was induſtriouſly ſtopped up and filled with logs; by which it became evident to all thoſe who knew that country, that our communication with our allied Indians was totally cut off; and what was worſe, our whole frontier left perfectly uncovered to the irruption of the enemies ſavages, who ſoon availed them⯑ſelves of our errors. For after the removal of theſe barriers, and the taking of Fort William Henry, of which we ſhall ſpeak preſently, they deſtroyed with fire and ſword the fine ſettlements which we poſſeſſed on the Mohawks river and on thoſe grounds called the German flats. Thus with a vaſt increaſe of our forces, and the cleareſt ſuperiority over the enemy, we only abandoned our allies, expoſed our peo⯑ple, and relinquiſhed a large and valuable tract of country. [41] The French ſoon made us feel effectually the want of what we had loſt, and what we had thrown away.

A conſiderable fort called Fort William-Henry, had been built on the ſouthern edge of the Lake George, in order to command that lake, and to cover our frontiers; a garriſon of 2500 men defended it. General Webb with about 4000 men was poſted at no great diſtance. No ſooner had the French learned that my Lord Loudoun with the body of the army was gone on the Louiſbourg expedition, than they prepared to take advantage of his abſence. They drew toge⯑ther all the forces which they had at Crown-Point, Ticon⯑deroga, and the adjacent poſts; they added a conſiderable body of Canadians, and a greater number of Indians than they had ever yet employed; the whole made near 8000 men. With theſe and a very good artillery, Monſieur Montcalm prepared to beſiege Fort William-Henry. It is ſaid that the advances of this commander were not made with ſo much ſecreſy as to prevent General Webb from having early intelligence of his motions; but unfortunately no credit being given to this intelligence, orders were not ſent to collect the militia in ſufficient time, which in con⯑junction with his own forces, and with thoſe in the fort had either obliged the French to relinquiſh their attempt, or to have made it a very great hazard. But the ſiege being now regularly formed, and the beſiegers meeting but little oppoſition from within, and no diſtur⯑bance at all from without, the place was in ſix days ſurrendered by the advice of General Webb; whoſe intercepted letter M. Montcalm ſent into the fort.

The garriſon marched out with their arms, and engaged not to ſerve during eighteen months. The French ſavages paid no regard to the capitulation, but falling upon our men as they marched out, dragged away the little effects they had left, hawling the Indians and Blacks in our ſer⯑vice out of their ranks, ſcalping ſome, carrying off others, and committing a thouſand outrages and barbarities, from which the French commander endeavoured in vain to reſtrain them. All this was ſuffered by 2000 men with arms in their hands, from a diſorderly crew of ſavages. However, the greateſt part of our men, though in a bad condition, got to Fort Edward, ſome by flight; ſome having ſurrendered themſelves to the French, were by [42] them ſent home. The enemy demoliſhed the fort, car⯑ried off the proviſion, ammunition, artillery, and the veſ⯑ſels which we had prepared on the lake, and departed without attempting any thing farther. Neither was any thing farther attempted on our ſide. And thus was finiſhed the third campaign in North America, where we had actually near 20,000 regular troops, a great number of provincial forces, and a great naval power of upwards of twenty ſhips of the line.

A war between the maritime powers is felt in all parts of the world. Not content with inflaming Europe and Ame⯑rica, and diſſentions of the French and Engliſh purſued the tracts of their commerce, and the Genges felt the fatal ef⯑fects of a quarrel on the Ohio. But here the ſcene is changed greatly to the advantage of our nation; the bra⯑very of Admiral Watſon and Colonel Clive, re-eſtabliſhed the military honour of the Engliſh, which was ſinking there as it had done in all other places. Admiral Watſon with no more than three ſhips of the line, ſailed from Madraſs, and afer a tedious voyage arrived at the port of Balaſore in the kingdom of Bengal, where ſtrength⯑ening his force with what recruits he could draw together, he entered the Ganges, and after a ſhort reſiſtance made himſelf maſter of Buſbudgia fort which commanded that part of the river. This opened him a paſſage to the fort of Calcutta, the late prin⯑cipal ſettlement of the company in Bengal, and the ſcene of the deplorable ſufferings of ſo many of our unfortunate countrymen. Animated with revenge at the affecting ſight of this place, our ſhips and land forces attacked it with ſo much ſpirits, that the Indians ſurrendered it on the ſame day it was approached. A few days after Hugly, ſituated higher up the Ganges, was reduced with as little difficulty.

The Nabob, who ſaw that the torrent of the Engliſh va⯑lour could not be reſiſted by ſuch feeble dams as forts de⯑fended by Indians, drew down a whole army conſiſting of 10,000 horſe, and 12,000 foot, to drive them from their conqueſts, Infinitely inferior as our troops were in number, they did not heſitate to attack the Nabob's army. Though our forces did not entirely rout the In⯑dians, yet they made a great ſlaughter amongſt them; and they had ſo much the advantage of the field, that the Nabob was in a ſhort time glad to con⯑clude a treaty of peace, by which the Engliſh [43] Eaſt-India company was re-eſtabliſhed in all its antient pri⯑vileges; an immunity from all taxes was granted, and a reſtitution promiſed for all that the trade had ſuffered in the taking of Calcutta.

When all obſtruction on the ſide of the Indians was re⯑moved, and the company's officers had taken poſſeſſion of their antient eſtabliſhments, the Admiral turned his arms againſt the French. He reſolved to attack Chandenagore, ſituated ſomewhat higher on the river than Calcutta; a place of conſiderable ſtrength and the principal ſettlement of the French in that part of the Eaſt-Indies. In this ex⯑pedition Colonel Clive commanded 700 Europeans and 1600 Black ſoldiers. The Admirals Watſon and Pocock com⯑manded the fleet, if it may be called a fleet, which conſiſted of no more than three ſhips of the line, the Kent, the Ty⯑ger, and the Saliſbury. The French prepared in the beſt manner they could to receive them, and ſunk ſeveral large veſſels both above and below their fort; but the Admiral having by carefully ſounding found a ſafe paſſage without being driven to the neceſſity of weighing up any of the ſhips, made ſo ſevere a fire upon the fort, in which he was ſeconded by Colonel Clive's batteries on the ſhore, that the place capitulated in leſs than three hours. 500 Europeans and 700 Blacks ſurrendered priſo⯑ners of war; 183 pieces of cannon were found in the place, beſides a conſiderable value in goods and money. Four forts coſt our troops no more than four days to reduce them.

The judicious timeing of theſe ſeveral operations, as well as thoſe which followed, was not leſs laudable than the gallant ſpirit with which they were executed. Before the French were alarmed, cure was taken to re-poſſeſs all the poſts we formerly held; to humble the Nabob by ſome ef⯑fectual blow; and by a treaty tie up his hands from acting againſt us. This Prince had ſhewed himſelf from the mo⯑ment of his ſigning that treaty, very little inclined to abide by the ſtipulations he had made. He indeed promiſed abundantly, but always deferred the performance upon ſuch frivolous pretences, as evidently demonſtrated his ill inten⯑tions. The Engliſh commanders underſtood this proceed⯑ing perfectly well; but they reſolved to diſſemble their ſenſe of it, until they had broken the French power in this pro⯑vince, which they had greater reaſon to dread, ſmall as it [44] was, than all the armies of the Nabob. When they had fully accompliſhed this by the taking of Chandenagore, they deliberated whether they ought not to re-commence hoſtili⯑ties with the Indians. A reſolution in the affirmative had been attended with great difficulty and danger, if a moſt fortunate incident had not helped to enſure ſucceſs.

The Nabob Suraja Doula, the ſame who had the laſt [...] taken Calcutta, had ſhewn to his own ſubjects the ſ [...]e [...] ⯑lent and perfidous ſpirit, which formerly and ſtill diſtreſſed the Engliſh. His Generals were moſtly diſcontented, and ſome of them entered into a conſpiracy againſt him. Jaffier Ali Cawn one of his principal officers, a man of great power and intereſt, was at the head of this conſpiracy. As ſoon as their deſigns were ripened, they communicated them to the Engliſh government in Calcutta, praying their aſſiſtance. The chiefs there did not heſitate long what party they ſhould take; they entered into a treaty with Jeffier Ali Cawn and the conſpirators; and in conſequence of this treaty, our troops immediately took the field uner Colonel Clive. The Admiral undertook to garriſon the fort of Chandenagore with his ſeamen, in order to leave the greater number of land forces for the expedition. A detachmnnt of fifty ſea⯑men with their officers were added to ſerve as gunners. A twenty gun ſhip was ſtationed above Hugly, in order to preſerve a communication between Colonel Clive and the Admiral.

Their preliminary meaſures being thus judiciouſly taken, they advanced up the river, and in a few days brought the Nabob's army of about 20,000 men excluſive of thoſe who favoured the conſpirators, to an action, which was deciſive in favour of the Engliſh. Two conſider⯑able bodies commanded by Jaffier and Roy Dolub remained inactive in the engagement. The Nabob ſeeing himſelf ruined by the treachery of his officers and the cow⯑ardice of his troops, fled with the few who continued faith⯑ful to him.

Jaffier Ali Cawn now declared himſelf openly; and en⯑tering Muxadavat the capital of the province with an army of his friends and victorious allies, he was placed by Colonel Clive in the antient ſeat of the Nabobs, and received the homage of all ranks of people as Suba of Bengal, Bahar and Orixa. The depoſed Nabob was ſoon after made priſoner, and put to death in his priſon [45] by the conqueror. In about thirteen days this great revo⯑lution was accompliſhed; and with leſs force and trouble than is often required to take a petty village in Germany, was transferred the government of a vaſt kingdom, yielding in its dimenſions to few in Europe, but to none in the ferti⯑lity of its ſoil, the number of its inhabitants, and the rich⯑neſs of its commerce. By the alliance with the new Nabob, and by the reduction of Chandenagore, the French were entirely driven out of Bengal and all its dependencies. This was one of the articles of the treaty. By the other articles, a perpetual alliance offenſive and defenſive was made be⯑tween the parties. The territories of the company were enlarged, and upwards of two millions ſterling was ſtipu⯑lated to be paid as an indemnification to the Eaſt-India com⯑pany, and the ſufferers in the taking of Calcutta. The new Nabob, full of gratitude to thoſe to whom he owed his dig⯑nity, gave, beſides the above large ſums, about 600,0000 pounds, as a gratuity to the ſea ſquadron and the troops. However ſhort of expectation our enterpriſes in America fell this year, thoſe in the Eaſt-Indies greatly exceeded every thing we could hope from the forces which were employed. And it may be doubted whether all the great powers en⯑gaged in the preſent bloody wars in Europe, in which ſuch torrents of blood were ſpilled, and ſo many millions of trea⯑ſure are waſted, will in the concluſion reap amongſt them ſo much ſolid profit as the Engliſh Eaſt-India company did with a handful of men in a ſhort campaign. The joy of the na⯑tion at theſe ſignal ſucceſſes, was not a little damped by the death of Admiral Watſon, who loſt his life by the unwholeſomneſs of the country, in which he had eſtabliſhed a great and laſting reputation. Colonel Clive ſtill lives to enjoy the fortune and honour he has ac⯑quired by his gallant actions.

CHAP. VIII.

ALL the bloodſhed of the laſt campaign in Germany, and thoſe loſſes which both the victorious and vanquiſhed felt ſo very ſeverely, produced no [44] [...] [45] [...] [46] overtures towards peace from any of the powers at war. And perhaps nothing ſo ſingular ever happened, as that ſo many ſtates, united, if not againſt their real intereſts, yet againſt all their former habits of connection, full of ſo ma⯑ny occaſions of jealouſy, abounding with matter of com⯑plaint againſt each other, and even involved in misfortunes which uſually deſtroy a mutual confidence, that not one of theſe powers either from fear, or hope, or wearineſs, or levity, deſiſted from their hoſtilities againſt the King of Pruſſia; nor did that monarch acquire one ally more by the admiration of his ſucceſſes, than he had formerly gained through compaſſion to his misfortunes. All the confe⯑derates preſerved the ſame attachment to each other, to him the ſame animoſity. It is equally a matter of great ad⯑miration, how the reſources even of theſe great ſtates, could keep pace with their ambition, and in a very few months ſupply the place of great armies almoſt wholly de⯑ſtroyed. The King of Pruſſia by his victories had added to his natural reſources. Theſe reſources were more conſide⯑rable than is commonly imagined; and the poſſeſſion of Saxony which yielded him great ſupplies, ſaved his own revenue. He was indeed not quite ſo freſh as at the be⯑ginning of the war; but then the condition of the enemy was in many reſpects far worſe than his. His troops had beſides acquired a high reputation and a clear ſuperiority over all others. The conſideration, however, of an army greatly harraſſed, and a moſt ſevere winter, obliged him to reſtrain his ardor, and to attempt nothing againſt the Auſtrians in the months of January, February and March. The ſame inaction owing to much the ſame cauſes, pre⯑vailed amongſt the Hanoverians for a little time: but hav⯑ing been reinforced about the middle of February by a body of Pruſſian horſe, they put their whole army once more in motion.

The Duke de Richlieu had been recalled, and the Count of Clermont now commanded the French troops. This was their third commander in chief within the ſpace of a year; a circumſtance alone ſufficient to ſhew the unſteadi⯑neſs of their councils, and the irregularity of their opera⯑tions. In effect, they every where retreated before the Hanoverians, whoſe main body marched on the right to the country of Bremen; whilſt a ſecond body under Gene⯑ral Zaſtrow kept on the left towards Gifforn. They puſhed [47] the French from poſt to poſt. They abliged them to eva⯑cuate Otterſberg, Bremen and Werden. The caſtle of Rotterberg was taken in ſix hours. A conſiderable detach⯑ment under Count Chabot was poſted at Hoya, a ſtrong fort upon the Weſer, and a place of ſuch conſequence that prince Ferdinand reſolved to diſlodge the enemy from it. He appointed for that ſervice the hereditary Prince of Brunſwick, with four batalions of foot and ſome light horſe. This Prince, not twenty year of age, had already entered into the courſe of glory under the auſpices of his uncle, and full of ardor to ſignalize himſelf, with joy em⯑braced the occaſion; and here he gave an earneſt of his fame, in one of the moſt lively and beſt conducted actions in the war. The firſt fruits of this young hero were ſuch as would have done honour to the maturity of the moſt experienced ſoldier.

The Prince had a broad and deep river to paſs. He had no means of tranſporting his men, but a ſingle float; ſo that a long time muſt be ſpent in get⯑ting them over: what was worſt, before half his troops were paſſed, a ſtrong wind aroſe, which rendered the float unſerviceable, and entirely cut off all communication between the Prince and the moſt conſiderable number of his party, whilſt the party he was going to attack was ſu⯑perior to him, had his whole body been together. In this exigence the Prince came to a reſolution worthy of himſelf. He reſolved not to ſpend any time in attempts to bring over the reſt of his troops, much leſs to make any at⯑tempts to return to them; but to urge on boldly, in ſuch a manner as to poſſeſs the enemy with an opinion of his ſtrength, and to attack them briſkly before they could be undeceived. Therefore, between four and five o'clock in the morning, they marched with the utmoſt ſpeed directly to the town of Hoya. When they had approached within a mile and a half of the place, another accident was on the point of defeating the whole enterpriſe. Their detachment fired by miſtake upon four of the enemies dragoons, who were patrolling; the firing was caught from one to another, and at laſt became general. This ſeemed more than enough to diſcover their motions and alarm the enemy. But the ſame ſpirit influenced the conduct of every part of this af⯑fair; a bold countenance became neceſſary, and it was aſſumed; they marched with the utmoſt diligence to the [48] town, and encountered the enemy at the bridge; a fierce fire, well ſupported on either ſide, enſued. The ground was ſuch, that the Prince could not bring up his whole de⯑tatchment equally. Senſible of this diſadvantage, he form⯑ed a deſign to overcome it, as judicious, as it was reſolute, which was to turn the enemy by attacking them in the rear; to execute this deſign, it was neceſſary to make a circuit about the town. Every thing ſucceeded: The attack on the enemy's rear was made with bayonnets fixed, a terrible ſlaughter enſued. The French abondoned the bridge, and fled in confuſion: The Prince having cleared the town of the enemy, joined the party he had left. The Count de Chabot threw himſelf, with two batallions into the caſtle, with a reſolution to maintain himſelf there; but in a little time he capitulated, ſurrendering the place, his ſtores, and magazines, his troops being permitted to march out. The Prince, who had no artillery, and who, on account of the badneſs of the roads, deſpaired of bringing up heavy cannon, ſuffered them to depart. Six hundred and ſeventy men were made priſoners in the action, and a place of much importance, and which opened a paſſage over the Weſer, ſecured to the Hanoverians, with the loſs of leſs than 1000 men killed and wounded. I have dwelt on this action, and deſcribed it as particularly as I could, though nothing deciſive in itſelf, becauſe it is not in pitched battles between great armies, where the moſt maſterly ſtrokes of conduct are always diſplayed; theſe leſſer affairs frequently call for as much or more of ſagacity, reſolution, and pre⯑ſence of mind, in the commander; yet are they often ſlighly paſſed by, as matters of no conſequence, by the generality of people, who rather conſider the greatneſs of the event, than the ſpirit of the action.

Prince Ferdinand continued to advance, with his right on one ſide of the Weſer, and his left on the other; the French continued to retire, and ſucceſſively abandoned all the places they had occupied in the electorate, except Minden. A garriſon of 4000 men defended that place; but it was cloſely inveſted, and in nine days the whole garriſon ſurrendered priſoners of war. Se⯑veral ſkirmiſhes happened between the advanced parties of the Hanoverian army and the French, always to the advantage of the former. The wretched con⯑dition of the French troops is hardly to be deſcribed or ima⯑gined: [49] officers and ſoldiers involved in one common diſtreſs; the officers forgot their rank, and the ſoldiers their obedi⯑ence; full hoſpitals, and empty magazines; a rigorous ſea⯑ſon and bad covering; their baggage ſeized or abandoned, and the huſſars and hunters of the allied army continually haraſſing, pillaging, and cutting them off. It was no alle⯑viation to their miſery, that the inhabitants of the country, which they abandoned, were reduced to the ſame extremi⯑ties. The ſavage behaviour of ſome of their troops at their departure, took away all compaſſion for their ſufferings; but this was not univerſal. The Duke de Randan, who commanded in Hanover, quitted the place with the ſame virtue, that he had ſo long held it. Reſentment had no power to perſwade him to act with rigour, in the adverſe turn of the French affairs, than the pride of conqueſt had in their proſperity. When he had orders to evacuate the place, there were very conſiderable magazines of corn and forage, amaſſed for the uſe of the army; he had full time to burn them, and he had precedents enough to have juſti⯑fied the action: but he left the whole in the hands of the magiſtrates, to be gratuitouſly diſtributed to the poor: he employed all his vigilance to prevent the leaſt diſorder amongſt his troops, and was himſelf the laſt man that marched out of the town. This behaviour, which did ſuch honour to his name and country, has made his memory for ever dear to the Hanoverians, drew tears of love and grati⯑tude from his enemies, and acknowledgments from the generous Prince againſt whom he ſerved.

The French, through extreme difficulties, marched to⯑wards the Rhine in three columns. The ſeveral ſcattered bodies, which had united at Munſter, formed the right. The body, which came from Paderborn; and which was commanded by the prince of Clermont in perſon, march⯑ed in the middle. The forces which had occupied Heſſe were on the left. In this order they reached the Rhine, which they all paſſed, except a body under Count Cler⯑mont, who ſtill remained at Weſel, and reſolved to main⯑tain that poſt. The French army, which about four months before had paſſed the Rhine in numbers, and in a condition to make the moſt powerful enemies tremble, with⯑out any adverſe ſtroke of war whatſoever, by a fate almoſt unparalleled, now repaſſed it like fugitives, in a condition the moſt deplorable, reduced to leſs than half their original [50] number, and cloſely purſued by the enemy, which they had obliged to lay down their arms.

The ſame ill fortune, and the ſame deſpair of their af⯑fairs followed them every where. On the arrival of a ſmall Engliſh ſquadron, commanded by commodore Holmes before Embden, and their taking an advantageous ſituation, which cut off the communication be⯑tween the town and the mouth of the river Ems; the French garriſon, conſiſting of 4000 men, im⯑mediately evacuated the place. As ſoon as Mr. Holmes diſcovered their deſign, and that they were tranſ⯑porting their artillery and baggage up the river, he order⯑ed out a few armed boats to purſue them. Theſe took ſome of the enemy's veſſels, in which were the ſon of an officer of diſtinction, and a conſiderable ſum of money. The commodore without delay reſtored the ſon to his fa⯑ther, and offered to return the money, on receiving the officer's word of honour, that it was his private property. This affair is mentioned, not only to do juſtice to the judi⯑cious conduct by which a place of ſo much conſideration was ſo eaſily carried, but alſo to that generoſity of ſpirit, which ſo nobly diſtinguiſhes almoſt all thoſe, who hold any rank in our ſervice.

CHAP. IX.

WHILST the French arms ſuffered ſuch diſgraces abroad, they endeavoured by an alteration of their councils at home, to reſtore their credit. Their miniſters had been long the ſport of female caprice; it was their power of pleaſing a miſtreſs who governed their King, that alone qualified them to ſerve their country. Some of the moſt able men were turned out of their employments with diſgrace; others retired from the publick ſervice with in⯑dignation; a certain low character had for a long time ap⯑peared [51] in all the proceedings of France, both within and without. Even in their domeſtic diſputes, and where ſomething of a free and manly ſpirit appeared, this ſpirit evaporated, and ſpent itſelf upon unworthy and deſpicable objects. Theſe conteſts which involved the church, the law and the crown, weakened them all; and the ſtate felt all the ill effects of diſunion of its orders, without ſee⯑ing an augmentation of power thrown into the ſcale of any. But now taught by their misfortunes and diſgraces, they were obliged to an alteration in their conduct: they were obliged to call men to the public ſervice upon public prin⯑ciples: at a time indeed, when in many reſpects things could only be altered, not mended: and wiſe and able mi⯑niſters could do little more by their penetration and public ſpirit, than to ſee and lament the ruin, cauſed by the want of thoſe virtues in their predeceſſors. The duke de Belle⯑iſle, known to all Europe for his great abilities, and his great exploits, was at length placed at the head of the mili⯑tary department, as ſecretary at war.

There appeared in the common prints a ſpeech, ſaid to be made by that nobleman in council; which, if it be not authentic, contains at leaſt ſuch ſentiments, as would come not unnaturally from a French patriot, and one who had ſerved his King and country with honour during better times.

‘I know, ſaid he, the ſtate of our armies. It gives me great grief, and no leſs indignation: for beſides the real evil of the diſorder in itſelf, the diſgrace and infamy which it reflects on our government, and on the whole nation, is ſtill more to be apprehended. The choice of officers ought to be made with mature deliberation. I know but too well to what length the want of diſcipline, pillaging and robbing have been carried on by the officers and common men, after the example ſet them by their generals. It mortifies me to think I am a Frenchman; my principals are known to be very different from thoſe which are now followed. I had the ſatisfaction to retain the eſteem, the friendſhip and the conſideration, of all the princes, noblemen, and even all the common people in all parts of Germany where I commanded the king's forces. They lived there in the midſt of abundance; every one was pleaſed; it fills my ſoul with anguiſh, to find that at preſent the French are held in execration; [52] that every body is diſpirited, and that many officers pub⯑lickly ſay things that are criminal and highly puniſhable. The evil is ſo great that it demands immediate redreſs. I can eaſily judge, by what paſſes in my own breaſt, of what our generals feel from the ſpeeches they muſt daily hear in Germany, concerning our conduct; which indeed would loſe much to be compared with that of our allies. I muſt particularly complain of the delays and irregularity of the poſts; a ſervice which is very ill pro⯑vided for. I am likewiſe diſpleaſed with the negligence of our generals returning anſwers; which is a manifeſt breach of their duty. Had I commanded the army, a thouſand things which are done, would not have been done; and others, which are neglected, would have been executed. I would have multiplied my communi⯑cations; I would have had ſtrong poſts on the right, on the left, and in the centre lined with troops. I would have had magazines in every place. The quiet and ſatis⯑faction of the country ſhould have been equal to their pre⯑ſent diſaffection, at being harraſſed and plundered; and we ſhould have been as much beloved, as we are at preſent abhorred. The conſequences are too apparent to need being mentioned. I muſt inſiſt o [...] theſe things, becauſe late redreſs is better than the continuation of the evil.’

M. de Belleiſle being eſtabliſhed in his office, turned all his attention to the cure of the evils, which he lamented; and exerted all the power that remained in the nation, to put their army in Germany once more upon a reſpectable footing. The expedition into Germany was originally a meaſure as contrary to the true intereſts of France, as it was of juſtice and equity; but having adopted that meaſure, the conſequences which aroſe ſeemed to demand that it ſhould be purſued with vigour. Therefore the connection with the Empreſs Queen was drawn cloſer than ever, and nothing was omitted to give a greater ſtrength, and a better order to the army on the Rhine. But theſe endeavours which ſtrained all the ſinews of France, already too much weakened by the almoſt total ruin of ſeveral eſſential bran⯑ches of their trade, drew away all the reſources neceſſary to ſupport their navy. It was then in a ſufficiently bad condition, from a want of ſeamen and ſtores; and there were no means found, or little attention uſed, to reſtore it: ſo that from a deficiency in the marine, it ſeemed to be [53] equally impracticable to feed the war in America, or to preſerve the coaſt of France itſelf from inſults. Such was the condition of our enemies, at the opening of the cam⯑paign of 1758.

As to England, far from being exhauſted by the war, or diſpirited by our ill ſucceſs, our hopes roſe from our diſap⯑pointments, and our reſources ſeemed to be augmented by our expences; with ſuch eaſe and alacrity were the neceſſary ſupplies granted and raiſed. Many errors and many abuſes which the war diſcovered without making fatal, were corrected. The ſpirit of our officers was revived by fear or by ſhame. Our trade was well protected by the ſu⯑periority, and prudent diſtribution of our naval force. The revenue was frugally managed, and the whole ſtate well cemented and bound together in all its parts, by the union of the adminiſtration, by the patriotiſm which ani⯑mated it, and by the entire confidence which the people had in the preſiding abilities and intentions. As France perſiſted in her attachment to the enemies of his Pruſſian majeſty, Great Britain entered into ſtill cloſer engagements with that monarch, the luſtre of whoſe virtues, ſet off by his late wonderful ſucceſſes, quite turned our eyes from the objections which were raiſed againſt the conſiſtency of that alliance with our intereſts. How far it is conſiſtent with them, is I think, a much more difficult point to ſettle, than the adherents to either party ſeem willing to allow. But it ought to be conſidered, that the circumſtances of affairs in the beginning of the war, hardly admitted of any other choice; it had been the height of madneſs, to have been on ill terms with his Pruſſian majeſty at that time; and it was impoſſible to have kept good terms with him, without being on very bad ones with Vienna. Things were in an ill ſituation; and the ballance of Germany was in danger of being overſet, what party ſoever ſhould pre⯑vail. It was impoſſible that England could have ſtood neu⯑ter in this conteſt: if ſhe had, France would not have imi⯑tated her moderation; ſhe would gladly have joined with the King of Pruſſia to diſtreſs Hanover, and reduce Auſtria. Theſe two powers ſo exerted, would doubtleſs compaſs their end, unleſs we interpoſed to prevent it; and we muſt ſooner or later have interpoſed, unleſs we were reſolved tamely to ſee France and her allies giving laws to the conti⯑nent. In a word, France would certainly have joined with [54] one party or the other, and the party which ſhe joined, would certainly, by that union, prove dangerous to the common liberty, and muſt therefore be oppoſed by us; we muſt have been in ſpite of us engaged in the troubles of Germany, as we ever have been, and ever ſhall be, as long as we are a people of conſideration in Europe. The alliance with Pruſſia was pointed out to us by the circumſtance of his acting on the defenſive. The King of Pruſſia medita⯑ted no conqueſts. But her imperial majeſty indiſputably aimed at the recovery of Sileſia, which was to diſturb the ſettled order of things; and this deſign was the only cauſe of the troubles in that part of the world. I am ſenſible that this is notwithſtanding all that may be ſaid, a queſtion of ſome intricacy, and requires a conſideration of many more particulars, than the brevity of our deſign will allow. But whether we choſe our party in this alliance judiciouſly or not, we have, I imagine, very great reaſon to be pleaſed with a meaſure, which has induced France to engage ſo deeply in the affairs of Germany, at ſo ruinous an expence of her blood and treaſure. Our miniſtry was at this time fully convinced of the prudence of the choice that had been made, and reſolved to ſupport his Pruſſian majeſty, and the army under Prince Ferdinand, in the moſt effectual manner; 100,000 l. were voted for the Hanoverian and Heſſian forces; and a convention between the King of Pruſſia, and his Britannic majeſty, was ſigned in London, whereby the King of Great Britain engages to pay his Pruſſian majeſty the ſum of 670,000 l. ſterling; and each of the contracting powers engaged to conclude no peace without the participitation of the other.

The northern courts made no alteration in their ſyſtem. In Sweden, ſome real plots to diſturb the eſtabliſhed con⯑ſtitution ended in the ruin of their contrivers; ſome ficti⯑tious plots were ſet on foot to give a ſanction to meaſures againſt the crown party, which anſwered their ends; and, as the ruling power continued the ſame and the internal diſſenſions the ſame, the hoſtilities againſt the King of Pruſſia were reſolved with the former animoſity, but pro⯑miſed to be purſued with the former languor. In Ruſſia, the Empreſs did not think her intentions well ſeconded by her miniſters. The great delays, and the unaccountable retreat in the laſt campaign, gave ground to ſuſpect, that [55] ſhe had been betrayed by her miniſters, or her generals. M. Apraxin was moved from the command, and was put under arreſt. He juſtified his conduct by expreſs orders from Count Beſtuchef. Beſtuchef was removed from his office, and put under arreſt alſo. Count Woronzoff ſuc⯑ceeded Beſtuchef in his employment, and the generals Brown and Fermor took the command of the army in the place of Apraxin.

As ſoon as the ſeason permitted the King of Pruſſia to re-commence his operations, he laid ſiege to Schweidnitz, and puſhed it with ſo much vigour, that the place ſurrendered in thirteen days. The garriſon reduced by ſickneſs during the blockade, and by their loſſes during the ſiege, from ſeven to little more than three thouſand men, yielded themſelves priſoners of war. By this ſtroke, the King of Pruſſia left his enemies no foot⯑ing in any part of his dominions. His next conſideration was how to guard againſt their future attempts, and at the ſame time to make a vigorous attack upon ſome part of the Auſtrian territories. His forces were well ſtationed for both theſe purpoſes; for beſides the troops which Count Dohna commanded on the ſide of Pomerania, a conſiderable body was poſted between Wohlau and Glogau, in order to cover Sileſia from the fury of the Ruſſians, in caſe they ſhould make their inroad that way. An army, in a little time after was formed in Saxony, commanded by his bro⯑ther Prince Henry, which conſiſted of thirty battalions, and forty-five ſquadrons. It was deſtined to make head againſt the army of the Empire, which by amazing efforts made during the winter, and by the junction of a large body of Auſtrians, was now in a condition to act again. A ready communication was kept up between all the King of Pruſſia's armies, by a proper choice of poſts.

The King reſolved to make Moravia the theatre of the war this year. Moravia was freſh ground; a country, as yet untouched by the ravages of war. If he ſhould ſucceed in his operations in this country, his ſuc⯑ceſſes by opening to him the neareſt road to Vienna, muſt prove more deciſive than they could any where elſe. If he ſhould fail, the Auſtrians were at a diſtance from the centre of his affairs, and would find it difficult to improve their advantages to his ruin. After the reduction of Schweid⯑nitz, the King ordered two bodies of his troops to poſt [56] themſelves in ſuch a manner, as to make it appear that he intended to carry the war into Bohemia. Whilſt he drew away the enemies attention from the real objects by theſe diſpoſitions, the main of his army by a very rapid march, entered into Moravia in two co⯑lumns, and made themſelves Maſters, in a ſhort time and with little or no oppoſition, of all the poſts ne⯑ceſſary to cover the troops to be employed in the ſiege of Olmutz. On the 27th of May the trenches were opened before that city.

M. Daun was no ſooner appriſed of the King's march to⯑wards Moravia, than he took his route through Bohemia to that province. Notwithſtanding that the Empreſs Queen omitted no poſſible endeavours to aſſemble a large army againſt the King of Pruſſia, though ſhe had for that pur⯑poſe exhauſted the Milaneſe and Tuſcany, and ſwept up the laſt recruits in her Danubian territories, M. Daun was not yet in a condition to give the King of Pruſſia battle; neither did his character lead him to truſt that to fortune, which he might enſure, though more ſlowly, by conduct. This wiſe general took his poſts from Gewics to Littau, in a mountainous country, in a ſituation where it was impoſ⯑ſible to attack him. He had the fertile country of Bohemia, from whence he readily and certainly drew ſupplies, at his rear. He was from his poſition at the ſame time enabled to haraſs the Pruſſian army before Olmutz, and to intercept the convoys which were brought to them from Sileſia.

Olmutz, by the extent of its works, and other advan⯑tageous circumſtances, is a city which it is very difficult compleatly to inveſt. So that ſome of the King's poſts be⯑ing neceſſarily weakened by occupying ſo great an extent of country, were attacked by Daun's detachments from time to time, with ſuch ſucceſs, that abundant ſuccours both of men and ammunition were thrown into the place. Theſe attacks were always made by night, and very few nights paſſed without ſome attack. The ſucceſs was various. But the operations of the ſiege were greatly diſturbed by theſe continual alarms. Beſides it is ſaid that the Auſtrians, be⯑fore the King's invaſion of this province, had deſtroyed all the forage in the neighbourhood of Olmutz. The horſe were obliged to forage at a great diſtance, which harraſſed them extreamly. M. Daun took advantage of all theſe circumſtances. It was in vain that the King of Pruſſia [57] endeavoured by all the arts of a great commander to pro⯑voke or entice him to an engagement. He profited of the advantages he had made, without being tempted by them to throw out of his hands the ſecure game he was play⯑ing.

The great object of M. Daun was the Pruſſian convoys. On receiving advice that a large and important one was to leave Troppau on the 25th of June, he took meaſures to intercept it. He ordered general Jahnus, who was at Muglitz on the left, to advance towards Bahrn, and a de⯑tachment which was at Prerau at a conſiderable diſtance to the right, to march to Stadt-Leibe; ſo that theſe two corps ſhould on different ſides attack the convoy at one and the ſame time. To further the execution of this project, M. Daun himſelf approached the Pruſſian army, and di⯑rected all his motions as if he intended to give them battle. However, the King was too great a maſter in the game of generalſhip, which was now playing, to be deceived by this feint. He detached a conſiderable party under general Ziethen, to ſupport his convoy, which was already about 7000 ſtrong. Before this detachment could come up, the convoy was attacked, but the Auſtrians were repulſed. But M. Daun, who provided for every thing, quickly reinforced his parties who renewed the engagement the next day. They firſt ſuffered the head of the convoy to go unmoleſt⯑ed; but as the centre was ſtill embarraſſed in a dangerous defile, they eaſily cut off the head from the reſt, and then they attacked the centre with the greateſt fury. The Pruſſians made as good a reſiſtance as the nature of the ground would ſuffer. General Ziethen did every thing which could be expected from an accompliſhed officer; but in the end they were entirely routed; all the waggons in that diviſion were taken; the rear was puſhed back towards Troppau; the head alone with great difficulty arrived at the Pruſſian camp.

This was a fatal ſtroke, becauſe it came at a time when it was impoſſible to repair it. The ſiege of Olmutz had been all along attended with great difficulties: and now the news which every day arrived of the nearer and nearer ap⯑proach of the Ruſſians, called the King loudly to the de⯑fence of his own dominions. Already the Coſſacks and Calmucks made incurſions into Sileſia, and by their ravages and cruelties, announced the approach of the great army. [58] The ſiege muſt be raiſed: Moravia muſt be abandoned; Marſhal Daun muſt have the Honour of freeing his coun⯑try, and driving away ſuch an Adverſary as the King of Pruſſia, from a conqueſt deemed certain; all was perform⯑ed without a battle, by a ſeries of the moſt refined and vi⯑gorous manoeuvres that ever were put in practice.

When the King of Pruſſia ſaw that the unproſperous ſitu⯑ation of his affairs obliged him to retreat; he took a reſolu⯑tion, ſuch as a victory inſpires in other. He took ad⯑vantage even of the excellent movement of M. Daun, by which that able general had advanced his quarters to Poz⯑nitz, and placed himſelf ſo as to ſupport Olmutz in the moſt effectual manner; by this movement, however, he was obliged to uncover the frontiers of Bohemia. The King of Pruſſia, whom nothing could eſcape, was ſenſible of this advantage, and therefore, inſtead of falling back upon Sileſia, which ſtep would immediately have drawn the Auſtrian army into his dominions, he determined to re⯑treat from one part of the enemies territories into another. The day before the ſiege was raiſed the firing of the Pruſ⯑ſians continued as briſk as ever, and ſhewed no ſort of ſign of an intention to depart; but in the night the whole army took the road to Bohemia in two co⯑lumns, and gained an entire march upon the Au⯑ſtrians. So that notwithſtanding the utmoſt efforts which the enemy could make to overtake and haraſs the King upon his march, he advanced into Bohemia with little mo⯑leſtation, ſeized upon a large magazine at Leutomiſſel, de⯑feated ſome corps of Auſtrians who had attempted to diſturb him in his progreſs, and arrived at Konigſgratz, one of the moſt important poſts in Bohemia, with all his ſick and wounded, with all his heavy baggage, all his heavy Artil⯑lery, and military ſtores complete. This place he poſſeſſed after driving from it a body of 7000 Auſtrians who were entrenched there. He immediately laid this city and ſeve⯑ral other diſtricts under contribution; but his plan not ad⯑mitting any further operations on that ſide, he took no other advantage from this momentous poſt. He ſoon re-entered Sileſia, and marched with the moſt amazing dili⯑gence to encounter the Ruſſians, who had at this time united their divided corps under Brown and Fermor, and fixed the long fluctuating plan of their operations, by en⯑tering the New Marche of Brandenburgh, and laying ſiege [59] to Cu [...]trin. The reduction of this place could leave them but a [...] [...]ys march to Berlin; Count Dohna was not in a condition to oppoſe their progreſs, the King was ſtill at a great diſtance. But it is neceſſary to break our narrative of his affairs, however intereſting, to take a view of the operations of the armies on the Rhine. We leave the King of Pruſſia in full march, do give one body of his enemies battle, after executing a retreat from the other, in a man⯑ner that did his military genius the greateſt honour. So that on the whole, it is difficult to ſay, which gained the greateſt glory, the King of Pruſſia by his retreat, or M. Daun by the meaſure which obliged him to it.

CHAP. X.

PRINCE Ferdinand had it not in his power to cut off the retreat of the French over the Rhine; but he preſſed them cloſely, and prepared himſelf to croſs that ri⯑ver in purſuit of them. His deſign was to carry the war beyond the Maeſe, and thereby oblige the Prince de Sou⯑biſe to abandon the enterprize he was preparing againſt Heſſe Caſſel. His Highneſs executed the paſſage of the Rhine at Herven with the corps immedi⯑ately under his command; then he ſent the bridge with which he ſerved himſelf ſo well up the river to Rees; the reſt of the troops paſſed there; the whole army were over before the 7th of June. The flattery of the laſt age ſaw with aſtoniſhment a paſſage of the Rhine by a French monarch, unoppoſed, at the head of a mighty army. We ſaw that river paſſed by the enemies of France, in the preſence of an army of 50,000 of that nation; it was an action which did not need the exaggerations of rhetoric.

The French army retired as the Prince advanced, and took an advantageous camp which threatened to retard the operations of the allies: their right was under Rheinberg; but the Prince by his well-judged motions turned their left flank towards the convent of Campe, by which the French found themſelves obliged to quit their advantageous poſt, [60] and to retire into Meurs: they ſtill kept towards the Rhine: the Prince advanced on the ſide of the Maeſe.

It was evident, that whilſt the French continued only to retire, it would prove impoſſible for them to hinder the allies from executing the plan they propoſed: they there⯑fore thought it adviſeable to change their countenance. They had falled back as far as Nuys; they now returned on their ſteps, and advanced as far as Crevelt, within a few miles of Prince Ferdinand's camp. The Prince made the diſpoſitions for a battle, with his uſual vigour and pru⯑dence. He carefully reconnoitred the ſituation of the enemy. He found that their right was at a village called Viſchelon; their left extended towards Anrath, where it was covered with a wood: Crevelt, which was in the front of their right was occupied by a party of their troops. His highneſs reſolved upon three attacks: the firſt and real attack was on the flank of the enemy's left wing; the other two were deſigned to divert their attention, and prevent their ſuccouring the object of his principal attack; for which purpoſe he recommended to his generals to make the beſt uſe of their heavy artillery, and not to advance too far unleſs they were perfectly aſſured of the ſucceſs of the main operation.

Having made theſe wiſe diſpoſitions, and perfectly learn⯑ed the beſt routes by which the enemy might be approached, his highneſs put himſelf at the head of the grenadiers of his right wing, and advanced on the ſide of Anrath in two colums. A canonading vio⯑lent and well ſupported opened the action: the Hanove⯑rian artillery was greatly ſuperior to that of the French; but though the French loſt many men, they loſt no ground in this way, and their poſition in the wood made a cloſe attack abſolutely neceſſary: the hereditary Prince of Brun⯑ſwick put himſelf at the head of the firſt line of foot, and with his uſual ſpirit, advanced with the whole front direct⯑ly to the wood. Here a furious fire of ſmall arms com⯑menced, which continued without the ſmalleſt intermiſſion for two hours and an half. All the Hanoverian battalions threw themſelves into the wood: two ditches well lined with infantry were oppoſed to their fury: they were forced one after another: the enemies battalions were puſhed back, they were entirely broken, and fled out of the wood in a diſorder which was irreparable: their cavalry, who [61] kept the beſt countenance poſſible, in ſpite of the terrible fire of the Hanoverian artillery, and in ſpite of the vigo⯑ [...]ous attempts of the Hanoverian horſe, who had by this time [...]and means to gain the plain, covered the retreat of their ſcattered infantry, and ſaved them from utter ruin: the right wing and the centre, though they ſuffered grievouſly by the cannonading, were no where broken, but retreated towards Nuys in the moſt perfect order.

Seven thouſand of their beſt troops were killed, wound⯑ed, and taken priſoners; but there was nothing in this battle ſo grievous to France, and ſo affecting even to the enemy, as the fate of the count de Giſors. This young nobleman, the only ſon of the duke de Belleiſle, not above twenty-five years of age, newly married to the heireſs of an illuſtrious houſe; himſelf the laſt hope of a moſt noble family, was mortally wounded at the head of his regiment, which be brought up with the moſt heroic courage, and inſpired by his example to make incredible efforts. He had been educated with all the care an excellent father could beſtow on a ſon of an uncommon genius, who was alone able to ſupport the reputation of his family. To the pureſt morals he had united the politeſt manners; he had made a great proficiency in learning; he knew many branches of it, and loved all; he had ſeen every part of Europe, and read courts and nations with a diſcerning eye; and wanted nothing to fulfil all hope, and to make him a perfect and laſting ornament and ſupport to his coun⯑try, but a knowledge in the military art; he entered that courſe of glory and danger, and fell in his firſt campaign. The unhappy father and miniſter ſaw his private misfor⯑tunes keep pace with the public calamities, and the tears of his family mingled with thoſe of his country.

Prince Ferdinand gained a victory at Crevelt, which did the greateſt honour to his military capacity, and to the bravery of his troops. But it was a victory neither entire nor deciſive: the French army on their own frontiers was quickly and ſtrongly reinforced; ſo that they were not only in a condition in ſome ſort to make head againſt the allies, but were enabled to detach a conſiderable reinforce⯑ment to the army of the Prince de Soubiſe on the other ſide of the Rhine.

Altho' the Prince had reaſon to imagine that he ſhould not be able to keep his ground on this ſide of the Rhine for [62] any conſiderable time, this did not hinder him from im⯑proving to the utmoſt, the advantage he had obtained. Whilſt the French, diſabled by their late defeat, were in no condition to oppoſe him, he paſſed the Rhine with a large detachment, and appeared on the 28th of June before Duſſeldorp, a city advantageouſly ſituated on the river, and belonging to the Elector Palatine. A ſevere bombardment obliged it to capitulate on the 7th of July: the garriſon, conſiſting of 2000 men, marched out with the honours of war. Prince Ferdinand placed here three battalions of Hanoverians, and threw a bridge of boats acroſs the river; by that means he multiplied his poſts and communications on both ſides of the Rhine; and threw a new and no ſmall impediment in the way of the French, to retard their pro⯑greſs, in caſe he ſhould find himſelf compelled to retire. After this, the army of the allies and that of France, ſpent ſeveral days in making various marches and countermarches, as if they both propoſed to bring on an action, to which, however, it does not appear that either party was very ſtrongly inclined.

Prince Ferdinand ſtill retained his hopes that the Prince of Yſenburg who commanded the Heſſian troops, would find the Prince of Soubiſe employment for ſome time. He had originally laid his plan in ſuch a manner, that by paſſing the Maeſe, and transferring the ſeat of war into the enemies country, he might draw the French from the Rhine, and perhaps oblige the Prince of Soubiſe to come to the aſſiſ⯑tance of the main army under M. de Contades, who com⯑manded in the room of count Clermont, being now the fourth commander of the French troops ſince they entered Germany. But whilſt Prince Ferdinand pleaſed himſelf with thoſe hopes, and ſtill continued to act as far as circum⯑ſtances would admit, in purſuance of this plan, he received an account which diſconcerted all his meaſures.

The duke de Broglio, ſupported by the corps of the prince de Soubiſe, with a much ſuperior force, attacked and defeated the Heſſian army of ſeven thouſand men near Sangerſhauſen: this opened to them the poſſeſſion of the Weſer: they might act in Weſtphalia, on which ſide ſoever they pleaſed, and it was to be feared, that if they availed themſelves of the advantages they had, they might be able to intercept the Britiſh troops. Theſe troops having been landed at Embden, were now on their [63] march under the command of the duke of Marlborough to reinforce the allied army. The prince in this ſituation of affairs, had no option left but an engagement with the French army, or a retreat over the Rhine: the former was not eaſy to compaſs, as the French induſtriouſly de⯑clined a battle, and it became extremely dangerous to re⯑main long in a poſition with the enemies army on his left, and the ſtrong fortreſs of Gueldre on his right. In this ſitu⯑ation his ſubſiſtence became every day more difficult. To repaſs the Rhine had its difficulties too; the roads which led to that river were rendered almoſt impaſſable by the heavy rains; the river itſelf was ſo ſwelled with them, that the bridge at Rees had been for ſome time uſeleſs.

Theſe diſagreeable circumſtances of the allied army did not eſcape the penetration of Monſ. de Chevert, one of the ableſt commanders among the French. He formed a plan upon them, which, if it had ſucceeded, muſt have put the allies into the greateſt perplexity. This general had ſome time before paſſed the Rhine, with an intention of making himſelf maſter of Duſſeldorp, and he had prepared all things with great ability for that enterpriſe: the rains uſually heavy for that ſeaſon, and ſome other croſs accidents, had fruſtrated his intentions. But perceiving that the ſame ac⯑cidents which defeated his deſign proved alſo unfavourable to the enemy, he reſolved to turn his diſappointment into an advantage, and from the ruins of his firſt project to build another of yet greater importance. Baron Imhoff was poſted to the right of the Rhine in a ſtrong ſituation near Meer. He was to cover the bridge at Rees; to ſecure a conſiderable magazine; and to keep open communication between the Engliſh reinforcements and the main army. The plan of Monſ. Chevert was to diſlodge Imhoff, to burn the bridge at Rees, to make himſelf maſter of the magazine, and to render the junction of the Engliſh troops with the Hanoverians impracticable. To execute this ju⯑dicious ſcheme, he united ſeveral detachments from the garriſon of Weſel, to a conſiderable corps which he intend⯑ed to have employed in the ſiege of Duſſeldorp. The whole made near 12,000 men: the troops under Imhoff were but ſix batallions, and four ſquadrons, hardly 3000 in all.

When that General was appriſed of the deſigns and mo⯑tions of the French, he ſaw it was in vain to expect ſuccours [64] from the army of Prince Ferdinand: the ſwell of the river had rendered all relief impoſſible; all his hopes were there⯑fore in his genius and the bravery of his troops. He conſidered that though the poſt he occupied was ſufficient⯑ly ſtrong, the enemy might make themſelves maſters of Rees, by turning his camp, and thus execute one of the principal parts of their deſign; he conſidered the great difference between attacking and being attacked; he con⯑ſidered the effect of an attempt altogether unexpected by the enemy; he therefore took the reſolution of abandoning his poſt, and going out to meet them. Perceiving that the French were marching into difficult ground, he did not loſe a moment to begin the action. He ordered a ſmall party, which he had poſted in a little coppice, to fall upon the enemies left, which he obſerved to be uncovered; and appointed the fire of this party, as a ſignal for all the reſt to advance, and make the onſet with bayonets fixed. The French thus vigorouſly and unexpectedly attacked, fell into confuſion; their cou⯑rage ill ſeconded the wiſdom of their general; they did not ſtand half an hour; they left on the field of battle eleven pieces of cannon, many priſoners, and much baggage to the Hanoverians, who drove them under the cannon of Weſel.

This ſignal advantage over ſuch a prodigious ſuperiority was not more gallantly obtained than well purſued and im⯑proved. Imhoff ſaw that the rains had increaſed to ſuch a degree, as to leave no hopes for the allied army to paſs by the bridge of Rees. Having taken proper care of his ma⯑gazines, he quitted his poſt at Meer, and being reinforced by ſome parties, who paſſed the river in boats, he marched with the utmoſt diligence towards the route of the Engliſh forces, and happily effected a junction, which had hitherto been attended with ſo many difficulties.

Prince Ferdinand in his retreat met with no obſtruction, but juſt what was ſufficient to diſplay more fully the gal⯑lantry of his officers, and the ſpirit of his troops. A town called Wachtendonck was on his left, as he retreated; this place, though not fortified, is a poſt of much importance, and being an inland ſurrounded by the river Niers, is ex⯑tremely difficult of acceſs: the French had thrown a body of troops into this place. The hereditary prince, the firſt in every active ſervice, was employed to force it. The [65] bridge on his approach had been drawn up. The prince ſee⯑ing that if he attempted to get down this bridge, the ene⯑my would gain time to recollect themſelves, threw himſelf into the river; his grenadiers, animated by ſo gallant an example, plunged in after him, and furiouſly attacking the enemy with their bayonets, in a few minutes drove them from that poſt; this advantage, joined to that gained by general Imhoff, and the uncommon reſolution which ap⯑peared in both theſe actions, awed the French. They found that their troops, raw, undiſciplined and little fit for hard ſervice, were not to be relied upon; and they feared to bring on an action, which by being deciſive againſt them might draw on the moſt fatal conſequences. So that the prince repaſſed the Rhine in a moſt excellent order, even with leſs trouble than he had at firſt paſſed it; and indeed with little moleſtation, but what he met with from the weather. Such exceſſive rains had fallen, that he in vain attempted a paſſage at Rhineberg or at his bridge of Rees; he effected it a little lower at a place called Griethuyſen.

Although Prince Ferdinand was obliged to paſs the Rhine, and to act more upon the defenſive for the future; yet his vigorous conduct in the beginning was very glorious to him, and very advantageous to the common cauſe. The French ſuffered greatly in their military reputation; the Hanoverians had gained a ſuperiority over them, and now ſo much of the campaign was waſted, that notwithſtanding the greatneſs of their numbers, it was not probable that they would find themſelves able to make any conſiderable progreſs in their deſigns againſt the King's electoral domi⯑nions for this year. The advantage gained by Broglio and Soubiſe was not attended with the conſequences, which might have been apprehended. Prince Yſenburg kept ſo good a countenance in a ſtrong poſt he had choſen, that the French did not chooſe to attack him again; and ſince Prince Ferdinand had repaſſed the Rhine, he might always be well ſupported.

CHAP. XI.

BY the retreat of the Pruſſians from Moravia, the war had aſſumed a new face. The Generals who conduct⯑ed it had changed hands. The King of Pruſſia was obliged to act upon the defenſive; M. Daun was now in a condition of diſplaying his talents in an offenſive war. The affairs of the King of Pruſſia were ſcarce ever in a more critical ſitu⯑ation than at that time. The Ruſſians ſeemed at firſt diſ⯑poſed to enter into Sileſia; but now they had united their ſeveral disjointed corps, penetrated into the New Marche of Brandenburgh, and having commenced the ſiege of Cuſ⯑trin, a place that threatened them with no great oppoſition, they were arrived within a few days march of Berlin Count Dohna poſted with a greatly inferior force at Frank⯑fort on the Oder, watched without being able to obſtruct their progreſs. In Pomerania, the Generals Weedel and Manteufel oppoſed almoſt the ſame ineffectual efforts to the arms of Sweden. The army of the Empire, and a conſi⯑derable body of Auſtrians under General Haddick, advanced into Saxony, and poſſeſſing themſelves by degrees of thoſe ſtrong poſts, which compoſe the frontiers of Miſnia, they continually ſtreightened the quarters of Prince Henry. That Prince was ſtrongly encamped at Dippolſwalde, with about 20,000 men, in order to cover Dreſden, and command the courſe of the Elbe. Thus circumſtanced, the King could not find his account in remaining long in Bohemia, where it was impoſſible to effect any thing deciſive. Every thing depended upon his being able to drive the Ruſſians out o [...] his territories, who with a mighty forced ruined every place they arrived at, and ſeemed not only to make war againſt him, but againſt human nature itſelf.

M. Daun was ſoon appriſed of the King of Pruſſia's in⯑tentions: but he conſidered that if he was to purſue the King into Sileſia, he moſt encounter with difficulties almoſt inſuperable; ſeveral ſtrong places ſtood in his way, and i [...] would prove eaſy for the Pruſſian troops left for the defence of that dutchy, to take an advantageous camp under one of thoſe places, and thus oblige them to waſte unprofitably the [67] time, which might be employed in the execution of more judicious projects. Beſides that in this manner of proceed⯑ing he could never act in concert, nor preſerve any effectual communication with the ſeveral bodies of his allies. To puſh forward with his whole force directly to Berlin, could at beſt be regarded as a coup de main, which could prove nothing deciſive in the campaign, even ſuppoſing the project ſhould ſucceed, but it was rather probable that it would not ſucceed, as the King of Pruſſia might clear his hands of the Ruſſians before the army of M. Daun could, for want of ſubſiſtance arrive in the Lower Luſatia. Every conſi⯑deration therefore pointed out the relief of Saxony as the great object of the Auſtrian operations. It was an object apparently to be compaſſed with greater eaſe, and if com⯑paſſed, productive of more ſolid advantages than any other. The army of the Empire already ſuperior to that of Prince Henry could co-operate in the deſign, and the recovery of Saxony once effected, the King of Pruſſia would ſee himſelf entirely diveſted of one of the principal reſources he had to rely upon in the war, for money, proviſions, and forage; whilſt his hereditary dominions ſtripped of this ſtrong bar⯑rier defenceleſs in themſelves, and aſſaulted on three ſides by powerful armies, could ſcarce find them employment to the end of the campaign.

M. Daun having reſolved upon his plan of operations ſuf⯑fered the King of Pruſſia to continue his march towards the Ruſſians, without any moleſtation: he contented himſelf with leaving a conſiderable body of Troops under the Gene⯑rals Harſch and de Ville, on the ſouthern frontiers of Sile⯑ſia, in order to form ſome enterpriſe on that ſide, which might draw the attention and forces of the Pruſſians as far as poſſible from the great object of his operations. When he had made theſe diſpoſitions he marched towards Saxony, through the country of Luſatia, by Zittau, Gorlitz, and Bautzen. His firſt project was bold. He propoſed to croſs the Elbe at Meiſſen; by which the communication between Dreſden and Leipſic would be cut of at one ſtroke. Then he propoſed to attack Prince Henry in his camp at Seidlitz, whilſt the army of the Empire fell upon him in another quarter. Thus the Prince was to be put between two fires, and his retreat into Dreſden to be rendered impracticable; but upon mature conſideration, this project was laid aſide. M. Daun reflected that the fortreſs of Sonneſtein, of which he [68] was not yet in poſſeſſion, would prove no ſmall impediment to his deſigns. He conſidered that the poſition of Prince Henry oppoſite to the army of the Empire was too advantageous, to make an attack upon him adviſeable: and unleſs the Prince could be induced to attack the Imperialiſts firſt, a point not to be expected in his circumſtances, he might always find it eaſy to throw himſelf into Dreſden, and by proper motions to preſerve a free communication with the King. M. Daun was obliged to renounce his firſt deſign, but he was left at full liberty to form and to execute ſuch other plans for the relief of Saxony as his prudence could ſuggeſt.

About that time the imperial court elated with their re⯑cent ſucceſs, began to ſhew with what moderation they were likely to behave if it continued and increaſed. They entirely threw of all the little appearance of reſpect they had hitherto retained for the King of Great Britain, and ſeveral others of the moſt reſpectable Princes and perſons of the Empire. They made the abuſe of their authority go hand in hand with the ſucceſs of their arms. On the 21ſt of Auguſt a concluſum of the Aulic council was iſſued againſt the King of Great Britain, as Elector of Hanover, againſt the Landgrave of Heſſe Caſſel, againſt Prince Ferdinand of Brunſwick, the Count of Lippe Buckebourg, and in general againſt all the Adherence to the King of Pruſſia, threatening them with Penalties indignity, perſon and eſtate. In con⯑ſequence of this decree, letters avocatory were iſſued, no⯑tifying to the ſovereign Princes, that if they did not within a limited time diſperſe their armies, break off their con⯑nection with the King of Pruſſia, pay their quota of Roman months, and ſend their contingents to the army of execution, they were to be put under the ban of the Empire. To all other perſons who held any dignity in the Empire, orders were given and penalties were threatened ſuitable to their condition. They in ſhort went all lengths, but that of actually and formally putting them under the ban, which they would not have failed to do, if their ſucceſs had an⯑ſwered its beginnings. So little regard had the court of Vienna to former ſervices of the moſt intereſting nature; and ſo entirely did ſhe ſeem to forget that ſhe owed to the King of Great Britain, not only that power which ſhe now unjuſtly and ungratefully turned againſt him, but al⯑moſt the very being of the Houſe of Auſtria. So entirely [69] did ſhe forget that this Monarch had expended his treaſures, employed his armies, and even expoſed his perſon in her cauſe, when it was not only abandoned, but attacked by almoſt all the reſt of Europe. However the violent pro⯑ceedings of the Aulic council, drew no one State or perſon from the Kings of Great Britain and Pruſſia; they rather had a contrary effect, in rouſing the whole Evangelic body to a ſenſe of their own danger. Much leſs were they able to ſtop the progreſs of the allied arms.

The King of Pruſſia conducted his retreat out of Bohe⯑mia in admirable order. The Generals Jahnus and Laudohn for ſeveral days hung upon his rear with two ſtrong bodies. They took advantageous poſts, ſometimes on one ſide, ſome⯑times on the other, ſometimes together, ſometimes ſepa⯑rately, and threw all poſſibly impediments in his way. But the vigour of the Pruſſians drove them with loſs from every poſt. So that by the 6th of Auguſt, they were obliged entirely to deſiſt from their purſuit. The King of Pruſſia freed from all moleſtation, marched with the utmoſt diligence by Wiſoca, Politz, Landſhut, and arrived on the 20th at Franckfort on the Oder. Here he joined the troops under Count Dohna. The army was now in a condi⯑tion to act, and they did not loſe a moment's time to march againſt the enemy. All their vigour and expedition was not more than neceſſary. The Ruſſians had beſieged Cuſtrin from the 15th. Though theſe people ſcarcely emerged from barbariſm, had not the moſt perfect ſkill in operations of this nature, they ſupplied that deficien⯑cy by a feroſity that ſcrupled nothing, by numbers whoſe lives they did not regard, and by a moſt formidable artillery, which rudely but furiouſly managed, only ſpread the more general and indiſcriminate deſtruction. In effect, they threw ſuch a multitude of bombs and red hot balls into that unfortunate city, that in a ſhort time it was on fire in every quarter. Of the wretched inhabitants ſome were burned, ſome buried in the ruins, ſome killed by the balls that fell like hail in the ſtreets: the ſurviving majority ſafe neither within nor without their houſes, abandoned their homes and their ſubſtance, and fled, many of them almoſt naked, out of the ſide which was not inveſted. Never was beheld a more deplorable ſpectacle; nor was it eaſy to ſay which formed the more wretched appearance, thoſe who periſhed, or thoſe who eſcaped. Mean while the Governor firm in [70] his courage and fidelity, did every thing for the defence of the walls and ruins of the place; but the walls built in the old manner did not promiſe a ſucceſsful defence; the enemy had poſted themſelves in the ſuburbs, and in the firing of the town, the principal magazine of the beſieged was blown up.

The protector and avenger of his dominions, was now however at hand. On the 23th, the King of Pruſſia's whole army paſſed the Oder at Gluſtebiſſel, about twenty Engliſh miles to the north-eaſt of Cuſtrin. The Ruſſians on the firſt notice of his approach, broke up the ſiege of that place, and marched towards the villages of Zwicker and Zorn⯑dorff. It was the King's intention to wind round the left flank of their army, and to take them in the rear, by which he hoped to throw them into confuſion. But in this he found himſelf diſappointed. The Ruſſian Generals had foreſeen his purpoſe and made excellent diſpoſitions. As the ground did not admit them to extend greatly in length, they threw themſelves into a ſquare body compoſed of four lines, forming a front almoſt equal on every ſide, and on every ſide ſurrounded by cannon and chevaux de frize. In this formidable diſpoſition they waited the attack of the Pruſſians.

It was on the 25th of Auguſt that the King of Pruſſia, after a march of 56 days, from the midſt of Moravia, brought his army in preſence of the Ruſſians. The King had never been perſonally engaged with that enemy before. His troops had never obtained any advantage over them. The whole fortune of the war depended upon the event of this day. The Pruſſians were now in the cloſeſt ſenſe to fight for their country, which was ready to fall under one of the ſevereſt ſcourges with which Providence has chaſtiſed a nation. Nothing was wanting which could inſpire the ſoldiers with revenge. Every where the marks of the enemies cruelty were before their eyes; the country deſo⯑lated on every ſide, and the villages in flames all round the field of battle.

At nine o'clock in the morning the battle began by a fire of cannon and mortars which rained on the right wing of the Ruſſians without the leaſt intermiſſion for near two hours. Nothing could exceed the havock made by this terrible fire, nor the conſtancy with which the Muſcovite foot, raw and unexperienced, ſuſtained a ſlaughter that [71] would have confounded and diſperſed the compleateſt vete⯑rans. They fell in their ranks; new regiments ſtill preſſed forward to fill their places, and to ſupply new ſlaughter. When the firſt line had fired away all their charges, they ruſhed forward on the Pruſſians. That firm body of the Pruſſian infantry which had often ſtood, and often given ſo many terrible ſhocks, by one of thoſe unaccountable move⯑ments of the human mind, that render every thing in war ſo precarious, gave way in the preſence of their Sovereign, and when they had in a manner ſecured the victory, retired in diſorder before the half broken battalions of the Muſco⯑vites. Had the Ruſſian officers known how to profit of this diſorder; had they immediately thrown in their horſe with vigour to compleat it, and entirely break that body; this had probably been the laſt day of the Pruſſian greatneſs. The King was not ſo negligent. For juſt in this anxious moment, whilſt the battle was yet in ſuſpenſe, by a very rapid and maſterly motion, he brought all the cavalry of his right to the centre, with which General Sedlitz at their head, burſting in upon the Ruſſian foot, uncovered by their horſe, and diſordered even by their advantage, they puſhed them back, with a moſt miſerable ſlaughter. The repulſed battalions of Pruſſia had time to recollect, and to form themſelves; and now returning to the onſet with a rage exaſperated by their late diſgrace, they entirely turned the ballance of the fight. The Ruſſians were thrown into the moſt horrid confuſion. The wind blew the duſt and ſmoke full in their faces. They no longer diſtinguiſhed friends or enemies. They fired upon each other. In this diſtraction they plundered their own baggage which ſtood between the lines, and intoxicated themſelves with brandy. Orders were now no more heard nor obeyed. The ranks fell in upon one another; and being crammed together in a narrow ſpace, every ſhot diſcharged by the Pruſſians had its full effect: whilſt the Ruſſians kept up only a ſcattered fire, without direction or effect, and quite over the heads of their enemies. It was now no longer battle, but a horrid and undiſtinguiſhed carnage. Yet ſtill, (which is a wonderful circumſtance) the Ruſſians thus diſtracted and ſlaughtered, kept their ground. The action continued without inter⯑miſſion from nine in the morning until ſeven at night. At laſt the night itſelf, the fatigue of the Pruſſians, and a judi⯑cious attack on their right wing, which drew their attention [72] on that ſide, gave the Ruſſian army ſome reſpite to recover their order, and an opportunity of retiring a little from the ſcene of their diſaſter. On their ſide near 10,000 fell upon the ſpot, they had more than 10,000 wounded, moſt of them mortally: 939 officers, not including the inferior, were killed, wounded, and taken priſoners; of two particular re⯑giments conſiſting before the battle of 4595 effective men, only 1475 were left; their whole loſs on this bloody day way 21,529 men. That of the Pruſſians in every way did not amount to 2000.

The Gazettes of both parties warmly diſputed the vain honour of the field of battle. On the moſt diligent en⯑quiry, it appears that both parties ſpent the night on or very near the place of action. But this is an affair of little con⯑ſequence. The Pruſſians had all the fruits, and moſt of the proofs of a victory the moſt complete and deciſive. A vaſt train of artillery taken, the military cheſt, a number of priſoners, many of them officers of high rank; the retreat of the Ruſſian army, the next and the following days; their General Fermor's requeſt for leave to bury the dead; their incapacity to advance or form any new enterpriſe; the King of Pruſſia's unmoleſted operations againſt his other enemies; all theſe form the moſt clear and certain demonſtration of a victory in all the points, for which a victory is deſirable.

Nothing leſs indeed, than a very complete victory could have done any eſſential ſervice to the King's affair at that time, when four armies of his enemies were making their way to one common centre, and threatened to unite in the heart of Brandenburg. The King renewed the attack on the Ruſſians the next morning. The event of the laſt day had ſhewed them, that there was no way of ſafety but in a retreat, and in effect they retreated before the Pruſſians as far as Landſperg on the frontiers of Poland. The King of Pruſſia was convinced that their late check muſt wholly diſ⯑able them from attempting any thing material againſt his dominions on that ſide; and he ſaw clearly that whatever he might hope to gain by improving his advantage againſt the Ruſſians, he muſt loſe far, more by allowing his other enemies to make a progreſs on the ſide of Saxony. He ſatisfied himſelf therefore with leaving a ſmall body of troops under Count Dohna, to obſerve the motions of the Muſcovite army; and marched with the greateſt part of his [73] forces and the utmoſt expedition to the relief of Prince Henry.

M. Daun having laid aſide his firſt project for paſſing the Elbe at Meiſſen, enterpriſed nothing new on the ſide of Saxony for ſome days; he contented himſelf with taking a poſition at Stolpen to the Eaſtward of the Elbe, by which, whilſt he preſerved to himſelf an eaſy communication with the army of the Empire, he interrupted the communication between Bautzen and Dreſden; he favoured the operations of General Laudohn, who had advanced through the Lower Luſatia to the confines of Brandenburgh; and by drawing the attention of the Pruſſian forces which were left in Si⯑leſia to the northward of that dutchy, he facilitated the progreſs of the Generals Harach and de Ville in the ſouthern parts. Admirable diſpoſitions without queſtion, if the time had not called for more vigorous meaſures, and if the reſcue of Saxony from the King of Pruſſia had not been the great object of the campaign! It is not impoſſible that the court of Vienna had ſtill ſuch an hankering after Sileſia, as in⯑duced them to ſlaken their efforts on the ſide of Saxony, in hopes, that if M. Daun could protract the operations there, ſo as to find full employment for the King of Pruſſia, their other forces might reduce Sileſia with great facility; and thus perhaps by aiming at two ſuch difficult objects at once, as it generally happens, they loſt them both. Upon any other ſuppoſition, it is not very eaſy to account for the ſeeming inactivity of M. Daun, whilſt he had ſo fair a game in his hands. However advantageouſly Prince Henry might have choſen his poſt, or however ſtrongly he might have ſecured it, yet the prodigious ſuperiority of the com⯑bined armies ſeems to have more than over-balanced that advantage, and to have juſtified, nay to have demanded ſome bold and deciſive attempt.

In fact, this appeared at length to be the Marſhal's own opinion. For when the ſtrong Fortreſs of Sonneſtein moſt unaccountably ſurrendered, with a garriſon of 1400 men, to the Auſtrian General Mac-Guire after the reſiſ⯑tance of no more than a ſingle day; M. Daun pro⯑poſed that the Prince of Deux-Ponts ſhould attack Prince Henry, whilſt the grand army of the Auſtrians laying bridges between two fires, at a ſmall diſtance from each other, ſhould paſs the Elbe, and falling at the ſame time on the Pruſſians, ſecond the attack of the Im⯑perialiſts, and cut off the retreat of their enemies [72] [...] [73] [...] [74] towards Dreſden. This was to bring matters to a ſpeedy deciſion. But now the King of Pruſſia by the moſt rapid marches had reached the frontiers of Saxony. The whole deſign was diſconcerted; and far from being able to diſlodge Prince Henry, they found themſelves utterly unable to pre⯑vent the King his brother from joining him, with his whole army. On his approach General Laudohn abandoned his advantages in the Lower Luſatia, and fell back upon M. Daun; who himſelf retired from the neighbourhood of Dreſden and fell back as far as Zittau. The army of the Empire poſſeſſed of the ſtrong poſt of Pirna, which the Saxons had occupied in the begin⯑ning of the war, kept their ground; but did not undertake any thing. Thus in fifteen days the king of Pruſſia, by his unparallelled ſpirit, diligence and magnanimity, fought and defeated a ſuperior body of his enemies, in one extre⯑mity of his dominions, and baffled without fighting another ſuperior body in the other extremity.

Theſe advantages, glorious as they were, were not the only ones which followed the victory at Zorndorf. The Swedes who directed their motions by thoſe of their Ruſſian allies, haſtened their operations when that army had ad⯑vanced into Brandenburgh. General Wedel was detached from Saxony, to ſtop their progreſs; and the Prince of Be⯑vern, now Governor of Stettin, gave them ſome oppoſition. All this, however, had proved ineffectual, if the news of the defeat of the Ruſſians had not alarmed the Swedes in ſuch a manner, as to make them return with more expedi⯑tion than they had advanced. Tho' the King of Pruſſia's affairs began to put on a better appearance by theſe efforts, the fortune of the war ſtill hung in a very dubious ſcale. The enemy was ſtill ſuperior. The Swedes and Ruſſians had ſtill ſome footing in his dominions. The Auſtrians and Imperialiſts were yet in Saxony; and if the King's armies had it in their power to take ſtrong ſituations; the enemy had the ſame advantages. The condition of things was ex⯑tremely critical, and the leaſt error or misfortune threat⯑ened ſtill to plunge the King of Pruſſia into an abyſs of calamities.

CHAP. XII.

THE operations of the armies in Weſtphalia, ſeemed for a long time to languiſh. The grand army of the French under M. de Contades, was wholly unable to drive Prince Ferdinand from the poſts which he had choſen ſo ju⯑diciouſly along the Lippe. The other diviſion of the French forces under the Prince de Soubiſe, had made no great pro⯑greſs on the ſide of Heſſe-Caſtle, againſt the Prince Iſenburg, who ſtill kept his ground in that principality, in order to protect the courſe of the Weſer, and to cover the electo⯑rate. The French were ſenſible that an attack on the prin⯑cipal army of the allies, would prove a very dangerous at⯑tempt, in which even if they ſhould have ſome ſucceſs, their progreſs into the King's electoral dominions muſt be very ſlow and difficult. But as the Body of the allies em⯑ployed in Heſſe-Caſtle was far the weakeſt, and as an ad⯑vantage on that ſide promiſed them the command of the Weſer, and a better paſſage into the heart of the enemies country, they determined to make an attempt there. To further this deſign, a conſiderable detachment was made from the army of M. de Contades, which increaſed the Prince of Soubiſe's corps to at leaſt 30,000 men. Prince Ferdinand, who was ſufficiently aware of the enemies plan, had ſome time before ſent General Oberg with a ſtrong reinforcement to join the Prince Iſenburg; but notwith⯑ſtanding this reinforcement, the whole force of the allies in Heſſe did not exceed 15000. This body was attacked by the French at Lanwerenhagen, and their great ſuperiority, eſpecially in point of cavalry, obliged the allies to retire with the loſs of about 1500 men. The allies unable to keep the field, had however ſome woods in their rear which covered their retreat, and they preſerved ſo good a countenance as prevented their defeat from becoming total.

[76]Great conſequences might have been apprehended from this affair. But the vigilance of Prince Ferdinand, who had eſtabliſhed the moſt ready communications all along the Lippe, ſuffered the victorious army to reap but little ad⯑vantage from their victory. That accompliſhed General ad⯑vanced with the [...]moſt expedition towards Rheda, and the P. Iſenburgh having fallen back upon him, they joined in ſuch a manner as perfectly to ſecure the Weſer, without loſing any thing on the ſide of the Rhine. And although theſe neceſſary motions, in ſome ſort uncovered the electorate, ſo as to lay it open to the incurſions of the enemies light troops, who penetrated even to the gates of Hanover; yet the French were not in a condition to eſtabliſh any conſi⯑derable body, or to take any poſt of moment in that part.

During this time, the armies of the King of Pruſſia and M. Daun, made no very remarkable movements. The Marſhal kept his advantageous camp at Stolpen, by which he preſerved a communication with the army of the Em⯑pire. The army was ſecured by its inacceſſible ſituation, but it enterpriſed nothing of conſequence. The King of Pruſſia on the other hand, having taken poſſeſſion of the important poſt of Bautzen, which lies ſo opportunely for commanding at once both Miſnia and Luſatia, extended his right wing to Hochkirchen. By this poſition he preſerved a communication with the army of his brother prince Henry, he protected Brandenburg from the incurſions of the Auſ⯑trians, and at the ſame time that he ſecured theſe intereſt⯑ing objects, he was better ſituated for throwing ſuccours into Sileſia, than he could be any where elſe conſiſtently with his general plan. The two armies kept the moſt watchful eye upon each others motions. The principal aim of the King of Pruſſia, ſeemed to have been the preventing M. Daun from communicating with Bohemia. The great intention of M. Daun was to cut off the King from Sileſia. Things were ſo ballanced, that it did not ſeem poſſible by mere ſkill in marches and poſitions to anſwer theſe ends very fully: therefore a battle ſeemed inevitable. But it ſeemed too that conſidering the ſituation of both armies, a battle could not be attempted without extreme danger to the party who ſhould begin the attack.

M. Daun ſaw that if any more time was loſt without action, the very ſeaſon muſt oblige him to evacuate Saxony, and thus give up all the fruits of the campaign. He came [77] to a reſolution of giving the King of Pruſſia Battle. But even in the vigour of this reſolution, appeared the extreme caution which characteriſes that able General. Having communicated his deſign to the prince of Deux-Ponts, and ſettled meaſures with him, he marched in the dead of a very dark night, in three columns, towards the right of the King of Pruſſia's camp. Notwithſtanding the darkneſs of the night, notwithſtanding the neceſſary diviſion of the Auſtrian army, the greatneſs of their num⯑bers, and the length of way they had to march, yet ſuch was the wiſe conduct and great good fortune of this deſign, that they all arrived at the ſame time at the Pruſſian camp, none having loſt their way, without diſco⯑very, without confuſion, and began the attack with the utmoſt regularity and reſolution at five o'clock in the morn⯑ing.

How the King's out-guards were kept ſo as to make ſuch a ſurpriſe practicable, is hard to ſay. It is hard to accuſe the vigilance of ſo able a commander, or the attention of ſo many finiſhed officers as ſerved under him. To ſpeak of treachery is a way of accounting for misfortunes, more common than reaſonable. However it was, the Pruſſians had not time to ſtrike their tents, when they found the enemy in the midſt of the camp, and an impetuous attack already begun. Scarce had the battle begun, when a de⯑feat ſeemed certain; not ſo much from the confuſion of the troops, as the irreparable loſs of two officers in the higheſt command, and of the greateſt merit. M. Keith received two muſquet balls, and fell dead upon the ſpot. Prince Francis of Brunſwick had his head ſhot off by a cannon ball as he mounted his horſe. The King of Pruſſia had then the whole of affairs to ſuſtain alone, at the time when he moſt wanted aſſiſtance. But his preſence of mind, his firmneſs, his activity, remedied in ſome meaſure the ef⯑fects of this unforſeen attack, and the loſſes and diſorders it had occaſioned; he was every where preſent, and inſpi⯑red his troops with an a [...]dor like his own. The King or⯑dered ſome detachments from his left, to reinforce his right wing; but in the moment the orders were received, the left itſelf was furiouſly attacked. General Retzow who commanded in that quarter, with difficulty repulſed the Auſtrians, and was not able to afford any conſiderable aſſiſ⯑tance [78] to the right, which was alone obliged to ſupport the whole weight of the grand attack.

The Auſtrians in the beginning of the engagement had beaten them out of the village of Hochkirchen; as the fate of the day depended upon that poſt, the hotteſt of the diſ⯑pute was there. The Pruſſians made three bloody and un⯑ſucceſsful attacks on the village; on the fourth they carried it; but the Auſtrians pouring continually freſh troops upon that ſpot, drove them out at length after reiterated efforts, and a prodigious ſlaughter on all ſides. Then the King deſpairing of the fortune of that field, ordered a retreat: his troops, which had been ſuddenly attacked in a dark night by ſuperior numbers, and had run to arms ſome half naked, and all in the utmoſt confuſion, had, notwithſtand⯑ing, made a moſt vigorous reſiſtance; and maintained the fight for near five hours. They made their retreat in good order without being purſued, ſupported by the good coun⯑tenance of their cavalry, and the fire of the numerous and well ſerved artillery, which was placed in the centre of their camp. They loſt in this bloody action at leaſt 7000 men, killed, wounded and priſoners, together with many cannon. The Auſtrian account allowed their own loſs in killed and wounded to amount to near 5000.

The King of Pruſſia, in retiring from Hochkirchen, in fact only altered the poſition of his right wing, which fell back as far as Weiſſenberg. His left ſtill remained at Baut⯑zen. This poſition was nearly as good as the former. The great loſs was the loſs of reputation, which always attends a defeat, and the loſs of two great generals which attended this in particular. M. Keith was a Scochman born. He engaged with his brother the Lord Marſhal in the Rebellion of 1715. Being obliged to relinquiſh his country on this occaſion, he entered into the troops of Spain, and after⯑wards paſſing into Ruſſia, he obtained a conſiderable com⯑mand, and performed many ſignal ſervices in their wars with Turkey and Sweden; and ſerved them alſo in peace by ſeveral embaſſies. But finding the honours of that country no better than a ſplendid ſervitude, and not meeting with thoſe rewards, which his long and faithful ſervices deſerved, he left that court for one where merit is better known and better rewarded: and having been employed ſince the be⯑ginning of the war in a diſtinguiſhed command in the King [79] of Pruſſia's armies, he fell at laſt in a ſervice that was wor⯑thy of him.

If the King of Pruſſia loſt ſome reputation in ſuffering himſelf to be ſurpriſed in this affair; he fully retrieved it by his extraordinary conduct in the courſe of the action, and his admirable efforts after it. On the whole, perhaps, when all circumſtances are conſidered, the King of Pruſſia will appear greater in this defeat, than in any victory he ever yet obtained. The wing of his army that was attack⯑ed, was ſurpriſed at a diſtance from him, the two Generals that commanded it ſlain in the firſt onſet, his other princi⯑pal Generals wounded, the whole wing in confuſion with⯑out a leader; to come, in theſe deſperate circumſtances, in haſte from another quarter; to recover all; twice to re⯑pulſe the enemy, and at laſt to retire, overborne only by numbers and fatigue, without being purſued, is ſuch an inſtance of great Generalſhip, as perhaps has never been exceeded.

Whilſt theſe things were doing in Saxony, the Ruſſians made no farther attempts on the Side of Brandenburgh; they remained in their camp near Landſperg, until the 21ſt of September; when after ſeveral feigned motions, made to cover their real deſign, they began their retreat towards Pomerania, where they arrived on the 26th.

It was impoſſible that they ſhould keep their ground in that province during the winter, unleſs they could ſecure ſome ſea-port, from whence they might be ſupplied with proviſions. The little town of Colberg was very opportune for that purpoſe, as it is a ſea-port on the Baltick, and ſo meanly fortified, that the reduction of it appeared to be as eaſy as expedient. On the third of October, they formed the ſiege of this inconſiderable place, with a body of 15000 men. But ſuch was the bravery of Major Heydon the Governor; and ſuch the incapacity of the Ruſſians for ope⯑rations of this nature, that this little town, defended only by a rampart, without any outwork, and lined with a very feeble garriſon, held out againſt the repeated attacks of the enemy twenty-ſix days, and then obliged them to raiſe the ſiege, without any ſuccours whatſoever from without. This was the laſt enterpriſe of the Ruſſians. Their vaſt army retired with diſgrace, firſt from Branden⯑burgh, and then from Pomerania; not being able to maſter one place of ſtrength in either country; but having de⯑ſtroyed [80] with the moſt ſavage barbarity both the open towns and defenceleſs villages; leaving as ſtrong impreſſi⯑ons of contempt for their incapacity, as of horror for their cruelty.

After the defeat which the King received at Hochkirchen, he omitted no meaſures to prevent the enemy from making any material advantage of it. He perceived clearly, that the advantage they propoſed to derive from it, was to cover the operations of their armies in Sileſia; and that they had no longer any ſerious deſign upon Saxony during this campaign. The King therefore, made no ſcruple to rein⯑force his army by conſiderable detachments from that of Prince Henry, which were brought up by that Prince him⯑ſelf. And as he ſaw that Neiſs, the ſiege of which had been already formed and proſecuted with great vigour, muſt certainly ſurrender if it were not ſpeedily ſuccoured, he reſolved to march into Sileſia.

To the execution of this deſign, the greateſt difficulties ſtarted up on all ſides. The army of M. Daun, lately vic⯑torious, had no other buſineſs than to intercept him. To fight was dubious; to avoid it hard. If he could even avoid a battle, he had much to apprehend from the efforts of the enemy to harraſs him on his march. If he ſhould be ſo happy as to eſcape or conquer theſe difficulties, yet his march entirely uncovered Saxony, and abandoned that moſt intereſting poſſeſſion, very poorly defended, to all the force of two powerful armies.

On the other hand, if the conſideration of Saxony ſhould detain him in his preſent ſituation, Sileſia ran the ſame riſque, and the ſame or greater diſadvantages muſt enſue to his af⯑fairs, by ſuffering the Auſtrians to obtain a footing there. This dilemma, which would have rendered a meaner genius entirely inactive▪ and hindered him from taking any reſo⯑lution, only obliged the King of Pruſſia to take his reſo⯑lution with the greater ſpeed, and to execute it with the greater vigour.

On the 24th of November at night, he quitted his camp at Dobreſchutz, and making a great compaſs he arrived, without any obſtruction from the enemy, in the plain of Gorlitz. A body of the Auſtrians had in vain endeavoured to ſecure this poſt before him; thoſe that arrived were de⯑feated, with the loſs of 800 men. By this happy march, all the advantages of M. Daun's ſtudied poſition, of all the [81] fruits his boaſted victory at Hochkirchen, were loſt in a moment, and an open paſſage to Sileſia lay before the King. He purſued his march with the greateſt diligence. General Laudohn, with 24,000 men was ſent to purſue him. That active general continually harraſſed his rear guard; but the King continued his march without interruption, and ſuffer⯑ed him to take many little advantages, rather than by de⯑laying to conteſt ſmall matters, to endanger a deſign, which might be deciſive of the whole campaign.

On the other hand, Daun, not content with the obſta⯑cles which General Laudohn threw in the King's way, ſent a large body of horſe and foot by another route to reinforce the army which under the Generals Harſch and De Ville had formed the ſiege of Neiſs, and the blockade of Coſel. But he perceived that all theſe meaſures would probably prove ineffectual, as his principal project, which was to cover Sileſia, had been defeated. He therefore turned his views towards Saxony, and ſatisfying himſelf with detaching Ge⯑neral Laudohn, which might create an opinion that the whole Auſtrian army purſued, he followed the King no further than Gorlitz; which place he immediately quitted, and having by forced marches gained the Elbe, he paſſed that river at Pirna, and advanced towards Dreſden. At the ſame time the army of the Em⯑pire, by its motions having obliged the Pruſſian army then extremely weakened by the detachments that had been drawn from it, to retire from its poſt before Dreſden, ſome miles to the weſtward of that city, cut off their communi⯑cation with Leipſic, whilſt M. Daun attempted to cut off their communication with Dreſden; but they found means to throw themſelves into that city, and afterwards to retire to the other ſide of the Elbe. The Auſtrians and Imperial⯑iſts began at once to inveſt thoſe two important places; another party advanced towards Torgau, an attempted that town. It ſeemed utterly impoſſible to prevent the Auſtrians from becoming maſters of Saxony, who in a man⯑ner covered the whole country with their forces.

In the mean time, the King of Pruſſia drew nearer and nearer to Neiſs. The ſiege of that fortreſs was commenced on the 4th of Auguſt; on the 3d of October it was com⯑pletely inveſted; and the place was puſhed on one ſide with the greateſt vigour, and on the other maintained with the moſt conſummate ſkill and bravery, until the approach of [80] [...] [81] [...] [82] the King of Pruſſia obliged the Auſtrians, on the 1ſt. of November, to raiſe the ſiege, leaving a conſiderable quantity of military ſtores behind them. The ſame terror obliged the parties employed in the blockade of Coſel, to leave that place at liberty, and to fall back, together with the armies of the Generals Harſch and De Ville, into Bohemia, and the Auſtrian Sileſia.

The King of Pruſſia, when he had thus by the report of his march, without fighting, driven his enemies out of Sileſia, loſt not a moment to return by the ſame route, and with the ſame expedition to the relief of Saxony. Two bodies of his troops had moved for the ſame purpoſe out of Pomerania, one under Count Doh⯑na, and one under General Wedel. The corps under We⯑del had thrown itſelf into T [...]rgau, repulſed the Auſtrians, who had attempted that place, and purſued them as far as Eulenbu [...]g. The grand operation of the Auſtrians was againſt Dreſden. M. Daun, with an army of 60,000 men, came before that city, on the very Day on which the King of Pruſſia began his march to oppoſe him, ſo that he might well imagine his ſucceſs certain againſt a place meanly for⯑tified, and defended only by 12,000 men. The ſame day he began to cannonade it, and his light troops, ſupported by the grenadiers of the army, made a ſharp attack upon the ſuburbs. The Governor, Count Schmettau, ſaw that from the weakneſs of the ſuburbs it would prove impoſſible for him to prevent the enemy from poſſeſſing themſelves of them by a coup de main, and if they ſucceeded in this at⯑tempt, the great height of the Houſes, being ſix or ſeven ſtories, and entirely commanding the ramparts, would ren⯑der the reduction of the body of the place equally eaſy and certain. Theſe conſiderations determined him to ſet theſe ſuburbs on fire.

It is well known that the ſuburbs of Dreſden compoſe one of the fineſt towns in Europe, and are greatly ſuperior to that which lies within the walls. Here the moſt wealthy parts of the Inhabitants reſide, and here are carried on thoſe ſeveral curious manufactures for which Dreſden is ſo fa⯑mous. Count Daun foreſaw this conſequence of his at⯑tempt. He endeavoured to intimidate the Governor from this meaſure, to which he knew the cruel reaſon of war would naturally lead him, by threatening to make him per⯑ſonally anſwerable for the ſteps he ſhould take; but Count [83] Schmettau anſwered with the firmneſs that became a man of honour and a ſoldier, that he would anſwer whatever he ſhould do, and would not only burn the ſuburbs, in caſe M. Daun advanced, but would likewiſe defend the city it⯑ſelf ſtreet by ſtreet, and at laſt even the caſtle, which was the royal reſidence, if he ſhould be driven to it. When the magiſtrates were appriſed of this reſolution, they fell at the feet of Count Schmettau, and implored him to change his mind, and to have mercy on that devoted part of their city. The part of the royal family, who remained in Dreſ⯑den, joined their ſupplications to thoſe of the magiſtrates; they prayed him to ſpare that laſt refuge of diſtreſſed royal⯑ty, and to allow at leaſt a ſecure reſidence to thoſe, who had been deprived of every thing elſe. All entreaties were vain. Schmettau continued firm in his reſolution. He told them that their ſafety d [...]ded on themſelves, and on M. Daun; that if he made no attempts, the ſuburbs ſhould be ſtill ſecure; but that if he took any farther ſteps, the neceſſity of his maſter's ſervice, and his own honour, would compel him to act very diſagreeable to the lenity of his diſ⯑poſition. The magiſtrates retired in deſpair. Combuſtibles were laid in all the houſes.

At three a clock next morning, the ſignal for firing the ſuburbs was given, and in a moment a place ſo lately the ſeat of eaſe and luxury, flouriſhing in traffick, in pleaſures and ingenious arts, was all in flames. A calamity ſo dreadful needs no high colouring. However, as little miſchief attended ſuch a combuſtion, as the Nature of the thing could admit. Very few loſt their lives; but many their whole ſubſtance. When this was done, the Pruſſian troops abandoned the flaming ſuburbs, and retired in good order into the city.

M. Daun ſaw this fire, which, whilſt it laid waſte the capital of his ally, made it more difficult for him to force it, he ſent in ſome empty threats to the Governor. But the Saxon miniſter at Ratiſbon, made grievous complaints to the Diet, of what he repreſented as the moſt unparalleled act of wanton and unprovoked cruelty, that had ever been committed. The emiſſaries of the court of Vienna ſpread the ſame complaints; and they made no ſcruple to invent, and to alter facts in ſuch a manner as to move the greateſt pity towards the ſufferers, and the greateſt indignation againſt the King of Pruſſia. All theſe, however, were in [84] a ſhort time abundantly confuted, by the authentick certi⯑ficates of the magiſtrates of Dreſden, and of thoſe officers of the court, who were perfectly acquainted with the tranſ⯑action. By theſe certificates it appears, that only 250 houſes were conſumed. Though this was a terrible cala⯑mity; it was nothing to the accounts given in the gazettes of the Auſtrian faction. By theſe certificates it appears alſo, that the people were not ſurpriſed, but had ſufficient notice of the Governor's intentions, to enable them to provide for their ſafety. In a word, all the charges of cruelty againſt the Pruſſian commander, and ſoldiery were fully overthrown.

This fire made a coup de main impracticable; regular operations demanded time, and the King of Pruſſia was now in full march towards Saxony. M. Daun retired from before the place on the 17th. The King, after croſſing Luſatia, paſſing the Elbe, and joyning his troops under Count Dohna and General Wedel, arrived triumphantly at Dreſden on the 20th. The armies of M. Daun and the Empire gave way towards Bohemia, into which kingdom they ſoon after finally retreated, without enterpriſing any thing further. Six ſieges were raiſed almoſt at the ſame time; that of Colberg, carried on by General Palmbach, under the orders of Marſhal Fermor; that of Neiſs by M. de Harſch; that of Coſel; that of Dreſden by M. Daun; the blockade of Torgau by M. Haddick; and that of Leipſick by the Prince of Deux-Ponts.

About the time that the Auſtrians retired into winter quarters, the French did the ſame; and the Hanoverians permitted them to do it without moleſtation, the ſeaſon be⯑ing too far advanced, and their army perhaps not of ſuffi⯑cient ſtrength for offenſive operations; and Prince Ferdi⯑nand kept the field no longer. The Britiſh troops had no occaſion of ſignalizing their bravery this year; but without a battle the nation ſuffered a conſiderable loſs, and was touched with a very deep and general ſorrow. The Duke of Marlborough died in Munſter, the 20th of October, of a fever, contracted by the fatigues of the Campaign. Never did the nation loſe in one man, a temper more candid and benevolent, manners more amiable and open, a more pri⯑mitive integrity, a more exalted generoſity, a more warm and feeling heart. He left all the enjoyments, which an ample fortune and an high rank could beſtow in the publick [85] eye; and which every milder virtue, every diſpoſition to make and to be made happy, could give in a domeſtic life: he left theſe for the ſervice of his country, and died for its defence, as he had lived for its ornament and hap⯑pineſs.

If we compare the events of this year with thoſe of the laſt, we ſhall find in the actions of the preſent year, perhaps ſomething leſs of that aſtoniſhing eclat; fewer battles; not ſo many nor ſo ſtriking revolutions of fortune; but we may diſcover upon all ſides far greater management, and a more ſtudied and refined conduct; more artful movements, a more judicious choice of poſts, more quick and vigorous marches. If in the laſt year, the King of Pruſſia was the hero of the imagination, he is this year the hero of the judgment; and we have, I think, reaſon to admire him upon juſter princi⯑ples. Obliged to evacuate Moravia, he throws himſelf into Bohemia, and executes a retreat with all the ſpirit of an invaſion. He marches more than an hundred miles through an enemy's country, followed and harraſſed by large armies, who are unable to obtain any advantage over him. Gain⯑ing at length his own territories, he engages the vaſt army of the Ruſſians and defeats it. He is unable to follow his blow, but he diſables them from ſtriking any againſt that part of his dominions, which he is obliged to leave. Whilſt he is engaged with the Ruſſians on the frontiers of Poland, the Auſtrians and Imperialiſts enter Saxony. Before they can do any thing deciſive, the King is himſelf ſuddenly in Saxony, and by his preſence, at once diſconcerts all their projects. The ſcene is again changed, they ſurpriſe him in his camp at Hochkirchen, two of his Generals are killed, his army defeated, his camp is taken. They attack Sileſia with a formidable army. Notwithſtanding his late defeat; notwithſtanding the great ſuperiority of his enemies; not⯑withſtanding the advantage of their poſts; he makes an amazing ſweep about all their forces, eludes their vigilance, renders their poſitions unprofitable; and marching with an aſtoniſhing rapidity into the remoteſt parts of Sileſia, obliges the Auſtrian armies to retire with precipitation out of that province. Then he flies to the relief of Saxony, which his enemies had again profited of his abſence to in⯑vade; and again by the ſame rapid and well conducted march, he obliges them to abandon their prize. Defeated by the Auſtrians he acquired by his conduct all the advan⯑tages [86] to the moſt compleat victory. He guarded all his poſ⯑ſeſſions in ſuch a manner, as to enable them all the endure his abſence for ſome ſhort time; and he conducted his marches with ſuch ſpirit, as did not make it neceſſary to them to hold out any longer; he made twice the circuit of his dominions, and in their turn he relieved them all.

Nor was the conduct of Prince Ferdinand of Brunſwick leſs worthy of admiration. Placed at the Head of a body of troops, who were but lately obliged to lay down their arms, he found the enemy in poſſeſſion of the whole open country, and of all the ſtrong places in it. Commencing the campaign in the midſt of a ſevere winter, without any place of ſtrength in his hands, he drove the enemy from all thoſe they held. He obliged them to repaſs the Rhine, he followed and defeated them in a pitched battle. Being af⯑terwards obliged by the great force of France on its own frontier, and the numerous armies they had in different pla⯑ces, to repaſs the Rhine; he defended Lippe againſt num⯑bers greatly ſuperior, and though they defeated a part of his army, they were not able to turn their victory to the leaſt advantage. Prince Ferdinand's campaign may well paſs for a perfect model of defenſive operations.

The Auſtrians, in taking winter quarters, diſpoſed their forces ſo as to form a chain of an amazing length, from the frontiers of Moravia paſſing through Bohemia, all along the ſkirts of Sileſia and the borders of Saxony. There the Imperial army joined this chain, and continued it through Thuringia and Franconia, where it was united to the quar⯑ters of the Prince de Soubiſe. Th [...]ſe troops had fallen back from Heſſe Caſſel, finding themſelves unable to maintain their ground in the landgraviate. The Prince de Soubiſe's cantonments extended weſtward along the courſe of the Maine and Lahn, to meet thoſe of the M. de Contades which ſtretched to the Rhine, and continued the chain be⯑yond it quite to the Maeſe, ſo as to command the whole courſe of the Rhine, and both ſides both upwards and down⯑ward. Prince Ferdinand was unable to extend himſelf to ſuch a length; and eſpecially found it impracticable to eſta⯑bliſh quarters on the other ſide of the Rhine; but he diſ⯑poſed his troops in the moſt advantageous manner in the biſhoprics of Munſter, Paderborn, and Hildeſheim, and in the landgraviate of Heſſe Caſſel. The ſeveral bodies may all unite with eaſe, and ſupport each other. To pre⯑ſerve [87] a communication between this and the Pruſſian army, as well as to break ſome part of that formidable chain of the enemy, the King ſent ſome bodies of his troops into Thu⯑ringia, who diſpoſſeſſed the army of the Empire of ſeveral of their poſts there, and they now threaten to penetrate ſtill farther.

The King of Pruſſia, when he had a ſecond time driven the Auſtrians and Imperialiſts out of Saxony, reſolved to keep no meaſures with that unhappy country. He declared that he was reſolved no longer to conſider it as a depoſit, but as a country which he had twice ſubdued by his arms. He therefore ordered thoſe of the King of Poland's privy council, who ſtill remained at Dreſden, to retire at a very ſhort warning. But if the King of Pruſſia had a right, as perhaps he had to conſider Saxony as a lawful conqueſt, he certainly ſeemed not to conſider the people as ſubjects, when he continued to exact the moſt ſevere contributions; and in a manner too, very little becoming a lawful ſovereign; for he ſurrounded the exchange with ſoldiers, and confi⯑ning the merchants in narrow lodgings on ſtraw beds, he obliged them by extreme ſuffering, to draw bills on their foreign correſpondents for very large ſums. This city had been quite exhauſted by former payments, and had not long before ſuffered military execution. And enemy that acted thus, had acted ſeverely; but when a country is en⯑tirely poſſeſſed by any power, and claimed as a conqueſt, the rights of war ſeem to ceaſe; and the people have a claim to be governed in ſuch a manner as becomes a juſt Prince; eſpecially when no extreme neceſſity in his affairs compels him to theſe rigorous courſes. To retaliate on theſe miſe⯑rable people ſome part of the cruelties committed by the Ruſſians on his dominions ſeems to be very unreaſonable, as it is but too obvious, that the barbarity of that people could not be reſtrained, however it might be exaſperated by the total deſtruction of Saxony. Such retaliations are odious and cruel. We heartily wiſh we could praiſe the King of Pruſſia as much for his temporate uſe of his con⯑queſt, as for thoſe wonderful and heroic qualities by which he obtained it. We might be conſidered as partial in our account, if we had omitted to take notice of what is alledg⯑ed againſt the King of Pruſſia, when we have ſpoken ſo fully of the outrages committed by his enemies. It is now time to turn our eyes from this great theatre towards leſſer [88] events, but ſuch as will employ us altogether as agreeably; the operations of the Britiſh [...]leets and armies in Europe and America againſt the French.

CHAP. XIII.

IN the beginning of this year, the good condition of our navy and our army; the ſpirit and popularity of the miniſtry; the wiſe choice of commanders, in contempt of vulgar and trivial maxims; the prevalence of the contrary to all theſe amongſt the enemy; gave us the beſt grounded hopes of a vigorous and ſucceſsful campaign. Concerning the theatre of our operations there was ſome doubt. It was the opinion of ſome, that our puſh in Europe ſhould be made on the ſide of Germany; and that we ought to ſtrengthen the army of Prince Ferdinand with ſuch a re⯑ſpectable body of troops, as might enable that finiſhed com⯑mander to exert all his talents, and to improve to the utmoſt the advantages he had already obtained over the French. They imagined, that if an early and conſiderable reinforce⯑ment were ſent to the Prince, whilſt the French army was yet in a diſtreſſed condition, and if in this condition that ſhould receive any conſiderable blow, they would find it extremely difficult to retrieve it: and receiving this blow, on the frontier of their own territories, the Prince might carry the war into France itſelf; and thus very probably bring matters to a ſpeedy deciſion. That in purſuing this plan a diverſion on the coaſt of France was by no means excluded: and that on the contrary it muſt, on this plan, be attended with conſequences infinitely more important than it could otherwiſe; that otherwiſe, France might laugh at the little deſultory efforts of an handful of men, who were to be embarked and diſ-embarked with great dif⯑ficulty and hazard, and which would always be obliged to fly at the firſt approach of an enemy. That whilſt the French had only an army, greatly inferior in number to en⯑gage on the ſide of Germany, they would always find them⯑ſelves [89] well able to act abroad, and defend themſelves at home.

On the other hand it was ſtrongly urged, that we ought to make the deſtruction of the French marine our great object, and to conſider all continental operations only in a ſecondary light. That by ſending a large body of Engliſh troops to the King's army on the Rhine, we muſt neceſſa⯑rily weaken our efforts in America, and on the coaſt of France; and by drawing away all our forces, we muſt ſhake that internal ſecurity, which invigorated all our operations abroad. That whilſt we maintained an army of 50,000 foreigners in Germany, it would be the greateſt imprudence to ſend alſo a large body of our own national troops into the ſame country, and by that means not only ſquander away our men, but employ almoſt every penny granted for the Land ſervice, out of Great Britain; a method which could not fail of exhauſting us in a very ſhort time. That the force already in Germany was ſufficient to keep the French engaged, and that the propoſed expeditions to France would, be attacking the coaſt, now in one part, now in another, and keeping all parts in continual alarms, neceſ⯑ſarily detain a very conſiderable part of their forces at home, and thus make a powerful diverſion, whilſt it was purſuing what ought to be the grand perpetual object of all our operations, the deſtruction of the French maritime power.

The latter opinion prevailed; but it was however ſo far modified by the arguments on the other ſide, that after ſome time a few regiments were ſent into Germany, as we have before related. Theſe and better reaſons, no doubt, determined the operations on the coaſt of France; but whilſt the neceſſary preparations were making, their deſti⯑nation was kept an inviolable ſecret; and now, as they had the year before, inſpired France with no little terror. Two ſquadrons, by the latter end of May, were in readineſs for ſailing. The greater under Lord Anſon, the ſmaller under Commodore Howe, which was ſo deſigned to convoy the tranſports, and to favour the landing and re-imbarkment. The land forces conſiſted of ſixteen battalions, and nine troops of light horſe: they were commanded by the late Duke of Marlborough. They ſailed from Portſmouth: but as ſoon as the fleet ſet ſail, the ſquadron of my Lord Anſon ſeparated from the reſt, and bore off to the Bay of Biſcay, in order to ſpread the alarm more [90] widely, and to obſerve the French ſquadron in Breſt. The other part of the fleet, which was commanded by Commo⯑dore Howe, with the tranſports, arrived without any acci⯑dent in Cancalle Bay, at a ſmall diſtance from the City of St. Maloes. Here the troops landed without op⯑poſition, and having fortified a poſt near Cancalle (a poſt by nature well fitted for defence) for the ſecurity of their retreat, they marched in two columns to St. Maloes. When the army arrived there it was ſoon vi⯑ſible, that the town, ſtrongly ſituated on a peninſula, com⯑municating with the main land only by a long and narrow cauſeway, was by no means a proper object of a coup de main; and though for want of outworks, it was ill qualified to ſuſtain a regular ſiege; yet our forces were, for want of ſtrength and artillery ſufficient, altogether as ill qualified for ſuch an operation. They were therefore contented with ſetting fire to about an hundred ſail of ſhipping many of them privateers, which lay under the cannon of the town, and to ſeveral magazines filled with naval ſtores. The damage was very conſider⯑able; yet, what is to be remarked, the enemy did not fire a ſingle ſhot on the detachment employed in this ſervice. Having nothing more to do on this ſide, they retired to Cancalle; and reimbarked with as little oppoſition as they met with at landing; the land and ſea com⯑manders having made all the diſpoſitions with great judgment.

Before the fleet returned, they reconnoitred the town of Granville on the coaſt of Normandy; but finding that a large body of troops were encamped in the neighbourhood, they made no attempt there. From thence they moved to⯑wards Cherbourg, and made the proper diſpoſitions for landing near that place; but a hard gale blowing into the ſhore, and the tranſports beginning to fall foul on each other, it became extremely hazardous to attempt landing. Beſides, the proviſion was near exhauſted, and the ſoldiers by being ſo long cooped up in the tranſports, were grown ſickly. It became highly neceſſary to return home, and they arrived at St. Helen's on the 29th-of June.

The ſucceſs of this expedition, by which the French ſuf⯑fered largely, with ſcarce any loſs on our ſide, though it ſufficiently anſwered the intention of the armament, fell ſomewhat ſhort of the expectations of the public, who [91] had formed much greater hopes, than it was poſſible for the nature of ſuch enterpriſes to fulfil. However, their hopes were again revived; by ſeeing that every thing was prepared for another expedition, and that our armies and fleets were to be kept in conſtant action during the ſummer. The time was now come when we were to turn the tables upon France, and to retaliate by real attacks, the terrors which had been raiſed by her menaces of an invaſion. The Duke of Marlborough had now taken the command of the Engliſh forces in Germany; and General Bligh ſucceeded him in this command. Prince Edward reſolved to go upon the expedition, and to form himſelf for the ſervice of his country under ſo brave and able a commander as Howe. It is eaſy to imagine, how much the ſpirit, the preſence and example of the gallant young Prince, who went with the utmoſt chearfulneſs through all the detail of a midſhip⯑man's duty, inſpired both the ſeamen and the troops.

On the firſt of Auguſt, the fleet ſet ſail from St. Helen's. In a few days they came to anchor before Cherbourg. The French had drawn a line ſtrengthened by forts, along the moſt propable places for landing. They had drawn down three regiments of regular troops, and a conſiderable body of militia to the ſhore, and had in all appearance threatened a very reſolute oppoſition to the deſcent of the Engliſh forces. But the Commodore diſpoſed the men of war and bomb ketches ſo judiciouſly, and made ſo ſharp a fire upon the enemy, that they never ventured out of their entrenchments; ſo that the landing was effected in excellent order, and with very little loſs. The French who made ſo poor an oppoſition to the landing, had ſtill many advantages from the nature of the ground which they occupied; but they neglected them all; and abandon⯑ing by a moſt ſhameful deſpair their forts and lines on the coaſt, they ſuffered the Engliſh to enter Cherbourg the day after the landing, without throwing the leaſt obſtacle in their way. It muſt be remembered too, that the whole number of the Engliſh forces on this expedition was rather ſhort of 6000 men.

Cherbourg is on the land ſide an open town; neither is it very ſtrongly defended towards the ſea. The harbour is naturally bad. But the place is well ſituated, in the midſt of the channel, for protecting the French, and annoying the Engliſh commerce in time of war and perhaps for fa⯑cilitating [92] an invaſion on England itſelf. Monſieur Belidor the famous engineer, had demonſtrated its importance, and propoſed a plan for the improvement and defence of the harbour, as well as for the fortifications of the town. This plan was approved and partly put in execution by the build⯑ing of a mole, digging a baſon and making ſluices and flood gates with excellent materials and a vaſt expence. The work had been for a conſiderable time diſcontinued; but in this expedition, that work of ſo great ingenuity, charge, and labour, was totally deſtroyed. Whilſt our humanity regrets the unhappy neceſſity of war, we cannot help think⯑ing that the Engliſh nation was freed by the ſucceſs of this expedition, from what might one day be cauſe of no trivial alarms.

When this work of deſtruction was over, all the veſſels in the harbour burned, and hoſtages taken for the contribu⯑tions levied on the town, the forces reimbarked, with great ſpeed and ſafety without any interrup⯑tion from the enemy, and with the ſame expedi⯑tion, care and conduct, as they had been firſt landed; the army having continued ten days unmoleſted in France.

The Nation exulted greatly in this advantage, eſpecially as it almoſt accompanied the news of our glorious ſucceſſes in America. Nothing was omitted to give the action its utmoſt eclat; the braſs cannon and mortars taken at Cher⯑bourg, were drawn from Kenſington to the tower, quite through the city, in great pomp and order, adorn⯑ed with ſtreamers, attended by guards, drums, muſic, and whatever elſe might draw the atten⯑tion of the vulgar. They who cenſured this proceſſion as too oſtentatious, did not conſider, how forcibly things of this nature ſtrike upon ordinary minds, and how greatly they contribute to keep the people in good humour to ſup⯑port the many charges and loſſes that are incident to the moſt ſucceſsful war.

The fleet when it left Cherbourg, was driven to the coaſt of England; but the troops were not diſembarked; it was reſolved, that the coaſt of France ſhould have no reſpite; and accordingly they ſailed towards St. Maloes, and landed in the bay of St. Lunar at a ſmall diſtance from the town of St. Maloes. This choice of a place for land⯑ing, muſt neceſſarily have ſurpriſed all thoſe who remem⯑bered upon what reaſons the attempt againſt that place had [93] been ſo recently laid aſide. There was no other object of ſufficient conſideration near it. The town was at leaſt in as good a poſture of defence as it had been then; and the force which was to attack it had ſince then been conſider⯑ably leſſened. There is undoubtedly ſomething very unac⯑countable as well in the choice as in the whole conduct of this affair. The perſons in the principal commands, ſhifted the blame from one to another. There is nothing more remote from our deſign, than to ſet up for judges in mat⯑ters of this nature; or ungenerouſly to lean on any officer, who, meaning well to the ſervice of his country, by ſome misfortune or miſtake fails in ſuch hazardous and intricate enterpriſes. We ſhall be ſatisfied with relating the facts as they happened.

As ſoon as the troops were landed in the bay of St. Lunar, it became evident that the deſign againſt St. Maloes was utterly impracticable. Other projects were then pro⯑poſed, but they all ſeemed equally liable to objection. Whilſt they debated concerning a plan for their operations, the fleet was in the greateſt danger. The bay of St. Lunar is extremely rocky; and the experience of the people of the country, together with what he ſaw himſelf, convinced the Commodore that it was impoſſible to remain any longer in this road with tolerable ſafety. Therefore he moved up to the bay of St. Cas, about three leagues to the weſtward.

The fleet was ſeparated from the land forces; but it was ſtill eaſy to preſerve a communication between them; and as no attack was yet apprehended, they made no ſcruple to penetrate farther into the country. In two days they arrived at the village of Matignon, having had ſeveral ſkir⯑miſhes with ſmall bodies of the enemy, who from time to time appeared on their flanks, and who always diſappeared when they were briſkly encountered. By this time the Duke d'Aiguillon, Governor of Britanny, was advanced within ſix miles of the Engliſh army, with a body of twelve battalions and ſix ſquadrons of regular troops, and two regiments of militia. This determined the council of war to retreat; they wanted but three miles to the bay of St. Cas. But in this little march a conſiderable time was conſumed, and the French army was cloſe upon them before they could be compleatly reimbarked. A very ſteep hill formed a ſort of amphitheatre about the bay of St. [94] Cas, where the embarkation was making; but before the laſt diviſion, which conſiſted of all the grenadiers of the army, and the firſt regiment of the guards, could get off, the French had marched down this hill, through an hol⯑low way, and formed themſelves in a long line againſt the few Engliſh troops that remained. There remained in this exigency only the expedient of aſſuming a bold countenance, and attacking them with vigour. The bra⯑very of our troops on this deſperate occaſion, was wor⯑thy of a better fortune. The ſhips and frigates ſeconded their efforts, and made a ſevere fire upon the enemy. All was to no purpoſe; their ammunition was at laſt ſpent; the enemies numbers prevailed; our little body attempted to retreat, but they fell into confuſion, they broke, an horrible ſlaughter followed, many ran into the water and met their fate in that element. The ſhore was covered with dead bodies. General Drury was drowned. Sir John Armitage, a young volunteer of great fortune and hopes, was ſhot through the head. Several officers, men of large fortune and conſideration fell. At length the firing of the frigates ceaſed, and the French immediately gave quarter. About 400 were made priſoners, 600 were killed and wounded.

In the midſt of this carnage, in the midſt of a fire that ſtaggered the braveſt ſeamen who managed the boats, Com⯑modore Howe exhibited a noble example of intrepidity and fortitude, by ordering himſelf to be rowed in his own boat through the thickeſt of the fire, to encourage all that were engaged in that ſervice, and to bring off as many men as his veſſel could carry.

This affair diſpirited the people of England, and elated the people of France far more than an affair of ſo little conſequence ought to have done. It was in fact no more than the cutting off a rear guard. There is often more bloodſhed in ſkirmiſhes in Germany, which make no figure in the Gazettes. And certainly, if our expeditions to the coaſt of France were planned with any judgment, on our part we had rather reaſon to congratulate ourſelves that we were able to land three times on that coaſt, with ſo in⯑conſiderable a loſs. The French indeed had reaſon to mag⯑nify this loſs; and they did greatly magnify it in order to conſole their people, who had ſeen their trade ſuffer ſo much, and their country ſo long inſulted with impunity.

[95]Whatever our ſucceſſes were on the coaſt of France, they did not affect us in the ſame manner with thoſe which we had in America. From this part of the world we had long been ſtrangers to any thing, but delays, misfortunes, diſap⯑pointments, and diſgraces. But the ſpirit which had been rouſed at home, diffuſed itſelf into all parts of the world where we had any concern, and invigorated all our opera⯑tions.

Admiral Boſcawen with a powerful fleet of men of war and ſeveral tranſports ſailed for Halifax from England. Feb. the 19th. He had the chief command in the expedition againſt Louiſbourg, and in particular the direction of the naval operations. General Amherſt, from whoſe character great things were expected, and who juſtified theſe expec⯑tations, was to command the land forces. Theſe amounted to about 14000 men, including ſome light troops, fitted for the peculiar ſervice of the country. The whole fleet con⯑ſiſting of 151 ſhips, ſet ſail from the harbour of Halifax. On the ſecond of June they appeared before Louiſbourg. They were ſix days on the coaſt before a landing was found practicable; ſuch a prodigious ſurf ſwelled all along the ſhore, that no boat could poſſibly live near it. The French not truſting to this obſtacle, had drawn intrenchments in every part where it might be poſſible to land, ſupported them with batteries in convenient places, and lined them with numerous infantry. At length the ſurf though violent at beſt, was obſerved to be ſome⯑what abated, and the Admiral and General did not loſe a moment to avail themſelves of this opportunity of landing; they made all their diſpoſitions for it with the higheſt judgment. They ordered the frigates towards the enemies right and left, to rake them on their flanks. Then the troops were diſpoſed for landing in three diviſions. That on the left was commanded by General Wolfe, and was deſtined to the real attack. The diviſions in the cen⯑tre to the right, were only deſigned for feigned attacks, to draw the enemies attention to all parts, and to diſtract their defence.

When the fire of the frigates continued about a quarter of an hour, General Wolfe's diviſion moved towards the land; the enemy reſerved their ſhot until the boats were near in ſhore, and then directed the whole fire of their cannon and muſquetry upon them. The ſurf aided their [] [...] [95] [...] [96] fire. Many of the boats overſet, many were broken to pieces, the men jumped into the water, ſome were killed, ſome drowned; the reſt ſupported and encouraged in all difficulties, by the example, ſpirit, and conduct of their truly gallant commander, gained the ſhore, took poſt, fell upon the enemy with ſuch order and reſolution, that they ſoon obliged them to fly in confuſion. As ſoon as this poſt was made good, and centre moved towards the left, and the right followed the centre, ſo that the landing was com⯑pleated, though not without much time and trouble, in an excellent order, and with little loſs.

The operations of a ſiege are too minute and intereſting to make a detail of them agreeable to readers, who are not converſant in the art military. The operations againſt Louiſbourg for ſeveral days went on very ſlowly, owing en⯑tirely to the prodigious ſurf and the rough weather, which made it extremely difficult to land the artillery, ſtores, and inſtruments to be employed in the ſiege; however, the ex⯑cellent conduct of the Generals Amherſt and Wolfe, by degrees overcame all the difficulties of the weather, which was extremely unfavourable, the ground which was rugged in ſome places and boggy in others, and the reſiſtance of the garriſon which was conſiderable. The French had five men of war of the line in the harbour, who could bring all their guns to bear upon the approaches of the Engliſh troops. The firſt thing done was to ſecure a point called the light⯑houſe battery, from whence they might play upon theſe veſſels, and on the batteries on the other ſide of the harbour. General Wolfe performed this ſervice with his uſual vigour and celerity, and took poſſeſſion of this and all the other poſts in that quarter. His fire from this poſt on the 25th ſilenced the iſland battery, which was that moſt immediately oppoſed to his; but the ſhips ſtill continued to bear upon him until the 21ſt of the follow⯑ing month, when one of them blew up, and communicating the fire to two others, they alſo were in a ſhort time con⯑ſumed to the water edge. This was a loſs not to be repair⯑ed; the approaches drew near the covered way, and things were in a good condition for making a lodgment in it; the enemies fire was conſiderably ſlackened; the town was conſumed to the ground in many places, and the works had ſuffered much in all. Yet the enemy ſtill delaying to ſur⯑render, gave occaſion to add one brave action to the others, [97] which had been diſplayed during the courſe of this ſiege. The Admiral who had all along done every thing poſſible to ſecond the efforts of the land forces, notwithſtanding the ſeverity of the weather, reſolved on a ſtroke, which by be⯑ing deciſive of the poſſeſſion of the harbour, might make the reduction of the town a matter of little difficulty. He reſolved to ſend in a detachment of 600 ſeamen in boats, to take or burn the two ſhips of the line which remained, and if he ſhould ſucceed in this, he propoſed the next day to ſend in ſome of his own great ſhips, who might batter the town on the ſide of the harbour. This was not more wiſely planned by the Admiral, than gallantly and ſucceſsfully ex⯑ecuted by Captain L [...]forey. In ſpite of the fire from the ſhips and the batteries, he made himſelf maſter of both theſe ſhips; one he towed off, the other, as ſhe ran aground, was ſet on fire.

This ſtroke, in ſupport of the ſpirited advances of the land forces, was concluſive. The town ſurren⯑dered the next day. The garriſon were priſoners of war, and amounted with the irregulars and ſeamen to 5637.

The taking of Louiſbourg (a) was an event the moſt [98] deſired by all our colonies; that harbour had always been a receptacle convenient to the enemies privateers, who in⯑feſted the Engliſh trade in North America. It was the moſt [99] effectual blow which France had received from the com⯑mencement of the war. By the taking of Louiſbourg, ſhe loſt the only place from whence ſhe could carry on the cod [98] [...] [99] [...] [100] fiſhery; and the only place ſhe had in a convenient ſituation for the reinforcements that were ſent to ſupport the war in the other parts of America; and with Louiſbourg fell the [101] iſland of St. John's, and whatever other inferior ſtations they had for carrying on the fiſhery towards Gaſpeſie and the bay de Chaleurs, which our ſhips ſoon after this event [102] entirely deſtroyed. It is incredible how much this ſucceſs in America, joined to the ſpirit of our other meaſures, ope⯑rated to raiſe our military reputation in Europe, and to ſink [103] that of France, and conſequently how much it influenced our moſt eſſential intereſts and thoſe of our allies.

The plan of our operations in America were, however, [102] [...] [103] [...] [104] by no means confined ſolely to this object, important as it was. Two other attempts were propoſed: the firſt at⯑tempt was with a great force to drive the French from Ti⯑conderoga [105] and Crown Point; in which, if we could ſuc⯑ceed, the enemy would loſe thoſe poſts from which they were in the beſt condition to moleſt our colonies, and by [104] [...] [105] [...] [106] loſing them, would lay open an eaſy road into the very heart of their ſettlements in Canada. The ſecond attempt was to be made with a conſiderable, though an interior [107] force, from Penſylvania againſt Fort du Queſne: the ſuc⯑ceſs of this attempt would eſtabliſh us in the poſſeſſion of the Ohio, (See the map of America at the latter end) and [108] break off the connexion between Canada and Louiſiana.

Gen. Abercrombie, commander in chief of our forces in America, conducted the firſt of thoſe expeditions. He em⯑barked [109] upon Lake George with near 16,000 troops, regu⯑lars and provincials, and a numerous artillery on the 5th of July; and after a proſperous navigation, arrived the next [110] day at the place where it had been propoſed to make the landing. They landed without oppoſition. The enemies advanced guards fled at their appearance. The Engliſh ar⯑my [111] proceeded in four columns to Ticonderoga. As the country through which their march lay was difficult and woody, and the guides which conducted the march to this unknown country, were extremely unſkilful, the troops were bewildered, the columns broke and fell in upon one another. Whilſt they marched on in this alarming diſor⯑der, the advanced guard of the French, who had lately fled before them, was bewildered in the ſame manner; and in the ſame diſorder fell in with our forces. A ſkirmiſh enſu⯑ed, in which this party was quickly defeated with the loſs of near 300 killed, and 148 priſoners. The loſs on the Engliſh ſide was inconſiderable in numbers; but great in conſequence. Lord Howe was killed. This gallant man, from the moment he landed in America, had wiſely con⯑formed and made his regiment conform to the kind of ſer⯑vice which the country required. He did not ſuffer any under him to encumber themſelves with ſuperfluous bag⯑gage; he himſelf ſet the example, and fared like a common ſoldier. The firſt to encounter danger, to endure hunger, to ſupport fatigue; rigid in his diſcipline, but eaſy in his manners, his officers and ſoldiers readily obeyed the com⯑mander, becauſe they loved the man; and now at the moment when ſuch abilities, and ſuch an example were the moſt wanted, was fatally loſt, a life which was long enough for his honour but not for his country. It adds in⯑deed to the glory of ſuch a death, and to the conſolation of his country, that we ſtill poſſeſs the heir of his titles, his fortunes and his virtues, whilſt we tremble to ſee the ſame virtues expoſing themſelves to the ſame dangers. ^*

[112]Excepting this loſs, the army had hitherto proceeded ſucceſsfully. In a little time they appeared before Ticon⯑deroga. This is a very important poſt, and as ſtrongly ſecured. The fort is ſituated on a tongue of land between Lake George and a narrow gut, which communicates with the Lake Champlain. On three ſides it is ſurrounded with water; and for a good part of the fourth it has a dangerous moraſs in front; where that failed, the French had made a very ſtrong line upwards of eight feet high, defended by cannon, and ſecured by 4 or 5000 men. A great fall of trees with their branches out⯑ward, was ſpread before the entrenchment for about an hundred yards.

The General cauſed the ground to be reconnoitred; and the engineer made ſo favourable a report of the weakneſs of the entrenchment, that it appeared practicable to force it by muſquetry alone. A fatal reſolution was taken, in con⯑ſequence of this report, not to wait the arrival of the artil⯑lery, which on account of the badneſs of the ground, could not be eaſily brought up, but to attack the enemy without loſs of time. They were confirmed in this precipitate re⯑ſolution, by a rumour that a body of 3000 men were on their march to join the French at Ticonderoga, and very ſhortly expected to arrive.

When the attack began, the difficulty of the ground, and [121] the ſtrength of the enemies lines which had been ſo little foreſeen, was but too ſeverely felt. Although the troops behaved with the utmoſt ſpirit and gallantry, they ſuffered ſo terribly in their approaches, and made ſo little impreſſion on the entrenchment, that the General ſeeing their reitera⯑ted and obſtinate efforts fail of ſucceſs, being upwards of four hours expoſed to a moſt terrible fire, thought it neceſ⯑ſary to order a retreat, to ſave the remains of the army. Near 2000 of our men were killed, wounded and taken pri⯑ſoners; the number of the taken being very inconſiderable. This precipitate attack, was followed by a retreat as preci⯑pitate; inſomuch that our army gained their for⯑mer camp to the ſouthward of Lake George, the evening after the action. ^(b)

[122]To repair the misfortune of this bloody defeat, General Abercrombie detached Col. Bradſtreet with about 3000 provincials againſt Fort Frontenac. The Colonel with [123] great prudence and vigour, ſurmounted great difficulties, brought his army to Oſwego, where he embarked on the Lake Ontario, and arrived at Frontenac the 25th of Au⯑guſt. [124] This fort ſtands at the communication of Lake On⯑tario with the river St. Lawrence, the entrance into which river it in ſome manner commands. However, for a poſt of ſuch moment, it was poorly fortified, and poorly garri⯑ſoned. It was taken without the loſs of a man on our ſide, in leſs than two days after it had been attacked. The garriſon, conſiſting of 130 men, were made priſoners; nine armed ſloops were taken and burned: and a large quantity of proviſions amaſſed there for the uſe of their garriſons to the ſouthward, was deſtroy⯑ed. Col. Bradſtreet having performed this important ſer⯑vice, returned. Many were of opinion, that ſo fine a poſt ought to be kept and ſtrongly garriſoned; others thought that it would be impoſſible to preſerve a place at ſuch a diſtance from our own eſtabliſhments.^(c)

It is very poſſible, that the ſucceſs of Col. Bradſtreet greatly facilitated that of the expedition under Gen. Forbes. The General had had a very tedious and troubleſome march, through a country almoſt impaſſable, very little known, and continually haraſſed on his route by the enemies Indi⯑ans. An advanced guard of this army, conſiſting of about 800 men under Major Grant, had moſt unaccountably ad⯑vanced to Fort du Queſne, with a deſign as it ſhould ſeem of reducing the place by a coup de main; but the garriſon ſuddenly ſallying out and attacking them warmly on all ſides, killed and made priſoners many of this party, and diſperſed the reſt. This was, however, their laſt ſucceſs; for the body of the army being conducted with greater ſkill and cir⯑cumſpection, baffled all their attempts; ſo that the French being convinced by ſeveral ſkirmiſhes that all their efforts to ſurprize the troops, or interrupt their communication were to no purpoſe, and being conſcious that their fort was not tenable againſt a regular attack, they wiſely aban⯑doned the place after deſtroying their works; and fell down the Ohio, to the number of 4 or 500 men, towards their more ſouthern ſettlements. Gen. For⯑bes once more erected the Engliſh flag on Fort du Queſne. Without any reſiſtance we became [126] maſters in the third year after the commencement of hoſtilities, of that fortreſs, the contention for which had kindled up the flames of ſo general and deſtructive a war. This place with its maſters has changed its name, and is called Pittſburg, with a propriety which does not need to be pointed out. ^(d)

Notwithſtanding the unhappy affair at Ticonderoga, the campaign of 1758 in America was very advantageous, and very honourable to the Engliſh intereſt. Louiſbourg, St. John's, Frontenac, and du Queſne reduced, remove from [127] our colonies all terror of the Indian incurſions, draw from the French thoſe uſeful allies, free our frontiers from the yoke of their enemies forts, make their ſupplies difficult, their communications precarious, and all their defenſive or offenſive operations uneffective; whilſt their country unco⯑vered of its principal bulwarks, lies open to the heart, and affords the moſt pleaſing proſpects of ſucceſs to the vigorous meaſures which we may be aſſured will be taken in the next campaign. Gen. Amherſt is now commander.

It would be doing great injuſtice to the ſpirit and conduct of the miniſtry, not to obſerve, that they omitted to diſtreſs the enemy in no part, and that their plans of operation were as extenſive as they were vigorous.

Two ſhips of the line with ſome frigates, were ſent early in the ſpring to the coaſt of Africa, to drive the French from their ſettlements there. They entered the river Senegal, and in ſpite of the obſtruc⯑tion of a dangerous bar, which the ſhips of war could not paſs, they obliged the French fort which commands the river to ſurrender. And on the 29th of December following, Commodore Keppel, with the aſſiſtance of ſome troops under the command of Lieut. Col. Worge, made himſelf maſter of the iſland of Goree and its forts; the garriſon ſurrendering at diſcretion to his majeſty's ſquadron ^(e). By theſe ſucceſſes, we have [128] taken from the enemy one of the moſt valuable branches of [129] their commerce, and one of the moſt capable of abundant improvement.

From the Eaſt Indies we have this year heard nothing remarkable. It does not ſeem that the French, notwithſtand⯑ing the great ſtruggle they made to ſend out a ſtrong arma⯑ment under Gen. Lally, have been in a condition to enter⯑priſe any thing. It is ſaid, and probably with good founda⯑tion, that the greateſt part of that force was dwindled away with ſickneſs during the voyage. Our naval force was ex⯑erted with ſpirit and effect in the Mediterranean. The French found that the poſſeſſion of Minorca could not drive us from the dominion of the Mediterranean, where Admi⯑ral Oſborn gave the enemies maritime ſtrength ſuch blows, as they muſt long feel, and which merited him the greateſt of all honours, to be joined with the conquerors of Louis⯑bourg, in the thanks of the repreſentative body of their country.

The coming year ſeems big with great events. In Ger⯑many the affairs of the rival powers of Pruſſia and Auſtria, appear to be more nearly ballanced than at any time ſince the beginning of the war. This force is as great as ever, and their animoſity is no way leſſened. Great ſteps are ta⯑ken to aſſemble powerful armies on the Rhine; whilſt Great Britain has ſent out two conſiderable armaments, one to the Weſt Indies, the other to Africa; the ſucceſs of which muſt go a great way towards determining the iſſue of the war. Other great preparations are alſo making on the part of Great Britain. In the mean time, the Dutch enraged at the captures of their ſhips, make complaints, and threaten armaments. The death of the Princeſs of Orange, which happened at a moſt critical juncture, adds more perplexity to affairs in that quarter. If we look to the ſouthward, the clouds ſeem gathering there alſo. The imminent death of the King of Spain, will be an event fruitful of troubles. In this affair the King of Sardinia, the houſe of Auſtria, and the houſe of Bourbon, will find themſelves concerned; to ſay nothing of the maritime powers. In a word, the flame of war threatens to ſpread in every part of Europe.

CHAP. I.

WHOEVER reflects upon the concluſion of the ſeveral campaigns ſince the year 1755, will eaſily perceive that at the end of the laſt, the fortune of the ſeveral powers at war ſeemed more nearly upon a ballance, than it had been at the cloſe of any of the former. The campaign was rather leſs bloody, than that which immediately preceeded it; and it was not concluded with any action of ſuch an eclat, as could greatly raiſe, or depreſs the hopes of any of the contending parties. All parties became more cautious; becauſe it be⯑came every day more evident, that the fortune of war was not to be decided by any ſingle ſtroke, however conſiderable. [133] The prize was reſerved for the player of the ſkilful game; for the moſt attentive patience: for the greateſt depth of reſources. An equality of this kind ſeemed at laſt to pro⯑miſe Europe ſome repoſe. All ſides might now give and receive honourable and equitable terms; and peace might be ſettled on that footing, on which it has been uſually made, for ſome time paſt, in our part of the world. But the great deſigns entertained by each power; revenge imbittered by the blows which all had felt in their turns, the conſideration of the vaſt expences that fell upon all, and which a peace at that time would have made fruitleſs; even the hopes ariſing from the equivocal appearances of the laſt campaign, eſtranged every court from the diſpoſition to peace. Inſo⯑much that there were no terms directly offered by any of the belligerent power; nor did any of the neutral interpoſe their mediation. Beſides theſe, another cauſe operated powerfully; a great event was hourly expected about this time; an event which threatened to involve the Southern parts of Europe in the calamities of that war, that had ſo long waſted the Northern; and which, whenever it ſhould take place, threatened to render the political ſyſtem infi⯑nitely more intricate, and probably to give the war quite a new turn.

The late King of Spain, by the force of a conjugal affec⯑tion, rarely ſeen in that dignity, ſince the death of his Queen had been given up to a melancholy, which preyed upon his health, and affected his underſtanding. His death, or incapacity, appeared inevitable within a ſhort time. The King of Naples, Don Carloſs, was next in the order of ſuc⯑ceſſion. In the treaty of Aix la Chapelle, it had been agreed, that the dutchies of Parma, Placentia and Guaſtalla, ſhould be reſtored to the houſe of Auſtria, in caſe Don Carlos ſhould ever come to the crown of Spain. Theſe countries were at the end of that war, in the hands of the Empreſs Queen, or her allies. Her imperial Majeſty had ſet up a claim to the reverſion of theſe dutchies, on the ex⯑tinction of iſſue male in the houſe of Farneſe. But the ambition of the Queen of Spain to make all her children Sovereigns, put powerful bars in her way to it. This am⯑bition was one of the cauſes which made the laſt ſo general a war. The peace of Aix la Chapelle, which put a period to that war, after ſettling theſe conteſted dutchies as an eſtabliſhment for Don Philip, ſecond ſon to the King of [134] Spain, provided, that whenever the event, which we have mentioned above, ſhould take place, that is to ſay, the ac⯑ceſſion of Don Carlos to the crown of Spain, then the King⯑dom of Naples and Sicily ſhould paſs to the infant Don Philip, and the dutchies which formed his eſtabliſhment ſhould refer to the houſe of Auſtria.

The King of Naples, not without reaſon, looked upon this article of the treaty of Aix la Chapelle, as injurious to his rights; accordingly he never acceded to it. No method in this caſe could be ſeen, which might prevent matters from coming to extremities, except the ſituation of the Em⯑preſs, engaged as ſhe was with a powerful adverſary, who kept her forces ſtrained to the utmoſt pitch. She was in no condition to engage in a new war, however intereſting the object might be. Her ally France, who ſo ineffectually aſſiſted her in Germany, could not probably aſſiſt her with more effect in Italy; ſhe therefore ſeemed to have no other part left, than to acquieſce for the preſent, and wait in ſilence a more favourable opportunity to aſſert her claims. The event of the King of Spain's death has ſince happened. It has produced none of theſe immediate effects which were apprehended; and this probably proceeded from the cauſe which we have juſt now hinted. A dead calm at preſent broods over Italy. But in this tranquility and ſilence there are materials gathering, which may in no very diſtant period burſt in a terrible tempeſt over that delightful country. They are very nearly the ſame that produced the laſt trou⯑bles there, and may not only revive them, but ſpread the horrors of war once more over all Europe.

Such were the inclinations of the powers at war at the opening of this year; their ſtrength ſeemed alſo very entire; in particular, the reſources of the King of Pruſſia appeared aſtoniſhing, after the great blows he had ſuffered; and after the advantages he had gained, but gained at ſo high a price. He was ſtill able to ſhew himſelf the father and benefactor, as well as the protector of his people. In the midſt of the devouring waſte of ſuch an expenſive war, from the funds of his oecomony he was enabled to remit the taxes to thoſe parts of his dominions, which had ſuffered from the Ruſſian barbarity; he even advanced money to thoſe which had ſuffered the moſt conſiderably.

To take a nearer view of his ſituation, we muſt obſerve, that the whole kingdom of Pruſſia ſtill remained in the [135] hands of the Muſcovites. The dutchy of Cleves, together with his other poſſeſſions on the Rhine, could yield him nothing; they were held by the French; but in theſe reſ⯑pects, his ſituation was not worſe than it had been, almoſt from the beginning of the war. He had to ballance theſe loſſes, the rich country of Saxony, which he had twice in one campaign wreſted from the hands of the Auſtrians. Add to this, the renewal of the ſubſidy treaty with Great Britain, on the advantageous terms of the former year. Theſe were undoubtedly great ſupports; and the King ſeemed as entire in power, and more advanced in reputation than ever.

But to a more critical examination, things had an aſpect not quite ſo favourable. This appearance was rather ſpe⯑cious than entirely ſolid; and whilſt all without looked full and fair, within there was a decay of ſubſtance, and an hollowneſs that rung at the ſlighteſt touch. That incom⯑parable body of troops, which at the beginning of the war had given him ſo great a ſuperiority, no longer exiſted in the ſame perſons. If his troops derived advantages from a long ſeries of active ſervice, theſe advantages were equally on the ſide of the enemy. His army had known what it is to be beaten; and it is no wonder, if a ſort of wearineſs and deſpair began to creep upon them, after ſuch an infi⯑nite train of unrewarded fatigues, when they ſaw that ſo many wonderful exploits had not yet ended the war in their favour. Many of his beſt generals had been killed in battle, or died, or had retired, or were diſgraced. The hoards which he had amaſſed before the war, by this time muſt have been intirely ſpent; his dominions muſt have been greatly exhauſted, both of men and money. Saxony could no longer yield ſuch ſupplies as formerly. The indigence of the ſubdued inhabitants, ſet bounds to the rapacity of the conqueror. The ſubſidy of Great Britain did a great deal; but it could not ſupply the de⯑ficiencies on this, and on every other ſide. Theſe circum⯑ſtances, probably, made the King of Pruſſia more cautious and dilatory than uſual.

The court of Vienna had as great burthens to ſuſtain as the King of Pruſſia, and ſhe had ſuffered much greater blows. That power has a ſtrength, ſomewhat unaccount⯑able and peculiar to herſelf. More deficient in pecuniary funds, than any other great power in Europe, ſhe is better able to ſubſiſt, and to do conſiderable things without them. [136] For by a long habit, the whole ſtate is formed to its neceſ⯑ſities; and the ſubject is more ready to ſupply free quarter, and to indure military licence than any other. The coun⯑try is abundantly fruitful in all its parts. And whilſt the war is carried on near home, an arbitrary government, operating on ſo extenſive an object, can hardly fail of ſuch reſources, as muſt ſerve an Auſtrian army; which is ſtill paid in a great meaſure, as Tacitus deſcribes the troops of the antient Germans to have been; they have a plentiful table in lieu of pay. ^(a)

And indeed it muſt be owned, that there is no Sovereign, who is more highly honoured in his dominions, or obeyed with a greater mixture of love and reverence, by all his ſubjects, than her Imperial Majeſty. So that having a very ample power, very willing obedience, a large territory and many men, not ſufficiently employed in the arts of peace, it perhaps may be gueſſed, in what manner ſhe has been able to ſupply her many and great loſſes, and to continue a war, like the preſent, better than ſtates more abundant in money. She is beſides, and this is a matter of no ſmall conſequence, ſupported by the countenance, the authority, and the forces of the Empire. And ſhe has for her allies the firſt, and moſt formidable names in Europe. In the wars which this power carried on in the laſt, and in this century, though uſually not very ſucceſsful, ſhe has always been the laſt to deſire a peace; though frequently ſlow in her operations, ſhe makes amends by an extraordinary perſeverance.

This ſlowneſs could not eſcape general obſervation, in the actions of the laſt year. That the Auſtrians did not play with ſufficient ſpirit, the great game which was in their hands, after the battle of Hochkirchen, and the entry of the Ruſſians into the New Marche of Brandenburgh, ſeems hardly diſputable. Perhaps it was that the court of Vienna, by an error common to many courts, but particu⯑larly ſo to this, and often fatal to it, interfered too much and too minutely, in the operations of the campaign.

It is not impoſſible that the character of Marſhal Daun himſelf, might have had ſome ſhare in this inactivity; a character almoſt in all things the direct reverſe of that of [137] his Pruſſian Majeſty. He ſaw that the King, active, reſo⯑lute and advantageous, waſted himſelf even by that activity and ſpirit, to which he owed his moſt brilliant ſucceſſes. Should the Auſtrians carry on the war in the ſame ſpirit, they might ſuffer in the ſame manner, without being ever able to equal, much leſs to exceed that great Monarch, in a ſtile of action peculiarly his own. Daun therefore by principle, ſeems to have kept his army from coming to action, in order to oppoſe a ſtrength entire, and recruited by a long reſt, to that of the King of Pruſſia, waſted by the efforts it was obliged to make inceſſantly, and on every ſide. His deſign ſeemed to be, that the iſſue of the war ſhould rather ariſe from the general reſult and concurrence of all the operations, gradually producing a ſolid though a ſlow advantage, than from the effects of a bold, quick, and maſterly ſtroke. In fact, the Auſtrians felt all the benefits, and all the inconveniencies which uſually attend this ſort of conduct, a conduct which probably loſt them Saxony in the laſt campaign, and which has ſecured them the poſſeſſion of what they now hold in that country. The Auſtrians and Pruſſians watched the time and one another, and came very late to action.

The court of Peterſburg ſtill adhered to its old ſyſtem, in ſpite of the late ill ſucceſs of her arms, and all the ef⯑forts of the Britiſh miniſter, to withdraw her from her al⯑liance. If ſhe had ſome loſs of men, it was the leaſt loſs ſhe could feel: and ſhe thought that whilſt the war was carried on at the expence of others, the reduction of ſo near, ſo dreaded, and ſo hated a rival as the King of Pruſſia, and the opportunity of the forming her troops to ſervice, and perfecting her officers, were objects of conſequence enough to keep her cloſely attached to her firſt ſentiments.

The Swedes preſerved likewiſe the ſame connexion; but they continued as before, an inconſiderable, and inglorious part of the war.

Holland preſerved her neutrality; but it was a neutrality little reſpected, and indeed in itſelf little reſpectable. Di⯑vided in her councils, attentive only to private intereſts, ſhe diſguſted the Engliſh, and neither pleaſed nor ſerved the French. For ſome of the ſubjects of that republic had car⯑ried on the trade of France in their bottoms, which ſubject⯑ed them to frequent captures from the Engliſh men of war and privateers. This prodoced loud complaints in Holland, [138] and warm remonſtrances to the court of London. Theſe complaints met with little attention, being in many reſpects but indifferently founded. The affair was drawn out in length, until the diſpute was extinguiſhed by the deſtruction of its object; ſome of the French colonies were reduced, and the trade in the others, grown too ſmall and too hazar⯑dous to be continued longer with any hope of advantage.

The affairs of France and England were partly connected with the general ſyſtem, and partly diſtinct and independent. France perceived that the ſtrength of the Engliſh, and the exertion of that ſtrength, increaſed continually in America; ſhe knew from the natural inferiority of her colonies, and the feeble ſtate of her navy, that ſhe could not in reaſon hope for great ſucceſs in that quarter; for which reaſon, although ſhe ſent a fleet under Monſ. B [...]mpart into the Weſt Indies, and ſome men of war, with as many ſtore and tranſport ſhips as ſhe could ſteal out of the river St. Law⯑rence, her great efforts were to be made in Europe; ſhe had two objects, the recovery of Hanover, and the invaſion of theſe iſlands; in either of which if ſhe ſucceeded, there could be no doubt, but that it would prove a ſufficient bal⯑lance for all that ſhe had ſuffered, or had to apprehend in any other part of the world.

With regard to the firſt object, though it was difficult to attain it, and though if it ſhould be attained, it did not promiſe to anſwer her purpoſes ſo well as the latter, yet it was upon that ſhe chiefly depended. Hitherto in⯑deed the ſucceſs which France had in Germany, was not at all proportioned to the prodigious efforts which ſhe made; ſhe began to find herſelf much exhauſted. The wants of the French obliged them to pay little reſpect to neutral, or even to friendly powers; ſo that the eſteem and aſſiſtance which they had in Germany, diminiſhed con⯑tinually. They eat up the country, and ſeized on ſuch towns as were convenient to them, without any ceremony: yet freed from all theſe reſtraints, their army had made very little progreſs; their generals had not diſplayed any great abilities, and their army, in itſelf very badly compoſed, was deficient in diſcipline, to a degree which is ſcarcely credible. They kept neither guards nor poſts, nor cen⯑tinels; a great part of their troops wandered from the camp into the neighbouring towns, and retu [...]ned drunk. Their councils of war were held in a tumultuous and diſor⯑derly [139] manner; and all their deſigns were perfectly known in the camp of the allies, where a very different picture was exhibited, with regard to regularity and caution.

The French troops have ſeveral eſſential defects in their conſtitution, which prevent them from equalling thoſe of Germany, and other nations. Several regiments are in a manner hereditary in great families, who placed at their firſt outſet at a very high point of military rank, think it unneceſſary to attain the qualifications, which lead others to it ſtep by ſtep. As to the reſt of the officers, as their pay is ſmall and their hopes littl [...], few ſtudy the art military, as a profeſſion: they ſerve becauſe it is the faſhion to do ſo, and that it is thought neceſſary to be a gentleman. Thus they diſpatch their buſineſs as a diſagreeable taſk; and having little to loſe in the ſervice, it is almoſt impoſſible to preſerve a due ſubordination. The common m [...]n are little more than abject vaſſals, and therefore want that high ſpirit which in their gentry makes ſome amends for the want of knowledge and aſſiduity. And as they are corrupted by the example of their ſuperiors, ſo by their negligence they are left without any reſtraint. The officers do not chuſe to incur the ill will of their men, or to give themſelves trouble, by exerciſing that wholſome ſeverity in which the health and vigour of military diſcipline conſiſt.

The German common people are indeed in a ſtill lower ſtate of vaſſalage than the French, and might therefore be ſuppoſed naturally, no better ſoldiers; but their bodies are more robuſt and hardy; their treatment is ſevere and rigo⯑rous, their ſubordination is moſt exact, which makes their diſcipline perfect; and Germany is ſo habituated to war, that all the people may be ſaid to be born ſoldiers. Theſe things give the Germans a great ſuperiority over the French; a ſuperiority which was more viſible in this, than in any former war.

Theſe defects in their army were increaſed by the low ſtate of their finances, which cauſed their troops to be very ill paid. The French court made ſome attempts to keep up their credit, by changing their former methods of raiſing money. Mr. Silhoute was made comptroller of the finances, and the farmers general were removed from their former employment of finding the ſupplies. New methods were diviſed, which might ſtave off the entire ruin of their finances, until their armies in Germany could ſtrike ſome [140] effectual blow, or their project of an invaſion, which quieted the minds of the people in ſome degree, ſhould be put in execution.

With regard to the latter project, France had formerly found that the bare report of ſuch a deſign had ſerved many material purpoſes; but in England things had ſince then, been greatly changed. The threats of an invaſion increaſ⯑ed our internal ſtrength, without raiſing any apprehenſions; they in a great meaſure executed the militia act, which hardly any thing elſe could have put in execution; they increaſed the regular troops, both in their number and their ſpecies. England for the firſt time ſaw light horſe and light foot. There reigned in both houſes the moſt perfect and unprecedented union. Among the great men there was no difference that could in the leaſt affect the conduct of the war. The diſpute concerning the preference of the continental and the marine ſyſtem, was entirely ſilenced; becauſe a ſyſtem took place which comprehended both, and operated in both as fully as the warmeſt advocates of either could deſire. Never did England keep a greater number of land forces on foot, on the continent of Europe, in England, in America, when ſhe turned all her power to her land forces only. Never did ſhe cover the ſeas with ſuch formidable fleets, when her navy alone engaged her atten⯑tion. Such is the effect when power and patriotiſm unite; when liberty and order kiſs; and when a nation ſits with a happy ſecurity under the ſhade of abilities which ſhe has tried, and virtues in which ſhe dares to confide.

CHAP. II.

THE ſeizing of Francfort in the laſt year, by a moſt flagrant violation of the liberties of the Empire, had given the French and their allies the moſt material advan⯑tage they had acquired in the campaign; for it ſecured to [141] them the courſe of the Maine, and the Rhine, and made it eaſy to them to receive every kind of reinforcement and ſupply. It ſecured likewiſe that communication between them, the Imperial, and the Auſtrian armies, and formed that chain, from which they derived no ſmall benefit of mutual ſuccour and concurrence in their operations. Much depended upon their being diſlodged from that poſt; as well with regard to the fortune of his Britannic Majeſty's army, as to that of the King of Pruſſia. Such a ſtroke muſt neceſſarily have the greateſt influence on the events of the whole enſuing campaign. Prince Ferdinand, ſenſible of this, as ſoon as the ſeaſon permitted him to enter upon action, drew his troops out of their cantonments; and at the head of thirty thouſand men, prepared to diſlodge them, before they could receive the ſupplies, of which they were in daily expectation. The reſt of his army, conſiſting of about ten or twelve thouſand men, were left to guard the electorate, and to watch the biſhoprick of Munſter. Some detachments of Hanoverians and Pruſſians had, in the latter end of February, driven the Imperialiſts and Auſtrians from the poſts, which they occupied at Erfurth and Eiſinach, and ſome places in the country of Heſſe; this drew a ſtrong body of the enemy into that part, which puſhed them back; but the hereditary prince of Brunſwick, who led the army of the allies through ways, before deemed impaſſable to an army, defeated them in ſome ſevere ſkirmiſhes; ſeveral places of importance were taken; ſeveral whole battalions were made priſoners, with their officers. The French, alarmed at the vivacity of this beginning, judged it but the prelude to ſomething more deciſive. Accordingly the Duke of Broglio took an advantageous poſt, near Bergen, at a village between Francfort and Hanau, which it was neceſ⯑ſary the Allies ſhould maſter, before they could penetrate to his line. This place he had made his right, and ſecured his flanks and centre in ſuch a manner, that the attack could only be made at that village.

In this diſpoſition was the French army when the Allies approached; they formed themſelves under an eminence, and began the attack on the village of Bergen, between nine and ten in the morning with great intrepidity. They were received with a very ſevere fire, which the enemy had prepared for them; they made three attacks in the ſpace of about two hours, and were every time repulſed.

[142]Prince Ferdinand now obſerved that the enemy ſtill kept a good countenance in their poſt, and that his own troops began to fall into ſome diſorder. This able general, who never riſques his fortune on a ſingle throw, began to think of a retreat, whilſt his loſs was yet inconſiderable, and the diſorder of his men eaſily to be repaired. But a retreat in the face of a victorious enemy, was hazardous; and the day was not yet above half ſpent. In this exigence he made ſuch movements, as ſtrongly indicated a deſign of falling once more upon the village, in the enemy's right, and of making at the ſame time a new attack upon their left. Theſe appearances were farther countenanced by a cannonode, on both theſe poſts, ſupported with an uncom⯑mon fury. The French deceived by theſe manoeuvres, kept cloſe in their poſts; they expected a new and a lively attack every moment; they returned the cannonade as briſkly as they could; and in this poſture things continued until night came on, when the prince made an eaſy retreat, without diſorder, or moleſtation, and halted at Windeken.

In this action the loſs of the allies was about two thouſand in every way: that of the French was by no means leſs conſiderable. The allies indeed ſuffered no⯑thing in their reputation; their countenance through the whole action having been excellent. Prince Ferdinand gained as much honour, and diſplayed as much ſkill, as could have been obtained, or ſhewn upon a more fortunate occaſion. The event however was, in its conſequences, far from indifferent; for the allies having miſſed this blow, the French ſtill kept Francfort, and all advantages which they drew from that ſituation; they had time and means to receive their reinforcements; and they acquired in a ſhort ſpace ſuch a ſuperiority, as obliged prince Ferdinand to content himſelf with acting on the defenſive, for a long time after.

The advantages which would have ariſen from another iſſue of that battle appeared more fully, from the operati⯑ons which were carrying on the ſide of Bohemia, and which probably were deſigned to concur with thoſe of the prince, in ſome grand and comprehenſive ſcheme. There is no doubt, that the army of the allies, and thoſe of his Pruſſian Majeſty, had determined to act in concert, and had ſettled ſome plan for that purpoſe; and though it ſhould not be diſcovered with equal certainty, what that plan was, [143] it may not however be unpleaſant to trace it; as far at leaſt as a reaſonable conjecture, guided by the lights de⯑rived from the tendency of each operation, may lead us. For if we ſucceed at all, in ſuch an attempt, it diffuſes at wonderful clearneſs over the whole narrative.

It is not impoſſible then, that it was deſigned in the firſt place, to keep the Ruſſians at a diſtance, until the latter end of the ſummer, by the deſtruction of their magazines in Poland. That on the other ſide prince Ferdinand ſhould attempt to drive the French towards the Rhine, and to get between them and the army of the Empire; which having thus loſt its communication with the French, prince Henry ſhould ruſh out of Saxony, and fall upon them in Bohemia and Franconia, and cut off alſo their communication with the great body of the Auſtrians. Then the Imperialiſts, would find themſelves ſituated between two hoſtile and ſu⯑perior armies; whilſt in Bohemia, Marſhal Daun would be either obliged to try his fortune ſingle handed, with the King of Pruſſia, or totally to abandon that kingdom, into which it was in the power of the Pruſſians to enter, in op⯑poſite parts at once.

The firſt part of this plan was executed with great ſpirit and ſucceſs. So early as the 23d of February the Pruſſian general Woberſnow marched into Poland from Glogau in Sileſia, with forty-ſix ſquadrons, and twenty-nine battalions, where they routed ſome bodies of Coſſacks; and after hav⯑ing deſtroyed ſeveral immenſe magazines, particularly one at Poſen, ſaid to be ſufficient for the ſubſiſtence of fifty thouſand men for three months, they retured without any loſs into Sileſia, on the 18th of April.

As for the ſecond Act of this military drama, it was ex⯑ecuted with as great ſucceſs, and with ſome advantages more ſtriking than the firſt. Prince Henry commanded the Pruſſian troops in Saxony, which the public accounts called forty thouſand men. He had certain intelligence, that ſome movements, which had purpoſely been made by the King of Pruſſia, had drawn the greateſt part of the Auſtrian troops, which had been poſted as a watch upon Saxony, towards the frontiers of Sileſia, He immediately took ad⯑vadtage of this opening, and entered Bohemia in two columns: one marched towards Peterſwade: the other, which was commanded by General Hulſen, made its way by Paſberg and Commottau. The [144] firſt penetrated as far as Loboſchutz, and Leitmeritz, the enemy flying before them, and every where abandoning or burning the vaſt magazines which they had amaſſed in all thoſe parts.

The body under General Hulſen did as much ſervice, and it had a more active employment. The paſs of Paſberg, ſtrong in itſelf, was defended by a conſiderable body of Auſtrians. General Hulſen having conducted his cavalry by another way, ſo as to fall directly on their rear, attacked them with his infantry in front, and drove them out of all their intrenchments; one general, fifty-one officers, and no leſs than two thouſand private men, were made priſoners on this occaſion. The Pruſſians loſt but ſeventy men killed and wounded They returned into Saxony with hoſtages for the contributions they had exacted.

After this fatiguing expedition, the prince gave his troops a few days to reſt, and then led them once more to action. He directed his march through the Voigtland, towards the army of the Empire; they entered Franconia by the way of Hoff; they attacked General Macguire, who command⯑ed a body of Auſtrians and Imperialiſts. Here they were bravely reſiſted for the whole day; but the numbers and ſpirit of the Pruſſians prevailing, Macguire gladly took advantage of the night to make a retreat, having loſt about five hundred men. A few ſkirmiſhes more decided the fate of Franconia. The army of the Empire retreated, as the Pruſſians advanced, and abandoned the rich biſhoprics of Bamberg and Wurtzburg to contribution. The town of Bamberg ſurrendered upon terms; but ſome confuſion happening before the capitulation was compleatly finiſhed, a party of Croats came to blows with a party of Pruſſians, who had by this time poſſeſſion of one of the gates; this was reſented as an infringement of the capitulation. A pretence was given to plunder the place; it was given up to pillage, by order of the comman⯑ders, for two days, in a very unrelenting and licentious manner. This produced loud and juſt complaints againſt the Pruſſians, and in due time a ſevere retaliation. Prince Henry had puſhed back the army of the Empire, as far as Nuremberg; he had diſabled a great part of the circle of Franconia from giving them aſſiſtance; and thus far he had accompliſhed the objects of his expedition. But as [145] that part of the plan, which Prince Ferdinand was to have executed, had ailed, it was impoſſible on one hand to hinder the French army from ſuccouring that of the Empire, or on the other, to prevent a body of Auſtrians from availing themſelves of his abſence, to penetrate into Saxony. In theſe circumſtances any farther ſtay in Franconia was uſe⯑leſs, and might be dangerous. His army, loaded with booty and contribution, returned to their old ſituation. The Auſtrians retired into Bohemia at their approach.

Appearances were hitherto favourable enough to the Pruſſians: however none of the great ends propoſed by the general plan were fully anſwered. The Ruſſians, notwith⯑ſtanding the deſtruction of their magazines, continued their march towards Sileſia. Count Dohna, who had raiſed great contributions and levies in the dutchy of Mecklenburg, was preparing to oppoſe them on the ſide of Brandenburgh; other parties under other commanders, were poſted at thoſe places where their irruption was the moſt apprehended. The approach of this army brought things nearer and nearer to a criſis. The eyes of all Europe were fixed with anxiety and expectation on their progreſs. It appeared the more formidable, becauſe the progreſs of the French arms was very rapid after the battle of Bergen.

Prince Ferdinand finding that another attack was not ad⯑viſeable, retreated continually. The French poſſeſſed them⯑ſelves of Heſſe without oppoſition; they met as little in making their way through the biſhoprick of Paderborn; and whilſt their grand army, under Marſhal de Contades, puſhed the allies in that quarter and on the ſide of Heſſe, M. d'Armentieres was poſted by Weſel, to advance on that ſide as occaſion ſhould require. The condition of the allied army was extremely dubious; whilſt the French increaſed in their numbers and ſpirit. Their new ſucceſs gave them reaſon to hope for a campaign as fortunate as that of 1757.

CHAP. III.

GREAT Britain was not content with the efforts which ſhe had made in Germany: America, the intereſts of which had given riſe to the war, was the object which principally engaged her attention. This was indeed the proper object of her natural ſtrength, and by her ſucceſs in this quarter, ſhe moſt effectually laid the axe to the root of the enemy's naval power, and cut away one great part of the reſources which fed the war. A ſquadron of nine ſhips of the line, with ſixty tranſports, con⯑taining ſix regiments of foot, in the end of the laſt year, ſailed for the Weſt Indies, in order to attack and reduce the French Caribbee iſlands. General Hopſon commanded the land forces; the fleet in the ex⯑pedition was to be under the orders of Commodore Moore, then in the Weſt Indies.

Their firſt object was Martinico, the firſt in reputation of the French Caribbees, the ſeat of government, the centre of all the trade which France carries on with thoſe iſlands; ſtrong both by nature and art. This iſland lies in the 15th degree N. lat. The ſhore is on every ſide indented with very deep bays, which they call Cul de Sacs, and the ſands, only diſcoverable at low water, form in many places a hid⯑den, and almoſt inſurmountable barrier. A lofty ridge of almoſt impaſſable mountains, runs north weſt and ſouth eaſt quite through the iſland; all the ſpace on both ſides is inter⯑ſected at inconſiderable diſtances with deep gullies, through which the water pours down in the rainy ſeaſons, with great impetuoſity. In other reſpects, the iſland is pleaſant and fruitful; well watered, and well cultivated, abounding with plantations and villages all along the ſea coaſt. The two principal places are St. Pierre, and Port Royal; both [147] town conſiderable in this part of the world, for their mag⯑nitude, trade and ſtrength.

By this ſhort deſcription may be diſcerned, how deſirable ſuch a conqueſt was, and the difficulties which naturally oppoſed themſelves to it. They were the greater, becauſe at this time there was in the iſland a conſiderable number of regular troops. They have at all times a numerous and well armed militia, not contemptible for their diſcipline, and well ſuited to the ſervice of the country; add to this, that they can bring into the field a large body of negroes, habituated to arms, and in general well affected to the in⯑tereſts of their maſters.

The Engliſh forces landed without oppoſition, on the weſt ſide of Port Royal harbour, aften the men, of war had driven the enemy from their bat⯑teries and entrenchments. But on their landing, they found that the nature of the country proved a greater obſtruction to their progreſs, than the ſtrength of the enemy. Theſe profound gullies, incloſed by ſteep, and almoſt per⯑pendicular precipices, proved an unſurmountable obſtacle to the regular march of the troops, or the conveyance of cannon. The enemy had broke up the roads; and five miles of ſuch roads, and through ſuch an impracticable country, were to be paſſed before Port Royal could be at⯑tacked by land. The commander, therefore, of the forces, judged the difficulties on the land-ſide inſurmountable; the naval commander held it impoſſible to put the cannon aſhore nearer to the fort. Some jealouſy ſeems to have ariſen. The reſult of the whole was, that the forces were reimbarked on the day of their landing.

Very little was done at Port Royal; but it was hoped, that more would be done at St. Pierre. They accordingly ſet ſail for that place; but when they had arrived before it, and examined the coaſt, new difficul⯑ties aroſe, which produced a new deliberation. They determined that the fort could not be reduced, without ſuch detriment to the troops and the ſhipping, that they could afterwards make little uſe of their ſucceſs; and in this they had probably good reaſon. The conduct of the officers afterwards plainly demonſtrated, that no mean views had any influence on their councils; they agreed to abandon their enterprize againſt Martinico. But having been foiled in this their firſt attempt, they [148] reſolved not to return with the diſgrace of having done nothing worthy of the greatneſs of the armament, and the expectation of their country. They conſidered, that the iſland of Guadaloupe was an object, though not of ſuch an eclat, of full as much real conſequence as Martinico; and they knew, that it was neither ſo ſtrong in troops or forti⯑fications. Their firſt failure might lead to an advantage, as conſiderable as that which they had miſſed. In purſuance of theſe reſolutions, they ſet ſail for Guadaloupe.

The iſland is called Guadaloupe, from a reſemblance which it bears to a chain of mountains of the ſame name in Old Spain. To ſpeak with exactneſs, Guadaloupe is rather to be conſidered as two iſlands, divided from each other by a ſmall arm of the ſea, or ſalt-water river, not above three hundred feet over where it is wideſt. One of theſe iſlands is called the Grand Terre; the other more particularly and by diſtinction, Guadaloupe; they are to⯑gether in a circle about ninety leagues. The firſt is nearly deſtitute of freſh water, and not perfectly cultivated; but it is otherwiſe with Guadaloupe. No part of the world is furniſhed with more or better. No leſs than fifty rivers, in that ſmall circuit, throw themſelves into the ſea; many navigable by boats, for two, ſome even for three leagues into the country. Not to mention the numberleſs ſprings which riſe among the rocks, and, after a thouſand beautiful meanders, loſe themſelves in the larger ſtreams. The firſt accounts which we have of that country, are laviſh in the deſcription of its beauties; and the lateſt agree with them, that no part of the Weſt Indies, perhaps of the world, affords more agreeable and romantic ſcenes. It is full of high mountains; one of which towers far above the reſt, and is a volcano, continually emitting ſmoke and fire. From hence they have conſiderable quantities of ſulphur. They have alſo hot baths, fit for all the medicinal purpoſes in which ſuch waters are uſed. The land in the valleys is extremely fertile; it produces the uſual Weſt India com⯑modities, ſugar, indigo, coffee, cotton, and ginger: the mountains abound with game: ſo that there is nothing in the iſland wanting, for the convenience and delight of life, in an air more temperate and ſalubrious than is commonly breathed between the tropics.

The French began to plant colonies in this iſland as early as the year 1632. But for a long time this, together with [149] all their other colonies, continued in a languiſhing condi⯑tion. It was in the beginning of the preſent century, that they began to emerge. After the peace of Utrecht had given France time to breathe, ſhe turned her attention ſtrongly to theſe iſlands; Guadaloupe partook however leſs of this care than Martinico, and yet, by its natural advan⯑tages, it does not fall ſhort of that iſland, neither in the quantity, or the goodneſs of its produce; if it does not greatly exceed it in both; as it certainly does in its capacity to receive all ſorts of improvement. The importance of this iſland, until its late conqueſt, was very little known in England. The reaſon was this. By an old regulation, the people of Guadaloupe were forbid to trade directly with Europe, but were obliged to ſend all their produce to Martinico, from whence they had all their European commodities. A ſtrange regulation, to be continued in an age ſo enlightened as this, by a nation ſo enlightened as France.

The Engliſh made attempts upon this iſland in 1691, and 1703; but they were neither powerful enough, nor con⯑ducted with ſufficient ability to produce any permanent ef⯑fect; the troops waſted the country, and retired with their booty. But on the occaſion, of which we are going to ſpeak, they were more able, ſtrong, and fortunate.

On the 23d of January the fleet came before the town of Baſſe Terre, the capital of the iſland, a place of conſi⯑derable extent, large trade, and defended by a ſtrong for⯑treſs. This fortreſs, in the opinion of the chief engineer, was not to be reduced by the ſhipping. But Commodore Moore, notwithſtanding this opinion, brought four men of war to bear upon the citadel; the reſt were diſpoſed againſt the town, and the batteries which obſtructed the landing. About nine in the morning a fire from all ſides began, which continued with the utmoſt fury until night, when the citadel, and all the batteries, were effectually ſilenced. During this cannonade the bombs, that were continually ſhowered upon the town, ſet it on fire in ſeveral places. It burned without interruption the whole of this and the fol⯑lowing day; when it was almoſt totally reduced to aſhes. The loſs was prodigious from the number of warehouſes in the town, full of rich, but combuſtible materials. Nothing could be more ſtriking, than the horror of the ſpectacle, [150] from the mutual and unremitted fire of ſo many great ſhips and batteries, heightened with a long line of flames, which extended along the ſhore, and formed the back ground of this terrible picture.

In this lively engagement, our loſs was very inconſidera⯑ble. The next day the forces landed without oppoſition, and took poſſeſſion of the town and citadel. Notwithſtanding this ſucceſs, the iſland was far from being reduced. The country is rugged and mountainous, and abounded with paſſes and defiles, of a difficult and dangerous nature. The inhabitants had retired with their armed negroes into the mountains; and all ſeemed prepared to defend their poſſeſſions bravely, and to the laſt extremities.

General Hopſon died on the 27th of February, and Ge⯑neral Barrington ſucceeded him. He embarked part of his forces for the Grand Terre, where Colonel Crump attack⯑ed and reduced the towns of St. Anne, and St. Francois; whilſt this attack diverted the enemy's attention, the Gene⯑ral fell upon the ſtrong poſt of Goſier, and poſſeſſed him⯑ſelf of it; and thus the Grand Terre was in a manner re⯑duced, and diſabled from ſending any relief to the other part.

There is a conſiderable mountain, not far from the town of Baſſe Terre, called Dos d'Aſne, or the Aſſe's Back; thi⯑ther a great part of the enemy had retired. It is a poſt of great ſtrength, and great importance, as it keeps a watch upon the town, and at the ſame time forms the only com⯑munication there is between that town, and the Capes Terre, the plaineſt, pleaſanteſt, and moſt fruitful part of the whole iſland. It was not judged practicable to break into it by this way; and all the reſt of Guadaloupe was in the enemy's poſſeſſion. Therefore a plan was formed for another operation, by which it was propoſed to ſurprize Petit Bourg, Goyave, and St. Mary's, and by that way to march into Capes Terre, which might be eaſily reduced. But this deſign failing, it was neceſſary to attempt thoſe places by main force. Col. Clavering and Col. Crump landed near Arnonville, and attacked the enemy, ſtrongly intrenched at a poſt, ſtrong by nature, called Le Corne. This was forced; another intrenchment at Petit Bourg had the ſame fate; a third near St. Mary's yielded in the ſame manner. An opening being at laſt made into the Capes [151] Terre, the inhabitants ſaw, that the beſt part of the coun⯑try was on the point of being given up to fire and ſword; they came in and capitulated; their poſſeſſions, and their civil and religious liberties were granted to them.

Three ſmall iſlands, near Guadaloupe, Deſeada, Santos and Petite Terre, ſurrendered a few days after, and on the ſame terms.

This capitulation was hardly ſigned, when the French ſquadron under M. Bompart appeared before the iſland, and landed at St. Anne's, in the Grand Terre, the Gene⯑ral of the French Caribbees, with ſix hundred regular troops, two thouſand buccaneers, and a large quantity of arms and ammunition. The capitulation was made at the moſt critical time; for had this reinforcement arrived but a day ſooner, the whole expedition had probably been loſt.

Thus came into the poſſeſſion of Great Britain, this valuable iſland, after a campaign of near three months, in which the Engliſh troops behaved with a firmneſs, cou⯑rage and perſeverance, that ought never to be forgotten, Intolerable heat, continual fatigue, the air of an unaccuſ⯑tomed climate, a country full of lofty mountains and ſteep precipices, poſts ſtrong by nature and by art, defended by men who fought for every thing that was dear to them; all theſe difficulties only increaſed the ardour of our forces, who thought nothing impoſſible under commanders, who were not more diſtinguiſhed for their intrepidity and ſkill, than their zeal for the ſervice of their country, and the perfect harmony and good underſtanding that ſubſiſted be⯑tween them. There is nothing perhaps ſo neceſſary to in⯑ſpire confidence into the ſoldier, as to obſerve that the of⯑ficers have a perfect confidence in one another ^(a).

[152]It muſt not be omitted, that many of the inhabitants exerted themſelves very gallantly in the defence of their country. A woman, a conſiderable planter in the iſland, [153] particularly diſtinguiſhed herſelf; ſhe was called Madam Ducharmey: this amazon put herſelf at the head of her ſer⯑vants and ſlaves, and acquitted herſelf in a manner not in⯑ferior to the braveſt men.

Soon after the reduction of Guadaloupe, the iſland of Marigalante ſurrendered itſelf upon terms ſimilar to thoſe which were granted to the [155] former iſland. This is a ſmall place, but the conqueſt is of conſequence, as the French by this are left no footing in the Leeward iſlands: Martinico is one of thoſe to the wind⯑ward. [156] Theſe beginnings were happy omens of the ſucceſs of the more important undertaking, which was to be carried on in another part of America. The reputation of our [157] arms there, except in the reduction of Louiſburg, had hitherto not been very great. But other commanders were now appointed, and other maxims prevailed. However, [158] we poſtpone the narrative of theſe very intereſting events, to conſider thoſe which intervened on the continent of Eu⯑rope, in which too we are to ſee our arms no leſs diſtin⯑guiſhed; [159] and to behold England emerging from the rub⯑biſh of low principles and timid conduct, once more become the pride and terror of Europe, and acting in a manner not unworthy the moſt illuſtrious periods of her hiſtory.

CHAP. IV.

WE left the army of Prince Ferdinand upon the retreat, ever ſince the battle of Bergen. The French ad⯑vanced with great vivacity; their light troops made incur⯑ſions [161] almoſt to the gates of Hanover. The Prince ſtill con⯑tinued to retire, but he left garriſons in Lipſtadt, Ritberg, Munſter and Minden, in order to retard the enemy's pro⯑greſs: [162] their principal deſign ſeemed to be be to cut off his retreat to the Weſer, to which he kept very cloſe, as he knew the infinite conſequence of that communication. How⯑ever, if the enemy ſailed to compaſs that object, all the

[163] precautions of the Prince proved alſo ineffectual to retard the progreſs of their arms. Ritberg was ſurpriſed, Lipſtadt was blockaded, Minden was taken by aſſault, where a gar⯑riſon of 1500 men were made priſoners, and where immenſe magazines fell into their hands. D'Armentieres advanced againſt Munſter; he attempted to take the place by a coup de main. Though foiled in his attempt with conſiderable loſs, he did not deſiſt; he drew up his cannon from Weſel, and after a ſhort ſiege, made himſelf maſter of the city; the garriſon of 4000 men, became his priſoners. Nothing ſeemed able to withſtand the rapid torrent with which the French over-ran the whole country; they no longer hoped, the conqueſt of Hanover; it was with them an abſolute certainty. Elated with the fair appearance of their fortune, they kept no bounds. The French miniſter, the Duke of Bellciſle, in his letters to the Marſhal Contades, ſpeaks only of the means of ſecuring their conqueſt, and preventing another expulſion from Ha⯑nover; and for this end propoſed the moſt cruel and un⯑warrantable expedients. Nor was there leſs dread and de⯑jection viſible on the ſide of the allies, than pride and con⯑fidence on that of the French. The archives and moſt va⯑luable moveables were ſent off from Hanover to Stade. All things ſeemed haſtening to the ſame poſture which drew on the famous capitulation of Cloſter Seven.

In this general gloom that overſpread the fortune of the allies, the Prince kept himſelf unmoved and attentive to his deſigns. He did not ſuffer himſelf to be diſconcerted by blows, which he had probably foreſeen, and the ill conſe⯑quences of which he knew how to prevent. The body of the French army after the taking of Minden, had poſted themſelves near the city, to which the right of their army extended; their left was protected by a very ſteep hill; in their front was a large moraſs; and a rivulet covered their rear. Nothing could be more advantageous than this ſitua⯑tion; and whilſt they continued in it, nothing could be en⯑terpriſed againſt them. The army of the allies, after a con⯑tinued retreat, began at laſt to advance, and fixed their [164] camp altogether as advantageouſly at Peterſhagen, a place about three leagues from the enemy.

Things were brought to that paſs, that nothing but a battle could hinder the French from taking winter quarters in the electorate. There was no poſſibility of attacking them with any hope of ſucceſs in the camp which they then occupied. The point was to draw them from that poſt in⯑to the plain; but the movements neceſſary to effect this were extremely hazardous to an inferior army, in ſight of the enemy. The operations of Prince Ferdinand, on this occaſion, diſplayed ſo penetrating and uncommon a genius, ſuch a guarded boldneſs, ſuch a certainty of the grounds he went upon, ſuch a perfect poſſeſſion of himſelf, that per⯑haps there is no inſtance in hiſtory of generalſhip ſo com⯑pleat and finiſhed; for which reaſon we ſhall endeavour from the beſt lights we have, to draw out at length the ſeveral parts that concurred to form this remarkable piece; we could indeed wiſh that the authentick accounts of ſo ve⯑ry memorable an event, had been more clear and explicit; but we muſt content ourſelves with the materials we have.

On the 29th of July, Prince Ferdinand forſook his camp on the Weſer, and marched towards Hillen, a village con⯑ſiderably to his right, with the greateſt part of his army: However he took care to leave on the brink of that river, a body under General Wangenheim; which extended to the town of Thornhauſen, where they were intrenched, and ſupported by a conſiderable artillery. He had the day be⯑fore detached the Hereditary Prince of Brunſ⯑wick, with 6000 men, to make a compaſs to⯑wards the enemy's left flank, and to poſt himſelf in ſuch a manner, as to cut off the communication of their convoys from Paderborn.

The French were not inattentive to theſe movements; their Generals immediately held a council of war; and the reſult was, that they gave completely into the ſnare that was laid for them. They ſaw, as they imagined, the allied army divided and disjointed; and now the happy moment preſented itſelf, for the attack of General Wangenheim, who they knew was not ſtrong, and who ſeemed at a great diſtance from the reſt of the army, ſo that it appeared im⯑poſſible that he could be relieved. This body being routed, as it eaſily might, it was obvious that they ſhould then be able to place themſelves between Prince Ferdinand's army [165] and the Weſer, and cut off his communication with that river; the great object at which they aimed, through the whole campaign, and in which was involved the certain de⯑ſtruction of the allies.

Full of theſe ideas they left their advantageous poſt, and in eight columns paſſed the moraſs in their front, and advanced into the plain. The Duke of Brog⯑lio was to lead the attack, by falling upon that body that lay near the river, which ſeemed to preſent him an aſſured and eaſy victory. He marched on, therefore, with great confidence; but as ſoon as he had gained an eminence which lay along his front, he was ſtruck with the utmoſt ſurpriſe, when, inſtead of a few poſts weakly guarded, he beheld the whole army of the allies drawn up in excellent order, ex⯑tending from the banks of the Weſer, quite to the moraſs, in the front of the late French camp. This was a ſtroke en⯑tirely unexpected; they believed the Prince to have been at Hillen; but he had marched up, and the whole army was joined in the night. This diſcovery for a while put a ſtop to the motions of the French; they were hemmed in be⯑tween the allies, the moraſs and the river. Their ſituation was diſagreeable, but it was now impoſſible to recede.

The allies, finding the French ſlower than they expect⯑ed, began to advance, and threatened the enemy's centre. This was compoſed almoſt wholly of horſe; but it was the flower of their cavalry, who anticipated the ſhock of the allies, and began the engagement. The brunt of the battle was almoſt wholly ſuſtained by the Engliſh infantry, and ſome corps of Hanoverians, which ſtood the re-iterated charges of ſo many bodies of horſe, the ſtrength and glory of the French armies, with a reſolution, ſteadineſs, and expertneſs in their manoeuvre, which was never exceeded, perhaps never equalled. They cut to pieces or entirely routed theſe bodies. Two brigades of foot attempted to ſupport them, but they vaniſhed before the Engliſh infantry. Waldegrave's and Kingſley's regiments diſtinguiſhed them⯑ſelves in a particular manner this day; nor were their com⯑manders leſs di [...]tinguiſhed. The enemy's horſe, which compoſed their centre, being entirely diſcomfited, and their right, which attacked Wangenheim, having made no ſort of impreſſion, they thought of nothing but a retreat.

At this point of time the Prince ſent orders to Ld. George Sackville, who commanded the whole Britiſh, and ſeveral [166] brigades of the German cavalry, to advance. That caval⯑ry formed the right wing of the allies, extended to the mo⯑raſs, and if it could have charged at the inſtance of the ene⯑my's retreat, ſuch a ſhock at that time, and in that ſitua⯑tion, would in all probability have left the French without an army in Germany. But the orders were not ſufficiently preciſe, or they were not ſufficiently underſtood by the En⯑gliſh commander; ſo that there was ſome delay in waiting for an explanation. The critical minute paſſed away; the Britiſh cavalry loſt their ſhare in the glory of the action; and the French retreated in ſome order, favoured by the ſpiri⯑ted and well-judged efforts of the Duke of Broglio, and the advantages which the poſſeſſion of Minden gave them.

What is remarkable, the French attributed their misfor⯑tune in this battle to the ſame error in their diſpoſition, which loſt them the battle of Blenheim; that of compoſing their centre almoſt wholly of cavalry, without any proper ſup⯑port of foot.

The battle was over; but then it was that the effects of Prince Ferdinand's admirable diſpoſitions appeared in their full luſtre. The French not having been moleſted by the Britiſh cavalry in their retreat, had an opportunity of regain⯑ing their former advantageous poſt. They had, indeed, loſt the honour of the day, and miſſed the ſtroke which they had meditated. They had likewiſe loſt a great number of men. But all theſe loſſes and diſgraces might be repaired, and there ſeemed nothing deciſive in the day of the Minden. It had certainly happened, as it then appeared, if the Prince who foreſeeing this, and neglecting nothing which could be provided, had not formed the plan of detaching away the Hereditary Prince in the manner already related. At five in the morning of that day, this young hero attacked a large body of the French under the Duke de Briſac; this body, though poſted in a moſt advantageous manner, he entirely defeated, and obliged them to take refuge in Min⯑den. The news of this blow came with an ill omen to M. de Contades, in the inſtant when the Engliſh infantry began to engage his centre. The enemy himſelf could not help admiring the dexterity of the ſtroke under which he ſunk: and full of aſtoniſhment at a conduct at once ſo daring and judicious, paid the juſt applauſe to a General, who could detach with ſecurity ſo large a body from his army, when [167] he was going to attack an enemy already much ſuperior to him in numbers.

This happy ſtroke decided the affair, all the paſſes thro' which the French could draw ſuccour or proviſion, were ſeized. They relinquiſhed their ſtrong poſt; they fled through Minden, and paſſing the Weſer, retreated to the eaſtward of that river; thus loſing all the advantages which they had made in the campaign, and forced to retreat thro' a country different from that through which they had ad⯑vanced, and in which they had taken no meaſures to pro⯑cure ſubſiſtence.

The loſs of the French in this action amounted to about ſeven thouſand men killed, wounded and priſoners; among whom were many officers of conſiderable rank. The loſs of the allies was not more than two thouſand. The Eng⯑liſh, as they gained the greateſt glory, ſo they were the greateſt ſufferers. Twelve hundred of the killed and wound⯑ed were of that nation. The Prince on the day after the battle paid the due honours to theſe illuſtrious corps, as well as to ſeveral of the Hanoverians who had behaved in the ſame gallant manner. He did juſtice to the merit of the officers; he diſtinguiſhed their names; and even particula⯑riſed ſo low as captains. To ſome in the moſt obliging man⯑ner he ſent conſiderable preſents; and he omitted nothing to ſhew that he knew what it is to be well ſerved, and how to encourage the troops and officers to do their duty with ſpirit and chearfulneſs.

Although the Engliſh had the greateſt ſhare in the ho⯑nour of this ſignal day, and that the Prince acknowledged their merit in the ſtrongeſt terms, ^(a) yet a cloud was caſt [168] over their triumph. There were ſome expreſſions in the orders for the rejoicing, which were ſuppoſed to convey a very ſevere reflection on Lord G. S. commander in chief [169] of the Engliſh forces. The Prince required with an em⯑phaſis, which ſeemed particularly pointed, that his orders by his aids de camps for the future ſhould be more exactly obeyed. In a manner ſtill leſs to be miſunderſtood, he expreſſed his concern that the Marquis of Granby had not had the command of the Britiſh cavalry. Had he com⯑manded, his highneſs made no doubt that the ſucceſs of the day had been much more complete and brilliant. The ſe⯑vere inſinuation concerning the diſobedience to orders, and the invidious compliment to a ſubordinate officer, were clear declarations.

The news of a victory ſo glorious to our troops, and of a cenſure ſo diſgraceful to their commander, came at once to England. In proportion to the joy which filled all hearts, in proportion to their opinion of the great general to whom they owed ſo ſeaſonable an an advantage, was their indignati⯑on againſt the unfortunate commander to whom it was at⯑tributed that this advantage was not greater. The public, as uſual, judged definitively upon the firſt charge. They never pardon a general whoſe error it is to fall ſhort. In vain they are prayed to ſuſpend their judgment, and to wait for a full diſcuſſion; the matter is already decided; they have a fact againſt an officer, and they look upon all rea⯑ſoning in his favour, not ſo much a defence of his conduct, as the exertion of eloquence and artifice to palliate a neglect [170] of duty. This indeed makes the caſe of officers particular⯑ly hard; but then it always ſhews them what they have to do.

The merits of the matter are ſtill regarded in the ſame light by the public. But the heat, the eagerneſs, and cu⯑rioſity of the firſt movements being over, the matter will be heard, whenever it comes to be again diſcuſſed with leſs attention, but with leſs paſſion too. It is not for us to de⯑liver any opinion in ſo nice a controverſy. We have in points of leſs moment hitherto declined it; and we ſhall always de⯑cline it until the proper judges before whom it probably will come, ſhall have taught us what to think. There is in⯑deed no doubt that if the cavalry of the allies right wing, ſituated as it was, had been brought to act at the critical time when it had orders to move, the battle of Minden had proved as deciſive as that of Hocſted. But whether it was a fault in the giving or the delivering of the orders, or whe⯑ther it was ſome miſapprehenſion in him who received them, we cannot but ſincerely pity a commander of ſuch admirable talents, who by the error or the misfortune of a moment, loſt an opportunity that would have ranked him for ever with the Marlboroughs and the Brunſwicks.

A few days after the battle his lordſhip reſigned his com⯑mand and returned to London. He was but a few days in London when he was deprived of all his military employ⯑ments. The Marquis of Granby, whom the opinion of Prince Ferdinand, and the deſires of the whole army had pointed out, ſucceeded him in his command. A generous and ardent courage, an affability of manners that flowed from no artifice, a manly freedom and openneſs of ſoul, a chearful and unreſerved converſation, a munificence that knew no bounds, ſo many qualities of the man and of the ſoldier, endeared him to the whole army, and rendered En⯑gliſh and foreigners, his inferiors, his equals and his ſuperi⯑or in command, unanimous in his favour.

Whilſt theſe changes were making, Prince Ferdinand loſt no time to improve his victory, by the purſuit of the French, who retired in the utmoſt diſtreſs. The allies were not indeed able to overtake the main body of their army, but they nara [...]ed them extreme [...]y, and the French were obliged to ſac [...]ifice a great part of their army piece-meal to preſerve the reſt entire. The neceſſity of providing ſubſiſ⯑tence drove them towards Caſſel. The Prince purſued

[171] them, obliged them to evacuate that place, and once more freed that poor diſtreſſed country from the French tyranny. The caſtle of Ziegenhayn, after an hour's defence, gave the allies about 400 priſoners. After this the He⯑reditary Prince of Brunſwick, equally conſpicu⯑ous in the greater and the leſſer operations of war, made a private march at night in order to ſur⯑priſe a corps of French irregulars, commanded by the famous partizan Fiſcher, which were poſted at Wetter, where it was convenient for the allies to encamp. This corps he entirely routed, killing a great number and taking 400. The French threw a garriſon into Marpurg, in hopes of putting ſome ſtop to the rapid career of the allies. In effect this did prove an obſtacle for ſome days, but at length the caſtle ſurrendered, and the garriſon, conſiſting of between 8 and 900 men, became priſoners of war.

Here a bound was ſet to the progreſs of the allied arms. Not that they were ſtopped by any conſiderable obſtruction from the main body of the French in that quarter, but from ſome effects in another quarter of the unſucceſsful begin⯑ning of the campaign, from which the battle of Minden had not yet perfectly diſengaged them. Munſter was ſtill behind them, and ſtill in the hands of the enemy, who had a powerful garriſon in that city. M. de Contades, who even after his defeat exceeded the allies in numbers, and had now no further view of an offenſive campaign, ſent a ſtrong body under d'Armentieres, which was reinforced by ſome troops from the Lower Rhine, to near 15,000 men, to cover that place. Prince Ferdinand had before detach⯑ed General Imhoff from Caſſel in order to reduce it. On the approach of d'Armentieres, Imhoff was obliged to raiſe the ſiege. But being ſoon after reinforced, the French commander retired in his turn towards Weſel, the poſſeſſion of which place had all along proved of infinite importance to the French in all their ope⯑rations. The ſiege of Munſter was again reſumed, but the buſineſs threatened to be difficult and tedious. This however was the only rub which the allies encountered. In all other reſpects they were perfectly fortunate. They had driven their enemy two hundred miles before them, and at the end of the campaign, after all their efforts, and all their [172] ſanguine hopes of conqueſt, ſet them down juſt where they had begun it.

The event of the battle of Minden, and the ſubſequent misfortunes of the French arms, threw Verſailles into the utmoſt confuſion. Ths news of that defeat arrived juſt as the King was taking horſe to hunt. He retired ſilent and dejected into the apartment of Madam de Pompadour, and for ſome time ſaw none of his miniſters. The Duke of Broglio and M. de Contades mutually accuſed each other, for the ill conduct of that day. The public acquitted Bro⯑glio. Belleiſle and his General Contades loſt all reputati⯑on: but the duke ſtill preſerved his employment and a con⯑ſiderable part of his influence at court.

As ſoon as the firſt confuſion and ſurprize of ſo unexpect⯑ed an event was a little abated; it was reſolved to ſend re⯑inforcements to their army in Germany, and at the ſame time to ſend thither ſome officer of experience and authori⯑ty, who might judge, and compoſe, if poſſible, the differ⯑ences which ſubſiſted between the commanders; as well as to aſſiſt in the deliberations for retrieving their affairs. Pub⯑lic misfortunes call great men from their obſcurity. M. de Etrees was choſen on this occaſion, and inveſted with an au⯑thority which he unwillingly accepted. When he arrived at the French camp, he could not avoid a ſigh on viewing of the ruins of that army, which had triumphed under his command at Haſtenbeck. How⯑ver, his behaviour to M. de Contades was polite and gene⯑rous. The old Mareſchal told him that he was not come to take his command, but to ſerve under him; and whilſt he aſſiſted him with his advice, he would receive his or⯑ders.

Whilſt the French endeavour to piece up their broken fortune in Germany, they made ſome ſhow of puſhing the other part of their ſcheme with vigour. All their ports were full of the preparations for an invaſion of the Britiſh dominions. Men of war, traſports and flat-bottomed boats, now almoſt a word of ridicule, were prepared with great di⯑ligence. They talked of a triple embarkation. M. Thu⯑rot was to command a ſmall ſquadron and ſeveral tranſports from Dunkirk, which it was believed were intended for Scotland. This man from a maſter of a merchant ſhip be⯑came a captain of a privateer, in which capacity he greatly annoyed the Engliſh trade, and acquired a reputation. At [173] a time when France does not abound with great men, his ſervices in this way and his daring ſpirit, recommended him to a command in the King's ſervice.

The deſign againſt England, as the voyage hither is the ſhorteſt, was to be attempted from Havre, and ſome other ports of Normandy, in flat-bottomed boats. The third embarkation, which was ſuppoſed againſt Ireland, was to be made from Vannes in the Lower Brittany, where a large body of troops was aſſembled, commanded by the Duke d'Aiguillon governor of that province. This embar⯑kation was to be covered by the fleet under M. de Conflans, which was preparing with great diligence in Breſt. Had this deſign been ſuch as it was repreſented, and had it been put into execution, there is no doubt but ſuch an attempt upon both kingdoms, at three different places at once, muſt have thrown the whole into no ſmall confuſion. But excel⯑lent meaſures were taken on the part of England to fruſ⯑trate their deſigns, whatever they might have been.

A ſquadron under Commodore Boys was ſtationed before Dunkirk. Admiral Rodney was ſent to bombard Havre, which ſervice he performed with ſucceſs. Admiral Hawke blocked up the harbour of Breſt with a ſtrong ſquadron, whilſt a leſſer kept a watch upon that of Vannes. Theſe precautions were continued the whole ſummer, during which time the French proceeded rather ſlowly, but after the battle of Minden had deſtroyed their hopes in Germany, they turned to this object with the greater attention. What iſſue it had we ſhall relate in its proper place. But their firſt attempts on the ocean proved as unſucceſsful as their arms on land.

A great fleet was equipped at Toulon, which ſome deſti⯑ned for America, whilſt others believed it was deſigned to unite itſelf with that of Breſt to favour the invaſion. Ad⯑miral Boſcawen who commanded in the Mediterranean, blocked up this ſquadron, until ſome unfavourable weather and the foulneſs of his ſhips obliged him to return to Gib⯑raltar to refit. The French took this opportuni⯑ty to ſail out, and they proceeded with great dili⯑gence to the ſtreights.

They had arrived very near Gibraltar before the admiral had notice of their approach; but notwithſtanding that our ſhips were not perfectly prepared to ſail, the admiral uſed [174] ſuch great expedition that in two hours after the account ar⯑rived the Engliſh fleet was out at ſea.

The Engliſh fleet was compoſed of fourteen ſhips of the line beſides frigates. The enemy had twelve of the line. They were ſuperior in the bulk of their ſhips and in the number of men, if they were inferior in the number of veſ⯑ſels; and it is the opinion of many perſons of judgment▪ that if they had formed a line of battle, and fought Mr. Boſcawen in order, they might very well have hoped for a better iſſue of this matter than they found. But the evil genius of France operating on the cowardice or incapacity of their commander, induced them to ſeparate their fleet and fly. The Engliſh ſhips were newly refitted; they pro⯑ved better ſailors; and the men, animated with the ſpirit⯑ed example of their admiral, engaged the French ſhips as they could overtake them; and they overtook ſome of them off Cape Lagos in Portugal. A briſk engagement enſu⯑ed. Two of the enemy's ſhips, the Ocean and the Re⯑doubtable, were run on ſhore and burned. The firſt was the ſhip of M. de la Clue, the French admiral, who eſca⯑ped to land; but being grievouſly wounded, and, as it is ſaid, having loſt both his legs, he died ſoon after. Two other capital ſhips, the Centaure and Modeſte, were taken.

The ſcattered remains of their fleet with difficulty got into the harbour of Cadiz, where they were ſoon after blocked up, and where they ſtill remain. This action hap⯑pened on the 18th of Auguſt; and it gave a great eclat to the Britiſh arms, which, in the ſame month, had triumph⯑ed ſo ſignally both by ſea and land ^(b).

CHAP. V.

AS the King of Pruſſia's victory at Roſbach had given the Hanoverians an opportunity to free their coun⯑try, it might be expected that the affair at Minden would [176] have ſerved to free his Pruſſian majeſty from ſome of the numerous armies that oppreſſed him. But as this battle was fought in the middle of the ſeaſon for action, and as Munſter ſtill continued in the poſſeſſion of the French, Prince Ferdinand could not venture at that time, to make any detachment from his army in the King's favour, with⯑out riſquing all the advantages which he had obtained from his victory. The King of Pruſſia was therefore left alone to ſtruggle with the Auſtrians, Ruſſians, Imperialiſts, and Swedes.

The Ruſſians, whoſe motions governed thoſe of all the other armies, left their camp at Poſna in Poland, and quit⯑ting the Viſtula, drew near to the banks of the Oder. They [177] were under the command of a Ruſſian nobleman, Count Soltikoff. Count Dohna, who had been ordered to oppoſe them, ſaw that their numbers were too conſiderable, and their poſts too ſtrong to be attacked with any proſpect of advantage, ſo that he contented himſelf with obſerving their motions, and haraſſing their march. This conduct ſeemed more dilatory and timid than the circumſtances, or the in⯑clinations of the King could bear. He is ſaid to have re⯑proached that General in ſo ſevere a manner, for a conduct in which he was in all probability very juſtifiable, that he took the firſt opportunity to reſign his command, and, un⯑der the pretence of recovering his health, retired to Ber⯑lin. The King immediately put General Wedel into his place, with poſitive orders to engage the Ruſſian army at all events. To enable him to obey his commands, he re⯑inforced him with ſeveral detachments from his own army. The poſitiveneſs of the King's orders on this occaſion may perhaps be cenſured; but it muſt be owned, that the time required a courſe next to deſperate. His hereditary domi⯑nions were in the utmoſt danger, and nothing but ſome great and fortunate ſtroke could effectually prevent the junction of the Auſtrian and Ruſſians armies, an event which, of all others, he had the greateſt reaſon to dread.

Fortified in ſome meaſure by the reinforcements he had received, and in conſequence of his orders, Gen. Wedel reſolved to attack the Ruſſians on their march. They had got to Zulichau and directed their courſe to Croſſen in Sileſia, to get before the Pruſ⯑ſian army, and to make good the paſſage of the Oder. The ſituation of the Ruſſians was very advantageous; poſt⯑ed upon eminences, defended by a powerful artillery, and near 70,000 ſtrong. The Pruſſian army fell ſhort of 30,000; and they had greater diſadvantages than their inferiority of number to get over. They had a bridge to paſs, and ſuch a narrow defile to ſtruggle through, that ſcarce a third of a battalion could march in front. The ground was ſuch, that the cavalry could not ſupport their infantry. Yet with all theſe difficulties the attack was long and reſolute. But this reſolution made their repulſe, which all theſe diſ⯑advantages had rendered inevitable, far more bloody and diſtreſsful. Four thouſand ſeven hundred were killed or priſoners: the wounded came to 3000. General Wober⯑ſnow, an officer of great ability, was killed, and General [178] Manteuffel was wounded. The Pruſſians were obliged to retire, but they were not purſued, and they paſſed the Oder without moleſtation. The Ruſſians ſeized upon the towns of Croſſen and Frankfort on the Oder.

The King of Pruſſia, ſince the beginning of the war, had never hitherto obtained an advantage where he was not perſonally preſent. His preſence now became more ne⯑ceſſary than ever. Since the action at Zulichau, the Ruſſi⯑ans had penetrated a conſiderable way into his territories, and had taken poſſeſſion of the important city of Frankfort upon the Oder. He therefore marched with 10,000 of his beſt troops, to join the broken army of Wedel, in order to drive this formidable and determined enemy from his country. Prince Henry commanded the remainder of his army, which was too well poſted to fear any inſult during his abſence. The eyes of all were fixed upon his march, and his ſoldiers, who remembered Zorndorf, eagerly long⯑ed to try their ſtrength once more with the ſame anta⯑goniſts.

M. Daun was not unappriſed of the motions of the Ruſſi⯑ans, or the deſigns of the King of Pruſſia. He knew that the great fault of the Ruſſian troops, was the want of a re⯑gular and firm cavalry, which might be depended upon in a day of action. This defect was a principal cauſe of their misfortune at Zorndorf in the laſt year; a misfortune which diſconcerted all the operations of that campaign. As this was the only want which the Ruſſians were under, ſo it was that which Daun was beſt able to ſupply at a ſhort warning. With this view he ſelected about 12,000 of his horſe, and there is no better horſe than that of the Auſtrians, which with about 8000 foot, he placed under the command of Gen. Laudohn, one of the ableſt officers in that ſervice. This body was divided into two columns, one of which marched through Sileſia, and the other through Luſatia. By extreme good fortune and conduct, with little loſs or oppoſition, they both joined the Ruſſian army, and were received with tranſports of joy.

In the mean time the King of Pruſſia, who was unable to prevent this ſtroke, joined General Wedel at Muhlroſe, and took upon him the command of the united armies. But ſtill finding himſelf too weak for the deciſive action he was preparing to attempt, he recalled General Finck, whom he had ſent ſome time [179] before into Saxony with nine thouſand men, in order to op⯑poſe the Imperialiſts in that country. With theſe reinforce⯑ments he was not able to raiſe his army to fifty thouſand compleat. That of the Ruſſians ſince the junction of Lau⯑dohn, was upwards of ninety thouſand. They had beſides, taken a poſt, which they had ſo ſtrongly entrenched, and defended with ſuch a prodigious number of cannon, that it was extremely difficult and hazardous to attempt them, yet under theſe accumulated diſadvantages, it was abſolute⯑ly neceſſary that he ſhould fight. The detachments from Count Daun's army already menaced Berlin; Saxony, which he was obliged to leave expoſed, had become a prey to the Imperialiſts; and the Ruſſians united with the Au⯑ſtrians, encamped before his eyes in Sileſia, the beſt and richeſt part of his dominions. In ſhort, his former repu⯑tation, his preſent difficulties, his future hopes, every mo⯑tive of honour and of ſafety demanded an engagement; the campaign haſted to a deciſion, and it was evident that no⯑thing farther could be done by marches and choice of poſts. The ſanguine temper of other generals has often obliged them to fight under diſadvantages; but the King of Pruſſia's circumſtances were ſuch, that from the multitude of his e⯑nemies, he was neither able to conſult times nor ſituations. Raſhneſs could hardly dictate, any thing which in his con⯑dition, would not have been recommended by prudence.

When the attack was reſolved, the King's troops put themſelves in motion at two in the morning, and having formed themſelves in a wood, advanced towards the enemy. It was near eleven, before the action began. The principal effort of the King of Pruſ⯑ſia was againſt the left wing of the Ruſſian army. He be⯑gan according to their uſual method, with a fierce cannon⯑ade, which having had the effect he deſired from it, he attacked that wing with ſeveral battalions diſpoſed in co⯑lumns.

The Ruſſian entrenchments were forced with great ſlaughter. Seventy-two pieces of cannon were taken. But ſtill there was a defile to be paſſed, and ſeveral redoubts to be maſtered, which covered the village of Cunnerſdorf. Theſe were attacked with the ſame reſolution, and taken one after another. The enemy made another ſtand at the village, and endeavoured to preſerve their ground there, by puſhing forward ſeveral battalions of horſe and foot; [180] but their reſiſtance there, proved not more effectual than it had done every where elſe; they were driven from poſt to poſt, quite to the laſt redoubts. For upwards of ſix hours Fortune favoured the Pruſſians, who every where broke the enemy, with an unparallelled ſlaughter. They had driven them from almoſt all the ground which they had occupied before the battle, they had taken more than half their artillery; ſcarce any thing ſeemed wanting to the moſt complete deciſion.

The King in thoſe circumſtances wrote a billet to the Queen to this effect; ‘Madam, we have beat the Ruſſi⯑ans from their entrenchments. In two hours expect to hear of a glorious victory.’ This news arrived at Ber⯑lin, juſt as the poſt was going out, and the friends of the King of Pruſſia throughout Europe, exulted in a certain concluſive victory. Mean time, Fortune was preparing for him a terrible reverſe.

The enemy, defeated in almoſt every quarter, found their left wing, ſhattered as it was, to be more entire than any other part of the army. Count Soltikoff therefore aſ⯑ſembled the remains of his right, and gathering as many as he could from the centre, reinforced that wing, and made a ſtand at a redoubt which had been erected on an advan⯑tageous eminence, in a place called The Jew [...] burying ground. Nothing was wanting to finiſh matters in favour of the King, but to drive the Ruſſians from this their laſt hope. But this enterprize was difficult. It is confidently ſaid, that the Pruſſian generals were unanimous in opinion, that they ſhould not endeavour at that time to puſh any fur⯑ther the advantages they had obtained. They repreſented to the King, that the enemy was ſtill very numerous, their artillery conſiderable, and the poſt which they occupied of great ſtrength; that his brave troops, who had been en⯑gaged for ſo long a time, in the ſevereſt action, perhaps, ever known, and in one of the hotteſt days ever felt, were too much exhauſted for a new attempt; an attempt of ſuch extreme difficulty, as might daunt even troops that were quite freſh. That the advantage he gained would be as de⯑ciſive in its conſequences as that at Zorndorf; and whilſt the enemy filled the gazettes of their party, with frivolous diſputes of the field of battle, he would be reaping, as he did then, all the effects of an unqueſtioned victory. That the enemy would be obliged to retire immediately into Po⯑land, [181] and to leave him at liberty to act in other quarters, where his preſence was full as neceſſary.

Theſe reaſons were very cogent; and for a few moments they ſeemed to ha [...] ſome weight with the King. But his character ſoon determined him to a contrary reſolution. He could not bear to be a conqueror by halves. One effort more was alone wanting to that victory, which would free him for ever from the adverſary, which had leaned heavieſt on him during the whole war.

Once more he put all to the hazard. His infantry, ſtill reſolute, and ſupported by their late ſucceſs, were readily brought to act again. They drew on their bodies fainting with heat and labour to a new attack. But the enterprize was beyond their ſtrength. The ſituation of the enemy was impregnable; and their artillery, which began to be ſupe⯑rior to that of the Pruſſians, on account of the difficulty of the ground, which made it impoſſible for the latter to bring up any other than a few ſmall pieces, repulſed theſe feeble battalions with a great ſlaughter. With an aſtoniſhing, per⯑haps, with a blameable perſeverance, the Pruſſian infantry was brought to a ſecond attack, and were a ſecond time repulſed, and with a loſs greater than at firſt. Theſe ef⯑forts being unſucceſsful, the affair was put to the cavalry. They made redoubled but uſeleſs attacks; the horſes were ſpent, as well as thoſe they carried.

It was juſt at that time, when the Pruſſian horſe was waſted by theſe unſucceſsful efforts, that the greateſt part of the Ruſſian, and the whole body of the Auſtrian cavalry, which had been hitherto quite inactive, and which was therefore quite freſh, ruſhed down upon them, broke them to pieces, forced them back upon their foot, and threw the whole into irreparable diſorder. The whole army was ſeiz⯑ed with a panic; and in a few minutes thoſe troops, ſo lately victorious and irreſiſtable, were totally diſperſed and defeated. The King did every thing to reſtore the field, hazarding his perſon, even beyond his former daring, and prodigal of a life, which he ſeemed to think, ought not to be ſeparated from conqueſt. Thrice he led on his troops to the charge; two horſes were killed under him; ſeveral balls were in his cloaths. The efforts of ſkill, courage, and deſpair, were made, and proved ineffectual; a ſingle error outweighed them all. Scarcely a general, hardly an inferior officer in the army was without ſome wound. That of Ge⯑neral [182] Seidlitz was particularly unfortunate; for to that wound, the failure of the horſe which he commanded, was principally attributed. It was to the ſpirit and conduct of this able officer, that a great part of the ſucceſs at Zorndorf was owing, and the laſt campaign. It is known, that if it had not been for a ſeaſonable movement of the horſe, the whole Pruſſian army had then been in great danger of a defeat.

The night, and the prudent uſe of ſome eminences, which were defended as well as circumſtances would admit, preſerved the Pruſſian army from total deſtruction. How⯑ever, this loſs was far greater than any which they had ſuſ⯑tained from the beginning of the war. All their cannon was taken, the killed, wounded, and priſoners, by the moſt favourable accounts, were near twenty thouſands. Gene⯑ral Putkammer was killed on the ſpot. Theſe generals whoſe names are ſo diſtinguiſhed in this war, Itzenplitz, Hulſen, Finck, Wedel, and Seidlitz, were among the wounded; as was the Prince of Wurtenburg, and five ma⯑jor generals. The enemy could not have fewer than ten thouſand killed on their ſide. For hardly ever was a more bloody battle.

When the King of Pruſſia found himſelf obliged to quit the field, he ſent another diſpatch to the Queen, expreſſed in this manner, ‘Remove from Berlin with the royal fa⯑mily. Let the archives be carried to Potzdam. The town may make conditions with the enemy.’ We ſhould in vain attempt to draw the picture of the court and city, on the receipt of ſuch news in the midſt of the joy, which they indulged for that which they had received but a few hours before. The terror was increaſed by the indi⯑ſtinct relation that ſoon followed, which gave them only to underſtand, that their army was totally routed; that there was no account of the King, and that a Ruſſian army was advancing to take poſſeſſion of their city.

The day after the battle, the King of Pruſſia repaſſed the Oder, and encamped at Retwein. From thence he moved to Fuſtenwalde, and placed himſelf in ſuch a man⯑ner, that the Ruſſians did not venture to make any attempt upon Berlin. He continually watched their army; a part of which, inſtead of turning towards Brandenburgh, march⯑ed into Luſatia, where it joined that of the Auſtrians. Here the victorious General Soltikoff, for the firſt time, met M. [183] Daun, and amidſt rejoicings and congratulations, conſulted about the meaſures for improving their ſucceſs.

The Ruſſian and Auſtrian armies thus united, ſcarce ſeemed from their ſtrength and their victories, to have any other deliberation left, than of what part of the Pruſſian dominions they ſhould take poſſeſſion. The King was twice defeated with a vaſt loſs. He was cut off from all commu⯑nication with the army of his brother Prince Henry; yet to the aſtoniſhment of all the world, the ſuperior, the vic⯑torious and united army acted upon the defenſive, and were curbed in all their motions, and fruſtrated in all their de⯑ſigns, by the inferior, the beated and divided. Nothing ever ſhewed the genius of the King of Pruſſia more fully, than his conduct after the battle of Cunnerſdorf. In a few days after ſo terrible a defeat, every thing was in order in his camp. He ſupplied the loſs of his artillery from his ſtores in Berlin. He recalled General Kleiſt, with about five thouſand men from Pomerania; in preſence of two ſuch armies as thoſe, of M. Daun and Count Soltikoff, he de⯑tached ſix thouſand men from his ſmall body, to the relief of Saxony, where the army of the Empire had availed itſelf of his abſence, to reduce the whole country. Hall, Wit⯑temberg, Leipſic, Torgau, and at laſt Dreſden itſelf, had opened their gates to the Imperialiſts. With the remain⯑der of his troops, he put himſelf between the Ruſſians and Great Glogau, covered that city, which was the object of the enemy's deſigns, and ſaw them ſoon after, notwith⯑ſtanding their two victories, obliged to return again into Poland; and to leave him free for the reſt of the campaign.

What was done by the King of Pruſſia ſince that time, will be the ſubject of another chapter; after we have re⯑lated the proceedings of the Engliſh and French in America, to which the order of time directs our preſent attention. But we cannot diſmiſs the affairs of Germany, in which two ſuch battles as thoſe of Minden and Cunnerſdorf were fought, with events ſo different for the common cauſe, without obſerving ſomething concerning the two generals who conducted them.

They are certainly in reputation the firſt in Europe, which probably never produced two greater men; though they differ as much in their characters, and in the kind of talents they poſſeſs, as they agree in the greatneſs of their abilities for war. The King of Pruſſia, rapid, vehement, [184] impatient, often gives deciſive blows; but he often miſſes his ſtroke, and wounds himſelf. Prince Ferdinand is cool, deliberate, exact, and guarded; he ſees every poſſible ad⯑vantage, he takes it at the moment, purſues it as far as it will go; but never attempts to puſh it farther. Nothing in the man diſturbs the commander. In him, we do not ſee a perſon who is a great ſoldier; it is the idea of a per⯑fect General; it is a general in the abſtract. Ferdinand ſuffers his temper to be guided by his buſineſs. He never precipitates matters; he takes them in their order and their courſe, and truſts nothing to fortune. The King on the other hand, leads, and even forces circumſtances; he does not endeavour to remove but to over-leap obſtacles; he puts all to the riſque; and by ſuffering Fortune to play her part in his deſigns, he acquires a ſplendor and eclat in his actions, which mere wiſdom could never give him. Prince Ferdinand is famous for never committing a fault. The King of Pruſſia is above all the world, in repairing thoſe he has committed. Like ſome of the great maſters in writing, when ever he makes, or ſeems to make a miſ⯑take, it is a ſignal to the obſerver, to prepare for ſome great and admirable ſtroke of ſpirit and conduct. His er⯑rors ſeem to be ſpurs to his abilities. He commits an er⯑ror, he repairs it; he errs again; and again aſtoniſhes us by his manner of eſcaping. We ſhould often condemn the commander, but that we are always forced to admire the hero.

CHAP. VI.

THE theatre of our operations in America, is of ſuch a vaſt extent, that if we had perſevered in the courſe we purſued for ſome time, in attacking but one place at once, the war would inevitably be ſpun out to an extreme length, without bringing on any thing deciſive; and it would have rendered our natural ſuperiority of little uſe, by ſuffering the French to collect, as they had hitherto [185] done, their ſtrength into one ſingle point, which enabled them to contend with us, with a force ſufficient for the ſervice in that country. This year another method was followed. It was propoſed to attack the French in all their ſtrong poſts at once; to fall as nearly as poſſible at the ſame time upon Crown Points, Niagara, and the forts to the ſouth of Lake Erie, whilſt a great naval ar⯑mament, and a conſiderable body of land forces ſhould attempt Quebec, by the River St. Lawrence.

This plan was very adviſable, as it tended to weaken, by diſtracting the reſiſtance of the enemy, and whilſt we adhered to it, it was clearly impoſſible for the French to maintain their ground in any of thoſe places which were attacked, without very weakly defending, or even deſert⯑ing ſome of the others; and if, by the means of ſuch diverſions, any of thoſe places ſhould fall into our hands, the campaign could not be ſaid to be ſpent to no purpoſe. But beſides the end in diſtracting the enemy's defence, there was another propoſed of no leſs conſequence; which was to make a concurrence in all the various operations, ſo that whilſt they divided the enemy, they might mutually ſupport one another.

General Amherſt, who commanded the American forces in chief, with the moſt conſiderable body, amounting, in regulars and provincials, to about twelve thouſand men, was to attack Ticonderoga and Crown Point by Lake-George; the reduction of thoſe forts would naturally lay open the Lake Champlain, where, having eſtabliſhed a ſufficient naval force, he was by the River Sorel, which forms the communication between this Lake and the great River St. Lawrence, to proceed directly to Quebec, the capital of Canada. Here he was to make a junction with General Wolfe and Admiral Saunders, who having entered the River St. Lawrence at the oppoſite quarter, would pro⯑bably have commenced the ſiege of Quebec, by the time that General Amherſt might find it practicable to join them. It was not doubted, that if this junction could be effected, the reduction of that city would follow of courſe.

The third of the grand operations was againſt the fort, near the Fall of Niagara; a place of very great conſequence both in war and in peace. The reduction of this was com⯑mitted to Brigadier General Prideaux, under whom Sir William Johnſon commanded the provincials of New York, [186] and ſeveral Indians of the Five Nations, who were engaged in our ſervice by the credit that gentleman had obtained a⯑mong their tribes.

The object of this operation lay too remote from the o⯑thers, to expect, with any great confidence, that they could be aſſiſted by its ſucceſs in any other manner than by weakening the enemy's forces. However it was hoped, that if they ſhould be fortunate enough to take Niagara, early in the ſeaſon, the troops might be embarked on the Lake Ontario, and finding no longer any obſtruction from Fort Frontenac, which was deſtroyed laſt year, might fall down the River St. Lawrence, and poſſibly either make themſelves maſters of Montreal, or by their approach at leaſt, draw ſuch a force to that part, as greatly to faci⯑litate our deſigns upon Quebec and Crown Point. But if this ſcheme, in addition to its own end, ſhould not facili⯑tate either of the other two capital undertakings, it would probably, as it was the moſt important place the French had in that part of the world, draw all the troops they had upon the Lakes to attempt its relief, which would leave the fort, on thoſe Lakes expoſed to a fourth, though infe⯑rior expedition, which was made againſt them, under Ge⯑neral Stanwix. In reality, it afterwards had that effect.

The army under General Amherſt was the firſt in mo⯑tion. The Lake George, or, as the French call it, Lake Sacrament, is a long, but in proportion, narrow water, a⯑bout forty miles in length, and encloſed on either ſide with marſhy grounds. This communicates by another long and very narrow ſtreight with Lake Champlain. This ſtreight is ſecured at each ſide by a fort; that to the ſide of Lake George, is called Ticonderoga; that to the Champlain Lake, is called Fort Frederick, or Crown Point; both extremely ſtrong in their ſituation; and the former of which had repulſed our troops with a very conſiderable ſlaughter, as has been related amongſt the events of the laſt year.

General Amherſt, after he had paſſed Lake George, ar⯑rived with very little oppoſition from the enemy before Ti⯑conderoga; at firſt the French made ſome appearance, as if they meant to defend the place; but as they knew the ſtrength of our forces, as they ſaw that the preparations for the attack were making with as much judgment as vi⯑gour, and as the enterprize which was preparing againſt Quebec, did not leave them a force ſo conſiderable as they [187] had there in the preceding campaign, they abandoned their fort in the night, having damaged it as much as they could, and retired to Crown Point

General Am [...]rſt immediately ſet himſelf about repair⯑ing the fortifications of this poſt, which effectually ſecured the Lake George; covered our colonies, and was of ſuch vaſt importance, to enable him to puſh forward his offen⯑ſive operations, or to favour his retreat, in caſe of a re⯑verſe of fortune. The only loſs of any conſequence which the Engliſh army ſuffered, in making this valuable acquiſi⯑tion, was the death of Colonel Townſend, who was killed in reconnoitring, by a ſhot from the fort. The ſteady bravery, the promiſing genius, and the agreeable manners of this officer, cauſed this loſs to be conſidered as a very great one. They compared this melancholy event with the death of Lord Howe; they remembered how much theſe young ſoldiers reſembled each other, both in their virtues, and in the circumſtances of their fate. Both dear to the troops, and having both loſt their lives on an expe⯑dition againſt this place.

Although the general had reaſon to imagine, that the ſame reaſons which had induced the enemy to abandon their fort and lines at Ticonderoga, would perſuade them alſo to relinquiſh Crown Point; he took all his meaſures with the ſame care, as if he expected an obſtinate defence at the fort, and an attempt to ſurprize him on his march. He remembered how fatal ſecurity had proved to us, in that part of the world upon many occaſions.

The French abandoned the fort as it had been foreſeen. The general retired with about three thouſand five hundred men to the bottom of Lake Champlain, and poſted himſelf at the iſland called Iſle du Noix. He was ſtill pretty ſtrong on the lake, having ſeveral armed boats and ſloops, with which he hoped to prevent the progreſs of the Engliſh into the interior parts of Canada. General Amherſt, as ſoon as he had taken poſſeſſion of Crown Point, uſed every endeavour to attain a naval ſuperiority on the lake, and in the mean time began to fortify this poſt, as he had that at Ticonderoga. To this time the French were actu⯑ally eſtabliſhed in the heart of our territories; ſo that dur⯑ing a war of three years, we had in effect been only acting on the defenſive. It was on the day on which Mr. Am⯑herſt took poſſeſſion of Crown Point, that he received the [188] agreeable news of the reduction of Niagara, by the troops under Sir William Johnſon; and he had the pleaſure and encouragement of ſeeing two of the great objects of the campaign accompliſhed, whilſt he prepared himſelf to co-operate in the accompliſhment of the third, which was to be deciſive of the whole. The body which had been appointed for Niagara, under General Prideaux, without any accident arrived at the fort, which lies at the bottom of the lake, towards the ſouth-weſt ^(a).

This is without exception, the moſt important poſt in America, and ſecures the greateſt number of communica⯑tions. For it is ſituated at the very entrance of a ſtreight, by which the Lake Ontario is joined to that of Erie, which is connected with the other three great ſeas of freſh water, by the courſe of the [...]ſt riv [...] St. Lawrence, which runs through them all, and carries off their ſuperfluous waters to the ocean. A little above the fort, is the cataract of Niagara, which is eſteemed the moſt remarkable in the world, for the quantity of water, and the greatneſs of the fall. This fall would interrupt the commerce between the lakes, but for a road which the French have made up the hilly country that lies up the ſtreight; ſo that there is here a good carrying-place, and not very tedious; for after a portage of about eight miles, you reimbark again, and pro⯑ceed without any interruption to the Lake Erie.

As the great communication of thoſe who go by water is along this ſtreight, and carrying place, ſo thoſe who tra⯑vel by land, are obliged to croſs it. The lakes are ſo diſ⯑poſed, that without a ſomewhat hazardous voyage, the In⯑dians cannot any otherwiſe paſs from the north-weſt to the ſouth-eaſt parts of North-America, for many hundred miles. The fort of Niagara, thus naturally commands all the Five Nations, and all thoſe Indian tribes that lie to the north⯑ward of the lakes, as well as thoſe that are ſcattered along the banks of the Ohio, Ouabache, and Miſſiſippi, and ac⯑cording as it is poſſeſſed by the Engliſh or the French, connects or disjoints the colonies of Canada and Louſiana, protects or lays open our own, and is in all reſpects of ſo much conſequence, that it was the opinion of perſons, the moſt converſant in American buſineſs, that this attempt ought to have been made much earlier; and, that if ſuch an attempt, made at ſuch a time, had ſucceeded, it would have contributed very much to the ſecurity of thoſe parts [190] of our colonies, which were the moſt expoſed, and would have, at the ſame time, greatly facilitated all our offenſive meaſures, and ſhortened the war.

From the time that the French were acquainted with this place, they were fully poſſeſſed with an opinion of its importance, both with regard to commerce, and to domi⯑nion. They made ſeveral attempts to eſtabliſh themſelves here; but the Indians who ſeemed more ſenſible of the con⯑ſequences than we were, conſtantly oppoſed it. They guarded this ſpot for a long time, with a very ſevere and prudent jealouſy.

But whilſt we neglected, confiding in our ſtrength, to cul⯑tivate the friendſhip of the Indians, the French, ſenſible of their weakneſs, omitted no endeavour to gain theſe ſavage people to their intereſts, and they prevailed at laſt, under the name of a trading houſe, to erect a ſtrong fort at the mouth of the ſtreight, on the very beſt harbour, not only on this, but on any of the lakes; an harbour which is ſafe from e⯑very wind, and open for the whole year. A French officer, an able and enterpriſing man, had been a priſoner among the Iroquois for a long time, and having, according to their cuſtom, been naturalized, he grew extremely popular a⯑mongſt them, and at laſt acquired his liberty. He com⯑municated to the then Governor of Canada, the plan of an eſtabliſhment at Niagara, and he himſelf undertook to exe⯑cute it. He returned amongſt the Iroquois, and pretending great love for their nation, which was now his own, told them, that he would gladly come to make frequent viſits to his brethren; but it was proper for that purpoſe, that they ſhould allow him to build an houſe, where he might live at eaſe, and according to his own manner: at the ſame time, he propoſed to them, advantages in trade from this eſtabliſhment. A requeſt, which ſeemed a compliment to thoſe to whom it was made, was readily granted. The houſe was built. By degrees this houſe extended itſelf; it was ſtrengthened by various additions; and it grew at laſt to a regular fortreſs, which has ever ſince awed the Five Nations, and checked our colonies.

The ſiege of this place had not been long formed, before General Prideaux was killed in the trenches, by the burſting of a cohorn. As ſoon as this accident happened, which threatened to throw a damp on the ope⯑rations, [191] an expreſs was ſent to General Amberſt, who al⯑ways attentive to the ſervice, loſt no time to ſend an offi⯑cer of character to command in his place. But the com⯑mand, which in the interim devolved upon Sir William Johnſon, could not have been better beſtowed. He omit⯑ted nothing to continue the vigorous meaſures of the late General, and added to them, every thing his own genius could ſuggeſt. Reſpected by the regular troops, dear to the provincials, almoſt adored by the Indians, poſſeſſed of that genius for acquiring popularity amongſt all kinds of men, and that verſatile diſpoſition, which we ſo ſeldom ſee united with diſintereſtedneſs and integrity, he employed thoſe talents ſolely for the benefit of his country. The troops, remembering, that it was under that General, the firſt advantage had been obtained over the French, puſhed on the ſiege with ſo much alacrity, that in a few days they had brought their approaches within an hundred yards of the covered way

The French were alarmed at the imminent danger of this intereſting place. They therefore collected all the regular troops and provincials, which they could draw from all their poſts about the lakes, and to thoſe joined a large body of ſavages, in order to give the Engliſh battle, and to raiſe the ſiege. The amounted in all to 1700 men.

When General Johnſon was apprized of their approach, he ordered his light infantry, ſupported by ſome grenadiers and regular foot, to take poſt on the road to his left, by which the French were to take their route. He placed his Indians on his flanks. Whilſt he took meaſures to receive the French, who came to relieve the place, he poſted a ſtrong body, in ſuch a manner, as to ſecure his trenches from any attempt of the garriſon during an engagement.

In this diſpoſition he waited to receive the ene⯑my. At nine in the morning the engagement be⯑gan, by a violent and horrid ſcream of the enemy's ſavages, according to their barbarous cuſtom. It was this ſcream, perhaps the moſt horrid ſound that can be imagined, which is ſaid to have ſtruck a panic into the troops of General Braddock, and was one of the principal cauſes of that de⯑feat, by which our endeavours in America were ſo long fruſtrated; but on this occaſion it had no effect. The e⯑nemy was ſo well received by the troops in front, and by the Indians on their flanks, that in leſs than an hour's time, [192] their whole army was ruined. The purſuit was hot and bloody; and it continued for five miles. Seventeen offi⯑cers were made priſoners, among whom were the firſt and ſecond in command.

This action was fought in ſight of the fort; and it was no ſooner concluded it favour of our troops, than the General ſummoned the garriſon to ſur⯑render; ſending a liſt of the priſoners, and remonſtrating on the ill effects of their holding out longer, particularly with regard to the Indians. The capitulation was ſigned that night. The garriſon, conſiſting of about 600 men, ſurrendered priſoners of war, and were conducted to New York. The fort and ſtores were given up to the Engliſh troops.

This was the ſecond very important ſervice performed by General Johnſon in this war, and a ſecond time he had the good fortune to make the commander in chief of the enemy his priſoner. It muſt not be omitted, to the ho⯑nour of this gentleman, that though he was not regularly bred a ſoldier, the moſt compleat officer could not have made more excellent diſpoſitions for the battle, or have conducted the ſiege from the beginning to the end, with a more cool and ſteady reſolution, or with a more compleat knowledge of all the neceſſary manoeuvres of war. The taking of Niagara broke off effectually that communication, ſo much talked off, and ſo much dreaded, between Ca⯑nada and Louiſiana, and by this ſtroke, one of the capi⯑tal political deſigns of the French, which gave occaſion to the preſent war, was defeated in its direct and im⯑mediate object.

CHAP. VII.

THE conſequences which attended the reduction of the fort of Niagara, as well as thoſe upon Lake Cham⯑plain, were very intereſting; but the great and central operation to which all the reſt tended, and to which even thoſe were to be only ſubſervient, was that againſt Que⯑bec, the capital of Canada; and as this was to be the de⯑ciſive ſtroke, it was proper that the greateſt force ſhould have been employed againſt it. If we reckon the maritime force, there is no doubt that we employed a greater num⯑ber of men againſt Quebec, than againſt the Champlain forts; but the land forces, from ſome cauſe, fell much ſhort of the number originally propoſed, for they did not exceed 7000 men, regulars and provincials, though the original plan intended 9000 for that expedition, indepen⯑dent of the junction of thoſe under Gen. Amherſt, whoſe aſſiſtance on the occaſion was taken for granted. In this expedition Gen. Wolfe commanded the land forces. The fleet was under Admiral Saunders.

The whole embarkation arrived in the latter end of June in the Iſle of Orleans, a few leagues from Quebec, without any accident whatſoever, notwithſtanding the ill fame of the river St. Laurence, and the reports of its dangerous navigation, probably ſpread for political purpoſes. They landed upon the Iſle of Or⯑leans, which is formed by the branches of the river St. Laurence. This iſland is about twenty miles in length, and ſeven or eight in breadth, highly cultivated, and af⯑fording every kind of refreſhment to the ſoldiers and ſailors after their tedious voyage.

As this iſland extends quite up to the baſon of Quebec, it was neceſſary to poſſeſs it in order to act againſt the [194] town; for the moſt weſterly point of this iſland advances towards an high point of land on the continent, called Point Levi. Both of theſe ſhut up the view of the northern and ſouthern channel, which environ the iſle of Orleans, ſo that the harbour of Quebec appears to be a baſon landlock⯑ed upon all ſides. The poſſeſſion of both theſe points were neceſſary, as they might be employed either with great ad⯑vantage againſt the town, or much to the annoyance of the beſiegers; for whilſt the enemy continued maſters of thoſe, it was impoſſible for a ſhip to lie in the harbour of Quebec. When theſe poſts were poſſeſſed, which was done with little difficulty, the harbour and town of Quebec appeared full to the view, at on [...]e a tempting and diſcouraging ſight. For no place ſeems poſſeſſed of greater benefits of nature; nor any of which nature ſeems more to have con⯑ſulted the defence.

Quebec, ſays F. Charlevoix, can boaſt of a freſh water harbour, capable of containing an hundred men of war of the line, at one hundred and twenty leagues diſtance from the ſea. It lies on the moſt navigable river in the univerſe. The river St. Laurence up to the iſle of Orleans, that is for about 112 leagues from its mouth, is no where leſs than from four to five leagues broad; but above that iſle it nar⯑rows, ſo that before Quebec it is not above a mile over. Hence this place got the name of Quebeis or Quebec, which, in the Algonquin tongue, ſignifies a ſtrait.

The city is the ſeat of the governor and the intend⯑ant, and the ſupreme tribunals of juſtice for all the French North America; it is alſo an epiſcopal ſee, and a place of conſiderable trade. It is large in extent, and elegant in many of its buildings both public and private. It conſiſts of an upper and lower town; the lower, which is narrow, is built upon a ſtrand, at the foot of a lofty rock, upon which the upper town ſtands. This rock extends itſelf, and continues with a bold and ſteep front, weſtward along the river St. Laurence for a conſiderable way. Another river from the north-weſt, called St. Charles, falls here in⯑to the former, waſhing the foot of the rock on which Que⯑bec ſtands; the point on which the town is built, thus be⯑comes a ſort of peninſula by the junction of theſe rivers; ſo that whoever attacks Quebec, muſt either make his ap⯑proaches above the town, and overcome the precipice which I have mentioned, or croſs the river St. Charles, and at⯑tempt [195] it upon that ſide. The former of thoſe methods muſt appear to a prudent commander wholly unadviſeable, and the latter extremely difficult. If the former method ſhould be attempted, they would have that dangerous precipice to overcome, defended by the enemies whole force, which the attack would draw to this quarter. On the other hand the country from the river St. Charles to the northward, for more than five miles, is extremely rough, broken and difficult, full of rivulets, gullies, and ravines, and ſo con⯑tinues to the river of Montmorenci, which flows by the foot of a ſteep and woody hill. On the ſide of the river St. Laurence is a bank of ſand of great extent, which pre⯑vents the approach of any conſiderable veſſel.

In this advantageous ſituation was the French army poſt⯑ed, upon what was deemed the only acceſſible ſide of Que⯑bec, all along from the river St. Charles to that of Mont⯑morenci, entrenched at every attackable ſpot, with the ri⯑ver and ſandbank abovementioned in their front, and thick impenetrable woods upon their rear. It is impoſſible to imagine a ſtronger poſt; a poſt at once more defenſible in itſelf, or better calculated for ſuccouring a city, on which ſide ſoever it ſhould be attacked. Thus poſted, they great⯑ly exceeded in number the beſiegers, being about 10,000 men, under an able, and thitherto fortunate commander, M. de Montcalm, who, though he was ſuperior in number to the Engliſh, reſolved to riſque nothing, and wiſely relied on the natural ſtrength of the country.

When Wolfe ſaw the ſituation of the town, the nature of the country, the number of the troops, and their poſiti⯑on, though of a ſanguine temper and highly adventurous, he began to deſpair; but, however another commander might have thought inaction in ſuch circumſtances juſtified to himſelf, or even to the world, by ſuch ſtrong appearan⯑ces, Wolfe reſolved to leave nothing unattempted, but amidſt the choice of difficulties which lay before him, to pitch upon thoſe where the valour of his troops might be employed with the beſt proſpect of ſucceſs.

As ſoon as he had ſecured the weſt point of the iſle of Orleans, and that of Levi, he erected batteries there of cannon and mortars, on the high ground, from the point of Levi, which looks towards the town; theſe fired conti⯑nually upon the place; Admiral Saunders was ſtationed be⯑low in the north channel of the iſle of Orleans, oppoſite to [196] Montmorenci; Admiral Holmes was ſtationed above the town, at once to diſtract the enemies attention, and to pre⯑vent any attempts from the enemy againſt the batteries that played upon the town.

After this wiſe diſpoſition was made of the fleet, Gen. Wolfe cauſed the troops to be tranſported over the north channel of the river St. Laurence, to the north-eaſt of Mont⯑morenci, with a view of paſſing that river, and bringing the enemy to an engagement. Some heights which com⯑manded the enemies intrenchments, and a ford above, and another below the falls, encouraged him to this attempt; but upon reconnoitring the ground, the oppoſite ſhore was found ſo ſteep and woody, that he could not hope to put his deſign in execution, which was by moving towards the ene⯑mies flank, to draw them to an engagement. To bring the French to an action was his ſingle object. He had found that any attempts to aſſault the city would prove to no purpoſe, whilſt the fleet could only batter the lower town, and muſt ſuffer greatly by the cannon and bombs of the upper, whilſt they were employed in this ineffectual ſervice; for after the reduction of the lower town, the paſ⯑ſages to the upper were extremely ſteep, and moreover ſo well entrenched, that this advantage would prove little to⯑wards the reduction of the place.

The only point left, therefore, was by every means to entice or force the enemy to an engagement; and to this end no means were omitted, by ſending detachments up the river, and by every appearance of a deſign to attack the town on that ſide. But the Marquis de Montcalm, in chuſing his poſt, was well appriſed of its importance. He knew ſufficiently the nature of the country up the river, and he truſted to it; and therefore kept himſelf cloſely in his poſt, diſpoſing his parties of ſavages, in which he was very ſtrong, in ſuch a manner, as to make any attempt upon him by ſurpriſe abſolutely impoſſible. In the mean time, from the town, fireſhips and boats were let down the ſtream to deſtroy the ſhipping, which, as they almoſt wholly filled the channel, were greatly endangered. But by the ex⯑traordinary ſkill and vigilance of Admiral Saunders, every veſſel of this kind ſent againſt them was towed aſhore with⯑out doing the leaſt miſchief.

[197]The general finding that all his efforts to decoy the enemy to an engagement had proved unſucceſsful, and, ſenſible that they deſired nothing more than to act defenſively, un⯑til the ſeaſon itſelf ſhould fight for them and oblige the Engliſh to retire, he came at laſt, in ſpite of all difficulties, to the reſolution of attacking them in their entrenchments on the ſide of Montmorenci. The place where the attack was to be made, was choſen with great judgment, as the only place thereabouts in which the artillery could be brought into uſe; as there, and there only, the greateſt part, or even the whole of the troops, might act at once, and that there the retreat in caſe of a repulſe was ſecure, at leaſt for a certain time of the tide. Having determined upon the place where the attack was to be, which was at the mouth of the river Montmorenci, the beſt diſpoſitions for it were made, both on the part of the Admiral and of the General. But notwithſtanding that the whole was conducted with equal vigour and prudence, it was totally defeated by one of thoſe accidents which ſo fre⯑quently interpoſe to the diſgrace of human wiſdom, and which demonſtrates that ſhe is far from being the ſole arbi⯑treſs of war.

The Engliſh grenadiers, who led the attack, had orders, immediately after their landing, to form themſelves on the beach; but inſtead of forming themſelves as they were di⯑rected, from the hurry and noiſe of their landing, or from an ill-governed ardor, they ruſhed impetuouſly towards the enemies entrenchments in the utmoſt diſorder and confuſi⯑on, without waiting for the corps which were to ſuſtain them, and join in the attack. In this diſorder, they were met by a violent and ſteady fire from the entrenchments, by which they were thrown into more confuſion, and obliged them to ſhelter themſelves behind a redoubt, which the French had abandoned on their appro [...]ch.

The General perceiving that it was impoſſible for theſe grenadiers to form under ſo ſevere a fire, that the night drew on, a violent tempeſt was gathering, and the tide began to make, ſaw clearly that he had nothing further left, than to order a retreat, with as little diſadvantage as poſſible. He therefore called off thoſe troops, and having formed behind Brig. Monckton's corps, which was on the beach in excel⯑lent [198] order, the whole repaſſed the river without moleſtati⯑on, the General expoſing his perſon with that intrepidity, which diſtinguiſhed him both during the attack, and the retreat.

The loſs in this check was not inconſiderable; and the event on the whole was ſuch, as to diſcourage any further attempts upon that ſide. They returned to the old meaſures. The General again ſent ſome bodies above the town, and ſome men of war ſailed up the ſtream for more than twelve leagues. They received intelligence that the enemy had amaſſed ſome magazines of proviſions in the interior coun⯑try, and they propoſed by getting between them and the town, to draw the French army from their entrenchments, to the long-deſired engagement; but if they failed to com⯑paſs this, they might at leaſt deſtroy the ſhips of war which the enemy had in the river, and help to open a communica⯑tion between them and Gen. Amherſt, on whom their laſt expectations were fixed, and who, they flattered them⯑ſelves, was on his march to their aſſiſtance.

But though they ſucceeded in deſtroying ſome of the ene⯑mies magazines, there was nothing of great moment in this. They could not come near the men of war. How⯑ever they received intelligence from ſome priſoners, of the ſucceſs of Sir William Johnſon againſt Niagara; they learned likewiſe, that the French had ſoothed the difficul⯑ties in the way of Gen. Amherſt, by abandoning Crown Point and Ticonderoga. But this intelligence, otherwiſe ſo pleaſing, brought them no proſpect of the approach of any aſſiſtance from that quarter. The ſeaſon waſted apace. The General fell violently ill, conſumed by care, watching, and a fatigue, too great to be ſupported by a delicate conſti⯑tution, and a body unequal to that vigorous and enterpriſing ſoul that it lodged. It was not enough for him to eſcape from ſo great an expedition uncondemned and unapplauded; to be pitied, was he thought but a milder cenſure; and he knew that no military conduct can ſhine, unleſs it be gild⯑ed with ſucceſs. His own high notions, the public hope, the good ſucceſs of other commanders, all turned inward upon him, oppreſſed his ſpirits, and converted diſappoint⯑ment into diſeaſe. As ſoon as he had a little recovered, he diſpatched an expreſs with an accouns of his proceedings to [199] England ^(c) , written indeed in the ſtile of deſpondency, but with ſuch perſpicuity, clearneſs, and elegance, as would have ranked him amongſt our beſt writers, if his military exploits had not placed him among our greateſt command⯑ers.

[200]He reſolved, when he ſent away his account, to conti⯑nue the campaign to the laſt poſſible moment; and after a deliberation with his officers, determined, that any further [201] attempts at Montmorenci were to little purpoſe, and that their principal operations ſhould be above the town, in or⯑der, if poſſible, to draw the enemy to an action. But the [202] deſign of Wolfe was deeper, and more particularly direct⯑ed than it had been before. The camp at Montmorenci was broke up, and the troops were conveyed to the ſouth⯑eaſt [203] of the river, and encamped at Point Levi. The ſqua⯑dron under Admiral Holmes made movements up the river for ſeveral days ſucceſſively, in order to draw the enemies [204] attention as far from the town as poſſible. This ſucceeded in ſome meaſure; for, though it could not perſuade the Marquis de Montcalm to quit his poſt, it induced him to [205] detach M. de Bougainville with 1500 men to watch their motions, and to proceed along the weſtern ſhore of the river, whilſt the Engliſh army directed its march the ſame way on the eaſtern bank.

[206]When Gen. Wolfe ſaw that matters were ripe for action, he ordered the ſhips under Admiral Saunders to make a feint, as if they propoſed to attack the French in their en⯑trenchments, [207] on the Beauport ſhore below the town, and by their motions to give this feint all the appearance of a reality which it poſſibly could have. This diſpoſition be⯑ing [208] made below the town, the General embarked his forces about one in the morning, and with Admiral Holmes's di⯑viſion went three leagues further up the river than the in⯑tended [209] place of his landing, in order to amuſe the enemy, and conceal his real deſign. Then he put them into boats, and fell down ſilently with the tide, unobſerved by the French centinels poſted along the ſhore. The rapidity of the current carried theſe boats a little below the intend⯑ed place of attack. The ſhips followed them, and arrived juſt at the time which had been concerted to cover their [210] landing. Conſidering the darkneſs of the night, and the rapidity of the current, this was a very critical operation, and it required excellent heads both on the part of the marine, and the land ſervice, to preſerve a communication, and to prevent a diſcovery and confuſion.

As the troops could not land at the ſpot propoſed, when they were put on ſhore an hill appeared before them ex⯑tremely high and ſteep in its aſcent; a little path winded up this aſcent, ſo narrow that two could not go abreaſt. Even this path was intrenched, and a captain's guard de⯑fended it. Theſe difficulties did not abate the hopes of the General, or the ardor of the troops. The light infantry under Colonel Howe laying hold of ſtumps and boughs of trees, pulled themſelves up, diſlodged the guards, and cleared the path; and then all the troops ſurmounting eve⯑ry difficulty, gained the top of the hill, and as faſt as they aſcended formed themſelves, ſo that they were all in order of battle at day break.

Montcalm, when he heard that the Engliſh had aſcended the hill, and were formed on the high ground at the back of the town, ſcarcely credited the intel⯑ligence, and ſtill believed it to be a feint to induce him to abandon that ſtrong poſt, which had been the object of all the real attempts that had been made ſince the beginning of the campaign. But he was ſoon, and fatally for him, undeceived. He ſaw clearly, that the Engliſh fleet and ar⯑my were in ſuch a ſituation, that the upper and lower town might be attacked in concert, and that nothing but a battle could poſſibly ſave it. Accordingly he determined to give them battle, and quitting Beauport, paſſed the river St. Charles, and formed his troops oppoſite to ours.

He filled the buſhes that were in his front with detach⯑ments of Indians, and his beſt markſmen, to the number of about 1500; his regular forces formed his left; his right was compoſed of the troops of the colony, ſupported by two battali [...]ns of regulars. The reſt of the Indians and Canadians extended on that ſide, and attempted to out-flank the left of the Engliſh, which was formed to prevent that deſign, in a manner which the military men call Po⯑tence; that is, in a body which preſents two faces to the enemy. Here Brigadier General Townſhend commanded ſix regiments, and the Louiſbourg grenadiers were diſpoſ⯑ed in a line to the right of this body, extending to the ri⯑ver. [211] A regiment was drawn up behind the right for a re⯑ſerve. It was formed in eight ſubdiviſions, with large in⯑tervals. The light infantry under Colonel Howe, protect⯑ed the rear and the left. The diſpoſitions on both ſides were judicious, and the engagement on both ſides began with ſpirit.

The Engliſh troops were exhorted to reſerve their fire; and they bore that of the enemy's light troops in front, which was galling, though irregular, with the utmoſt pa⯑tience and good order, waiting for the main body of the e⯑nemy, which advanced faſt upon them. At forty yards di⯑ſtance, our troops gave their fire, which took place in its full extent, and made a terrible havock among the French. It was ſupported with as much vivacity as it was begun, and the enemy every where yielded to it; but juſt in the moment, when the fortune of the field began to declare itſelf, General Wolfe, in whoſe life every thing ſeemed included, fell: General Monckton, the next to him in command, fell immediately after, and both were conveyed out of the line; the command now devolved on General Townſhend. It was at a very critical time. For, though the enemy began to fall back, and were much broken, the loſs of the two generals was a very diſcouraging circum⯑ſtance, and it required great temper and great exertions to ſupport the advantages that had been gained, and to puſh them to their proper extent. General Townſhend ſhewed himſelf equal to ſo arduous a duty; the troops preſerved their ſpirit, and each corps ſeemed to exert itſelf with a view to its peculiar character. The grenadiers with their bayonets, the Highlanders with their broad ſwords, and the reſt of the forces, with a ſteady and continued fire, drove the enemy in great diſorder from every poſt, and compleat⯑ed their defeat. During the whole action, Colonel Howe with his light infantry covered the left wing in ſuch a man⯑ner, as entirely to fruſtrate the attempts of the enemies In⯑dians and Canadians upon that flank.

The field now ſeemed to be compleatly decided, when a new enemy appeared, which threatened to bring on a freſh engagement, and to put all again to the hazard. M. de Bougainville, whom the feigned movements of the Engliſh troops had drawn up the river, turned back on diſcovering their real deſign, and now appeared on the rear of the army, with a body of 2000 men. But fortunately the main body [212] of the French was by this time ſo broken and diſperſed, that the General was able to eſtabliſh his rear, and to turn ſuch an oppoſition on that ſide that the enemy retired after a very feeble attempt.

In this deciſive action our troops loſt about 500 men; on the ſide of the enemy at leaſt 1500 were killed. But however glorious this victory was, and however important in its conſequences, it muſt be admitted that it was very dearly bought. Soldiers may be raiſed; officers will be formed by experience; but the loſs of a genius in war, is a loſs which we know not how to repair. The death of Wolfe was indeed grievous to his country, but to himſelf the moſt happy that can be imagined; and the moſt to be envied by all thoſe who have a true reliſh for military glory. Unindebted to family, or connections, unſupported by in⯑trigue or faction, he had accompliſhed the whole buſineſs of life at a time, when others are only beginning to appear; and at the age of thirty-five, without feeling the weakneſs of age or the viciſſitude of fortune, having ſatisfied his honeſt ambition, having compleated his character, having fulfilled the expectations of his country, he fell at the head of his conquering troops, and expired in the arms of victory.

The circumſtances that attended the death of ſuch a perſon, are too intereſting to be paſſed over in ſilence, and they were indeed ſuch as ſpoke the whole tenor of his life. He firſt received a wound in his head; but, that he might not diſcourage his troops, he wrapped it up in his hanker⯑chief, and encouraged his men to advance: ſoon after he received another b [...]ll in his belly; this alſo he diſſembled, and exerted himſelf as before; when he received a third in his breaſt, under which he at laſt ſunk, and ſuffered himſelf, unwillingly, to be carried behind the ranks. As he lay ſtruggling with the anguiſh and weakneſs of three grievous wounds, he ſeemed only ſollicitous about the fortune of the battle. He begged one, who attended him, to ſupport him to view the field; but as he found that the approach of death had dimmed and confuſed his ſight, he deſired an officer, who was by him, to give him an account of what he ſaw. The officer anſwered, that the enemy ſeemed broken; he repeated his queſtion a few minutes after with much anxiety, when he was told that the enemy was totally routed, and that they fled in all parts. Then, ſaid he, "I am ſatisfied;" and immediately he expired.

[213]Without the ſame advantages, the enemy alſo had an heavy loſs in this battle, which, no doubt, contributed to their defeat. M. de Montcalm, commander in chief, was killed on the ſpot; an officer who had done the higheſt ſervices to his country throughout the whole American war, and perfectly ſupported his reputation in this laſt ſeene of it, having made the moſt perfect diſpoſitions that human prudence could ſuggeſt, both before the battle and in the engagement. It is ſomething remarkable that in both ar⯑mies, the firſt in command ſhould be killed, and the ſecond dangerouſly wounded. But General Monckton happily re⯑covered, the French officer died a little after the battle.

Five days after the action, the enemy ſeeing that the communication between the town and the army was cut off, and that the Engliſh fleet and troops were preparing with all vigour for a ſiege, ſur⯑rendered the city of Quebec upon terms of honour to the garriſon, and advantage to the inhabitants, who were pre⯑ſerved in the free exerciſe of their religion, and the poſſeſ⯑ſion of their civil rights, until a general peace ſhould decide their future condition. The fortifications of the city were in tolerable order; the houſes almoſt totally demoliſhed. A garriſon of 5000 men under General Murray, were put into the place, with a plenty of proviſions and ammunition for the winter. The fleet ſailed to England ſoon after, fearing leſt the ſetting in of the froſts ſhould lock them up in the river St. Laurence. ^(a)

[214]Thus the capital of French America was rendered to the Engliſh, after a moſt ſevere campaign of near three months; and perhaps, if the whole be conſidered, there never was [215] an enterpriſe of ſuch difficulty carried on with a more gal⯑lant perſeverance, or accompliſhed with more vigour and ability. A city ſtrong in ſituation and fortifications, was to [216] be attacked. An army greatly ſuperior in number to the beſiegers, was poſted under the walls of that city in an im⯑pregnable ſituation. That army was to be forced to a battle [217] againſt the inclinations of a wiſe and cautious commander. A theatre of more than five leagues was to be filled, and operations of that extent to be carried on in the eye of the [218] ſuperior army, by leſs than 7000 men. In this conteſt with ſo many difficulties, one may ſay with nature itſelf, the ge⯑nius of the commander ſhewed itſelf ſuperior to every thing.

[219] All the diſpoſitions to that daring but judicious attempt, near Silery, which at laſt drew Montcalm from his en⯑trenchments, were ſo many maſter-pieces in the art of war. [220] But it is certain, that theſe things, notwithſtanding the ex⯑traordinary abilities of the general, could never have been compaſſed, had not the marine co [...]operated with an unani⯑mity, diligence, and ſkill, which never could have taken place, but from that perfect love to their country, that ani⯑mated all thoſe that were concerned in this expedition. Here was no murmuring nor diſcontent, nor abſurd jealou⯑ſy; no mean competition between the land and ſea-ſervice; but the moſt zealous endeavours to ſecond each others ef⯑forts, and the moſt generous inclinations on each ſide, to give a due praiſe to their mutual ſervices.

When the news of this deciſive action arrived in England, we all remember, though it is very difficult to deſcribe, the various and mixed emotions with which every one was af⯑fected. But two days before this came, was received the expreſs which General Wolfe had ſent off after the affair of Montmorenci. When the general doubted, the public thought they had reaſon to deſpair. But whilſt this gloom was freſh and in the midſt of the general deſpondency; a ſecond expreſs arrives, and brings all at once an account of [221] the victory, the taking of Quebec, and the death of Gene⯑ral Wolfe. The effect of ſo joyful news, immediately on ſuch a dejection, and then the mixture of grief and pity, which attended the public congratulations and applauſes, was very ſingular and affecting. The ſort of mourning triumph, that manifeſted itſelf on that occaſion, did equal honour to the memory of the General, and to the huma⯑nity of the nation.

A little circumſtance was talked of at that time, and it de⯑ſerves to be recorded, as it ſhews a firmneſs of ſentiment, and a juſtneſs of thinking, in the lower kind of people, that is rarely met with even amongſt perſons of education. The mother of General Wolfe was an object marked out for pity by great and peculiar diſtreſs; the public wound pierced her mind with a particular affliction, who had ex⯑perienced the dutiful ſon, the amiable domeſtic character, whilſt the world admired the accompliſhed officer. Within a few months ſhe had loſt her huſband; ſhe now loſt this ſon, her only child. The populace of the village where ſhe lived unanimouſly agreed to admit no illuminations or firings, or any other ſign of rejoicing whatſoever near her houſe, leſt they ſhould ſeem by an ill-timed triumph, to inſult over her grief. There was a juſtneſs in this, and who [...]ver knows the people, knows that they made no ſmall ſacrifice on this occaſion.

The [...]ation, which never ſuffers any public ſervice to paſs unrew [...]ded, proceeded to honour the merits of the living and o [...] the dead. The miniſter himſelf made the motion for this purpoſe in the houſe of commons, and all the force of eloquence was diſplayed in ſetting off theſe ſervices in their proper light. A magnificent monument was voted for the deceaſed General in Weſtminſter Abbey; the living Generals and Admirals received the greateſt of honours, the thanks of their country, by their repreſen⯑tatives.

It is not known with certainty in what manner the French diſpoſed of the remainder of their army after the battle of Quebec. It is probable that they retired towards Montreal and Trois Rivieres, the only places of any con⯑ſequence which they had left in Canada. In order to de⯑prive them of ſubſiſtence in any attempt they might be in⯑duced to make towards the recovery of Quebec in the winter, the country along the river was laid waſte for a [222] very conſiderable extent. A meaſure, which for the ſake of humanity, we could have wiſhed not to have been found neceſſary.

Whilſt the operations were thus ſucceſsfully carried on in the river St. Laurence, General Amherſt was not want⯑ing in his endeavours on the ſide of Lake Champlain. Though the retreat of the French from Crown Point and Ticonderoga had left him entirely maſter of Lake George, he found that the command of Lake Champlain was ſtill an object of ſome difficulty. Mr. Bourlemaque, who com⯑manded in that part, had retired to the Iſle de Noix, at the bottom of the lake, where he had three thouſand five hundred men ſtrongly entrenched; he had likewiſe four ſtout armed ſloops, by which he could eaſily defeat any attempts by boats.

General Amherſt found it neceſſary to attain a naval ſu⯑periority upon the Champlain, before he could hope to puſh his operations any further; but this was a work of ſo much time, that it made it abſolutely impoſſible to attain the great end of the campaign, the communication with Ge⯑neral Wolfe, who was left in the manner we have ſeen to the exertion of his ſingle ſtrength. The naval preparations were not perfectly accompliſhed before the 10th of Octo⯑ber. They conſiſted of a great radeau, eighty four feet in length, and twenty in breadth, which carried ſix twenty-four pounders; the reſt conſiſted of a brigantine and a ſloop.

Covered by theſe the army was embarked in boats in a moſt excellent diſpoſition, and proceeded a conſi⯑derable way up the lake; but as the ſeaſon was far advanced, and the weather growing cold and tempeſtuous, he judged it highly dangerous to venture his troops much upon the water in open batteaux; for the waves run as high on this lake as at ſea in an hard gale of wind. Beſides, he could not hope at this advanced ſeaſon to act at ſuch a diſtance as the Iſle de Noix with any effect; he therefore wiſely poſtponed his operations on that ſide to another year, and contented himſelf for the preſent with the efforts of his little marine, which exerted itſelf with great activity; they blocked up two of the enemies ſtrong⯑eſt veſſels in a bay, but the French abandoned them in the night, and ſunk them in a deep wa⯑ter, the crews making their eſcape; theſe they [223] were in hopes to weigh up. The French appearing no where to oppoſe them, the armed ſloops returned to Crown Point ſoon after the troops, which were diſpoſed in winter quarters.

The memorable and vigorous campaign of 1759, which made full amends for the inactivity of the former, was thus happily cloſed. By the taking of Niagara, Ticonderago, and above all, Quebec, the French, in the little remaining part of Canada, are inveſted upon every ſide. The troops which they have under Mr. Levy at Montreal, and thoſe under Mr. Bourlemaque at Iſle de Noix, can neither be recruited with men, nor properly ſupplied with military ſtores, all communication with France being cut off. So that in the opening of the next campaign, if they are at⯑tacked with vigour from the ſide of Quebec, whilſt Gene⯑ral Amherſt advances with his body by Lake Champlain, of which he has now the entire dominion, the reſiſtance will be no more than ſufficient to give reputation to the con⯑queſt; and it will depend more upon our own ſentiments of convenience what part of North America we ſhall leave to France, than to any efforts they may make in that part of the world; happy if our European ſyſtem ſhould ſo far concur, as to leave us free to conclude a peace in America upon its own merits.

CHAP. VIII.

WE took notice, in the preceeding part of our narra⯑tive, of that movement of the king of Pruſſia, by which he got between the Ruſſians and Great Glogau, and thereby baffled their deſign upon that important place. This movement, at once daring, prudent and neceſſary, hindered the Ruſſians from taking winter quarters in his dominions; but at the ſame time it unavoidably cut off all communica⯑tion with the army of Prince Henry.

[224]That Prince, ſeeing that he could not ſecond the opera⯑tions of the King, his brother, on the ſide of Sileſia, con⯑trived another expedient of co-operating with him, which was immediately to direct his march towards Saxony. There was no object, the poſſeſſion of which was more intereſting; on that account it was very proper; but this march anſwered alſo another end; for it drew the attention of M. Daun to the ſide of Saxony, and diſabled him from aſſiſting the deſigns of the Ruſſians againſt Glogau, either with his whole army, or with any conſiderable de⯑tachment from it. The whole country of Luſatia, through which this projected march lay, was in a manner overſpread with the enemy. M. Daun, with the main army of the Auſtrians, lay at a place called Sorau, oppoſite to the prince's camp. Five bodies of Ruſſians occupied as many advanta⯑geous poſts between the Bober and the Neiſs. General Laudohn poſſeſſed the whole country along the Spree, with ſeveral Auſtrian corps. To get round M. Daun, it was neceſſary to make a vaſt circuit, and to march between the Auſtrian and Ruſſian armies for more than ſixty Engliſh miles.

Before the prince entered upon this arduous deſign, by ſeveral bold movements he obliged M. Daun to retreat from Sorau to Gorlitz, and from Gorlitz as far as Bautzen, keeping himſelf as much as poſſible between the prince and Saxony. But his Royal Highneſs having perceived the direction in which M. Daun was moving, made a com⯑paſs to the northward of the Auſtrians, into the Lower Luſatia, paſſed the Neiſs at Rothenburg, and marching with the utmoſt expedition arrived at Hoyers Werda in two days from his leaving his poſts near Zittau. This rapid march brought them quite unexpected upon a body of five or ſix thouſand Auſtrian irregulars, commanded by General Vehla, who were ſitu⯑ated in all ſecurity behind the town. They were routed with no ſmall ſlaughter. Having diſlodged this corps, the prince's army had leiſure to repoſe themſelves after ſuch a fatiguing march, for two days; and then continued their progreſs towards the [...]be, which river they croſſed at Torgau, having received notice that M. Daun had croſſed it before them near Dreſden. Thus was the grand theatre of the war once more trans⯑ferred into Saxony, and that miſ [...] country, continually [225] harraſed, continually toſſed from hand to hand, the ſport of violence and fortune, ſuffered equal diſtreſſes from its deliverers and its enemies.

The Pruſſian army, from the beginning of this war, has been particularly diſtinguiſhed for its marches; and there is certainly nothing in all the various operations of war, which more particularly diſtinguiſhes good troops, and able and ſpirited leaders. But this march of prince Henry over ſuch a tract of country, almoſt every where occupied by the enemy, in ſo ſhort a time, and with ſo little loſs, is perhaps one of the moſt extraordinary, and the beſt con⯑ducted, of the marches, that have been made by the Pruſ⯑ſian, or any other army.

This fortunate ſtroke, together with the retreat of the Ruſſians, afforded ſome hope, that notwithſtanding his re⯑peated diſaſters, the King of Pruſſia might ſtill conclude the campaign to his advantage. The detachments under Finck and Wunſch had no ſooner entered Miſnia, than they attained a ſuperiority over the united armies of Au⯑ſtria and the Empire; all the places which in ſo ſhort a time they had ſeized, in as ſhort a time were reduced to the obedience of their former maſters. Wunſch had en⯑gaged their army, and defeated one of its wings. This victory gave them the poſſeſſion of every thing to the gates of Dreſden, the only town which remained to the enemy of all thoſe they had taken. They found themſelves unable to prevent prince Henry from paſſing the Elbe; they found themſelves unable to prevent General Hulſen from coming to his relief with a conſiderable detachment; they [...]ound themſelves unable to prevent the King from joining himſelf to thoſe; when, after obliging the Ruſſians to evacuate Sil [...]ſia, he marched to their relief, leaving General [...]tzenplitz, with a part of his army, to keep the Ruſſians from availing themſelves of his abſence. On this the army of the empire retired. M. Dawn fell back towards Dreſden. All the King of Pruſſia's poſts were left unmoleſted, and after all his loſſes, and all his ne⯑ceſſary detachments, he ſtill ſaw himſelf at the head of a gallant army of ſixty thouſand men, in high ſpirits, and ready to execute the moſt deſperate of his orders, notwith⯑ſtanding the advanced ſeaſon, and the great extremity of the cold.

[226]It is true, that M. Daun was ſuperior to him in num⯑bers, and yet more ſo in ſituation. He could at any time take poſſeſſion of the famous camp at Pirna, where he could not be attacked with any proſpect of ſucceſs; but then the freezing of the Elbe, the ſnow on the mountains which divide Bohemia from Saxony, and the continual mo⯑leſtations which might be expected from the Pruſſian par⯑ties, made this ſituation as dangerous, in ſome reſpects, as it was deſirable in others.

It was the opinion of many, that theſe advantages on the ſide of the King of Pruſſia, well purſued without aim⯑ing at more, would in a ſhort time infallibly have obliged M. Daun to relinquiſh his ſtrong poſt, and to retire into Bohemia, abandoning Dreſden, and with it all the fruits of his victorious campaign. But the King, poſſeſſed by an idea of the ill ſituation of the Auſtrians, thought that advantages of greater moment, and more deciſive, might he drawn from it. He knew, that the paſſes into Bohemia were ſo difficult, that by ſome poſts properly choſen and ſtrongly guarded, the ſubſiſtence of the Auſtrians might be made impracticable, and even their retreat rendered ſo difficult, that M. Daun would find himſelf compelled to fight at a diſadvantage, and to put to the hazard of the field, all that his caution and prudence had been ſo long and ſo painfully procuring.

Upon this plan the King, having obliged M. Daun to retreat as far as Plauen, advanced himſelf as far as Keſſel⯑dorf; and ordered General Finck, with a ſtrong corps, to turn the Auſtrians, and ſeize the defiles of Maxen and Ot⯑tendorf, through which alone it ſeemed poſſible for the Auſtrians to communicate with Bohemia. This was ſo ſucceſsfully executed, that there appeared no doubt that the King had effectually ſecured one of his principal ob⯑jects, and had placed Daun between two fires.

Whilſt the Pruſſians enjoyed this ſecurity, M. Daun, who was aware of their deſign, had ſo occupied all the eminences about this rough and dangerous place, and all the paſſes into it, that the Pruſſians were hardly attacked, when their defeat ſeemed inevitable. It is probable that they had got too far into theſe defiles, and had not taken proper meaſures to ſecure a retreat, or any ſort of com⯑munication with the grand army. They became too late ſenſible of their ſituation, and they made, for a whole day, [227] the moſt intrepid efforts to diſengage themſelves from it; but they were foiled in every attempt, with conſiderable loſs of men, and of the moſt part of their artillery.

Night put a ſtop to the engagement; the Auſtrians em⯑ployed it effectually, to entangle the Pruſſians, by guarding with double ſtrength and vigilance, every avenue through which it was poſſible for them to eſcape. So that when the morning appeared, they ſaw the hills covered upon every ſide with great bodies of their enemies, and every defile preſented a wall of bayonets, through which it was impoſſible to penetrate. Thus galled with the loſſes of the preceding day, in which it is ſaid they had exhauſted almoſt all their ammunition, ſtripped of the greateſt part of their cannon, ſurrounded by the enemy on all quarters, no reſource, no proſpect of re⯑lief appearing, the army loſt all hope, and all ſpirit. To make any efforts in this condition, General Finck thought would only be to throw away unprofitably the lives of many brave men, which might be reſerved for a more hopeful occaſion; he therefore, notwithſtanding the known rigour of his maſter, the apparent ſhame of the thing, and the thouſand circumſtances of embarraſſment that muſt have ariſen to a man of honour at ſuch a juncture, came to a reſolution of ſurrendering the whole army priſoners of war. Nineteen battalions and thirty five ſquadrons, compoſing near twenty thouſand men by the Auſtrian account, above twelve by the Pruſſian confeſſion, ſixty-four pieces of cannon, many ſtandards and colours were taken on this occaſion.

It was unqueſtionably the greateſt blow which the Pruſ⯑ſians had felt from the beginning of the war; conſidering the critical time, the numbers taken, and the loſs of repu⯑tation, which aroſe from the manner in which they were taken. It is no wonder, that ſuch an extraordinary advan⯑tage, thus cheaply obtained, ſhould greatly have elevated the friends of the houſe of Auſtria. They had put the cheat upon the Pruſſians, they had caught their enemy in the very trap which they had laid, as they thought, with ſuch addreſs for them. They had now received a full in⯑demnification for the capture of the Saxon army, which had ſurrendered in much the ſame manner, and very near this place, in the year 1756.

[228]The King of Pruſſia had not time to recover from this ſtroke, under which he was yet ſtaggering, when he receiv⯑ed another blow, and a ſevere one. General Durceke was poſted at the right of the Elbe, oppoſite to Meiſ⯑ſen; but on the approach of a large body of Au⯑ſtrians, they prepared to retreat over the river into that place into which they thought their retreat ſecure; but having been obliged by an hard froſt to withdraw their bridge of boats, a thaw ſupervening, when they attempted to lay a bridge of pontoons, ſo many great fragments of ice floated in the river, that they found it impracticable; they were therefore under the neceſſity of paſſing over their army in boats. Whilſt they ſtruggled wirh theſe difficul⯑ties, their rear guard was attacked by the Auſtrians with great fury, and all the men that compoſed it, together with the General, were killed or made priſoners. The loſs of the Pruſſians on this occaſions is ſaid to have been three thouſand killed and taken; and this ſecond ſurprize brought a new diſcredit, as well as a great detriment to the Pruſſian arms.

M. Daun was not ſo carried away with this flood of ſuc⯑ceſs, as to depart in the leaſt degree from his uſual cauti⯑ous management. Two advantages were now obtained, which, with a very few efforts, might be improved, to the entire deſtruction of the King of Pruſſia. At leaſt, many Generals would have thought ſo; but M. Daun thought that the ſame conduct, which, with no riſque, and with little loſs, had reduced the King ſo low, was the moſt likely, if purſued, to bring on his entire ruin. He reſolved to give that monarch no ſort of chance to recover his fortune; Daun, after the two great victories he had himſelf newly obtained, retired behind Dreſden; and as if he had been beaten, as often as he was victorious, he took refuge in the impregnable camp at Pirna, having ſo diſpoſed matters, that the King of Pruſſia, now to weak to ſend out any great detachments, could not prevent his communication with Bohemia.

Whilſt the King of Pruſſia carried on his unſucceſsful campaign in Saxony, through all the rigours of the ſevereſt winter for many years felt in Europe; the army of the al⯑lies kept the field with better fortune. It is true, things had been ſo diſpoſed by the obſtinate reſiſtance of Munſter, [229] and the reinforcements which arrived in the French army, that Prince Ferdinand did not find himſelf in a condition to force them to a deciſive action; and therefore the ſitu⯑ation of the two armies had continued much the ſame for a conſiderable time. At length Munſter, after a ſeries of operations, ſometimes a ſiege, ſometimes a block⯑ade, now broken off, and now reſumed, at laſt ſurrendered, and the garriſon capitulated for their liberty.

Not long after this, the Hereditary Prince of Brunſwick, all whoſe enterpriſes are diſtinguiſhed with a peculiar eclat and ſplendor, that mark them for his own, performed a ſer⯑vice that curbed the French, even more than the loſs of Munſter. Prince Charles of Bevern was alſo engaged in this deſign.

The Duke of Wurtemburg had renewed his treaty of ſubſidy with France, and having recruited and augmented his troops, he lay at Fulda, a great way to the right of the French army. The Hereditary Prince formed a deſign to attack him at that diſtance.

On the 28th of November, taking a ſmall, but well choſen corps of horſe and foot, and diſengaging them from their baggage, he arrived in two days at Fulda, where the Wurtemburgers enjoyed themſelves in full ſecurity. A feu de joye had been ordered for that day; the troops were all in their beſt cloaths; the Duke had invited all the ladies in the town to his table, and to a ball, which he intended to have given that very day; but the Hereditary prince diſ⯑concerted their meaſures, both of war and diverſion. A large party of the Wurtemburg troops were poſted in a plain before the town. The Hereditary Prince fell upon them unawares in their front and flank, and drove them into the town, into which he cloſely purſued them. Here they made ſome appearance of maintaining their ground for ſome minutes, but they were ſoon driven out on the other ſide, and hotly purſued by the Prince of Brunſwick; without the town they were met by Prince Charles of Be⯑vern, who had made a compaſs about the place, and at⯑tacked them vigorouſly as ſoon as they had got out of it. Four battalions made ſome reſiſtance, and were all cut to pieces or made priſoners; the reſt, with the Duke himſelf, covered by the reſiſtance of theſe battalions, made a ſhift to eſcape. Above a thouſand priſoners were made on this [230] occaſion; and the Prince returned to the camp of the allies, after having effectually diſabled this corps from performing any thing conſiderable; and this action was of the greateſt conſequence, as, by the diſpoſition of that corps at Fulda, there was an appearance as if the French meant to form a communication with the army of the Empire, for the mutual extenſion and ſecurity of their winter quarters.

This enterpriſe was only the prelude to another, which promiſed to be much more extenſive in its conſequences. The ſeaſon was now grown too ſevere to ſuffer the allies to puſh any further the advantages they had obtained over the French; at the ſame time it diſabled the French from attempting any thing conſiderable againſt them. Beſides theſe advantages of the ſeaſon, by poſſeſſing Munſter, the allies were no longer obliged to keep ſo large a body of men in Weſtphalia. Theſe were the conſiderations which ſuf⯑fered Prince Ferdinand to turn his eyes to the diſtreſſed ſtate of the King of Pruſſia's affairs. After the two great blows which that monarch had ſuffered, there was no hope of diſlodging M. Daun with his ſingle force; and he was utterly unable to avail himſelf as heretofore, of the rigour of the ſeaſon, to ſtrike a deciſive blow. Prince Ferdinand, diſtant as he was from his diſtreſſed ally, and ſo near to an enemy ſuperior in numbers, did not heſitate to ſend him ſuccours, to enable him, if poſſible, to make a final effort. He detached therefore 12,000 of his beſt men, and placed them under the command of the Hereditary Prince, with whoſe vigour and diligence he was perfectly acquainted, and under whom he knew the ſoldiers would endure any hardſhip with chearfulneſs. They marched from Korſdorff, and in the depth of the late ſevere ſeaſon, without loſing a man by ſickneſs or deſertion, in fifteen days, marched near three hundred miles, and join⯑ed the King of Pruſſia at Freybourg.

This junction raiſed for a while the ſpirits and hopes of the Pruſſian army, but, in effect, it did more honour to the abilities of the Hereditary Prince, than ſervice to the King. The ſeaſon which fought equally againſt all ſides, the inacceſſible camp at Pirna, and the caution of M. Daun, rendered it impoſſible for the King, notwithſtanding this re⯑inforcement, to make any attempt. So that after ſeveral movements in hopes of bringing the Auſtrians to an en⯑gagement, he was obliged at length to deſiſt, and to ſuffer [231] the ſhattered remains of his army to repoſe in winter quar⯑ters, after the fruitleſs fatigues of ſo long, ſo laborious, and ſo bloody a campaign.

The King of Pruſſia did not derive the benefits that were expected from this detachment; the French had no ſooner notice of it, than they attempted to avail them⯑ſelves of the weakneſs it cauſed in the allied army. The Duke of Broglio was now at the head of the French troops; he had lately returned from Verſailles, having ruined the character of M. de Contades, eſtabliſhed his own, remov⯑ed his rival, and, in ſpight of ſeniority, had acquired the marſhal's ſtaff, and the command of the army. He thought he had now an opportunity for an action of eclat to diſtin⯑guiſh his entrence into command. He attempted to attack Prince Ferdinand by ſurpriſe. But finding him perfectly prepared, and all his poſts well guarded, he thought it moſt prudent to retire to his former quarters; and with this abortive attempt cloſed the ope⯑rations of the German campaign, from whence France had entertained ſuch ſanguine hopes; leaving to Prince Ferdi⯑nand the glory of taking Munſter in the preſence of one of their armies, and of ſecuring his own poſts againſt all their efforts, after he had, from an inferior number, detached 12,000 men three hundred miles from his camp.

CHAP. IX.

THE ſeverity of the winter could not put a ſtop to the operations of the land armies; it had no more effect upon the operations at ſea, which went on with vigour, in ſpight of the inclemency of the ſeaſon. The invaſion projected by France, which the engagement off Cape Lagos had retarded, was by no means laid aſide.

The preparations for a naval equipment in the har⯑bour of Breſt, and for tranſporting a body of forces from [232] Vannes, went on continually. The winter did not delay theſe preparations, becauſe it was hoped that in that ſeaſon, the Britiſh fleet might be obliged to take refuge in their own harbours; and thus might afford an opportunity for the French fleet to come out unoppoſed, and to execute the object of their deſtination before the Britiſh navy could be in readineſs to encounter them.

In fact, they were not wholly diſappointed in their ex⯑pectations. A violent ſtorm forced Sir Edward Hawke to quit his ſtation off Breſt. He came with his whole fleet to anchor in Torbay.

The French fleet availed itſelf of his abſence to put to ſea. The whole Engliſh nation was alarmed; but it was an alarm which produced no hurry or diſturbance, but vigorous, cool, and ſettled methods for defence.

And now the event of the whole war was put to the iſſue; for upon the good or ill ſucceſs of this ſtroke every thing depended. Admiral Hawke loſt not a moment's time to put again to ſea, and to ſeek the French fleet. Both ſquadrons put to ſea on the ſame day; Sir Edward Hawke from Torbay, M. de Conflans from Breſt. There was a difference of but one ſhip of the line in their forces.

It is impoſſible here to paſs over the gallant behaviour of one of our Admirals, as it helps to mark the genius and ſpi⯑rip of this happy time, and as this is one of the fineſt inſtan⯑ces of it. Admiral Saunders came into port from his Que⯑bec expedition immediately after Hawke had ſailed. After ſuch a long voyage and ſo ſevere a campaign, unbroken by fatigue, and ſtill inſatiated with glory, he determined im⯑mediately to ſet ſail again, and partake the honour and danger of the coming engagement. For this purpoſe no time was to be loſt, and he had no orders. But he thought the exigencies of his country ſufficient orders; and he knew that at this time the letter of military diſcipline would never be ſet againſt its ſpirit. He therefore ſet ſail without waiting for orders with ten ſhips; but fortune did not fa⯑vour the generoſity of his intentions, and he did not join the Britiſh fleet time enough for the engagement.

As Sir Edward Hawke concluded that the firſt rendez⯑vous of the enemy's fleet would be at Quiberon, he direct⯑ed his courſe with all diligence for that bay. But here [233] again fortune for a while ſeemed to declare for the French; for a ſtrong wind blown in an eaſterly point, drove the En⯑gliſh fleet a great way to the weſtward; but at length it became more favourable, and bore them in directly to the ſhore. About eight o'clock the headmoſt ſhips diſcovered the enemy bearing to the northward, between the iſland of Belleiſle and the main land of France.

Hawke ſaw at laſt what he had ſo long, and ſo ardently wiſhed for, (though hitherto in vain) the enemy in his reach. But yet there were ſuch difficulties in his way, as would have checked a very cautious commander, or per⯑haps any commander in circumſtances leſs critical to the public ſafety. On the ſlighteſt inſpection of the chart it will appear, that all this ſea is ſown thick with ſands and ſhoals, and ſhallows, and rocks; our pilots were by no means well acquainted with it; and the wind blew little leſs than a violent ſtorm, and the waves ran mountain high. In theſe circumſtances they were to attack a very ſtrong ſquadron of the enemy on their own coaſt, with which they were perfectly acquainted. All theſe difficul⯑ties only animated the Engliſh Admiral. In one of the fi⯑neſt ſhips in the world, commanding the flower of the Britiſh navy, and ſeconded by ſome of the moſt tried and braveſt officers in the ſervice; and above all not dubious of him⯑ſelf. He ordered the ſhips neareſt the enemy immediately to chaſe, and, by engaging them, to give time for the reſt of the fleet to come up.

M. Conflans had two choices, either to fly, or to ſtand and fight it out. But he followed neither perfectly; for ſome time he appeared as if he meant to fight; but after giving the Britiſh ſhips time to come near him, when it was too late, he crouded all the ſail he could carry; at the ſame time he ſhewed an attention to keep his ſquadron toge⯑ther.

At half an hour after two, the action began with great fury. In two hours the enemy had loſt three ſhips of the line, one ſtruck, two were ſunk outright. Hawke ordered his ſhip to reſerve her fire, to paſs by all the others, and to be laid along ſide of the Soleil Royal, the beſt ſhip in the French navy, and commanded by M. de Conflans; the maſter remonſtrated on the almoſt inevitable danger of the coaſt. Hawke anſwered, ‘You have done your duty in this re⯑monſtrance; now obey my orders, and lay me along [234] ſide the French admiral.’ A French ſhip of 70 guns generouſly put himſelf between them; Hawke was obliged to beſtow here the fire he had reſerved for a greater occa⯑ſion, and at one broadſide ſunk her to the bottom. The headmoſt of the Engliſh ſhips fired on the enemy as they came up to them, and then paſſed on to others, leaving thoſe behind to improve their ſucceſs, and deſtroy or take them; and by this method they had got up quite to the van of the enemy, and would have totally deſtroyed their fleet, had not night interpoſed to ſave them. Before night came on, the enemy's fleet was much diſperſed; but in the eagerneſs of the purſuit, two of the Engliſh ſhips unfortu⯑nately run upon a ſand, called the Four, and were loſt. The enemy fled in to their own coaſt. Seven ſhips of the line threw overboard all their guns, and eſcaped into the River Villaine; about as many more got out to ſea, and made for other ports.

Nothing could be conceived more dreadful than the night which ſucceeded this action. A violent ſtorm blew all night long. It was a pitchy darkneſs; a dangerous coaſt ſur⯑rounded them on almoſt all ſides. A continual firing of diſtreſs guns was heard, without knowing whether they came from friend or enemy; and on account of the badneſs of the coaſt and the darkneſs of the night, our people were equally unable to venture to their aſſiſtance.

When morning came on, they found the French Admi⯑ral had run his ſhip, and another called the Heros, on ſhore; the firſt was ſet on fire by the enemy, the other by our ſeamen. Thus concluded this remarkable action ^(c) , in [235] which the French had four capital ſhips deſtroyed, one ta⯑ken, and the whole of their formidable navy, in which con⯑ſiſted the laſt hope of their marine, ſhattered, diſarmed, and diſperſed. The long threatned invaſion which was [236] to repair their loſſes in every part of the world, was diſſi⯑pated, and the credit of their arms broken along with their forces. The behaviour of the Engliſh captains and ſeamen, [237] on the contrary, added as much to the glory of the Britiſh arms, as to the ſafety of their country. Perhaps there ne⯑ver was a naval engagement of ſuch extent, in which no [238] captain was accuſed, nor even in any degree ſuſpected of miſbehaviour or cowardice; in which thoſe who engaged, and thoſe who did not, gave proofs that they were equally ardent in the ſervice of their country.

[239]Thoſe who think ſuch matters deſerving of their notice, have obſerved, that this deciſive naval engagement, the ſurrender of the Pruſſian troops at Maxen, and the taking of Munſter, happened on the ſame day, the 20th of No⯑vember.

[240]This was the concluſion of the French affairs in Europe. The iſſue of the campaign in America had not been more favourable to them. Although the events in the Eaſt Indies belong properly to the laſt year, yet, as the accounts did not arrive until this, and that the actions there were of great importance, and equally fortunate on our ſide, it is proper that we ſhould take ſome notice of them here.

[241]The Engliſh had by no means that ſuperiority over the French in the Eaſt Indies, which they had in America. It was here the French ſeemed to have made thoſe efforts, by which they hoped in ſome degree to ballance their loſſes in other parts. They had a very ſtrong ſquadron under M. d'Ache in thoſe ſeas. M. de Lally, an officer of credit, and of greater rank than had uſually been ſent on that ſervice, commanded a body of 2000 Europeans, a great army, in a country where the name of an European is itſelf a ſtrength.

In the beginning, their ſucceſs ſeemed proportioned to their forces; they took the fort and city of St. David's. But in a very ſhort time the ill ſtar of France, which in no part of the world ſet well on their affairs, began to influ⯑ence them here. M. d'Ache, in two naval engagements, was worſted, and prevented from co-operating with the land forces for the reſt of the campaign. And had the ſpirit and conduct of Admiral Pococke been as well ſeconded by ſome of his captains, as it was by others, there is great reaſon to believe, that the French naval power had been as effectually deſtroyed in thoſe ſeas, as it had been in thoſe of Europe.

Notwithſtanding theſe checks, it was neceſſary that M. Lally ſhould act. But it was not only the diſgrace of the French fleet, but an extreme want of money which delayed his operations. A Prince of the country, the King of Tan⯑jour, appeared the only reſource which was open. To this prince he applied for a conſiderable ſum of money, which being abſolutely refuſed, he carried the war into his dominions, and laid ſiege to his capital city. But after lying ſeveral days before it, and after having even made a prac⯑ticable breach, the ſkill of ſome Engliſh gunners, the want of proviſions and ammunition, and the diſorders which reigned in his army, obliged him to return without the money, and with the mortification of being beaten from a place, only fortified after the Indian manner.

This failure in their pecuniary expectations, and their repulſe from an Indian town, were bad encouragements to the undertaking of an enterprize againſt an European ene⯑my, and a fortification in ſome degree regular. But having ſeized upon a Dutch veſſel, as it is thought much with its own conſent, which contained a large treaſure, they ſet out at length to beſiege Madraſs. But here their ſucceſs [242] was no better than at Tanjour, though their ſtrength was greater, and their efforts much more obſtinate.

Colonel Draper and Major Brereton defended the place with the utmoſt ſkill and bravery. Mr. Pigot likewiſe with equal generoſity and prudence, ſeconded their endeavours, by the ſupplies of ſtores and ammunition, which were ad⯑mirably diſtributed, and co-operated with the military with a firmneſs and intrepidity, by which he obtained an honour equal to any in the defence of the place. Whilſt the town was defended with great ſpirit within; parties were con⯑tinually ſent out, which ſo infeſted the roads through which the enemy's convoys were to paſs, that their army in the trenches were infinitely weakened by the detachments which they were obliged to ſend out. After a ſiege of more than two months, they were obliged to abandon their en⯑terprize, and by that means renounce for ever all thoſe ſan⯑guine hopes, which they had entertained from the forces in this part of the world. The Engliſh, on the contrary, went on from ſucceſs to ſucceſs. Whilſt they defeated the French on the Eaſtern coaſt of the great peninſula of India, on the weſtern they took the great and opulent city of Surat from the powers of the country, with very little loſs.

General Lally left Madraſs in the utmoſt tranſports of rage and deſpair, which a man of honour and ability in his profeſſion can feel, who is ill ſeconded by his troops, neg⯑lected by thoſe who ought to ſupport him, and cheated by the villainy of contractors, and of all thoſe who turn war into a low traffic. ^(a)

[242] His letter is a ſtrong and very ſtriking [243] picture of theſe agitations; and certainly it is worthy of remark, that every where there ſhould appear ſomething more unaccountably wrong and weak in the management of the French, than has been in the conduct of that or almoſt any other nation at any time. It ſeems to argue an [244] eſſential and radical fault in ſome ſuperior part of their government, more eaſily indeed viſible in its conſequences, than diſcoverable in its cauſe.

In Europe they received offers of peace from the Kings of Great Britain and Pruſſia. But as they did not expect, from their ſituation, very advantageous or honourable terms, they reſolved to act, in one inſtance, the Roman part, and ſtill hold out, determined to hazard the laſt ex⯑tremities; perhaps, hoping ſomething favourable from the fortune of their allies, ſince their own had deſerted them; and reſolving to contract their plan, and to make one ſtrong effort in one part, rather than unprofitably to waſte their ſtrength upon ſevereal inferior objects. This effort could be made with any proſpect of ſucceſs only in Germany. ^(a)

[245] But the ſupplies neceſſary for this great charge were difficult to a nation, whoſe trade was wholly deſtroyed. On this occaſion they did not ſcruple to break in upon [246] the public faith, and to find ſupplies for one year in an expedient, that ſtruck at the ſources of all future credit. They ſtopped the payment on many public bills and funds ^* . The King threw in his own plate into the public ſtock as an example, and a requeſt that others ſhould contri⯑bute in the ſame manner from their private fortune, to the neceſſities of the ſtate; tho' ſeveral of the nobility, and many churches and convents ſent in their plate, there was yet a general backwardneſs to give into this method of ſup⯑ply, and to truſt the public with ſo conſiderable part of their ſubſtance at the inſtant when they ſaw it ſo notoriouſly break its faith in other particulars.

[247]However, theſe reſources, ſuch as they are, will enable them to keep the war on foot. They turn their whole at⯑tention to Germany, where they have very greatly aug⯑mented their army, and placed it under a general, from whom they have ſome hopes, after their repeated diſap⯑pointments, and the frequent changes they have made. They propoſe alſo another army under the prince de Sou⯑biſe; if they can compaſs this latter project, as it is believ⯑ed they may, the ſyſtem of Germany is ſtill in very immi⯑nent danger. For notwithſtanding the tried goodneſs of our troops, and the admirable commander at the head of them, it is certain, even with any reinforcements we may be able to ſend, we ſhall find it very difficult to contend with two armies, ſuppoſing that we ſhall have no other than French armies to contend with, and that the King of Pruſſia ſhould be able, as he has hitherto been, to find employment for the many, the powerful, and the implaca⯑ble enemies that ſurround him.

It is certain he is much reduced; and that his reſources are nearly exhauſted. Theſe are facts which cannot be concealed; and yet ſome glimmering of hopes may be ſtill perceived, when we conſider the admirable talents for war and government, which that monarch poſſeſſes; and when we conſider even the events of the laſt (to him) unfortunate campaign; where after having ſuffered four capital defeats, and having obtained no one conſiderable advantage, he has yet continued in ſome ſort ſuperior in the field; the enemy has not been able to make the leaſt impreſſion upon his do⯑minions; and he has, at laſt, more than divided Saxony with them; the city of Dreſden is all that they poſſeſs in that country, and the acquiſition of which has been the only fruit [...]f four campaigns, and four victories in one campaign, and the efforts of the united forces of Auſtria, Ruſſia, and the Empire, to ſay nothing of France and Sweden.

As for Great Britain, ſhe has only to fear from her con⯑nections. In no one year ſince ſhe was a nation, has ſhe been favoured with ſo many ſucceſſes, both by ſea and land, and in every quarter of the globe; nor have her officers, both by ſea and land, ever done more honour to their coun⯑try, by th [...]ir ſkill and bravery. And with regard to the in⯑ternal adminiſtration, it ſuffices to ſay, that whilſt France became bankrupt, without delay or murmuring there have been more than ſix millions borrowed in England at a very [248] eaſy rate; and that the intereſt on this immenſe ſum has been made good by a ſingle tax upon malt, which will ſcarce be felt by the people. By this the reſources of England may be imagined; eſpecially if we conſider, that highly as we are taxed for the neceſſary charges of the war; we have not been prevented from great and expenſive vo⯑luntary exertions of public ſpirit and beneficence. The cities of London and Weſtminſter, and after their example other towns made a large ſubſcription for enliſting ſoldiers. Subſcriptions were alſo carried on to a great amount, for cloathing the enemies priſoners, abandoned through the neglect or poverty of their ſovereign; and for adminiſter⯑ing to the relief of the families of thoſe who had fallen in the battles of Quebec and Minden. Thus actuated by the warmeſt patriotiſm, which far from extinguiſhing, ſeemed to kindle a beneficence towards our enemies in their diſtreſs.

The condition of Europe, which all people thought would have been decided in this campaign, is nearly as du⯑bious as ever; and the difficulties which oppoſe themſelves to a peace are rather augmented than diminiſhed. Here then we cloſe the ſcene, and conclude the events of the preſent year; in the next we hope, notwithſtanding appear⯑ances, after ſo many ſcenes of horror, to have the more pleaſing taſk of relating the ſteps taken to a general peace, on terms as particularly advantageous to our own country, as the mixed intereſts of Europe, and the various fortunes of the powers embarked in the ſame cauſe, will admit.

CHAP. I.

IF all the wars which have harraſſed Europe for more than a century had not proved it, the events of the laſt campaigns muſt have ſatisfied every thinking man, that victories do not decide the fate of nations. Four moſt bloody, and to all appearance moſt ruinous defeats, which he ſuffered in that year, had deſpoiled the King of Pruſſia of no more than a ſingle town. After theſe accumu⯑lated blows he ſtill found himſelf in a condition to make good his winter-quarters; to cover his dominions; and to tempt the favour of fortune in another campaign.

[250]To carry our attention a little further back; who could have imagined, that when the French had compelled the Hanoverian troops to lay down their arms, when they had thruſt them into a defenceleſs corner, had bound them down with the yoke of a ſtrict and ſevere capitulation, and had poſſeſſed themſelves of every place which could boaſt the ſmalleſt ſhare of ſtrength in the king's German dominions, that in a few months they ſhould find themſelves compelled to fly before their captives; and after having ſuffered a conſiderable defeat, ſhould be puſhed back almoſt on their own territories.

On the other hand, it might have been ſuppoſed that the effects of theſe advantages under the management of a very great commander, who was beſides largely reinforced, could have been fruſtrated only by the loſs of ſome great battle. But the fact was otherwiſe. The Hanoverians, without any adverſe ſtroke in that campaign, were obliged to repaſs the Rhine and the Lippe; and ſince that time, fortune having decided nothing by the events of five years war, has given to Prince Ferdinand the poſſeſſion of a great part of Weſtphalia in the manner of a conquered country, and yet ſees him abandoning Heſſe, and with difficulty co⯑vering the borders of Hanover.

In ſhort, the victory of Crevelt could not enable the Duke of Brunſwick to defend the Rhine. The battle of Bergen did not give M. Broglio an entrance into Hanover. The great victory of Minden did not drive the French from the Maine. We have ſeen armies, after complete victory, obliged to act as if they had been defeated; and after a defeat, taking an offenſive part with ſucceſs, and reaping all the fruits of victory.

Theſe reflections are ſtill more ſtrongly enforced by the fortune of the King of Pruſſia. Covered with the laurels of Lowoſitz, Prague, Roſbach and Liſſa, when he began after ſo many compleat triumphs, to purſue his advantages, and to improve ſucceſs into conqueſt, the ſcene was ſud⯑denly altered. As ſoon as he attempted to penetrate with effect into the enemies country, without having ſuffered any very ſignal blow, without any conſiderable miſtake committed upon his ſide, Fortune, who hath as it were at⯑tached herſelf to the defenſive, immediately forſook him. He was not able to take a ſingle place. And thoſe advanta⯑ges which at other times and ſituations, would have laid [251] the foundation of laſting empire, have in his caſe only protracted a ſevere deſtiny, which ſome think in the end inevitable; but which as many, as great, and as entire victories ſince obtained over his forces, have not been yet able to bring upon him.

The ballance of power, the pride of modern policy, and originally invented to preſerve the general peace as well as freedom of Europe, has openly preſerved its liberty. It has been the original of innumerable and fruitleſs wars. That political torture by which powers are to be enlarged or abridged, according to a ſtandard, perhaps not very ac⯑curately imagined, ever has been, and it is to be feared will always continue a cauſe of infinite contention and bloodſhed. The foreign ambaſſadors conſtantly reſiding in all courts, the negotiations inceſſantly carrying on, ſpread both confederacies and quarrels ſo wide, that whenever hoſtilities commence, the theatre of war is always of a pro⯑digious extent. All parties in thoſe diffuſive operations, have of neceſſity their ſtrong and weak ſides. What they gain in one part is loſt in another; and in concluſion, their affairs become ſo ballanced, that all the powers concerned are certain to loſe a great deal; the moſt fortunate acquire little; and what they do acquire is never in any reaſonable proportion to charge and loſs.

Frequent experience of this might prove one of the ſtrongeſt grounds for a laſting peace in Europe. But that ſpirit of intrigue, which is the political diſtemper of the time, that anxious foreſight which forms the character of all the preſent courts, prevent the ſalutary effects which might reſult from this experience. Theſe modern treaties of peace, the fruits not of moderation but neceſſity; thoſe engagements contracted when all the parties are wea⯑ried and none ſatisfied, where none can properly be called conquerors or conquered, where after having ſought in vain to compel, they are content to over-reach them in the very moment they are formed, and from the very act of forming them, with the ſeeds of new diſſentions, more implacable animoſities, and more cruel wars. For if to for⯑ward the work of peace, any member in theſe alliances ſhould acquire a ceſſion of any importance in its favour, this afterwards becomes a ground for another alliance, and for new intrigues to deprive them of their acquiſition. To ſettle the peace of Germany, Sileſia was yielded in 1745 [252] to the King of Pruſſia, and that ceſſion gave occaſion for the war of 1756.

The kings of Great Britain and Pruſſia choſe the mo⯑ment of ſucceſs, to propoſe an accommodation; and they deſired that the oppoſite powers ſhould concur with them in nominating ſome place for a congreſs. Some ſpoke of Leipſic, as a means of indemnification to that unfortunate city; the States General would have given a town of theirs; King Staniſlaus offered Nancy, his capital: but the time of peace was not yet come. The two kings made a diſplay of moderation; and they had reaſon to think that if their pro⯑poſals ſhould be accepted (which probably they did not then expect) they muſt naturally take the lead in that negotiation, and muſt give the whole a turn to their advantage. But the adverſe alliance unanimouſly rejected their efforts, and the refuſal of ſome of its members was couched in terms ſufficiently haughty.

To ſpeak impartially, they could not at that time have accepted propoſitions for peace. France had ſuffered in every quarter: in her preſent condition ſhe could ſcarcely look for every favourable terms. As they had now aban⯑doned in deſpair all attempts by ſea, and conſequently all efforts in North America and both the Indies, all their hopes were centered in Germany. Hitherto their fortune in that country had not been very encouraging. But ſtill, in that country lay their beſt and indeed their only proſpect. The ſtrength and perſeverance of the two empreſſes, the waſted condition of the King of Pruſſia, the enormous ex⯑pence of the German war to England, which muſt gradually exhauſt the reſources of her credit, and with them the pa⯑tience of an inconſtant people, had inſpired with no ſmall hope. All theſe conſiderations confirmed their reſolution of hearkening to no terms, until by acquiring ſuperiority, or at leaſt an equality, they might be aſſured of procuring ſuch as were not very diſadvantageous or humiliating.

The empreſs queen upon her part had a moral certainty, that ſhe could not procure, by a treaty propoſed at ſuch a juncture, thoſe objects for which ſhe had begun, and with ſuch ſteadineſs in every fortune had carried on the war. In reality, her circumſtances then were, and they ſtill continue, very intricate and embarraſſed. It was neceſſary that ſhe ſhould have allies of great power; but if they have done her great ſervices, they have formed high pretenſions; in⯑deed [253] ſo high, that if ſhe and her allies cannot abſolutely pre⯑ſcribe the terms of peace, it is impoſſible that they ſhould all be in any degree ſatisfied.

Her ſituation in this reſpect has puſhed ad internecionem, the war between her and the King of Pruſſia. Even the ceſſion of all Sileſia in her favour, cannot procure a peace for that monarch. The Ruſſians will never let looſe their hold of the ducal Pruſſia; a country conquered by their own arms, a poſſeſſion which rendered the King moſt formida⯑ble to them, and which is their ſole indemnification for what they have expended in a war entered into for other views than thoſe of glory, or even of revenge. It has been confidently aſſerted, that the empreſs queen of Hungary has actually guarantied the poſſeſſion of that country to its conquerors. This is indeed a very extraordinary ſtep, and the fact is not ſufficiently authenticated. But the report is not altogether improbable. We may be ſure that if ſuch a guarantee has been made, it has been entered into upon ſome reciprocal engagement of equal force, and for an ob⯑ject equally important.

Nothing but the laſt deſperate neceſſity, nothing in ſhort but being conquered in the moſt abſolute ſenſe, will ever induce the King of Pruſſia to ſubmit to both theſe ceſſions. By ſuch a ſubmiſſion, beſide being deſpoiled of that con⯑queſt, which is the great glory of his reign, and conſtitutes the firmeſt ſupport of his revenue, he will ſee his heredi⯑tary dominions curtailed of another province from whence he derives his royal title, and what makes it of infinitely great⯑er importance in his eyes, the beſt commercial part of his territories, and that only part of his territories, by which he could have hoped to become in any degree a maritime power.

But though it were poſſible that his Pruſſian Majeſty could be brought to ſubmit to theſe humiliating terms, a great deal ſtill remains to be adjuſted. There are other de⯑mands, which though not ſo high in their nature, nor ſo ſtrongly enforced, are notwithſtanding conſiderable, and cannot, with any decency be totally neglected. What is the nature of the bargain between the Empreſs and the Se⯑nate of Sweden, has not yet been made publick. Be it what it will, this is probably the leaſt perplexing part of the whole.

But ſome indemnification for the King of Poland, on [254] whoſe dominions the greateſt calamities of the war have fallen, ſeems abſolutely neceſſary; and on what principle can Auſtria ever expect an ally, if ſhe ſhould ſecure all the benefits of the pacification to herſelf, and leave to her con⯑federates nothing but the ſufferings of a war in which they were involved purely in her quarrel?

This variety of demands, all to be ſatisfied out of the do⯑minions of a ſingle Prince, muſt neceſſarily perplex the work of peace with almoſt inſurmountable difficulties. It ought not indeed to be concealed, that there are circum⯑ſtances which ſeem to lead to ſome ſolution of this embar⯑raſſment. But if they are attentively concerned, they will, I believe, be rather found to increaſe it.

Great Britain has had remarkable ſucceſs againſt France at ſea, in America, and in the Indies. On the continent of Europe, her fortune is even at this day, tollerably ballanced: the two weak parts, therefore, in the oppoſite alliances, (I ſpeak only with regard to the events of the preſent war) are France and Pruſſia. As therefore France will expect ſome ceſſions from Great Britain, it is reaſonable that they ſhould be bought by ſome moderation of the rigorous terms which otherwiſe would have been impoſed on Pruſſia.

All the ſacrifices to peace muſt be made out of the ad⯑vantage acquired by Auſtria and Great Britain. But when Great Britain ſhall have conſented to ſome conceſſions, to forward this great work, what return can the Empreſs Queen make, but an abatement of her demands upon Sile⯑ſia? That is, by giving up that grand, favourite, and in⯑deed to her ſole object, for which ſhe has brought upon herſelf a heavy war, diſguſted her antient and natural al⯑lies, and purchaſed the aid of her natural enemy, at the price of places which the beſt blood of Europe has been ſo often ſhed to preſerve in her family. To all who conſider the character of that court, it will appear very plainly that ſhe will hazard almoſt any thing, and even riſque thoſe con⯑ſequences to which her imprudent alliance with France has expoſed her, rather than accept a peace which muſt deprive her of her hopes of Sileſia.

When theſe things are weighed, it will not appear won⯑derful that there have been ſo few ſerious overtures for peace; and that the longer the war continues, the greater difficulties ſeem to oppoſe themſelves to any concluſion of it.

[255]The only hope that remains of any happy concluſion, is that ſome of the great members of the alliance, wearied and exhauſted, will at length fly off, and thereby throw the reſt into ſuch confuſion, that a peace will be ſuddenly huddled up; and all difficulties not removed, but forgotten, by not allowing time to weigh and ſtudy what may be gained or loſt. This muſt produce a ſyſtem of pacification, the na⯑ture of which it is impoſſible to foreſee; becauſe it cannot be ſaid upon which ſide this defection will begin; but prin⯑cipally becauſe the war ſtill continues, in the event of which, in ſpight of all that can be conjectured from the ſtrength and preſent condition of the powers concerned, fortune will have ſo large a ſhare. But we may predict without raſhneſs, that the firſt overtures will be between Great Britain and France: for they never think of peace in Germany.

CHAP. II.

THIS was the poſture of Europe at the cloſe of the campaign of 1759. And all thoughts of peace being entirely removed, the war was proſecuted in this part of the world with the utmoſt vigour as ſoon as the ſeaſon per⯑mitted them to recommence operations.

But in America, the ſeverity of winter was not able whol⯑ly to interrupt the progreſs of the war. Canada had been ſuppoſed conquered, by the taking of Quebec. Indeed without the poſſeſſion of that place, it had been impoſſible to reduce that country; but ſtill a great deal remained to compleat the advantage to which the taking of Quebec had only given an opening. The French troops after their de⯑feat, had retired into the heart of their country. And the Engliſh navy having provided the town ſufficiently with military ſtores and proviſions, ſet ſail, fearing leſt they ſhould be overtaken by the froſt. Ten battalions, two companies of the artillery, one of American wood-rangers, in all about 7000 men, formed the garriſon which was left [256] in Quebec to command Canada during the winter, and to facilitate the entire reduction of that province in the enſuing campaign. They were under the orders of General Murray.

As the river St. Laurence is commonly ſhut up by ice, for the greater part of the winter, all communication with Europe was cut off. The conquering army was therefore ſubject to be inveſted in Quebec. The French command⯑er, M. Levi, was ſenſible of this advantage; and he ſaw that it was the only reſource by which he could have any chance of preſerving Canada. He accordingly prepared to make uſe of this laſt, and only opportunity; and he was not without ſome proſpect of ſucceſs.

He knew that the fortifications of Quebec were weak and incomplete, without any kind of outwork; that the town was almoſt a general ruin, ſince the late ſiege; and that the Engliſh garriſon had been much enfeebled, and greatly reduced in their numbers by the ſcurvy. He knew alſo, that by ſome misfortune, no proviſion had been made to prevent his attaining a ſuperiority on the river; as no veſſels had been left, on a ſuppoſition, that they could not be uſeful in winter.

The winter had paſſed in ſkirmiſhes always terminating in favour of the Engliſh, by which they enlarged the ſphere of their ſubſiſtence. M. Levi had indeed propoſed, during the rigour of the ſeaſon, to attempt the place by a coup de main; and had made preparations for that purpoſe. But the activity of the garriſon was ſuch; and all the outpoſts ſo well ſecured, that he thought it more prudent to abandon that deſign, and to poſtpone his operations, to the opening of the ſpring, when a regular ſiege might be formed.

The forces which ſtill remained in Canada, were not un⯑equal to the attempt. Ten battalions of regular troops, amounting to near 5000 men; 6000 of experienced militia of Canada; about 300 ſavages. This was the force which M. Levi had collected at Montreal, and with which he took the field on the 17th of April, 1760.

His proviſions, ammunition, and heavy baggage, fell down the river St. Laurence, under the convoy of ſix fri⯑gates from 44 to 26 guns. By this ſquadron, which there was nothing to oppoſe, he acquired the undiſputed com⯑mand of the river, a point of the greateſt importance to [257] the whole deſign. In ten days march, the French army arrived at the heights of Abraham three miles from Quebec.

When Gen. Murray perceived the approach of the ene⯑my, he had two parts to take, either to keep within the town, and confiding in his troops, which though weak as an army, were ſtrong as a garriſon, to ſuſtain the ſiege to the utmoſt extremity; or to march out, and by trying the fortune of the field, to avoid the tedious hardſhips of a ſiege, in a place which ſeemed to him ſcarcely tenable.

He reſolved on the latter part. But when he came to review his ability for this undertaking, he could poſſibly draw into the field no more than 3000 men. However he was not frighted by the enemy's great ſuperiority. He de⯑termined to engage; and he grounded his reſolution on the following reaſons.

Firſt, that his army, notwithſtanding its inferiority, was in the habit of beating the enemy. That they had a fine train of field artillery; that to ſhut themſelves up at once within the walls, was putting all upon the ſingle chance of holding out for a conſiderable time a wretched fortification; a chance which an action in the field could hardly alter, at the ſame time that it gave an additional one, and perhaps a better; and in fine, that if the event was not proſperous, he might, after holding out to the laſt extremity, retreat, with what ſhould remain of the garriſon, to the iſle of Orleans or Coudres, and there wait for reinforcements.

It is not eaſy to comprehend the prudence of engaging in the open field, an army four times ſuperior; eſpecially when the weaker army had it in their power to keep upon the de⯑fenſive in a ſtrong poſt; and Quebec may well be conſider⯑ed at leaſt as a ſtrong retrenchment. It is as hard to under⯑ſtand how the chance of holding out a fortreſs, ſhould not be leſſened after a defeat of the troops, which compoſe the garriſon, who muſt neceſſarily ſuffer by ſuch an event, both in numbers and in ſpirit; it is equally difficult to conceive how the remains of that garriſon, which ſhould be driven from Quebec, could have ſafely retreated to the iſle of Or⯑leans or Coudreſs, or have remained in either of thoſe places, with any tolerable ſecurity, whilſt the enemy were, as they were, confeſſedly maſters of the river. Theſe are matters not ſo eaſily comprehended by thoſe who are at a diſtance from the ſcene of action; there circumſtances may have given theſe reaſons their due weight; and they had the [256] [...] [257] [...] [258] greater influence from the character of the general; a man of the moſt ardent and intripid courage, paſſionately deſi⯑rous of glory, and emulous of the reputation Wolfe had ac⯑quired. He knew that a bold and ſucceſsful ſtroke, and well purſued, might ſo diſable the enemy, who were in no likelihood of receiving ſpeedy or conſiderable ſuccours from France, that the way to conqueſt would lie plain and open before him; and he might expect the honour of the total reduction of Canada, before the arrival of the reſt of the king's forces to his aſſiſtance.

Thus depending on fortune, on the tried goodneſs of his troops, and his own courage to animate them, he marched out of the city, and deſcended from the heights of Abra⯑ham with the army mentioned above, and twenty field-pie⯑ces. The right and left of the enemy's van poſſeſſed them⯑ſelves of ſome ſmall woody eminences; the main army marched by the road of St. Foix; and formed themſelves under the ſhelter of the woods. Whilſt the body of the enemies army was yet unformed, the Engliſh troops attack⯑ed their van, both on the right and left, with the ut⯑moſt impetuoſity, and drove them from the eminences, though they were well maintained; the advanced poſts of the French centre gave way, without a blow, and fell back upon their main army.

Hitherto the fortune of the field was favourable to the Engliſh; but now the advantages they had obtained brought them full on the main army of the French, which formed in columns, and advanced with great rapidity to ſupport their broken vanguard. The fire became very hot, and ſtop⯑ped the progreſs of our troops; whilſt thoſe of the enemy having ſupported their centre, wheeled round the flanks of the Britiſh army to the left and right, and formed a ſemi⯑circle, which threatened to cloſe upon our rear. Proper movements were made to protect the flanks, but it was evident the army was in the greateſt danger, not only of a defeat, but of ſeeing itſelf ſurrounded, and its retreat to Quebec intirely intercepted. Near one thouſand men, ſol⯑diers and officers, (a third of the army) had been, by this time killed and wounded. Nothing could be now thought of but as ſpeedy a retreat as poſſible; and in this there were difficulties, which nothing but the bravery of the ſol⯑diery and the ſkill and ſpirit of the officers could overcome. They gained Quebec with little loſs in the purſuit; but [259] they were obliged to leave their cannon, which they could not bring off, on account of the wreaths of ſnow, which even in this advanced ſeaſon, and in the temperate latitude of 47, ſtill lay upon the ground. The French loſt at leaſt 2000 in the action.

When the account of this victory arrived in Europe, the French were for a while infinitely elated. The blow was ſenſibly felt in England. Our ſanguine hopes were at once ſunk. If Quebec was loſt, it was evident that the greateſt difficulties muſt have ariſen to our affairs in America, and the reduction of Canada muſt become the work of more than one campaign. Nobody imagined that the town could hold out longer after ſuch a defeat; and the fleet ſent from Europe to reinforce the place was then at a great diſtance.

Nevertheleſs all things were prepared at Quebec for a vi⯑gorous defence. The late check he had received, only rouſed the governor to more ſtrenuous efforts. He knew that the loſs of the place would be attributed to the teme⯑rity of his councils; he was ſenſible that in proportion to the honours paid by the public to thoſe who had conquered Quebec, would their indignation fall upon thoſe by whom it ſhould happen to be loſt; and that in general nothing makes a worſe figure, than a raſhneſs which is not fortu⯑nate. Theſe thoughts were perpetual ſtings to a mind like his, paſſionately deſirous of glory; and that very diſpoſiti⯑on which led him to fight unſucceſsfully with a weak army, gave him activity and ſucceſs in the defence of a weak forti⯑fication.

The French, whoſe whole hope of ſucceſs depended on perfecting their work before a Britiſh ſquadron could ar⯑rive, loſt not a moment's time to improve their victory. They opened trenches before the town the very night of the battle. But it was the 11th of May before they could bring two batteries to play upon the fortifications. They were greatly deficient in this reſpect. Their accounts ſay, they had no more than twelve pieces of iron artillery, which carried twelve pound balls. The Engliſh train, was without compariſon, ſuperior. Before the French had opened their batteries, 132 pieces of cannon were placed on the ramparts. The fire of the beſiegers was therefore always ſlack, interrupted, and of little effect.

Notwithſtanding the weakneſs of the enemies fire, the ſuperiority of the Engliſh artillery, and the reſolution of the [260] governor, and garriſon, the relief of the place depended en⯑tirely on the early arrival of the Britiſh fleet, which was looked out for every hour with the moſt anxious expectati⯑on. Had any French ſhips of force come before the En⯑gliſh, it was the general opinion that the place muſt inevi⯑tably have fallen into their hands.

On the 9th of May to the great joy of the garriſon, an Engliſh frigate anchored in the baſon and brought them an account that the Britiſh ſquadron commanded by Lord Colville, was then in the river. On the 16th, a ſhip of the line and a frigate arrived; the next morning the two frigates were ſent to attack the French ſquadron above the town. They executed their commiſſion ſo well, that in a moment all the French veſſels of whatever kind were diſ⯑perſed, and the greateſt part deſtroyed or taken.

M. Levi, who had the mortification to behold from the eminences this action, which at one ſtroke put an end to all the hopes he had conceived from the late victory, was perſuaded that theſe frigates by the boldneſs of their man⯑ner, muſt have been the vanguard of a conſiderable rein⯑forcement; and that too cloſe at hand: He therefore raiſed the ſiege in the utmoſt hurry and precepitation, leaving be⯑hind all his artillery, and a great part of his ammunition and baggage, although Lord Colville, with the reſt of the ſquadron, did not arrive at Quebec untill two days after.^(a)

[261]Thus was fortunately preſerved from the moſt imminent danger, the moſt conſiderable place we had taken in the war; and that which gave us the moſt deciſive advantage, [262] The triumph of the French, and the anxiety of England, were but ſhort. The account of the ſiege, and the raiſing it, followed cloſe on the heels of each other. And there [263] was nothing now to cloud the proſpect of the certain re⯑duction of Canada, by the united efforts of three Engliſh armies, who by different routs were moving to at⯑tack [264] thoſe parts of it which ſtill remained to France. In the mean time that haughty power was obliged to ſit the impotent ſpectator of the ruin of her colonies, without be⯑ing [265] able to ſend them the ſmalleſt ſuccour. It was then ſhe found what it was to be inferior at ſea.

We ſhall reſume the American affairs, when we have re⯑viewed the ſcenes that began about this time to open on the theatre of Europe.

CHAP. III.

A Winter remarkably ſevere ſucceeded the bloody cam⯑paign of 1758. At Bareith in the night of the 16th of December, the cold was inſupportable. Reamur's [267] therometer was ſunk to 15, which is preciſely the ſame degree it fell to in 1709. A year like this diſtinguiſhed by the intenſeneſs of the cold, and the fury of war. Birds dropped dead in their flight. At Leipſic ten centinels were froze to death. An infectious diſeaſe which began in the armies, diffuſed itſelf among the inhabitants of Saxony, and made a dreadful havock. A peſtilential contagion ra⯑ged among the cattle. Famine was ſoon added to the reſt of their calamities; and every miſery that can afflict man⯑kind, was poured out upon that unfortunate people with the moſt liberal meaſure. There was no proſpect of an al⯑levation of theſe diſtreſſes. On the contrary, the ſuffer⯑ings of the people only made their ſovereigns more earneſt for revenge; and out of the general want a reſource aroſe to their armies, who were the more readily recruited, be⯑cauſe the ſcanty pay and ſubſiſtence of a ſoldier, became an object of envy to the wretched peaſantry in moſt of theſe countries; and death ſeemed more honourable and leſs certain by the ſword, than by penury and diſeaſe.

France and England vied in their endeavours to augment their forces in Germany. M. Broglio had now the com⯑mand of the grand army, and the ſole conduct of the ge⯑neral plan of operations. He had early in this year, been honoured with the ſtaff of a marſhal of France. And no⯑thing was omitted to give luſtre to his command, and to furniſh him with every means of exerting his talents. His corps was augmented to near 100,000 effective men. Thir⯑ty thouſand drawn out of their quarters in Duſſeldorp, Cleves, Cologne and Weſel, and compleated by draughts from France, formed a ſeperate army on the Rhine, under the Count de St. Germain. This diſpoſition was made not only to divide the attention of the allied army, but to prevent the ill conſequences of the miſunderſtanding which was known to ſubſiſt between this general and the Duke de Broglio. The third army propoſed at the cloſe of the foregoing campain did not appear.

On the ſide of England, the preparations were not leſs conſiderable in proportion to her ability for that kind of war. Six regiments of foot commanded by Major Gene⯑ral Griffin, were forthwith ſent to reinforce the allied ar⯑my. Elliot's regiment of light horſe ſoon followed them. At the opening of this campaign, we had in Germany twelve regiments of heavy, and one of light horſe; and [268] twelve regiments, with two Highland battalions of foot; the whole amounted to near 22,000 men. In the courſe of the ſummer, they were further reinforced to near 25,000, Such a number of Britiſh troops, ſerving in one army, had not been ſeen on the continent, for two hundred years paſt. The allied army indeed fell ſhort of the French in numbers; but they exceeded it in the quality of the troops. Thoſe newly arrived from England were freſh but not undiſciplin⯑ed; the old were indeed harraſſed, but they had been ac⯑cuſtomed to victory.

In the beginning of the year, the death of the Landgrave of Heſſe Caſſel had excited ſome ap⯑prehenſions; the diſpoſitions of the ſucceſſor were uncertain; and his withdrawing himſelf from the cauſe of the allies would have made a breach in their army, that it would have proved almoſt impoſſible to ſtop. But theſe fears were ſoon diſſipated. The new Landgrave among the very firſt acts of his government, gave the ſtrongeſt proofs of his ſteady adherence to the ſyſtem of his father, and even agreed to add conſiderably to the Heſſian troops in the pay of Great Britain; ſo that all things promiſed as favourably to the allies, as from that irremediable inferiority in numbers could have been expected.

The king of Pruſſia was under far greater difficulties; he had felt the heavieſt blows, and was moſt ſcanted in the means of healing them.

His loſſes were not to be reckoned by the men killed and priſoners, but by armies deſtroyed or taken. Forty gene⯑rals had died, or were ſlain in his ſervice, ſince the 1ſt of October 1756, excluſive of thoſe who had been wounded, diſabled, or made priſoners. And this alone would have been a loſs not to be repaired, if theſe murdering wars which cut off ſo many experienced officers, did not at the ſame time, form ſo many more to ſupply their places. The king had renewed his alliance on the former terms with Great Britain. By his indefatigable induſtry, no gaps were ſeen in his armies. But they were no longer the ſame troops, and if the king of Pruſſia had formerly the merit of ably commanding the moſt excellent armies; he has now to fill up the moſt remarkable deficiency on the part of his troops by his own heroiſm; and to undertake far more ar⯑duous enterprizes, than his firſt, with infinitely weaker in⯑ſtruments. His affairs wore a bad aſpect in the opening of [269] the former year. In this they ſeemed altogether deſpe⯑rate.

The Ruſſians had ſuffered; but they were ſufficiently reinforced. The Swedes who had been generally obliged to give ground in the winter, had in that of 1759 the ad⯑vantage in ſeveral ſmart ſkirmiſhes, and had even taken priſoner the Pruſſian general Manteuffel. As to the Auſ⯑trians, victorious for a whole campaign almoſt without fighting, their armies and magazines were full, their corps compleat, their men freſh, vigorous, and full of reſolution. Several ſkirmiſhes of conſequence had been fought during the ceſſation of the great operations; and they were gene⯑rally to their advantage.

The King of Pruſſia was ſenſible, that in this, as in the former campaigns, he ſhould be attacked by four armies; and that his dominions would be inveſted upon every ſide. As theſe operations were very extenſive and complicated, to enable the reader to form an idea of the campaign, it will not be amiſs to ſay ſomething of the ground the king had to defend, which is circumſtanced in this manner.

To the north is Pomerania. This country is very open; and it is defended on that part on which the Swedes gene⯑rally act, with but few, and thoſe mean fortifications, An⯑clam, Demmein and Paſſewalk. But then the Swediſh army is not numerous, and if they ſhould attempt to pene⯑trate far into the country, they muſt leave Stetin, in which there is always a ſtrong garriſon behind them to their left, which would render their ſubſiſtence difficult, and their re⯑treat in caſe of any misfortune, extremely hazardous; and they have not ſufficient ſtrength to maſter this place by a regular ſiege. This has always proved a check to the pro⯑greſs of that army, even when they have been otherwiſe ſucceſsful.

This ſame country to the eaſtward of the Oder, is one great object of the Ruſſian deſigns. Its chief ſtrength in this quarter is the town of Colberg; a place they have frequently attempted, but always without ſucceſs. And their failure, in this inſtance, has been the main cauſe why they have never been able to take winter quarters in the King of Pruſſia's dominions, or even during the campaign, to make any conſiderable impreſſion upon Pomerania. For they can have no communication with their own country by ſea, for want of this port. On their rear, lies the exten⯑ſive [270] and inhoſpitable deſert of Waldow; and this with the uncertain diſpoſition of the city of Dantzick, renders their ſupplies of proviſion from Poland difficult and precarious. Neither is it poſſible in theſe circumſtances, to unite their forces with thoſe of Sweden acting in the ſame country. The Oder flows between them; which is ſo commanded by the city of Stetin, as to make all communication between theſe armies in a great meaſure impracticable. Inſomuch, that on the ſide of Pomerania, the force of theſe two pow⯑ers is compelled to act ſeparately, without concert, and therefore weakly and ineffectually.

To the weſtward, the King of Pruſſia is ſufficiently co⯑vered by the city of Magdebourg, the ſtrongeſt place in his dominions, and in that part of Germany. Here are his greateſt magazines, and his principal founderies; and this is the repoſitory of whatever he finds neceſſary to place out of the reach of ſudden inſult.

To the ſouthward he is obliged to defend Saxony and Si⯑leſia. Both of theſe countries on their frontiers towards Bo⯑hemia, riſe into very rough, broken, and mountainous grounds, abounding in advantageous poſts and ſtrong ſitua⯑tions. Luſatia lies between them; a level ſandy plain, (in⯑terſperſed with pine-woods,) extending without any obſta⯑cle to the very gates of Berlin. Through this country the king's communication between Sileſia and Saxony muſt be kept up, and therefore it has been from the beginning of this war, the great ſcene of thoſe remarkable marches and counter-marches, by which his Pruſſian majeſty has acqui⯑red ſo great a reputation; and alſo of thoſe bold and ſudden attempts which have diſtinguiſhed ſome of the generals of the adverſe party. As an army cannot be advantageouſly poſted in this territory, it has not been uſual for a conſider⯑ably body to remain there long; and it is particularly un⯑favourable to defenſive operations. This country may be conſidered as the curtin, and the frontiers of Saxony and Sileſia as the baſtions, that flank the ſort of fortification, which the king is to maintain.

No part of that monarch's territories are naturally more defenceleſs than the eaſtern; at the ſame time that it is at⯑tacked by the moſt powerful of his enemies. A country al⯑together ſandy and level, extends along both ſides of the Oder, from the northern frontier of Sileſia, until it meets Pomerania, a country of the ſame kind. There is no re⯑ſpectable [271] fortification on this ſide; and the river Warta that falls here into the Oder, makes the tranſport of pro⯑viſions, and conſequently the ſubſiſtence of the armies that act againſt him more eaſy.

As to Sileſia, it is covered on the Bohemian ſide with mountains, and it contains places of ſuch ſtrength as to be above the neceſſity of yielding to the firſt army that appears before them. Indeed it is to be remarked, that ſuch a de⯑gree of ſtrength ſeems ſufficient for the kind of ſervice which has diſtinguiſhed this war. Never was a war of ſuch a length and extent, in which fewer ſieges of conſequence have been formed; and the late ſervice which affords ſo large a field for experience in every other ſpecies of military operations, affords very little matter of improvement in the art of reducing or defending ſtrong places.

The King of Pruſſia's deſign ſeems to have been to ſave himſelf as much as poſſible to the end of the campaign; the only time when his ſucceſs might be deciſive, and his ill-fortune not ruinous. He therefore formed a defenſive plan. In purſuance of this he withdrew his out-poſts from Freyberg, and drawing a chain of cantonments from the foreſt of Tharandt on his right to the Elbe, he took a moſt advantageous camp between that river and the Multa; ſtrongly intrenching it where it had not been previouſly for⯑tified by nature; and furniſhed it with ſo numerous an ar⯑tillery, that they reckoned in their front only 250 pieces of cannon.

In this ſituation he covered the moſt material parts of Saxony, kept the attention of M. Daun's army engaged, and was enabled to ſend out reinforcements to Prince Henry, or elſewhere, as occaſion ſhould require, without expoſing one part whilſt he defended the other.

Whilſt the King's army defended his conqueſts in Miſ⯑nia, Prince Henry had aſſembled an army about Franckfort on the Oder, and took various poſitions about that place and Croſſen. In this poſition, he commanded three prin⯑cipal communications, in ſuch a manner as to protect at once Sileſia, the New Marche of Brandenburg, and the avenues to Berlin; all which were threatened by ſeveral bo⯑dies of the enemy. General Fouquet had eſtabliſhed his quarters near the county of Glatz, and whilſt he covered that ſide of Sileſia, he communicated with Prince Henry, and [272] was ſo diſpoſed as to ſend to or receive ſuccours from him, as either party ſhould happen to be preſſed.

M. Daun, as ſoon as he ſaw that the King of Pruſſia had fortified himſelf in his poſt, he too buried himſelf in en⯑trenchments, and kept the moſt attentive eye upon all hi [...] majeſty's motions. Whilſt he confined himſelf in this po⯑ſition, in order to tie down the King of Pruſſia, genera [...] Laudohn, with a ſtrong but light and diſincumbered army, moved from the camp he had occupied during the winter in Bohemia, and preſenting himſelf alternately on the ſide o [...] Luſatia, and on the frontiers of Sileſia, threatened ſome⯑times to penetrate into Berlin, ſometimes by a bold ſtroke to effect a junction with the Ruſſians, and attack Prince Henry, ſometimes to ſit down before Glatz, Schweidnitz, or Breſlau; and thus the alarm was ſpread upon every ſide, not knowing where the ſtorm would fall.

At length he declared himſelf. Having by ſeveral fein [...] perſuaded general Fouquet that his intentions were againſt Schweidnitz, that general marched thither a conſiderable body of his troops, and left Glatz uncovered. As ſoon as Laudohn perceived this movement, he on his ſide made another, and poſſeſſed himſelf of Landſhut; and when he had taken Landſhut, he pretended a deſign of ſecuring this poſt by leaving a ſmall body of troops there. This feint alſo ſucceeded, and drew general Fouquet from Schweid⯑nitz back again to Landſhut. He drove the Auſtrians from that place without difficulty; but in the mean time Lau⯑dohn made himſelf maſter of ſeveral important paſſes, by which he was in ſome ſort enabled to ſurround the corps of General Fouquet.

The commander finding himſelf in thoſe dangerous cir⯑cumſtances, had nothing left but to fortify his poſt, for⯑merly made a very ſtrong one, with additional works; which he did with ſuch effect, that it had more the reſem⯑blance of a regular fortification than an entrenchment. How⯑ever, the army he commanded was far from numerous; and he was obliged to weaken it ſtill farther by a detachment of 2000 men, to preſerve, if poſſible, a communication with Schweidnitz.

Laudohn longed to diſtinguiſh himſelf by ſome capital ſtroke; he had now by a ſeries of very artful movements procured a moſt favourable opportunity. Firſt, therefore, he ſhut up with great dexterity the paſſes on every ſide, and [273] rendered his adverſary's retreat impracticable. Then he began an attack on the Pruſſian entrenchments in the dead of the night in three different places. The ſignal for the aſſault was given by four hawbitzers fired in the air. The Auſtrians ruſhed to the attack with uncommon fury, and maintained it with ſo ſteady a reſo⯑lution, that in three quarters of an hour the two ſtrongeſt entrenchments were carried, and the line of communicati⯑on forced: The Pruſſians at day-break found themſelves puſhed back from hill to hill, and line to line, to their laſt entrenchments. Their reſiſtance was all along brave, and their retreat regular. The enemy purchaſed every advan⯑tage at the deareſt rate; but at laſt preſſed upon every ſide, worn down by a terrible ſlaughter, their general diſabled by two mortal wounds, at eight in the morning the rem⯑nant of the army threw down their arms and ſurrendered on the field of battle.

On the ſide of the vanquiſhed, the ſlain were about 4000. The priſoners were, one general of foot, namely general Fouquet; two major generals; two hundred and thirteen officers of the inferior rank; and upwards of 7000 private ſoldiers, 58 pieces of artillery, with a number of colours. Never was a more entire and deciſive victory. The whole army, general, officers, every thing was deſtroyed. Scarce three hundred of the body intrenched by Landſhut eſcaped. The corps alone which was to preſerve the communicati⯑on, together with ſome bodies of cavalry who had not been engaged, with difficulty got into Schweidnitz, where they expected every moment to be beſieged. This advantage coſt the Auſtrians above 12000 men killed and wounded.

CHAP. IV.

THIS victory was purſued with as much rapidity as it was obtained with courage and addreſs. Baron Lau⯑dohn immediately returned back from Landſhut, fell [274] like a ſtorm upon Glatz. Glatz conſiſts of two fortreſſes, the old and the new. The old was taken by ſtorm; the new ſurrendered at diſcretion. Two thouſand brave men and ſome good works could not defend it againſt the impe⯑tuoſity of the Auſtrians. One hundred and one pieces of braſs cannon were taken. Immenſe magazines of proviſi⯑on and military ſtores piled up in this frontier place to fa⯑vour in better times an irruption into Bohemia, fell into the hands of the conqueror. Every thing gave way. The poſſeſſion of Glatz laid all Sileſia open, and the Auſtrians might turn their arms upon any ſide without the leaſt dan⯑ger to the freedom of their retreat. Neither was there any ſort of army to give the leaſt obſtruction. The King of Pruſſia held down by M. Daun, was in Saxony. Prince Henry was alſo at a great diſtance towards Cuſtrin. If that Prince attempted to move to the relief of Sileſia, he laid open Brandenburgh, and even Berlin itſelf to the irruptions of the Ruſſians. If he remained in his poſt, Sileſia was in⯑evitably loſt. Even his ſpeedieſt march ſeemed by no means a certain way to releive it. The King was yet further diſ⯑tant; and any motion of his threatened to ſhake and un⯑hinge the whole ſcheme of his defence; expoſing at once Saxony and Berlin. The loſs of his third army, ſmall as that army was, laid him under difficulties that ſeemed in⯑ſuperable.

Favoured by theſe circumſtances, Laudohn had only to chuſe what direction he ſhould give his arms. Sileſia, as has been obſerved, lay open before him. He had threat⯑ened Schweidnitz; but he ſaw that Breſlaw was a place of greater conſequence, much more eaſily reduced, and that the poſſeſſion of it facilitated a junction with the Ruſſians; a point on which the ultimate improvement of his victory wholly depended. The place beſides is of ſo great extent, and the works of ſo little comparative ſtrength, that he had no ſmall hopes of maſtering it before Prince Henry could come, if he ſhould at all attempt to come to its re⯑lief.

He therefore delayed no longer than the march of his heavy artillery and the neceſſary preparatives required, to lay ſiege to the capital of Sileſia, of whoſe ſafety the moſt ſanguine friends of his Pruſſian majeſty began to diſpair,

But in the interval between the battle of Landſhut and the commencement of the ſiege of Breſlau, the King of [275] Pruſſia was not idle. His thoughts were continually em⯑ployed to repair this diſaſter; all ordinary reſources were impracticable or ineffectual. His genius alone could enter the liſts with his ill fortune. Placing therefore his hopes in himſelf, he aimed by a daring and unexpected ſtroke, to draw even from ſo ſevere a misfortune ſome new and more brilliant advantages.

In purſance of the plan he had laid, he diſpo⯑ſed all things for a march towards Sileſia, and had paſſed the Elbe and penetrated through a woody coun⯑try without oppoſition; had the enemy been appriſed of his march as early as he began it, it had been attended with great and unſurmountable difficulties. Marſhal Daun no ſooner had advice of his march, than he alſo immediately moved with the utmoſt expedition at the head of his main army towards Sileſia, leaving the army of the empire, and a body under General Lacy, to awe Saxony in his abſence.

The two armies continued their route through Luſatia; that of the King of Pruſſia a little to the northward, that of Marſhal Daun to the ſouthward; both apparently puſh⯑ing towards the ſame object, and with equal eagerneſs. But as the army of the marſhal had rather the ſhorter cut to make, and as he moved with far greater and more unaf⯑fected diligence, he got very conſiderably the ſtart of the King.

When his majeſty was appriſed that M. Daun had gained full two days march upon him; that he had actually arrived at Gorlitz, and was puſhing by forced marches to Lauban; his great purpoſe was ob⯑tained. Immediately he ſtruck into M. Daun's track, but wheeled into the oppoſite direction, repaſſed the Spree near Bautzen, and whilſt every one imagined him on the fron⯑tiers of Sileſia, he ſuddenly ſprung up like a mine before Dreſden. The army of the Empire retired. Lacy's corps was obliged to ſhift its ſituation. The Pruſſian generals Hulſen and Ziethen, who had probably been prepared to act in con⯑cert with the King, joined him before that place, and knowing there was no room for delay, began the ſiege with the utmoſt vigour.

Then was this moſt unfortunate city a third time expo⯑ſed to the fury of war. The inhabitants ſuffered in their habitations for the weakneſs of the works; and there were armies both without and within of ſuch mutual and deter⯑mined [276] rage, and ſo careleſs of all things but their enmity, that they little ſcrupled to ſtrike at each other through the bodies of the ſuffering Saxons. All Europe had now its eyes turned to the event of this maſterly manoeuvre; and certainly through the whole courſe of this eventful war, nothing appeared more worthy of regard, nor at any time had there been exhibited a piece of generalſhip more com⯑pleat, than the conduct of the King of Pruſſia's march.

Since Dreſden had fallen into the hands of the Auſtrians, it had been ſtrengthened with the addition of ſeveral new works. The burning of the ſuburbs by the Pruſſians, in order to keep them out, became an advantage to them when they came to poſſeſs the town. In ſhort, the place, was rendered in all reſpects more defenſible than formerly. It had alſo a very large garriſon under General Macguire, an officer of courage and experience, who reſolved to main⯑tain it to the laſt extremity: when he was ſummoned to ſurrender, he made anſwer, "That it was impoſſible the king could have been appriſed with his being entruſted with the command of that capital; otherwiſe ſo great a captain as his majeſty would not make ſuch a propoſal to an officer of his ſtanding: that he would defend himſelf to the laſt man; and wait whatever the king ſhould think proper to attempt."

Both parties being therefore inſpired with the utmoſt reſolution, the one to attack, the other to defend, the ſiege was puſhed on by every method of force and addreſs; there was ſcarce any intermiſſion of aſſaults, ſurprizes, coups de mains, ſallies, and all kind of actions uſed on ſuch occaſions; and all the moſt vigorous in their way. In the mean time three batteries of cannon and mortars played continually, but with much greater damage to the buildings than effect on the fortifications.

Marſhal Daun was in Sileſia when he heard all at once of the deceit put upon him by the King of Pruſſia, of his return to Saxony, of the ſiege, and the extreme danger of Dreſden. His return was as rapid as his march had been. On the 19th he appeared within a league of Dreſden. His approach only cauſed the Pruſſians to redouble their efforts; that day they had received reinforcements of heavy cannon and mortars, and battered the place with new fury. The cathedral church, the new ſquare, ſeveral principal ſtreets, ſome palaces, the noble manufactory of porcelain, were all entirely reduced to aſhes.

[277]The ſiege continued till the 22d. The night of the 21ſt, M. Daun had thrown ſixteen battalions into Dreſden. It was in vain to continue any longer the pretence of beſieg⯑ing a whole army within the town, whilſt at the ſame time there was another army to reinforce it without. The king withdrew his forces without moleſtation from the ſuburbs, though there were three conſiderable armies of the enemy in the neighbourhood, beſides that which was within the walls.

Thus ended, without the ſucceſs ſo maſterly, a proceed⯑ing deſerved, the King of Pruſſia's famous ſtratagem. But the want of ſucceſs can detract nothing from the merit of the meaſure. By drawing Marſhal Daun from Saxony to Sileſia he gained the uſe of eight days, free of obſtruction from the enemy's grand army; eight days at a time when hours and even moments were critical. In this time he had certainly a chance at leaſt of reducing Dreſden; and by the poſſeſſion of that place he would have found himſelf in⯑finitely better able to carry his arms to the defence of every part of his territories for the preſent, and for the future would have that great place of retreat in caſe of any misfor⯑tune. If he failed in this attempt his affairs were preciſely in their former condition; and he could not ſuffer in repu⯑tation by having made it.

As the King of Pruſſia could not be blamed for the ſpeedy return of Marſhal Daun, and the conſequences of that re⯑turn; ſo neither in effect could the Marſhal ſuffer any juſt imputation in having been deceived by the king's march. He knew that there were very plauſible motives to call, and even to preſs him to move that way. He knew that if the king ſhould get into Sileſia without any oppoſition from him, Laudohn might not only be deprived of all the advan⯑tages he could hope for from his late victory, but by being attacked by the united armies of the king and his brother, would run the riſque of a defeat that might fully revenge that of Landſhut.

Whatever the merit of either of the commanders might be on this occaſion, it is certain that Laudohn met no con⯑ſiderable obſtruction.

But Laudohn who ſaw all things prepared for an obſti⯑nate defence, did not wholly truſt to his military manoeu⯑vres. He ſent a letter to the governor Count Tavenzien, to intimidate him by the diſplay of his ſtrength. He ſet [278] forth, that his forces conſiſted of 50 battalions and 80 ſqua⯑drons; that the Ruſſian army of 75,000 men were within three days march; that it was in vain for the governor to expect ſuccour from the King of Pruſſia, who was then at the other ſide of the Elbe, that it was ſtill more vain to look for relief from Prince Henry, who could ſcarce hope to ſtand his own ground againſt the grand army of the Ruſſians; that in caſe of obſtinacy he could expect no reaſonable terms: and that theſe were the laſt that ſhould be offered. Moreover he reminded him that the place was a mercantile town, not a fortreſs; and that he could not defend it without contravening the laws of war.

Theſe rules, by which honour is reduced to act, not by its own feelings, but according to intrinſical circum⯑ſtances; rules by which they have attempted to determine exactly and mechanically that niceſt of all lines which diſ⯑criminates courage from raſhneſs, form one of the ſtrongeſt inſtances of the great difference between the antient and modern methods and ideas of war. In the antient times, a brave commander would have anſwered this threatning meſſage in general terms of defiance. But Count Taven⯑zien reſpected theſe imaginary laws. He took care to prove that in defending the town, he did not infringe them; and ſpoke as Laudohn had done in the character of a military juriſconſult, as well as a ſoldier; he gave for reply. That the town of Breſlaw being ſurrounded with works and wet ditches, was to be conſidered as a place of ſtrength, and not ſimply as a mercantile town. That the Auſtrians themſelves defended it as ſuch in 1757, after the battle of Liſſa. That the king had command⯑ed him to defend it to the laſt extremity, that therefore General Laudohn might ſee it was not from humour he had refuſed to liſten to his ſummons. That he was not frighted with the General's threats to deſtroy the town; for he was not entruſted with the care of the houſes, but the fortifications.

Laudohn had alſo ſent in a memorial in the ſame menac⯑ing ſtile, where he thought it might have a greater effect, to the civil magiſtrates, hoping that the ruin with which the town was threatened, might induce them join with the inhabitants, to perſuade the governor to a ſpeedy ſurrender.

All theſe menacing meaſures ſeemed to argue a fear in [279] Baron Laudohn, that the Ruſſians were not ſo near as he pretended, and that the town might poſſibly be releived be⯑fore their arrival. However he ſhewed them, at nine of the very evening of the meſſage, that his threats were not vain, by a terrible diſcharge of mortars and red hot balls that fell in an uninterrupted ſhower upon the city untill midnight. During this fierce bombardment, that made a dreadful havock in the town, he attempted the out-works by aſſault. His Croats attacked the covered-way in many places at once, with the uſual impetuoſity of thoſe brave irregulars; but they were received and repulſed with a reſolution equal to their own, and with more ſteadineſs.

This operation of this dreadful night having made no im⯑preſſion on the inflexible determination of the governor, Baron Laudohn had once more recourſe to negotiation. He now changed his ſtile, and held out the moſt flattering pro⯑poſitions; offering to grant him what capitulations he ſhould think proper to aſk, and even to leave himſelf to draw up the articles. The governor replied that the firing the town had made no change in his reſolution; and he would wait with firmneſs for the enemy upon the ramparts; but that he could not help obſerving it was contrary to the laws of arms to begin the ſiege of a fortreſs, by ruining its inha⯑bitants. The meſſenger made anſwer, that the trenches would be ſoon opened. The governor ſaid, it was what he had long expected.

The Auſtrians, foiled in their hopes from treaty, conti⯑nued to batter the town, and made ſeveral attacks upon the out-works for three days ſucceſſively. They found every poſt bravely defended; the Ruſſian army did not appear, but they now began to perceive the approach of another army leſs agreeable; that of Prince Henry; which having marched with the utmoſt diligence from Great Glogau, now came faſt upon him; and on the 5th of Auguſt, reached within a few miles of the town.

Laudohn did not think it expedient to put the advantage he had gained, and thoſe which he had yet to expect from the management of time, to the iſſue of a battle; he there⯑fore decamped and made his retreat in good order, but with ſufficient quickneſs; having procured from this enterpriſe only the wretched ſatisfaction of reducing a great part of the city to a heap of rubbiſh, and of having revenged upon Breſlaw ſome part of the ſufferings of Dreſden.

CHAP. V.

THE French and allied armies had been reinforced in the manner we have already mentioned. But the vigour of their operations did not altogether correſpond with what might have been expected from their ſtrength and mutual animoſity. The campaign, at leaſt in any effective manner, opened late. A country which had been ſo long the theatre of ſo ruinous a war, had been too much waſted to make the ſubſiſtence, and conſequently the free motion of the armies eaſy. The winter had been ſevere and long; and it was not untill the green forage appeared plentifully above ground, that thoſe great bodies of cavalry, which make ſo large a part in our modern armies, were in a condition to act. The ſufferings of the Engliſh horſe, from a want of dry forage, during a great part of the winter and the ſpring had been extreme; this obliged them to fall much farther back from the French cantonments; and to moleſt them leſs than they otherwiſe would have done. It was beſides a loſs, that at the opening of the campaign, they had ſo extenſive a tract between them and Hanover; which by an artful choice of poſts might have been yielded ſtep by ſtep, and the campaign ſo managed and ſpun out, that the ſeaſon of action muſt have expired, before the French could have reaped any deciſive advantage from their ſuperiority.

Although the French were during the winter ſupplied far better than the allies with all neceſſaries by the com⯑mand of the Maine, the Moſelle and the Rhine; and that the countries at their back had been much leſs conſumed by the war; yet the ſame difficulties embarraſſed them as ſoon as they thought of taking the field, and quitting their advantageous cantonment. Therefore there was a ſlow⯑neſs in the principal armies upon both parts, until the mid⯑dle of ſummer.

[281]Not however, but that ſomething was attempted in this interval, by leſſer parties. On the ſide of the Rhine, ſome actions happened between the army of St. Germain, and the corps of General Sporken, who was poſted at Dulmen, to obſerve the French in that quarter. Dulmen formed the right flank of the chain of cantonments made by the allied army, which extended its left to the ſouth-eaſt fron⯑tiers of the country of Heſſe, above an hundred and fifty miles diſtant. The Hereditary Prince who was on that wing, exerted, as much as circumſtances would permit, his uſual activity and enterprize. He threw himſelf into the diſtrict of Fulda; he laid it under an heavy contribution and broke up ſeveral French corps that were poſted there.

Theſe actions decided nothing. The French army ſu⯑perior in numbers, and in ſituation, advanced; and the allies, who ſeemed to have choſen the defenſive, gradually retired. In effect, if the French had purſued their original plan, it would have proved almoſt impoſſible for the allied army to maintain its ground. If St. Germain, poſſeſſed of Cleves, Weſel, and Duſſeldorp, had advanced on the ſide of Munſter; and M. Broglio moving forward through the country of Heſſe, had made a ſtrong detachment to the eaſtward of the Weſer, whilſt with his main body he en⯑gaged the attention of Prince Ferdinand, the allies would ſhortly have found themſelves encloſed upon three ſides; and nothing could have extricated them but a capital vic⯑tory obtained under every diſadvantage.

The French army was ſufficiently numerous for theſe operations. But it was ſuſpected that the jealouſy which ſubſiſted between M. de St. Germain and the Duke of Broglio prevented their being carried into execution. This miſunderſtanding daily increaſed. Inſomuch, that M. Broglio thought fit to order the corps of St. Germain to unite itſelf with the grand army. The count, who could not brook obedience to a younger officer, and one beſides with whom he was not on the beſt terms, re⯑tired from the ſervice. He had only ſerved be⯑fore upon condition of commanding an army en⯑tirely diſtinct, and under his own particular orders. This difference deprived France of one of its moſt able generals, and diſconcerted one of its moſt promiſed ſchemes of operation.

Before this miſunderſtanding had produced theſe effects, [282] the affairs of the French went on with all imaginable proſperity. The principal army not retarding itſelf, by conſideration of the places of ſtrength which the allies poſſeſſed in their front, the caſtles of Marburg and Dillen⯑bourg, puſhed forward into the landgraviate of Heſſe, leaving detachments to reduce thoſe fortreſſes. The firſt of which ſurrendered on the 30th of June, the latter held out to the 16th of July; but the garriſons of both ſur⯑rendered priſoners of war.

In the mean time whilſt M. Broglio advanced on the ſide of Heſſe; the corps of St. Germain had penetrated through the dutchy of Weſtphalia, and the two armies joined near a place called Corbach. The allied army had fallen back from the poſt they occu⯑pied at Fritzlar, and were retreating towards the river Dymel. As yet they had received no advice of the dreaded junction of the French armies; but as it was imagined that the corps of St. Germain only moved that way, and the vanguard only of that corps could be arrived at Corbach, which could not be eſtimated at more than 10,000 foot, and 17 ſquadrons at the utmoſt, the Hereditary Prince formed a ſceme of attacking and driving them from that poſt.

When he had begun the attack, contrary to his expec⯑tation he found the enemy already formed; but it was now impoſſible to recede. The action grew every moment more furious and bloody. The French ſtood their ground with firmneſs, and the main army being extremely near, inſtead of being waſted in the action, they grew more nu⯑merous by the reinforcements that were continually ſent.

In this ſituation it was neceſſary that the Prince ſhould make as ſpeedy a retreat as poſſible; but the difficulty of drawing out of the field in the middle of the day, before an enemy quite freſh, and every inſtant reinforced, may be eaſily imagined. To compleat this difficulty, ſome bodies of the German troops both horſe and foot fell into great confuſion. The enemy ſaw it at the firſt glance, and to increaſe it to the utmoſt diſorder, puſhed forward upon them with a numerous artillery and a large body of cavalry. The allied army ſeemed to be in the way of inevitable ruin.

In this exigence the Hereditary Prince, as his laſt re⯑ſource, put himſelf at the head of a ſquadron of Bland's and Howard's regiments of dragroons. By theſe the un⯑common [283] heroiſm of their young leader was perfectly ſe⯑conded. They charged the enemy with the utmoſt fury, ſtopped their career of their victorious horſe; and enabled the alied battalions to make an undiſturbed retreat.

The Hereditary Prince was wounded in this action; about 900 men were killed, wounded, or priſoners, fifteen pieces of cannon, the whole of the artillery, was left to the enemy, but ſtill in their circumſtances to have avoided a total defeat, was in ſome ſort victory. The well-timed impetuoſity of the Hereditary Prince, and the ſpirit of the Engliſh horſe, could not be too highly praiſed. The Prince retired to the main army of the allies, who had now poſſeſ⯑ſed themſelves of the ſtrong poſt of Saxenhauſen: whilſt the French continued oppoſite to them in the no leſs ſtrong poſt of Corbach, which they had acquired by their victory; and here for ſome time they watched each other.

The Hereditary Prince ſuffered more by this check than from the wounds he had received. His mind, forgetful of his pain and weakneſs, only brooding over his defeat, ſeek⯑ing out with anxiety an opportunity of revenging his loſs by ſome bold, ſignal, and unexpected ſtroke againſt the enemy. It was not long before an opportunity preſented itſelf.

Advice had been received, that among the detachments which the French employed to reduce thoſe fortreſſes which the allies had garriſoned on their retreat, there was one very conſiderable, formed of French and Saxon, under Monſ. Glaubitz, moving towards Zigenhagen, a place of importance in the landgrave of Heſſe. The Hereditary Prince undertook to relieve it, and for that pur⯑poſe ſelected ſix battalions of the German troops, two brigades of hunters, a regiment of huſſars, and Eliot's light dragoons. Although this laſt corps was but juſt arrived, had been newly raiſed, and had never ſeen any kind of ſervice, the Prince was ſo well pleaſed with their countenance, that he choſe them preferably to all other for his difficult enterprize, and the event proved that he was not miſtaken.

Monſ. Glaubitz remained in the moſt perfect ſecurity; he was under no ſort of apprehenſion of being moleſted by a detachment of an army ſixty miles diſtance, under the eye, and as it were, guard of a ſuperior body which [284] demanded all its attention; when on a ſudden he found himſelf attacked with the utmoſt violence▪ The Hereditary Prince having reconnoitred hi [...] poſition, made a detour of two leagues through woods and mountains, fell upon his left, whilſt the reſt of his troop [...] climbed the mountains on the oppoſite ſide, and ruſhe [...] with the ſame ſpirit upon the right.

Glaubitz had ſcarce time to form his troops; and they were only formed to be immediately broken. They retired with precipitation, leaving their camp and all it contained to the enemy. The Prince had ſo diſpoſed his cavalry as to cut off the retreat of ſome; but the moſt conſiderable part gained ground upon him. On this occaſion he relied entirely on Elliot's horſe, as it was altogether impoſſible for the infantry, already haraſſed by the action, and a moſt fatiguing forced march of two days, to follow them. A [...] the head of this horſe he overtook the fugitives as they came out of a wood, charged and broke them five different times, ſeperated a body of 500 from the reſt, ſurrounded them, and obliged them to throw down their arms. Hav⯑ing routed this, with the like rapidity, he flew to another body who had taken poſt near a wood, ſurrounded them in the ſame manner; ſummoned and received them all priſo⯑ners of war. A regiment of the enemy's huſſars was en⯑tirely cut to pieces. Nothing was wanting to compleat his victory. Elliot's light horſe, proud to be led on by the Prince himſelf, and worthy of that honour, had the greateſt ſhare of the glory and ſufferings of that day. So young a corps had never ſo eminently diſtinguiſhed itſelf. No more than 79 of the allies were killed in this action, but of theſe 71 were of this ſingle regiment.

The numbers of the enemy killed is not known, but for a time the ſlaughter was terrible. General Glaubitz himſelf was made priſoner, together with the Prince of Anhalt. There were beſides 177 officers, and 2482 private men. A greater number of priſoners could ſcarely be expected from a victory in a general engagement. The trophies were nine pair of colours and ſix pieces of cannon. In all the Petite Gurre of this campaign, (and the campaign be⯑tween the French and the allies was almoſt wholly made up of ſuch,) this was by far the moſt billiant action; and alone might have eſtabliſhed the reputation of the Hereditary Prince, if any thing had been wanting to eſtabliſh him the [285] firſt man of his age, in that ſpecies of war. He returned to the camp of Saxenhauſen, without moleſtation, having fully revenged the affair of Corbach.

Prince Ferdinand did not remain long after this action in his camp at Saxenhauſen. By ſo advanced a poſition, the landgraviate, and even Hanover, lay too open to the enemies incurſions. He therefore took his camp at a place called Kalle, in a ſituation nearer to Caſſel On this M. Broglio formed a plan, which the greatneſs of his army in ſome ſort enabled him to execute. The Chevalier de Muy, who commanded in the room of the Count St. Germain, was ordered to croſs the Dymel at Statbergen, with his reſerve, conſiſting of 35,000 men, in order to cut off the allies from their communication with Weſtphalia. Whilſt the reſt of the French, dividing themſelves into two bodies, moved, the main army under M. Broglio towards Duke Ferdinand's camp at Kalle, the reſerve under Prince Xavier of Saxony towards Caſſel.

Theſe important movements obliged Prince Ferdinand to ſet himſelf alſo in motion; and as he was not in a condition to make detachments of ſufficient ſtrength, he croſſed the Dymel with his grand army, in order to fight the Chevalier de Muy.

His Serene Highneſs formed his main body on the heights of Corbach, and moved towards the enemy, who were advantageouſly poſted near Warbourg; in the mean time the Hereditary Prince with two columns wheeled round the enemy's left, and began a vigorous at⯑tack at once upon that flank, and upon their rear. The French commander poured reinforcements on that quarter. An hot engagement was there maintained with equal obſti⯑nacy for near four hours. Whilſt this combat continued with uncertain fortune on the left, Prince Ferdinand cauſed ſome bodies to file off towards the French bridges on the Dymel to their right, by which he propoſed to attack alſo on that ſide, and intercept them on their retreat; at the ſame time the main of his army advanced with the utmoſt expedition to charge the enemy in front.

The French now ſaw themſelves in the moſt imminent danger of being ſurrounded. Already their left, attacked in flank and rear by the Hereditary Prince, began to give way: his fire became every moment ſuperior; and the ear⯑lieſt retreat was the ſafeſt.

[286]As ſoon as Prince Ferdinand perceived the enemy to tire, he ſaw it abſolutely in vain to think of bringing infantry upon their front. The Engliſh cavalry alſo, up which he chiefly confided, was too diſtant to give al [...] any hope that they could be made to act. But the Engl [...] cavalry out-did his expectations, and indeed all former [...]amples. They conſidered themſelves as defrauded of th [...] ſhare of the glory of Minden: and they panted for an [...]caſion of ſignalizing their courage; and their commande [...] Lord Granby and Moſtyn, forwarded their ardour, kno [...]ing that great actions are commonly tranſgreſſions of or [...]nary rules.

They came up five miles on a full trot, (the Germa [...] called it a gallop) without being blown, without the le [...] confuſion or diſorder, and attacked the enemies cavalry [...] infantry ſeveral times. The greateſt part of the enem [...] horſe fell back and did not ſtand the charge. The Eng [...] artillery were brought up with the ſame ſurprizing quic [...]neſs, and employed with the ſame powerful effect. Capt [...] Phillips had done more with artillery than had been thoug [...] poſſible at Minden; and he exceeded it at Warbou [...] The Engliſh foot vied with the cavalry and artillery, a [...] made ſuch earneſt efforts to come to action, that in ſtra [...]ing their paſſage through moraſſy ground and in burni [...] weather, ſeveral ſoldiers dropped down on their mar [...] But they were too late to engage, and probably in th [...] waſted condition it was well that it ſo happened.

The French made a precipitate retreat towards Statber [...] ſeveral were drowned in paſſing the Dymel; 1500 were [...] on the field of battle; as many were made priſoners. T [...] pieces of cannon were taken; but they conſoled themſel [...] in having loſt no colours. The loſs of the allied army general has not been, that I can find, publiſhed. That the Engliſh in killed, wounded, and miſſing, was 590, [...] then the battle lay chiefly on them, and the killed include in that number were but about 130 ^(a) .

[287]So brilliant a ſucceſs following cloſe on the heels of the [...]ormer, raiſed the reputation of the allied arms. As con⯑ [...]iderable an advantage might have well been expected from [288] it; but according to the uſual play of fortune in this w [...] the firſt account that followed the defeat of ſo large a p [...] of the French army, was, that with a rapid and unreſiſt [...] [289] tide of ſucceſs, they had reduced Caſſel, Eimbach, and Ziegenhayn; by which they became maſters of the whole landgraviate of Heſſe; that they had puſhed into the king's [290] territories, ſeized upon Gottingen and Munden, and thre [...]tened Hanover itſelf. In ſhort, almoſt the worſt con [...]quences which could have ariſen from a defeat followed [291] victory; and whilſt in England we gave looſe to our joy on the ſucceſs of our arms, the French were taking the moſt important places of our allies.

The fact was that Prince Ferdinand muſt have been ſen⯑ſible, that in quitting his camp at Kalle, and taking poſt to the northward of the Dymel, he in a great meaſure, laid open Caſſel and the whole territory of Heſſe to the French; nay, that by this movement nothing was left to hinder their entering the Hanoverian dominions on the right of the Weſer. But notwithſtanding theſe riſques, the ſtep he [292] took was prudent, and even neceſſary. Had he ſuffe [...] the progreſs of the Chevalier de Muy, on the Dymel; h [...] he permitted him to ſtrengthen his poſts upon that rive [...] his communication with Weſtphalia had been inevitably [...] off, and of courſe his ſphere of ſubſiſtence greatly ſtreig [...]tened. It would have had a worſe effect. For he m [...] have entirely loſt the command of the Weſer, witho [...] which he could not have ſtood his ground a moment; a [...] he would on that loſs have found himſelf compelled to re [...] into the heart of Hanover, where he muſt neceſſarily [...] ſtreightened in his winter cantonments, and where a blo [...] of any conſequence muſt be deciſive againſt him.

He therefore fought the battle of Warbourg though [...] loſt all Heſſe by his victory; and he would not quit his po [...] on the Dymel, though he ſaw Gottingen and Munden the hands of the French. He was not to be frighted fro [...] his ſteady and well choſen plan, by vain rumours or threa [...] ⯑ening appearances. He was by no means in a condition [...] make large detachments; it was therefore neceſſary to ſ [...] ⯑crifice ſomething; and he made the ſmalleſt ſacrifice th [...] circumſtances would admit. For he foreſaw that the Fren [...] army whilſt he kept his poſition on the Dymel, could [...] poſſibly take up their quarters in Hanover, or even act the in any conſiderable body, and for any conſiderable tim [...] without ſubjecting themſelves to the ſame or greater inco [...] ⯑veniencies than thoſe to which he would have been himſ [...] liable, had he in defending Heſſe ſuffered them to occu [...] thoſe critical poſts on the Dymel. He knew farther, th [...] it would prove extremely dangerous for them to haza [...] themſelves beyond Gottingen; and that it would be mo [...] difficult for the French army to ſupport themſelves in th [...] advanced poſt, than for him to annoy them there.

It is poſſible that reaſons ſomewhat like the foregoing together with others probably far more cogent, might ha [...] determined that great commander to this conduct. B [...] whilſt he ſecured that middle communication and acted upo [...] the defenſive plan, the troops were not idle; his detach⯑ments acted in many parts with ſpirit and effect. But w [...] muſt defer for a while the narrative of theſe actions, being called from this part of the theatre to the eaſtern parts [...] Germany, where about this time ſcenes of greater ecl [...] were opened.

CHAP. VI.

FROM the time that the King of Pruſſia found himſelf compelled to raiſe the ſiege of Dreſden, it was evident that he could have no hopes of acting in Saxony to any good purpoſe. The buſy part of the campaign came on faſt. Though Prince Henry had obliged Laudohn to retire from Breſlaw; that general, able, and lately victorious, was ſtill formidable; he kept Neiſſe and Schweidnitz blocked up; and wanted to effect a junction with the Ruſſians, by which he propoſed to give the final blow to the king's power in Sileſia, The Ruſſians had now actually arrived in the fron⯑tier parts of that province, and wanted but a very few days eaſy march to compleat that fatal and long dreaded junction. At the ſame time another body of Ruſſians had penetrated into Pomerania; laid all the defenceleſs parts under con⯑tribution, and threatened the ſiege of Colberg: The Swediſh army, ſaid to conſiſt of 22,000 men, commenced alſo, tho' with leſs vigour, their operations. In all that country the King of Pruſſia had not 5000 men to oppoſe them.

In theſe circumſtances a plan of mere defence would have proved altogether without effect. The King of Pruſſia had but two armies; and it was neceſſary that one of them, at leaſt, ſhould make the moſt rapid and ſudden movements to oppoſe ſo many combinations. On the ſide of Sileſia the danger ſeemed more preſſing, and accordingly he marched to its relief; advanced near two hundred miles, and left Marſhal Daun, who had conſider⯑ably the ſtart, far behind him. This march would have been thought an aſtoniſhing exploit in a partizan at the head of a ſmall and diſencumbered corps; but that a nume⯑rous army clogged with its artillery, with above two thou⯑ſand waggons, ſhould in that time traverſe ſuch a ſpace, [294] ſhould paſs the Elbe, the Spree, the Neiſſe, the Queiſs, and the Bober, five conſiderable rivers; that they ſhould effect all this, with one army of the enemy on one ſide of it flanks, another behind, and with a third in its front (th [...] actual poſition of the Auſtrians in Luſatia) was an actio [...] reſerved for, and only to be expected from the King [...] Pruſſia. The attempt itſelf could have been juſtified on [...] by neceſſity; and the neceſſity was urgent. The Ruſſia [...] approached. M. Daun followed towards Sileſia; and th [...] king could hardly promiſe himſelf ſucceſs, but from march of ſuch rapidity, as might enable him to try his fo [...]tune with General Laudohn, before the triple junction [...] apprehended had made his enemies irreſiſtable. But no [...] ⯑withſtanding the hopes conceived from this march, befo [...] the king could come to an action three bodies of Auſtria [...] had joined, Laudohn's, Daun's, and Lacy's; and extendin [...] themſelves along the Katſbach, a river which falls into th [...] Oder, occupied all the ground from Parchwitz to Coſſe [...]dau, a ſpace of little leſs than thirty Engliſh miles. But this extent their poſts were every where ſtrong, and the communications eaſy. The king's camp was at Lignit [...] It was in vain that for ſeveral days he attempted, by vario [...] devices, to detach one body of the enemy from the reſt, to turn their flanks and attack them at diſadvantage. Th [...] nature of the ground or the ſkill of the oppoſite gener [...] always diſappointed him.

At length Mr. Daun took himſelf the offenſive party. T [...] advantage of his ſituation, and the ſuperiority of his num [...]bers, prevailed over his cautious nature to riſque an atta [...] It was therefore reſolved, after the ſituation of Lignitz h [...] been well reconnoitred, all circumſtances maturely weighe [...] and the deſign communicated to the other generals, to a [...]tempt the King of Pruſſia in his camp, with the unit [...] ſtrength of the three armies. To enſure ſucceſs beyond doubt, it was determined that this attempt ſhould be ma [...] by ſurprize, and therefore in the night. M. Daun reme [...] ⯑bered the bad guard which had been kept by the Pruſſians and the advantage, which in the year 1758 he derived fro [...] a night attack at the battle of Hochkirchen.

In conſequence of this plan the whole army, as ſoon as ſhould begin to grow dark, was to march from their ſeven poſts to ſuch ſituation as were marked out for each corps they were to ſtrike their tents, but yet to keep up the fir [...] [295] in their camps, and to have the drums beat the tattoo as uſual.

Some time after Marſhal Daun had begun to move, to his aſtoniſhment the patroles he had ſent out returned with the account, that they had met no out-poſts. As ſoon as day broke and the army had advanced, their apprehenſions were confirmed. They were diſappointed in their deſign, there was no enemy in the camp; but when they caſt their eyes from thence, they could perceive at a diſtance the riſing of a thick ſmoke, which left them no room to doubt that their fortune was then on the point of deciſion, by a part of their forces only, and that the King and Baron Laudohn were at that moment hotly engaged; Daun could only look on and wait the event.

On the 13th of July the king was in his camp at Lignitz, when he received advice that the Ruſſian army of 24,000 men, under Count Czernichew, had thrown bridges over the Oder, at a place called Auras, and that they were to paſs the river on that very day. He ſuſpected alſo, that the enemy had formed the deſign of a general attack. Troops which have been a long time oppoſed to each other can reciprocally gueſs at each other's deſigns; the method uſed by the enemies generals grow familiar, and the leaſt motion they make diſcloſes their deſigns.

This is the account the Pruſſians gave of the means by which they came to a knowledge of M. Daun's projects. The Auſtrians attributed this diſcovery, not to the Pruſſian ſagacity, but to intelligence given by deſerters.

Whatever the means were by which the King of Pruſſia became ſuſpicious of this deſign, it is certain, that he took the moſt early, the moſt vigorous, and the moſt effective mea⯑ſures to defeat it. He was thoroughly ſenſible of the danger he ran of being ſurrounded, if he continued in his poſt at Lignitz; out of that very deſign, which was calculated for his ruin, his genius drew a new means of ſafety. He ſaw at a glance, that the plan which the enemy had formed to ſurround him, at the ſame time, neceſſarily divided their own armies. And this diviſion was the great object he had purſued ſo long, and thro' ſuch diſcouraging diſappoint⯑ments. His only buſineſs was to prevent their reuniting in a general attack upon his quarters. Therefore in the very evening calculated for the attempt on his camp, he quitted it with as much privacy as the enemy had propoſed to attack [296] it, marched and took an advantageous poſt on the w [...] through which Laudohn was to paſs.

And now the deciſive hour aproached, in which he w [...] to put to the riſque as a great a ſtake as had been played fo [...] ſince the beginning of the war. No vulgar advantag [...] would ſuffice in his ſituation, and that very ſituation in ſom [...] ſort diſabled him from attaining a great one. After fo [...] bloody campaigns, and the viciſſitudes of a ſucceſs in all i [...] changes exhauſting, his old corps was nearly annihilate [...] Thoſe who ſucceeded to their places, had ſcarcely ſeen t [...] brilliant times of the kings fortune; and they inherite [...] neither the ſevere diſcipline, nor the undaunted ſpirit of th [...] firſt companions of his hopes; they were new to ſervice yet diſpirited with defeats. The king himſelf gave life [...] the whole, he alone was to rectify a thouſand faults, and [...] ſupply a thouſand deficiencies.

The poſt which he choſe, was ſuch, as whilſt it ſtopp [...] the progreſs of Laudohn in front, if Daun ſhould attemp [...] his rear, would from the nature of the ground lay him un⯑der great difficulties. This rear he further ſtrengthen [...] with ſeveral batteries. As ſoon as his army was drawn up he divided it, leaving his right on the ground, where it ha [...] been formed to obſerve Marſhal Daun and to maintain th [...] poſt; whilſt with his left he turned in order to fall upo [...] the corps under Laudohn. No diſpoſitions could have bee [...] made with a more perfect ſkill.

Mean time Laudohn was advancing faſt to the ſnare whic [...] had been laid for him. Already he had paſſed the Kat [...] ⯑bach, and was moving towards Lignitz, full of the hope of no ſmall ſhare in the glory of giving the final blow t [...] the King of Pruſſia, and had advanced as far as the villag [...] of Pſaffendorf, when by three in the morning, the day light began to dawn; a thick fog that had covered all th [...] adjacent grounds ſuddenly cleared up, and like the openin [...] of a great ſcene diſcloſed at once the whole Pruſſian army regularly embattled, advantageouſly poſted, furniſhed wit [...] a dreadful and well-placed artillery.

He was now come full upon his enemy. [...] was impoſſible to recede; the ſurprize he intend⯑ed was turned upon himſelf. But this able gene⯑ral, though ſurpriſed, was not diſordered. The beſt diſpo⯑ſitions were made that the time would admit; a ſharp an [...] obſtinate combat began; which continued without giving [297] way on either ſide, until ſix. The King of Pruſſia exerted himſelf with incredible diligence to preſerve an uniform ſtrength in every part of his line, and hazarded his own life with a daring, which nothing but his ſituation could excuſe from temerity. His cloaths were ſhot through in ſeveral places, his horſe was killed under him. But all theſe trou⯑bles and dangers were fully compenſated by the efforts of his troops, who maintained ſo ſteady a fire, and puſhed the Auſtrians with ſo much ardour, that they at laſt gave ground, and retreated with precipitation, though not with⯑out ſome order, towards the Katſbach.

The king purſued them to this river, and no further. His advantage as it was gained by the moſt vigorous ſteps, ſo bounds were ſet to the ardour of improving it with the moſt guarded caution. He feared if he purſued his ſucceſs too far, it might disjoin the part of the army en⯑gaged from that which he had left to obſerve M. Daun; and perhaps give that general an opportunity of taking a ſevere revenge on the right, for the ſucceſſes of the left. Notwithſtanding this reſerve of the king, (a reſerve, the want of which was formerly the only failing in his mi⯑litary character, but which his misfortunes had now per⯑fectly taught him,) notwithſtanding, I ſay he did not puſh his good fortune againſt Baron Laudohn to the utmoſt, the victory was compleat, glorious, and adorned with all the trophies. By their own confeſſion, the Auſtrians loſt upwards of 6000 men, killed, wounded and priſoners. The Pruſſians made it amount, and not without proba⯑bility to 10,000. Among the priſoners, were two gene⯑rals, and 84 officers; 82 pieces of cannon and 23 pair of colours were taken. On the ſide of the conquerors, five hundred were killed, and 1200 wounded.

With regard to Sileſia, the victory near Lignitz produced ſome moſt immediate, and moſt uſeful effects. Although M. Daun, not diſpirited with his late miſadventure, and only ſollicitous to repair his loſs, had detached a ſtrong corps under Prince Lowenſtein, and Gen. Beck to ſtrengthen the Ruſſians and encourage them to advance. Count Czerni⯑chew was ſo intimidated with the late defeat of the Auſtri⯑ans, that he repaſſed the Oder by the ſame bridges on which he had lately croſſed it.

Thus one great end of the King of Pruſſia's march was obtained. He prevented the dreaded junction of thoſe two [298] powers. In the other part of his deſign, he did not ſ [...] perfectly ſucceed. M. Daun ſince the action of Pſaffendorf could indeed make no progreſs in Sileſia; but on the othe [...] ⯑hand, the king was not able entirely to drive him out o [...] that province. The Auſtrians even after their defeat, fa [...] ſuperior to the king, had been beſides largely reinforced The empreſs exerted all her power, to remove the ill effec [...] this late check might have had on the reputation of her arms at the ſame time that ſhe augmented her troops, ſhe com⯑forted and encouraged Baron Laudohn, and by a very gene⯑rous and gracious letter let him ſee, that ſhe was not a ſove⯑reign, in whoſe mind a late misfortune cancels the memory o [...] paſt ſervices. In the praiſes which this letter beſtowed o [...] Laudohn, ſeveral were of opinion, was couched an indire [...] cenſure on the conduct of Count Daun, the ſlowneſs o [...] whoſe temper ſo ill agreed with the ardour of her ambition▪ and with theſe great hopes, which the number of he forces, and the ſtrength of her alliance had encourage her to entertain.

The king after this victory joined his brother Prince Henry at Newmarcke. One part of that Prince's army under General Goltze had paſſed the Oder to obſerve the Ruſſians, who ſince the repaſſing that river, ſeemed to direc [...] their motions northward. The king being ſtrengthened by this junction, and having his communication with Breſla [...] clear, marched againſt Daun, who had begun to form the blockade of Schweidnitz, fell upon a corps under General Beck; made two battalions of Croats priſoners, diſperſed ſeveral ſquadrons, and by this lively affair obliged the enemy▪ grand army to raiſe the blockade, and by a precipitate re⯑treat, to take refuge in the mountains of Landſhut.

Whilſt his majeſty was thus exerting the moſt heroic ef⯑forts in defence of Sileſia; Gen. Hulſen, who commanded for him in Saxony, ſeconded his endeavours in that quarter with uncommon bravery and ſucceſs. The army of the empire had formed a deſign of cutting him off from Tor⯑gau. To fruſtrate their intentions, that general quitted his camp at Meiſſen, and marched to Strehla. The enemy divided into two bodies; one attacked an advanced poſt about a cannon ſhot from his camp upon every ſide, with the greateſt fury from, day break to ſix in the morning, whilſt another corps was ſo placed as to keep his camp in awe, and to prevent his [299] attempting any thing for the relief of the advanced poſt. Gen Hulſen ſaw that unleſs he could ſpeedily do ſomething for its ſuccour, that body muſt inevitably periſh. He there⯑fore in this exigency, gave orders to his cavalry to make a circuit round an height; and to charge if poſſible the ene⯑mies flank. This order was executed with the utmoſt promptitude and ſpirit. The Imperialiſts were charged on their flanks; their battalions and horſe were thrown upon one another in confuſion, and 41 officers and 1200 men were made priſoners, The loſs of the Pruſſians was incon⯑ſiderable. Gen. Hulſen by this advantage, was enabled to encamp under To [...]gau, while he retreated through an ap⯑prehenſion, as the grand army of the Imperialiſts was com⯑ing up, that he might be cut off from his communication with the Elbe. This retreat made the Auſtrians magnify the affair into a victory on their ſide; but the circumſtances render the Pruſſian account much more probable.

Fortune ſeemed once more to have ſmiled, after a long interval of gloom on the King of Pruſſia's affairs; and the reputation of his arms began to revive. But the victories he obtained, though glorious, were deciſive of little more than the field upon which they were fought. They were far from having lowered the power of the enemy to an equality with his. And the movements he made to gain thoſe advantages, and to protect one part of his dominions neceſſarily expoſed the reſt. The enemy was able to de⯑tach without end; and whilſt bodies of Ruſſians traverſed the Lower Sileſia, ſeveral corps of Auſtrians ſcoured Luſa⯑tia; and thus together they broke off all regular commu⯑nication between the king's army and his hereditary domi⯑nions, and of courſe between him and his general Hulſen, who with very unequal forces was ſtruggling to ſecure Saxony; a country in which there are towns indeed forti⯑fied; but fortified for the greater part in ſuch a manner, as to be little more than ſnares for increaſing the number of priſoners, by betraying defenceleſs garriſons into the hands of an enemy ſuperior in the field.

In this ſituation, the king is ſaid to have wrote a letter to the celebrated ⁽¹⁾ Marq. d'Argens, very pathetick, and very deſcriptive of his condition, and of his frame of mind under thoſe preſſures. This letter is ſaid to have been in⯑tercepted [300] by a Ruſſian detachment, and induſtriouſly ſpread about in order to diſ-ſpirit his friends. On that account ſome have ſuſpected its authenticity. But the letter is ſurely highly conſonant to his circumſtances, and ſufficiently agree⯑able to his general manner of writing: ſo that we do not think ourſelves diſpenſed with inſerting it in this place.

‘Formerly, my dear marquis, the affair of the 5th Auguſt would have decided a campaign. At preſent tha [...] action is no more than a ſcratch; a great battle mu [...] determine our fate. We ſhall have one, according to all appearances, very ſoon, and then, if the event is favour⯑able to us, we may rejoice. It required many ſtratagem [...] and much addreſs to bring things to this paſs. Don't talk to me of danger; the laſt action coſt me only a ſu [...] of cloaths and a horſe. This is buying victory ve [...] cheap.’

‘I have not had the letter which you mention. W [...] are in a manner blocked up, in regard to correſponde [...] by the Ruſſians on one ſide the Oder, and by the Au⯑ſtrians on the other. A ſmall ſkirmiſh was neceſſary to clear the way for Cocceii ⁽²⁾ ; I hope that he will deli⯑ver you my letter; I never was, in the courſe of my life, in a more embarraſſing ſituation than in this cam⯑paign. Believe me, nothing leſs than a miracle is ſtill neceſſary to extricate me from the difficulties that I fore⯑ſee. I ſhall certainly do my duty when occaſion offers, but, my dear marquis, always remember that I pretend not to command fortune, and that I am obliged, in my projects, to leave too much to chance, for want of be⯑ing able to form any thing more ſolid. I have the labours of a Hercules to undergo, at a time of life when my ſtrength fails me, my infirmities increaſe, and, to ſpeak the truth, when hope, the only conſolation of the unhappy, begins to defert me. You are not ſufficiently acquainted with the circumſtances of affairs to have a clear idea of all the dangers which threaten the ſtate; I know, but conceal them; I keep all my fears to myſelf, and only commu⯑nicate to the public my hopes, or the little good news [301] that I can acquaint them with. If the blow that I me⯑ditate ſucceeds, then, my dear marquis, it will be time enough to expreſs our joy: but till then, let us not flat⯑ter ourſelves, for fear ſome unexpected bad news ſhould detect us too much.’

‘I lead here the life of a millitary monk. I have much to think off about my affairs, and the reſt of my time I devote to literature, which is my conſolation, as it was of the conſul, the father of his country and of eloquence. I know not if I ſhall ſurvive this war, but I am deter⯑mined, in caſe it ſhould happen, to paſs the reſt of my days in retirement, in the boſom of philoſophy and friendſhip.’

‘When our correſpondence ſhall be more open, you'll oblige me by writing more frequently. I know not where we ſhall have our winter-quarters. My houſes at Breſ⯑law were deſtroyed by the bombardment, Our enemies envy us every thing, even day-light and the air that we breathe. They muſt however leave us ſome place, and if it is ſafe, it will be a treat to receive you there.’

‘Well, my dear marquis, what is become of the peace with France? Your nation, you ſee, is more blind, than you imagined. Thoſe fools loſe Canada, and Pondicher⯑ry, to pleaſe the Queen and the Czarina. Heaven grant that Prince Ferdinand may well reward them for their zeal. The officers, innocent of theſe evils, and the ſol⯑diers, will be made the victims, and the illuſtrious offen⯑ders will ſuffer nothing.’

‘Theſe are the ſubjects which offer themſelves to me. I was in a writing vein, but I ſee that I muſt conclude, leſt I ſhould tire you and neglect my own buſineſs. Adieu. my deareſt marquis.—I embrace you, &c.’ ^*

CHAP. VII.

WE leave the King of Pruſſia to theſe thoughts, in [...] ⯑der to return to the armies on the Weſer. Pri [...] Ferdinand was not miſtaken, in imagining that Gotting would prove the utmoſt bound of the French progreſs in Hanover. After they had ſecured that place with a ſtro [...] garriſon, the grand army of M. Broglio moved towards [...] reſerve which had been defeated, and pitched his camp Dierenberg, a place within a ſmall diſtance of the alli [...] who ever ſince the battle continued to occupy Warbou [...] the Dymel running between the two armies. In this ſit [...] ⯑ation they continued for about a month.

The Hereditary Prince who was ever in motion, continually hovering now on one ſide, now on the other, the French camp, in one of his excurſions had perceiv [...] that the French, according to their uſual negligence, w [...] not very exact in their out-poſts and patrols. He had a [...] received intelligence, that they had thrown a corps of h [...] and foot, conſiſting of ſomething more than two thouſa [...] men, into the town of Zierenberg, a place ſurround with ſome damaged walls.

From theſe lights, he reſolved upon the ſurprize of th [...] body, and accordingly made his diſpoſitions for this bo [...] attempt, in the manner following; firſt, he ordered a bo [...] of his light troops to turn the town of Zierenberg, and take poſt between it and Darienberg, in order to interce [...] any that ſhould attempt paſſing to the camp of the enemy Next he poſted at proper diſtances eight ſquadrons of d [...] ⯑goons, [303] two battalions of grenadiers, and one regiment of foot, on the road between his own camp and the place which was to be attacked, with a view to cover his retreat, in caſe he ſhould be repulſed and purſued. With the reſt of his foot, conſiſting for the greater part of Engliſh, he marched with the utmoſt caution and diligence towards the town.

When they had arrived within two miles, they divided into three bodies, which took three differ⯑ent routs, by which the place was compleatly ſurrounded. At eight in the evening, they ſet out from Warbourg, and came before this place at two the following morning. Not⯑withſtanding the precautions taken, the trampling of the troops over the gardens gave the alarm to a guard of the enemies dragoons, who immediately began to fire. Strict orders had been given to proceed with as little alarm as poſſible, and to reſerve their fire; and ſuch was the delibe⯑rate courage, ſuch the perfect diſcipline of the Engliſh gre⯑nadiers, that they ſuſtained this fire, puſhed on with bayo⯑nets, drove back the enemies piquets, killed the guard at the gate, and entered the town along with the fugitives, without the leaſt noiſe, hurry, or confuſion. Never was ſurprize more compleat.

The column of the Engliſh grenadiers having forced the gate, advanced regularly with their bayonets fixed, and without firing a muſquet, by the two ſtreets that led to the church-yard, (which being the only open part of the town, ſerved the French as a place of arms,) killing or taking a great number of thoſe who ran from the houſes towards this rendezvous; and thus they advanced with the greateſt order and the moſt profound ſilence, until they reached the church-yard. The night was ſo dark that they formed by the ſide of the French, who for a while took them to be their own piquets that had aſſembled; but they were ſoon undeceived; a fierce encounter with bayonets enſued, in which the French were quickly obliged to give way.

Two regiments of the enemies dragoons endeavoured to fly to the gate that led to their camp; but they found it, oc⯑cupied by 400 grenadiers, who drove them back with their bayonets; forced from hence, they fled to another gate; there they were repulſed with a ſharp fire of ſmall arms. Then they were compelled to ſeparate; and flying at ran⯑dom as fortune and the night directed, made their eſcape [302] [...] [303] [...] [304] at the ſeveral breaches of the wall. The prince was m [...] ⯑ter of the place in about an hour; but the nearneſs of [...] French camp and the approach of day prevented as long [...] continuance in the place as he wiſhed for reaping the fruits of his victory; therefore about three o'clock he [...] ⯑gan his retreat, carrying off two pieces of cannon, 36 o [...] ⯑cers, and between four and 500 private men. The ſlaug [...] ⯑ter of the enemy was conſiderable. The prince reached camp without the leaſt moleſtation in his retreat.

If we conſider the difficulty of this attempt, very [...] have been bolder; if we examine the diſpoſitions, [...] could be conducted with greater wiſdom; if we attend the behaviour of the troops, we ſhall no where find a [...] [...] ⯑ample of more exact obedience, diſcipline and coura [...] To attack ſo large a body of the enemy, ſo ſtrongly po [...] within a ſmall league of their grand camp, to march ſo fa [...] that critical ſituation, and in a very dark night, to divide i [...] ſo many parts, yet to act with ſo much order and ſo en [...] a concert, was certainly an exploit of the very firſt ra [...] and though not of any great importance in its conſequence is ſo admirable in its conduct and execution, that it [...] deſerves to be told at the length we have given it. [...] added greatly to the reputation of the Britiſh ſoldie [...] troops, and no leſs to their honour as men, by the hu [...] ⯑nity they ſhewed to their priſoners, and the generous [...] ⯑timents of the common ſort with regard to money; there were ſeveral noble inſtances that night of their re [...] ⯑ſing to take any thing from their priſoners, who had of [...] ⯑ed them their purſes. They loſt but ten men.

From this time the operations of the two armies, w [...] for a time ſeemed to languiſh, were renewed with freſh gour. Prince Ferdinand perceived, that whilſt the Fre [...] communication with the Rhine and with Frankfort on [...] Maine continued open, it muſt prove to little purpoſe attempt any thing either for the relief of Gottingen or [...]ſel. Their progreſs indeed into Hanover had been che [...]ed; but whilſt ever they continued in ſo advanced a p [...]on, it was evidently impoſſible to prevent their making [...] ⯑ry ruinous inroads into that country. To force them [...] battle againſt their inclination, would be difficult, and attempt itſelf dangerous. There remained but one me [...] which was to make frequent and ſtrong detachments i [...] the ſouthern parts of Heſſe and Wetteravia, and thus [...] ⯑der [305] precarious the French communication with the Rhine and Maine, from whence they drew the greateſt part of their ſupplies of all kinds.

With this intention, he detached general Bulow at the head of a ſtrong corps, who puſhed forward towards Mar⯑purg, ſurprized the town, deſtroyed the French ovens, with ſeveral hundred waggons of flour, and carried off a conſiderable quantity of cloathing and military ſtores. In the mean time, his light troops ſcoured the country in ſuch a manner as for a while anſwered the great end of the ex⯑pedition in breaking the French communication with Frankfort. Proceeding on this plan he made a further movement towards Frankenau, which, at length, neceſſi⯑tated the French general Stainville, who commanded in thoſe parts, to quit his poſition, and endeavour to ſtop the progreſs of this detachment. He came up with their rear as they were paſſing the river Orche, and falling upon them at this diſadvantage with ſuperior numbers and great fury, he entirely routed the rear; and took ſome men and a very great number of horſes.

It was to be apprehended that he might have purſued this advantage, to the entire ruin of M. Bulow's detachment; if the Hereditary Prince by a forced march of five German miles had not arrived time enough to ſupport him. On the prince's arrival M. Stainville fell back, and took poſſeſſion of a ſtrong poſt in which it was in vain to attack him.

Whilſt theſe meaſures were taking with mixed ſucceſs for diſquieting the French, and interrupting their commu⯑nication to the ſouthward of their quarters, like movements were made to the northward, to oblige them, if poſſible, to relinquiſh their hold on Gottingen. But General Wan⯑genheim, who with that deſign had croſſed the Weſer, and in the beginning had proceeded with no ſmall expecta⯑tions; but at length he received a ſevere check, which forced him to repaſs the river with ſome precipitation. However theſe frequent detach⯑ments anſwered ſo well the end of harraſſing the French, that on the 20th they retired from Immenhauſen, and fell back upon Caſſel where they began to entrench themſelves. Prince Ferdinand followed them cloſe; and the better to obſerved their motions, fixed his quarters as near as he could to thoſe of the enemy.

[306]But whilſt the grand armies thus watched each other, the Eyes of Europe were drawn to a different quarter, by a movement equally aſtoniſhing for its rapidity and myſte⯑rious for its deſign. The Hereditary Prince of Brunſwick, whom we have ſeen but a few days before in the further part of Heſſe, ſuddenly appeared on the frontiers of the United Provinces, with an army of twenty battalions and ten ſquadrons, One detachment of his troops which ha [...] proceeded on the ſide of Duſſeldorp, paſſes the Rhine above Roeroot; another which had marched through Munſter, paſſes it nearly about the ſame time, but a grea [...] diſtance below, at Rhees; theſe two detachments moved t [...] meet each other, and as they proceed, ſeize all the French poſts along the Rhine; the enemy's guards are every whe [...] taken or abandon their redoubts. This puts into the [...] poſſeſſion a number of boats, by which they are enable to tranſport all the reſt of the troops, which are intended t [...] act upon the left of the Rhine. Then they proceed with⯑out delay or oppoſition, directly to Cleves; th [...] garriſon takes refuge in the caſt⯑le, which is vigo⯑rouſly attacked, and in three days ſurrenders 50 men priſoners of war. Whilſt this was performed by o [...] body, another had laid ſiege to Weſel, and battered t [...] place with ſo much fury, that the reduction of it appeare [...] certain; and with it the entire poſſeſſion of the Low [...] Rhine almoſt from Duſſeldorp to Cleves.

The ſecrecy, and the rapidity of the march, togethe [...] with the vigour of the ſubſequent operations, were ſuch [...] might be expected from the character of the Heredita [...] Prince; but on what deſign this rapid march was mad [...] and theſe vigorous ſteps taken at that particular time, ga [...] room for a great deal of reaſoning. During a good part [...] the ſummer, very great preparations had been made i [...] England for a conjunct expedition; a powerful fleet was i [...] readineſs; and they had embarked a large train of fi [...] and battering artillery, a conſiderable body of foot, and regiment of light horſe.

As this armament was ſuppoſed in readineſs to ſail abo [...] the time of the Hereditary Prince's march to the Rhine [...] conjecture united theſe two deſigns together, and ſuppoſe the fleet at Portſmouth and the army in Weſtphalia, we [...] to act on the ſame plan. On this ſuppoſition it was judge that the ſtorm would probably fall on the Auſtrian Nether⯑lands; [307] and that Oſtend, which the Empreſs ſo unpolitically for herſelf, and ſo ungratefully to her former friends, had given into the hands of France, would be the firſt object of thoſe forces which were to unite from ſuch a diſtance.

This deſign of the expedition from Portſmouth has, we underſtand, been formerly diſavowed. Whether in ſtrict⯑neſs, not being a principal in the war, with her imperial majeſty, England ought to have made ſuch an attempt, though Oſtend was defended by a French garriſon, we ſhall not take upon us to determine; but without the aid of ſuch conſiderations, it is evident there were ſuffi⯑cient objections to it from the ſide of mere prudence. Almoſt inſuperable difficulties occurred in ſuch a ſcheme; and it would ſcarcely appear to moſt men adviſeable to add a Flemiſh to our German war.

But we think it poſſible to give ſome reaſonable account of the expedition of the Hereditary Prince, independent of any connection with the Britiſh armament. For a conſide⯑rable time the French had ſeemed reſolved to reſume their former plan of an army on the Lower Rhine; ſuch motions were made as ſtrongly indicated that this deſign would ſhort⯑ly be put in execution; and the allied army had every thing to fear from it. For as the French were checked from proceeding to the compleat conqueſt of the electorate by the allied, army on the Dymel, if this army ſhould itſelf be ſo checked, by one of the enemy advancing from the Lower Rhine, there would be then nothing to hinder M. Broglio from ſending forward ſo ſtrong a reſerve as might finally reduce Hanover. In theſe circumſtances nothing but a very deciſive victory could poſſibly ſave the allied ar⯑my, thus ſurrounded and deprived of its ſubſiſtence, from periſhing in the moſt miſerable, or ſurrendering in the moſt ſhameful manner.

There was one ſtep only which might with certainty pre⯑vent this deſign, and even in ſome meaſure turn it upon the enemy; the taking Cleves and Weſel into the hands of the allies. This would not only defeat the ſcheme of the French for acting on the Lower Rhine, but greatly em⯑barraſs their operations in every other quarter. Even the attempt, though it ſhould not be attempted with ſucceſs, would neceſſarily draw the attention of the French that way, and thus ſave Hanover at leaſt for one campaign. This alone had been a ſufficient reaſon for the march. But [308] had the Britiſh armament at the ſame time been intende [...] for ſome part of the coaſt of France, or had England poli⯑tically kept up ſuch a rumour, when ſhe had in reality [...] more remote object for her armament; in either of theſ [...] caſes it would undoubtedly have co-operated with the He⯑reditary Prince's deſigns, by detaining a greater body o [...] the French troops at home to defend their own coaſts.

We do not pretend to penetrate into all the motives But it is evident, that in the German enterpriſe every thing depended on the celerity of the operations. The ſiege o [...] Weſel was carried on with great vigour, by that part o [...] the prince's army which was on the right of the Rhine [...] whilſt the prince covered it on the left. But before the enemy could diſturb him, nature declared againſt his ſuc⯑ceſs by the fall of immenſe rains, which ſwelled the Rhine and Lippe to ſuch a degree as greatly interrupted the pro⯑greſs of the ſiege, having rendered the roads of Weſtphalia impaſſable, and therefore prevented the arrival of theſe reinforcements which were intended to puſh the ſiege with the greater effect. Theſe rains alſo made it very difficult for the prince to preſerve his communication with the be⯑ſiegers, which however he made a ſhift to keep open by one bridge above and another below the town,

In the mean time, the French with all the expedition they could uſe, had collected an army under M. de Caſtrie [...] of thirty battalions and thirty-eight ſquadrons, partly from the great army in Heſſe, partly from the Low Countries. This body advanced as far as Rheinberg, and after a ſtrenu⯑ous reſiſtance drove out a detachment of the allies which had been poſted there. From thence they marched by their left, and encamped behind the convent of Campen. The Hereditary Prince now ſaw at the ſame time the ſea⯑ſon and a ſuperior army acting againſt him, to fight this enemy, fully prepared to receive him, with the troops which he could ſpare from the ſiege, might be a deſperate attempt. To break up the ſiege would have of itſelf an⯑ſwered the intention of the enemies march. There was no [...] medium but a ſurprize; which was reſolved, and all the diſpoſitions for it made with the judgment by which the great prince who commanded is diſtinguiſhed upon ſuch difficult occaſions. This attempt became the more neceſſary, and the leſs time was to be loſt in making it, as intelligence had been received that the French army was ſhortly to be [309] augmented by powerful reinforcements. The prince be⯑gan his march at ten in the evening.

To reach the enemy's camp, it was neceſſary to diſlodge Fiſcher's corps of irregulars, who had occupied the con⯑vent of Campen in their front. This produced ſome ſhot, and this ſhot alarmed the whole French army, which immediately got under arms and poſted themſelves in a wood. The allied troops puſhed forward, twice repulſed the French, and with the moſt noble perſeverance reiterated their attacks on the wood, and kept up a terrible and well ſupplied fire for ſixteen hours without intermiſſion, that is from five in the morn⯑ing to the ſame evening at nine. There have been few ex⯑amples of ſo obſtinate a combat. But at length finding night approach, the troops harraſſed, their ammunition ſpent, and all hopes vain of diſlodging a ſuperior enemy from an advantageous poſt, the Hereditary Prince having had an horſe killed under him, and being himſelf wound⯑ed, was with regret compelled to retire. Eleven hundred and ſeventy of the allies were killed and wounded in this bloody action; about 500 were made priſoners. The loſs of the French was far greater but they had the field.

On this occaſion, the Engliſh nation regretted the loſs of one of its moſt ſhining ornaments in the death of Lord Downe, who whilſt his grateful ſovereign was diſtining him to higher honours, received a mortal wound in this battle. He was a perſon of free and pleaſurable life: but of an ex⯑cellent underſtanding, amiable manners, and the moſt in⯑trepid courage. In the beginning of this war he had a conſiderable ſhare in rouſing a martial ſpirit amongſt the young people of rank in England, and having long ſhewed them by a gallant example how to fight, he at laſt by a melancholy one, ſhewed them how to die for their country.

As the britiſh troops had been the greateſt ſufferers in this as well as in moſt other actions of the campaign, great murmers were raiſed againſt the commander of the allied army, as if upon all occaſions, even the moſt trivial, he had wantonly expoſed the lives of the Britiſh, in order to preſerve thoſe of the German ſoldiery. Some carried this complaint to a ridiculous length. But could it with reaſon have been expected, that where 25,000 Engliſh had ſerved for a whole campaign, were engaged in five ſharp encoun⯑ters (ſome of them a ſort of pitched battles) in all which [310] they acquired the whole glory, that they ſhould loſe a ſma [...] number than 265 killed and 870 wounded, which is whole of their loſs in all the encounters of this campai [...] It is true, the life of a man is a ſacred thing, and of val [...] his country. But in ſome circumſtances it is ridiculous a nation to think of ſparing even a greater effuſion of [...] to acquire reputation to their arms, and experience to [...] troops and the officers. The Engliſh deſired the po [...] honour with equal ſpirit and wiſdom, they were entitle [...] it, they had it, and they purchaſed it more cheaply, on the whole might have been expected. Neither their blood laviſhed on every trivial occaſion, as had [...] falſly ſuggeſted. The only affairs in which they ſuff [...] any thing worth notice, were thoſe of Warbourg [...] Campen; both actions of the higheſt conſequence.

After the diſappointment and loſs the Hereditary P [...] had ſuffered in the late engagement, he was ſenſible th [...] ſiege could no longer be carried on with any proſpec [...] ſucceſs, in ſight of an army ſo much ſuperior; the R [...] every day ſwelled more and more, and his communica [...] with the troops before Weſel became every hour more [...] ⯑ficult. Beſides, as the whole country was by this [...] overflowed, his men muſt have been expoſed to the gr [...] ⯑eſt hardſhips and the moſt fatal diſtempers. Theſe c [...] ⯑derations determined to repaſs the Rhine without [...] Notwithſtanding the extreme nearneſs of the French a [...] the late repulſe the Prince had met, and the great ſwel [...] the waters, ſuch was the impreſſion he had left on [...] enemy and the excellence of his diſpoſitions, that they not even attempt to diſtreſs his rear; and he paſſed Rhine without the leaſt moleſtation, not only under the [...] but as it were within the graſp of a ſuperior French a [...]

From this the operations of the armies became grad [...] more languid; for as nothing deciſive happened on e [...] ſide during the whole campaign, it was impoſſible to thin [...] this advanced ſeaſon of undertaking any very ſignal enterp [...] As if by common conſent they began to move tow [...] winter quarters. So that whatever happened after [...] was not connected with the general plan of the campai [...] and were the ſudden acts of detached parties, who atte [...] tempted ſome advantages of ſurpriſe. Of theſe we ſhall [...] ſome notice before we conclude, but we paſs them by preſent; the attention of all men being at this time [...] [311] engaged by an event of the greateſt importance, and which many were of opinion would make no ſmall change in the nature of the war, and above all in the general ſyſtem of pacification. This was the death of George II. king of Great Britain.

He died ſuddenly in his palace at Kenſington in the 77th year of his age and 33d of his reign. The immediate cauſe of his death was the rupture of the ſubſtance of the right ventricle of his heart, by which the circulation was ſtop⯑ped in an inſtant. This was preceded by no ſort of appa⯑rent illneſs. His majeſty enjoyed an uncommon degree of health and ſtrength for that age; but it was believed that he had ſuffered, by expoſing himſelf too much to the cold, in reviewing ſome troops that were to be embarked for the expedition. He had been extremely ſolicitous about the fortune of this expedition. He had been no leſs anxious for the fate of the enterpriſe under the Hereditary Prince, an account of the ill ſucceſs of which he had received, tho' it was not at that time made public. This was believed to have touched him deeply, and to have been one of the cauſes of a death ſo afflicting to all his people.

When future hiſtorians come to ſpeak of his late majeſty, they will find both in his fortune and his virtue, abundant matter for juſt and unſuſpected panegyric. None of his predeſſors in the throne of England lived to ſo great an age; few of them enjoyed ſo long a reign. And this long courſe was diſtinguiſhed by circumſtances of peculiar feli⯑city, whether we conſider him in the public or the private character. His ſubjects, allowing for one ſhort and as it were momentary cloud, enjoyed perpetual peace at home, and abroad on many occaſions accquired great glory There was to the laſt a conſiderable increaſe in their agriculture, their commerce, and their manufactures, which were daily improving under the internal tranquility they enjoyed, and the wiſe regulations that were made in every ſeſſion of his parliaments. By a wonderful happineſs, he left theſe em⯑provements no way checked, but rather forwarded, in one of the moſt general and waſteful wars that has raged in the world for many centuries.

He lived entirely to extinguiſh party and the ſpirit of party in his kingdoms; it was not till the cloſe of his reign, that his family might have been conſidered as firmly and immoveably ſeated on the throne; but he, having baffled [312] all the private machinations of his enemies policy, [...] ⯑dued at length the utmoſt effort of their force: and the [...] on that menacing occaſion, he experienced in the f [...] meaſure the affection of his people, yet the completion this great ſervice to his family, he owed ſolely to the [...] city and bravery of his own ſon.

He lived with his queen in that kind of harmony confidence, that is ſeen between the beſt ſuited couple [...] private life. He had a numerous iſſue, in which he [...] great cauſe of ſatisfaction, and very little of diſquiet, what was the almoſt neceſſary conſequence of a life [...] ⯑tracted to a late period. He ſurvived ſeven of his child. He had the ſatisfaction to ſee in his ſucceſſor, what is rare, the moſt effectionate obedience, the moſt dutiful [...] quieſcence in his will; and what is no leſs rare, cont [...] to the fortune of moſt old kings, he never poſſeſſed [...] perfectly the love of his ſubjects than in the laſt year [...] his life. And he died at the very point of time when [...] terror of his arms, the power of his kingdoms and the [...] [...]dom of his government, were all raiſed to almoſt as [...] a pitch as they could poſſibly arrive at; they were in [...] at that height of proſperity and glory, as never had [...] exceeded in the reign of the moſt fortunate of his p [...]ceſſors.

His parts were not lively or brilliant; but the whol [...] his conduct demonſtrates that he had a judgment both [...] lid and comprehenſive. He underſtood the intereſts of [...] other ſovereigns of Europe; and was particularly ſki [...] in all the receſſes of that political labyrinth, the ſyſtem [...] Germany; of the liberties of which he was through whole life a moſt zealous aſſerter. In the year 1741, took up arms, and even riſqued his own perſon, when the projected diſmemberment of the houſe of Auſtria, [...] were in danger of falling a ſacrifice to a French fact [...] He afterwards reſiſted with equal firmneſs that very ho [...] of Auſtria, which he had expoſed his life to defend, w [...] the liberties of the empire were threatened from t [...] quarter.

The acquiſitions of his father, were by him confirm [...] improved and enlarged. He was enabled by his oecono [...] always to keep up a conſiderable body of troops in Ha [...]ver; by which means, when the war broke out, there [...] a diſciplined force ready to oppoſe the common enem [...] [313] and we do not hazard any thing in aſſerting, that if it had not been for the prudent foreſight of that meaſure, the army which has ſince been formed, and the great things which have ſince been done, could never have had exiſt⯑ence. So that if we only examine what he has done in Germany, when we reflect what enemies ſecret and de⯑clared he had at different times to manage and to fight in that country, he muſt in every fair judgment be allowed the greateſt prince of his family.

He was in his temper ſudden and violent; but this, tho' it influenced his behaviour, made no impreſſion on his conduct, which was always ſufficiently deliberate and at⯑tentive to his own intereſts and thoſe of his ſubjects.

He was plain and direct in his intentions; true to his word; ſteady in his favour and protection to his ſervants, and never changed them willingly; this appeared clearly in thoſe who ſerved more immediately on his perſon, whom he ſcarce ever removed; but they grew old along with him, or died in their places. But having been in a ſort compelled by a violent faction, to relinquiſh a miniſter for whom he had great affection, and in whom he repoſed an unlimited confidence, it afterwards became a matter of more indifference to him by whom he was ſerved in the affairs of his government.

He was merciful in his diſpoſition, but not to ſuch a de⯑gree as in any ſort to encourage offences againſt his go⯑vernment. On the ſuppreſſion of the rebellion in 1746, he behaved without any remarkable diſplay either of ſeve⯑rity or clemency. Many were pardoned, many puniſhed; and this perhaps, is the moſt proper conduct on ſuch oc⯑caſions, where offended majeſty requires victims, juſtice examples, and humanity pardons. But though the law in many inſtances had its free courſe, the exceſſes commit⯑ted in the rage of war, were by him neither commanded nor approved. After that rebellion had been ſuppreſſed, he retained no bitter remembrance of it, either to the country in which it unfortunately began, or even to many of the perſons who were actually concerned in it.

As he came into England in a riper age, and of conſe⯑quence never had been able to attain a perfect knowledge of the force and beauties of our language, he never ſhewed a ſufficient regard to the Engliſh literature, which in his reign did not flouriſh: and this muſt be conſidered as the [314] greateſt, or rather the only blemiſh that lay upon his g [...] ⯑vernment.

He has been cenſured, as a little too attentive to mone [...] and perhaps in ſome minute things this cenſure was [...] wholly without foundation. But there are two conſider [...] ⯑tions which greatly enervate this objection to his charact [...] Firſt, that this diſpoſition never ſhewed itſelf in one [...] ⯑pacious act; and 2dly, that it never influenced his c [...] ⯑duct on any important occaſion. For it is now well kno [...] that he ſhewed no improper parſimony, when this [...] broke out. In fact, he expended ſo much on that oc [...] ⯑ſion, that on his deceaſe, his private wealth was found [...] be far inferior to what had commonly been imagined.

Though it is true, that during his whole life, he [...] ſhewn a remarkable affection to his Hanoverian ſubjec [...] yet the laſt act of it demonſtrated that they were [...] from engroſſing the whole of his regard; and that [...] reality his German poſſeſſions held no other place in [...] conſideration than what their relative importance to t [...] reſt of his dominions naturally claimed. For when t [...] truly ſevere trial came, in which the intereſts of Engla [...] and Hanover were ſeperated, when a war began for an [...] ⯑ject wholly foreign to that country, a war in which Ha [...] ⯑ver muſt ſuffer much, and could hope no advantage, en [...] there his majeſty did not heſitate a moment to expoſe [...] German dominions to almoſt inevitable ruin, rather th [...] make or even propoſe the ſmalleſt abatement from the i [...] ⯑menſity of the Engliſh rights in America. A conduct th [...] more than wipes of every ſuſpicion of an improper pa [...] ⯑tiality; and which ſurely ought never to be mention [...] without the higheſt gratitude to the memory of that ma [...] ⯑animous monarch.

If the authors of theſe ſheets were equal to ſuch a de⯑ſign, it would perhaps be impoſſible to exhibit a mo [...] pleaſing picture than that which might be formed from [...] juſt view of his late majeſty's conduct, to theſe two [...] differently conſtituted parts of his dominions. His virtu [...] was proved by two of the greateſt trials to which the na⯑ture of man is liable; the truſt of abſolute and unbounded power; and the moſt exalted ſtation limited by the ſtrict⯑eſt laws. For theſe two ſo very different ſituations, very different and almoſt oppoſite tempers and talents have been always thought neceſſary. But that king had a mind per⯑fectly [315] adapted to both; for whilſt in England he kept the liberties of his people inviolate, and like a wiſe magiſtrate, was ſatisfied to make his authority co-operate with law, and his will freely ſubſervient to the wiſdom of ages, in Hanover like an indulgent father, acting only from the ſentiments of a paternal heart, his affection and his equity ſupplied the want of law and conſtitution. He has indeed left to his illuſtrious ſucceſſor, an admirable example; which he not only promiſes to follow, but in many re⯑ſpects to exceed; and his ſubjects take the greater intereſt in his virtues, as they look upon them as more peculiarly their own; and they now boaſt of a prince, who neither has, nor can have any partiality but the beſt, and who is in birth as well as inclination Britiſh.

As ſoon as his preſent majeſty came to the throne, and had met his parliament, he in the moſt public and ſolemn manner confirmed the hopes of his allies, and gave the moſt undoubted aſſuran⯑ces of his reſolution to continue the war on the former plan, and with the former vigour; and he found his par⯑liament no ways changed in their reſolution of ſupporting it with the ſame liberality and ſpirit. Inſomuch that as there was no apparent change either in the ſyſtem of the alliance, in the diſpoſition of the king, or in that of the nation, or in the general plan of the war, we have only to paſs again to the tranſactions of the continent, thinking it unneceſſary to apologize to our readers for having been diverted from the courſe of the narrative for a ſhort time, by an event of ſuch melancholy importance to Great Bri⯑tain and to all Europe.

CHAP. VIII.

THE King of Pruſſia's letter, with which we cloſed the 6th chapter, exhibited a true picture of that mo⯑narch's apprehenſions; the events which immediately fol⯑lowed proved that theſe apprehenſions were but too well [316] grounded. The victory near Lignitz, indeed, gave ſo [...] relief to Sileſia; but whilſt the enemy had ſo many and [...] numerous armies in the field, even ſhame independent [...] their intereſt exacted from them ſome ſtroke of co [...] ⯑quence.

The late manoeuvres had neceſſarily drawn the king [...] Pruſſia into the ſouthern parts of Sileſia, and conſequen [...] to a great diſtance from Brandenburg, with which coun [...] his communication was much interrupted, or rather who [...] cut off. The Ruſſian army, which after it had repa [...] the Oder at Auras, began to move out of Sileſia, puſh [...] forward a powerful detachment under Count Czerniche [...] towards the March of Brandenburg. A body of 15 [...] Auſtrians under the Generals Lacy and Brentano fro [...] the army of Count Daun, and the whole united corps [...] Auſtrians and Imperialiſts which acted in Saxony, beg [...] their march in concert with the Ruſſians, and propoſed [...] unite at the gates of Berlin. Theſe armies amounted [...] forty thouſand men.

General Hulſen, who was altogether too weak to o [...] ⯑poſe the Imperialiſts in Miſnia, ſell back upon Berli [...] General Wernef who had lately been ſent into Pomeran [...] returned with incredible ſpeed and joined the troops und [...] Hulſen; but when they viewed their combined ſtrengt [...] they found it conſiſted of no more than 15 or 16000 me [...] a force far too weak to oppoſe to thoſe powerful armi [...] that were marching againſt them. Wholly unable to pro⯑tect a place of ſuch immenſe extent, and ſuch imperfect fortifications, they ſaw that to attempt a defence, woul [...] be only to involve the troops in the inevitable fate the waited the city, without being able to add any thing effec⯑tual to its ſecurity; therefore after having defended it againſt the advanced guard of the Ruſſians under Tottle⯑ben, who attacked the gates and bombarded the town, when they found the grand armies advancing; they made their retreat; leaving only three weak battalions in the place, to enable it to make ſome ſort of capitulation with the enemy.

Berlin is compoſed of five towns, which have ſtretched to each other and grown into one vaſt city upon the banks of the river Spree. It has been augmented to this gran⯑deur, by having long been the reſidence of the electors of Brandenburg and kings of Pruſſia, who as they have en⯑larged [317] their dominions by inheritance, force, or policy, have all contributed ſomething to the grandeur and mag⯑nificence of this their capital. The ſituation of the town on ſo noble and navigable a river as the Spree, communi⯑cating on one ſide with the Oder, by a canal (the moſt princely work of her ſovereigns) and on the other falling into the Elbe, has added not a little to its extent and opu⯑lence; but that which has contributed moſt of all, has been the reception of the French refugees, to which this city has always been a moſt aſſured and favourable aſylum, as it has alſo been to thoſe proteſtants who have been perſecuted in any part of Germany; and the preſent king by enlarging his plan, and imparting an extent of toleration unknown to his predeceſſors, has alſo introduced Roman Catholics, whom he has encouraged by ſuffering them to build a moſt magnificent church in the heart of Berlin. By this means he has brought the moſt oppoſite factions to concur in pro⯑moting the grandeur of his royal reſidence. From theſe cauſes Berlin is become one of the moſt conſiderable cities in Europe; vaſt in its extent; conſiderable in its commerce, and magnificent beyond moſt others in its public and private buildings, and the regular diſtribution of the ſtreets in the new town. It had long been the ſeat of the greateſt mili⯑tary arrangements in the world; and it was made by the preſent king the ſeat of arts and ſciences, and the place of reſort of ingenious men, in every ſcience, in every art, and from every quarter.

Such is Berlin, which at this time being deſerted by the greateſt part of its garriſon, was abandoned to the mercy of a mighty army of Auſtrians, Ruſſians, Saxons and Imperia⯑liſts, animated by revenge; exaſperated by injuries; and in⯑ſtigated by avarice. Nothing could exceed the terror and conſternation of the inhabitants on this occaſion. They were acquainted with the ſavage character of one part of the enemy, and with the violent animoſity of the reſt; and they knew that they did not want pretences for colouring their ſeverities, with the appearance of a juſt retaliation.

In theſe diſpoſitions of the inhabitants, the enemy ap⯑poached. The garriſon immediately propoſed to capitu⯑late. With reſpect to them, the terms were ſhort; they were made priſoners of war. But with regard to the inha⯑bitants, where the great danger lay, the conditions were more tolerable than they expected; they were promiſed [318] the free exerciſe of their religion; and an immunity violence to their goods and perſons. It was alſo agreed the Ruſſian irregulars ſhould not enter the town; and the king's palace ſhould be inviolable. Theſe on the w [...] were favourable terms; and they were granted princip [...] on the mediation of the foreign miniſters reſiding Berlin, who interpoſed their good offices with great and humanity. The difficulty was, how to ſecure the ſervance of them.

Theſe conditions being made, the army of allied powers entered the town; totally deſtr [...] the magazines, arſenals, and founderies, ſe [...] an immenſe quantity of military ſtores, and a number cannon and arms; called firſt for an immenſe payment 800,000 guilders, and then laid on a contribution 1,900,000 German crowns: not ſatisfied with this, [...] irregularities were committed by the ſoldiery; but on whole, though ſome ſhocking actions were committed far more exact diſcipline was obſerved than from ſuch tr [...] could have been expected upon ſuch an occaſion, w [...] there was every incentive which could work upon the lice [...] of a conquering army. Their officers no doubt with g [...] difficulty preſerved even that degree of order.

But though their behaviour was tolerable, with regard [...] the private inhabitants, there was ſomething ſhocking a [...] ungenerous in their treatment of the king's palaces. [...] apartments of the royal caſtle of Charlottenburgh w [...] entirely plundered, the precious furniture ſpoiled, the p [...] ⯑tures defaced, without even ſparing the antique ſta [...] collected by Cardinal Polignac, which had been purcha [...] by the houſe of Brandenburg. The caſtle of Schonhou [...] belonging to the queen, and thoſe of Fredericksfeld, [...] longing to the margrave Charles, were alſo plundered.

The palace of Potſdam, the famous Sans-ſouci, ha [...] better fate; Prince Eſterhaſi commanded there; it was p [...]ſerved from the ſmalleſt violation. The Prince on view [...] the palace only aſked which picture of the king reſembl [...] him moſt, and being informed, deſired that he might h [...] leave to take it, together with two German flutes which t [...] king uſed, to keep them, he ſaid, in memory of his majeſt [...] This was a ſort of taking very different from pillage.

They ſtaid in the city four days, but hearing that t [...] king, apprehenſive of this ſtroke ▪ was moving to the rel [...] [319] of his capital, they quitted it on the 13th of October; and having waſted the whole country round for a vaſt extent, and driven away all the cattle and horſes they could find, retreated by different routs out of Brandenburgh, leaving the people ſtill trembling under the alarm, and hardly yet certain of their ſafety.

We do by no means undertake to authenticate the rava⯑ges which the Pruſſian accounts charged upon the Auſtrians and their allies, in this incurſion; nor whether they may not have been in general much exaggerated, or in ſome caſes abſolutely feigned. We have abundant reaſon to ſuſ⯑pect the exact veracity of many pieces of that nature which have been publiſhed on all ſides; and which are but too fre⯑quently a ſort of ſtate libels▪ where the powers at war, not content to deſtroy each other in the field, purſue their ad⯑verſaries reputation, and endeavour mutually to paint each other as monſters equally devoid of juſtice and compaſſion. Indeed if we were to give credit to all the writings of this kind that have appeared, it were hard to ſay which of the parties have by their conduct brought the greateſt diſgrace upon human nature. It is, however, certain, that the country of Brandenburg ſuffered more ſeverely on this oc⯑caſion than the city of Berlin. An ill diſciplined army is always moſt furious in its retreat, and the country had made no conditions.

CHAP. IX.